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**THESIS**

**REVISING THE U.S. GLOBAL MILITARY BASING  
POLICY: IS A PERMANENT U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE  
STILL REQUIRED?**

by

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December 2004

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PERMANENT U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE STILL REQUIRED?**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines the U.S. policy for employing military forces across the globe. The major transformational trends in improving U.S. military capabilities over the past two decades, and the changing international security environment have impacted the way in which American leaders focus on the global military posture strategy. The American military interventions in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan help determine whether the United States has demonstrated true global reach capability without the advantage of permanent forward operating bases. The Philippines-U.S relationship provides an opportunity to assess whether the United States has demonstrated the capability and commitment to defend its national interests and its ally and to maintain peace and stability despite the removal of major U.S. bases. U.S. capability and commitment may allow greater flexibility in choosing alternatives to the current policy of permanent forward basing around the globe.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Why does the United States continue to deploy nearly 100,000 active duty military personnel in Northeast Asia? Why, after President Bush proposed to withdraw as many as 70,000 forces from overseas bases around the world, are most of the forces in Asia projected to remain? Many analysts have presented arguments in favor of withdrawing U.S. military forces from overseas locations, while others, primarily in the Department of Defense (DoD) argued to leave forces in place or even increase military presence. From a historical perspective, American military personnel have been stationed in Japan, and South Korea over fifty years; the mechanism for these deployments is the U.S. bilateral alliances with each country. The outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in 1950 pitted the Soviet and Chinese-backed-North Korean military against the American, United Nations, and South Korean forces. According to Blackwill and Dibb, the U.S.-Japan alliance was traditionally intended to curb the spread of communism in Asia.<sup>1</sup> The end of the Cold War in 1991 eliminated the Soviet communist threat in the Pacific region. One of the main premises for developing the U.S.-Japan alliance and for keeping U.S. military forces in the region dissolved, causing some analysts to call for the removal of U.S. forces.<sup>2</sup> In recommending troop withdrawal, Ivan Eland argued that the United States tends to overstate regional threats that may never develop into credible threats.<sup>3</sup>

While some threats dissipated, other threats remained and replaced old ones, including the real North Korean and terrorist threats and the perceived China threat. In 2002, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that America will not yield its strategic position in Asia because the U.S. military is crucial to stability.<sup>4</sup> Garrett and Glaser also argued that if U.S. troops are removed from Korea and Japan, instability would reign,

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<sup>1</sup> Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds., *America's Asian Alliances*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 31.

<sup>2</sup> Doug Bandow, "Cutting the Tripwire: It's Time to Get Out of Korea," Reason Online, <http://reason.com> July 2003, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Ivan Eland, "Tilting at Windmills: Post-Cold War Military Threats to U.S. Security," Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, No. 332, 8 February 1999.

<sup>4</sup> Colin Powell in AFX News Limited, "US Military Key to Stability in Asia – Powell," *AFX European Focus*, 11 June 2002.

arms races would ensue, and Japan might even decide to remilitarize and develop nuclear weapons.<sup>5</sup> On 11 March 2003, South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun advocated maintaining a strong U.S.-Korea alliance, stating that the defense arrangement with U.S. forces in Korea greatly contributes to national security.<sup>6</sup>

While there are tangible benefits to the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances, including deterrence, security, regional access, and stronger political and economic ties, there are also tremendous costs. According to Bandow, who insists that U.S. troops should come home, the cost of maintaining troops in South Korea alone is \$13-14 billion dollars per year, while Japan bears roughly half the financial burden for hosting troops in Japan.<sup>7</sup> One estimate indicates that without the Korean contingency, the United States would be able to reduce its military presence by about one-fourth, saving \$20-\$30 billion dollars annually.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the monetary costs, in some countries the troops are no longer welcomed by a majority of the populace. In both South Korea and Japan, nationalism has been on the rise. These nationalistic feelings often translated into anti-American sentiment. A public opinion poll in 2003 indicated that seven out of ten South Koreans want the U.S. military out of Korea.<sup>9</sup> According to Ralph Cossa, who also argues for withdrawing U.S. troops, the United States has always said that it would maintain troops in South Korea as long as the Korean people and government wanted them and as long as the threat remained.<sup>10</sup> The growing anti-Americanism brings this policy into question. The situation in Japan is not much better. According to Richard Halloran, who is

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<sup>5</sup> Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions About Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1997, 383-402.

<sup>6</sup> Lee, Soo-jeong, "South Korean President Calls for Stronger South Korea-U.S. Alliance," *Associated Press*, 11 March 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Doug Bandow, "Free Rider: South Korea's Dual Dependence on America," Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 308, 19 May 1998, 3.

<sup>8</sup> Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, (Princeton New Jersey: Basic Books, 2001), 311.

<sup>9</sup> Jonathan Manthorpe, "Asia's Anxious Dictator," *Vancouver Sun*, 2 April 2003, A17.

<sup>10</sup> Ralph A. Cossa, *Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures*, (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 43.

adamant about returning U.S. troops to America, despite the 50-year alliance, 39 percent of the Japanese people polled by the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper in Tokyo do not trust the United States.<sup>11</sup>

According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the U.S. military is undergoing a transformation process that aims to construct an expeditionary force capable of global, rapid, and sustained response to deter, fight, and win wars.<sup>12</sup> Despite this transformation and plans to consolidate troops into mobile hubs, this strategy calls for an increase of troops in Northeast Asia.<sup>13</sup>

The basic arguments for removing troops from overseas boil down to beliefs that the threats have diminished; that overseas presence is too costly; military personnel are stretched too thin; that host nations can now fend for themselves; and that the host nation's populace no longer wants a U.S. military presence. The basic arguments for maintaining a military presence overseas can be summarized by the following: threats to U.S. national interests have expanded; a military presence helps maintain peace and security because it demonstrates U.S. commitment, reassures allies and deters threats; and military presence saves deployment time when responding to a crisis in a remote region.

Many of these arguments, while seemingly contradictory, are valid. Some threats like the Soviet one have diminished, while others, like the terrorist threat and the threat of rogue states using WMD, have expanded. Responding to the diminished Soviet threat, the United States has downsized its military forces. On the other hand, responding to the expanding terrorist and rogue state threats, the United States has broadened its presence in remote countries and stretched its military thin. Despite the rising nationalism around the world and the growing anti-American sentiment, many countries and many people still value and desire U.S. engagement because U.S. military presence does help maintain peace and security.

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<sup>11</sup> Richard Halloran, "Anti-Americanism in Seoul Korea," *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 21 July 2002, 1.

<sup>12</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001, iii-iv.

<sup>13</sup> General Leon J. LaPorte, "Statement of General Leon J. LaPorte, Commander, United Nations Command," Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony Before Subcommittee on Military Construction, 29 April 2003, 1-18.

The problem with these arguments is that they fail to recognize the capability of the military and the U.S. commitment to use the military as the critical elements to accomplishing objectives. While U.S. military presence may help maintain peace and security, it may not be essential. Peace and security, reassurance of allies and deterrence of potential enemies may be achieved without a permanent physical military presence. Military capability and the success of an objective are not necessarily limited or restricted by the physical presence of troops. If the United States possessed laser weapons that could pinpoint and destroy targets around the globe with the push of a button, or if America possessed weapons that could selectively target and eliminate personnel based on their DNA, and potential enemies knew of these weapons and were convinced America would use them, military forces as we know them today might cease to exist. Though not to the same futuristic extent, America's military capabilities have improved to the point that they can reach across the globe in a matter of days. Relative to other nations' militaries, the U.S. military instrument has been modified and modernized to the point where its asymmetric advantages in capability eclipse other forces and make it ludicrous to match force on force in the traditional sense. Potential enemies are aware of U.S. capabilities and are aware of U.S. commitment to use them. A major limiting factor to U.S. capability lies in its ability to gain access to a region; however, access is not guaranteed by physical presence, but may be garnered through political or diplomatic means.

If military capability and the commitment to use it are essential elements in maintaining peace and stability, reassuring allies and deterring enemies, then it is important to focus on whether the United States possesses these abilities and is committed to use them to defend itself and its allies. Examining U.S. military transformation efforts and the results of American conflicts since the end of the Cold War will help outline U.S. capabilities. These same conflicts and an assessment of U.S.-Philippines relations since the closure of U.S. bases and withdrawal of U.S. forces will help resolve the question about U.S. commitment. Once capability and commitment concerns are satisfied, we can resolve issues of effective force-posture policy.



## **II. U.S. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION AND ITS IMPACT ON CAPABILITY**

### **A. THREAT-BASED VS. CAPABILITIES-BASED FORCES**

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the dissipation of a traditional and credible conventional threat, the United States has been trying to come to grips with the changing international security environment. In the absence of a clear, comparable threat, the dilemma has been how to structure U.S. military forces without compromising a technological lead and competitive edge over potential threats. How can the United States build a force capable of defeating modern asymmetric threats while still maintaining the conventional power to face the more traditional conventional military threats? If the military can build a force capable of handling both types of threats, how will this new capability affect the U.S. force posture around the world? “Transformation” became the buzz word for defining how the United States would adapt its Armed Forces to the changing security environment.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld provided the transformation process with a new vision and determination, and the September 11 terrorist attacks added a sense of urgency and focus. The United States has moved away from a threat-based strategy to a capabilities-based strategy, concerned not with who is doing the threatening but with how America is being threatened. In contrast to developing forces from a specific threat or scenario, capabilities-based strategy is planning under uncertainty to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern challenges and situations.<sup>14</sup>

Emphasis has shifted from deliberate to adaptive planning and from permanent organizations and large hierarchies to smaller and highly distributed joint and combined forces and standing or contingency Joint Task Forces. According to Joint Vision 2020, the overall goal of U.S. military transformation is to create a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations, persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict. Operational concepts include dominant maneuver, precision

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<sup>14</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on ‘21<sup>st</sup> Century Transformation’ of US Armed Forces (transcript of remarks and question and answer period),” (Washington D.C: National Defense University, 31 January 2002).

engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection. Information operations and joint command and control are also essential.<sup>15</sup>

To accomplish its transformational goals, the United States is investing \$144 billion through 2007.<sup>16</sup> The Pentagon is focusing on a new strategy that shifts resources away from traditional, large-scale warfare to lighter, more lethal and more mobile forces for fighting terrorism, insurgencies, unconventional wars and asymmetric threats. Based on these premises, wars of the future will not likely feature the traditional large armies and large navies.<sup>17</sup> The plan calls for moving funds away from ships, aircraft, and tanks and toward Special Operations Forces and command, control, communications and computer capabilities. In a speech on transformation trends, VADM Arthur Cebrowski, the lead person on DoD Transformation in 2002, reinforced Secretary Rumsfeld's vision of transformation and added that in order to reduce the military footprint by 50 percent, America must substitute information for mass—the military must become more expeditionary, one that can operate without a forward infrastructure or have the capability to carry infrastructure forward.<sup>18</sup>

Part of the Pentagon's strategy is to build a surge force that can draw upon a global pool of forces that can respond faster and with more flexibility to crises. Secretary Rumsfeld set a speed goal for the military. He wants rotational forces to be able to deploy to a remote region within 10 days, conquer an enemy or exercise with an ally

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<sup>15</sup> Office of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Vision 2020: America's Military Preparing for Tomorrow," Department of Defense, 2001.

<sup>16</sup> The six specific transformation goals identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review are as follows: defend the U.S. homeland and other bases of operation and defeat nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery; deny enemy sanctuary, depriving them of the ability to run or hide; project and sustain forces in distant theaters in the face of access denial threats; conduct effective operations in space; conduct effective information operations; and leverage information technology to give joint forces a common operational picture. To protect bases of operations, America is developing missile defense. Fast transport ships will help project power in denied areas. Space-based radar systems will help deny enemy sanctuaries. Laser technology is being developed for space operations. The United States is improving its information and space warfare systems, and it already has developed joint task forces. Paul Wolfowitz, "Testimony Delivered on Military Transformation Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing," (Washington D.C.: 9 April 2002).

<sup>17</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, "Shift from Traditional War Seen at Pentagon," Washington Post, 3 September 2004, 1.

<sup>18</sup> Arthur Cebrowski, "Transformation Trends—17 Feb Issue, Speech by VADM Arthur Cebrowski to the Network Centric Warfare 2003 Conference," Arlington VA: Office of Force Transformation, 22 January 2003.

within 30 days, and reconstitute fast enough to reengage another enemy or ally in a different part of the world 30 days later. This strategy is transformational because it improves upon the traditional practice of allocating specific forces to regional commanders, who rely on them to execute war plans.<sup>19</sup>

The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), under the leadership of Admiral Thomas Fargo has taken great strides in the journey to transform its armed forces by incorporating capabilities-based initiatives as well as by becoming a more expeditionary force. Admiral Fargo recognized that a true Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) could not occur through technological advancement alone but by transforming the doctrine, organization, leadership, and training used to parlay the technology into effective capability. When referring to a regional combatant commander's responsibility for implementing transformational guidance, Admiral Fargo described it as "operationalizing the Asian-Pacific defense strategy."<sup>20</sup>

In his testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee, General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe expressed his belief that the strategic transformation campaign plan is founded on America's need to remain globally engaged with allies and international institutions and it capitalizes on America's military commitment and capabilities to face the challenges of the new century.<sup>21</sup>

To support transformation and modernization efforts President Bush proposed a \$401.7 billion dollar defense plan for 2005. The defense budget proposal will continue

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<sup>19</sup> Jason Sherman, "U.S. Seeks to Add Flex to Force," *Defense News*, 6 September 2004, 4.

<sup>20</sup> Admiral Fargo said there are six elements to this strategy: update operational plans, strengthen command and control constructs to better respond to emerging security threats, develop expeditionary capabilities for immediate employment in the Pacific or anywhere else they are needed, integrate and co-locate expeditionary forces with high-speed lift and interdiction assets, improve precision and lethality capabilities to enhance and reduce our force posture and footprint, and finally, gain access opportunities and preposition logistics throughout the theater. Thomas Fargo, "America's Forward Deployment in Asia and the Pacific," Federal News Service, Inc., 26 June 2003.

<sup>21</sup> General Jones stated the transformation plan was based on several key assumptions: the U.S. desires to maintain a position of global influence through effective use of all its instruments of power; the U.S. remains committed to its friends and allies through its organizations, institutions, and agreements; the U.S. remains committed to a global strategy with forward based and deployed forces as its cornerstone; the U.S. supports in-depth transformation of its armed forces and basing structure; the U.S. will seek to overcome obstacles posed by 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges; the U.S. basing within EUROCOM may not satisfy the challenges posed by an expanded NATO or the asymmetric challenges of the future; the U.S. will preserve assets of enduring value to its national interests. General James L. Jones, "U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) Holds Hearing on Overseas Installations," Federal Document Clearing House Inc., 29 April 2003, 1-18.

on the growth path over the next five years that would carry it to Cold War levels. Major portions of the spending are projected toward equipment upgrades, and research of new weapon systems.<sup>22</sup> Some of these transformation dollars will also be used to upgrade military capabilities in Korea. Paul Wolfowitz indicated that about \$11 billion dollars would be spent over the next four years in some 150 programs to enhance U.S. capabilities on the Korean peninsula.<sup>23</sup>

Recent military transformation developments outline some of the specific Service-related goals and describe how these objectives fulfill the broader DoD transformation requirement to improve overall military capabilities.

## **B. ARMY TRANSFORMATION DEVELOPMENTS**

The Army may be undergoing the most ambitious transformation of any of the services. It is proceeding along three parallel tracks, developing a long-term objective force, a medium-term, interim force, and a legacy force to hedge against the other two forces. The key element to the Army's long-term approach is a transition to smaller, lighter, faster units that rely on technology to replace the M-1 tanks and Bradley vehicles. If this approach is not adequate, the Army can still rely on its mid-term approach, which focuses on using pre-positioned equipment and Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) as a rapid deployment force.<sup>24</sup> Over the past decade, the Army has undergone changes emanating from three separate visions: digitization, preservation, and transformation. Based on the first two visions, the Army was prepared to fight major theater wars with heavy armored divisions, and thus it was less prepared to fight the many small-scale contingencies that have emerged globally. The latest Army vision of transformation seeks to create a Future Combat System (FCS) composed of a light to medium-weight force that can still respond to a major theater war as necessary, while remaining mobile and capable enough to fight the smaller-scale contingencies. A transformed Army will

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<sup>22</sup> Esther Schrader, "Budget Concentrates on Modernizing Military," Los Angeles Times, 31 January 2004.

<sup>23</sup> Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., "U.S. Troops Slated to Move South from Korean DMZ," 6 June 2003.

<sup>24</sup> Hans Binnendijk, ed., *Transforming America's Military*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, August 2002).

seek to negate anti-access and area denial strategies. Until this FCS is available, the Army will field an interim force consisting of legacy forces and six IBCTs.<sup>25</sup>

One of the newly developed technologies gaining attention is the Stryker light armored vehicle. Strykers can reach speeds up to 100 kph, they can be transported by plane anywhere in the world within 96 hours, and can operate for three days without refueling.<sup>26</sup> The Strykers are about half the weight of a tank, yet the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) possesses significantly more firepower, survivability, and mobility than the light infantry brigade. Two of these Stryker brigades have already been assembled. Coupled with the Army's new maneuver units of action these systems are fully integrated combined-arms organizations that will substantially reduce deployment time because they comprise a complete force package that trains and deploys together. From a joint perspective, the SBCT provides an air deployable asset that contains substantial ground combat capability and complements the Marines' expeditionary units or the Air Force's expeditionary forces.<sup>27</sup>

The FCS is part of an overall Objective Force composed of Units of Action. It is the Army's full spectrum force, organized, manned, equipped, and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the full spectrum of operations. Objective Force units conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances, conduct forcible entry, overwhelm aggressor anti-access capabilities, and rapidly impose their will on the enemy.<sup>28</sup>

When former Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki retired in 2003, he warned that the increase in America's global commitment would require more troops, not less, as has been evidenced by the build-up of the forces in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld disagreed with this assessment and insisted that the build-up of forces was temporary and that the

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<sup>25</sup> Joseph N. Mait, and Jon G. Grossman, "Relevancy and Risks: The U.S. Army and Future Combat Systems," (Washington D.C.: *Defense Horizons*, National Defense University, May 2002).

