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**NATO - RUSSIAN RELATIONS: STATUS AND
PROSPECTIVES**

by

Serkan AKTI

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Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Hans-Eberhard Peters
Mikhail Tsyarkin

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Serkan AKTI
Lieutenant, Turkish Navy
B.S., Naval Academy, Turkey, 1993

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2004**

Author: Serkan AKTI

Approved by: Hans-Eberhard Peters
Thesis Advisor

Mikhail Tsypkin
Second Reader

James J. Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has attributed great importance to the development of cooperation with Russia. This thesis, first, evaluates the main developments in NATO - Russian relations since 1991. Although Moscow and the Alliance established a NATO - Russia Council (NRC) and asserted the initiation of a qualitatively new relationship, Russia still needs to fulfill some requirements for catching up the Western standards. Russia's external relations and political, economic and security factors internal to Russia will determine the future of the relationship. This thesis examines Russia's political development and transformation of its economic system, and establishes the problems in its political and economic systems. It also examines Russia's problematic external relations in the region, and their impact on the NATO - Russian relationship. It looks into Russia's National Security Concept, explores regional conflicts such as Chechnya and Georgia, and the U.S. - NATO presence in Central Asia. Then, it examines the oil and natural gas transportation problems created by the Russian monopoly, and evaluates Russian technology transfers to Iran, particularly in the nuclear sector. Consequently, it evaluates the internal and external interactions mentioned above and offers conclusions about the prospects for security and stability in Europe.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has changed the power balance of the world. With the end of that era, significant changes have occurred in former Warsaw Pact countries. Reforms of the political and economic systems of Russia, Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania have fundamentally changed these societies. These countries have taken steps towards freedom and democracy, which have gone far beyond expectations. In most Central and Eastern European countries, free elections have taken place, former divisions were overcome, and repressive border installations were dismantled. Within less than a year, the unification of the two German states took place on 3 October 1990, with the support of the international community and the agreement of the Soviet government. The promise, offered for over forty years, to bring an end to the separation of Europe, took on real meaning with the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Beyond its primary symbolism, the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) realized that this event was part of a wider process which would lead to an unquestionably whole and free Europe.

The reform movement and the prospects for further reforms resulted in important positive changes in the relationships of Russia and Central and Eastern European countries with the international community. Accordingly, a new and enriched dialogue involving East and West opened up. This offered real hope, in place of the fear of conflict and realistic plans for cooperation, in place of polemics and depression. This situation particularly obliged the NATO to review and evaluate its role, and to undertake necessary reforms. In view of the new security challenges and risks, the purposes and tasks of the Alliance were redefined. Consequently, the Allies approved a new Strategic Concept at the Rome Summit in 1991. Then, NATO's Strategic Concept was updated at the Washington Summit in 1999. Since many of the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries were interested in joining NATO, the Allies agreed to the enlargement of the Alliance. The number of NATO member countries has currently increased to 26, and NATO's missions expanded to Afghanistan, for the first time in the Alliance's history.

Russia's future relationship with NATO will depend on its internal development, such as the further development of democratic structures; the economic transformation to a modern market system; the development of external relations; and the prospects for resolutions of regional crises. This thesis assesses Russia's role as a former super power and its influence on European security. Then, it analyzes the internal and external factors that shape NATO-Russian relations, and makes an assessment about their future development.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has attributed great importance to the development of cooperation with Russia. The Second Chapter evaluates the main developments in NATO - Russian relations since 1991. As Lord Robertson, NATO's former Secretary General, evaluated and emphasized the significance of the decade-old relationship in 2000, NATO - Russian coordination is essential for the security and stability of Europe. "NATO and Russia face common challenges and we share a common responsibility for European security and stability. Playing unique strategic roles in the Euro-Atlantic area, Russia and NATO cannot afford to ignore each other. Our cooperation can contribute an added value to European security."¹ Also, Russia's prompt support to the United States after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks accelerated the improvement in relations between NATO and Russia.

Although Moscow and the Alliance established a NATO - Russia Council at the Rome Summit in May 2002, and asserted the initiation of a qualitatively new relationship, Russia still needs to fulfill some requirements. Russia's external relations and political, economic and security factors internal to Russia will determine the future of the relationship. If Russia does not make progress on these factors and resolve disagreements with the Alliance, it will never be a real partner of NATO.

A more democratic and prosperous Russia is important for a peaceful Europe. Meanwhile, resolving disagreements will promote the development of a more stable and secure continent. The Third Chapter examines Russia's internal development, including the status of democratic structures, institutions, rule of law, the power of the Presidency, transformation of its economic system, and poverty at present. It establishes the problems in political and economic systems in Russia, and evaluates their prospects.

¹ Lord Robertson, "Prospects for NATO-Russian Relations," <<http://www.nato.int/docu/articles/2000/a000501a.pdf>>, accessed on 21 February 2004.

The consolidation of democracy in Russia certainly would contribute to improved security and stability in Europe. This chapter applies Bruce Russett's Democratic Peace Theory to Russia's political environment. As Russett statistically demonstrated in his peace theory, in modern international systems, democracies have almost never fought each other.² In democratic countries, rulers prefer peaceful conflict resolutions because democratic norms, rules and legitimate institutions constrain the arbitrary actions of the leaders.

International terrorism is a major threat for almost all regions of the world at present. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan underlines the importance of promoting prosperity in fighting terrorism and states that poverty is one of the key factors causing terror. "Let me say that, as part of the fight against terrorism, we should intensify our efforts to get to the root causes, which you have referred to - that is, conflict, poverty, ignorance and racism. Indeed, people who are desperate and in despair become easy recruits for terrorist organizations."³ Definitely, promoting economic prosperity in Russia will contribute to improve security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. According to Alexander Vershbow, the U.S. Ambassador to Russia, there is a critical economic aspect to the war on terrorism that goes beyond dismantling terrorists' financial networks. We need to encourage prosperity, progress and hope among developing nations, where terrorists seek to exploit poverty and sow seeds of hate.⁴

NATO and Russia previously cooperated in Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR), and in that way demonstrated how they could interact successfully to achieve common goals. However, they still face security disagreements, owing in part to their different interests and priorities that could make them challenge each other.

The Third Chapter also examines Russia's problematic external relations in the region, and their impact on the NATO - Russian relationship. It looks into Russia's National Security Concept, accepted in January 2000, and its importance from NATO's

² Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 4.

³ Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, Transcript of Press Conference (19 Sep 2001, Press Release), SG/SM/7964, <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7964.doc.htm>>, accessed on 17 May 2004.

⁴ Alexander Vershbow (U.S. Ambassador to Russia), *Allies against Terrorism*, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 11 September 2003, <http://moscow.usembassy.gov/bilateral/statement.php?record_id=60>, accessed on 1 May 2004.

point of view. It explores regional conflicts such as Chechnya and Georgia, and the U.S. - NATO presence in Central Asia. Then, it assesses their consequences for NATO - Russia cooperation. It explores the oil and natural gas transportation problems created by the Russian monopoly over the Caspian Basin pipelines among the Caucasus and Central Asian states. Finally, this chapter evaluates Russian technology transfers to Iran, particularly in the nuclear sector, that increased the tension among the NATO countries which recognized the importance of nonproliferation.

The peaceful era, which began with Mikhail Gorbachev, provided the initial steps for creating a peaceful world. There is still a long way to realize the desired result. However, if individuals realize their own responsibilities and perform by establishing democratic norms; then, a peaceful world is inevitable. The concluding chapter evaluates Russia's internal and external interactions and offers conclusions about the prospects for security and stability in Europe. Finally, it offers solutions in order to improve the NATO - Russian relationship.

II. NATO - RUSSIAN RELATIONS SINCE 1991

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has given great importance to the development of cooperation with Russia since the end of the Cold War. NATO has considered that NATO - Russian coordination is essential for security and stability in Europe. As NATO former Secretary General Lord Robertson said:

NATO and Russia face common challenges and we share a common responsibility for European security and stability. Playing unique strategic roles in the Euro-Atlantic area, Russia and NATO cannot afford to ignore each other. Our cooperation can contribute an added value to European security.⁵

NATO and Russia have been working together on a variety of defense and security-related issues since the end of the Cold War. This chapter evaluates the principal developments in NATO - Russian relations since 1991.

A. EUROPE'S NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The significant events between 1989 and 1991 - the opening of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, the collapse of the Communist governments and progress towards political and economic system reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact - compelled NATO to review its traditional missions, evaluate its role, and to undertake the necessary reforms including the dialogue with its former adversaries.

During the Cold War period, NATO provided collective defense and common security for its member countries. It continues to accomplish these basic missions; however, has undertaken new tasks according to the new security environment in Europe. In the North Atlantic Council meeting in Copenhagen on 7 June 1991, NATO countries declared that the decade-old division of Europe was over and that they wanted to build a constructive partnership with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They also stated that they would continue, with all available means, to support reforms undertaken in the Central and Eastern European states to establish democratic systems and to create modern, competitive market-oriented economies.

⁵ Lord Robertson, "Prospects for NATO-Russia Relations."

NATO member countries agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new period in Europe. Therefore, a new Strategic Concept was developed and completed in November 1991. Compared with the previous concepts, it highlighted cooperation with former adversaries, as opposed to confrontation. It maintained the security of its members as NATO's primary purpose; however, combined this with the specific duty to work towards improved and expanded security for Europe as a whole:

The new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members.... On the other hand, the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.⁶

The new Strategic Concept emphasized cooperation with former adversaries for the security and stability in Europe as a whole. "The Alliance's security policy is based on dialogue; cooperation; and effective collective defense as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions."⁷ Accordingly, by using the new opportunities available, the Alliance would maintain security with the minimum level of forces.

B. NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL (NACC)

The member countries of NATO, and Central and Eastern European countries - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union - established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with the purpose of "a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues"⁸ in December 1991. In March 1992, all of the Commonwealth of Independent States became members.

The consultations and cooperation in the NACC focused on security and related issues where Allies could offer their experience and knowledge, such as defense

⁶ NATO Basic Texts, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, (Rome, 8 November 1991), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm>>, accessed on 2 April 2004.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ NATO Basic Texts, *The Rome Declaration* (Rome, 8 November 1991), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108b.htm>>, accessed on 4 April 2004.

planning, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes. This new program improved the participation of NACC partners in the scientific and environmental programs of the Alliance. It also allowed the maximum dissemination of information about NATO in the Central and Eastern European countries, through diplomatic liaison and embassies.

C. NATO ENLARGEMENT, RUSSIA'S PFP FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT AND INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

NATO enlargement is a process towards its essential purpose and has contributed to improved stability and security in Europe. As stated in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance was open to membership of other European countries. "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."⁹

At NATO's Brussels' summit, on 10 January 1994, the Allies declared that they expected and would welcome the democratic countries of the East in order to enhance stability in Europe. "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. This new program goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace."¹⁰

The Partnership for Peace has operated under the North Atlantic Council and formed new security relationships between NATO and its Partners for Peace. NATO would consult with any country in the Pfp if that partner perceived a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political sovereignty, or security. The Alliance and Pfp countries have worked in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in fields such as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations. To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, peacekeeping field exercises began in 1994 within the Partnership framework.

⁹ NATO Basic Texts, *The North Atlantic Treaty* (Washington D.C., 4 April 1949), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>>, accessed on 6 April 2004.

¹⁰ NATO Basic Texts, "Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document," (Brussels, 10 January 1994), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b940110a.htm>>, accessed on 6 April 2004.

The other partner states provided the NATO authorities “Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities.”¹¹ NATO proposed a program for the Partnership exercises and other activities regarding the Partnership's objectives. Due to this program and its Presentation Document, each partner state developed an individual Partnership Program.

Russia, a founding member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (since 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document in June 1994 and approved a PfP Individual Partnership Program agreement with NATO in May 1995. Although Russia and NATO agreed to pursue broad, enhanced dialogue and cooperation within and outside PfP, Russia's participation in PfP activities has been minimal because of its concerns about NATO's prospective enlargement:

Russia's military involvement in PfP has been almost nonexistent. Various explanations for Russia's passivity have been suggested: above all, financial and other resource limitations; a continuing distrust of NATO and a reluctance to lend support and legitimacy to a NATO - centered and - directed network of relationships; and a wish to signal displeasure regarding NATO's projected enlargement.¹²

In the summer of 1995, a NATO information officer was placed at the NATO Contact Point Embassy in Moscow.

D. RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR) AND STABILIZATION FORCE (SFOR)

NATO - Russian cooperation on the implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 added a new dimension to the security partnership. Russian troops participated in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and subsequently in the Stabilization Force (SFOR). Russia's effort assisted the two sides in overcoming misperceptions about each other.

NATO implemented UN Security Council sanctions and no-fly zones to resolve ethnic conflicts among the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1998), p. 136.

Croatia between 1992 and 1995. The Dayton Agreement signed in November 1995 and the UN Security Council Resolution in December authorized NATO to implement the agreement. An Implementation Force (IFOR) with 60,000 troops was established:

Together, we affirm our commitment to continue the Alliance's efforts to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our common resolve, founded on transatlantic cooperation, will enable us to respond effectively to this threat to European stability. We have today endorsed the military planning for the Implementation Force. JOINT ENDEAVOR will attest to NATO's capacity to fulfill its new missions of crisis management and peacekeeping, in addition to its core functions as a defensive alliance. We welcome the wide range of offers from Partnership for Peace and other nations outside of our Alliance to participate in and support the operation. Russia's participation is especially significant as a concrete example of our evolving relationship.¹³

In December 1996, a NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) with 31,000 troops was established as the successor of IFOR because of the uncertainty and instability in the region:

An international military presence is still required to provide the stability necessary for consolidating the peace. NATO is therefore prepared to organize and lead a Stabilization Force (SFOR) to take the place of IFOR authorized by a UN Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. SFOR will contribute to a secure environment necessary for the consolidation and stabilization of peace by deterring or, if necessary, halting a resumption of hostilities. It will also provide time for political reconciliation and economic reconstruction to gain momentum.¹⁴

Russia's unpredicted participation in both NATO-led missions opened a new dimension towards the NATO - Russian partnership:

NATO's preparations for SFOR have been conducted in close cooperation with Russia and the other non-NATO countries now contributing forces to IFOR. We are pleased that all 17 of these countries, and other new contributors, are willing to be part of SFOR. Our cooperation in Bosnia

¹³ NATO press communiqué, "Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina," 5 December 1995, M-NAC-2(95)119, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-119.htm>>, accessed on 24 April 2004.

