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THESIS

**THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN'S CONSTITUTION
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FORCES ON
OKINAWA**

by

Giuseppe A. Stavale

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Thesis Advisor:

Second Reader:

Edward A. Olsen

H. Lyman Miller

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V. THE WAY AHEAD: OPTIONS FOR WASHINGTON AND TOKYO

A. SUMMARY OF THE ABOVE CHAPTERS

The preceding chapters sought to examine how and why Japan is debating and studying the issue of constitutional revision by examining the effects of 9/11 and Japan's goal of participating more in global affairs and its own security. In doing so, key variables such as the "burden" of Okinawa, where the bulk of U.S. forces in Japan are concentrated, have been examined and the near to mid-term threats to United States and Japanese security and interests have been thoroughly articulated. Henceforth, this chapter will provide a policy-prescriptive "way ahead" for U.S. military transformation in Japan, specifically Okinawa, which considers Japan's constitutional progression along with concerns on Okinawa, in order to address the threats in East Asia.

B. PREMISE FOR ACTIONABLE OPTIONS

The actionable options asserted below are predicated on the current transformational processes both nations are undergoing and the DPRI process which informally joins them. It is my assertion that the below options can be the outcome of the DPRI discussions. While this chapter may not cover all the points that require adjustment, I believe it covers the most pressing ones. My premises for the following options are broken down into six points. First, both the U.S. and Japan concur on the threats to the national interests of both nations and that a strong security alliance must be maintained to guard against those threats and maintain stability in East Asia.

Second, U.S. forces in Japan must be considered in strategic terms but smaller ways towards becoming better neighbors, through localized efforts, should not be dismissed as insignificant contributions to the overall maintenance of the alliance. In order to be better understood and accepted among the communities in Japan, U.S. forces must re-think their actual presence and weight them against the impact and sensitivities of their host nation neighbors.

Third, U.S. Marines are not an irritant to the alliance but a key to its success in promoting stability to the region and giving would-be belligerents pause to act aggressively. Members of the Pentagon's Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of

Defense stated that the physical presence of Marines in Japan has proven effective in deterring aggression. Japanese officials have also echoed this assessment. Mr. Hideki Yamaji, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, stated that U.S. Marines are not an irritant and that their presence have added to the stability of East Asia and towards building confidence between the military services of East Asian nations. Mr. Yamaji further stated, “stability in East Asia cannot be maintained without the U.S. Marine Corps.”¹⁹⁰ The First Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Embassy of Japan in Washington, DC, Takehiro Funakoshi stated in an interview on May 12, 2004 that the Government of Japan recognizes that the physical presence of U.S. Marines plays an important role in the deterrence of aggression.” Mr. Funakoshi added that GOJ is not wedded to the role of each individual service but more so to the overall capabilities of USFJ, with or without a Marine Corps. The Government of Japan’s bottom-line is that it does not want to reduce the overall deterrence or operational effectiveness of USFJ.¹⁹¹ The reason asserted with unique continuity as to why the Marines are not an irritant but a key contributor is the unique and proven capabilities a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) offers to the security alliance. Grant Newsham captures the various expressions of a MEF contributing to the security alliance as follows:

...modern war is a combined arms activity. The most effective and least costly approach combines air, ground, and sea capabilities. Each can do what the other cannot. III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) on Okinawa and mainland Japan is the only immediately deployable ground force in a massive operational area stretching from Hawaii to Africa. In war and other contingencies (especially humanitarian intervention, disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, and noncombatant evacuations) you must have people on the ground to seize terrain, to engage enemy forces, or to aid and assist people. This cannot be accomplished by simply sending ships to cruise offshore or planes to fly overhead. ¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Hideki Yamaji, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC and former Chief of the SOFA Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Government of Japan, interview on 12 May 2004.

¹⁹¹ Funakoshi, 12 May 2004.

¹⁹² Grant Newsham, “Marines on Okinawa are Indispensable,” *Sentaku Magazine*, August 2002. Lieutenant Colonel Grant Newsham is an East Asia Regional Affairs Officer for Marine Forces Pacific, and assigned as a reservist to the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo. He is a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer and was

Fourth, while the United States is nudging Japan to participate more in its own security and to become more involved internationally and, as long as both Koreas move ahead with plans to unify and become a lesser threat towards stability in East Asia, there should be an anticipation for calls in Japan to lessen the U.S. military footprint in Japan and equalize the security burden-sharing. Mr. Yamaji asserts that it would be impolitic in Japan if actions to adjust the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance are not taken in light of these developments. This is especially true in Okinawa where polls consistently demonstrate that more reduction, albeit moderate reduction, with respect to U.S. military presence are desired.¹⁹³

Fifth, closely related to the fourth premise and key to continued effective U.S. presence in Okinawa is the need for a formal process of reconciliation between Tokyo and Okinawa. On May 19, 2002, during the Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the Reversion of Okinawa, U.S. Ambassador Howard Baker thanked Okinawans for shouldering the burden of U.S. military bases for many years.¹⁹⁴ His thanks was not enthusiastically welcomed as Okinawans contend that they do not want thanks for something they claimed to have no say. Okinawans responded that the U.S. military bases were forced upon them by mainland Japan which continues to perpetuate a “not-in-my-backyard” position regarding the basing of U.S. forces in Japan. There must be a defining moment where Tokyo reconciles with Okinawa for shouldering the weight of the U.S. military presence in Japan and acknowledges the contributions Okinawans have made towards the maintenance of security for Japan. Japan, and the rest of Asia, could learn how to take the first step towards reconciliation from Europe as Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schroedor attended the World War II D-Day commemoration at Normandy, France on June 6, 2004.

Sixth and often forgotten during peacetime, is how U.S. installations in Japan support the many war plans and contingencies that may arise in the region. This is what I call the “blind spot” that fails to receive consideration when analysts and government

assigned as such to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo from 1993 to 1997. As a civilian, he is an Executive Director of Morgan Stanley-Tokyo.

¹⁹³ *Okinawan Views On U.S. Military Base Issues*, Office of Research: Opinion Analysis, Department of State: Washington, DC, 30 January 2001, 1.

¹⁹⁴ U.S. Embassy, Tokyo. Transcript: “*Baker Thanks Okinawans for Their Friendship and Support*,” May 19, 2002. *U.S. Embassy, Tokyo Online* [home page on-line]; available from <http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/amb/tamb-0026.html>; Internet; accessed 10 July 2004.

officials search for ways to better package the security alliance. Finding a force structure which projects an effective force capable of accomplishing a myriad of tasks in accordance with the security alliance while addressing evolving community concerns during peacetime, is not a task which can be approached in a tacit manner. A senior Marine official pointed out that peacetime operational tempo bears no resemblance to wartime or contingency requirements. Along these lines, there is little, in terms of force structure, to remove from Japan, specifically Okinawa and the Marines based there. The political reality of Okinawa makes this especially difficult and a factor which may undermine the U.S. deterrent posture in Asia should the strategic importance of Okinawa be brushed aside. In the words of an anonymous senior U.S. military official:

...there are no pieces to give up on Okinawa. There is no “fat” in III MEF force structure or any other service organizations on Okinawa. III MEF is less than half the size of the other two Marine expeditionary forces. Still, the Marines on Okinawa are the only general purpose forces forward-based in the region that are available to project power or respond to any event on short notice throughout the region.¹⁹⁵

In short, we must look at the entire picture of the issues this thesis is attempting to assess, and not forget to look at a very important piece—the “blind spot” or wartime requirements.

C. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Independent variables which may influence this process are actual Japanese Constitutional reinterpretation or revision, Korean unification, or both, sooner rather than later. The outcome of the November 2004 U.S. Presidential elections and a subsequent halt or reversal of the DoD bottom-up review and transformation of military forces was another independent variable. Other independent variables are:

- Internal turmoil in China and a downturn in the Chinese economy.
- Another major incident between the United States and Japan such as the February 9, 2001 collision between the U.S. Navy’s nuclear attack submarine, USS Greenville with the Japanese fishing boat the Ehime Maru near Hawaii.

¹⁹⁵ Source wishes to remain unnamed from an interview with author via e-mail correspondence from Monterey, California on 4-5 June 2004.

- Japanese overreaction to the killing of Japanese troops in Iraq and potential misperception of a remilitarized Japan.¹⁹⁶
- Costs associated with transformation in the United States and in Japan towards packaging the optimal force and security alliance for the future may be too expensive for Japan's sluggish economy. Japan's 15 year recession has taken a toll on defense spending as evidenced in Japan's procurement of front-line equipment which has steadily dropped for over a decade,¹⁹⁷ (see Appendix D). Japan Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) which contributes nearly \$1 billion annually towards the maintenance and construction of facilities on U.S. bases in Japan has been redefined with limits in order to save GOJ funds¹⁹⁸ and has dropped slightly between FY 2002 and FY 2003.¹⁹⁹ As Japan pursues missile defense (MD) technology with a laggard economy, it may be constrained to adopt radical adjustments to the current force structure and facilities of U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan.
- Negative local reaction to increased military presence in mainland Japan. It is no secret that mainland Japanese have been accused by Okinawans that they have a case of "not-in-my-back-yardism," or "NIMBY." Lieutenant Colonel Duke explains, "GOJ acknowledges the need to relocate some forces from Okinawa to mainland Japan and even to realign some U.S. forces in mainland Japan elsewhere in Japan; however, GOJ is reticent to pursue them because of the significant push back that would take place from the local communities."²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ Colonel Takeo Yamaoka, Military Attaché, Embassy of Japan, Washington, DC, interview 12 May 2004, stated that the Japanese public has reacted favorably after witnessing how well Japanese troops have been received in Iraq and pointed out that their role and limited success thus far is indicative of a transformed Japanese "military" and should quell concerns of a potential return to an aggressive military such as it was pre-1945. It should be noted however, Japanese troops did not operate in the Middle East prior to 1945 and there are no World War II memories of Imperial Japanese Forces in the Middle East as there is in Northeast and Southeast Asia.

¹⁹⁷ *Defense Program for FY 2003: An Overview*, Defense Agency, Japan.

¹⁹⁸ In 2000 a provision in a Special Measures Agreement is that Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) funds can no longer be used for "revenue producing" projects. Examples of projects disallowed in the FY01 program were Army and Air Force Exchange Service warehouses, exchanges, commissaries, and gymnasiums. The effect of this provision is that additional military construction (MILCON) funding will be required for the Services, Defense Logistics Agency, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchange, Defense Commissary Agency, and DoD Schools to support Quality of Life initiatives for U.S. service members in Japan. Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command before The Senate Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year 2002 Posture Statement, 27 March 2001.

¹⁹⁹ *Defense of Japan 2003*, 438.

²⁰⁰ Stephen E. Duke, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Japan Desk Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps, interview by author, Washington, DC, 13 May 2004. There has been regular reporting in the Japanese media on the reaction of local communities in mainland Japan to the unofficial proposals made by the U.S. side during the DPRI process. See, Shinichi Cho, Norio Oyama, and Hideyo Suzuki, "Rising Opposition from Municipalities Designated as Proposed Relocation Sites in Line with U.S. Force Transformation; Government May Ask U.S. to Reconsider." *Mainichi*, (Tokyo) 29 July, 2004, and *The Japan Times*, "U.S. Proposes Moving Some Troops to Hokkaido." *The Japan Times Online* [home page on-line]; available

D. ACTIONABLE OPTIONS

1. Status Quo

The proponents of the status quo are found within the official positions of both governments at the time being. Various mainstream media outlets in Japan report the announcements of key GOJ officials, such as former Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, who stated that there is every intention to pursue and complete the agreed terms of the 1996 SACO.²⁰¹ The U.S. government officially asserts this position also but displays more flexibility to pursue broader changes with U.S. force structure in Japan and changing roles for the JSDF. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage stated, “at present, there is no change in our position to observe the [SACO] agreement.”²⁰²

The status quo is the safe position for both governments to take until the DPRI process can find a better way ahead. Both governments agree that changes to the security agreement are in order and both sides have many ideas but both sides cannot agree on the way ahead. Mr. Yamaji points out an example of this in regards to changes in the SOFA. Mr. Yamaji stated that both governments wish to make changes in the implementation of the current SOFA; however, the changes are so different and far apart that both governments cannot come to agreement and therefore maintain the status quo.

Along with completing the 27 initiatives of the 1996 SACO Final Report, DoD has been pursuing Visiting Forces Agreements (VFA) and Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) in Southeast Asia and reintroducing military forces into Guam. The Marine Corps’ General James Jones, Commander of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and U.S. European Command, asserts that the United States should adopt smaller, less expensive basing throughout the world dubbed the “lily pad” concept.²⁰³ The trend of adopting VFA’s and “lily pads” in Southeast Asia could evolve with USFJ acting as a regional hub of operations. In sum, maintaining the status quo is predicated on waiting to see how key issues such as Korean unification and Japanese

from <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040608a1.htm>; Internet; accessed 8 June 2004.

²⁰¹ *Asahi* (Tokyo), 21 February 2004.

²⁰² *Tokyo Shimbun* (Tokyo), 11 March 2004 in *Kyodo News* (Washington), 10 March 2004.

²⁰³ This concept is not new but the softer language of calling the concept “lily pads” is a better approach than something along the lines of “police boxes” which lends to the perception that the United States is the global policeman.

Constitutional reinterpretation or revision actually unfold; a *de facto* wait and see position (see Appendix E).

2. Security Alliance Transformation Initiative (SATI)²⁰⁴

This model precisely addresses the premises I arrived at in this study (see Appendix F). The following are detailed dependent variables which should not require a revised treaty.²⁰⁵ The 1996 SACO Final Report was an agreement which offers flexibility which a treaty does not. The Security Alliance Transformation Initiative (SATI) could be the result of the DPRI process and since it is not a total revision of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, it could be as flexible as the 1996 SACO Final Report.

a. SATI's Dependent Variables

(1) Land Return and Consolidation. The report titled, *The Technical Assessment of the Feasibility of Relocating the Operational Capability of MCAS Futenma to Kadena Air Base Proper* conducted on July 29, 1996 by the Director of Operations (J3), USFJ must be restudied by an agency outside of the Department of Defense. An objective study by an impartial entity must be conducted in order to ensure the study is not conducted on a defensive footing. The study should be anchored on a positive approach towards assessing on how the task of integrating air operations of the Air Force and Marine Corps in Okinawa onto Kadena Air Base can be done, and evolving the base into a genuine joint U.S. base with the future possibility of inviting JSDF units onto the huge installation also. This should be a study which is shared by the United States and Japan and should consider the additional feasibility of shifting some 18th Wing functions from Kadena Air Base to Yokota Air Base.

