

Does the SBCT Intelligence Structure need a dedicated ACE / Fusion Cell?

**A Monograph
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This monograph examines the SBCT intelligence structure to determine if it is adequately resourced to conduct operations under a corps headquarters serving as a Joint Task Force Headquarters without a dedicated division level fusion cell. This question is considered due to a lack in Army doctrine for the establishment of a Stryker Division headquarters to serve as the link between a SBCT and a corps headquarters.

This monograph answers the question by comparing the capabilities of a division and a corps ACE to the intelligence capabilities of a Stryker Brigade. The first two chapters look at the development and structure of the SBCT, with specific emphasis placed on the SBCT intelligence structure. The third chapter reviews the structure and capabilities of a division and corps ACE. The comparison chapter uses the six-step joint intelligence cycle as criteria to compare these two structures.

A trend found during the comparison chapter is an apparent lack of experienced personnel (specifically by rank structure) within the SBCT. While the Stryker Brigade has a robust intelligence structure in size, equipment, and number of personnel, the level of experience resident in its analysis teams are significantly less than that found in a division ACE. If a Stryker Brigade deploys directly under a corps headquarters serving as a JTF headquarters, it could be inadequately supplied with the necessary detail of intelligence to conduct effective operations.

Three options are presented to improve the intelligence capabilities of a SBCT. The first is to restructure of the SBCT MI company to include analysis teams lead by senior warrant officers, versus the current three-platoon structure. A second option is for the SBCT to only deploy under control of a standing division headquarters. This action would provide the SBCT with access to a division ACE structure for intelligence support. The third option to improve the intelligence capability of the SBCT is to establish a standing ACE "type" structure that supports one or multiple Stryker brigades during deployments. This option would increase the overall personnel numbers of the SBCT structure, but provide a necessary intelligence function to the brigade.

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CHAPTER ONE - Introduction

Army units conducting joint and combined operations will see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operation.¹

Concepts for the Objective Force

In 2003, the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This brigade is the first of six planned Stryker Brigades certified for operations and deployed into a combat environment.² Deploying from Fort Lewis, the brigade deployed without a habitual command and control element at the division level and was initially assigned to the 4th Infantry Division (MECH) for command and control in Iraq.³

In the current published doctrine, there is ambiguity in the planned employment and support to a SBCT. *Field Manual 3-21.31, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, does not specify a doctrinal higher headquarters for a SBCT.⁴ The final draft of *Special Text 2-19.402 (FM 34-80-2), Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations*, states that the SBCT “generally fights as part of an ARFOR in a JCF (Joint Contingency Force). The manual goes on to say “in rare circumstances, the headquarters SBCT will act as the headquarters for a JCF.... [and] potentially, the SBCT will be the ARFOR in a small JCF....”⁵

¹“Concepts for the Objective Force,” *United States White Paper* (8 November 2001), iv.

²Burns, Robert, “Stryker Brigade Ready for Iraq Duty,” *The Honolulu Advertiser*, (4 August 2003), www.the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2003/Aug/04/mn/mn_02a.html, accessed 17 September 2003.

³Tonya Townsell, “Army Announces Plans for Stryker Units,” *Army News Service*, Published in the *Fort Leavenworth Lamp* (31 December 2003): 4.

⁴The only reference found to a higher headquarters element in this manual is located under paragraph, 2-6, figure 2-1, titled Command and Control System Infrastructure. This figure shows an ARFOR element as a SBCT higher headquarters. *Field Manual 3-21.31, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, Washington: Department of the Army, 13 March 2003, www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/query/info/FM+3-21.31, access on 10 September 2003.

⁵*Special Text 2-19.402 (FM 34-80-2), Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations, Final Draft*, Fort Huachuca: US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, 25 July 2003, Appendix E.

A current trend in the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) is for a corps headquarters to deploy to assume the duties of a JTF headquarters. With today's expanding force requirements, the possibility of a SBCT deploying directly under a corps headquarters serving as a JTF headquarters is high. To provide intelligence support, portions of that corps' Analysis and Control Element (ACE) usually deploys. If a maneuver brigade is deployed from a division to support a JTF, that brigade often receives support through a Deployable Intelligence Support Element from its parent division "in addition to the support from the JTF" intelligence cell.⁶ For the purpose of comparison and analysis, the premise of this monograph is that the SBCT needs the same intelligence processing and analysis capabilities as a current U.S. Army division to operate effectively under a JTF headquarters.