<sup>26</sup> Hiroko Kono, "Challenge of America/Military Transformation Arms U.S. for Age of Ascendancy," *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, 5 January 2003.

<sup>27</sup> Eric Peltz, *Toward an Expeditionary Army: New Options for Combatant Commanders*, Testimony Presented to the House Armed Services Committee, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 24 March 2004), 4-6.

<sup>28</sup> Eric K. Shinseki, U.S. Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force," (Washington D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Army, 2001).

United States would trim down its force structure as part of the military transformation. He said, “It was the capability of a force, not its size that should be the critical measurement.”<sup>29</sup>

Secretary Rumsfeld also indicated that America is only using a relatively small percentage of its military forces in deployments across the globe—and these forces are continually recycled through deployments. The problem is not that the United States has too few forces; the problem is how America manages the mix of forces at its disposal. When nearly 60 percent of the Guard and Reserve forces have not been deployed, the overall military has not been stressed; only the other 40 percent has been stressed. The key is to get the best use of all forces or restructure them so that there are more forces with the right capabilities.<sup>30</sup>

To correct this imbalance in the type of forces, the DoD has already redistributed skill sets within the Reserve and active-duty components resulting in rebalancing 10,000 positions. By the end of 2004, the DoD projects to have rebalanced 50,000 positions. In addition, the Services are transforming to increase their combat capabilities while decreasing the demand on personnel. To accomplish this feat, the Army is focusing on creating modular, self-contained brigades that would be interchangeable with any division. The new “modular army” will not only become more interoperable within the Army but with the other services. Other innovations include, improving force management by taking military personnel out of civilian jobs to make them available for military tasks; reducing the number of troops and dependents constantly being rotated; and fixing the mobilization process to make it more flexible for troops and families.<sup>31</sup>

As part of the transformation process, the Army recently announced that it would encourage “homesteading” for its personnel. The nomadic lifestyle of persistent deployments will become a practice of the past. Keeping troops and their families together for six or seven years at the same location will improve the unit cohesiveness the Army is trying to develop within its new “modular army.” By training personnel together, sending them to fight together, and returning them home together, the Army can

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<sup>29</sup> George Edmonson, “Size of Military Sets the Stage for Big Political Battle,” *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 25 January 2004, 1-2.

<sup>30</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, “New Model Army,” *Wall Street Journal*, 3 February 2004, 1-2.

<sup>31</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, “New Model Army,” *Wall Street Journal*, 3 February 2004, 1-2.

develop a more effective combat team. In addition to this mission benefit, decreased deployments will also strengthen family ties for personnel.<sup>32</sup>

To lead the way in building the “modular army,” Secretary Rumsfeld handpicked the once retired SOF commander General Peter Schoomaker. The new Army Chief of Staff is restructuring the 10-division Army from 33 to 48 combat brigades. These brigades will be maneuver units of action that are already back-fitted with support personnel to reduce deployment time. The battlefield laboratory is the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division, which has been reorganized into five maneuver units of action—it is projected for fielding in Iraq in 2005.<sup>33</sup> When speaking about transformation, General Schoomaker revealed an openness and feisty innovativeness to “think outside the box”.

As far as I’m concerned, there is not a damn thing sacred about what we are doing in the Army except our values...I’m often asked, how far can I move the Army? I tell them as far as I can. The Army is tremendously resilient. You can’t fool around on the margins if we’re going to change. We’re going to move very quickly.<sup>34</sup>

The recent cancellation of major weapons systems programs has demonstrated Secretary Rumsfeld’s strict adherence to his transformational goals. With the advent and profusion of precision-guided munitions, Rumsfeld decided that the Army no longer required the world’s most sophisticated howitzer so he canceled the Crusader. Lessons learned from operations in Iraq demonstrated the vulnerability for low-flying helicopters, so he canceled the Comanche program. The outcome of the Air Force’s F/A-22 fighter, the Marine Corps’ MV-22 Osprey, and the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship are also undergoing heavy scrutiny to ensure these systems will complement the military of the future.<sup>35</sup>

### **C. AIR FORCE TRANSFORMATION DEVELOPMENTS**

The Air Force’s Vision 2020 calls for assuring security and stability in the world through global vigilance, to anticipate and deter threats with strategic reach, to prevent

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<sup>32</sup> Thomas Ricks, “Army Says Soldiers Will Change Bases Less,” *The Washington Post*, 10 February 2004.

<sup>33</sup> Rowan Scarborough, “Major Overhaul Eyed for Army,” *The Washington Times*, 3 February 2004.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Vago Muradian, ed. “Rumsfeld’s Resolve,” *Defense News*, Army Times Publishing Co., 1 March 2004, 60.

crises and to attain overwhelming power to prevail in conflicts and wars. To achieve this vision, the Air Force has constituted 10 deployable Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) that provide commanders with flexible and effects-based aerospace packages to respond to any contingency worldwide. In addition, the Air Force maintains an Air Expeditionary Wing that can respond to emergencies such as the 9/11 terrorists attacks. The rotational structure of the AEF allows two forces to be constantly deployed or on-call, providing predictability and stability to personnel. The Air Force can deploy up to five AEFs simultaneously within 15 days to conduct wars.<sup>36</sup>

Two separate military technologies offered an order-of-magnitude breakthrough in transforming the Air Force. The first was low-observable, stealth technology and the second was precision-guided munitions. Together these two capabilities, in connection with effects-based planning, allowed U.S. forces to execute parallel warfare. Parallel warfare provides simultaneous application of force across the breadth and depth of the battlefield. The joint force commander, regardless of service affiliation can use aerospace power in an integrated way to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical success. The past decade has proven that aerospace power's inherent speed, range, and flexibility allowed it to make the transformational leap from the Cold War to the demands of the contemporary world.<sup>37</sup>

Regardless of the nature or location of the crises, aerospace power has played a significant role. From 1990 to 1997 alone, the Air Force has been engaged in 45 small-scale contingencies—an average of one per every nine weeks, as compared to 16 during the entire Cold War period. This record portends the type of warfare the United States can expect in the future and provides the basis for the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF). GSTF allows the United States to overcome range barriers by providing the means to rapidly push back threats. GSTF rapidly establishes air superiority and guarantees that joint forces enjoy freedom from attack and freedom to attack. GSTF is a rapid-reaction

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<sup>36</sup> U.S. Department of the Air Force, "Global Vigilance Reach and Power, America's Air Force Vision 2020," Defense Department--Department of the Air Force, 1998, 5.

<sup>37</sup> David A. Deptula, "Air Force Transformation: Past, Present, and Future," *Aerospace Power Journal*, 13 August 2001.



force with leading-edge power-projection capabilities employed within the AEF while maintaining interoperability with joint or coalition forces.<sup>38</sup>

Air Force leaders have recently stated their commitment to support ground troops. The Air Force appears to be implementing the best lessons learned in Afghanistan and making a concerted effort to integrate its transformation efforts into the joint realm.<sup>39</sup> The Air Force Chief of Staff, General John Jumper believes that generations of Army officers often saw aircraft fly overhead, but never knew how they supported Army operations. To correct this deficiency, General Jumper vowed that the Air Force and the Army would exercise together to ensure Army leaders understood how air and space power could benefit them.<sup>40</sup>

To support this jointness, the Air Force recently decided to purchase the Marines' short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing (STOVL) version of the Joint Strike Fighter. The STOVL will help support ground forces since it will be able to access smaller landing sites closer to the ground fighting. In addition, the stalwart ground-support aircraft, the A-10, will be modernized with stronger engines, new avionics, better data links, and improved precision weapons capability to enhance its support of the ground troops. Furthermore, through its "Battlefield Airman" project, the Air Force has enhanced the ground controller's integration with airpower by reducing the weight of equipment packages by 50 percent, improving communications links that reduce connection times by 40 percent and designing data links that pinpoint targets up to 10 kilometers away.<sup>41</sup>

Even as the Air Force awaits final development of F-22 and F-35 aircraft, it is modernizing its existing fleet of F-16s and F-15Es with new radars and converting some F-15Cs into strike versions to support ground operations. Secretary Roche stated this

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<sup>38</sup>John P. Jumper, "Global Strike Task Force: A Transforming Concept, Forged by Experience," *Aerospace Power Journal*, (Spring 2001).

<sup>39</sup> Air Force Secretary James Roche stated the following in an Air Force Association Symposium: We believe it is important that our land forces see us demonstrate our obvious commitment to air-to-ground support, both deep interdiction and close air support. We intend to be fully integrated with them, whether they are SOF, Army, Marines or coalition land forces. With this strategy, we will solidify our goal of developing evolving joint air-to-ground doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. See Elaine M. Grossman, "Air Force Unveils Fresh Commitment to Supporting Ground Troops," *Inside the Pentagon*, 19 February 2004, 1.

<sup>40</sup> Elaine M. Grossman, "Air Force Unveils Fresh Commitment to Supporting Ground Troops," 2.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

“focused investment, these new approaches and newer ways of thinking will enable us to produce a set of capabilities that will expand our Air Force portfolio of military advantages.”<sup>42</sup>

#### **D. NAVY TRANSFORMATION DEVELOPMENTS**

In many ways, the Navy has changed in more fundamental ways than the Army. The Navy has moved away from focusing on control of the high seas to gaining the advantage in the littoral areas and in gaining access to inland areas. Virtually every ship in the Navy can support aircraft operations. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is intended to support the Navy’s new focus on securing and exploiting the littoral areas. The LCS would complement existing littoral capabilities and would exploit maturing networks, off-board systems, and advances in platform technology. With shallow draft, fast transport ships, the LCS will be able to move forces into contested littoral areas more rapidly and will be less dependent on traditional ports.<sup>43</sup>

Future naval operations will use revolutionary information superiority and dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive assurance, and operational independence. Sea Power 21 is the Navy’s vision and it includes the following concepts: Sea Strike, projecting precise and persistent offensive power; Sea Shield, projecting global defensive assurance; and Sea Basing, projecting joint operational independence. These strategies will be facilitated by a Force-Net, which is an overarching effort to integrate people, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a combat network. The Global Concept of Operations will disperse combat striking power by creating additional independent operational groups capable of responding simultaneously around the globe. The operational groups include 12 Carrier Strike Groups, 12 Expeditionary Strike Groups, and multiple missile-defense Surface Action Groups and guided missile submarines.<sup>44</sup>

Sea Basing is critical to Sea Power 21. It places capabilities at sea that are essential to operational success of joint and coalition missions. By doing so, it reduces

<sup>42</sup> Quoted in Elaine M. Grossman, “Air Force Unveils Fresh Commitment to Supporting Ground Troops,” 3.

<sup>43</sup> Navy Warfare Development Command, “Littoral Combat Ship Concept of Operations,” Department of the Navy, February 2003, 6-7.

<sup>44</sup> Vern Clark, “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Operations,” *Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 2002, 1.

the need to build up forces and supplies ashore, minimizes their vulnerability, and enhances operational mobility. The traditional shortcomings of sea-based forces including reach and connectivity have largely been overcome by new technologies and concepts of operations, making the traditional advantages of sea-based forces including independence, mobility, and security more accessible.<sup>45</sup>

The Sea Base is comprised of the integrated carrier and expeditionary strike groups, support ships, maritime pre-positioning ships, and high-speed support vessels. Keeping the arsenals of U.S. firepower within the theater decreases deployment and employment timelines and provides commanders with greater operational responsiveness. A theater presence and operational freedom are vital to deterring and defeating threats. Rotating crew strategies will optimize manning and provide an enduring on-scene presence.<sup>46</sup>

In the summer of 2004, the Navy successfully demonstrated responsive, credible combat power across the globe by simultaneously deploying seven Carrier Support Groups (CSGs) in five separate theaters. The exercise called “Summer Pulse ‘04” demonstrated the Navy’s first attempt to exercise its new operational strategy, the Fleet Response Plan (FRP). Within the FRP strategy, the Navy can deploy six CSGs in less than 30 days to respond to a crisis anywhere on the globe, and it should be able to deploy two more CSGs within three months to reinforce the initial forces or to support another crisis elsewhere. The plan departs from traditional six-month deployments of CSGs and steers toward a force that is more flexible and prepared to simultaneously respond whenever and wherever it is called upon.<sup>47</sup>

## **E. MARINE CORPS TRANSFORMATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) is the foundation upon which the Marines will fight in the uncertain security environment of the future. EMW combines the best of the Marines’ heritage in maneuver and expeditionary warfare. The Marines possess a strategic agility, the capability to deploy to distant theaters; an operational

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<sup>45</sup> Charles W. Moore, and Edward Hanlon Jr., “Sea Basing: Operational Independence for a New Century,” *Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 2003, 80-85.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> Commander, U.S. 2<sup>nd</sup> Fleet Public Affairs, “Four Carrier Strike Groups to Return from Summer Pulse ‘04,” *Navy Newsstand*, 21 July 2004.

reach, the capability to conduct effective operations through the depth of the battle space; and tactical flexibility, the capability to conduct concurrent, dissimilar missions. The Marines will operate from a sea-basing concept, using the littorals to influence events, and using the sea as maneuver space and as a secure base from which to project power. The Marines will fight from flexible teams known as Marine Air Ground Task Forces. They will combat major wars using Expeditionary Forces; they will fight small-scale contingencies using Expeditionary Brigades; and they will promote peace and stability with Expeditionary Units.<sup>48</sup>

Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) is the execution of combined-arms maneuver from the littoral battlespace directly to inland objectives. STOM's objective is to project combat units ashore and to sustain them until mission accomplishment. The force disposition is based on the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Previous logistics support for amphibious operations required a build-up of beach support areas, fuel farms, ammo storage, and supply centers. With the sea base providing the conduit for moving supplies, personnel and equipment ashore, the requirement for shore-based support is minimized. The maritime pre-positioning force allows a commander to rapidly create a comprehensive combat capability afloat in theater with minimum reliance on availability of access ashore.<sup>49</sup>

Transformation efforts throughout the military services share the common goals expressed by the Secretary of Defense and Joint Vision 2020. As described, the transformation efforts within the services also share the common characteristics of creating more mobile, flexible, and lethal capabilities that are geared towards self reliance and self sustainment; yet these forces are integrated with each other as well as friends and allies to accomplish objectives.

The introduction and demonstration of varied transformational initiatives has the eventual and natural side-effect of influencing how the military force is structured and positioned around the globe. The way forces are structured and positioned also depends

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<sup>48</sup> Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, "Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare: Marine Corps Capstone Concept," (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 10 November 2001), 5-9.

<sup>49</sup> Edward Hanlon, "The STOM Concept of Operations (STOM CONOPS)," Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 30 April 2003, iii.

on the military capabilities demonstrated and results achieved. The next chapter evaluates U.S. military capability in terms of its demonstrated actions in various conflicts since the Cold War.

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### **III. U.S. MILITARY CONFLICTS IN AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND KOSOVO**

The major U.S.-led conflicts since the end of the Cold War reflect similar themes in terms of the keys to their success. The United States built coalitions, gaining the necessary access into the regions of interests and providing legitimacy for its cause; and America demonstrated overmatching military capability based on technological prowess, precision weapons, joint integration, and strategic logistics, including pre-positioned materiel in the region.

#### **A. COALITIONS/ACCESS**

The building of coalitions of nations in each of these conflicts demonstrated a U.S. commitment to multinational efforts and confirmed America's reliance on other nations for access and support in remote regions.

##### **1. Afghanistan**

While peacekeeping efforts are ongoing, the United States and its allies were able to destroy Taliban forces and remove the enemy from power in Afghanistan in a mere 49 days. This is significant because the original military estimate for success was thought to be six months. This remarkable feat was achievable only when the United States rallied a coalition of nations to fight the Taliban in less than three weeks after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack in the United States.

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan demonstrated that it is difficult to rapidly deploy forces into a distant theater without standing operations orders, assured access to regional airfields/airspace, and the supporting infrastructure. Following the September 11 attacks on the United States, it took planners nearly three weeks to forge alliances, prepare plans against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and put in place the overflight, basing, and special-access agreements essential for Operation Enduring Freedom. Ramstein Air Base, Germany served as the principal strategic hub for all airlift operations supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Armenia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Azerbaijan,

Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan granted overflight privileges. Bulgaria also allowed the U.S. military use of a Black Sea base for KC-135 tanker operations.<sup>50</sup>

In accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, an attack on any one signatory is taken as an attack on all. The United States invoked this article and the NATO governments agreed. The British contributed Special Forces units, warships, and aircraft flying out of Oman, including an AWACS aircraft. Most other nations provided peacekeeping forces after the new government had been installed at Kabul. The Russians and Chinese also supported the war on terrorism. Russia helped arm the Northern Alliance.<sup>51</sup>

In preparation for the war in Afghanistan, USCENTCOM and the USAF completed site surveys of many Central Asian airfields, entered agreements with three of the countries, and negotiated limited use of airfields in the other two.<sup>52</sup> Uzbekistan was the first country to offer access rights to U.S. military forces for operations in Afghanistan. It offered Khanabad for all but offensive combat operations, serving as a logistics hub in support of ground forces in Afghanistan, search and rescue operations, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) launch and recovery. In exchange for use of airfields, the United States signed an agreement with Uzbekistan on 12 March 2002 for future cooperation and security arrangements.<sup>53</sup>

In December 2001, America signed a one-year lease/access agreement with Kyrgyzstan for use of Manas International Airport near the capital of Bishkek. The U.S. military built a 37-acre base extension to the airport with an administration headquarters, housing, warehouses, munitions bunkers, fuel tanks, etc. It was clearly the best operational base that U.S. forces had for direct access into the region. This facility supported a variety of missions and was a strategic logistics, refueling, and operational hub for air forces supporting operations over Afghanistan. It was used to transport troops and cargo to bases in the Afghan cities of Kandahar, Bagram, and Mazar-i-Sharif; stage

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<sup>50</sup> William D. O'Malley, *Central Asia and South Caucasus as an Area of Operations: Challenges and Constraints*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003), 249.