¹⁴ NATO press communiqué, "Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina," 10 December 1996, M-NAC-2-(96) 166, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-166e.htm>>, accessed on 28 April 2004.

has enhanced the relations between the Allies, Russia and our other Partners and has moved Europe towards a new stage of security cooperation.¹⁵

E. THE FOUNDING ACT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN NATO AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND NATO - RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL

NATO and the Russian Federation approved the Founding Act on Mutual Relations and set up the NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in Paris in May 1997. Secretary General Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov pursued a four-month negotiation in order to deepen and widen NATO-Russia relations. As a consequence, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997 by the Heads of States and Governments of the Alliance, the Secretary General of NATO and the President of the Russian Federation. The Founding Act was undertaken at the highest political level, to work together in order to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. The Founding Act described the goals and methods of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that would constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia:

NATO and Russia will help to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They do not consider each other as adversaries. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples.¹⁶

The four sections of the Act outline the principles and mechanisms ruling the cooperation between NATO and Russia.

1. Principles

Section I described details over principles on which the NATO - Russian partnership is based.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ NATO Basic Texts, "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," (Paris, 27 May 1997), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/fndact-a.htm>>, accessed on 28 April 2004.

NATO and Russia accepted the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, and agreed to work together to contribute to the establishment of common and comprehensive security in Europe. They also determined to strengthen the OSCE, “as the only pan-European security organization, which has a key role in European peace and stability.”¹⁷

NATO and Russia decided to cooperate among participating states of the OSCE in order to create a common space of security and stability in Europe. They also decided to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries as a response to new risks and challenges, such as “aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability.”¹⁸

2. NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC)

Section II created a new environment for implementing consultation and cooperation under the Founding Act: NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).

NATO and Russia determined to create the NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Council in order to carry out the plans and purposes declared by this Act and to improve common approaches to European security and to political problems:

The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none. If disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will endeavor to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect within the framework of political consultations.¹⁹

NATO and Russia's aim was that the Permanent Joint Council would provide an apparatus for consultations, coordination and for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. NATO and Russia decided to consult

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

within the Permanent Joint Council in case one of the Council members perceived a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

The Permanent Joint Council met at various levels and in different forms, according to the subject matter and the requests of NATO and Russia. The Permanent Joint Council met at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defense Ministers two times a year, and also monthly at the level of ambassadors/permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council. Military representatives and Chiefs of Staff also met; gatherings of Chiefs of Staff took place more than twice a year, and also monthly at the military representatives level.

The Permanent Joint Council was chaired in cooperation by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member States on a rotation basis, and a representative of the Russian Federation. The PJC gathered for the first time on 18 July 1997, and dealt with a wide range of issues of direct interest to both sides. The Russian Federation established a mission at NATO headquarters in March 1998.

3. Areas for Consultation and Cooperation

Section III outlined the areas for consultation and cooperation. NATO and Russia agreed to focus on particular areas of mutual interest in building their relationship:

Issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area; conflict prevention; joint operations; exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defense policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia; arms control issues; nuclear safety issues; preventing the proliferation of Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) weapons; combating nuclear trafficking; possible cooperation in Theatre Missile Defense; enhanced regional air traffic safety; combating terrorism and drug trafficking; establishment of a NATO documentation centre or information office in Moscow.²⁰

4. Political - Military Matters

Section IV covered political-military matters, including the reiteration of the political commitment by NATO member states that they have “-no intention, no plan and no reason- to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members of the Alliance.”²¹

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ NATO Handbook, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), p. 83.

The member States of NATO and Russia determined to struggle for larger transparency, predictability and mutual confidence with regard to their armed forces. They agreed to use and to improve existing arms control regimes and confidence-building measures in order to form security relations based on peaceful cooperation. NATO and Russia decided to execute a program of extended military activities and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia at all levels.

F. EURO - ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (EAPC)

The countries in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and participating countries of the Partnership for Peace, determined to raise their political and military cooperation to a qualitatively new level, and decided to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on 29-30 May 1997. “They reaffirmed their joint commitment to strengthen and extend peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, on the basis of the shared values and principles which underlie their cooperation, notably those set out in the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace.”²² The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council has been a new mechanism for enhanced efforts in both the political dimension of partnership and practical cooperation under PfP. The consultation and cooperation framework contains political and security related matters, crisis management, regional matters, arms control issues, NBC proliferation and defense issues, international terrorism, defense planning and budgets, and defense policy and strategy, security impacts of economic developments, civil emergency and disaster preparedness, armaments cooperation, nuclear safety, defense related environmental issues, civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control, scientific cooperation, and issues related to peace support operations.²³

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council replaced the NACC Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation with an EAPC Work Plan. The NACC members and PfP participating countries automatically became members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

²² NATO Basic Texts, *Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council*, (Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b970530a.htm>>, accessed on 2 May 2004.

²³ Ibid.

G. THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND RUSSIA'S TEMPORARY SUSPENSION FROM DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION

NATO and Russia fully used the PJC to consult on the Kosovo crisis in 1998. On 11 -12 June, Defense Ministers of NATO and Russia met at NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting and reaffirmed their determination to contribute to international efforts to resolve the crisis. They condemned Belgrade's massive and disproportionate use of force as well as violent attacks by Kosovar Albanian extremists. They reaffirmed their determination to contribute to international efforts to resolve the crisis and support regional stability:

We are deeply concerned by the situation in Kosovo which has deteriorated seriously in recent days. Reports have indicated a new level of violence on the part of the Serb security forces. We call upon all parties to avoid actions which prolong the violence. NATO continues to support a political solution which brings an end to the violence, provides an enhanced status for Kosovo, preserves the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and safeguards the human and civil rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo, whatever their ethnic origin.²⁴

On 9 October, NATO and Russia stated their support for diplomatic efforts to find a political solution and to prevent a humanitarian disaster as well as full compliance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions:

NATO and Russia expressed their full support for the ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at securing a political solution to the crisis, noting the urgency of the present situation. They reiterated their deep concern about the serious humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and stressed the need to see immediate, full and irreversible compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199.²⁵

As the situation in Kosovo worsened, the North Atlantic Council issued a warning to Belgrade, that in the case of failure to meet the demands of the international community, NATO intervention would be inevitable:

The FRY must immediately end the excessive and disproportionate use of force in accordance with these commitments. All parties must end

²⁴ NATO press release, "Statement on Kosovo," *Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session*, (11 June 1998), M-NAC-D-1(98)77, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-077e.htm>>, accessed on 2 May 2004.

²⁵ NATO press statement, *NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting At Ambassadorial Level*, 9 October 1998, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p981009e.htm>>, accessed on 12 May 2004.

violence and pursue their goals by peaceful means only. NATO demands that the parties to the conflict in Kosovo cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission. The next few days will be decisive. What we have seen in Yugoslavia during the past decade is that it is very difficult to stop internal conflicts if the international community is not willing to use force - when all other means have failed. We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the Former Yugoslavia.²⁶

Russia did not share this view and emphasized its full support for the peace talks.

Consequently, on 23 March 1999, when all diplomatic movements ended, NATO decided on the use of force. When NATO air strikes began, Moscow temporarily suspended certain dialogues and cooperation with NATO and Allied governments. Russia did not officially withdraw from the Founding Act; however, it ceased participating in meetings of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Additionally, NATO information officers were expelled from Moscow.

H. THE MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT, UN RESOLUTION IN KOSOVO AND RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN KFOR

On 9 June 1999, the Military Technical Agreement was signed and the air operation was suspended after seventy-eight days of air strikes. The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established the basis for an international security force (KFOR) in Kosovo on 12 June 1999, and Russia's participation in KFOR was made possible with another agreement signed in Helsinki on 18 June 1999.

In Kosovo, the cruel campaign of tyranny and ethnic cleansing was brought to an end. Thus, the political and military goals of the international community were accomplished by the withdrawal of FRY security forces. Certainly, NATO played a vital role in accomplishing this mission. KFOR was authorized by the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with NATO at its core, in Kosovo, to achieve NATO objectives which were "the complete withdrawal of FRY military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; an end to all violence; the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations."²⁷

²⁶ NATO press release, "Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General Dr. Javier Solana," 28 January 1999, (99)11, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-011e.htm>>, accessed on 12 May 2004.

²⁷ NATO press release, "The Situation in and Around Kosovo," 18 June 1999, (1999)097, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-097e.htm>>, accessed on 15 May 2004.

The Alliance wanted its Partners and other interested nations to participate in KFOR. NATO declared that it expected the participation of the Russian Federation in KFOR within a unified chain of command. It was an opportunity for arrangements to allow Russian and NATO forces to work together to bring peace and stability to all peoples in Kosovo.

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Defense Minister of the Russian Federation Igor Sergeyev met in Helsinki to talk about Russia's role, including more than two hundred Russian troops that surprisingly moved into Kosovo, taking control of Pristina's airport and Russia's insistence on patrolling its own sector of Kosovo and refusal to accept NATO command. Finally, on 18 June 1999, the President of the U.S. declared that an agreement had been reached:

Let me say, first of all, how pleased I am and appreciative I am for the efforts made by Secretary Cohen and Defense Minister Sergeyev to reach the agreement under which the Russian forces will join KFOR in Kosovo. They provide for unity of command. They provide for a significant range of responsibilities for the Russians, which I think are entirely appropriate and will enhance the mission's effectiveness. And I am fully supportive of this agreement and very pleased by it.²⁸

A Russian battalion, 13th Tactical Group, had been in the Kosovo Theater from June 1999 to July 2003. The tasks of Task Force Falcon were as follows; monitoring, verifying and enforcing, as necessary, the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement in order to secure a safe and secure environment, providing humanitarian assistance in support of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) efforts, initially enforcing basic law and order, then, transitioning this function to the designated civilian agency as soon as possible, and establishing and supporting the resumption of core civil functions.²⁹

During NATO's former Secretary General Lord Robertson's visit to Moscow on 16 February 2000, a mutual statement was issued in which NATO and Russia decided to a gradual return to wide cooperation on the basis of the Founding Act. "After my visit to Moscow this February, I feel that we are at a new juncture in NATO - Russian relations.

²⁸ The White House, "Remarks by President Clinton on Russia/KFOR Agreement," 18 June 1999, <<http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/Europe-9906/html/Speeches/990618c.html>>, accessed on 22 March 2004.

²⁹ NATO Kosovo Force, <<http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html>>, accessed on 18 January 2004.

They reflect a willingness to engage Europe, including the Alliance, to cooperate and to move the NATO - Russian relationship forward.”³⁰ Foreign Ministers of NATO and Russia agreed to improve their dialogue in the PJC and to look for enhanced cooperation on a wide range of issues in Florence, on 24 May 2000. They approved a PJC Work Program and determined to establish a NATO Information Office in Moscow.³¹

I. THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The new Strategic Concept, like the previous one published in 1991, is the authoritative statement of NATO’s purposes and tasks and provides the highest level of guidance on the political and military means to be used in accomplishing its objectives. Because there had been intense political and security developments since 1991, the member states of NATO approved the Alliance's new Strategic Concept at their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999.

According to the new Concept, NATO's essential and enduring purpose remained the same:

to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. However, to achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance must carry out security, consultation and deterrence and defense tasks. And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must perform crisis management and partnership tasks.³²

In order to shape its security environment and improve the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, the following factors would be essential:

the Alliance’s growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organizations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including peace support operations.³³

³⁰ Lord Robertson, “Prospects for NATO-Russia Relations.”

³¹ NATO press statement, “NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting,” Florence, 24 May 2000, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p000524e.htm>>, accessed on 17 May 2004.

³² NATO press release, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” 24 April 1999, NAC-S (99)65, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>>, accessed on 22 May 2004.

³³ Ibid.

J. IMPROVEMENT IN NATO - RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS AND NATO - RUSSIA COUNCIL (NRC)

President Putin's decision to offer support to the United States after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks accelerated the improvement of relations between NATO and Russia. On 13 September 2001, the NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Council held an extraordinary session and expressed its anger and disapproval for the attacks committed against the people of the United States of America:

NATO and Russia are united in their resolve not to let those responsible for such an inhuman act to go unpunished. NATO and Russia call on the entire international community to unite in the struggle against terrorism. NATO and Russia will intensify their cooperation under the Founding Act to defeat this scourge.³⁴

Foreign Ministers of NATO countries and the Russian Federation met in Brussels on 7 December 2001, and signed a Joint Statement. They determined to enhance their relations and cooperation against the new threats:

We are reminded by these tragic events (9/11 terrorist attacks) that NATO and Russia face common threats that demand comprehensive, coordinated responses. Today we commit ourselves to forge a new relationship between NATO Allies and Russia, enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand up to new threats and risks to our security. We have decided to give new impetus and substance to our partnership, with the goal of creating a new council bringing together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at twenty.³⁵

The member states of NATO and the Russian Federation, signed a declaration in Rome on 28 May 2002, NATO - Russian Relations: A New Quality, which established the new NATO - Russia Council. The NATO - Russia Council (NRC), the successor to the NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), has started "a new era in NATO - Russian relations by making an effective forum for consensus-building, consultations, joint decisions and joint actions."³⁶ NATO member states and Russia declared that they

³⁴ NATO press releases, "Meeting in extraordinary session of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council," 13 September 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p010913e.htm>>, accessed on 22 May 2004.

³⁵ NATO press statement, "NATO-Russia Joint Statement," Brussels, 7 December 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p011207e.htm>>, accessed on 25 May 2004.

³⁶ NATO Basic Texts, "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality," (Rome, 28 May 2002), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b020528e.htm>>, accessed on 28 May 2004.

would work as equal partners in areas of common interest, stand together against common threats and risks to their security, and pursue opportunities for joint action at twenty. They determined to create concrete results that would benefit the peace and security of the people of the Partner states, and would contribute to gradually increasing cooperation between NATO and Russia. They also reaffirmed their determination to construct together a permanent and complete peace in the Euro-Atlantic region on the principles of democracy and joint security, and the view that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible:

The NATO - Russia Council will serve as the principal structure and place for improving the relationship between NATO and Russia. It will operate on the principle of consensus. The members of the NATO - Russia Council will take joint decisions and will bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation.³⁷

The NATO - Russia Council, replacing the NATO - Russia Permanent Joint Council, will focus on all areas of mutual interest identified in Section III of the Founding Act, including the provision to add other areas by mutual agreement. NATO member states and Russia will continue to intensify their cooperation in areas including the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control, confidence-building measures, theatre missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies.³⁸

The format of NATO - Russian meetings changed from “19 NATO members meeting as a body with Russia (19+1)” to Russia, “as one participant among 20 (at 20)” (since 29 March 2004, “at 27”). However, Russia still does not have a veto on NATO decisions.