Research Question

Does the Stryker Brigade Combat Team require a dedicated Analysis and Control Element/fusion cell to support operations when assigned to a Joint Task Force? This monograph will develop criteria to analyze the question of whether the SBCT intelligence structure is resourced adequately to work directly for a corps headquarters serving as a JTF.

Background

On 12 October 1999, General Eric K. Shinseki, then Chief of Staff of the United States Army, announced the Army's Transformation Plan.⁷ With this announcement, the Army began a three-track approach to military transformation. One of these tracks

⁶*FM 34-1 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, Washington, Department of the Army, 27 September 1994, 1-8.

⁷The Army's transformation was later formalized as the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. *United States Army Transformation Campaign Plan*, Department of the Army, Washington, 1 August 2000; and *CSA Message Release 99-095*, "The Army Vision Statement," (12 October 1999), <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/r19991015vision095.htm>, accessed 10 November 2000.

involves the development and fielding of an interim force. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) was designed to meet that requirement.

The SBCT is designed to be a rapidly deployable medium weight maneuver brigade with combat power greater than that of a light infantry or airborne brigade, but not as heavy and logistically intensive as armored or mechanized forces. The SBCT is to bridge the gap between today's current Army force structure and the Objective Force, the Army's future structure.⁸ The ultimate goal of Army Transformation is the Objective Force; a fully networked, rapidly deployable combat force with the lethality and survivability of current forces, but with reduced logistic footprint and improved sustainability.⁹

In addition to serving as the link between the Army's current force structure and the Objective Force, the SBCT was fielded to provide the "division, corps, or joint task force commander a unique capability across the spectrum of conflict.... it may fight *by itself* or as part of a division or corps (emphasis added)."¹⁰ The SBCT was designed to meet a "combatant commander's" requirement for a "rapidly deployable, early entry force with significant firepower."¹¹ The SBCT is not designed to be a forced entry unit, but to

⁸The three tracks of Army transformation, often called the trident, are: the sustainment and modernization of the current force, the development of an interim force (SBCT) to test new technologies and tactics and bridge the gap to the Army's future combat force, the Objective Force. The Objective Force is a term that encompasses the evolving transformation of the Army. The organization of the Objective Force is not set, but will evolve over time with the maturation and integration of new technologies and doctrine. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., "The Army and Land Warfare: Transforming the Legions," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 2002), 76-77; and Lieutenant General John Riggs, *Transforming the Army to the Objective Force*, <http://www.objectiveforce.army.mil/Articles/Transforming%20the%20to%20the%20Objective%20Force.pdf>, accessed 28 August 2003.

⁹"The IBC: A Combat Force for Today, a Proving Ground for Tomorrow," *Issue 5, The Interim Brigade Combat Teams in Army Transformation*, Association of the United States Army, December 2001, 2.

¹⁰Chapter 1, "Overview of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team," *Field Manual 3-21.31, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*.

¹¹"Stryker Brigade Combat Team," www.lewis.army.mil/arrowheadlightning/sbct%20unit%20fact%20sheets.pdf accessed 13 August 2003.

fill the gap between the deployment of forced entry forces and the arrival of heavier follow-on forces.¹²

The initial concept developed for the IBCT (Interim Brigade Combat Team, the early name for the SBCT) was for it to work “for a division or corps headquarters”¹³ and not to work “by themselves on deployments.”¹⁴ The requirement for an interim division headquarters to provide command and control for a SBCT continued to be refined through 2002, and is addressed in *The 2002 Army Modernization Plan*.¹⁵ *The 2003 Army Modernization Plan*, however, does not mention any plans for the development of a SBCT higher headquarters. The plan only addresses that the SBCT “might be organized to operate directly under a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters...[or] fight under the direct control of a higher army headquarters such as a division or corps.”¹⁶

In order for the SBCT to conduct operations “by itself” as part of a rapidly deployed corps or Joint Task Force (JTF), intelligence support to the brigade must be refined and actionable. If the SBCT does not receive analyzed intelligence from its higher headquarters for mission planning and execution, the SBCT’s intelligence section must be capable of refining and focusing a corps level intelligence product into a package that can be used by a brigade commander and staff. In a current U.S. Army

¹²“Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT),” *Global Security.org*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm> accessed 13 August 2003.