<sup>51</sup> Norman Friedman, *Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War*, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 137.

<sup>52</sup> O'Malley, *Ibid*, 255.

<sup>53</sup> O'Malley, *Ibid*, 289.



tactical fighter operations over Afghanistan; and launch unmanned UAVs. Unlike the agreements with other nations, the agreement with Kyrgyzstan did not limit the type of aircraft or missions that allies could perform from Manas. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan both provided critical overflight rights and limited access to their airfields. It cannot be overemphasized that these countries provided critical staging bases on the perimeter of Afghanistan that allowed America to more effectively and efficiently move assets into the combat zone<sup>54</sup>

In December 2001, Tajikistan offered the United States use of former Soviet air bases. The United States identified one as suitable for staging fighter-bombers, search and rescue aircraft, helicopters, and as a transportation hub for supplies, equipment and personnel into Afghanistan. In early 2002, U.S. forces deployed to Kulyab airbase, from which they conducted logistics support, search and rescue, troop deployment, and air operations. Allied French and Italian forces also deployed from this base.<sup>55</sup>

Pakistani or Saudi Arabian assistance was limited and low-key because both had been outside supporters of the Taliban. Pakistan military intelligence had placed the Taliban regime in power and much of the Al Qaeda network's financing came from Saudi Arabia. Pakistan provided direct air and ground access as well as intelligence information on the Taliban forces. President Musharraf of Pakistan found the war very useful in helping combat the fundamentalists who had been trying to overtake the Pakistan government. Saudi Arabia did not want any new American forces in its country; however it did allow the use of its American-built air operations center. The less visible the American presence, the more acceptable it was. Support aircraft were more acceptable than combat aircraft and the Saudis refused to allow combat operations from its soil.<sup>56</sup>

Since Afghanistan was landlocked and combat operations from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were not allowed, the United States had to develop a coalition with the willing Afghans. A secret agreement was reached with Uzbekistan to move U.S. troops into the country to secure bases to airlift supplies to the Northern Alliance. America

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<sup>54</sup> O'Malley, Ibid, 265-269.

<sup>55</sup> O'Malley, Ibid, 266-267, and 288.

<sup>56</sup> Friedman, Ibid, 138-144.

needed external coalition partners for two key reasons. One was operational--the United States needed intelligence on the Taliban and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had information. The other reason was that the United States required access to airspace and bases.<sup>57</sup>

Other gulf states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman did welcome U.S. and British aircraft. The United States government made it clear that it would be fighting the Taliban government and not the Afghan people. Based on Afghanistan's history of expelling occupation forces, this was a good thing because America did not intend to occupy the country and it wanted to avoid the perception that this was a war against Muslims.<sup>58</sup>

By mid-October 2001, 44 countries had provided overflight permission and 33 had provided landing rights. In addition, 36 offered military forces or equipment for raids against the Taliban, and 14 had accepted U.S. forces on their territory. Special Forces were deployed to Afghanistan by Britain, Australia, and Canada. All these countries were helpful in the cause against the Taliban; however, none were absolutely essential in that they did not hold veto power over American action. This was a key because countries may have felt pressured to veto American activity based on Muslim/Arab ties. As it turned out, American sea power provided mobile bases near Afghanistan in international waters, and the United States conducted the initial phase of the war prior to completing assembly of the coalition. Since the United States demonstrated it would conduct the war on its own if necessary, it freed many countries into feeling less pressure to join the cause.<sup>59</sup>

## **2. Iraq: Desert Shield/Storm**

Although the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated America's preeminent military power, it also confirmed the importance of building and maintaining coalitions of nations and the United States' dependence on its allies for assistance and legitimacy. The U.S.-led coalition not only provided political legitimacy, it fostered economic, military, and logistical support.<sup>60</sup> Providing some of the most critical support from outside the region

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<sup>57</sup> Friedman, *Ibid.* 140-141.

<sup>58</sup> Friedman, *Ibid.* 145.

<sup>59</sup> Friedman, *Ibid.* 149-150

<sup>60</sup> Michael J. Mazarr, Don M. Snider, and James A. Blackwell, Jr., *Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 57.

were countries such as Great Britain, Spain, Germany, France, Australia, Turkey, and Japan. From within the region it was crucial to have the support of as many Arab nations as possible including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, and even Syria to a limited extent.<sup>61</sup>

The alliances created by the United States provided access for the deployment of forces and the prosecution of the war. Access to Saudi Arabia ports and airfields was critical to the successful deployment of allied forces into the gulf region. Without this access, the United States would have had to rely on unsecured Kuwaiti facilities or depend on launching aircraft and missiles from other locations including U.S. ships.<sup>62</sup>

The staging bases located in Torrejon, Spain and Rhein Main, Germany were crucial to airlift support within the region. The deployments would have been more difficult and taken much longer without these enroute bases. It was not just a matter of having runways but it was also important to have the infrastructure, ramp space, storage facilities, refueling capability, cargo handling equipment, and personnel support facilities.<sup>63</sup>

### **3. Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom**

Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the continuing importance of regional friends and allies. The United States acquired sustained open support from the United Kingdom, Australia, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, and it also received quiet support from Saudi Arabia and Jordan despite the growing tensions between the Arab world and the United States. Saudi Arabia allowed the United States to over-fly its territory with aircraft and missiles and broadened the use of its bases to increase support of the no-fly zones. Although it did not allow combat operations from its soil, Saudi Arabia did authorize command and control and surveillance missions and operations from its territory, and it allowed the use of its facilities for search and rescue missions.

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<sup>61</sup> Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 38 and 252.

<sup>62</sup> Scott W. Conrad, *Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond*, Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994, 17.

<sup>63</sup> Rand Corporation, "Project AIR FORCE Assessment of Operation Desert Shield: The Buildup of Combat Power," (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1994).

Egypt allowed transit through its airspace and the Suez Canal. Jordan allowed U.S. overflight of its territory and authorized Patriot missile batteries to operate from its soil.<sup>64</sup>

There were some problems with obtaining basing and overflight rights for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The hesitation and reluctance on the part of some allies demanded greater flexibility and adaptation in the planning and deployment processes. When the ability to leverage access and overflight rights constantly changed, the system needed to be flexible enough to adapt.<sup>65</sup>

#### **4. Kosovo**

Again the importance of coalitions is a prevalent theme throughout this conflict. The United States could not have conducted Operation Allied Force unilaterally. NATO allies provided personnel, logistics, bases, overflight permission, host-nation force contributions including aircraft, and political and diplomatic support. Some of the most significant contributions in the region came from Hungary, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania.<sup>66</sup> General Wesley Clark, Commander of Operation Allied Force also believed that consensus among the 19 NATO nations was required to approve action and that the fundamental lesson of the campaign was that this alliance system was successful.<sup>67</sup>

### **B. MILITARY CAPABILITIES**

The U.S. military conflicts since the Cold War have confirmed that the DoD is not only on the right tract regarding transformation efforts but also that the military success demonstrated unrivaled capabilities and inspired more aggressive transformational developments along asymmetric lines.

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<sup>64</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*, (Westport Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 487 and 490-491.

<sup>65</sup> Jim Garamone, "Admiral Expands on Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned," Washington D.C.: American Forces Press Service, 2 October 2003, 1.

<sup>66</sup> Jim Garamone, "DoD Studies Kosovo Lessons Learned," *American Forces Press Service*, 14 October 1999, 2.

<sup>67</sup> Wesley Clark, "Air Chief's Kosovo Lesson: Go for the Snake's Head First," *American Forces Information Service News Articles*, October 1999, 1.

## 1. Afghanistan

Some analysts thought that America could not drop enough weapons tonnage to defeat the Taliban because it did not possess bases in the area. In September 2001, a Russian commentator remarked that the United States would find war in Afghanistan difficult because it had no nearby bases. The commentator omitted the floating bases operated by the U.S. Navy, from which about 75 percent of combat sorties over Afghanistan were launched.<sup>68</sup>

This was the first time in history that a government had relied on its fleet to strike a land-locked country more than 350 miles from the sea and separated from the sea by a third state (in this case, Pakistan). The Afghan war was largely a maritime-based war. The Marines came from the sea, Tomahawks were fired from destroyers, and submarines operated in the Gulf of Oman. With sufficient refueling, the range of carrier aircraft could match the cruise missiles. The United States could move these floating carrier bases at will. The majority of tactical air power was delivered from the carriers since the only permanent air base in the region at the beginning of hostilities was located at Oman.<sup>69</sup>

The war involved three strike aircraft carriers--the Enterprise, Carl Vinson, and Theodore Roosevelt. The carrier John C. Stennis was also sent to the area in November 2001. There were also two amphibious ready groups and the large amphibious ships, Bataan and Pelelieu, carrying Marine Expeditionary Units that would play the principle ground forces role in southern Afghanistan. Army helicopters based in Uzbekistan covered the northern part of the country.<sup>70</sup> In the Afghanistan campaign, America used one of its carriers, the Kitty Hawk as an afloat forward staging base (AFSB) for Special Forces, including more than 1,000 personnel from the Navy SEALs, U.S. Army and USAF special operations units, and Green Berets. Rotary assets including the MH-60 Blackhawk, MH-47 Chinook, and MH-53 Pave Low were also available from the carrier. This flexibility allowed better command and control of Special Forces operations, provided joint basing and command facilities, and allowed for better management of

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<sup>68</sup> Friedman, *Ibid.* 157.

<sup>69</sup> Friedman, *Ibid.* 159-160.

<sup>70</sup> Friedman, *Ibid.* 160-161.

helicopter assets.<sup>71</sup> The use of carriers as AFSBs is an evolution in the role of carriers in military operations and represents the military's desire to increase American power projection and strike capability across the globe.<sup>72</sup>

Aircraft range is of limited importance when forward basing is available; however, at the beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan, the United States could not deploy combat aircraft into bases in Central Asia and Pakistan, although it did acquire this capability over time. The lack of forward basing limited the use of shorter range aircraft; however, F-18s, F-14s, and other fighters relied on air refueling for extended missions from the carriers. The successful carrier operations were highly dependent on USAF refueling assets based in Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman.<sup>73</sup>

Since America had no operating bases or strong allies guaranteeing access rights near Afghanistan, the most efficient and effective way to support operations, as demonstrated in Bosnia and Kosovo was to establish at least one regional staging base. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the Air Force staged about 12 KC-10/135 tankers out of Burgas air base, Bulgaria, to refuel air-lifters over the Black Sea.<sup>74</sup> America relied heavily on strategic airlift to transport forces and equipment to forward staging areas and the battlefield. Of the 5,500 missions in Afghanistan, the USAF estimated that the C-17 was involved in 2,872. The Air Force is using these figures as part of the justification to purchase 60 new C-17s.<sup>75</sup>

During the early weeks of Operation Enduring Freedom, American and allied combat air operations were restricted to long-range bombers and carrier-based aircraft. The U.S. Navy generated about 90 percent of the sorties during the initial weeks of combat. The Air Force prefers to operate their larger airlift and tanker aircraft from long, well-reinforced runways, usually 8,000 to 10,000 feet. The emphasis is on preference

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<sup>71</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Control*, (Washington DC: Center For Strategic International Studies, 12 August 2002), 84.

<sup>72</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Control*, 84-85.

<sup>73</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Control*, 48-49.

<sup>74</sup> O'Malley, 263.

<sup>75</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Control*, 39.

because the Air Force is prepared and has operated from airfields that fall far short of the preferred standard. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the Air Force improvised due to lack of access to larger airfields by having them fly racetrack orbits along the en-route flight paths. This option was less than optimal because it increased the sortie rate for the tankers. The Air Force was prepared to overcome shortfalls by bringing in fuel bladders, mobile navigation and control systems, tents, and life support systems. Additionally both the Air Force and the Army employed American contractors to provide specific support using local labor and materials.<sup>76</sup>

In the Central Asian airfields, the Air Force deployed a Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE) to establish or upgrade existing command and control, navigation, maintenance, and logistic support operations. Air Force engineers also deployed early to improve airfield operations and provide life-support facilities for troops on the ground. The Air Force has prepackaged, transportable bare base kits that contain everything from tents to latrines to support a thousand troops. The Central Asian airfields served as forward support locations (FSLs) for U.S. forces operating in the region. FSLs are regional support facilities outside CONUS, located at sites with high assurance of access. They can be upgraded and stocked to support the rapid deployment of forces into the region, and can be maintained with only a minimal or temporary U.S. military presence.<sup>77</sup>

Diego Garcia housed eight B-1B and ten B-52 bombers. These aircraft flew on average, one mission every other day, or a total of four B-1 and five B-52 missions per day. The new GPS technology allowed these heavy bombers to drop precision guided munitions. Overall, naval aircraft flew about 75 percent of all sorties and dropped about 30 percent of the munitions while the AF flew about 25 percent of the combat sorties and dropped about 70 percent of the munitions.<sup>78</sup>

The use of air power was a principle factor in the speedy collapse of the Taliban. In the initial phase, American bombers and carrier-based aircraft destroyed Taliban air defenses, communications, and military installations. It was not until the fourth week of the offensive that air power shifted to support of ground troops. Special Forces on the

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<sup>76</sup> O'Malley, 249-251.

<sup>77</sup> O'Malley, 266.

<sup>78</sup> Friedman, 161.

ground helped identify targets for the aircraft. In many cases the response time was less than 20 minutes from the moment a target was spotted to its destruction.<sup>79</sup>

The shift toward precision munitions since the end of the Cold War has been demonstrated by the estimate that 10,000 of the 18,000, or 60 percent of the U.S. air weapons used in Afghanistan were precision guided. This compares to 35 percent used in the Kosovo campaign and 10 percent used in Iraq for Desert Storm. B-52s and B-1s flew 10 percent of the missions but delivered 65 percent of the munitions and bombers dropped half of the guided munitions.<sup>80</sup>

In the past, U.S. forces had to rely on laser-guided bombs. The pilot not only had to visually locate the target, the target had to be distinctive from its surroundings. Many targets were difficult to locate or to distinguish from the environment. The new precision weapons, namely Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), flew to preset coordinates based on satellite navigation. The JDAM meant that forward controllers had a different set of requirements. The controller only needed a set of target coordinates and a hand-held GPS receiver to provide the coordinates. A laptop computer and a modem were used to transmit the results to an orbiting bomber. The equivalent laser designator was heavy and relatively more difficult to operate.<sup>81</sup> Another benefit of JDAMs was that a heavy bomber could use them to engage multiple targets and in quick succession; thus the strategic bomber force could also be used as a powerful tactical weapon.<sup>82</sup>

Another key to success in Afghanistan was the close interaction of fire and maneuver—neither of which was sufficient by itself, and neither of which could have succeeded without forces on the ground.<sup>83</sup> In cooperation with trained spotters on the ground, airpower demonstrated a level of flexibility, accuracy, and power exceeding any previous war. Surveillance assets could not detect all enemy positions and precision

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<sup>79</sup> Milan Vego, “What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?” *Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 2002, 5.

<sup>80</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Control*, 47 and 86.

<sup>81</sup> Friedman, 166.

<sup>82</sup> Friedman, 167.

<sup>83</sup> Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002), iv.



weapons could not annihilate the most heavily concealed, dug-in positions. It was the combination of the combat ground forces, all-weather fires and air support that made the difference.<sup>84</sup>

U.S. forces faced operational challenges in Afghanistan with regard to terrain. They effectively used helicopters to provide high-speed mobility, and responsive and precise airborne fire support to provide long-range engagement capability as well as close air support. The combination of precision-guided munitions and good target designation/identification from the ground proved to be a deadly combination that made it possible to effectively use high-flying bombers for close support missions.<sup>85</sup>

Controllers made flexible air operations practical, as aircraft could orbit over Afghanistan until they were assigned a particular controller. Some controllers even rode on horses to traverse the mountainous terrain. One report credited the controllers with winning the battle for Kabul in 25 days rather than the six months predicted by war planners.<sup>86</sup> Air attacks were called in and controlled by Special Forces personnel, including Air Force tactical air controllers. Not all targets were found by Special Forces on the ground. In many cases reconnaissance aircraft were cued by electronic intelligence aircraft such as the EP-3E and the RC-135.<sup>87</sup>

The United States demonstrated much better joint capabilities in warfighting than it had in previous campaigns. According to USAF Brig. Gen. James Smith, in a traditional scenario, the military in Afghanistan would have had the Marines on the coast, the Army in another sector, and the Air Force in another. Lines on a map would divide them. They would not talk to each other, so you had to stay on your own side of the line. There were no lines in Afghanistan. Military officials developed a technical bridge between two systems. The joint forces commander had the new ability to integrate ground forces with air forces.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Conrad C. Crane, *The U.S. Army's Initial Impressions of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, September 2003), 2.

<sup>85</sup> O'Malley, 291.

<sup>86</sup> Friedman, 171.

<sup>87</sup> Friedman, 156-157.

<sup>88</sup> Linda D. Kozaryn, "Demystifying 'Transformation.'" Suffolk, VA: *American Foreign Press Service*, 14 August 2002, 2-3.