²⁰⁴ The acronym S.A.T.I in this precise spelling has no meaning in Japanese. The syllable TI; however, is pronounced and recognized as *chi* in Japanese, consequently *SACHI(TI)* means happiness in Japanese.

²⁰⁵ Stephen E. Duke, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Japan Desk Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps explained during an interview by author, Washington, DC, 13 May 2004, that the 1996 SACO Final Report was a report that outlined recommendations for realigning forces on Okinawa and measures to reduce the impact of the U.S. military on Okinawa which both countries agreed to adopt.

The tone of the 1996 study was generally incredulous, but it did acknowledge the possibility of shifting certain air operations to nearby Ie Island²⁰⁶ which will limit some of the excess air traffic. The report also confirmed available acreage for “absorbing the rotary wing functions from MCAS Futenma to Kadena AB” and also for “the projected future capability of the [Marine Corps’] MV-22.” The use of the large runway on Ie Island should not be dismissed due to its austere environment but embraced as an opportunity for economic revitalization. The 1996 study however, failed to address that a consolidation of MCAS Futenma into Kadena Air Base would actually enhance certain operations such as aircraft ordnance upload and download. It has been standard procedure for Marine aircraft from MCAS Futenma to conduct all ordnance uploading and downloading at Kadena Air Base and as a result, must fly from MCAS Futenma to Kadena Air Base to pick-up ordnance and then fly to the training ranges. Consolidation would eliminate a certain amount of air traffic required for that task along with other logistical requirements and conceivably, enhance ordnance operations during contingencies.

Restudying the integration is imperative considering the 2001 QDR and the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces. Kadena Air Base²⁰⁷ is based on a Cold War-era base model and, as the Air Force transforms itself towards becoming more capabilities-based, so should efforts for a new and clean look at its bases in Japan be taken, specifically Kadena Air Base. A stellar paradigm for the future of Kadena Air Base and other U.S. bases overseas is Misawa Air Base, located in Aomori Prefecture, in northern Japan. Misawa Air Base is a joint, bilateral installation with all four U.S. services stationed there along with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force. Misawa Air Base is also home to the Misawa Airport, which runs Japan Air System, a civilian airline

²⁰⁶ Ie Island is located off the northwest coast of Okinawa and the Marine Corps operates a sizeable airfield and range (Ie Shima Training Facility) for a variety of training operations. Operational Support Detachment (OSD), Ie Shima is a 13-man unit which maintains the airfield and ranges which consists of over 800 acre range, 5,000 foot unimproved coral runway, 1,200 foot V/STOL runway, 1,100m x 700m parachute drop zone and other training resources. Source: Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, AC/S G-3, OSD fact sheet of July 2000.

²⁰⁷ Kadena Air Base is the largest U.S. military installation in the Asia-Pacific region and the largest wing in the Air Force. See Kadena Air Base. *Kadena Air Base Online* [home page on-line]; available from <http://www-02.kadena.af.mil/18wg/18wg/staff/18wgpa/PAWeb/facts.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 May 2004.

which has four daily flights out of Misawa.²⁰⁸ At the time of this writing, there is a U.S. Navy tenant command and limited Marine Corps operations on Kadena Air Base, supported by a small detachment, Marine Wing Liaison Kadena (MWLK). These operations are important but are small in scale and not what the base could evolve into considering the wide range of operations conducted at Misawa Air Base, a much smaller installation. Conducting a fresh non-partisan study, sanctioned by the governments of Japan and the United States will *de facto* suspend the completion of the 1996 SACO Final Report in regards to the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) plan in Henoko.

As the original 1996 SACO Final Report is on schedule for completion by 2008, except for the issue of MCAS Futenma, the completion of an updated and favorable study of the integration of MCAS Futenma²⁰⁹ into Kadena Air Base could be the impetus of a potential second round of SACO or the Security Alliance Transformation Initiative (SATI).²¹⁰ A second round of SACO or SATI should not be limited to Okinawa but should consider all of USFJ. SATI, embraced by both GOJ and USG could serve as a strategic way ahead and the result of the DPRI which synergizes the transformation efforts of both nations' armed forces in accordance with the existing security treaty.

(2) Camp Kinser, Okinawa. Whether MCAS Futenma integrates into Kadena Air Base or relocates to Henoko, Okinawans will shift their attention to another Marine Corps installation perched on a prime piece of real-estate on the outskirts

²⁰⁸ James L. Bressendorff, First Lieutenant, USAF, Public Affairs Officer, 35th Fighter Wing, Misawa Air Base, Japan, in an e-mail interview by author on 28 April 2004.

²⁰⁹ According to Stephen E. Duke, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Japan Desk Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, in an interview by author on 13 May 2004, there has been discussions about moving the flight operations from MCAS Futenma elsewhere as an interim solution for meeting Ginowan city concerns regarding noise and safety at MCAS Futenma while at the same time, not fully returning the installation, until a replacement facility can be built. Essentially maintain it as a UN base in "warm" status until the replacement facility can be built and the UN flag shifted. (The concept of just maintaining a base is called a "warm base"). Until a replacement facility can be built this will enable PACOM to maintain an operational airfield capability should they need it in a contingency. In my view, this option poses risks and challenges in Okinawa because once a precedence is set anywhere in Japan, especially Okinawa, it is near impossible to reverse it, such as the 1995 halt to artillery firing on Okinawa and numerous provisions contained within the SOFA which have not been exercised by the U.S. in many years. Clear definitions of contingencies and open communication will be required should this option be pursued.

²¹⁰ Professor Edward A. Olsen of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, advised against calling this process "SACO II" since the term may be looked upon unfavorably because it suggests creating a new process when the original process (1996 SACO) is not finished.

of *Shin Naha* (New Naha)-- Camp Kinser. Third to Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma, Camp Kinser is the installation most Okinawans would like to see returned²¹¹ as it is the most prominent U.S. facility in the heavily congested southern part of Okinawa. Camp Kinser's major tenant command is the Marine Corps' headquarters of 3d Force Service Support Group (3d FSSG) and contains numerous facilities warehousing warfighting supplies for III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) and other tenant commands such as the Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO), headquarters offices for the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) branch in Okinawa, warehouses for the Army/Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), and other smaller activities. The leitmotif here is the DoD transformation, and the sea-basing concept the Navy and Marine Corps are continually pursuing. The U.S. Navy's strategic vision, *Sea Power 21*, is the Navy's bid to transform itself into projecting decisive joint capabilities. The concept of sea basing is one of the three required capabilities in achieving transformation in the Navy and one which is intimately linked to the Marine Corps' Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) concept. The emerging sea basing concept includes:

...providing joint force commanders with global command and control and extending integrated logistical support to other services. More than a family of platforms afloat, sea basing will network platforms together and promote interoperability among the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), the Combat Logistics Force, and emerging high-speed sealift and lighterage technologies.²¹²

As these concepts are evolving and developing technology to support them, a close examination should be conducted on placing the combat logistical power of 3d FSSG on ships, such as high-speed vessels ported at White Beach. This will call for the expansion of White Beach. Other facilities which cannot be embarked on ship should be moved to Camp Hansen where space will be afforded in the void of the Marine artillery regiment and where a significant portion of III MEF units, which 3d FSSG supports, reside and maintain their equipment. Family housing and related facilities will need to be expanded in the northern areas of Okinawa if all of Camp Kinser is returned.