¹³Statement by Major General James Dubik, then Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, Training and Doctrine Command. Cited in Jim Caldwell, “Technology Breakthroughs to Keep Transformation on Track,” <http://www.usma.edu/PublicAffairs/PVArchives/000804/Track.htm>, accessed 17 September 2003.

¹⁴Statement by Major General Robert St. Onge. Cited in Zoe Morris, “Second Signal Unit Prepares for IBCT,” *The Signal*, (7 September 2001), www.gordon.army.mil/pao/Signal/Issues/0901/nn0906.htm, accessed 10 September 2003.

¹⁵The 2002 modernization plan addressed the need for an Interim Division headquarters to be established prior to 2008. To fill the void till 2008, the plan discusses the establishment of a HICON or higher control element for the IBCT. *The 2002 Army Modernization Plan*, 23, <http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache:4pSpQCkUoewJ:www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2002/wMPmainv03b.pdf+HICON+IBCT&hl=en&ie=UTF-8>, accessed 10 November 2003.

¹⁶*The 2003 Army Modernization Plan*, 24, <http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache:SLbjL581AQJ:www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2003/MP03Mainweb100.pdf+2003+Army+Modernization+Plan+Overview+SBCT&hl=en&ie=UTF-8>, accessed 10 November 2003.

division, the G2 and his staff provides this fidelity to maneuver brigades with intelligence support developed by the division's Analysis and Control Element or ACE.

The ACE is the division's primary organization for controlling intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations. The ACE performs collection management, produces all-source intelligence, provides IEW technical control, and disseminates intelligence and targeting data across the range of military operations.¹⁷ When developing products, a division ACE generally receives products from a corps ACE and then tailors those products to meet the needs of the maneuver brigade and separate battalion commanders.¹⁸

Without a division ACE structure to support its intelligence requirements, the SBCT intelligence section needs the capability to analyze and produce intelligence from a larger, less refined intelligence product developed by a corps / JTF staff. The hypothesis for this paper is that the current intelligence structure of the Stryker Brigade is not adequate to support the brigade during deployed operations without external augmentation in the form of a separate ACE or fusion cell.

Scope and Limitations

This monograph compares the intelligence support provided by a division and a corps ACE and the capabilities of the intelligence section of a SBCT. To make this comparison, criteria will be developed using the six-step joint intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle is a process by which information is converted into intelligence and

¹⁷*Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics*, Washington: Department of the Army, 30 September 1997, 1-9.

¹⁸In this definition, maneuver brigades are Armor, Infantry, and Aviation brigades. Separate battalions include Engineer, Signal, Air Defense, and Signal battalions. The Division Support Command (DISCOM) also receives support from the ACE.

made available to users.¹⁹ The phases of the joint intelligence cycle are discussed in Chapter 4.

When comparing the capabilities of a division ACE and the capabilities of the SBCT a detailed discussion of each intelligence system within these organizations is not possible due to the size constraints of this paper. However, each intelligence system capability will be addressed briefly for the purpose of comparison.

To conduct a comparison of the SBCT and a division ACE, an airborne /air assault division ACE MTOE will be used. The use of an airborne /air assault division ACE for comparison is based on the mission of the SBCT to be an early entry force and not a follow on force like most heavy units.²⁰ The differences between a heavy and light division ACE are not discussed in this paper.

This paper will address capabilities of the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadron organic to the SBCT in order to examine its intelligence support to the brigade. While the RSTA squadron provides the SBCT with an excellent organic capability to gather tactical intelligence, it does not provide a conduit for liaison to intelligence support at higher levels (corps and above), or provide an organic analysis section.

Monograph Structure

This monograph consists of five chapters, including this introductory chapter. The following two chapters will look at the SBCT intelligence structure and its capabilities and the doctrinal capabilities of a division and a corps ACE. Chapter 4 will establish criteria to compare the capabilities of a division intelligence structure and the capabilities

¹⁹ *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 23 January 2003), 217.