One of the most incredible aspects of the war was the speed with which it was begun and then fought. The new type of warfare that made it possible to fight using very limited forces increased that speed.<sup>89</sup> Some U.S. officials cautioned that it would take over six months to break the Taliban's five-year hold on power; it took 49 days. The sensor-to-shooter loop which indicates the time it takes to obtain, process, and relay target information was tightened from days to hours, and then to minutes.<sup>90</sup>

The sensor-to-shooter process relied on surveillance sensors including thermal images, Predator reconnaissance drones, and satellites to locate the enemy. With this network of intelligence and surveillance, U.S. ground forces held the enemy in place from a distance and bombs or artillery, not infantrymen, were often used to finish off the foe.<sup>91</sup>

In Afghanistan, for the first time, America was able to provide around-the-clock airborne surveillance. Virtually any ground movement could be detected and dealt with. This allowed U.S. forces to attack a target within minutes of identifying it and led to real time targeting. Navy pilots reported that in 80 percent of their missions they did not know their intended target when they left the carrier. Command and reconnaissance aircraft were linked so that real time intelligence could be used for targeting purposes.<sup>92</sup>

## **2. Iraq: Desert Shield/Desert Storm**

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Five days later, the United States began its initial deployment of military forces to Saudi Arabia. Phase I of the military deployment, Desert Shield, was implemented as a defensive maneuver to deter Iraqi forces from overtaking Saudi Arabia. It marked the greatest buildup of combat power across the greatest distances in history; the deployment of forces and equipment was several times larger than the amounts deployed during Vietnam and Korea during a comparable time frame.<sup>93</sup> It took nearly six weeks to deploy the first heavy armored division and roughly three months before equipment, supplies, and troops adequate to

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<sup>89</sup> Friedman, 158.

<sup>90</sup> Bernard Rostker, *Transformation and the Unfinished Business of Jointness: Lessons Learned for the Army from the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003), 145.

<sup>91</sup> Rostker, 146.

<sup>92</sup> Friedman, 168.

<sup>93</sup> Scott W. Conrad, *Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond*, 23-24.

defend Saudi Arabia were in place. The absence of further Iraqi aggression provided the United States and its allies the luxury of time to position the necessary troops and equipment in the theater.<sup>94</sup> Three months into the buildup of forces, President Bush decided to change U.S. objectives from merely defending Saudi Arabia to an offensive strategy of expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Nine weeks from the beginning of deploying offensive forces into Saudi Arabia, the United States was ready for Phase II of the operations, Desert Storm.<sup>95</sup>

The United States was well prepared for its foray into the Iraq in 1990; however, the previous Cold War military structure and force positioning strategy did not lend themselves to easily support logistics for various regional contingencies around the globe. President Bush's new "global stability" strategy called for a more mobile crisis response capability which promoted influence and access around the world. To reduce deployment time, the United States developed pre-positioning ships that could store strategic war materiel at sea in specific regions of interest. In addition, despite the fact that the Middle East countries kept the U.S. military forces at arms length and prevented them from establishing permanent bases in the region, some of these countries did allow temporary deployments and military exercises in the region. These exercises helped the United States get its foot in the door in the Middle East and proved to be part of the success story in Iraq because it allowed America to attain a military presence and capability in the region, even if only temporary and on a small scale.<sup>96</sup>

Strategic sealift provided a solid base for Desert Shield/Storm deployments. The Navy had 11 Afloat Pre-positioned ships. These ships, including one hospital ship, carried ordnance, fuel and supplies for the Army and the Air Force. The Army used four of these pre-positioned ships at Diego Garcia. The Marines used assets from its 13 maritime pre-positioned ships forming three squadrons based in Guam, Diego Garcia,

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<sup>94</sup> United States Government Accounting Office, *Desert Shield/Storm: U.S. Transportation Command's Support of Operation: Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives*, (Washington D.C.: The Government Accounting Office, January 1992), 4.

<sup>95</sup> United States Government Accounting Office, *Operation Desert Storm: Transportation and Distribution of Equipment and Supplies in Southwest Asia*, (Washington D.C.: The Government Accounting Office, 26 December 1991), 2-3.

<sup>96</sup> Douglas Menarchik, *Powerlift—Getting to Desert Storm: Strategic Transportation and Strategy in the New World Order*, (Westport Connecticut: Praeger, 1993), 5-10.

and the Atlantic. These ships carried equipment and 30 days of supplies for three Marine Expeditionary Brigades. The Navy also possessed eight Fast Sealift Ships capable of 30 knots speed for rapid deployment of Army equipment and supplies. The Ready Reserve Force consisted of 96 ships, mostly of the roll-on/roll-off variety to allow rapid loading and unloading of equipment and supplies. Most of the ship-borne assets were processed through the Ad Dammam and Al Jubail seaports in Saudi Arabia.<sup>97</sup>

The Air Force had 30 percent of its pre-positioned assets at air bases in the Middle East, including Oman, Thumrait, Masirah, and Bahrain, and 52 percent stored in pre-arranged sets of supplies in the CONUS. Most airborne assets were offloaded at Dhahran airport. The Air Force primarily used four enroute staging bases to deliver equipment and supplies to the Middle East. Zaragoza and Torrejon Spain, and Rhein-Main and Ramstein Germany handled 75 percent of the airflow for deployments.<sup>98</sup>

As important as technology, airpower, stealth, and precision weapons were to this new way of war, the American strategic transportation system was just as critical to the success of the war in Iraq. The United States was able to strategically move a defensive force halfway around the world in twelve weeks; strategically move an offensive force, double the size of the defensive force, to the Gulf in another nine weeks; and strategically transport two Corps in theater for a surprise envelopment of the Iraqi forces. American strategic forces demonstrated the ability to reach anywhere on the globe. America further demonstrated it could deploy air forces and light ground forces around the world in a matter of days.<sup>99</sup>

The war against Iraq was without precedent in military history. It was the dawn of a new age in which technology overshadowed conventional war-making, a war in which the allied side had a clear picture of unfolding events while the Iraqis remained in the fog. It was a war in which a new breed of highly specialized and proficient warriors outmatched the traditional soldiers, and it was the first war in history in which airpower, not ground forces, was the deciding element. In the end, a million-man army was

<sup>97</sup> Department of the Navy, "The United States Navy in 'Desert Storm,'" Department of Defense—Department of the Navy, 15 May 1991, 13-14.

<sup>98</sup> John Lund, Ruth Berg, and Corinne Replogle, *An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993, 18, and 35-41.

<sup>99</sup> Menarchik, 18 and 176.

devastated and its equipment and facilities were laid to waste as easily as target practice. This was new way of war demonstrated how technology and asymmetric capabilities ruled the day and it would portend the wars of the future.<sup>100</sup>

### **3. Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom**

The transformational character of Operation Iraqi Freedom clearly stood out when contrasting the U.S.-led forces with the Iraqi military. The speed and scale of the successful military operations spoke volumes about the differences in capabilities between the two forces. From 19 March 2002, when Special Operations Forces entered Iraq to 14 April 2002, when major military operations ceased, the U.S.-led forces swept through Iraq with speed and efficiency, clearing the way for profound change in the country. The coalition forces obviously did not require the traditional gauge of military power to achieve victory. Given traditional war planning strategies, the United States would have needed five to seven heavy divisions to defeat the Iraqi military, not the one American Army mechanized division, the one Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, the one light British armored division, and the one light Air Mobile Division.<sup>101</sup>

In terms of capability, the Iraqi Army was no match for the superior forces led by the United States. The United States was able to combine air and land operations and support them from the sea in concert with joint and coalition forces to defeat the enemy. Secretary Rumsfeld summarized the key lessons learned during operation Iraqi Freedom as overmatching the opponent.

“Overmatching power” is more important than “overwhelming force.” In the past, under the doctrine of overwhelming force, force tended to be measured in terms of mass—the number of troops that were committed to a particular conflict. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, mass may no longer be the best measure of power in a conflict. After all, when Baghdad fell, there were just over 100,000 American forces on the ground. General Franks

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<sup>100</sup> As a result of the allied dominance and rapid success in the Iraq War, President Bush believed the Persian Gulf War was the prototype of the post-cold war conflict. He predicted that potential adversaries would reconsider aggressive and hostile moves out of fear of having to face a U.S. challenge. The war sent a message to any future tyrants that the United States would not stand idle in the face of a threat to its national interests. See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War*, x-xi and 467.

<sup>101</sup> Officers like General Richard Meyers, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and General John M. Keane, Army vice Chief of Staff indicated that precision airpower and advances in armored maneuver capability and joint warfare created a situation where far smaller forces could be used to secure the flanks and rear, and where precision and speed of maneuver would be much more effective than a more traditional method of fighting. See Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*, 149.

overwhelmed the enemy not with the typical three to one advantage in mass, but by overmatching the enemy with advanced capabilities, and using those capabilities in innovative and unexpected ways.<sup>102</sup>

In terms of pre-positioned equipment and supplies, the United States was able to move about a quarter of the amount of war materiel transported during Desert Shield/Storm with less transportation capacity in about three months. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, it took the United States only three months to build the same combat capability that took seven months to build in the first Iraq War.<sup>103</sup>

#### **4. Kosovo Conflict**

On 24 March 1999, the United States and its NATO allies shifted from a diplomatic path to a strategy backed by the threat and use of force supported by diplomacy. The United States and its NATO allies forced Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo, degraded his military capabilities, and rescued and resettled over one million refugees. The coalition accomplished its goals through the most precise and lowest-collateral-damage air campaign in history as reflected by the zero American or allied combat casualties in over two months of combat operations, including over 38,000 air sorties.<sup>104</sup>

In preparation for the Kosovo campaign, the United States augmented its European forces with forces from around the world. It even repositioned forces and placed others on alert-response postures to ensure potential threats from North Korea and Iraq did not increase. Stocks of preferred precision weapons were pre-positioned within the theater to improve the logistics flow and to save time. Strategic airlift was preferred over sea lift due to the commander's requirement to have materiel deployed as soon as possible. As there were not enough bases in the local area to accommodate all the force capabilities required, strike aircraft were deployed in close proximity to Kosovo while tanker and airlift aircraft were positioned at longer-range airfields.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Prepared Testimony by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 July 2003.

<sup>103</sup> Robert W. Cone, "Briefing on Joint Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom," U.S. DoD News Transcript, 2 October 2003, 4

<sup>104</sup> William S. Cohen, and Henry H. Shelton, "Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review," United States DoD News Release, 14 Oct 99, 1-2.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, 6-12.

Similar to the war in Afghanistan, there was no traditional clash of massed military forces in Operation Allied Force. The use of air strikes and precision guided munitions against strategic, military-industrial infrastructure, and national command and control targets as well as attacks against ground forces and equipment caused Milosevic to surrender.<sup>106</sup>

### **C. MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED**

In less than two months, the United States destroyed a most repressive regime in Afghanistan. America fought without convenient bases or ports, 7,000 miles away – and against a landlocked, mountainous and unfamiliar land. The Army demonstrated proficiency at closing in on and destroying the enemy, coordinating precision fires and maneuver, maintaining information superiority, commanding and controlling joint and multinational forces, defending land and people, and conducting sustainment operations.<sup>107</sup> In similar short periods of time, U.S. military forces routed Iraqi forces and dispelled them from Kuwait in 1991, U.S. forces deposed the tyrannical Iraqi regime in 2003, and overthrew Milosevic from Kosovo in 1999.

The Afghan War demonstrated the need to be able to rapidly project land and airpower at very long distances. It demonstrated the value of strategic airlift and long-range strike capability, and the ability to operate with limited forward basing. It also confirmed the value of Special Forces for counterterrorism and asymmetric warfare.<sup>108</sup>

This war was far different from the war to liberate Kuwait. The five-month build-up to Desert Shield and Desert Storm relied on the Time Phased Force Deployment Lists (TPFDLs) and detailed plans. There were only 12 Requests for Forces (RFFS) during the Persian Gulf War while there were over 160 for the Afghanistan War, reflecting the constantly changing nature of the conflict. Augmentees and reinforcements came from various commands around the world.<sup>109</sup>

Compared to the Kosovo War, forces engaged in Enduring Freedom used preexisting command structures from Central Command. Command relations were clear

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, 4-6.

<sup>107</sup> Crane, 6.

<sup>108</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation*, 38.

<sup>109</sup> Crane, 2.

from the beginning and the structure did not have to be built for this specific operation. The solution was the permanent Joint Task Forces that were assigned to operations on an 'as required' basis.<sup>110</sup>

The Afghan War was both a test and a demonstration of an emerging new style of warfare, or a Revolution in Military Affairs. It was characterized by remote sensors used to allow commanders to attack targets which the attackers often cannot directly see. It emphasized quick operations to upset an enemy's timetable and to destroy his will to fight. When the ground force element was added to the employment of precision weaponry, the strategy proved very successful. Without the Northern Alliance and the Special Forces guiding the weapons to many unseen targets, success would not have been achieved.<sup>111</sup>

With the success of the Afghan, Iraqi, and Kosovo models, it would make sense to restructure U.S. forces to reduce dramatically the ground forces that make up such a large fraction of today's military, and shift toward a much greater reliance on standoff precision engagement forces and the SOF teams needed to direct their fire. In Korea, for example, many analysts believe that our South Korean allies could at least match their enemy's skills as the Northern Alliance did against the Taliban, and this would suggest that large U.S. ground forces may be less necessary for the defense of the peninsula than is often supposed.<sup>112</sup>

The precision with which these wars were conducted proved vital from a military perspective because the limited number of weapons required to achieve a specific result corresponded to the limited logistics tail the United States could bring to bear in the region. One implication of this type warfare is that small units gain enormously in firepower. A battalion properly supported can perform the work of a brigade. Concentration in investment shifts from platforms and mass units to remote sensing and network coordination. The bottom-line effect may be in cutting down the size of our force structure.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Friedman, 163-164.

<sup>111</sup> Friedman, 212.

<sup>112</sup> Biddle, 50.

<sup>113</sup> Friedman, 213-216.



In general, during this last decade, access has been granted to U.S. and allied aircraft, especially when a host nation's national interests are threatened. Access restrictions will always impact operations; however, Operation Allied Force proved that employment from great distances is possible when conducting sustained operations and forward basing need not be a major limitation. These wars also demonstrated the value of naval forces which could operate free of bases. This independence encouraged neighboring states to offer basing facilities, which made it possible to conduct the war more efficiently.<sup>114</sup>

#### **D. MILITARY LIMITATIONS**

The success of a military operation often depends on the local operational capabilities. Local infrastructure may not be able to support a planned deployment of U.S. forces. Whatever the mission, the first step in implementation is to deliver forces and equipment into the area of operations. In Central Asia and the South Caucasus the distance to the region, rough terrain, and lack of infrastructure, as well as access to airfields and ports posed significant challenges. The degree of the challenge depends on how much material and equipment must be transported into the region.<sup>115</sup> Since the distance from Ramstein AB to the combat area was more than 3,500 miles and the C-17 range is approximately 2,600 miles, refueling was required enroute.<sup>116</sup>

The conflict in Afghanistan confirmed the value of favorable military positioning, planning, preparing and executing in major campaigns. U.S. maritime, land-based aircraft, and ground forces, and their logistical supplies had to be moved into the area from thousands of miles away. In the initial phases, America lacked adequate host nation support to insert its ground forces and tactical land-based aircraft into the region. That is why the U.S. Navy's carrier battle groups played such a critical role.<sup>117</sup> This limitation should not be a shortfall in places where access and pre-positioned supplies and equipment are already available, such as in Japan, Korea, and Guam.

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<sup>114</sup> Friedman, 219.

<sup>115</sup> O'Malley, 242-243.

<sup>116</sup> O'Malley, 269-270.

<sup>117</sup> Vego, 3.

While some may think the new technologies passed the test of the revolution in military affairs, the Taliban and Iraqi forces never had a chance to challenge the overwhelming power of America. Air defenses that were virtually non-existent accounted for U.S. air superiority in only a matter of hours. The enemy did not have the capability to effectively respond to the attack. The United States will still have to be on its guard against a tougher, more adept foe.<sup>118</sup>

Despite having allies around the world, there is no such thing as “assured” access to the territory of any other sovereign power. Regardless of what treaties, agreements, or understandings may be in place, nations retain ultimate control of their territory and airspace.<sup>119</sup> In addition, even when access is granted, the facilities in a host nation may not be suited for American requirements. For example, although some bordering states, all ex-Soviet, were sympathetic to the war on terror, use of their bases required build-up since spares and maintenance facilities were absent. Whatever airbases they offered at the outset could only support limited aircraft operations.<sup>120</sup>

Sea basing also poses limitations. In order to gain mobility, ships carry only limited numbers of aircraft and munitions. These limitations made the precision weapons all the more crucial in the war. One reason that the United States did not immediately attack Iraq after Afghanistan was that it needed to replenish weapon stocks.<sup>121</sup> Another limit is that carrier-based aircraft have to be refueled in order to strike deep inland. Refueling operations relied heavily on U.S. and British tankers based in Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE. However, even if these countries had vetoed aircraft refueling operations from their bases, the U.S. carrier aircraft still had the capability of refueling each other using the buddy-system.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Vego, 8.

<sup>119</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, and Jeremy Shapiro, ed., *Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand. 2002), 351.

<sup>120</sup> Friedman, 163.

<sup>121</sup> Friedman, 213.

<sup>122</sup> Friedman, 161-162.

#### **IV. CAPABILITY AND COMMITMENT VS. PERMANENT PRESENCE: THE EXAMPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES**

The loss of forward basing in an allied country does not necessarily mean a loss in deterrence, nor does it automatically result in instability within the region. Credible U.S. capability and commitment reinforced by strong and positive engagement may produce the same desired effects of forward basing.

##### **A. THE U.S-PHILIPPINES DEFENSE ALLIANCE**

On 14 March 1947 President Roxas and U.S. Ambassador Paul MacNutt signed the U.S.-Philippines “Military Bases Agreement.” It formalized the use of 23 bases and installations by the United States in the Philippines.<sup>123</sup> The military basing agreement received most of the publicity when the U.S. military was ousted from the Philippines in 1992; however, the United States had various other treaties or pacts that marked its comprehensive relationship with the Philippines. The 12 March 1947 “Military Assistance Act” committed the United States to assist in the development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), including creation of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) to assist in the training and equipping of the AFP.<sup>124</sup>

The United States entered into another agreement with the Philippines called the “Military Assistance Pact.” It was signed on 21 March 1947 and obligated the U.S. armed forces to equip and train the AFP. The Philippines and the United States also have a long-standing agreement for mutual defense. On 30 August 1951, the signing of the “Mutual Defense Treaty” further strengthened the U.S.-Philippines relations. Article 4 of the treaty states that “each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its own constitutional processes.”<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Col Samuel Narcise, “Republic of the Philippines – United States of America Visiting Forces Agreement: Balikatan Exercises,” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003, 3.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid, 4.