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks definitely strengthened the relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation. Asymmetric threat made clear that more cooperation was needed for combating terrorism. Russia and the West realized that they needed each other to keep stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The cordial relations, which began by the establishment of PJC in 1997, have been accelerated by the NRC, established in 2002. The main difference between the PJC and the NRC is that the latter is intended to allow Russia to participate in discussions as an equal partner, as one

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

participant among 20 (at 20). NATO intended to give more rights to Russia with the NRC. The NRC particularly intended to increase the reliance between NATO and Russia, and to cooperate deeply in combating recent threats. PJC was not able to improve the reliance between NATO and Russia due to the events such as NATO's air operation in Kosovo. However, the NRC has increased the trust level of both countries, and improved cooperation by creating more working groups in many areas. NATO and Russia have realized their importance and been consulting with each other about broader areas of cooperation since the NRC was established.

K. NATO - RUSSIAN RELATIONS AT PRESENT

NATO - Russia Council (NRC) marked its first birthday on 28 May 2003. On 4 June 2003, all participants at the ministerial meeting stated that they would continue to strengthen practical cooperation in each of the areas within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council in Madrid. "We further underscored our determination to continue and deepen the development of political dialogue in the NRC. Substantial work has been undertaken over the past year in the framework of the NRC. As a result, NATO-Russia relations are being elevated to a new quality."³⁹

On 29 March 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia formally became members of NATO. On 2 April 2004, Foreign Ministers in the NATO - Russia Council (NRC) met in Brussels for the first time in an enlarged format "at 27." They welcomed the participation of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. They also reaffirmed their determination to continue to work together against common threats and risks to their security. The 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid and other recent terrorist attacks were strongly condemned at the meeting.

NATO member countries and the Russian Federation held the third conference on terrorism in Norfolk, Virginia, on 5 April 2004. Terrorism experts and top officials discussed ways of increasing military cooperation in the fight against terrorism, one of the priority areas for cooperation in the NATO - Russia Council.

Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Secretary General of NATO, visited Moscow on 7-8 April 2004. He emphasized the importance of the NATO-Russia partnership and

³⁹ NATO press releases, "Statement," *Meeting of the NRC*, (Madrid, 4 June 2003), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p030604e.htm>>, accessed on 2 May 2004.

stated that Russia must not consider NATO's recent eastward enlargement as a threat. "I consider it my job, my responsibility, to convince (Russians) that NATO has no ulterior motives. NATO wants to co-operate. NATO needs Russia and Russia needs NATO. We live in a dangerous world and we can only solve these problems together."⁴⁰ It was agreed to create Russian Military Liaison Offices at NATO's Operational Command in Belgium, and at the Transformation Command in Norfolk, Virginia. They also determined to strengthen NATO's existing Military Liaison Mission in Moscow with additional personnel.

1. NATO's Istanbul Summit

The leaders of NATO countries and Russia gathered in Istanbul, the city where the continents of Europe and Asia meet, on 28-29 June 2004. During the Summit, the NRC met at the Foreign Ministerial level, examined the previous period, and declared important decisions about the future activities. They determined more practical cooperation between NATO and Russia than that of the previous period.

First and the foremost, the NRC declared its strong determination against the terrorist threat once again. Russia offered to participate in Operation Active Endeavor, the maritime operation which conducts naval operations against international terrorism in the Mediterranean. Russia also offered practical support to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The NAC accepted both of Russia's cooperative offers on combating international terrorism.

The NRC evaluated the results of Kaliningrad 2004, the civil emergency planning and response exercise, which was conducted in June 2004. They also assessed Theater Missile Defense Command Post Exercise-04, conducted in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The ministers declared that NATO and Russia would improve military practices and the interoperability of NATO and Russian forces.

The progress in NATO - Russian relations, which has been accelerated with the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, can be easily seen in the practical area at present. The NRC's decisions accepted at the Istanbul Summit would bring NATO and Russia together practically in many areas. Russia is willing to participate in NATO exercises and provide support for NATO-led operations. However, Russia's participation in practical

⁴⁰ NATO update, "NATO and Russia Enhance Military Cooperation," 7-8 April 2004, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/04-april/e0407c.htm>>, accessed on 31 May 2004.

events was very limited prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The more cordial relations between NATO and Russia appear to contribute to increased mutual trust. Accordingly, this partnership will create a more peaceful Europe and a safer world. As former Secretary General Robertson said, the NATO-Russia relation is still in progress; however, it will definitely contribute to the security and stability in Europe:

I think it is fair to say that ten years after the end of the Cold War the construction of a new, lasting and stable partnership between NATO and Russia is still a «work in progress.» But if we extrapolate the progress already achieved into the next ten years to come, we will have made an enormous contribution to the security and stability of our continent.⁴¹

⁴¹ Lord Robertson, “Prospects for NATO-Russia Relations.”

III. FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE FUTURE NATO - RUSSIAN RELATIONS

A more democratic and prosperous Russia is important for a peaceful Europe. Additionally, resolving disagreements between NATO and Russia will promote the development of a more stable and secure continent. Russia was rewarded with the “at 20” decision-making framework at the Rome Summit in 2002. However, Russia would have to meet many political and economic requirements if it intended to progress in its cooperation with NATO.

“Will Russia’s authoritarian cultural tradition accept liberal democracy? Will Russia accept a modern market economy?”⁴² First, this chapter examines Russia’s internal development, including the status of democratic structures, institutions, rule of law, the power of the presidency, transformation of its economic system, and poverty at present. It establishes the problems in the political and economic systems in Russia, and evaluates their prospects.

Although NATO and Russia have agreed in principle to cooperate in security matters, notably via the NATO - Russia Council (NRC), there are still disagreements over some security and economic issues. This chapter also examines Russia’s problematic external relations in the region, and their impact on the NATO-Russia relationship. It looks into Russia’s National Security Concept, accepted in January 2000, and its importance from NATO’s point of view. It explores regional conflicts such as Chechnya and Georgia, and the U.S. - NATO presence in Central Asia, and assesses their consequences for the NATO - Russian relationship. Finally, it evaluates the Russian monopoly over the Caspian Basin pipelines, the leading supplier of transportation services for the Central Asian countries, and finally Russian technology transfers to Iran, especially in the nuclear sector.

A. RUSSIA’S INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

Russia’s current political and economic institutions are the result of a series of struggles, which began in the late 1980s, under the reformist leadership of Michael Gorbachev. From the Bolshevik Revolution to the disintegration, Russia was a

⁴² Archie Brown, *Contemporary Russian Politics*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 253, 532.

Communist system, meaning that the Communist Party held a monopoly on political authority. Initially, Communism was a revolutionary movement aimed at putting an end to the Tsarist system. However, its aspirations went much further than that. The Communists' long-term objective was the defeat of capitalism throughout the world and the founding of a global socialist system. Eventually, the Communist movement achieved establishing Communist regimes in Russia, Eastern Europe, much of Asia, and a few isolated countries in other regions. Nevertheless, the worldwide Communist revolution never happened, and Communists of the Russian Federation dedicated most of their energies to strengthening the power of the Soviet state.

Gorbachev was deeply concerned about the future of the system and about the Soviet Union's ongoing status as a super power. As Gorbachev stated, "Radical measures were needed, if the Soviet Union was to enter the next century in a manner worthy of a great power."⁴³ Gorbachev reaffirmed much of the existing doctrine and plans of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), giving little signal of upcoming reforms, at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February 1986. While ordering "radical reforms" in the economy, he simply reemphasized the requirement to boost production and to use more advanced technology in heavy industry.

Gorbachev began by recognizing that the economy was in sharp decline; therefore, the status of the country was imperiled. A revived Soviet economy was the vital requirement for sustaining superpower status. "The gap [between the Communist system and the West] in the efficiency of production, quality of products, scientific and technological development, the production of advanced technology and the use of advanced techniques began to widen, and not to our advantage."⁴⁴ He declared that the remedy was a quick transition to intensive economic growth, increased labor productivity and scientific-technical development. These goals could be achieved by modernizing the machine-tool industry, and by decentralizing economic management.

By the summer of 1986, the new General Secretary felt ready to start a more aggressive program of change. Gorbachev himself spoke of two main goals: *glasnost* or openness, and *perestroika* or restructuring. In introducing his political reforms in 1988,

⁴³ Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1996), p. 411.

⁴⁴ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988), p. 19.

Gorbachev made it sufficiently clear that he was not supporting a shift to a multiparty system as well. Gorbachev did not want to remove Communism, but rather to save it by imposing a new cure. "There is only one criterion here: we will listen to and take into consideration everything that strengthens socialism, whereas the trends alien to socialism we will combat, but, I repeat, within the framework of the democratic process."⁴⁵ Gorbachev added that "There is no democracy, nor can there be, without glasnost. And there is no present-day socialism, nor can there be, without democracy."⁴⁶

The red flag came down over the Kremlin for the last time and Mikhail Sergeevic Gorbachev read his farewell address over television on 25 December 1991. At that time, none of the key Soviet institutions remained. The procedure that had begun with the end of Leninism in Eastern Europe in 1989 was now complete with Leninism's collapse in the mother state. Gorbachev was a man before his time and had the right ideas of reform; however, his timing was a little off. As Gorbachev was to admit in 1990, "When we started, we did not understand the depth of the problems we faced."⁴⁷

The reform and transition period, which began with Gorbachev, continued during the Yeltsin era. The first presidential election in Russia was held on 12 June 1991, and Yeltsin became the first President of the Russian Federation. Yeltsin and acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar started another economic reform which later was to be called shock therapy. "It included rapid and radical price liberalization, massive privatization of state-run enterprises, sharp and radical decreases in state and military spending, and increases in taxation."⁴⁸ However, it created many undesired side effects.

The Russian people showed their confidence and approved President Yeltsin and his government in a referendum on 25 April 1993. On 12 December 1993, the parliamentary elections and the referendum on the new Constitution were held. According to the election results, the Constitution was accepted, and the president considerably increased his power.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 57.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 79.

⁴⁷ Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy*, p. 436.

⁴⁸ Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, (San Francisco: Longman, 2002), p. 14

In December 1995, election of deputies to parliament (parliamentary elections) was held in Russia. Despite his health problems, Boris Yeltsin officially announced that he would run for a second-term presidency. In the 16 June 1996 (second round on July 3) presidential elections, the Russian people gave him another four-year term in the presidency.

Vladimir Putin became Russia's Prime Minister in August 1999. In December 1999, the Russian people voted for Parliamentary elections. Then, Boris Yeltsin resigned and designated Putin as acting president of the Russian Federation on 31 December 1999. In the 26 March 2000 Presidential elections, the Russian people elected Putin as the first President of Russia of the 21st century. "Putin who received 52.9 percent of the votes began his new mission on May 7, 2000."⁴⁹ Russia's fourth Parliamentary election was held in December 2003. Finally, President Putin was elected for another four-year term on 14 March 2004 by receiving more than 70 percent of all votes in the presidential election.⁵⁰ Prior to the presidential election in 2004, President Putin changed the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Mikhail Yefimovich Fradkov became the new Prime Minister on 5 March 2004 as the successor to Kasyanov.

Obviously, Russia's political and economic system has progressed a great deal under the presidency of Putin. However, Russia still faces transition and its system has great problems, such as the significant power of the president, and the poverty and inequality among the Russian people.

According to David Yost:

Some European observers are concerned that, despite its internal political fragility and its economic and military weakness, Russia has been awarded such an important role in defining the future European security order...If the United States and its Allies treated Russia in accordance with its objective economic and conventional-military standing, Russia would be humiliated.⁵¹

Russia was rewarded with the "at 20" (since 29 March 2004, "at 27") decision-making framework at the Rome Summit in 2002. However, Russia would have to meet

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 185.

⁵⁰ The Russia Journal, "Putin Announced President of Russia," Moscow, 15 March 2004, <<http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=42935>>, accessed on 18 May 2004.

⁵¹ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p.144.

many political and economic requirements if it intended to make progress in cooperation with NATO. A more democratic and prosperous Russia is important for a peaceful Europe.

1. Democratic Structures and Institutions

The consolidation of democracy in Russia would contribute to improved security and stability in Europe. As Bruce Russett asserts:

In the modern international system, democracies have almost never fought each other. Democracies are inherently more peaceful or dovish internationally because of the political culture favoring the peaceful resolution of disputes, or because the democratic process produces restraint by the general populace which will have to pay the price of war in blood and money.⁵²

The rules and legitimate democratic institutions constrain the arbitrary action of the leaders.

This chapter provides a brief overview of Russia's current political structure. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the dominant institution which ruled the country prior to 1989. The executive apparatus of the CPSU consisted of the General Secretary, at the top, and the Politburo (Cabinet). The Soviets, representative organizations, were less powerful. Reformist General Secretary of the CPSU, Michael Sergeevic Gorbachev, made some major changes in the institutional structure of the Soviet system. The first election was held for a new body, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, in March 1989. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these new bodies became the supreme organizations of legislative authority in Russia. Today, the Russian Federation (*Rossiyskaya Federatsiya*) consists of forty-nine oblasts, twenty-one republics, ten autonomous okrugs, six krais, two federal cities and one autonomous oblast. A Bicameral Federal Assembly (*Federalnoye Sobraniye*) consists of the Federation Council (*Sovet Federatsii*) and the State Duma (*Gosudarstvennaya Duma*). The Federation Council has 178 seats, with members appointed by the top executive and legislative officials in each of the eighty-nine federal administrative units; oblasts, krais, republics, autonomous okrugs, oblasts, and the federal cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, mentioned above. The members of the Federation Council serve four-year

⁵² Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 4.

terms. The State Duma has 450 seats, of which 225 seats are elected by proportional representation from party lists winning at least 5% of the vote, and 225 seats from single-member constituencies. The members of the State Duma are elected by direct, popular vote to serve four-year terms.⁵³

a. *The Constitution*

The new Constitution of the Russian Federation was ratified by a referendum held on 12 December 1993. The Constitution is based on the rule of law, human rights, equality, democratic values, and recognizes the Russian people as a part of the world community. “We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, united by a common fate in our land, affirming human rights and liberties, civil peace and accord... recognizing ourselves as a part of the world community, hereby adopt this Constitution of the Russian Federation.”⁵⁴ The Russian system is defined as “presidential-parliamentary” by political scientists Matthew Shugart and John Carey.⁵⁵ According to the Constitution, the President of the Russian Federation is the head of state. Additionally, the president has acquired wide powers.

b. *The President of the Russian Federation*

The president is entirely responsible for the sovereignty, independence and state integrity of the Russian Federation. The president adopts measures to protect these assets, and ensures agreed functioning and interaction of bodies of state authority.