²⁰ See "Mission Statement" for the 313th Military Intelligence Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, <http://www.bragg.army.mil/AFVC-Z/>, accessed on 28 November 2003.

of a SBCT based on the six-step intelligence cycle. Chapter 5, the conclusions and recommendations chapter, will address findings from in Chapter 4 and offer options to improve the intelligence structure of the SBCT. The next chapter, “What is a SBCT?” will address the structure of the SBCT and its doctrinal intelligence capabilities.

CHAPTER TWO - What is a SBCT?

One of the key aspects of gaining situational understanding in the SBCT is the need for significant MI capabilities.²¹

Major General John Thomas

This chapter reviews the development of the SBCT and its capabilities, beginning with a brief overview of the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan that led to the development of the Stryker Brigade. The general structure and capabilities of the SBCT is covered first, followed by a detailed discussion of the brigade's intelligence systems, structure, and capabilities.

Background

The *United States Army Transformation Campaign Plan*, published in August 2000, established three major objectives for Army transformation. These include the Initial Force, the Interim Force, and the Objective Force.²² The Initial Force consisted of the establishment of two brigade combat teams at Fort Lewis to evaluate and refine the Operations and Organization (O&O) concept for the brigade combat team and to develop tactics, techniques and procedures for the Interim Force. The Interim Force plan included the fielding of up to six additional brigade combat teams based on the Initial Force structure.²³ The final objective of Army transformation is the establishment of the future Army structure, or Objective Force. The Objective Force will be “a

²¹Thomas, Major General John, “The Initial Brigade Combat Team,” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (April-June 2000), 2.

²²United States Army Transformation Campaign Plan, 4.

²³The Army later announced that it intended to field a total of six SBCTs including the two Initial Force brigades. Jim Garamone, “Army Names New Vehicle After Enlisted Heroes,” *American Forces Press Service*, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/n02272002_200202274.html, accessed 30 November 2003; and *United States Army Transformation Campaign Plan*, 6-7.

strategically responsive Army capable of dominating at every point on the spectrum of operations.”²⁴

The Initial and Interim Force designs resulted in the establishment of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) structure. The IBCT (renamed the Stryker Brigade Combat Team in August 2002) was to operate *within a division structure* and provide a complementary capability between the Army’s current light and heavy force structures (emphasis added).²⁵ Additionally, the Stryker Brigade was to serve as a test bed for the experimentation of new technologies as the Army develops the Objective Force.²⁶

The 2003 Army Modernization Plan shows a defined change in the Army’s policy for developing an Interim Division. This document, unlike the 2002 plan, makes no reference for the establishment of a SBCT higher headquarters. The plan only states that the SBCT “might be organized to operate directly under a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters...[or] fight under the direct control of a higher army headquarters such as a division or corps.”²⁷ The Army is addressing the possibility of a SBCT being assigned directly to a standing division in the final draft of *Field Manual 3-91, Division Operations*. Appendix D of this manual describes the augmentation required by a division headquarters to command and control a subordinate SBCT.²⁸

²⁴United States Army Transformation Campaign Plan, 4.

²⁵“Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT),” *Global Security.org*, <http://globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm>, accessed 13 August 2003; and “Army Certification of Stryker Brigade Combat Team,” *The United States Army*, <http://www.army.mil/features/strykeror/>, accessed 13 August 2003.

²⁶Colonel Michael Mehaffey, “Vanguard of the Objective Force,” *Military Review* (September-October 2000), 6; *The IBCT: A Combat Force for Today, A Proving Ground for Tomorrow*, 2.

²⁷*The 2003 Army Modernization Plan*, 24, <http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache:SLbjL581AQJ:www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2003/MP03Mainweb100.pdf+2003+Army+Modernization+Plan+Overview+SBCT&hl=en&ie=UTF-8>, accessed 10 November 2003.

²⁸*Field Manual 3-91, Division Operations, Final Draft*, Washington: Department of the Army, October 2002, D-1.