An armed attack on either of the parties includes an armed attack on the territory of either of the nations, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.<sup>126</sup>

The original Military Bases Agreement was intended as a 99-year lease but was revised in 1966 to allow only 25 years from the date of the revision. On 16 September 1991, a quarter of a century later, by a vote of 12 to 11, the Philippine Senate rejected to extend the lease. The American flag was lowered for the last time at Subic Bay on 24 November, 1992.<sup>127</sup> The next section examines some of the causes for the Philippine Senate's rejection of the basing agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces.

## **B. WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES**

The Philippines rejection of an extension to the basing agreement and the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces resulted from a combination of international and domestic factors and natural forces. The end of the Cold War brought about pressures for reduced American forces presence worldwide. The closure of the bases in the Philippines occurred in the same period as American domestic support for overseas forces waned and political pressure for base closures and military downsizing gained momentum. This period was also a time of political turmoil in the Philippines, when the nationalist movement to remove U.S. military bases was at its peak. Many Filipinos believed that they were never given the same respect by the United States as other countries such as Japan and those in Europe. Many Filipinos did not consider themselves to be completely independent so long as the Americans continued to occupy bases in their country. Others resented the nearly century-long presence of the United States in their country and the continuing American support of the Marcos "dictatorship."<sup>128</sup>

In terms of renegotiating the military bases agreement, the Philippines was bargaining for a lofty \$1.5 billion annually in exchange for use of the bases, while American diplomats were negotiating with figures at the low end of the spectrum, \$450 million per year. After Mount Pinatubo erupted from 12-15 June 1991 and blanketed

<sup>126</sup> Micool Brooke, "Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty," *Asian Defense Journal*, no. 6 (June 1999), 7.

<sup>127</sup> Earl K. Hampton, Jr., "Subic Bay: The Last Five Years Has USCINCPAC Strategy Changed?" (Newport R.I.: Naval War College, 1998), 1.

<sup>128</sup> Thomas J. Garcia, "The Potential Role of the Philippines in the U.S. Naval Forward Presence" (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Master's Thesis, 2001), 11.

Clark Air Base in ash, the United States lost its desire to use this airfield and offered \$203 million annually for the use of Subic Bay. Nicholas Pratt the American ambassador not only knew that this figure was unacceptable to the Philippines; he also doubted that the U.S. Congress would even approve the proposed 10-year, \$2 billion dollar treaty.<sup>129</sup>

Mother Nature complicated matters further when Typhoon Yunya struck the northern Philippine islands at the same time as the major eruption of Mt. Pinatubo on 15 June. The resulting damages from collapsed, ash-laden buildings, flooded homes, and looted facilities drove estimates for restoring Clarke AFB after Pinatubo to between \$600 and \$800 million. Congress would hardly authorize that kind of money even if the Philippine Senate voted to retain the basing agreement.<sup>130</sup>

Despite the pressures from all sides to discontinue basing U.S. forces in the Philippines, the United States and the Philippines still valued their alliance. The next section demonstrates the will and commitment of both countries to support their comprehensive security relationship.

### **C. CONTINUED AMERICAN SUPPORT**

#### **1. Other Agreements and Comprehensive Security:**

Despite the Philippine rejection of the Military Bases Agreement and the American forces withdrawal, the two countries remained defense allies based on the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The United States also insisted that it would remain a Pacific power, hoping to continue projecting its influence in the region.<sup>131</sup> The rejection of the basing agreement did not void the other agreements, namely the Military Assistance Agreement, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. These agreements guaranteed U.S.-Philippine security and defense.<sup>132</sup>

Not only are the United States and the Philippines bound by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, they are bound by long-standing investments, the presence of over 100,000 Americans in the Philippines and 2.2 million Filipinos in the United States. In 1992, nearly a century of U.S. military presence ended. Former President Ramos

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<sup>129</sup> Donald Kirk, *Looted: The Philippines after the Bases*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998), 11.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid*, 27, and 32-33.

<sup>131</sup> Col Samuel Narcise, "Republic of the Philippines – United States of America Visiting Forces Agreement: Balikatan Exercises," 5.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid*, 6.

dismissed the idea that the American departure created a power vacuum in the region. “What is more important than basing forces on land is the continued presence, engagement, and commitment of the only remaining superpower.”<sup>133</sup>

In his meeting with Philippine President Ramos, President Clinton said that “cooperative U.S.-Philippine relations would continue despite the recent closure of two huge U.S. bases” in the Philippines. President Clinton continued, “the end of the Cold War and the closure of our bases there has not changed the basis for continuing cooperation between our two nations...such cooperation will be based on investment ties, mutual security interests and the democratic ideals both countries hold.”<sup>134</sup>

President Ramos supported Clinton’s remarks by stating that the region’s security should not be based solely on defense treaties or joint military exercises with U.S. forces but also on economic development. “We foresee a long period of stability and prosperity in the region; however, for this to be the case, the United States must remain engaged.”<sup>135</sup>

In 1992, more than 25,000 U.S. troops departed Asia, mostly due to the Philippine base closings. Despite this withdrawal, from the perspective of other Southeast Asian nations, the United States still retained access to the region through its landing rights and facilities in several nations. Malaysia’s Defense Minister, Datuk Mohamed Najib Abdul Razak said “The U.S. forces can still operate anywhere, of course, but regional powers will be expected to play a much more influential role. This is a natural process.”<sup>136</sup>

“In any event, analysts agreed that the U.S. military could defend the Philippines through the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet and Ready Reaction Marine Task forces without stationing troops in the country which suited the current security scenario as well as the Philippine pride over

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<sup>133</sup> William Branigin, “Philippine Leader Begins U.S. Visit Aimed at Strengthening Ties,” *The Washington Post*, 11 November 1993, A.45.

<sup>134</sup> Ann Devroy, “U.S., Philippines Pledge Economic Cooperation; Trade, Investment Dominate Clinton-Ramos Talks,” *The Washington Post*, 23 November 1993, A.32.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> Marcus W. Brauchli, “Security Tensions Rise in Southeast Asia---Suspensions Simmer Privately as Defenses Are Altered,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 31 March 1993, A.1.

the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA.)”<sup>137</sup> The next section demonstrates how America continued supporting the Philippines through various forms of aid, training, and exercises.

## **2. Aid, Training, and Exercises**

Though the United States withdrew its military forces from the Philippines, it continued to provide financial aid and military assistance to its ally. For example, in 1993, the United States provided \$156 million in financial aid, \$45 million in military assistance and \$2.45 million in International Military and Education Training (IMET).<sup>138</sup> Though U.S. aid to the Philippines decreased after its armed forces departed, it hovered around \$50 million per year in the mid 1990s.<sup>139</sup>

Since the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the U.S.-Philippine security relationship evolved to fit the current security system. America gradually established a post-bases relationship consistent with its activities elsewhere in the region—exercises, warship visits, exchanges, and policy dialogues.<sup>140</sup>

In Asia, U.S. force presence played a key role in promoting peace and security in the region; however, it was only one element of the U.S. overseas engagement in the region that included conventional diplomacy, international trade and investment, educational, scientific and cultural exchanges. The diversity of U.S. policy reflected a comprehensive overseas engagement to protect and promote security interests in Asia.<sup>141</sup>

After the Philippines discontinued the basing agreement, it continued to conduct annual military training exercises with the United States through 1995. Much of the exercise program was on hiatus until 1998 when the United States and the Philippines resolved the legal issues of the Visiting Forces Agreement. The current U.S.-Philippine

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<sup>137</sup> Micool Brooke, “Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,” p. 11.

<sup>138</sup> IMET is intended to allow the United States to do the following: Retain contact and influence with the Philippine military in the absence of the day-to-day relationship that existed prior to the bases withdrawal; uphold its R.P.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty responsibilities; ensure that the Philippine military is competent and compatible with the United States’ military; maximize joint training and interoperability as outlined in the East Asian Strategy Initiative; and continue to support democracy and human rights in the Philippines. See Jennifer Morrison Taw, “Thailand and the Philippines: Case Studies in the U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development,” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994), 39-40.

<sup>139</sup> Donald Kirk, *Looted: The Philippines after the Bases*, 19.

<sup>140</sup> Micool Brooke, “Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,” 6.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid*, 7.

relations include a number of annual combined exercises, the most important of which is Balikatan, which is designed to improve planning, readiness and interoperability between the forces.<sup>142</sup>

U.S. Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing also play a key role in supporting American regional policy. The United States also participates in a number of combined training activities that improve dialogue and exchange between countries, reduce misperceptions, increase understanding of security concerns, and build confidence between the two defense establishments to avoid accidents or miscalculations.<sup>143</sup>

One of the lessons the United States can learn from losing its bases in the Philippines is to avoid heavy reliance on support from any one country. Expanded relations and cooperation with ASEAN is imperative. Since the removal of U.S. bases from the Philippines, other ASEAN nations have been more accommodating of U.S. military forces. While America lost bases in the Philippines it acquired access to ports in Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. American presence is only one element of stability in the region; cooperation among ASEAN nations is the foundation of security.<sup>144</sup>

Exercise CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) is an example of this cooperation. Each ASEAN state with the exception of Vietnam participates with U.S. armed forces in training and military assistance. Other exercises include Cobra Gold with Thailand, and search and rescue operations with Malaysia and Indonesia.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Other combined military activities include the following: Balance Piston, a special operations exercise specializing in small unit tactics; Teak Piston, a special ops exercise in various types of air operations; Flash Piston, a special ops exercise in maritime operations and small unit tactics; Vector Balance Piston, a special ops exercise in Close Quarter Battle skills; Carat (Cooperation Afloat Readiness And Training), a 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet exercise in naval combat training, amphibious operations, and air surveillance; MARSURVEX (Maritime Surveillance Exercise – quarterly 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet exercise involving integrated maritime and air operations; PALAH (Pang Lupa Alon Himpapawid) Semi-annual SEAL exercise; Marine Tactical Warfare Simulation (MTWS) computer war gaming SAGIP CAINCPAC war gaming exercise; and HANDA – annual seminar focused on crisis action planning. See JANE’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 6 April 2004.

<sup>143</sup> Some of the combined training activities include Mobile Training Teams (MTT), Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE), Observer Training, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and its component E-IMET (Expanded IMET). See Micool Brooke, “Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,” 10.

<sup>144</sup> Earl K. Hampton, Jr., “Subic Bay: The Last Five Years Has USCINCPAC Strategy Changed?” 12-13.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, 14.



ASEAN joins with the United States to prevent conflict, enhance stability, promote economic growth, and assure that the interests of all nations are considered. ASEAN also advocates continued U.S. military presence in the region. Port access agreements, military training and education programs, and other bilateral and multilateral security-related frameworks complement U.S. overseas presence and further affirm Southeast Asia's increasing importance as a regional partner for enhancing security.<sup>146</sup>

Presence goals are being achieved with “places not bases” in East Asia. This policy of accessibility within East Asia not only meets the end objective of American strategy but continues to foster alliances with our Pacific neighbors. Former USCINCPAC, Admiral Pendley pointed out, “Access agreements are not gifts and there will be costs in the form of military assistance, improvements in infrastructure, regional exercises, and political engagement. These costs will be insignificant, however, when measured against maintaining the flexibility and necessary capability to protect U.S. forces throughout the Asia-Pacific region and in to the Persian Gulf.”<sup>147</sup>

Losing the Philippine bases did not change American strategy in the region. On the contrary, events in the 1990s demonstrated United States commitment to the region was still strong. In 1996 it ordered two carrier battle groups to Taiwan during the Straits crisis, and America continued to demonstrate its will and commitment via bilateral exercises, country assist teams and routine port visits. With the “places not bases” policy, the United States still garners its access, presence, and influence programs within the region without the Asian anxieties of permanent American basing.<sup>148</sup>

Throughout the 1990s, the Philippines remained one of the weakest nations in Eastern Asia in terms of its economy and military and gave the perception of greater vulnerability to external threats. To a large extent, this vulnerability kept the Philippines-U.S. ties close despite public cries for greater independence. The next section examines the Spratly Islands issue as a cause for greater security concern in the Philippines.

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<sup>146</sup> Micool Brooke, “Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,” 11.

<sup>147</sup> Earl K. Hampton, Jr., “Subic Bay: The Last Five Years Has USCINCPAC Strategy Changed?” 14-15.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid*, 14.

During this foray with China, the Philippines still clutched the specter of American military power like a security blanket—it may have been old and worn but it was still reliable in times of serious threat.<sup>149</sup>

### **3. The South China Sea**

China has claimed the Spratlys based on historical rights that date back 1700 years to the Han dynasty. In February 1972, Beijing officially declared the Spratly Islands as an integral part of China. China forcibly took the Paracels from South Vietnam in 1974, then clashed with Vietnam over the Spratlys in 1988, sinking three Vietnamese ships.<sup>150</sup>

The Spratlys are disputed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. The 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea urged a peaceful settlement of conflicting territorial claims and the need to cooperate in order to ensure the safety of maritime navigation and communication as well as other forms of security cooperation. China disregarded this appeal and in 1995 seized Mischief Reef, 150 miles west of the Philippine Island of Palawan by stationing troops and building structures on the island. Relations between the two countries deteriorated as the Philippines arrested Chinese fishermen in the area and destroyed Chinese markers on the islands. Whereas the Philippines hoped to settle the issue via international law, China did not consider itself bound by the Manila Declaration.<sup>151</sup>

Despite agreeing to not change the status quo in the South China Sea through unilateral steps and to seek a peaceful solution through negotiations, the PRC continued to test the political will of Vietnam and the Philippines as well as their support within ASEAN. In August 1995, Beijing and the Philippines agreed to a code of conduct to prevent any direct confrontation over the Spratly Islands. Beijing's strategy of limiting alliances against it has been largely successful as China has frustrated attempts made by some ASEAN countries to internationalize the dispute. Insisting on bilateral negotiations provides China with considerable leverage over its much weaker opponents.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Donald Kirk, *Looted: The Philippines after the Bases*, 18.

<sup>150</sup> Earl K. Hampton, Jr., "Subic Bay: The Last Five Years Has USCINCPAC Strategy Changed?" 3-4.

<sup>151</sup> Frank Umbach, "Trends in the Regional Balance of Power and Potential Hotspots," *International Security Quarterly*, 30 June 2002, 9.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

In October 1995, President Ramos begged the United States to flex its muscles against China's new military, economic, and political might. "Only with U.S. help, only with America's leadership, are we to have lasting regional stability."<sup>153</sup> The mutual defense agreement with America is important to the Philippines as it is undergoing a military modernization drive. The U.S. military may provide added security to the Philippines in case China again attempts to claim some of the disputed Spratly Islands. One Filipino intelligence officer stated "Our neighbors will not take us lightly – if they bully us, we can call upon a bigger bully."<sup>154</sup>

The United States and the Philippines differ in one important provision of the treaty, concerns over the Spratly Islands. The American interpretation is that the treaty does not require the United States to intervene for the Philippines over the Spratly Islands, especially since the Philippines did not formally claim the islands until after the treaty was signed. The Philippines disagrees and believes that America is obligated to come to its aid given armed conflict over the Spratlys.<sup>155</sup>

As presented in a Department of State briefing on 10 May 1995, "The United States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various islands, reefs, atolls, and cays in the South China Sea." Since the United States does not recognize any nation's claims to the Spratlys, it has no obligation to respond under its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. However, the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are another story and are of great concern to the United States. The United States measures the value of the South China Seas as it relates to the expanding Asian economy and the SLOCs are integral to international trade.<sup>156</sup>

The United States warned China that it will not accept any restrictions on freedom of movement for its ships in the area. Establishing sovereignty over the Spratlys would entail some sort of control over the shipping lanes passing through the Malacca Straits.<sup>157</sup> Former Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon said that U.S. officials promised to defend the

<sup>153</sup> Donald Kirk, *Looted: The Philippines after the Bases*, 19.

<sup>154</sup> Adam Easton, "Filipinos Toss a Hot Potato: Letting US GIs Back," Global Newbank, *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 March 1998, 8.

<sup>155</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 27 April 2004.

<sup>156</sup> Earl K. Hampton, Jr., "Subic Bay: The Last Five Years Has USCINCPAC Strategy Changed?" 5.

<sup>157</sup> Frank Umbach, "Trends in the Regional Balance of Power and Potential Hotspots," *International Security Quarterly*, 30 June 2002, 9.

Philippines in the worst case: a shooting war in the Spratlys. Even if America does not enter into a shooting war over the Spratlys, the U.S. military presence in the Spratlys will be more visible.<sup>158</sup>

When the Philippine Navy discovered four Chinese ships anchored near the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal, the United States and Philippine navies responded in the guise of a live firing exercise in the vicinity. In October 1998, the Philippines discovered China had completed new hardened structures on Mischief Reef, including three-story buildings, a new pier, an observation post, a military command center, gun emplacements, and radar facilities at four different sites—a helipad was still under construction. The Philippines responded with a major naval deployment in the area and by detaining 20 Chinese fishermen in the vicinity of Mischief Reef.<sup>159</sup>

The mutual defense treaty with America is not the only way to defend the Philippines. The interrelated dynamics that may be created by conflict over disputed land increases the possibility for America's intervention. Upsetting the balance of power can prompt U.S. military intervention, regardless of whether or not there is a treaty calling for immediate retaliation. America has a big economic and security stake in maintaining the balance of power in the region. Japan and ASEAN have big stakes in a credible U.S. presence in the region.<sup>160</sup> 75 percent of Japan's oil imports pass through the South China Sea. The United States is obliged to assist Japan out of self interests. The security and stability of Asia are as much American concerns as they are Asian concerns.<sup>161</sup>

While the United States refuses to go to war over the Spratly Islands on the grounds that it is not part of the mutual defense treaty, America, Japan, and ASEAN cannot remain indifferent to any escalation of the dispute between the Philippines and China. Any aggression between these two countries will immediately create insecurity

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<sup>158</sup> Micool Brooke, "Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty," 6.