The rights of the President are defined in the fourth chapter of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: The President of the Russian Federation determines the primary directions for the state's internal and foreign policy. He/she appoints the Prime Minister and the federal ministers. The President has the right to dismiss the Government and the Federal Ministers in case that they are not compliant with the Constitution and the law. The President forms and heads the National Security Council of the Russian Federation, responsible for the accomplishment of National Security Concept (NSC), the highest security document in Russia. (The NSC will be

⁵³ CIA World Factbook, <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html>>, accessed on 1 May 2004.

⁵⁴ The Constitution of the Russian Federation, <<http://www.therussiasite.org/legal/laws/constitution.html>>, accessed on 16 April 2004.

⁵⁵ Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, p. 51.

examined in the second part of this chapter in detail). The President approves the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which provides guidelines for the organization, personnel, equipment, and methods of warfare. He/she appoints and dismisses plenipotentiaries of the President of the Russian Federation and the highest commanders of the Armed Forces. The President has the right to dissolve the State Duma in case that they are not compliant with the Constitution and the federal laws. The President conducts negotiations with other states and signs international agreements. He/she is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or an indirect threat of aggression, the President of the Russian Federation has the right to set up martial law.⁵⁶

c. The Federal Assembly (The Parliament)

The Federal Assembly - the Parliament - is the representative and legislative organization of the Russian Federation. The Federal Assembly consists of two bodies - the State Duma and the Federation Council.

d. The State Duma

The State Duma consists of 450 deputies who are elected for a term of four years. The rights and duties of the State Duma are described in the fifth chapter of the Constitution. The Duma issues approval to the President for the appointment of the Chairman of the Government. The questions of confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation are resolved in the State Duma. It appoints and dismisses the Chairman of the Central Bank. In addition, it declares amnesties, and makes accusations against the President of the Russian Federation for his/her removal from office in case that he/she is not compliant with the Constitution and the law.

A federal law is passed by the State Duma by a majority of the votes of the total number of deputies. Federal laws passed by the Duma are transferred for consideration by the Federation Council within five days. In the event that a federal law is rejected by the Federation Council, the chambers may establish a conciliation commission in order to resolve disagreements, and the law will be subjected to repeat consideration by the State Duma. In the event that the State Duma does not agree with the

⁵⁶ The Constitution of the Russian Federation.

verdict of the Federation Council, the federal law is considered “passed” if, during a repeat vote, at least two-thirds of the total number of State Duma deputies vote for it.⁵⁷

e. The Federation Council

Every unit of the Federation is represented in the Federation Council by two deputies, one from the executive branch and one from legislative branch, from each region. The rights and duties of the Federation Council are described in the fifth chapter of the Constitution. According to the Constitution, the Federation Council approves the changes in borders between internal bodies of Russia and approves the decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the introduction of martial law and state of emergency. The Council decides the questions concerning the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of the Russian Federation. It schedules the elections of the Presidency. It has the right to remove the President from office in the cases defined by the Constitution. The Federation Council appoints the judges of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation.

The Federation Council considers laws passed by the State Duma. If the Council passes them, the laws go to the president for his/her signature. If it rejects them, the Duma may try to dominate the rejection, or the two chambers form a conciliation commission to settle their disagreements. Then, the result is voted on by both chambers and if both pass it, it is sent to the president for his/her signature.

f. The Government

The Government of the Russian Federation exercises the executive authority of the Russian Federation. The Government issues decrees and directives in order to secure their execution. The Government consists of the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen, and federal ministers.

The Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (Prime Minister) is appointed by the President with the agreement of the State Duma. The sixth chapter of the Constitution defines the rights and duties of the Government -it drafts and submits the federal budget to the State Duma. The Government secures the implementation, in the Russian Federation, of a unified financial, credit and monetary

⁵⁷ Ibid.

policy. It secures the execution, in the Russian Federation, of a unified state strategy in the spheres of culture, science, education, healthcare, social welfare and the environment. It carries out the management of federal property. The Government implements measures to secure the defense of the country, state security and the realization of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. It implements measures to secure the rule of law, the rights and liberties of citizens, the protection of property and public order, and the fight against crime.⁵⁸

g. Political Parties

Political parties, elections and contests are enviable assets of a democracy. In Russia, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1995, 1999 and 2003 parliamentary elections gave impetus to the development of political parties. Today, Russia's political parties can be classified under four main types: democratic, centric, communist and nationalist.

Democratic parties support liberal democratic norms and market-oriented economic values. The Union of Rightist Forces (SPS) and the Yabloko Party are under this class of democratic parties. Centric parties, United Russia and Motherland Bloc (Rodina), are the parties which favor the policies that the majority of the people desire. In the 7 December 2003 parliamentary elections, 37.1 % of all voters chose United Russia which became the first political party in the election.⁵⁹ The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) is the foremost successor party to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It strongly opposes market reforms and privatization programs. It also shows hostility to Western influence in Russia. The major nationalist party is the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). This party favors a national theme stronger than Communism, demands more aggressive foreign policies and discriminates against non-Russian ethnic minorities.

h. The Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation consists of nineteen judges. The court checks the constitutionality of federal laws, international agreements, and actions of the president, the government, and the parliament.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ CIA World Factbook.

The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation gives interpretations of the Constitution of the Russian Federation upon a request from the President, the Federation Council, the State Duma, and the Government. The Court also gives a decision on compliance with the established procedure for accusing the President of treason or the commission of other serious crimes upon a request from the Federation Council.

i. Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law

Only the courts are authorized to keep justice in the Russian Federation. Judicial authority is implemented by way of constitutional, civil, administrative, and criminal courts. The court system in Russia is established only by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal constitutional law.

Judges must be citizens of the Russian Federation, be at least 25 years of age, possess higher legal education and have practiced in the legal profession for at least five years. Judges are autonomous and answer only to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal law. Judges have immunity, which cannot be dismissed.

According to the Constitution, human rights and liberties and citizens' rights of the Russian people are recognized and guaranteed by the principles and norms of international law, and in accordance with the Constitution. The implementation of human rights and liberties and citizens' rights must not violate the rights and liberties of other persons. All Russian people are equal before the law and the courts.

The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation is the supreme judicial organization for civil, criminal, administrative, and other cases assigned to courts of general jurisdiction.

2. Transformation of the Economic System

An economic reform movement has been carried out in Russia since the Gorbachev era. Gorbachev declared his reform movement of restructuring and reorganizing the centralized economic structure at a Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in June 1987.

I would say that the concept of economic reform provides for fundamental changes in every area; including the transfer of enterprises to complete cost accounting, a radical transformation of the centralized management of the economy, fundamental changes in planning, a reform of the price

formation system and of the financial and crediting mechanism, and the restructuring of foreign economic ties.⁶⁰

Russia has undergone a transition from a state-owned, centrally-directed economy to a market system since 1991. The transition of one of the biggest economies in the world has been undoubtedly very difficult. However, in many respects, Russia has had an extremely positive basis from which to achieve its goal: “important natural resources, including minerals and energy; a highly educated labor force, which is still employed to a large extent in the less productive state sector; and a potentially large domestic market with pent-up demand for consumer goods and social infrastructure.”⁶¹ Privatization and macroeconomic stabilization are the key reform movements, which Russia pursued under the direction of Boris Yeltsin.

a. Stabilization

Stabilization, the structural adjustment, can be defined as a severe regime for the economy.⁶² During the stabilization period, governments try to reinstate a macroeconomic balance between spending and earning. The governments must make serious cuts in state spending, increase the taxes, stop price control policies, and open the market to foreign trade, so that foreign products can compete with domestic ones.

In the short term, stabilization lowers the standard of living of the society. The most important result of this kind of severe regime can be hyperinflation. The economy gets better only when high inflation is under control. However, the inflation rate reached 850 percent in 1993 in Russia.⁶³ The producers did not respond to the economic shock therapy by continuing production; moreover, they reduced the numbers of employees, and stopped paying their bills and taxes. Consequently, the Russian economy went into a severe depression.

b. Privatization

According to Remington, privatization is the transfer of legal title of state firms to private holders. In addition to its stabilization policy, the Russian Government

⁶⁰ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, p. 84.

⁶¹ Stanley Fisher, *International Monetary Fund Speeches*, “The Russian Economy at the Start of 1998,” 9 January 1998, <<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/010998.htm>>, accessed on 5 May 2004.

⁶² Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, p. 202.

⁶³ Stanley Fisher, *International Monetary Fund Speeches*.

pursued another important program which determined to privatize state assets. "Market theory holds that under the right conditions, private ownership of productive assets is more efficient for society as a whole than is monopoly or state ownership, because in a competitive environment owners are motivated by an incentive to maximize their property's ability to produce a return."⁶⁴

Privatization acquired great public support in Russia. However, the top of the state - Yeltsin and the Government - were challenged because of the privatization process. The parliament tried to constrain Yeltsin's policy of privatization in 1993. As a result, Yeltsin dismissed the government. Then, the economic reform program continued until 1998.

c. 1998 Economic Crisis

Russia's economy was bankrupt on 17 August 1998. The ruble's value collapsed, the stock market crashed, and the government and many banks defaulted on their debts. The government issued bonds at high rates in order to increase revenues. However, it couldn't pay its commitments and declared a moratorium on its debts. "The ruble's collapse - from seventeen to just four U.S. cents per ruble - has made Western imports prohibitively expensive, leaving the market open for Russian manufacturers. Exporters, meanwhile, are now competing on price and aggressively moving into foreign markets."⁶⁵

However, Russia's economy was not defunct as the experts had expected. According to Peter Westin, an economist with the Russian-European Center for Economic Policy, "one year after the crisis, it's far better than we predicted. The rise in oil prices helped as well, boosting the government's tax revenue. And despite the devaluation, inflation runs low."⁶⁶

The Russian economy has overcome the August 1998 crash. Currently, the economic conditions of the Russian Federation have been slowly improving, particularly over the last two years. Russian Economy Minister German Gref said that "Russia's GDP

⁶⁴ Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, p. 210.

⁶⁵ BBC News, "Business: The Economy from Russia with Love," 16 August 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/the_economy/421828.stm>, accessed on 2 July 2004.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

grew seven percent in 2003”⁶⁷ (It was 4.3 percent in 2002).⁶⁸ The Chairman of the Russian Central Bank, Sergey Ignatyev, declared that the inflation rate in January 2003 in Russia was 2.4% and decreased to 1.8% in January 2004. He also added that "The inflation rate continues to decrease this year."⁶⁹ According to the IMF Russia Country Report, “the most important battles in securing macroeconomic stabilization and creating a market economy have been won, but much remains to be done to secure the future growth of the economy.”⁷⁰

d. President Putin’s Objectives

Vladimir Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, stated that his aim was to keep the economy on the course of growth. “Russia's active participation in further liberalization of the world economy” is one of the main goals of Russia.”⁷¹ His economic program consists of a set of actions for reviving market-oriented reform. Among these are reorganization of the natural monopolies such as Gazprom; resuming privatization of state enterprises; adopting legislation to provide guarantees for private property; setting macroeconomic policy in a way that favors entrepreneurship, investment, and economic growth.⁷²

3. Problems, Possible Outcomes and Prospects

Russia has nominally been in a transition to a democracy since 1991. The right to vote, parliamentary and presidential elections, the constitution, and various institutions, mentioned above, are the major indicators of the transition. However, “leadership is still the basic institution in Russia.”⁷³ President Putin has exerted a great deal of personal control over improvements in Russia. “The president has wide powers to issue decrees and faces few restraints on the exercise of his power. In practice the president directly

⁶⁷ Gateway to Russia, “GDP Grew 7%in 2003,” 22 January 2004, <http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_202125.php>, accessed on 19 July 2004.

⁶⁸ CIA World Factbook.

⁶⁹ The Russia Journal, “Inflation Continues to go down in Russia,” (Moscow, 4 February 2004), <<http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnewswire.shtml?dmy=4-2-2004#n42379>>, accessed on 25 July 2004.

⁷⁰ Stanley Fisher, *International Monetary Fund Speeches*.

⁷¹ Pravda, “Putin for Russia’s Active Role in World Economy Liberalization,” 30 October 2001, <<http://english.pravda.ru/economics/2001/10/30/19563.html>>, accessed on 1 August 2004.

⁷² Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, pp. 225-226.

⁷³ Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin’s Russia*, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 273.

oversees foreign policy and national security. He is the supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces, to authorize them to order armed forces into action to preserve order.”⁷⁴ Putin has increased his own power by arranging the direct report of some other ministries to him. “According to the new regulation, not only the security ministers, but also the heads of finance, economic development and trade, agriculture, natural resources, and energy and industry will report directly to the president.”⁷⁵

President Putin also decided to strengthen his power due to the terrorist attack on a Russian school in North Ossetia in the first week of September 2004. He announced his plans for a radically restructured political system that would make his power stronger by ending the popular election of governors and independent lawmakers. Under his plan, “Putin would appoint all governors to create a single chain of command and allow Russians to vote only for political parties rather than specific candidates in parliamentary elections.”⁷⁶ During a meeting with cabinet ministers and governors, Putin stated that “Under current conditions, the system of executive power in the country should not just be adapted to operating in crisis situations, but should be radically restructured in order to strengthen the unity of the country and prevent further crises.”⁷⁷ Although Putin described the changes as increasing national unity in the face of a terrorist threat, it is most likely that this is another step toward strengthening the power of the presidency. In other words, this is an unfortunate movement against democracy in Russia. However, a possible political weakening of the presidency in the near future may contribute to a decrease in the time period of transition to democracy in Russia.

Political culture and civic society are the crucial components of a real democracy, and serve to consolidate democracy more than any other factors. Democracy is a compromise between the people and the state. This compromise is sustained by the limitation of the state’s power. Either democratic institutions or society can limit the

⁷⁴ Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, p. 13.

⁷⁵ John Helmer, *The Russia Journal*, “Putin’s Innovative Cabinet Lineup,” Moscow, 16 March 2004, <http://www.russijournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=42954>>, accessed on 7 August 2004.

⁷⁶ Peter Baker, *The Washington Post*, “Putin Moves to Centralize Authority by Ending Popular Election of Governors and Independent Lawmakers,” 14 September 2004, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17838-2004Sep13.html>>, accessed on 18 October 2004.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

state's power. Political culture predetermines both political structures and political behavior. If we consider that political culture is resistant to a sudden significant change, "Russia's political culture and cultural tradition offers almost no chance for democracy."⁷⁸ The first component of political culture is the political past. Totalitarian regimes - mostly Communism - shaped the history of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Communism generally destroyed the desire of the people to participate. This weakens one of the main features of democracy, which is continuous support of the people. Public support is crucial to sustain democracy. However, "Russians have lower confidence in present-day representative political institutions. Trust for local government, 18 %; for the DUMA, 13 %; for political parties, 7 %."⁷⁹ According to VTSIOM data, "about 60 % of Russians reject the Western capitalist model of life for their country."⁸⁰ As Boris Yeltsin said, "The country's continuing problems have been caused by the blind embrace of the Western-style capitalist ideology and the disregard for traditional social values."⁸¹

The Russian Central Election Commission declared the official results of the Russian presidential elections held on 14 March 2004. "Some 69,581,761 voters took part in the elections, which was 64.4 % of all voters. The turnout at the 2000 presidential elections was 68.7 %. Vladimir Putin mustered 49,565,238 votes, which was 71.3 % of the vote."⁸² President Putin received the absolute majority of all votes. However, overall participation in the presidential election was less than 65 %, which demonstrated that the willingness of Russian people to take part in a democratic system has diminished.