²¹¹ *Okinawan Views On U.S. Military Base Issues*, Office of Research: Opinion Analysis, Department of State: Washington, DC, 30 January 2001, 16.

²¹² Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003, 8.

An enormous side benefit for returning Camp Kinser and relocating vehicle maintenance units to the northern installation of Camp Hansen, is the decrease of the uneasy spectacle of large military vehicle convoys on the small congested roads of southern Okinawa. This effort will greatly diminish the risk of accidents which has plagued motorists on Okinawa for years, as young service members drive large American built vehicles on unfamiliar pavement and on the opposite side of the road.

(3) Marine Troop Relocation and Reduction from Okinawa.

Along with the current study of relocating a Marine artillery regiment from Okinawa to Camp Fuji, the headquarters elements of the Marine artillery regiment should be relocated to Camp Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture, where housing and facilities exist and can be expanded for families and is in close proximity to Camp Fuji.

In addition, to moving the Marine artillery regiment to Camp Fuji, I propose that one of the Marine Corps infantry unit deployment program (UDP) battalions also be relocated to Camp Fuji where land exists for expansion of facilities and infrastructure. Training opportunities are limited on Okinawa due to the 1997 halt to artillery firing on Okinawa and land return in accordance with the 1996 SACO and the adherence to a “sensitive days” calendar,²¹³ (see Appendix G). In 2000, III MEF participated in 77 training events of which 74 occurred off Okinawa.²¹⁴ Some of these training events occurred on Camp Fuji where restrictions and limits to training also exist. The point is that there are limits to training everywhere in Japan and the best training opportunities are found in bilateral or multilateral exercises throughout East Asia. The stationing of an infantry battalion at Camp Fuji should not erode readiness and the viability to expand the existing runway at Camp Fuji to be able to handle troop transport planes, such as a C-130, should also be considered. Additionally, by moving troops to Camp Fuji, they are only a few hours away by ground transportation from existing troop transport capabilities at Yokosuka Naval Base and Yokota Air Base.

²¹³ The “sensitive days” calendar serves to bracket acceptable days of the year for training on Marine installations in Japan with consideration given to the local community so that military training is conducted on days which will not be disrespectful or an affront to Japanese/Okinawan holidays, anniversaries, and other politically or culturally sensitive days.

²¹⁴ Earl B. Hailston, Lieutenant General, USMC (Retired) , former Commanding General III MEF in an 11 May 2001 briefing at Headquarters III MEF, Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan.

A future alternative from moving one infantry UDP battalion to Camp Fuji is keeping one infantry UDP battalion at its home station in Hawaii. This will leave three infantry UDP battalions on Okinawa, one of which is assigned to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (31st MEU). When a full brigade of Marines, 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3d MEB), is to be assembled, the remaining two infantry UDP battalions on Okinawa could constitute itself with the infantry battalion from Hawaii wherever needed and form as a brigade with the remaining elements of the brigade's Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). This option may become more feasible once the *Sea Basing* concept is realized and matures and deserves a separate study to fully address the risks, political implications, and available strategic lift which is already in short supply.

The two immediate preceding options address a demand which is gaining more attention than land return²¹⁵ in post-1996 SACO, which is to “lessen the burden” by relocating troops off Okinawa. Considering moving one of the infantry UDP battalions along with moving a Marine artillery regiment will considerably lighten the “footprint” on Okinawa.

(4) *Best neighbors, not just good neighbors (Community Buy-In).*

Current initiatives which should be sustained are efforts to create more “buy-in” towards the community from young service members and military families living in Okinawa and the rest of Japan. Through my observations and experience as a military policeman, there are higher occurrences of incidents involving younger (18-20 year old) male, service members who are stationed on Okinawa without their families and for less than a year. On September 19, 2003, Headquarters Marine Corps released a new policy aimed at sustaining operational readiness but carried the by-product of creating an environment where Marines had the time to get to know the community they live in and become a more responsible member of that community. Specifically, the policy was changed to create greater continuity, unit stability and individual maturity, cultural knowledge and familiarity with local and regional military forces, governments and private citizens, and to improve knowledge of continuing operational requirements. Marine Administrative message 529/2003, III MEF and MCBJ Assignment Policy,

²¹⁵ Land return and consolidation must be careful not to create traffic problems on Okinawan's narrow and already congested roads.

announced the Marine Corps will begin the transition in FY-2004 to the DoD standard²¹⁶ for permanent change of station (PCS) assignments to Okinawa and Iwakuni, Japan, which are 36-month tours for those accompanied by family members and 24-month tours for those who are not accompanied by family members.²¹⁷

(5) Environmental Concerns. Another noteworthy and maturing effort is evident with respect to the environment. The Marine Corps remains pro-active by using the latest technology to address environmental concerns. The Marine Corps maintains a full-time environmental staff on Okinawa to address a myriad of issues, such as the effects of range fires to rectifying past disposal practices dating back to the immediate post-World War II years with the discovery of chemical irritants and barrels buried with hazardous material by the U.S. Army. The most salient environmental concern which must continue to be addressed is soil erosion, commonly referred to as *akatsuchi* or “red-soil runoff.” According to Okinawa Prefecture’s 2001 “Annual Red Soil Outflow Amount Survey,” only eight percent of the island’s red soil erosion comes from U.S. bases, a decrease of more than 27% since 1998. Red-soil runoff from Marine Corps training ranges is a concern which is being addressed with success by the Marine Corps with intense aerial-hydroseeding and other re-vegetation efforts such as the planting of *Wedelia* plants. According to Larry Soenen, soil scientist with the U.S. Forest Service, “...the *Wedelia* plant is very durable and fire resistant. This plant can stand up to the shooting Marines need to do on the ranges.”²¹⁸

(6) U.S. Funded Jobs. All of USFJ should take note of the example Marines have set as they civilianize positions in accordance with the transformation. In keeping with specific guidance from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Marines have made great strides towards taking Marines out of garrison service and support roles and returning them to combat related duties. Seeing an

²¹⁶ DoD directive 1315.7 directs that the standard overseas tour will be 36 or 24 months for locations with quality-of-life reasonably comparable to U.S. standards.

²¹⁷USMC. “MARADMIN 529/03, III MEF and MCBJ Assignment Policy,” *USMC Online* [home page on-line]; available from <http://www.usmc.mil/maradmins/maradmin2000.nsf/d50a617f5ac75ae085256856004f3afc/265fddd4be13b6e085256de30059b048?OpenDocument&Highlight=2.529>; Internet; accessed 12 August 2004.