<sup>159</sup> Frank Umbach, "Trends in the Regional Balance of Power and Potential Hotspots," *International Security Quarterly*, 30 June 2002, 11.

<sup>160</sup> U.S. Information Agency, Foreign Media Reaction, Daily Digest, "Philippine Firmness Needed," *National Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 22 May 1997.

<sup>161</sup> Earl K. Hampton, Jr., "Subic Bay: The Last Five Years Has USCINCPAC Strategy Changed?" 6.

among other ASEAN members and over the critical role of America in maintaining peace and the balance of power in the Pacific.<sup>162</sup>

The Philippines is not the only country nervous about the Spratlys. It is important to note that the rest of Asia is also afraid of China's military posturing. Standing together, these countries have a better chance of success. ASEAN is stronger if it remains united. There is no way the Philippines can defeat China militarily even if Manila spent its entire but paltry \$20 billion government budget on defense. The real deterrent of China lies in diplomacy not military operations. The Philippines belongs to ASEAN, a group to which China ascribes importance. The Philippines has also appealed to America, more so by means of a diplomatic arsenal rather than via military protection to restrain China.<sup>163</sup>

After years of negotiation, ASEAN nations and China agreed to sign the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in November 2002. The declaration was a step in the right direction but did not establish a legally binding code. All claimants have failed to relent from their strong position of sovereignty over the islands. ASEAN could not develop a binding code because China refused to relinquish its undisputed claim and because China had bilateral talks with individual members and succeeded in dividing them with bilateral codes of conduct. China seems prepared to sign only a non-binding multilateral code of conduct to focus on dialogue and regional stability rather than on issues of sovereign jurisdiction.<sup>164</sup>

While events in the South China Sea provided opportunities for U.S.-Philippines rapprochement, the next section examines other factors that energized their relations.

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<sup>162</sup> U.S. Information Agency, Foreign Media Reaction, Daily Digest, "Spratlys—A Worry for ASEAN, U.S., Japan," National Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 May 1997.

<sup>163</sup> U.S. Information Agency, Foreign Media Reaction, Daily Digest, "Use Diplomacy, Not Force to Deal with China" National Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 May 1997.

<sup>164</sup> In the Joint Declaration, the parties reaffirmed their respect and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and through the South China Sea and agreed to resolve their disputes by peaceful means; pledged to exercise self-restraint in activities that could spark disputes; agreed to provide advance notice of any military exercises and to provide relief for distressed persons in the area; may cooperate in environmental protection, scientific research, combating crime, and Search and Rescue operations. See Ralf Emmers, "ASEAN, China and the South China Sea: An Opportunity Missed" Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 21 November 2002.

## **D. IMPROVED U.S.-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS**

After the closure of U.S. military bases in the Philippines, the U.S.-Philippine relations were somewhat strained for several years. As already noted, the perceived China threat brought the two nations closer together towards a common purpose. Other factors also encouraged improved relations as both nations realized they could benefit more by working together. Economic and military gains as well as an enhanced feeling of security against both internal and external threats influenced the Philippines' decision to resume closer ties with America. These benefits resulted from increased combined exercise and training schedules spurred by the Chinese threat and the U.S.-led war against terrorism, and were made possible by the Visiting Forces Agreement. For its part, the United States, achieved a greater stronghold against global terrorism and reestablished critical access to bases within Southeast Asia from which it could serve as a balancer among regional powers and as a stabilizing force for the entire region.

In commemoration of the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, Presidents Arroyo and Bush “agreed to strengthen the military alliance on a sustained basis, through increased training, exercises, and other joint activities.”<sup>165</sup>

### **1. Economic Factors**

When President Bush visited the Philippines in October 2003, he announced that the Philippines had a new designation as a major non-NATO ally, a category that includes Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Thailand.<sup>166</sup> U.S. and Philippines defense leaders agreed on a new five-year plan for increased U.S. military assistance and to establish a senior civilian group for coordinating military policy, further strengthening a Pacific alliance that has gained renewed prominence in the Bush administration's global war on terrorism. Other assistance provided by the United States has included road-building, well-digging, and other economic aid that has generated local good will and breathed new life into a military alliance that was battered when U.S. forces were evicted in 1992.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> Admiral Dennis C. Blair, “Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Command Before the House International Relations Committee,” 27 February 2002.

<sup>166</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 27 April 2004.

<sup>167</sup> Bradley Graham, “New Defense Ties with Philippines; Washington, Manila Set Up Group to Coordinate Military Policy,” *The Washington Post*, 13 August 2002, A.10.

U.S. military aid increased from \$38 million in 2001 to \$114 million in 2003. In fact, the Philippines is the world's fourth largest recipient of U.S. foreign military financing and Asia's most significant beneficiary of the U.S. IMET program. President Bush committed more than \$95 million in military and financial assistance in 2003 and also pledged to provide continued assistance against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).<sup>168</sup>

President Bush promised 20 UH-1 helicopters and an additional 10 for spare parts. He also signed a proclamation expanding product coverage for the Philippines under the Generalized System of Preferences, providing \$30 million in trade benefits, \$30 million in new grant aid for equipment and training for AFP to counter terrorism, \$30 million in new bilateral development assistance for Mindanao, and \$25 million in new grant assistance to train and equip a combat engineering unit. In March 2004, the United States transferred a refurbished 'Cyclone' Class coastal patrol ship, including a two-year supply of spare parts, a package valued at \$30 million. In October 2003, the U.S. Ambassador and the Secretary of the Interior signed a Memorandum of Intent to enhance the anti-terrorism and anti-crime activities of the Philippine National Police. In addition, America is helping the Philippines to strengthen its law enforcement through training, equipment, and organizational reforms. President Bush also asked the U.S. Congress to allocate \$164 million for military and economic assistance for the Philippines in 2005.<sup>169</sup>

## **2. Visiting Forces Agreement**

The United States and Philippines signed the VFA on 10 February 1998. The VFA is essentially concerned with the legal issues and jurisdiction surrounding the treatment of U.S. armed forces and defense personnel who would be in the Philippines for purposes covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty. It provides substance to the treaty by serving as the legal framework in promoting defense cooperation between the Philippines and the United States. It underscored the fundamental importance of U.S.-Philippine military alliance in maintaining peace and security in East Asia and Southeast Asia.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 27 April 2004.

<sup>169</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 6 April 2004.

<sup>170</sup> Col Samuel Narcise, "Republic of the Philippines – United States of America Visiting Forces Agreement: Balikatan Exercises," 6.

The VFA allows the United States and the Philippines to resume regular large-scale military exercises and port calls after a three-year impasse.<sup>171</sup> In 1999, the Philippines Senate ratified the VFA. The first major combined military exercise under this new agreement occurred in February 2000, Exercise Balikatan; another occurred in May 2003.<sup>172</sup>

The United States requested the VFA due to the lack of a “Status of Forces Agreement” (SOFA).<sup>173</sup> The visit of then President Fidel Ramos to Washington in April 1998 affirmed the mutual commitment to the timely resumption of U.S. training activities in the Philippines. Familiarity, cooperation, and interoperability are important ingredients to a strong alliance. America has clearly stated that it seeks to develop the defense relationship in ways and at a pace comfortable to the Philippines. In its continuing dispute with China over Spratly island claims, President Estrada believed that the VFA would serve as an effective deterrent against China’s expansionary tendencies in the South China Sea.<sup>174</sup>

The VFA was not instituted without resistance from the host country. Many contended that the VFA violated the Philippines sovereignty, and its constitution, and that it was lopsided in nature because it favored the Americans.<sup>175</sup> The vice president of the Philippines resigned over differences with President Arroyo in foreign policy concerning the United States. The vice president was opposed to two agreements between the Philippines and the United States. One extended and expanded the war games to include the destruction of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); the other, the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), provided the U.S. forces on Filipino soil with “billeting, transportation, communication and medical services, base operations support, storage services, use of facilities, training services, repair and maintenance services,

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<sup>171</sup> Global News Bank, “Key Chapters of US-Philippines Military Ties,” French Press Agency, 27 May 1999.

<sup>172</sup> Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 27 April 2004.

<sup>173</sup> Adam Easton, Global Newsbank, Manila: *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 March 1998.

<sup>174</sup> Micool Brooke, “Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,” 6.

<sup>175</sup> Col Samuel Narcise, “Republic of the Philippines – United States of America Visiting Forces Agreement: Balikatan Exercises,” 1.



calibration services, and port services. Some Filipinos felt that the shift by Arroyo ended the Philippines' short period of sovereignty and placed it back within the United States' tight embrace.<sup>176</sup>

Nothing in the VFA violates the territorial integrity, sovereignty, or constitutional rights of the Filipinos, rather it reflects the government's commitment to fulfill its obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty, in the spirit of cooperation, to satisfy mutual security and defense interests in East Asia.<sup>177</sup>

### **3. War on Terror**

Ties warmed up between the United States and the Philippines after the 11 September terrorist attacks when Arroyo invited America to use the Philippines airspace for "war on terror." In return, the Philippines received million-dollar pledges of military and economic aid as well as military support to quash the ASG.<sup>178</sup> The common threat of terrorism helped thaw the security alliance between the U.S. and the Philippines.<sup>179</sup> By September 2001, the Philippines had granted the United States full access to its ports and airfields to assist in the war against terrorism.<sup>180</sup> Washington sought to maintain a presence in the South China Sea, and the 'war on terrorism' provided the United States an opportunity to consolidate its ties with its ally.

After 9/11, the United States increased its military engagement in the Philippines to hunt for Al-Qaeda cells. The improved relations with the Philippines offered America the opportunity to project power in the region and strengthen its access to naval facilities and bases. The United States increased its force deployment in Basilan from 650 to 950

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<sup>176</sup> The rationale for the Philippines to opt for the VFA despite public criticisms is as follows: To enhance its military preparedness and defense capability; to provide the Armed Forces of the Philippines training on the newest techniques and latest technology in defense and warfare; to promote the country's security interests, particularly on national defense, territorial integrity and protection of its natural resources; to give substance to the Mutual Defense Treaty and improve its deterrent effect against external aggression; and to strengthen the Philippines relationship by reinforcing its political, economic, and security linkages with the United States. See Col Samuel Narcise, "Republic of the Philippines – United States of America Visiting Forces Agreement: Balikatan Exercises," 10 and 31-32.

<sup>177</sup> Col Samuel Narcise, "Republic of the Philippines – United States of America Visiting Forces Agreement: Balikatan Exercises," 10.

<sup>178</sup> Marites Sison, "Politics: Philippines Back in U.S. Foreign Policy Embrace," New York: *Global Information Network*, 8 July 2002, 1

<sup>179</sup> Col Samuel Narcise, "Republic of the Philippines – United States of America Visiting Forces Agreement: Balikatan Exercises," 31-32.

<sup>180</sup> Thomas J. Garcia, "The Potential Role of the Philippines in the U.S. Naval Forward Presence" (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), 33.

in 2002. In May 2003, the countries negotiated for another deployment further south against the ASG terrorist group. U.S. forces also held Balikatan 2004 exercises in Central Luzon, Batanes, and Palawan involving 2,500 U.S. troops and 2,300 Filipinos.<sup>181</sup>

In 2003, when referring to the American intent to send more troops to fight terrorism in the Philippines, Derek Mitchell, an Asia specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies said “It also is a chance to finish a job begun last year and, by doing so, demonstrate continued commitment and strengthen a critical alliance with the Philippines.”<sup>182</sup> The new initiative was considered by Pentagon officials as a strategic opportunity to reinforce a crucial alliance with the Philippines.

#### **4. Regional Stability**

Improved relations not only offered the Philippines the opportunity to improve security within the Philippines, it provided the United States with another essential option for its visiting vessels and troops in the region. On the domestic side, it provided relative economic stability and a sense of control over peace and order within the country. On the international side, the improved relations contributed to the greater stability of the region. The presence of the U.S. troops; helps bring peace and order to the affected areas as well as help deter China’s aggression.<sup>183</sup>

The U.S. military presence, albeit temporary, serves as an important deterrent. The U.S. military presence allows the United States to anticipate problems, manage potential threats, and encourage peaceful resolution of disputes.<sup>184</sup> The United States does not seek to establish a permanent base in the Philippines but instead seeks “flexible arrangements” to help meet the future challenges of security in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>185</sup>

The presence of military forces engaged in joint training exercises with the Philippines gives other nations in Southeast Asia a sense of security. This sense of security encourages nations to engage in multilateral cooperation, instead of seeking

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<sup>181</sup> Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 27 April 2004.

<sup>182</sup> Bradley Graham, “Military Action Aims to Cement Philippine Ties,” *The Washington Post*, 22 February 2003, A.21.

<sup>183</sup> Col Samuel Narcise, “Republic of the Philippines – United States of America Visiting Forces Agreement: Balikatan Exercises,” 9 and 31-32.

<sup>184</sup> Micoool Brooke, “Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,” 10.

<sup>185</sup> Paul Romero, “The US Seeks Return of Troops to RP but not of Bases,” *Philippine Star*, 14 July 2001.

strength through arms races. The United States benefited from a number of access agreements and other arrangements with Southeast Asia that have supported continued American engagement. These arrangements include allowing port calls, repair facilities, training ranges and logistics support and have become increasingly important to U.S. overseas presence. Singapore offered the use of its Changi Naval Base, and a pier that can accommodate aircraft carriers.<sup>186</sup> With the ability to park an aircraft carrier in the region, America was sending a message to all of Asia that it could and would remain a factor in regional security even without permanent bases and that Singapore was willing to help.<sup>187</sup>

America's level of commitment to the Philippines is interpreted as a sign of Washington's commitment to the rest of the region; this perception makes joint military exercises more than mere war games. By working with the Philippines, the United States mitigates fears about a dwindling American presence and sends a signal to the world that it has not forgotten its allies.<sup>188</sup>

Though the U.S.-Philippines relationship soured in the aftermath of the eviction of U.S. military and its bases in 1992, it was sustained through the mutual defense treaty and other military assistance pacts. The United States did not abandon its ally; on the contrary, it remained committed to defense of the Philippines and to regional stability.

Recognizing the mutual benefits of closer ties, both countries worked to establish a Visiting Forces Agreement which provided the Philippines with increased economic, military, and security benefits while allowing the United States periodic access to critical bases without the intrusive effects of a permanent footprint. The U.S.-led war against terror solidified the U.S.-Philippines relationship, once again providing a cohesive common goal—a defense against a common threat. The U.S.-Philippines relations may have lain dormant for several years; however, like Mt. Pinatubo, awakened after a long sleep, the U.S.-Philippines relations were heated by internal and external forces, and

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<sup>186</sup> Micool Brooke, "Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty," 7.

<sup>187</sup> The then Singapore Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo stated that Singapore built the port to accommodate the US fleet in Southeast Asian waters because the presence of these ships has a stabilizing effect in the region. See Trish Saywell, "Places not Bases Puts Singapore on the Line," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 May 2001.

<sup>188</sup> Jeremy Bratt, "A Faltering Philippines Pact; Military Exercises: A Treaty Crucial to Regional Stability Needs an OK from Manila," *Los Angeles Times*, 20 August 1998, 9.

when called upon, erupted to provide a stronghold against global terror and to strengthen security and stability throughout the region.

Given its military advancements and advantages wrought by transformation initiatives, its successful application of new concepts and technology in a new way of war, and its commitment to defend allies and national interests, what changes has the United States been willing to make regarding its force posture? The next section details some of America's latest plans to restructure its military posture around the world and analyzes whether these steps coincide with its capabilities.

## V. THE IMPACT OF CAPABILITES AND COMMITMENT ON U.S. FORCE POSTURE POLICY

### A. GLOBAL PRESENCE

In light of the new international environment, security threats, and military capabilities, Secretary Rumsfeld called for an overhaul of the U.S. military presence worldwide. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan supported his idea that smaller, more mobile forces could be as effective if not more effective as the traditional conventional forces.<sup>189</sup>

Through its recent words and actions concerning troop structure and positioning, the United States further corroborates what military transformation and the aforementioned conflicts have established, that U.S. military capabilities far exceed those of any other nation and preclude the traditional organizational structuring and positioning of forces.

In August 2004, President George Bush announced U.S. plans to reposition about 70,000 U.S. troops from overseas bases. The president stated that American forces are more agile, more lethal, and more capable of striking anywhere around the globe on short notice. Some of these troops will be withdrawn, others positioned in other areas around the world to be able to quickly respond to unexpected threats. U.S. administration officials noted that America is attempting to portray the strength of its commitment to its allies in terms of capabilities not in the number of troops. The technological prowess of the U.S. military in terms of its ability to project power over great distances supports such troop withdrawals.<sup>190</sup>

The broader plan includes eliminating a number of large U.S. bases from overseas, bringing some troops home and repositioning others abroad, while constructing skeletal outposts and dispersing critical equipment in regions that portend potential hotspots of trouble.<sup>191</sup> The aim is to create flexible, small units that could be moved

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<sup>189</sup> Brad Glosserman, "Redeployment Dilemma," *South China Morning Post Ltd.*, 25 December 2003, 11.