The media in Russia is not completely independent. This situation is another constraint for democracy in Russia. The international group, which observed the 14 March 2004 presidential elections in Russia, including monitors from thirty-nine countries acting under the sponsorship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), suggested that:

⁷⁸ Archie Brown, *Contemporary Russian Politics*, p. 532.

⁷⁹ Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, p. 133.

⁸⁰ Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Old, New and Post Liberal Attitudes Toward the West: From Love to Hate*, (20 August 1998), p. 10.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 21.

⁸² The Russia Journal, "Putin Officially Declared Winner of Presidential Race," Moscow, 23 March 2004, <<http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnewswire.shtml?dmy=23-3-2004#n43037>>, accessed on 28 May 2004.

Russia strive to emphasize the transformation of the controlled media into an independent one. In the opinion of the group's organizers, the elections cannot be considered a fundamental test of Russia's democratic system. Because, the incumbent president refused to conduct a traditional electoral campaign, while the government-controlled media supported him exclusively.⁸³

Russia, “the dominant-power system, is still ruled by political forces that appear to have a long-term hold on power.”⁸⁴ There is a limited political sphere. However, it is under the personal control of President Putin. Participation and competition are almost impossible with a people who do not trust the system and do not know the meaning of civic society. Therefore, the conditions in today’s Russia give no chance for a real democracy in the country in the near future.

In market economies, legal institutions guarantee the right of private ownership of productive resources. Producers and consumers make decisions on production and consumption in a competitive environment. “Russia remains far from having reached this point. Russia’s method of enacting economic reform - rapid, radical price liberalization combined with sharp decreases in state spending and in increases in taxation - has been called shock therapy.”⁸⁵ This created a rise in rates of poverty and inequality. A small group of people became wealthy. However, a majority suffered a decline in living standards. According to UNAIDS official reports, the poverty (the official poverty line is about \$2.33 a day) rate remains high: 29.9%, almost equal to what it was in 1992.⁸⁶

Boris Yeltsin aimed at using privatization to widely share ownership of state enterprises with many people to create support for the market economy. However, a small group dominated the privatization movement, and became ultra-wealthy. These business people who owned great empires of finance, industry, energy, telecommunication and media are called oligarchs. They showed that they could cooperate only when it served their interest.

⁸³ Ros Balt, *Pravda: Russia*, “OSCE: Russian Presidential Elections not Truly Democratic in some Respects,” <<http://newsfromrussia.com/main/2004/03/16/52799.html>>, accessed on 24 June 2004.

⁸⁴ Thomas Carothers, *Journal of Democracy: The End of the Transition Paradigm*, (January 2002), p. 13.

⁸⁵ Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, p. 14.

⁸⁶ UNAIDS Report, <<http://www.unaids.org/en/geographical+area/by+country/russian+federation.asp>>, accessed on 7 April 2004.

As Russia's former Economy Minister, Professor Yevgeny Yasin asserted, fighting corruption and the patronage economy in particular will determine the future of economic reforms and prosperity in Russia. "Russia cannot achieve significant growth without major investment, which in turn demands a favorable investment climate."⁸⁷ He outlined three steps vital to promoting investment in Russia:

Protection and expansion of property rights, reform of the financial system, and a significant reduction in corruption and crime. The war against corruption will be the most difficult challenge for Russia to overcome. Corruption has contributed to the weakness of Russia's state institutions today. Reform is necessary at the regional and local level to reduce the power of governors and other regional officials who have created a patronage economy in place of a market economy.⁸⁸

According to a survey conducted by GALLUP International in November and December 2003, 36% of Russians believe that the next generations will be less prosperous than that of today.⁸⁹ Although the Russian economy is in a transition to a quasi-market economy, poverty remains the same. The resolution of power struggles and the rule of law in a real democracy could form the necessary economic institutions, and increase prosperity in Russia.

B. RUSSIA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON NATO - RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Although NATO and Russia agreed in principle to cooperate in security matters, notably via the NRC, as former Secretary General Lord Robertson said in his speech while evaluating the decade of the relationship, there are still disagreements over some security and economic issues:

How should we cooperate? First and foremost, the spirit of our dialogue and cooperation must be frank and realistic. And while we must not lose sight of our strategic aims, we must realize that a patient effort will still be needed to overcome stereotypes and misperceptions that have become

⁸⁷ Yevgeny Yasin, Former Russian Minister of Economics, "Prospects for the Russian Economy," (The Nixon Center, 13 September 1999) Program Brief, vol. 5, #22, <<http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/Program%20Briefs/vol5no22yasin.htm>>, accessed on 3 August 2004.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ GALLUP International, <http://www.weforum.org/pdf/AM_2004/security_survey.pdf>, accessed on 2 May 2004.

engrained in decades of an antagonistic relationship. The heritage of the Cold War still exerts a certain gravitational pull that at times propels us away from each other.⁹⁰

On 10 January 2000, Russia's Acting President, Vladimir Putin, signed a new National Security Concept, which outlined Russia's national interests in the international arena. The new concept described a wide assessment of internal and external threats to Russia. The 2000 Concept is significant for its criticism of the U.S. and other Western states and for the radically revised nuclear posture it contains. This chapter first gives an overview of Russia's National Security Concept accepted in 2000. It examines Russia's new threat perception and the Russian viewpoint towards NATO's enlargement to the East.

Russia is concerned about any NATO intervention in Chechnya, such as that which happened in Kosovo in 1999. Therefore, it announced that the Chechnya problem is completely internal and Russia will never allow others to intervene. In addition, the NATO presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia and Georgia's intention to join NATO in the near future are security concerns to Russia. Russia's interest in asserting a *droit de regard* over the other former Soviet republics creates problems. This chapter looks into Georgia and Chechnya as case studies, and the NATO presence in Central Asia, which are important security issues.

Russia's monopoly over Caspian Basin pipelines, the dominant supplier of transportation services for the Central Asian countries, and Russian technology transfer to Iran, especially in the nuclear sector, are two of the main economic and political disagreements between NATO and Russia. This chapter reviews the pipeline problem in Central Asia and the power struggle in the region. It provides an overview of Iran's nuclear program and examines the status of the nuclear power plant being built in Bushehr. It looks into Russia's role in that construction and evaluates the actual purpose of the Russians. Finally, it makes an assessment of NATO-Russia relations by examining the West's response to Russia's technology transfer to Iran.

1. Russia's National Security Concept (2000)

The Russian Federation became the legal successor of the Soviet Union after its disintegration in December 1991. At first, the Russian political and military leaders

⁹⁰ Lord Robertson, "Prospects for NATO-Russia Relations."

thought that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would create and develop similar organizations to that of the former Soviet Union, under Russian supervision. However, after a short time, a number of CIS countries decided differently and established their own armed forces and formed their independent security policies. The impact of these developments forced Russia to form its own armed forces and Ministry of Defense in 1992. Since 1992, the Russian Federation has presented three National Security Concepts, two Foreign Policy Concepts, and four Military Doctrines.⁹¹

The National Security Concept (NSC), Russia's grand strategy, consists of military, economic, diplomatic, legal, informational and other means at the state's hand in order to achieve its objectives.⁹² Separate concepts and doctrines are based on NSC to guarantee the security in international, military, economic, social, environmental, and informational areas. Two of them are the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine. The National Security Concept is aimed at protecting national interests against domestic and foreign threats. The Foreign Policy copes with maintaining relations with international actors, such as states and international organizations. The Military Policy consists of analyses and procedures concerning war, conflicts, crises, deterrence, and suppression of aggression, force generation and preparation of armed forces, population and economy in securing vital interests of the state.⁹³

a. *Development of the National Security Concept*

The NSC is the basic document for originating and achieving a precise and complete policy that determines and accordingly secures Russia's national interests. Russia has constantly described the NSC as the highest security document since the first draft version of the Military Doctrine in May 1992.

Yury Skokov, Secretary of the National Security Council, began drafting the NSC in 1992. Although the Security Council gave high priority to the accomplishment of the NSC, it did not assign a commission to draft it until July 1994.

⁹¹ Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott, *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*, (Portland, OR: Conflict Studies Research Center, UK Defense Academy, 2003), p. 3.

⁹² Arms Control Association, "Russia's National Security Concept," <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/docjf00.asp>, accessed on 3 June 2004.

⁹³ Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott, *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*, p. 4.

Finally, the President signed the first National Security Concept of the Russian Federation on 17 December 1997.

In the second half of 1999, after the Kosovo Conflict, a radical change occurred in Russia's security policy. Army General Makhmut Gareyev, President of the Academy of the Military Sciences, stated Russian thinking with regard to NATO's new Strategic Concept of April 1999 and towards the military intervention of the Alliance in Kosovo in 1999:

NATO's strategy, following the security policy of the United States, was no longer directed at defensive but at pre-emptive use of force, including the possibility of deploying outside the territory of the Alliance's treaty, the emphasis being more on the use of military force rather than diplomatic or non-violent methods of implementing policy. The U.S. and other influential Western countries were aiming at a unipolar system of international relations at global level under their authority. The aggression of NATO against the former Yugoslavia was a clear example of its policy to ignore the United Nations and the standards of international law.⁹⁴

Western security policy was now considered to be a threat, which resulted in statements of Russian security policy expressing anti-Western feelings. Most of the amendments of the security policy were applied in the new edition of the NSC and the Military Doctrine in autumn 1999. Finally, President Putin ratified the final draft of the new NSC on 10 January 2000 and authorized Russia's modified security policy.

b. The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)

Russia's acting President, Vladimir Putin, signed the new National Security Concept, which outlined Russia's national interests in the international arena on 10 January 2000. The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation is a system which defends the security of the individual, society and state against domestic and foreign threats. The Concept describes the principal directions of the state policy of the Russian Federation. The new Concept is an edited version of a draft approved by the Russian Security Council on 5 October 1999 and replaced the previous Concept adopted in December 1997.

The new Concept is a wide evaluation of internal and external threats to Russia. The 2000 Concept is important for its criticism of the U.S. and other Western

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 7.

states and for the radically revised nuclear posture it contains. The previous National Security Concept (1997) reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first “in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation,” the new Concept allows such use “in the event of need to repulse armed aggression, if all other means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted.”⁹⁵

(1) Russia's National Interests: Russia’s national interests, which emphasize the equal status of Russia in the international arena and the sovereignty of the state, are defined in the NSC. Russia's national interests in the international sphere lie in:

upholding its sovereignty and strengthening its position as a great power and as one of the influential centers of a multi-polar world, in development of equal and equitable relations with all countries and integrative associations and in particular with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia's traditional partners, in universal observance of human rights and freedoms and the impermissibility of dual standards in this respect.⁹⁶

Russia's national interests in the military sphere lie in “protection of its independence, sovereignty and state and territorial integrity, in the prevention of military aggression against Russia and its allies and in ensuring the conditions for peaceful and democratic development of the state.”⁹⁷

(2) Threats to the Russian Federation's National Security: According to the new concept, first and the foremost, the intention to increase their influence by the West including the U.S. and NATO in neighboring countries is considered a threat to Russia’s national interests. Additionally, Russia’s political and economic problems, explained in the first part of this chapter, create domestic and foreign threats to Russia’s security. Terrorism also represents a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. Russia claims that international terrorism is waging an open movement to destabilize Russia.

The condition of the national economy and incomplete nature of the system and structure of the authorities of state and of society, social and political

⁹⁵ Arms Control Association, “Russia’s National Security Concept.”

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

polarization of society and criminalization of social relations, the growth of organized crime and terrorism, and a deterioration in domestic and international relations are all creating a broad range of internal and external threats to the country's security.⁹⁸

In the economy, these threats are of a comprehensive nature and are caused, above all, by a important reduction in the gross domestic product, reduced investment and innovation, diminished scientific and technological potential, stagnation in agriculture, a imprecise banking system, growth in the state's internal and external debt, and domination of exports by fuel, raw materials and energy components, and of imports by food and consumer items, including consumer essentials.⁹⁹

Some of the fundamental threats for Russia in the international sphere are brought about by the following factors:¹⁰⁰ The strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO's eastward expansion, the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders, the weakening of integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of CIS member states, and territorial claims on Russia.

The most important part of the new Concept is Russia's changed threat perception of NATO after the Kosovo air campaign. NATO's intervention in the Kosovo conflict, without UN Security Council sanction, was criticized in the new Concept, and it was considered that NATO could behave in the same way in the other conflicts:

NATO's transition to the practice of using military forces outside its zone of responsibility (for example in Chechnya) could destabilize the entire global strategic situation. The growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers and their enhanced ability to create new weapons and military equipment could provoke a new phase of the arms race and radically alter the forms and methods of warfare.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

The NSC points out that Russia favors political, diplomatic, economic and other non-military means in preventing war and armed conflicts. However, Russia's national interests necessitate a sufficient presence of military power for its defense. The Russian Federation armed forces have the major role in guaranteeing the military security of the country. The main principle for the option of employing military force to ensure national security is the use of all existing forces and assets, including nuclear, in the event of need to resist armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective.

c. Russia's Interests in Kosovo

NATO's air campaign during the Kosovo conflict created strong opposition across the entire political field as well as in the general public in Russia. It also produced a serious dilemma for Moscow - opposing NATO's military action without annoying the U.S. and the other NATO countries. This dilemma, which affected Russia's clear goals during the conflict, and the tension due to these goals, seriously weakened Moscow's position.

Russia's cultural, religious and historical ties with Serbs were one of the major factors behind Moscow's opposition to NATO's air operation. Other factors were also important. Russian society had almost never been concerned with foreign policy issues such as NATO's enlargement policy until that time. NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia, and the disappointment of the Government and moderate politicians, created deep popular anger. In addition to emotional and domestic political factors, some Russian leaders were worried by what they perceived as a growing NATO military threat approaching their borders while Russian conventional armed forces were in terrible condition. Particularly frightened of NATO's decision to use military force without UN or OSCE agreement to deal with a human rights situation in Kosovo, many Russians were reminded of their own recent conflict in Chechnya. Russian leaders were concerned that NATO would act militarily elsewhere without Russia's approval and possibly against its interests.¹⁰²

Russia wanted to stop NATO's air operation and to make the Alliance accept the principle that the use of military force required U.N. approval. Russia also

¹⁰² Paul E. Gallis, *Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force*, (CRS Report for Congress, 19 November 1999), p. 12.

tried to use the conflict to show that it was an essential world power. On the other hand, Russia certainly wanted to stay away from the conflict and to prevent an escalation of the conflict that would increase its own military risk.