Structure of the SBCT

Each SBCT has approximately 3,500 assigned personnel in pre-configured, ready-to-fight combined arms packages. The design includes many organic capabilities, including signal, engineer, antitank, artillery, combat service support, reconnaissance, and military intelligence elements. The SBCT is designed to fight in combined arms teams down to the company level to allow for mission flexibility in complex and urban terrain.²⁹

The primary maneuver element in the Stryker Brigade is its three wheel-mobile infantry battalions. Each infantry battalion is equipped with the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV), a modified and improved version of the eight-wheeled Light Armored Vehicle (LAV-III). The IAV can travel at speeds up to 60 mph and has a cruising range of 330 miles. The armor on IAV can withstand 14.5 mm heavy machinegun fire and artillery fragments. Each Brigade will be equipped with over 300 IAVs in various configurations.³⁰

The SBCT will also have a field artillery battalion, a brigade support battalion, and a Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron assigned to its structure. The artillery battalion contains three towed 155-mm artillery batteries. The brigade support battalion (BSB) performs distribution-based and centralized logistics while providing health service support and Class VII resupply. The BSB is designed to provide the SBCT with self-sustained support for 72-hours of combat operations. The RSTA squadron is designed to provide accurate and timely information and provide the commander and staff a tactical visualization of the battlefield.³¹

²⁹Field Manual 3-21.31, *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, 1-14.

³⁰Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV)," *Global Security.org*, www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/iav.htm, accessed 13 August 2003; and *The IBCT: A Combat Force for Today, a Proving Ground for Tomorrow*.

³¹Field Manual 3-21.31, *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, 1-15 -- 1-16, 1-20.

Organic to the SBCT structure, are four separate companies and a headquarters company. The SBCT Antitank Company serves as the combat team's primary tank-killer, with three platoons of three vehicles each. The Engineer Company provides the brigade with an organic mobility support element and consists of three mobility platoons and one mobility support platoon. The Signal Company provides the SBCT wide-area network capability and is configured to manage the tactical Internet and command post data networks. The brigade Signal Company is responsible for connecting the SBCT to the global information grid. The MI Company provides the SBCT with support to the common operating picture and provides information for targeting effects, situation development, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).³² Further capabilities of the MI Company are addressed later in this chapter.

SBCT Capabilities

The capabilities of the SBCT differ significantly from those of a traditional divisional brigade. Similar to an Army separate maneuver brigade or an armored cavalry regiment, the SBCT is designed to conduct operations as a combined arms force with no external support. Its composition as a standing brigade combat team allows it to train together year round without outside interference or training schedule deconfliction.

Performance of the SBCT is further enhanced, with the integration of advanced technologies down to the lowest level.³³ The SBCT is equipped with an enhanced digital communications suite that allows it to leverage theater and national assets to create an "information-enabled force."³⁴ Using an enhanced Command, Control, Computer,

³² *Ibid.*, 1-17 -- 1-19.

³³ "What is a Stryker Brigade Combat Team," *Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, www.lewis.army.mil/arrowheadlightnig/what%20is%20a%20SBCT.pdf, accessed 10 September 2003.

³⁴ The communications suite is known as a digitally enabled battle command bridge, "Bridging the Capabilities Gap-Stryker Brigade Combat Teams," *The 2003 United States Army Posture Statement*, www.army.mil/aps/2003/realizing/transformation/operationsal/bridging/, accessed 12 September 2003.

Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability, the Stryker Brigade will “revolutionize combat paradigms from ‘*make contact, develop the situation, maneuver the forces*’ to ‘*understand the situation, maneuver the forces, make contact at the time and place of your own choosing, and finish decisively.*’”³⁵

The Army developed the SBCT with the intent for it to operate across the spectrum of military operations, from low-intensity through high-intensity combat operations. It was designed to balance lethality, mobility, and survivability against the requirement for rapid strategic deployability.³⁶ While the Stryker Brigade lacks the firepower and survivability of a heavy brigade, its mobility and organic weapon systems far exceed the capabilities of a light brigade structure.³⁷ The Stryker Brigade’s key operational capabilities include:

1. Increased operational and tactical mobility
2. Enhance situational awareness and understanding
3. Combined Arms integration down to company level
4. Lethal and non-lethal joint effects³⁸

The SBCT leverages advanced C4ISR systems to enable the brigade to “see” the entire battlefield and react before engaging the enemy.³⁹ To leverage available C4ISR capabilities, the SBCT incorporates the full suite of Army Battle Command System (ABCS) technologies. These ABCS systems provided the Stryker Brigade the ability to develop and maintain situational awareness and facilitate command and control. One of the ABCS systems, the Force XXI Battle Command Battalion/Brigade and Below (FBCB2), is a conduit that provides a common operating picture (COP)

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ FM 3-21.31 *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, 1-1.