²¹⁸T. J. Kaemmerer, Marine Corps News, “Hydroseeding heals quickly,” *Marine Corps News Online* [home page on-line]; available from <http://www.okinawa.usmc.mil/Public%20Affairs%20Info/Archive%20News%20Pages/2004/040319-hydroseeding.html> ; Internet; accessed 31 March 2004.

opportunity to contribute an economic boost to local communities in Okinawa, the Marine Corps turned these jobs which Marines once did into permanent civilian positions fully funded by the Marine Corps. Since 2001, the Marine Corps has provided an additional 357 full-time positions as bus drivers and cooks in support of Marines on Okinawa.²¹⁹ As a bonus, the Marine Corps was able to return a battalion-size amount of Marines back into the combat-related roles they were originally intended for. As of March 2004, GOJ employed 8,813 Japanese nationals as base employees throughout all U.S. military bases on Okinawa. It is important to note that even 357 jobs are significant and appreciated, especially when funded by the United States and expansion of the Master Labor Contract (MLC)²²⁰ by GOJ is not feasible during a sluggish Japanese economy. In Japanese fiscal year 2003, 15,582 Japanese nationals applied for 675 jobs on U.S. military bases on Okinawa and of those, all 675 were hired into full-time positions.²²¹ Continuing along this trend should be fully pursued and studied in accordance with DoD's Business Reform Initiative (BRI) and the overall transformation.

(7) Public Affairs. Of utmost importance is the need for a different approach towards public affairs and the acceptance that our efforts should not be only to inform the American military community but that of our surrounding local communities in accordance with a sincere approach towards being a great neighbor. There are many outlets on U.S. military bases to keep English speaking people informed; however, the surrounding communities of U.S. military bases in Japan are dependent on their local media sources, which are more often biased against the U.S. military and do not offer the whole story or counter-balancing stories to issues and events. Brigadier General Larsen began to address this gap towards keeping the local communities informed by starting the publication of a bilingual, quarterly magazine called *Okina Wa*, or "Big Circle," in 2002. Funding is small and distribution is limited to a small portion of the population of key Japanese officials and civic leaders. Perhaps expanding this initiative with the Japanese Self-Defense Force and other U.S. military forces on

²¹⁹ Statistics provided by Larry Brantley, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler during an e-mail interview by author, Monterey, California, 20 April 2004.

²²⁰ The Master Labor Contract (MLC) is an agreement between GOJ and USG regarding the employment of GOJ funded Japanese national employees for U.S. military bases in Japan. USFJ reports a total of 23,500 Japanese employees on U.S. military bases throughout all of Japan, including Okinawa.

²²¹ *Okinawa Times* (Naha), 20 April 2004.

Okinawa could provide the funding and readership for a monthly publication. Other recommendations to increase outreach and readership/viewership are as follows:

- Make base newspapers bilingual in order to keep Japanese base employees and their families informed, this will spill over into other sectors of the local community who will find interest in being able to read U.S. base newspapers.²²²
- Make all U.S. military websites in Japan bilingual. Much progress has already been made towards this effort in 2004. On July 12, 2004, USFJ reported a Japanese-language version of the USFJ website located at http://usfj.mil/j_index.html. Prior to this announcement, Marine Forces Japan and Naval Forces Japan launched Japanese-language versions of their websites, <http://www.kanji.okinawa.usmc.mil/>, and <http://www.kanji.cnfj.navy.mil> respectively. This effort should be sustained and further developed with all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan. Japanese who are interested in hearing from the U.S. side on various issues can now find an official U.S. website in Japanese. This is important as these websites will counter the unofficial and biased, anti-military websites which have proliferated in Japan. Many of the unofficial websites are rumor-type of sites which perpetuate sensational reports as facts. Furthermore, there are unofficial websites established by Japanese base workers who are frustrated at the lack of official U.S. news media, in Japanese, countering the biased reports of Japanese media and websites, such as, <http://home.interlink.or.jp/~mabe/>.
- Consider having a Japanese speaking announcer on the Okinawa-based Armed Forces Network (AFN) FM radio station 89.1. Having segments in complete Japanese is not practical, but having a bilingual announcer who is able to repeat news such as events and incidents in Japanese will be of great benefit since the radio station is frequently listened to by Okinawans for its Western music.²²³

Mr. Funakoshi gave encouraging comments on other existing community relations initiatives mainly from the U.S. Marines on Okinawa which should

²²² DoD should examine *Pacific Stars and Stripes*' mission and enforce high and ethical standards of reporting in Japan and avoid tabloid style reporting in order to call attention to itself as a relevant newspaper. *Pacific Stars and Stripes* has been known to report on unsubstantiated and uncollaborated data which communicated incorrect and false information to base communities and surrounding local communities.

²²³ According to Marine Gunnery Sergeant G.T. Fontana, Station Manger for Det. 11, *American Forces Network (AFN) Okinawa*, in an e-mail interview 23 May 2004, there is no official polling data on the exact number of Japanese listeners; however, 400,000 (estimate) out of Okinawa's 1.3 million population live within the transmitting signal of *AFN Okinawa* and are considered the "shadow audience."

continue, such as the English teaching program in schools and the prospects for expansion, volunteerism at orphanages, and beach clean-ups.²²⁴

(8) Cultural Training. Finally regarding community relations, the cultural training of Marines reporting for duty on Okinawa may be flawed. Depending how a Marine is assigned to Okinawa determines how they receive cultural training. Marines who report to Okinawa with their family on an accompanied²²⁵ tour will spend a full day in a newcomer's orientation. Marines who deploy to Okinawa with their units for a typical six-month period on the unit deployment program will receive briefs in a pre-deployment training package before leaving their home base in the United States and then again upon arrival by local authorities such as military police and community relations liaisons. Marines who report to Okinawa individually for a one-year unaccompanied²²⁶ tour will receive a series of briefs within a one-week span while temporarily assigned to the Joint Reception Center (JRC) on Okinawa until they are delivered to their permanent units. It is estimated that between 9,500-10,000 personnel transit through the JRC annually.²²⁷ It is my assertion that cultural training is not as effective as it could be in this third group of Marines and sailors which is mainly composed of young (18-20 year-old) and low ranking personnel on their first assignment in the military. Most of these Marines and sailors are jet-lagged and what they retain is a basic fear of making a mistake and not wanting to venture off-base. These fears are quickly dispelled as soon as they make relationships with Marines who have been on Okinawa for a while. Since the Marine Corps is an expeditionary force and frequently deploys its personnel overseas it should consider institutionalizing a similar period of instruction (POI) used by Marine Security Guard (MSG) School in Quantico, Virginia for instructing their Marines on cultural sensitivities associated with overseas assignment in a diplomatic environment. Institutionalizing a similar POI in recruit training along with existing pre-deployment training may create a foundation upon which Marines can

²²⁴ Other initiatives are the hosting of base open-houses (festivals) and Special Olympics hosted by the U.S. Air Force on Kadena Air Base.

²²⁵ Accompanied tour implies a command-sponsored, three-year assignment with family.

²²⁶ Unaccompanied tour implies a one-year assignment without command-sponsorship for family.