Consequently, Russia did not want the Kosovo conflict to create a crisis in relations with the U.S. and other NATO countries that would refuse Russia the economic assistance it immediately needed. Russia's warnings to NATO were blunted by its military weakness and its continuing requests for economic assistance.

In the beginning of Operation Allied Force, the author was on duty on a Turkish frigate, TCG MUA VENET (F-250), a part of NATO's Task Force, Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), in the Adriatic Sea. This task force consisted of eight frigate/destroyer class fighting ships from NATO countries. During the campaign, this task force secured the sea area of the Operation. At the beginning, Russia had declared that it would send a task force which would consist of six or eight ships. However, it was able to send only one Moma-class intelligence ship, because Russia was militarily unprepared and economically in a difficult situation.

Russia made a radical change in its threat perception with its new National Security Concept (2000). Although NATO and Russia had improved their cooperation and partnership since 1991, the Kosovo Air Campaign became a turning point for Russia to change its perceptions in negative way towards NATO. Meanwhile, Russia emphasized its nuclear capability and declared that it would use its nuclear weapons in the event of need to repulse armed aggression.

2. Regional Conflicts

a. Chechnya

NATO's decision to use military force without United Nations or OSCE approval and to address a human rights situation in Kosovo reminded many Russians of their own recent conflict in Chechnya. Russian leaders realized that and were concerned that NATO would act militarily elsewhere without Russia's approval and possibly against its interests.¹⁰³

During the German invasion in WWII, Soviet leader Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin accused Chechens of collaborating with Nazis and, accordingly,

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 12.

ordered all Chechens deported from their homeland to Central Asia in 1944. They were allowed to return home by Nikita Khrushchev in 1957, four years after Stalin's death. Chechen leader Dudayev declared their independence on 1 November 1991. Yeltsin, afraid other ethnic groups would try the same action against Russia, ordered a full invasion of Chechnya in December 1994. The Chechen leader, Dudayev, had been killed in a bomb attack in April 1996. The new leader, Aslan Maskhadov, signed a cease-fire and declared the war over on 31 August 1996. However, since Muslim rebels had entered the Russian Republic of Dagestan in August 1999, next to Chechnya, Russia claimed the rebels came from Chechnya and the Second Chechen War begun.

Today, the first and the foremost disagreement between the West and Russia is Chechnya. Lord Robertson, NATO's former General Secretary, pointed out these disagreements:

This is not to say that we do not have real and significant differences. We do. On Chechnya, for example, it is difficult to argue that Russia simply exerts its legitimate right to fight terrorism and preserve its territorial integrity when the campaign shows signs of an indiscriminate application of force against its own civilian population.¹⁰⁴

Although Russia has attempted to present the Chechen conflict as a fight against the forces of global terrorism and as internal in principle, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has claimed that it has documented very serious violations of human rights by Russian forces in Chechnya, including summary executions, torture, disappearances, and indiscriminate bombing. The HRW representative in Moscow reported that recent Russian security operations in Chechnya amounted to collective punishment of the civilian population.¹⁰⁵

Russians are very sensitive about the Chechen conflict. The significant fear of being a second Kosovo is the Russians' nightmare. "Russia would make it clear that no one would be allowed to intervene in Russian domestic affairs. The West would be taught that Russia is not Yugoslavia."¹⁰⁶ Today, one of the crucial functions of

¹⁰⁴ Lord Robertson, "Prospects for NATO-Russia Relations."

¹⁰⁵ Sergei Blagov, "Putin's Chechen Spin has Rights Groups in a Whirl," <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/175-6.cfm>>, accessed on 27 February 2004.

¹⁰⁶ Alexei G. Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned From Kosovo and Chechnya*, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 2, p. 21.

Russia's nuclear forces, including Non Strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF), is to inhibit the intervention of outside powers (such as the U.S. or NATO) in regional conflicts involving Russia.¹⁰⁷ Russia's main concern is that NATO would intervene in Chechnya without any U.N. sanction as happened in Kosovo in 1999. Therefore, Russia has introduced the Chechen problem as its internal matter, and declared that it could use its nuclear force in case of an intervention.

b. Georgia

NATO - Georgian relations are also another great concern for Russia. Georgia has been a PfP participant since 1994. Eduard Shevardnadze, former President of Georgia, declared their intention to become a full member of NATO at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Summit at Prague on 21-22 November 2002:

The Georgian public's perspective on the future of the country's national security is widely seen in the context of the country's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. My people have for centuries been cut off from the Western civilization although it always saw its rightful place there. I am happy that at the Summit of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council I can declare that Georgia is determined to be a full member of NATO and is resolved to work hard to prepare for this historic mission.¹⁰⁸

Georgia's new President Mikhail Saakashvili visited NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in order to show his country's desire to continue on its way to NATO, and addressed the North Atlantic Council on 7 April 2004. President Saakashvili stated Georgia's individual partnership action plan, which included defense reform goals. He emphasized Georgia's intention of being a real member of NATO. They also discussed the current situation in Georgia and regional issues such as the withdrawal of Russian military personnel from Georgia, in line with the 1999 Istanbul agreement.

What makes Georgia struggle to align itself with the West? Georgia is crucial for Russia in the South Caucasus. Georgians believe that Russians have always been their enemies, and since their independence, they have done everything to destabilize and to make their country a part of Russia.¹⁰⁹ However, the presence and

¹⁰⁷ David S. Yost, *Russia's Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces*, "International Affairs", vol.77, no.3, (July 2001), p. 536.

¹⁰⁸ Eduard Shevardnadze, former President of Georgia, Statement, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021122h.htm>>, accessed on 27 February 2004.

¹⁰⁹ Lutz Kleveman, *The New Great Game*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), p. 32.

investments of Western countries in Georgia could thwart Russia from interfering in the country's domestic and international relations. According to Alexander Rondeli, a senior diplomat in the Georgian Foreign Ministry, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline supported by the U.S. is vital and, as a matter of fact, is a matter of national security for Georgians. "We need the big oil pipeline so that we will continue to have the U.S. on our side against Russia. You see, Georgia has got nothing else to offer to the world, we have to sell our geographical position."¹¹⁰ The diplomat also believes that Russia will attack Georgia sooner or later. Only the West's support of Georgia can prevent Russia's aggression.

As mentioned before, NATO enlargement to the east, which encircles the country, bothers Russia. According to the statement in the NATO Review by General Konstantin Totskiy, the Russian ambassador to NATO, "there are, nevertheless, aspects of our relations with the Alliance that cause us concern, including, first and foremost, NATO's eastward expansion. Here, we believe that Russia's legitimate security interests must be taken into account."¹¹¹ NATO and the U.S. have been slowly increasing their presence in Georgia, training local troops and storing military equipment in the region. In May 2002, the Pentagon stationed five hundred elite U.S. Special Forces soldiers in Georgia to train the country's forces in antiterrorist warfare. In addition, Georgian Armed Forces received \$64 million in military aid, including small weapons and ammunition, uniforms and communication equipment.¹¹² The presence of the U.S. and NATO troops in Georgia could undermine Russia's interests in the region. Alexander Kosovan, the former Deputy Defense Minister, believes that "The presence of U.S. troops in Georgia should worry every Russian soldier."¹¹³ Therefore, Russian Defense Minister Ivanov declared that they had postponed the withdrawal of Russian bases in Georgia for another eleven years, which appears to have created a great debate between NATO and Russia.

Moreover, Russia has accused Georgia of harboring terrorists responsible for crimes in Russia's war with Chechnya, and Georgia claimed that Russia violated its sovereignty under the guise of antiterrorist operations. On several occasions since the

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 31.

¹¹¹ NATO review, *Interview, General Totskiy: Russian Ambassador to NATO*, Autumn 2003, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021122h.htm>>, accessed on 27 February 2004.

¹¹² Lutz Kleveman, *The New Great Game*, p. 35.

¹¹³ Ibid.

second Chechen conflict began in 1999, Russian aircraft have violated Georgian airspace and attacked ground targets. While denying these claims, Russian authorities have threatened to send troops into Georgia's Pankisi Gorge to hunt Chechen fighters said to be operating there. Such action appears to constitute a clear violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which states "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."¹¹⁴

3. U.S. and NATO Presence in Central Asia

Russia's interest in asserting a *droit de regard* over the other former Soviet republics creates problems. Russia accepted its new National Security Concept (NSC), modified after NATO's air operation in Kosovo, in 2000. The new NSC considered that NATO's eastward expansion and the NATO - U.S. presence in Central Asia are the main threats for Russia's strategic interests. On the other hand, Central Asia is now going to be very much part of NATO's agenda since NATO has taken over the running of the stabilization force in Kabul, Afghanistan. In recent years, the Central Asian states have been involved in NATO's Participation for Peace (PfP) program, including joint training and other exercises. The number of the U.S. troops is growing in Central Asia to provide support for combating terrorism. However, Russia also is raising its military presence in Central Asia with a desire to counter the expansion of the U.S. influence in Central Asia over the last several years.

Central Asia is a relatively new region for U.S. foreign policy. Since the Central Asian countries became independent, political, economic and military interests of the U.S. have progressively increased. Until 1994, U.S. interests were restricted to economic and political pursuits - military interests were nowhere in sight.¹¹⁵ However, the situation has changed. Today, the U.S. uses all its power to establish itself as a major player in Central Asia.

¹¹⁴ Inis L. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, "The Charter of the United Nations," Fourth Ed., (N.Y.: Random House, 1971).

¹¹⁵ Col. (Ret.) Richard Witherspoon quoted in, Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, *Central Asian Security*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 127.

a. NATO in Central Asia

In March 1992, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan became NACC members, and all Central Asian countries - except Tajikistan - signed the PfP Framework Documents in 1994. On 29-30 May 1997, the NACC members and PfP participating countries automatically became members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have participated in a number of activities and military exercises with NATO and Partner countries. However, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have almost never participated in such activities.

(1) Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan has improved its relationship with NATO and other Partners through EAPC and PfP since 1992. Kazakhstan signed the PfP Framework Document on 27 May 1994, and began its mission to NATO in 1998. As Kassymzhomart Tokaev, the Minister of the Foreign Affairs, said, Kazakhstan aims at full cooperation with NATO. "We are fully satisfied with the level of our cooperation with NATO. We are going to reinforce our cooperation in Partnership for Peace and Science for Peace program."¹¹⁶ Kazakh military personnel participated in the events conducted by NATO for Partner Countries. For example, the CENTRASBAT-97 military exercise was conducted on the territory of Kazakhstan involving military from the other Central Asian countries as well as from the U.S., Russia and Turkey. CENTRASBAT-2000, which was conducted in Kazakhstan, also contributed to improve the regional security structure and joint peacekeeping efforts of Central Asian states.

(2) Kyrgyzstan: The Kyrgyz Republic was one of the first CIS countries to start a cooperative relationship with NATO, and it remains one of the most active partners. Kyrgyzstan signed the PfP Framework Document on 1 June 1994. The country has participated in different activities with the Alliance, including a number of PfP peacekeeping exercises. A number of joint seminars were held, including the first NATO regional seminar in the CIS, "Planning for civilian emergencies and civilian-military cooperation," organized in Bishkek in June 1995. In the framework of PfP, the Kyrgyz Republic took part in several peacekeeping exercises, such as Cooperated

¹¹⁶ NATO speeches, Kassymzhomart Tokaev, The Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, 29 May 1998, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980529j.htm>>, accessed on 11 August 2004.

Nugget-95, Cooperative Osprey 96, CENTRASBAT-97, 98 (Osh, Kyrgyzstan), and 2000 with the financial assistance of NATO member states.

The Kyrgyz Republic sees cooperation with NATO not only as beneficial to security and stability in the region but also as a support for its internal political and economic reforms:

The absence of any large-scale military-industrial complex in this small, poor, peace-loving Republic, coupled with the current economic crisis, is the key factor behind the Kyrgyz Republic's focus on the civilian sphere in its cooperation with NATO. Nevertheless, military contacts and cooperation are not necessarily ruled out.¹¹⁷

(3) Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan has been developing its cooperation with NATO since it became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in March 1992:

We consider our participation in PfP and EAPC as a way of strengthening the independence and sovereignty of Uzbekistan, acquiring modern technology and training highly qualified national military and civil personnel, and as an important tool to be involved in joint efforts of the global community aimed at the establishment of a common security and stability system.¹¹⁸

Uzbekistan signed the PfP Framework Document on 13 July 1994, and signed the Security Agreement with NATO on 16 August 1995. Uzbekistan has actively participated in the activities organized in the framework of EAPC and PfP. Since 1996, Uzbekistan has been participating in joint exercises and has provided military troops for some of them. CENTRASBAT-97/98/2000, Cooperative Aura, Cooperative Automation, Cooperative Banner, Cooperative Chance, Cooperative Demand, Cooperative Determination, Cooperative Guard, Cooperative Nugget, Cooperative Osprey, Cooperative Support, Strong Resolve, Cooperative Safeguard are some of those exercises, which have been conducted with participation of Uzbek representatives.

¹¹⁷ NATO review, Ambassador Djoumakadyr Atabekov, Advisor to the Presidency of Kyrgyzstan, November 1996, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9606-8.htm>>, accessed on 14 August 2004.

¹¹⁸ Alisher Shaykhov, The Head of the Mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 8 March 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/pfp/uz/welcome.htm>>, accessed on 19 August 2004.

b. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), (Kabul, Afghanistan)

According to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1386, 1413 and 1444, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan was initiated in 2001. ISAF was established to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) in maintaining security within the ISAF Area of Responsibility. It was aimed at the ATA and the UN personnel to operate in a secure environment in order to enable the ATA the build up of security structures in Afghanistan in accordance with the Bonn Conference, held in December 2001. ISAF supports the Afghan Transitional Authority in expanding its authority to the rest of the country, and in providing a safe and secure environment contributing to free and fair elections, the spread of the rule of law, and the reconstruction of the country.