³⁷ “Toward an Expeditionary Army,” RAND Arroyo Center, Army Research Division, www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB3041/RB3041.pdf, accessed 11 December 2003, 2.

³⁸ “What is a Stryker Brigade Combat Team”

³⁹ *Ibid.*

throughout the combat team.⁴⁰ The brigade also uses the Maneuver Control System (MCS) to digitally display friendly and enemy locations in the brigade and battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs).⁴¹ With this increased digital situational awareness, a Stryker Brigade doctrinally operates within a 50 x 50 kilometer area of operations.⁴²

Improved logistics practices and enablers make the SBCT more deployable and sustainable than heavy forces. Each brigade team is designed for sustained operations, requiring 37 percent fewer CSS personnel than a heavy brigade.⁴³ Additionally, the use of a common vehicular platform, the IAV, reduces the maintenance and logistical footprint required for vehicle support.⁴⁴

SBCT Intelligence Capabilities

Each Stryker Brigade has a robust intelligence structure that provides unequaled capabilities to gather intelligence at the brigade level. One author characterized the SBCT intelligence structure as a major change in the Army's "pattern of thought" about intelligence operations.⁴⁵ To gain and maintain situational awareness, the SBCT will exploit its organic collection systems and advanced technologies to perform intelligence reach operations.

A key aspect of intelligence support to the SBCT is the concept of reach and reachback. Intelligence Reach is a process by which deployed military forces rapidly access information, receive support, and conduct collaboration and information sharing with other units (deployed in theater and from outside the theater) unconstrained by

⁴⁰Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Toomey, "C4ISR in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams," *Military Review* (May-June 2003), 44.

⁴¹Cotter, Philip, "The Role of Retrans in the IBCT," *Military Review* (May-June 2002), 50.

⁴²"Initial Brigade Combat Teams are First Step in Creating Objective Force," *Army News Service*, <http://www.gordon.army.mil/AC/SUMR00/dubik.htm>, 11 September 2003; "Stryker Brigade Combat Team;" and Major Yvette Hopkins, "Putting the RSTA O&O to the Test: Burma 2004, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advance Military Studies (2001), 20.

⁴³"Bridging the Capabilities Gap-Stryker Brigade Combat Teams"

⁴⁴"Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)"; and "Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV)"

⁴⁵Atkins, Colonel Charles, "Intelligence Transformation: Beyond Paradigm Shifts, Changes in Ethos," *Military Intelligence* (October-December 2000), 25.

geographic proximity, echelon, or command.⁴⁶ The term reachback is mentioned 14 times in the O&O concept for the interim brigade. One portion of the O&O document states, the “IBCT is dependent upon the division and higher echelons of command for reachback linkages to expand its capabilities in the areas of information, intelligence, joint effects, force protection, and sustainment.”⁴⁷ Two systems are organic to the Stryker Brigade to support its reachback and intra-theater communications requirements.

The first of these systems, the Trojan Spirit high-capacity satellite communications system, provides the Stryker brigade with worldwide strategic connectivity. The Trojan Spirit system allows access to classified national intelligence networks to answer tactical intelligence requirements. Each SBCT will have three Trojan Spirit systems, one more than is currently assigned to each corps MI brigade.⁴⁸

The second major communications system within the SBCT is the Secure Mobile Antijam Reliable Tactical Terminal, or SMART-T. Normally found at the division level and above, the SMART-T allows the SBCT to exercise greater dispersion while maintaining secure communications. Like the Trojan Spirit system, it is a satellite-based system, and like the Trojan Spirit, requires the scheduling of military satellite protocols for use.⁴⁹ These systems provide the SBCT intelligence section with excellent internal and long haul communications capabilities to acquire and distribute information.

⁴⁶Field Manual 2-33.5 (ST), Intelligence Reach Operations, Approved Final Text, Washington: Department of the Army (1 June 2001), 1.

⁴⁷U.S. Department of the Army, *The Interim Brigade Combat Team, Organization and Operational Concepts*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 20 June 2000. Cited in Brigadier General John Custer, “Reach: Leveraging Time and Distance,” *Military Review* (March-April 2003), 4.