<sup>190</sup> Susan V. Lawrence, and David Lague, "Marching Out of Asia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 August 2004, 1-2

<sup>191</sup> Bradley Graham, "U.S. May Halve Forces in Germany," *The Washington Post*, 25 March 2004, 1.

quickly to temporary bases. To calm Russian encirclement fears, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that “What we are interested in are, perhaps, forward operating locations that we could train at temporarily, or we can have agreements at particular airfields that make it easier for us to deploy to particular areas of potential crisis.”<sup>192</sup>

The U.S. forward basing concept has drawn increasing attention especially in Korea, Japan, and Germany, where the original purpose for stationing U.S. troops abroad was to thwart the advance of Soviet communism. While a valid North Korean threat remains, it lacks the credibility of a “world expansionist” and is increasingly viewed by the United States in light of its potential influence as an exporter or supporter of global terror and for its potential to upset East Asia’s stability. In light of its perception of North Korea as a rogue state, the United States still deems an American military presence in South Korea as vital to maintaining peace and stability in the region. However, as U.S. Senators Hutchison and Feinstein indicated, while we may need more troops abroad, clearly the needs are different than they once were, and it is critical that America moves beyond the Cold War basing concepts.<sup>193</sup>

Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, corroborated the senators’ viewpoints by indicating that U.S. forward presence in Korea needs to be modernized; it needs to be flexible; it needs to transcend regional theater bounds so it can be incorporated into the global theater. The United States wants the flexibility to use forces in Korea as needed around the world. The United States wants facilities and bases to transform from service-oriented installations to joint ones.<sup>194</sup>

The initiative to consolidate U.S. Armed Forces in Korea is an excellent example, a microcosm, of the transformative force-posture process underway in PACOM and the DoD. For over 50 years, the U.S. military on the Korean peninsula has been solidly entrenched in its structure, doctrine, training, and procedures. Personnel stationed in

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<sup>192</sup> Judy Dempsey, “Pentagon Preparing to Slash Number of US Troops in Europe by a Third,” *London Financial Times*, 4 February 2004.

<sup>193</sup> Kay Bailey Hutchison and Diane Feinstein, “It is Senseless to Close Bases on U.S. Soil Only to Later Realize we Made a Costly, Irrevocable Mistake.” Corpus Christi Texas: Caller-Times Publishing Company, 6 May 2003, A7.

<sup>194</sup> Peter Rodman, “America’s Forward Deployment in Asia and the Pacific” Federal News Service, Inc. 26 June 2001, 1.

Korea have always been considered taboo or off-limits in terms of considering them for deployments to other regions or hot spots.

Now personnel stationed in Korea are no longer considered off-limits when considering them for global commitments. Case in point is the transfer of 3,600 troops from Korea to Iraq and the recent deployment of six B-52s to Guam to make up for the combat power lost in the Pacific caused by rotating troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to relieve the burden of 130,000 American troops in Iraq, the Pentagon is forced to draw on military units worldwide.<sup>195</sup> The United States has plans to withdraw 12,500 of the 37,000 troops from Korea by the end of 2005.<sup>196</sup> According to General Leon LaPorte, Commander U.S. Forces Korea, the specific reorganization plan in Korea calls for relocating the Yongson Army base function out of Seoul to Pyongtaek, located about 50 miles south of Seoul and consolidating the remaining 41 major installations and 90 facilities into several central hubs further south of Seoul. The plan returns half the land, 32,000 acres granted to the U.S. forces under the SOFA agreement.<sup>197</sup>

The Second Infantry Division's move from north of Seoul to new hubs further south is intended to produce a far-reaching change in America's entire East Asian security posture. Where it once was stuck in an inflexible, defensive position close to the DMZ, the shift of the division further south will permit the United States to deploy the division anywhere within PACOM.<sup>198</sup> According to Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, the changes are part of the U.S. military worldwide posture review and are "pointed to a new ability to integrate our forces into joint operations." He also added that "we place a great premium on mobility, on the ability to move great distances rapidly, and to use temporary basing solutions as needed."<sup>199</sup>

Christopher Lafleur, State Department special envoy for Northeast Asia security consultations, emphasized that the expanding population in Seoul was encroaching on the U.S. forces and their training regimen. The move further south is not only intended to

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<sup>195</sup> Associated Press, "U.S. Sending B-52s to Pacific Air Base," *New York Times*, 4 February 2004.

<sup>196</sup> Yoo Dong-ho, "1<sup>st</sup> Group of US Forces Leave for Iraq," *Korea Times*, 6 August 2004, 1.

<sup>197</sup> Leon LaPorte, "U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) Holds Hearing on Overseas Installations" Federal Document Clearing House Inc., 29 April 2003, 1-18.

<sup>198</sup> Richard Halloran, "Relocation of Second Division," *The Korea Herald*, 4 July 2003, 11.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid.

relieve anti-American pressure by reducing the military footprint, but to also take advantage of new military capabilities and to enhance the mobility of U.S. forces and their ability to rapidly deploy.<sup>200</sup> The global posture review is not to weaken but to strengthen America's defense relationships with its friends and allies, improve flexibility, enhance regional and global action, exploit advantages in rapid power projection and focus on overall capabilities instead of numbers.<sup>201</sup>

In addition to the proposed changes in Korea, the DoD is also planning to radically alter its forward-positioning strategy in Europe. Over the past decade, the U.S. has reduced the number of its installations in Europe by 66 percent; yet there is still much to be accomplished in terms of trimming down the basing structure. The asymmetric world and its associated threats, NATO's expanding membership, the deepening crises in Africa, and the emergence of ungoverned regions where drug trafficking, criminality, and terrorism abound, argue for a drastic change in the paradigm of how the United States implements its basing structure. America must not only maintain its most crucial infrastructure, it must also transform it into more agile, expeditionary, and efficient support mechanisms for our military forces.<sup>202</sup>

The Pentagon plans to withdraw half of the 71,000 U.S. troops stationed in Germany. Instead of maintaining a vast force in Germany, the United States plans on continued use of bases it established in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) for combating terrorism in the region.<sup>203</sup> The United States is also planning to use multiple sites in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania for their potential to host U.S. military forces. This move is the latest stage in a U.S. plan to reposition EUROCOM forces to more effectively fight the war on terrorism and to better cope with the

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<sup>200</sup> Christopher Lafleur, "America's Forward Deployment in Asia and the Pacific" Federal News Service Inc., 26 June 2003.

<sup>201</sup> Jeremy Kirk, "USFK, Japan Commands to Merge Under Camp Zama Three-Star," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 4 February 2004, 1.

<sup>202</sup> General James L. Jones, "U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) Holds Hearing on Overseas Installations" Federal Document Clearing House Inc., 29 April 2003, 1-18.

<sup>203</sup> Bradley Graham, "U.S. May Halve Forces in Germany," *The Washington Post*, 25 March 2004.



asymmetric threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The sites will range from small facilities or airstrips for refueling to training facilities and bare-boned facilities to serve as combat launching pads into the region.<sup>204</sup>

EUROCOM is working to identify truly “bare bones” facilities that can accommodate rotational forces. These forces will come from anywhere around the world and be there for only a limited time for training, strategic engagement, or strategic response to a crisis. These bases can go from active to inactive status, be turned on-and-off very quickly. Rotational forces could take advantage of this family of forward operating locations to perform a specific mission and then return home. These facilities virtually make the 20<sup>th</sup> century-type base obsolete because they allow power projection anywhere in the world at a fraction of the cost.<sup>205</sup>

According to General James Jones, American bases should have a transformational footprint, and be geo-strategically placed in areas where presence yields the highest return on investment. Bases should contract and expand as required and be constructed in such a way as to take advantage of abilities to rotationally base forces coming from different parts of the world. Flexible forward operating bases, smaller forward operating locations and new sites for pre-positioned equipment to augment a permanent strategic presence will prove to be extremely useful to future requirements. The United States no longer needs to build small American cities of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to achieve its strategic goals.<sup>206</sup>

Senators Hutchison and Feinstein commended General Jones’ efforts and reinforced his comments by stating that the United States must also be in a position to engage in contingencies where America has no permanent bases such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, Africa, and the Middle East.<sup>207</sup>

In an attempt to purge festering terrorist sites in remote regions of the world, the United States is accelerating its efforts to expand its military reach into these areas. The Pentagon is seeking military access into countries such as Cameroon and Mauritania.

<sup>204</sup> Brian Whitmore, “Military to Scout East Europe Base Sites,” *Boston Globe*, 8 February 2004.

<sup>205</sup> General James L. Jones “U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) Holds Hearing on Overseas Installations” Federal Document Clearing House Inc., 29 April 2003, 1-18.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> Kay Bailey Hutchison and Diane Feinstein, “Base Needs,” *Caller-Times Publishing Company*, 6 May 2003, A7.

Morocco has offered America access to its military bases for exercises and U.S. troops are already training in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Tunisia. Instead of building permanent facilities in these areas, the United States is planning to frequently rotate troops in and out of these camps to launch against actual terrorist threats and to deter potential threats. While the United States has previously avoided prolonged military involvement in such unstable regions, the mere instability itself provides a breeding ground for terrorists.<sup>208</sup>

The Pentagon is also seeking access, logistics support, and places to pre-position equipment and supplies to minimize transportation requirements and to increase responsiveness. These moves are being made in concert with friends and allies; indeed, the United States is attempting to strengthen its alliances in the process.<sup>209</sup>

The strategy to create a more mobile, flexible, and lethal force capable of launching from any one or an assortment of these strategically located sites or “lily pad” bases and pre-positioning large volumes of equipment and supplies within various regions, both ashore and off-shore, expands U.S. capability and enables the United States to skirt national boundaries and political sensitivities about access. While withdrawing forces from some areas may appear to decrease capability, the United States maintains that with its advanced technologies, fewer troops can possess greater capability. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith stated that the United States is “not focused on maintaining numbers of troops overseas. Instead, we are focused on increasing the capabilities of our forces and those of our friends.”<sup>210</sup>

The global threat requires a global presence. With the terrorist threat based in some of the most remote locations on earth, the United States seeks to establish a military presence everywhere the terrorists are congregating. The United States military cannot be satisfied with fighting and winning the nation’s wars, it must also discourage military competition and prevent wars from starting; therefore, according to Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, it must be positioned around the world.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Esther Schrader, “U.S. Seeks Military Access in N. Africa,” *Los Angeles Times*, 27 March 2004.

<sup>209</sup> Jason Sherman, “U.S. Shifts Troops Around the World,” *Defense News*, 31 May 2004, 1.

<sup>210</sup> Ann Scott Tyson, “New US Strategy: ‘Lily Pad’ Bases,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 August 2004, 1-2.

<sup>211</sup> Mark Mazzetti, “Pax Americana: Dispatched to Distant Outposts, U.S. Forces Confront the Perils of an Unruly World,” *U.S. News and World Report*, 6 October 2003, 2.

Confirming this global presence initiative, the United States has bases or shares military installations in Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. These sites can serve as forward outposts that are lightly garrisoned with rapidly deployable units, but that can also serve as surge points for greater U.S. force build-up as required to respond to a contingency. A larger majority of bases will become forward operating sites and small support staffs will maintain them. The smaller sites in remote regions will be designated as cooperative security locations and will not have a permanent military presence but will serve as staging areas for troops requiring quick access for training or for engaging a threat. The entire plan not only includes repositioning forces but also involves the pre-positioning of combat equipment in these staging areas and aboard ships. Despite having more “outposts,” the Pentagon still plans to maintain a string of permanent strategic military hubs in closely allied countries like Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan.<sup>212</sup>

The lengthy build-up of forces and equipment in Iraq may have been the last operation of its kind. If you have to wait a month to respond to a threat, the threat may have vanished by the time you deploy. One of the goals is to avoid repeating the amount of lead-in time required for the war in Afghanistan where the United States had no forward presence. It had to perform crisis management to secure basing, access, and overflight rights and the Marines had to deploy into Afghanistan from ships 400 miles away.<sup>213</sup>

While preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Marines experimented with high speed ships that could move thousands of troops and equipment 1,000 miles in one day. With a shallower draft than most ships, these vessels will also be able to provide U.S. troops access to ports and places previously restricted to war planners.<sup>214</sup>

Forward basing and pre-positioning of equipment and supplies are both forms of positioning strategies. Training rotations are also forms of positioning forces on a

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<sup>212</sup> Michael Kilian, “Expansion of Military Bases Overseas Fuels Suspicions of U.S. Motives,” *Chicago Tribune*, 23 March 2004.

<sup>213</sup> Mark Mazzetti, “Pax Americana: Dispatched to Distant Outposts, U.S. Forces Confront the Perils of an Unruly World,” 5.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid*, 6.

temporary or sustained basis without a permanent base. Pre-positioning equipment allows cost-effective transportation without firmly committing the nation to a specific objective.<sup>215</sup>

Referring to the new force posture strategy, Douglas Feith, Pentagon undersecretary for policy and an architect of the global realignment plan stated that the idea of having a large force of forward-deployed forces could save deployment time was outmoded. Some forward deployments result in costing time because host nation permission or negotiation is required.<sup>216</sup>

Despite the military transformation, its success in military conflicts and proposed restructuring and repositioning of forces, the United States still clings to some of the traditional force structuring and posturing. The next section provides an alternative approach.

## **B. ALTERNATIVE**

An unlimited budget and limitless pool of military resources would diminish arguments against forward positioning military personnel in allied countries. However budgets are limited and the pool of military personnel is being stretched thin. Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker indicated that it is no secret that the Iraq deployment of over 130,000 troops is severely testing the Army's personnel limits.<sup>217</sup> It is important then to consider the most effective means of deploying troops around the world.

Because there are more effective ways of using military forces, and because there is nationalistic pressure from other countries to reduce or eliminate U.S. military presence, the DoD's proposed changes to the military's force posture around the globe is not as bold as the overall 70,000 troop reduction might indicate. Partially withdrawing troops from bases in Korea, Japan, and Germany falls short of recognizing the true

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<sup>215</sup> There are three forms of pre-positioning forces: equipment can be stored on land in a specific location that is deemed critical and where access potential exists. Examples of this pre-positioning strategy are the storing of heavy equipment sets in Korea, Germany, and Kuwait. A second form of pre-positioning is the storing of equipment sets aboard ships such as the Marine Maritime Pre-positioning Squadron. Theater positioning is a form of land storage that can later be transferred by ship within a theater of operations. Such a strategy occurred at Qatar prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. See Eric Peltz, "Toward an Expeditionary Army: New Options for Combatant Commanders," Testimony presented to the House Armed Services Committee, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 24 March 2004), 9.

<sup>216</sup> Bradley Graham, "U.S. May Halve Forces in Germany," 1.

<sup>217</sup> Richard Whittle, "General: Iraq 'Stretching the Army,'" *The Dallas Morning News*, 13 July 2004.

impact of U.S. military advantages and clings to remnants of Cold War beliefs that a permanent physical presence is necessary to reassure allies and deter threats. From the highest, most influential leaders in the United States including the President, Senators, and the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of Defense to retired and current military commanders, all emphasized that force posture is not about the numbers and placement of forces but about the capabilities of the forces. Military capability and the commitment to use this instrument as necessary are key, not the physical presence in an allied nation.

As Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the current leader of U.S. military transformation noted, the United States requires a global presence for a global mission against terror. And for that mission, America is establishing a temporary military presence in some of the most remote regions of the world because that is where terrorism breeds. A permanent presence is not required in those countries nor is one needed in Japan or Korea to fight terror because the United States has already firmly established strong alliances and access agreements with these nations. America can not only help fight terror in Northeast Asia without a permanent military presence, as it does so in the Philippines and other countries, it can also still deter, fight, and win a major conventional war in this region, however unlikely that type of conflict may seem, as it has so aptly demonstrated in Iraq. The United States could send a much stronger message to its friends and allies as well as its potential enemies by withdrawing all U.S. military troops from these countries while still committing itself to their defense by expanding its physical presence in U.S. territories within the region and increasing its engagement practices with its friends and allies.

Maintaining access to bases, facilities, and equipment in a particular region is critical; however, access and pre-positioned materiel no longer mandate a forward military presence in Korea and Japan. If the United States withdraws its forces, it must reassure its friends and foes alike, in a clear and unmistakable message, that it will honor its treaties and alliances with the same will and commitment demonstrated in the Philippines.

Instead of keeping a costly forward presence in Japan and Korea, the United States should redistribute those forces elsewhere around the globe, including American

soil. In addition to withdrawing these forces, the United States should bolster its alliances with Japan and Korea through diplomatic and political means and increase, not decrease military exercises, education, and training programs, and collaboration in regional and global institutions and efforts. Finally, the United States should continue the ongoing transformation process by improving its military capabilities, shoring up its defenses on its own turf, including places like Guam and Diego Garcia, and overcoming the shortfalls it currently faces with regard to the range and sustainability of its personnel, weapons and support systems.

### **1. Bolster Alliances**

In discussing methods for improving U.S. commitment in the Pacific region, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice referred to how the United States is working with allies and friends in the region to improve alliances, promote open trade and investment, and to encourage democracy across the globe. Multilateral negotiations with North Korea to halt its nuclear program, and multilateral collaboration in the war against terrorism are several approaches the United States is using to demonstrate its commitment to the region. Though the United States' Pacific alliances were formed over 50 years ago to counter a specific Soviet threat, they were also established based on the common values and goals that bond free nations.<sup>218</sup>

Deterrence is one of the main arguments for maintaining a forward military presence in an allied nation. Using deterrent threats or promises, the United States reassures and protects friends and allies. For the deterrence to be credible the deterring nation must become so enmeshed with the country it is attempting to protect that there is no other choice but to defend it should an enemy attack. To create a credible deterrent, the deterring nation can act aggressively to persuade an enemy from attacking. The deterring nation can also relinquish the initiative to an enemy by creating a "tripwire" or placing its own personnel in harms way to guarantee a response to an attack. Finally, a strong political commitment can serve as a deterrent because it places a nation's honor in

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<sup>218</sup> Condoleezza Rice, "Our Asia Strategy," *The Wall Street Journal*, (Eastern Edition), 24 October 2003, A-15.

the balance.<sup>219</sup> Regardless of the changes the United States makes to its overseas force posture, allies and potential enemies should not doubt U.S. commitment.