²²⁷ Michael F. Jackson, CWO4, USMC, Personnel Officer, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, Okinawa, Japan, in an e-mail interview with author, 2 June 2004.

become better educated and ready to learn specifics about Okinawa, Japan, or any other location they are assigned too.

3. U.S. Department of State

Efforts from the U.S. Department of State (DOS) outside ordinary diplomatic dialogue to implement programs or take actions which could strengthen the security alliance and facilitate understanding between the U.S. military and local communities or, to counter biased and inflammatory media coverage has been mild. The U.S. Embassy's staff in Tokyo and the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate, Naha, Okinawa have been heavily engaged in talks and discussion; however, implementation of programs or ways to communicate facts to the local community has been assumed by the U.S. military.

An example of where the Department of State could exercise their diplomatic resources is with the graduate school initiative on Okinawa, known as the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology (OIST). Although the U.S. military has no official role with bringing this international graduate school to Okinawa, GOJ has asked USG for support by providing space for the children of the OIST staff to attend the U.S. military's Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS) on Okinawa, which the U.S. military has agreed to provide on a space available basis and with payment of the tuition.²²⁸

Sincere concern for Okinawans is exemplified by the leadership and initiative of U.S. military commanders. The Commander of Marine Forces Pacific, Lieutenant General W.C. Gregson has provided a contractor, Okinawa Education Initiatives Project Coordinator, to assess the possibility to implement two projects linked to OIST. First, was a team-teaching program within the local high schools on Okinawa; the Marine Corps has the goal to provide native English speakers to aide the Japanese teachers in teaching English. The second project is to establish an international school that will provide education for the OIST staff children and local Okinawans.²²⁹ These programs among others which the Marine Corps and the rest of USFJ have been consistently implementing, with goals towards strengthening the alliance and giving something back

²²⁸ Kaori Martinez, GS-11, Community Relations Specialist, AC/S G-5, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, during an e-mail interview on 24 May 2004.

²²⁹ Ibid.

to Okinawans in particular, are indicative of the things that the State Department could and should consider initiating.

4. Options for the Japanese to Consider

As the constitutional debate and the review of the NDPO progresses in Japan, Tokyo has already made some plans to transform the JSDF, first, with plans to establish a joint headquarters and also with the speculation that the JDA will evolve into a ministry.²³⁰ Additionally, the Japanese are debating the future roles and missions of the JSDF. I propose that GOJ transform the JSDF into a joint operating task-force with expeditionary capabilities to augment U.S. forces in combined/joint task forces. Bush administration officials' views on the evolution of the JSDF are compared to the Marine Corps' three-block war concept. General Charles Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant between 1995-1999, once termed a "three-block war" as a scenario where troops find themselves engaged in a spectrum of operations, from humanitarian missions, through peace keeping and peace enforcement-type actions, to full-blown combat--sometimes within the space of three city blocks. A senior Bush administration official asserted that the Japanese will be able to do one of those blocks in the future.²³¹

a. JSDF on U.S. Bases in Japan

In coordination with the United States, discussion should be initiated for establishing training detachments as tenant commands on U.S. bases in Japan. Having Japanese units on U.S. bases in Japan may help by putting more of a Japanese face onto the installation and assist the JSDF by providing them with better facilities. This creates the opportunity to make a Japanese officer the Deputy Camp Commander of U.S. installations and even use Japanese resources and troops to assist in force protection. Colonel Yamaoka believes that this should be pursued and stated that Japanese officers could act as a buffer between local community concerns and U.S. military officials. Furthermore, Colonel Yamaoka believes that the JSDF should transform its roles and missions towards an expeditionary air-ground task force operating with naval forces such as the U.S. Marine Corps. Being collocated with Marine units would be a benefit if that

²³⁰ Yamaoka, 12 May 2004.

²³¹ Source wishes to remain unnamed from an interview with the author in Washington, DC on 14 May 2004.

is the direction Tokyo wishes to take. Mr. Yamaji believes there are some dangers in this however, due to the JSDF being still politically inexperienced and may be improperly influenced by local community leaders.

b. JSDF on U.S. Bases in the United States

Allowing JSDF detachments as tenant commands in the United States at the various services' learning centers may assist the JSDF to professionalize itself into a more joint and capable force. Precedence with foreign militaries in the United States has already been established with the introduction of German Air Forces in Holloman Air Force Base, Alamogordo, New Mexico in 1996.²³² Mr. Yamaji stated that allowing Japanese forces, with a SOFA, may be the start to making the alliance more reciprocal.²³³ Having Japanese detachments on military bases within the U.S. may create opportunities for U.S. forces to learn from them also, beginning with cultural issues and martial arts.

c. Economic Development

Hiroshi Kitamura said it best 33 years ago:

...the Japanese should try to reduce the amount of attention directed toward the United States to a level proportionate to the reality of each problem... Japanese attention to any problem involving the United States is generally so high and so overplayed by the Japanese press that political and economic circles cannot handle problems with due consideration for their actual importance on a scale of national interest.²³⁴

A 2001 poll reports that the economy is of equal concern with the U.S. military base issue in Okinawa²³⁵ and higher in the rest of Japan. Interestingly, in a recent poll conducted

²³² On 1 May 1996, the German Air Force Tactical Training Center was established in concept with the 20th Fighter Squadron which provides aircrew training in the F-4F Phantom II. The TTC serves as the parent command for two German air crew training squadrons. The F-4 Training Squadron oversees all German F-4 student personal affairs, and provides German instructor pilots to cooperate in the contracted F-4 training program provided by the U.S. Air Force (20th Fighter Squadron). A second TTC unit, the Tornado Training Squadron, provides academic and tactical flying training, by German Air Force instructors, for German Tornado aircrews. The first contingent of Tornado aircraft arrived at Holloman in March 1996. More than 300 German Air Force members are permanently assigned at Holloman to the TTC--the only unit of its kind in the United States. The German Air Force Flying Training Center activated March 31, 1996. Holloman AFB, "Holloman AFB History," *Holloman AFB Online* [home page on-line]; available from <http://www.holloman.af.mil/hafb/basehistory.html>; Internet; accessed 23 May 2004.

²³³ Yamaji, 12 May 2004.

²³⁴ Kitamura, 37.

²³⁵ *Okinawan Views On U.S. Military Base Issues*, Office of Research: Opinion Analysis, Department of State: Washington, DC, 30 January 2001, 1.

by the University of Tokyo and the *Asahi Shimbun* the issue of U.S. military bases did not register as an important issue or concern (see Table 5).