On 16 April 2003, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided to approve the deployment of NATO troops to Afghanistan to work under the ISAF command. On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed the lead of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan. This is the first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area in NATO's history. ISAF currently numbers 6,500 troops from 35 NATO and non-NATO nations. Individual contributions by each country change on a regular basis due to the rotation of troops.¹¹⁹

c. Bagram Air Base (Bagram, Afghanistan)

Bagram Air Base is a former Soviet air base, built about 25 miles north of Kabul on the Shamali plain. The base is now home to more than 3,500 U.S. and allied anti-terrorist troops in Afghanistan. The base is home to units from the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division. It is also the main base for the various Army Special Forces units in Afghanistan. Bagram also is the main base of the British Royal Marines from the 45th Commando Group. The commandos search neighboring villages for remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters to take them to Bagram or Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for interrogation.¹²⁰

Troops from other nations involved in the peacekeeping force including

¹¹⁹ NATO Issues, "NATO in Afghanistan," <<http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html>>, accessed on 18 August 2004.

¹²⁰ CNN.Com, In-depth Special, "War against Terror," <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/military.map.html>>, accessed on 18 August 2004.

Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Austria, Turkey and Denmark are based at Bagram. Bagram has a 9,700-foot runway and a number of aircraft are based there, including helicopters and a small group of A-10 close air support aircraft.

d. *Kandahar Air Base (Kandahar, Afghanistan)*

Kandahar International Airport, located in the east of the city, was one of the largest airports in Central Asia. U.S. warplanes began to target it at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. By mid-December, hundreds of U.S. forces - first Marines and later Army troops - took control of the airfield, and made it an important U.S. military base in Afghanistan. U.S. forces also have established a small helicopter base in Pul-i-Kandahar, about 20 miles west of Kabul, which hosts Chinook transport helicopters, and Apache and Cobra attack helicopters.

e. *Mazar-e-Sharif Air Base (Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan)*

As General Tommy Franks emphasized, Mazar-e-Sharif holds a strategic location along highways leading to the western city of Herat, the capital Kabul, and Afghanistan's borders with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. "We're interested in it because it would provide a land bridge, as has been said, up to Uzbekistan - which provides us, among other things, a humanitarian pathway for us to move supplies out of Central Asia and down into Afghanistan."¹²¹ The Mazar-e-Sharif Airfield has a 10,500-foot runway. The airfield hosts around 200 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, known as Task Force Commando.

f. *Khost Air Base (Khost, Afghanistan)*

Khost is located approximately 150 kilometers south of Kabul and about twenty miles from the Pakistani border. During the Soviet-Afghan War, Soviets used the Khost airfield as an initial staging ground to place troops into the combat zone, using Mi-8 armed transport helicopters. In January 2002, 100 American troops were stationed at the Khost airfield. Almost 200 US soldiers were stationed at the Khost airfield in February 2002 in order to train a 400-strong Afghan "anti-Al Qaeda" force. In July 2002,

¹²¹ CNN. Com. / World, War against Terror, <<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/11/09/ret.afghan.attacks/>>, accessed on 24 August 2004.

about 50 US special operations troops were based at the field in Khost. Finally, between 500 and 1,000 U.S. soldiers were based near the city of Khost in mid-September 2002.¹²²

g. *Khanabad Air Base (Karshi, Uzbekistan)*

In the mid-1990s, the U.S. began developing its relationship with Uzbekistan. American Special Forces went to Uzbekistan to train Uzbek officers and Special Forces in 1999. Finally, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Uzbek Government declared that they would open Uzbekistan's airspace to the U.S. and allow them to establish military bases in their country. Khanabad is a former Soviet airbase about 100 miles north of the Afghan border. The Base was used by light infantry of the 10th Mountain Division and Special Forces during the Operation Enduring Freedom. These troops were the first U.S. soldiers to be deployed on the former Soviet territory.

h. *Manas Air Base (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)*

Manas airport, with a 13,000-foot runway, was built by the Soviet Union to house the largest bombers in the former Soviet fleet. The airport is located nineteen miles outside of Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. The airfield is informally called Ganci Air Base to honor Peter J. Ganci, New York City Fire Department Chief, who died in the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.

Manas airbase is the latest military base established by the U.S. in Central Asia. The airbase now hosts more than 1,150 U.S. troops, the largest American military presence in Central Asia outside Afghanistan, and allied units from Spain, France, and Denmark.¹²³ The air base was initially established as a temporary staging area for raids into neighboring Afghanistan. However, today the base serves mainly as a strategic airlift center and launching area for air refueling missions.

Russians state that they do not accept a long term U.S. presence in Central Asia. As Victor Kalyuzhny, Russian deputy Foreign Minister and Putin's special envoy to the Caspian region, said, "The Americans have to pull out of Central Asia as soon as they have caught bin Laden."¹²⁴ Russia is also very concerned about the American and

¹²² Khost Airfield, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/khowst_afld.htm>, accessed on 24 August 2004.

¹²³ Michael Mainville, "U.S. Bases Overseas Show New Strategy," *Pittsburgh-Post Gazette*, 26 July 2004, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/040726-us-bases.htm>>, accessed on 22 August 2004.

¹²⁴ Lutz Kleveman, *The New Great Game*, p. 190.

NATO presence in Central Asia. Moscow's largest military force outside the Russian borders - more than twenty thousand army troops and border guards - are stationed in Tajikistan in order to counterbalance the increasing U.S. presence in Central Asia. Russians say that they are protecting the southern border of the CIS against terrorists, arms dealers, and drug smugglers. According to Sergei Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister, "Russian troops would stay in Tajikistan for at least another fifteen years."¹²⁵

CIS countries signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Moldova in October 2003, during the Commonwealth of Independent States summit. Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan agreed to establish a Rapid Reaction Force for Central Asia in 2003. Then, a special air unit - the core of an anti-terrorism force at Kant that will operate under the control of the CST - was established in Kyrgyzstan by decision of its members. Kant airbase is located 35 miles away from the Manas air base. It hosts Su-27 fighter planes, Su-25 ground-attack aircraft and Mi-8 helicopters, which conduct training exercises in Kyrgyz airspace. The agreement will be in force for at least fifteen years, but may then be extended by five-year terms. Undoubtedly, the deployment in Kyrgyzstan is being driven by a Russian desire to counter the expansion of the U.S. influence in Central Asia over the last several years.

However, the presence of the Russian base in Kant looks as if it is not likely to change the balance of power in the region. The new Russian base does not cover the growing role of the U.S. and NATO in the region in helping Central Asian states improve their defense capacities.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, Russian officials have repeatedly said that Moscow will continue to increase its military presence in Central Asia. Putin commented that "the opening of the air base was the first step in increasing the Russian presence in the region."¹²⁷ Definitely, Russia and the U.S. will continue to increase their military and political influence in Central Asia in the near future.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p. 193.

¹²⁶ Antoine Blua, "Kyrgyzstan: Putin to Attend Official Opening of Russian Air Base," <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/10/mil-031022-rferl-153832.htm>>, accessed on 24 August 2004.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

4. Other Issues

a. *Caspian Basin - Pipelines*

The Russian monopoly over the Caspian Basin pipelines is one of the main economic disagreements between NATO and Russia. The oil and natural gas sector plays a large economic role in several of the countries of the former Soviet Union. After the creation of national frontiers, five countries - Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - emerged as major net energy exporters. Russia enjoys an effective domination as the master supplier of transportation services for the Central Asian countries, and has controlled the access of other exporters in the CIS to the key transit routes to Western Europe. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are among the exporters most seriously affected by limited access to Gazprom's pipelines and by unclear prices.

The world's largest oil resources lie in the Caspian Basin. Estimates range from 50 to 110 billion barrels of oil, and from 170 to 463 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.¹²⁸ The U.S. oil companies realized the importance of Central Asia before the U.S. government. Major oil companies had been in the region before the U.S. established embassies in the Central Asian countries. In the mid-1990s the U.S. began to show interest in an idea of creating a pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan, Turkey. Russia still enjoys an effective monopoly as the dominant supplier of transportation services for the Central Asian countries, and has controlled the access of other exporters particularly Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to the key transit routes to Western Europe that are under its control. The new project is aimed at making these countries free from Russia's monopoly.

Caspian oil has been important since the First World War. After the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Russia, Eric von Ludendorff, the Chief of the German General Staff, wanted Baku's oil in addition to Russia's Baltic territories, Finland and Ukraine. The Turkish Army, allied with the German Army, seized several oil fields in Baku in August 1918. However, Germany's oil dream did not come true, for Germany surrendered on 11 November 1918. The importance of Caspian oil was also significant for Adolph Hitler in the Second World War. Operation Barbarossa and later

¹²⁸ Lutz Kleveman, *The New Great Game*, p. 3.

Operation Blue aimed at seizing oil fields particularly in the Caucasus. However, the vast lands of Russia, its enormous manpower, winter conditions, and Germans' supply problems, forced Germany to retreat in January 1943.

Azerbaijan became a significant independent republic after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Heydar Aliyev became the first elected president in 1993 with the idea that the country's independence lies in the oil business. Therefore, President Aliyev opened Azerbaijan's oil fields to foreign investors. For the first time since 1917, foreign investors were allowed in the country's oil industry. The American company Amoco and the British company British Petroleum became the major investors. Russia and Iran strongly protested Aliyev's decision. Since there was no agreement among the five states - Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan - about sharing the Caspian Sea, the other countries accused Azerbaijan of making contracts for the oil fields, which did not belong to Azerbaijan.

The Western investors, then, were faced with the problem of getting the oil and gas to the industrialized world. According to U.S. thinking, the U.S. was determined to prevent Russia from exercising a monopoly on access to the region and accordingly depriving Russia of decisive political leverage over the policies of the new Central Asian states.¹²⁹ The U.S. also rejected a southern route through Iran. As President George W. Bush said on January 29, 2002, "Iran is a part of the Axis of Evil along with Iraq and North Korea." Donald Rumsfeld also defined Iran as a terrorist country. "Oh, my goodness, Iran is certainly not an ally... Iran is a state like Iraq, North Korea, Cuba and Syria and Libya that's on the terrorist list."¹³⁰

Consequently, the treaty authorizing the construction of the 1,090 mile Mediterranean pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan was signed by the heads of state of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey on 18 November 1999. Construction is now 75 percent-complete and will be completed in the first quarter of 2005. The project was first proposed by Turkey because of its great concern about the increasing number of oil tankers from the Black Sea that could cause accidents in the Bosphorus Straits.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p. 25.

¹³⁰ Interview with CNN, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Department of Defense, 30 November 2001, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t11302001_t1130cnn.html>, accessed on 17 August 2004.

Russia aims to show that the Caucasus, particularly Georgia, is unstable, to prevent the Mediterranean Pipeline project. According to Alexander Rondeli, a senior diplomat in the Georgian Foreign Ministry, the Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan pipeline is vital, as a matter of fact, it is a matter of national security for Georgians. “We need the big oil pipeline so that we will continue to have the U.S. on our side against Russia. You see, Georgia has got nothing else to offer to the world, we have to sell our geographical position.”¹³¹ The diplomat also believes that Russia will attack Georgia sooner or later. Only the support of the West for Georgia can prevent Russia’s aggression.

The Afghan pipeline is another project to prevent Russia from reaching Central Asian oil and natural gas. Afghanistan’s significance, from an energy viewpoint, comes from its geographical position as a potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from land locked Central Asia to the Arabian Sea.¹³² Afghan President Karzai, President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf, and President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Nyazov (Turkmenbashi) signed a treaty authorizing the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Pakistani port of Gwadar. Later a second parallel pipeline for oil was also planned. The 900-mile pipeline runs through the Herat-Kandahar corridor, and its capacity will be one trillion cubic feet of gas per year.

The U.S. concern is that the Russians could try to sabotage the pipeline project. Besides, the instability in Afghanistan is another issue of concern for the project. According to a U.S. diplomat in Kabul, “An entire army is needed to protect this pipeline.”¹³³ The Russians would lose their monopoly and economic advantage over pipelines after completion of the new pipeline projects. Furthermore, their struggle to regain dominance over former Soviet Republics would come to nothing. Therefore, the pipeline issue will continue to be a disagreement between Russia and the West in the near future.

b. Transfer of Russian Technology to Iran

The Russian transfer of technology to Iran is one of the main economic-political disagreements between NATO and Russia. This part of the paper provides brief

¹³¹ Lutz Kleveman, *The New Great Game*, p. 31.

¹³² Ibid, p.226.

¹³³ Ibid, p. 225.

research on Iran's nuclear program, defines Russia's role in construction, and assesses the West's pressure on Russia concerning its transfer of technology to Iran.

When Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary Islamic regime came to power in Iran in 1979, it inherited two partially completed, German-supplied nuclear power reactors at Bushehr; however, Khomeini stopped construction of these reactors. The structures of the nuclear power reactors were severely damaged by Iraqi attacks during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980-1988. The Iran - Iraq War, particularly, compelled Iran to pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iranian forces during the war. In the spring of 1988, Iraq's bombardment of Tehran with Scud missiles forced Iran to accept a cease-fire in October. Since the West did not respond to Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran, Iranian leaders decided that acquiring those weapons was the only way for self-defense. After the cease-fire, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's (later) President, declared Iran's intention to acquire WMD:

With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons. From now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task.¹³⁴

Therefore, Iran wanted to complete these nuclear reactors immediately. However, under U.S. pressure, Germany refused to repair the power plants because of Iran's obvious nuclear weapon interest. Iran then asked Germany to ship the reactor components and technical documentation that it had paid for; nevertheless, the German government still refused to do so. The issue is still unsettled.

An association of companies from Argentina, Germany and Spain submitted a proposal to Iran to finish the Bushehr-1 reactor, in the late 1980s. However, U.S. pressure blocked the contract. The pressure by the U.S. also prevented Spain's National Institute of Industry and Nuclear Equipment from completing the Bushehr project, in 1990. Iran continued to try to get components for the Bushehr reactors; however, its attempts were prevented by the U.S. After years of searching in the West for a supplier to finish the Bushehr-1 nuclear power plant, Iran turned to the Soviet Union

¹³⁴ Hashemi Rafsanjani quoted in, Joseph Cirincione, *Deadly Arsenals*, (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 256.

and then Russia. In March 1990, Iran signed its first protocol on the Bushehr project with the Soviet Union. According to the contract, Moscow was to complete the Bushehr project and to build two extra reactors in Iran; however, the lack of funds delayed the deal. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy signed another contract for the construction of two Russian reactors at Bushehr in 1993. Nevertheless, the agreement was never realized due to Iran's financial problems.