⁴⁸Scott Gourley, “Trojan Spirit Lite,” *Army Magazine* (July 2003), [http://www.ansa.org/www/armymag.nsf/\(soldier\)/20037?OpenDocument](http://www.ansa.org/www/armymag.nsf/(soldier)/20037?OpenDocument), accessed 16 December 2003.


⁴⁹Toomey, 44.

SBCT Intelligence Section

The Stryker Brigade Intelligence Section is manned with a major as the brigade S2, a second major as the S2X (counter-intelligence/human intelligence coordinator), two captains, three warrant officers, and ten enlisted soldiers (including five non-commissioned officers). The S2 Section coordinates all intelligence collection activities within the brigade to answer the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) by using organic assets and by sending information requests to a higher headquarters.⁵⁰ One of the primary intelligence assets used by the S2 to manage information and answer the commander's information requirements, is the MI Company.

SBCT MI Company

The structure of the SBCT MI Company is larger and more developed than the Direct Support (DS) MI Company that supports a maneuver brigade in a divisional



Field Manual 3-21.31, Figure 1-11

⁵⁰Field Manual 3-21.31, *Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, 1-26 --1-28; Special Text 2-19.402, *Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations*, paragraph 3-2 --3-3.

structure. The company consists of 67 assigned personnel divided into three platoons and a small headquarters section. The company also has an attached United States Air Force weather team for field operations.⁵¹

The mission of the MI company is to develop databases and products to support the SBCT S2 in maintaining an accurate picture of the threat situation. The MI company has three platoons, an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Integration Platoon, the ISR Analysis Platoon, and the Tactical HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Platoon. Each platoon provides a unique capability to the SBCT.

The ISR analysis and ISR integration platoons operate directly for the Stryker Brigade S2 Section in an OPCON status.⁵² These two platoons are the primary support elements to the S2 for conducting general military operations and IPB, targeting and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) tracking ISR management, and in presenting a current threat picture to the commander and staff. These platoons manage intelligence requirements and production and maintain visibility of all brigade level reconnaissance assets. They are also responsible for refining large volumes of information into intelligence databases. The ISR analysis and ISR integration platoons produce tailored products to support SBCT mission planning and execution.⁵³

The ISR analysis platoon focuses on receiving, processing, and fusing information from both organic collectors and theater, joint and national agencies. This platoon is extremely reliant on a higher headquarters to provide long-term detailed analysis, tailored IPB products focused at the entity level, and access to distributed

⁵¹USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34143F300 MI CO, (BCT), TOE Detail, [MTOE, SBCT MI Company], <https://www.usafmsardd.army.mil/protected/products/toe/toe.cfm?toenumber=34143F300>, accessed 16 December 2003, 1-16; and "Stryker Brigade Combat Team,"

⁵²*Field Manual 3-21.31, Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, 1-19.

⁵³*Special Text 2-19.402, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations, Final Draft*, paragraph 9-3.

databases and products.⁵⁴ Important to the effectiveness of this platoon, is its access to refined data from a higher headquarters.

The ISR analysis platoon has 18 soldiers divided into four sections: a target development section, a situation development section, a database management section, and a disposition development section. Within this platoon is the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System or JDISS. Using the Trojan Spirit system to gain satellite access, JDISS allows the SBCT S2 access to technical products from national and theater analytic centers to meet the needs of the SBCT. Using this organic communications capability, the ISR analysis platoon can access both joint and national Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) resources at the unclassified and classified level.⁵⁵

The ISR integration platoon is manned by 23 soldiers and is divided into four sections. These sections are the ISR requirements section, the S2X element, a CGS section, and an imagery analysis team.⁵⁶ The ISR requirements section manages the Brigade's ISR plan. During field operations, this section develops and adjusts the unit's collection plan to fill brigade information requirements. The S2X element works directly for the S2X, and synchronizes HUMINT collection efforts with theater and national HUMINT agencies to ensure the coordination of the HUMINT actions within the brigade's ISR plan.⁵⁷

The CGS section acquires, processes, displays, and disseminates data from multiple real-time sensors and systems. These include reports from Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition System (JSTARS) aircraft; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV); Imagery

⁵⁴Martins, Major Ted, "The Brigade Combat Team—The Transformation Process," *Military Intelligence Public Bulletin* (July-September 2000), 5.