Table 5. **Poll Representing the Most Important Issues Facing the Japanese Today**

Question: Aside from whether you are for or against, pick as many issues as you think are important from among the following 13 items.

| | |
|---|-----|
| Japan should build up its defense capability | 248 |
| Japan should reinforce its security alliance with the U.S. | 119 |
| Japan should not hesitate to strike first if and when an armed attack is predicted | 162 |
| Japan should play its international role as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council | 175 |
| Japan should dispatch SDF personnel to help with Iraq's reconstruction | 234 |
| It would be better to downsize the government even though its services, such as social welfare, may deteriorate | 122 |
| Japanese companies should retain lifetime employment | 139 |
| Job security with public works is needed for local districts | 155 |
| For the time being, the government should increase public spending to stimulate the economy instead of curtailing budget appropriations for a fiscal turnaround | 244 |
| The government should raise the consumption tax rate for its sustainable pension systems | 434 |
| The government should privatize its 3 postal services | 190 |
| The government should stop building new highways and the existing highways should be toll free | 228 |
| Voting rights should be granted to foreign nationals with permanent residency status | 92 |

From: The survey was conducted by the University of Tokyo and the *Asahi Shimbun* on a face-to-face basis to follow up 1,978 effective respondents among 3,000 persons who were sampled out of the nation's voting population on a stratified two-stage random-sampling basis for a previous survey conducted September 15-16, 2003. A questionnaire form was mailed to them between November 8 and 9, 2003 and answers were obtained from 1,233 persons (62.3 percent). All 1,233 respondents did not necessarily answer all questions. The total percentage does not reach 100% due to rounding.

Tokyo has made token periodic and seasonal concessions to Okinawa in the form of hosting the 2000 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit on Okinawa, lowering expressway tolls, and promoting the tourism industry in Okinawa, which is at the mercy of seasonal typhoons. In April 2002, Tokyo passed the Okinawa Promotional Special

Measures Law which allowed for the creation of a Special Free Trade Zone (SFTZ) on Okinawa, the only free trade zone in Japan. The purpose of the SFTZ is “to encourage business enterprises to establish facilities in Okinawa and promote trade.”²³⁶ The incentives and subsidies available for enterprises who would partake in the SFTZ are attractive but, limited partly due to space and restrictions to types of business. This initiative is on the right track but has yet to draw large-scale international interest. Perhaps, expanding the actual free trade zone to other areas on Okinawa and better international advertising and promotion of other laws and programs, such as the Okinawa Industrial Location Promotion Act,²³⁷ designated at attracting foreign investment, may prove beneficial.

The Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs, the Okinawa Policy Council, the Okinawa General Bureau,²³⁸ and the Okinawa Prefectural Government should consider promoting an industry base in Okinawa capitalizing on the indigenous talent there such as glass making and textiles. In addition for researching and planning for the future graduate school-OIST, a debate and study should be considered for promoting an international karate and sports academy on Okinawa, possibly in partnership with the JSDF and USFJ. An international karate and sports academy could be attractive towards Japanese Olympic training and future venues should the Olympics go to Japan in the future. Perhaps introducing casinos to Okinawa will generate steady tourism and revenue even during periods of inclement weather due to typhoons.

²³⁶ OPG. “Business,” *OPG Online* [home page on-line]; available from <http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/english/business/images/english.pdf>; Internet; accessed 23 July 2004, 7.

²³⁷ The Okinawa Industrial Location Promotion Act, Factory Location Law (designates potential industrial sites on Okinawa which offers preferential tax treatment), and the Okinawa Prefectural Ordinance for the Promotion of Industrial Sites Act qualifies for national and offers prefectural subsidies and financing for industrial factories and enterprises in manufacturing, overland freight transport, warehousing, packing, wholesale, software, data processing services, information services, designing, and natural science research institutions in Okinawa Prefecture.

²³⁸ The Okinawa General Bureau was established as a general branch office of the national government. It carries out the local work of the regional offices of ministries and agencies including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. See, CAO, “Policies on Okinawa,” *CAO Online* [home page on-line]; available from <http://www.cao.go.jp/okinawa.pdf>; Internet; accessed; 23 July 2004.

E. CONCLUSION

This thesis sought to provide policy-prescriptive options for U.S. forces in Japan, specifically Okinawa. In doing so, this thesis illustrated all the processes involved and taken by GOJ and the U.S. government and other psychological and cultural issues which shape the environment. This thesis calls for Japan to determine its national direction and for Okinawa to define a viable solution in practical terms. The options suggested offer flexibility in light of potential independent variables and are asserted with the goal of moving the security alliance towards a more reciprocal relationship.

While Japan continues to debate constitutional revision, its foreign policy and defense continues to be subject to United States approval. This “back seat” position in world affairs handicaps Japan from making an effective drive for permanent membership in the UNSC and limits Japan’s ability to deal more independently with regional neighbors. As a result, Japan will continue to be portrayed as not being a “normal country” in some circles and its interests marginalized.

An obvious recommendation from this thesis is for a continued U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in one form or another. The effects of 9/11 and the uncertainty of North Korea and China validates a strong security alliance, able to adjust to meet the needs of both nations. This thesis has provided some adjustment options for both nations to consider.

An issue which is not addressed in this thesis but should be addressed in a separate future thesis is the reaction of regional neighbors to the change in U.S. force structure in Japan should SATI or a variant of SATI be adopted. Japanese officials are pointing at the limited successes they have achieved in Iraq with the JSDF’s overseas developmental assistance missions; however, regional critics of a militarily stronger Japan will be sure to point out that Japan has never operated in the Middle East prior to World War II and as a result, there are no bitter memories or animosities directed towards Japan as it currently exists in East Asia.

APPENDIX A

POLLING DATA

Political Parties' Opinion Regarding Amending the Constitution ²³⁹

A joint questionnaire survey of lawmakers in the House of Representatives, conducted by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and Professor Jun Iio's office at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), discovered a substantial difference of views between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, the New Komeito party, over basic policies.

LDP: 94 percent were in favor of amending Article 9.
New Komeito: 33 percent in favor of amending Article 9.

In this regard, respondents were asked to answer if they thought the Constitution should be amended so that Japan can participate in collective defense.

- As a result, 66 percent of the respondents answered "yes."
- In the LDP, "yes" reached 90 percent.
- In the New Komeito, however, three-fourths answered "no."

Japanese Public's Opinion Regarding Amending the Constitution

First Sample:

Sixty-five percent of respondents FAVOR a revision of the Constitution, of this, 52 percent cite that Japan could not fully contribute to the international community under the current Constitution. **From:** *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), 2 April 2004.

Second Sample Grouping:


| Support For Constitutional Revision Polls | | | | |
|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Sep 00 | Aug 01 | Apr 04 | Jun 04 |
| In Favor to Revise the Constitution (% in favor) | 50% | 56% | 65% | 77.8% |

From: September 2000 and August 2001 from Office of Research, *Stretching the Security Consensus in Japan*, Department of State, Washington, DC, 20 September 2001. April 2004 from the *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll reported 2 April 2004. June 2004 from the *Tokyo Shimbun* poll reported 23 June 2004, of this 29.1 percent of the respondents are in favor of revising the constitution to include Article 9; however, 48.7 percent are in favor of revising certain parts of the constitution but not Article 9.

²³⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), 17 March 2004.