Eventually, Tehran and Moscow signed an \$800 million deal to finish the first reactor in January 1995. The secret protocol on nuclear cooperation was signed by Viktor Mikhailov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, and Reza Amrollahi, Director of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran. This reactor would be under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) control, and would be capable of producing up to 180 kg/year of plutonium in its spent fuel. The agreement called for Russia "to complete the first reactor at Bushehr within four years, and while it is still unfinished, to provide a 30-50 megawatt thermal light-water research reactor, 2,000 tons of natural uranium, and training for about 15 Iranian nuclear scientists per year."¹³⁵ When the Clinton administration found out about the secret protocol for the reactor sale contract, tensions rose between the U.S. and Russia. According to the protocol, Russia also had decided to install a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility in Iran. The facility would be under IAEA inspection and produce low-enriched uranium (LEU); however, it could enable Iran to build and operate a similar plant covertly to produce weapons-grade fissile material. The U.S. strongly objected to this part of the agreement. Finally, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared in Moscow, on May 1995, that the centrifuge export contract had been cancelled.

Iranian nuclear officials say that they want Russia to build more nuclear reactors to help generate greater amounts of electricity. Asadollah Sabouri, Deputy Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, in charge of nuclear power plants, said that "We have contracts with Russia to build more nuclear reactors. No number has been

¹³⁵ Mohammad Sahimi, "Iran's Nuclear Program," <<http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html>>, accessed on 24 August 2004.

specified but definitely our contract with Russia is to build more than one nuclear power plant."¹³⁶ Sabouri also said that the first Bushehr plant is expected to be operational by August 2006.

“Iran has two policies on nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry: a declared policy advocating global abolition of such weapons and a secret policy to build and sustain offensive nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities.”¹³⁷ In May 2003, the Iranian officials told other NPT Prepcom delegates that, “We consider acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral and illegal, and against our basic principles. They have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine.”¹³⁸ In August 2003, President Khatami stated that “Iran cannot use such weapons based on our Islamic and moral teachings.”¹³⁹ However, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Tehran remains intent on becoming a nuclear power.”¹⁴⁰

Due to the inspections in Iran, the IAEA concluded that “Iran has continued production of centrifuge equipments, and proceeding with the generation of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF₆) at a Uranium Conversion Facility is at variance with the Agency’s previous understanding. As a consequence, Iran still maintains its nuclear weapon aspirations.”¹⁴¹ As Anthony Cordesman said in 2000, “Iran is at least five to seven years away from acquiring a nuclear device without foreign assistance.”¹⁴² This means Iranians are very close to acquiring nuclear weapons; moreover, foreign assistance will reduce the time needed.

Russian construction of a light-water power reactor for Iran's nuclear power station at Bushehr has considerably increased proliferation concerns, although

¹³⁶ NTI, “Iran Would Not Operate Bushehr Reactor Until 2006,” 23 August 2006, <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004/8/23/EAAEB887-0A90-4B91-BC88-0A7BA46A03FE.html>, accessed on 28 August 2004.

¹³⁷ Gregory F. Giles, *The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 84.

¹³⁸ Sharon Squassoni, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments,” CRS Report for Congress, 4 March 2004, <<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/24050.pdf>>, accessed on 22 August 2004.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Stephen Pullinger, *Disarmament Diplomacy*, “Iran: the Saga Continues,” Issue No. 77, May/June 2004, <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77iran.htm>>, accessed on 23 August 2004.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Anthony Cordesman quoted in Joseph Cirincione, *Deadly Arsenals*, p. 259.

both countries have guaranteed that the reactor would be built under IAEA safeguards. The U.S. raised these concerns through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and other bilateral channels. However, Russia still remains determined to accomplish its obligations under the \$800 million deal, and the Bushehr reactor is planned for completion in August 2006.¹⁴³

Russia wants to earn money from the \$800 million nuclear reactor and from its operation. Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Lev Ryabev said, "Economically, it is a very profitable project for us. It is a big contract - worth hundreds of million of dollars - and it creates jobs for people."¹⁴⁴ However, on the other side, Russia's aim is also political. The Ministry of Atomic Energy viewed itself as "keepers of the Russian imperial flame, and the only people who can oppose the American influence in the world."¹⁴⁵

President Vladimir Putin amended the presidential decree on nuclear exports to allow Russia to export nuclear materials, technology, and equipment to countries that do not have full-scope IAEA control, on May 2000. During 2001, Russians remained an important source of dual-use bio-technology, chemicals, production technology, and equipment for Iran. In January 2001, Bill Richardson, U.S. Secretary of Energy, warned Yevgeniy Adamov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, against selling laser equipment to Iran, which could be used for uranium enrichment process. Russian officials claimed that U.S. allegations were groundless and that the equipment would not be used in a covert Iranian uranium enrichment program. Finally, Russians voided the sale and informed the U.S., in March 2001. "The equipment was returned to the Yefremov Scientific Research Institute for Electrophysical Apparatus (NIIEFA) in St. Petersburg instead of going to Iran."¹⁴⁶

Russian and Iranian officials state that the Bushehr plant is planned only for peaceful purposes. They stress that the reactor and its facilities will be under the

¹⁴³ NTI, "Russia: Nuclear Exports to Iran," <<http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/exports/rusiran/nukeovr.htm#irannuke>>, accessed on 24 August 2004.

¹⁴⁴ Caroline Wyatt, "Russia's Iran Nuclear Link Angers US," *BBC News World Edition*, 16 August 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2198913.stm>, accessed on 16 May 2004.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ NTI, "Russia: Nuclear Exports to Iran: Enrichment, Mining and Milling," <<http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/exports/rusiran/enrich.htm>>, accessed on 5 September 2004.

safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as Iran is a party of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They further insist that under Article IV of the NPT, Iran is allowed to develop peaceful nuclear energy, including not only nuclear power plants, but the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including mining and milling of uranium as well as enrichment of reactor fuel. They also emphasize that the reactor being built at Bushehr is a light water reactor, which presents a rather low proliferation risk because, its spent fuel cannot easily be converted into plutonium for nuclear weapons.

Russia has promised to finish construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Reactor, under President Putin's leadership. Moreover, Russia and Iran signed an arms agreement that included an air defense system to be built around the Bushehr reactor after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.

The Bushehr project is a serious concern in that it would provide indirect support to a suspected Iranian nuclear weapons program. According to the agreement's protocol, Moscow is committed to training Iranian physicists and technicians for nuclear reactors at the Kurchatov Institute and the Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant. Russian officials stated that Russian specialists would also assist Iranians in the operation of the Bushehr 1 nuclear reactor for the first six years of its operation. "ITAR-TASS reported on 10 July 2003 that to date more than 500 Iranian nuclear specialists who will work at Bushehr have received instruction in approximately thirty different disciplines at Russia's training center in Novovoronezh."¹⁴⁷ Working with Russian technicians will significantly increase the knowledge of Iranian nuclear experts and improve their access to aspects of Russian nuclear technology. Working together in the building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant could give Iran useful know-how in the construction of a covert plutonium production reactor. Furthermore, legal Russian-Iranian nuclear collaboration could provide a cover for illegal transfers of nuclear technology from Russia to Iran, which cannot be ruled out given the financial crisis in the Russian nuclear industry and the relative weakness of Russian export controls.¹⁴⁸

Washington has been pressing Moscow to stop the construction, insisting that Iran wants this plant for developing nuclear arms. However, the U.S. pressure on

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

Russia has had little success in preventing Iran from developing its nuclear program. It may have delayed the project a few years. Both Iran and Russia passionately reject the claims, stating that the Bushehr plant is for peaceful and civilian purposes. In addition to its economic profit, Russia feels that this issue is a challenge to U.S. hegemony in the world. Definitely, Russians think that the deal with Iran is a step on their way to regaining Russia's great power status.

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IV. CONCLUSION

NATO - Russian cooperation, which began with the collapse of the Soviet Union, is still in progress. The relationship has improved after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Russia's President Vladimir Putin was the first foreign statesman to send a message of condolences after the attacks. As a result of these tragic events, both sides clearly understood that more cooperation was needed in combating international terrorism. Russia and the Western countries clearly realized that they needed each other to keep stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Accordingly, NATO allowed Russia to participate in discussions as an equal partner, via the NRC. The NRC particularly intended to increase the reliance between NATO and Russia, and to allow cooperation in combating recent threats. NATO and Russia have recognized each other's importance and have been consulting about broader areas of cooperation since the NRC was established.

Certainly, a more democratic and prosperous Russia is significant for a peaceful Europe. Meanwhile, resolving disagreements between the two sides will promote the development of a more stable and secure continent. NATO and Russia cooperated in SFOR and KFOR, and thus demonstrated how they could interact successfully to reach common objectives. Both sides have clearly understood that they needed each other more than before 11 September 2001. Russia definitely was rewarded with the "at 20" (since 29 March 2004, "at 27") decision-making framework at the Rome Summit in 2002. However, Russia will have to meet many political and economic requirements if it intended to make progress in cooperation with NATO.

On the one hand, Russia has to gain the norms and interests which the Western countries strongly appreciate. It has to fulfill the requirements for catching up with Western standards. On the other hand, NATO should increase planning common exercises with Russia in order to augment mutual trust. Russia's participation in NATO-led activities has been very low, so far. However, arranging more combined actions against their common threats could decrease doubt between the two sides.

The Western countries must assist Russia during the period of transition to democracy and a market economy. Russian leaders' great power aspirations and the

distrust of Russian society of the current institutions could constrain and extend the period of transition to democracy, necessary for a stable Europe. Russia needs international assistance to create a civic society which knows the meaning of democracy. Good relations with the Western countries including trips and vacations in these countries, close and friendly links with the Western younger generation, and education of Russian youth in the Western universities could contribute to the transition. Russians who live and are educated in a democratic country could better understand the benefits and the real meaning of democracy.

Although the Russian economy looks to be improving, the poverty in Russia, which would weaken the European stability, remains almost the same compared with a decade ago. The Russian economic system also needs foreign assistance to increase the level of prosperity. Foreign assistance and investment are necessary for Russia to achieve a successful transition period to a market economy. Encouraging and assisting Russia's preparations to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) would be an important step.

The Chechen problem is likely to remain in the middle of NATO - Russian disagreements in the near future. Human rights violations in Chechnya are one of NATO's main concerns. Russians think that their malicious attacks on Chechnya will solve the problem. On the contrary, they contribute to an increase of the problem, not only in Chechnya, but also in the international arena. Russia's main concern is that NATO would intervene in Chechnya without any U.N. sanctions as happened in Kosovo in 1999. Therefore, Russia introduces the Chechen problem as its internal matter, and declares that it could use its nuclear force in case of an intervention. Russians must look for diplomatic solutions in Chechnya which could give advantages and support to Russia in its foreign affairs that Russia needs in its transition days.

The presence of U.S. and NATO troops in Georgia would undermine Russia's interests in the region. Therefore, Russians postponed the withdrawal of Russian bases in Georgia for another eleven years, which appears to have created a great debate between NATO and Russia. Moreover, Russia has accused Georgia of harboring terrorists responsible for crimes in Russia's war with Chechnya, and Georgia has claimed that Russia violated its sovereignty under the guise of antiterrorist operations, which appears a clear violation of the U.N. Charter. If Russia wants to enhance its partnership with

NATO, it must respect the sovereignty and decisions of all its neighbors. This is fundamental, not only for NATO, but also for all countries and international organizations.

Russia made a radical change in its threat perception with its new National Security Concept (2000). The new National Security Concept (NSC) defines NATO expansion towards the East and the U.S. presence in Russia's neighbors as threats to Russia's strategic interests in the region. It gives Russia the right to protect its strategic interests in its sphere of influence. The NSC also gives Russia the right to use its nuclear weapons in case that it is required. The new NSC creates an aggressive attitude to Russia's foreign policies.

Most Russians - about two thirds - assume that the Western nations are hostile toward their country, and the majority is against the expansion of NATO.¹⁴⁹ This idea of distrust could cause Russia to continue to increase its influence over the former Soviet republics by deploying more military power. This covert struggle between NATO and Russia could undermine the European peace. Russia realized that Americans have begun to strengthen their political and military forces at its southern boundaries. The U.S. has repeatedly announced that it was in Central Asia solely for combating international terrorism. Nevertheless, new pipeline projects, NATO's enlargement toward Central Asia, U.S. economic and military aid to the Central Asian countries, and the growing NATO - U.S. military presence in the region confirm that the U.S. policy is beyond combating terrorism.

Russians declared that they would never accept a long term U.S. presence in their southern neighbors. The establishment of the new base at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, and Moscow's moves to reinforce its Central Asian position in recent months by promoting multilateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization among CIS countries are evidence of Russia's determination to keep U.S. influence in check.

However, the presence of the Russian base in Kant appears not likely to change the balance of power in the region. The new Russian base does not cover the growing

¹⁴⁹ Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Old, New and Post Liberal Attitudes Toward the West: From Love to Hate*, p. 22.

role of the U.S. and NATO in the region, in helping Central Asian states improving their defense capabilities. Nevertheless, Russian officials have repeatedly said that “Moscow will continue to increase its military presence in Central Asia.”¹⁵⁰

First and foremost, the West must convince Russia that it does not have hostile intentions. If the West isolates Russia in the region, the conditions could be worse than those of today. Therefore, the Western countries must plan joint military exercises or humanitarian tasks with Russia. Common training and exercises are crucial to stimulate partnership and mutual reliance. Russia’s offers at NATO’s Istanbul Summit on 28-29 June 2004, to participate in Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), the maritime operation which conducts naval operations against international terrorism in the Mediterranean, and in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan could be important steps for resolving disagreements between the two sides.

The Russian monopoly over pipelines, which link landlocked Central Asian countries to industrialized regions, is likely to remain as another disagreement. Therefore, the Western countries are establishing new pipeline routes. Russians would lose economically and lose their control over pipelines after the completion of new pipeline projects. Therefore, the pipeline issue will continue to be a disagreement between Russia and the West in the near future.

NATO has great concerns about the Russian construction of a nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, Iran, despite assurances from both countries that the reactor will be placed under IAEA safeguards. Regardless of international pressure, Russia under President Putin’s leadership has pledged to complete construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. The U.S. and European Union countries have been pressing Moscow to abandon the construction, insisting that Iran wants this plant for developing nuclear arms. However, the U.S. pressure on Russia has had almost no success in preventing Iran from developing its nuclear program. In addition to its economic profit, Russia feels that this is a kind of challenge to U.S. hegemony in the world.

Russia must understand clearly that currently it needs international assistance in its transition period more than ever. Nearly all its domestic and foreign policies appear to

¹⁵⁰ Antoine Blua, “Kyrgyzstan: Putin to Attend Official Opening of Russian Air Base,” <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/10/mil-031022-rferl-153832.htm>>, accessed on 21 August 2004.

be aspiring to regain its superpower status. Russia must recognize that it gains more if it chooses cooperation instead of confrontation. The Western norms and values would build a stronger Russia than those of an empire. Those democratic norms and values would make Russia a contemporary country, make the Russian people more prosperous, and make Europe and the world more peaceful.

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