The United States can use a strong political commitment in Asia to continue reassuring allies and deterring foes. In Korea, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated that the Korean people do not need American troops as a “tripwire” to guarantee American involvement if North Korea attacks the South. He also added that U.S. commitment to South Korea remains firm and should not be judged by the number of American troops in Korea but by the spirit of the Korea-U.S. defense treaty.<sup>220</sup> Wolfowitz even added that withdrawing and repositioning troops is designed to enhance deterrence not weaken it.<sup>221</sup>

Allied nations can also help send a message of continuing commitment and deterrence by reinforcing diplomatic efforts. Both South Korean and U.S. officials indicated that the reductions would not weaken their combined defense against North Korea.<sup>222</sup> Seoul dismissed concerns about a security vacuum on the Korean peninsula in the event of U.S. troop withdrawals. The Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ban Ki-moon stated that the troop reductions in Korea are nothing new and that the government is taking measures to ensure the country’s security remains strong.<sup>223</sup>

Unsuccessful U.S. interventions in Vietnam and Somalia can have lasting effects beyond the realm of military operations in that they can negatively affect America’s political will, reduce the credibility of U.S. military deterrence abroad, and raise potential adversaries’ perceptions of the contestability of U.S. power. A nation must not only understand a foe’s capabilities and the threshold that must be reached to coerce him but must also effectively communicate to him that it has both the will and the capability to prevail.<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>219</sup> Mazarr, Snider, and Blackwell, *Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned*, 23.

<sup>220</sup> Yonhap News Agency, “US has “More than 150 Plans” to Build up Forces in South Korea – Wolfowitz,” Global News Wire, BBC Monitoring/BBC, 2 June 2003.

<sup>221</sup> Department of Defense, “U.S. Troops Slated to Move South from the Korean DMZ,” Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., 6 June 2003.

<sup>222</sup> Jack Kim and Rhee So-eui, “U.S. Plans to Cut Troops in S. Korea by a Third,” Seoul: Reuters, 7 June 2004.

<sup>223</sup> Reuben Staines, “Seoul Dismisses Concerns Over US Troop Pullout,” *The Korea Times*, 18 August 2004.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid*, 80-81

To reinforce a strong political commitment, U.S. leaders must continue to send clear messages of intent to remain engaged and committed in the region. In a speech to Asian defense ministers, U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld assured them that the withdrawal and repositioning of U.S. forces will not diminish America's ability to respond to threats in the region. A withdrawal of troops from South Korea does not signal a decrease in America's ability to deter North Korea, nor do North Koreans believe it will weaken the deterrent. Concentration on numbers versus capabilities misses the point that U.S. forces can do much more with much less.<sup>225</sup>

Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, emphasized how an increase in capability could offset the effects of drawing down troops. Regardless of the final outcome in the positioning of forces, the goal is to enhance, improve, upgrade, and modernize the military and its ability to fight, defend, and deter, not to reduce commitment, not to disengage but to engage more comprehensively. It is to exploit new technologies and capabilities and adapt to new threats. The final result will be a stronger more effective commitment to allies. "And after what was done in Iraq...no ally or friend should doubt either our capability or our political will to defend our interests and to defend our friends."<sup>226</sup> Representative Jim Leach underscored Mr. Rodman's comments by stating that from a U.S. congressional perspective, regardless of how the executive branch rearranged forces to optimize capability, America has no desire to downgrade its commitment in the Pacific; instead, it fully supports maintaining, even upgrading its commitment to Pacific friends and allies.<sup>227</sup> These are the kinds of political statements required to reinforce U.S. commitment to friends and allies and to continuing deterring threats.

In addition to strong diplomacy, the United States must continue to show strength of action to reassure allies and deter foes. According to Jonathan Pollack, chairman of

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<sup>225</sup> Greg Jaffe, "Rumsfeld Urges Asian Nations to Join U.S.-Led War on Terror," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 June 2004.

<sup>226</sup> Peter Rodman, "Hearing of the Asia Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee: America's Forward Deployment in Asia and the Pacific," Federal News Service, Inc., 26 June 2003.

<sup>227</sup> Jim Leach, "Hearing of the Asia Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee: America's Forward Deployment in Asia and the Pacific," Federal News Service, Inc., 26 June 2003.



the Strategic Research Department at the Naval War College, the United States requires “the arrangements, the access, the collaboration, the training, the exercise profile that make it credible when and if you have to act.”<sup>228</sup> Increasing engagement activities enhances the credibility of U.S. commitment in the region.

## **2. Increase Engagement Activities**

Exercises are visible demonstrations of U.S. commitment to the region. They improve interoperability and readiness, and demonstrate America’s ability to form and lead effective coalitions. Exercises promote burden sharing on the part of friends and allies and facilitate integration. They exhibit America’s capabilities and resolve, and provide realistic conditions for working with the technologies, systems and procedures that are critical in times of crisis. International exercises also provide familiarity with the host country including an understanding of its cultures, values and habits.<sup>229</sup>

Major General Joseph F. Weber, a previous commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine division in Okinawa Japan emphasized the importance of maintaining a physical military presence in Asia via bilateral and combined exercises. This type of military cooperation with allies and friends reinforces to potential terrorists and rogue nation threats the message that the United States and its allies intend for them to behave.<sup>230</sup>

The United States is already expanding its engagement activities with the region. America and Australia announced that they would develop a new hi-tech training facility in northern Australia. The new joint training facility will link U.S and Australian command and communications centers to help provide a common intelligence picture. While the new training facility enhances existing relations between Australia and the United States it does not allow for the permanent stationing of American forces.<sup>231</sup> U.S. equipment and munitions will be pre-positioned at these training locations. Australia has also agreed to partner with the United States on missile defense. Thailand has also agreed to accept equipment stockpiles but no permanent stationing of troops, while the

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<sup>228</sup> Susan V. Lawrence, and David Lague, “Marching Out of Asia,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 August 2004.

<sup>229</sup> Micool Brooke, “Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,” 10.

<sup>230</sup> Fred Zimmerman, “Iraq-Bound General Stresses Pacific Forces’ Role in Maintaining Stability,” *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 19 February 2004, 1.

<sup>231</sup> Greg Sheridan, “Down Under Base Not on US Agenda,” *The Australian*, 18 June 2004.

Philippines will accept more troops in its attempts to stamp out terrorism within its territory. And Singapore is already a growing refueling and maintenance shelter for U.S. ships but it is unable to handle large numbers of ground troops as it already exports much of its military training to Australia.<sup>232</sup>

Under a new “strategic framework,” Singapore will strengthen its security relationship with the United States. Singapore’s Coordinating Minister for Security and Defense Tony Tan stated that Singapore will fall short of becoming a U.S. ally, but as a strong friend it will broaden its defense and security cooperation with the United States. Tan also believed that a U.S. presence continues to contribute to regional stability and that U.S. military effectiveness would not diminish if troops were removed from Korea and Japan.<sup>233</sup>

### **3. Improve U.S. Capabilities at Home**

Because access issues are still prevalent and they point to shortfalls in U.S. military capabilities, the United States should focus research, development and technology to overcoming these limitations. Weapon systems with longer range and greater precision, capabilities to launch against objectives without moving forces ashore or providing access in remote locations without the advantage of ports or airfields will better prepare the United States to face the challenges of the future. However, even if America has the ability to accomplish an objective alone that approach may not always be the best course of action. Maintaining coalitions of like-minded nations minimizes backlash against the United States when compared to the times when it acts unilaterally.

When commenting about the necessity to change force posture, Admiral Arthur Cebrowski stated the United States must look to new approaches in positioning its forces. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, American forces were garrisoned forward in Kuwait and the United States heavily reinforced that garrison to launch missions against objectives within Iraq. However, he said that operations from garrisons forward were becoming more vulnerable to military threats and political criticism. He proposed operational

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<sup>232</sup> Alan Boyd, “Pentagon Shuns Asia for Canberra’s Embrace,” *Asia Times*, 10 July 2004.

<sup>233</sup> Hong Kong AFP, “AFP: Singapore Stepping Up US Defense Ties Ahead of American Troop Cuts,” Hong Kong AFP, 17 August 2004.

maneuvers from strategic distances and operational maneuvers from the sea could solve some of these problems by providing more security for our forces and minimizing the need to seek access approval.<sup>234</sup>

The United States can reduce its reliance on other nations for access by building FSLs. These forward support locations are intended to support power projection. Spares, equipment, and munitions could be pre-positioned at these locations, which should be built where access is either guaranteed or highly likely. Extensive RAND analysis strongly suggests that properly located and outfitted FSLs offer significant leverage in enabling both rapid and sustainable expeditionary operations. Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Diego Garcia are great options for FSLs. Taken together, these locations put most of the world within C-130 range of a permanent center of American power projection capability. While engagement does not necessarily equate to “assured” access, close security relations with potential hosts do appear to facilitate cooperation. Contact between America and its partners helps develop common perspectives on key issues and encourages the pursuit of joint goals and objectives.<sup>235</sup>

One area that would serve as a perfect FSL is Guam, where America is already developing its power projection capabilities on the outskirts of Asia. General William J. Begert, Pacific Air Forces commander discussed the advantages of using Guam in the U.S. global force repositioning strategy. “Guam, first of all, is U.S. territory. I don’t need overflight rights. I don’t need landing rights. I always have permission to go to Guam. It might as well be California or New Jersey.”<sup>236</sup> The Air Forces is discussing plans to deploy a wing of advanced fighters to Guam along with a fuel tanker squadron, and a group of Global Hawk surveillance planes to complement an assortment of bombers. The Air Force is also exploring “Flexbasing” a global system of tiered

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<sup>234</sup> Doug Sample, “Force Posture Needs Change, Transformation Chief Explains,” Alexandria, VA: American Forces Press Service, 12 August 2003, 1-2.

<sup>235</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, and Jeremy Shapiro, ed., *Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 367-371.

<sup>236</sup> James Brooke, “Looking for Friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds it Already Has One,” *The New York Times*, 7 April 2004.

locations for deploying its forces that includes Guam as a centerpiece in its strategy.<sup>237</sup> In addition, the U.S. Navy is increasing its capabilities on Guam, including adding submarines and ships to its ports and discussing plans about stationing a second carrier on the island. Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, commander U.S. Pacific Command said that “Guam’s geo-strategic importance cannot be overstated. Both Navy and Air Force facilities will continue to figure prominently in Guam’s increasing role as a power projection hub.”<sup>238</sup>

The U.S. Army is working on Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) that are designed to deter or defeat aggression and other challenges to U.S. interests without establishing a permanent presence. A key characteristic of FDOs is that they do not put U.S. forces at risk until the political decision has been made to apply decisive military force. Even when U.S. ground forces are not already present, early arriving ground forces demonstrate American commitment, to both friends and foes, and they potentially deny the aggressor the prospect of an easy victory.<sup>239</sup> In the event of a North Korean attack, the U.S. could deploy CONUS-based air, sea, and land forces, including Army heavy brigades, whose personnel would be airlifted to Korea, where they would man pre-positioned equipment sets. These pre-positioned sets diminish the need for rapid deployment because they focus on the initial days of the campaign while America’s strategic sustainment forces gear up.<sup>240</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> There are three types of locations in the flexbasing strategy: core support locations (CSLs) are composed of bases in the CONUS and main operating bases (MOBs) overseas; Forward Storage Locations (FSLs) are sites for storing equipment and supplies to enhance deployments within a theater; Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) are potential deployment sites within a region. See Paul S. Killingsworth, Lionel Galway, Eiichi Kamiya, Brian Nichiporuk, Timothy L. Ramey, Robert S. Tripp, James C. Wendt, “Flexbasing: Achieving Global Presence for Expeditionary Aerospace Forces,” (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000), 21

<sup>238</sup> James Brooke, “Looking for Friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds it Already Has One,” 1-2.

<sup>239</sup> David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft. “Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment.” (Santa Monica CA: Rand. 2002), 76-77.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid, 71.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Rapid advances in U.S. technology, including precision-guided weapons, stealth bombers and integrated command, control, and communications have provided a stand-off capability and increased military superiority over any other country. The integration of this technology into its armed forces through transformation initiatives allows the United States to deal with potential threats on its own terms and provides a powerful deterrent without relying on the traditional conventional or nuclear methods.<sup>241</sup>

The U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo manifested some of the latest ongoing transformation trends within the U.S. Armed Forces, including the employment of an effects-based or capabilities-based type of warfare. The United States demonstrated that its military could operate half-way around the globe without a forward-based infrastructure and when necessary, it could carry that infrastructure forward. On the other hand, these wars also demonstrated that U.S. forces still rely heavily on the ability to obtain and maintain access within a region to successfully and efficiently conduct operations. While America demonstrated global reach capabilities with its long-range bombers and strategic airlift, and displayed awesome tactical and amphibious strike capabilities with its naval forces far from the battlefield, it still required access to bases and facilities within the region to facilitate refueling and support operations.

In terms of applicability to other potential conflicts around the world, such as the Korean Peninsula, the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo have demonstrated that “access” not permanent bases, and “capabilities” not sheer personnel and equipment numbers are the limitations in future conflicts. Maintaining U.S. bases and forces in Japan and Korea do not guarantee that these nations will support the United States or even allow access in a future conflict. France would not allow overflight rights to the United States when it was striking Libya in response to a disco bombing. Despite having U.S. bases and troops on its soil, Turkey denied the United States the ability to launch an offensive strike against Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The United States invested

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<sup>241</sup> Takeshi Haruhara, “Japan: Bush Military Transformation Plan Response to New Threats, ‘Asian Shift,’” *Japan Times*, 17 August 2004.

huge sums of money into building facilities and installations in places like Saudi Arabia; yet, was unable to use those facilities when it needed them to fight against Iraq.<sup>242</sup>

Even Japan, one of the staunchest American allies, hesitates over approving elements of the U.S. transformation/force repositioning strategy in Asia. The current plan calls for consolidating all elements of U.S. military services headquarters in Japan. From a Japanese perspective, this plan would increase Japan's level of cooperation with the United States in security issues including concerns outside the region. Some Japanese think that such moves would give U.S. forces in Japan control over operations in the Middle East and that would entangle the Japanese in issues that are beyond the scope or in violation of the Japan-U.S. security treaty.<sup>243</sup>

While it may be true that access issues have never stopped an operation in which the United States was seriously committed, without access, the operation becomes more difficult and more costly. Access may be afforded by various methods; however, there is no such thing as assured access.<sup>244</sup> The potential for access increases when a mutually beneficial relationship between nations exists and while engagement does not guarantee assured access, close security relations do facilitate cooperation and this cooperation helps develop common perspectives and fosters partnerships on mutual goals and objectives.<sup>245</sup> Maintaining mutual defense treaties, military cooperation, combined exercises, shared intelligence, and base and port access rights in a contingency can provide the same level of assurance to friends and foes alike. Using such methods the

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<sup>242</sup> Rear Admiral Arthur J. Johnson, Commander of Naval forces on Guam made these comments when comparing the benefits of having U.S. autonomy in Guam versus the unknown support of other nations. See James Brooke, "Looking for friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds it Already Has One," New York: The New York Times, 7 April 2004.

<sup>243</sup> Nao Shimoyachi, "Pullout of U.S. Forces Could Skip Japan," *Japan Times*, 18 August 2004.

<sup>244</sup> The various methods of access include the following: permanent bases in allied countries that the United States is bound by treaty to defend; substantial presence to support ongoing military operations; and country visits for education, training, exercises, or contingency operations. At permanent bases overseas, host nation approval is required for operations that are not directly linked to the defense of the host nation and approval is not guaranteed, as was the case when Turkey did not allow American forces in Turkey to engage in operations against Iraq. In places like Saudi Arabia where we have ongoing operations the troops are expected to depart after the mission objective is complete; yet even in these circumstances the host nation can deny the United States use of its facilities to launch against objectives it does not support. Country visits are subject to host nation invitation or approval. See David Shlapak, "Providing Adequate Access for Expeditionary Aerospace Forces," in Zalmay Khalilzad and Jeremy Shapiro's *Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 351.

<sup>245</sup> David Shlapak, "Providing Adequate Access for Expeditionary Aerospace Forces," 361.

United States demonstrated its continuing commitment to the Philippines after eliminating its permanent presence, and still maintained peace and stability in the region.

The latest U.S. conflicts also demonstrated that alliances and coalitions, overmatching capabilities, and access and pre-positioning of equipment and supplies were crucial for success; however, the pre-positioning of troops or a permanent forward presence was not essential. The movement of troops is discussed in terms of days as opposed to the months required for the transportation of equipment. Given the likelihood that future conflicts will resemble the new way of war demonstrated in Europe the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the global war on terror, withdrawing forces from Korea and Japan will not undermine these keys to success. By strengthening alliances, participating in joint and combined military exercises, and increasing overall cooperation with our friends and allies, the United States can continue to build like-minded partners who share the same values and goals. Fostering strong alliances will help the United States maintain its access, its ability to pre-position equipment and supplies, and its capability to surge forces into allied countries as required.

The permanent physical presence of military forces does not guarantee Japan or Korea will side with the United States in a conflict with China over Taiwan or in a global war against terror. Japan and Korea will side with the United States when America has won them over with shared values, goals, and interests; with the right justification of its cause; with the strength of its alliance; and with the capability and commitment of its forces to defend mutual interests in peace, stability, and freedom around the world. This partnership is not won or guaranteed by a permanent military presence within the allied country, but by fostering relations between nations, by using diplomacy, by training and exercising together, and by demonstrating the capability and commitment to respond as America says it will respond.

Finally, the evolution of the U.S. military force structure and forward positioning strategy may be analogous to the change in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons strategy within the Republic of Korea. When the United States under the leadership of President Bush decided in 1991 to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Korea did deterrence fail or instability prevail? No! On the contrary, despite initial protests and arguments from both

the Japanese and South Korean governments to keep the tactical nuclear capability within the Republic of Korea, the United States convinced its friends and allies, as well as its potential enemies, that the capability lost by removing tactical nuclear weapons was more than compensated under the overarching, protective umbrella of the strategic nuclear weapons based in the United States.<sup>246</sup> In essence, in terms of capability and its impact on reassuring allies and dissuading enemies, the existence and threat of a better, more capable weapon system positioned outside the region could accomplish the same objectives of a less capable, redundant weapon system within the region, and thus precluded the physical presence of such tactical forces. In much the same way, the U.S. military has developed and demonstrated such advanced asymmetric military capabilities that global reach and sustainment goals are within its normal purview, so as to preclude the redundant presence of traditional/conventional military forces within an allied nation.

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<sup>246</sup> Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Basic Books, 2001), 259-260.



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