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APPENDIX B PROCESS OF TRANSFORMING THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE



❖ See footnote 33

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APPENDIX C CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT THREATENING ACTIONS BY THE DPRK

(Compiled by author, September 2004)

- June 1993 DPRK test-launched a *Nodong* 1 missile into the Sea of Japan (Advertised at 600 miles range, but blew at exactly 300 miles). Basically, *Nodong* 1 was a SCUD missile modified with more engines for greater range making it a medium-range missile. Experts not sure whether the precise targeting of the missile was accidental or an indication of the North's technological advances.
- 1993-1994 DPRK is discovered to have been using a Soviet-provided power reactor at Yongbyon to enrich uranium for making plutonium for nuclear weapons and brings the United States and the DPRK to a new level of tension. The creation of the Agreed Framework diffuses the situation.
- April 1996 DPRK soldiers invaded the Panmunjom Joint Security Area.
- September 1996 Incidents occurred of DPRK submarines infringing upon ROK territorial waters.
- July 1997 DPRK soldiers crossed the DMZ and fired at ROK forces.
- June 1998 Incidents occurred of DPRK submarines infringing upon ROK territorial waters.
- August 1998 DPRK test-launched a *Taepodong* ballistic missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.
- December 1998 ROK forces sank a North Korean submarine that had intruded into ROK's southern waters.
- March 1999 Two suspicious boats presumed to be North Korea spy ships located off of Japan's Noto Peninsula. Warning shots and bombs were dropped from a Japanese P-3C airplane.
- June 1999 Shooting incidents arose between ROK and DPRK patrol boats.
- 21-22 December 2001 A suspicious boat observed in waters southwest of Japan's Kyushu Island, suspected of being a North Korean spy ship.
- June 2002 Shooting incidents arose between ROK and DPRK patrol boats.


| | |
|--------------------------------|--|
| October 2002 | Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly confronted Kim Jong-II's regime with evidence that the DPRK was violating the 1994 Agreed Framework by continuing to enrich uranium. The DPRK subsequently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, and disabled the IAEA's monitoring devices and reopened the Yongbyon plant to make plutonium. |
| October 2002 | Five abducted Japanese citizens were permitted a brief visit to Japan and ended up staying, but their family members were left behind and not permitted to reunite by Pyongyang until May 2004. |
| February 2003 | A DPRK MiG-19 transgressed the Northern Limit Line (NLL). |
| 24 February & 10 March 2003 | DPRK test-launched short-range <i>Rodong</i> missiles. |
| March 2003 | Four DPRK fighter aircraft approached a U.S. military aircraft. |
| July 2003 | North and South Korean Troops exchange fire between guard posts on the DMZ. |
| December 2003 | The United States intercepted a ship bound for Yemen loaded with North Korean Scud missiles. |
| August 2004 | Reports from Jane's Defence Weekly that the DPRK has developed a land-based, road-mobile and ship or submarine launched medium-range ballistic missile by using the Soviet R-27, (NATO classification SS-N-6), which was a submarine launched ballistic missile. The land-based model is estimated to have a range of 2,500 to 4,000 kilometers and the sea-launched version has an estimated range of at least 2,500 kilometers. The R-27 is a single-stage, liquid-propellant, sub-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that became operational in the Soviet Navy in 1968. It weighs 14,200kg and is 9.65m in length, with a diameter of 1.5m. The original version carried a single nuclear re-entry vehicle (RV), with a 200kT payload. These systems have the capability of striking everywhere in East Asia including U.S. soil. |

APPENDIX D

JAPAN'S PROCUREMENT FUNDING FOR FRONT-LINE EQUIPMENT

(From: Defense Program for FY 2003: An Overview, Japan Defense Agency)

3. Procurement fundings for Front-line Equipment (in budget authority)




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APPENDIX E

STATUS QUO MODEL

(Compiled by author, May 2004)


❖ Based on conventional wisdom the below timelines are advocated.



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APPENDIX F SECURITY ALLIANCE TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

(Illustrated by author, May 2004)



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**APPENDIX G MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP S.D. BUTLER,
OKINAWA, JAPAN, SENSITIVE TRAINING DAYS FOR FY 2003**

(From: Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler)

| | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. New Years Holiday | 1-3 January | Island Wide |
| 2. National Center Test for University Admissions | 18-19 January (1000-1730) | Island Wide |
| 3. Lunar New Years Day | 1-3 Feb | Island Wide |
| 4. Examination of Okinawa Prefecture University of Arts | 3-7 February (0930-1700) | Shuri, Naha City |
| 5. Examination of Okinawa Women's Junior College | 5 February (0930-1500) | Nagata, Naha City |
| 6. Examination of Okinawa International University | 6-7 February (0930-1500) | Ginowan, Ginowan City |
| 7. Examination of Okinawa Christian Junior College | 7 February (0900-1700) | Onaga, Nishihara Town |
| 8. Examination of Okinawa University | 9-10 February (0900-1600) | Kokuba, Naha |
| 9. Examination of Meio University | 11 February (1300-1600) | Biimata, Nago City |
| 10. Examination of Okinawa Prefecture College of Nursing | 25 February (1000-1700) | Yogi, Naha City |
| 11. Examination of University Ryukyu | 25-26 February(0830-1700) | Senbaru, Nishihara |
| 12. Examination of Okinawa Prefecture University of Arts | 25 February - 1 March (0930-1700) | Shuri, Naha City |
| 13. Examination of Okinawa International University | 6 March (0930-1600) | Ginowan, Ginowan |
| 14. Examination of Okinawa University | 9 March (0900-1600) | Kokuba, Naha City |
| 15. Examination of Okinawa Women's Junior College | 10 March (0930-1500) | Nagata Naha City |
| 16. Examination of Okinawa Christian Junior College | 11 March (0900-1700) | Onaga, Nishihara |
| 17. Examination of Prefecture High Schools | 10-11 March (0800-1630) | Island Wide |

| | | |
|--|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 18. Examination of Okinawa Prefecture College of Nursing | 12 March (100-1700) | Yogi, Naha City |
| 19. Examination of University Ryukyu | 12-13 March (0900-1830) | Senbaru, Town of Ryukyu |
| 20. Hamarauri | 4-6 April | Kin Blue Training Area/Gimbaru |
| 21. Anniversary of Reversion of Okinawa to Japan | 15 May | Island Wide |
| 22. Memorial Day for War Victims | 23 June | Island Wide |
| 23. Examination of Okinawa Christian Junior College | 1 August (0900-1700) | Onaga, Nishihara Town |
| 24. Lunar Obon Festival | 10-12 August | Island Wide |
| 25. Anniversary of the End of the War | 15 August | Island Wide |

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Monterey, California
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Naval Postgraduate School
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Yokota Air Base, Japan
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Commandant of the Marine Corps
Assistant Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Facilities)
Headquarters, Marine Corps
Washington, DC

12. John J. Norris
Senior Executive Service 4 (SES 4)
Foreign Policy Advisor to the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps
Headquarters, Marine Corps
Washington, DC
13. Colonel Takeo Yamaoka, JGSDF
Military Attaché
Embassy of Japan
Washington, DC
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Embassy of Japan
Washington, DC
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Office of the Secretary of Defense
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International Affairs Officer Program Coordinator (PLU-8)
International Issues Branch, Strategy and Plans Division
Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O)
Headquarters, Marine Corps
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Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii
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Center for International Security Studies and Policy (CISSP), Osaka University
Osaka, Japan
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Washington Bureau Chief, Kyodo News, National Press Building
Washington, DC
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Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Studies
Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institute
Washington, DC
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Washington, DC
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United States Forces Japan
Yokota Air Base, Japan
30. Major B. E. Swanland, USAFR
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California