⁵⁵Special Text 2-19.402, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations, Final Draft, figures 8-1, 8-33, 9-1, paragraph 9-18.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, Figure 8-1.

⁵⁷Martins, 6.

Intelligence (IMINT) platforms; Signal Intelligence (SIGINT); Electronic Intelligence (ELINT); and other sources. The system includes a robust suite of communications equipment for secure radio, satellite, and secure landline communications.⁵⁸ The CGS also provides a conduit for theater level assets including video and telemetry from Air Force UAVs, U-2 aircraft, ARL (Airborne Reconnaissance Low) platforms, and can receive reports from fire-control radar and freeze-frame pictures from Apache Longbow aircraft.⁵⁹

The imagery analysis team develops tailored imagery products to support analysis, maintains an imagery library database, supports targeting development, and provides support to BDA. The imagery team also submits requests for imagery support to outside collectors.⁶⁰

The final platoon in the MI Company is the Tactical HUMINT platoon. This platoon provides the SBCT with the capability to conduct HUMINT collection (interrogation, debriefing, tactical questioning, tactical source operations, and limited document exploitation) and counterintelligence (CI) support (CI assessments, CI analysis, preliminary investigations, and counterintelligence force protection source operations).⁶¹ The platoon is composed of two operational management teams and four tactical HUMINT teams, with four soldiers each. The HUMINT platoon provides the SBCT with a wide range of capabilities, from basic debriefing and interrogations, to liaison with local foreign authorities and military agencies.⁶²

⁵⁸ *Common Ground Station, Information Dominance for the 21st Century*, <http://www.gd-decisionsystems.com/cgs/main.html>, accessed 13 December 2003.

⁵⁹ *AN/TSQ-179 Joint STARS Common Ground Station (CGS)*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/jstars-gsm.htm>, accessed 11 December 2003.

⁶⁰ *Special Text 2-19.402, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations, Final Draft*, paragraph 9-30.

⁶¹ *Field Manual 3-21.31, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, 1-19.

⁶² *Special Text 2-19.402, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations, Final Draft*, paragraphs 10-2 to 10-7.

RSTA Squadron

Several authors believe that one of the most unique and critical capabilities of the Stryker Brigade is its ability to achieve situational awareness on the battlefield.⁶³ The brigade's primary ability to gain tactical information on the battlefield is through its organic RSTA Squadron.

The fundamental role of the RSTA Squadron is to conduct ISR operations to develop and share a common operational picture throughout the brigade. While the brigade receives large amounts of information from theater and national assets, the RSTA Squadron serves as the brigade commander's primary eyes and ears on the battlefield. The squadron is composed of five troops; a headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT), three reconnaissance troops, and a surveillance troop.⁶⁴ In total, the RSTA Squadron is capable of fielding 36 reconnaissance squads, 4 UAV systems, three signals intelligence collection systems, and numerous ground intelligence collection systems.⁶⁵

The three reconnaissance troops include a headquarters element, and three reconnaissance platoons. Each platoon has four vehicles (currently IAVs) with a four-member reconnaissance squad in each. Depending on the mission, each squad could be augmented with a fifth member, a linguist.⁶⁶

The fifth troop in the RSTA Squadron is the surveillance troop. This troop is built with a specialized mix of airborne and ground mobile sensors. The troop consists of a

⁶³See Martens, 6; Kasales, Major Michael, "The Reconnaissance Squadron and ISR Operations," *Military Review* (May-June 2002), 52-53; Tyson, Ann, "New Army 'Stryker' Combat Vehicle Nears Iraq Test," *Christian Science Monitor* (9 October 2003), <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Oct2003/e20031009223121.html>, accessed 9 September 2003; and Carrington, Colonel William and Major Jerry Schlabach, "The MI-Signal 'Rock Drill' for the Initial Brigade Combat Team," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (July September 2000), 15.

⁶⁴*Field Manual 3-21.31, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, 1-16.

⁶⁵"Briefing for LTG Alexander, Army G-2, Stryker Brigade Combat Team," <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/dc/sf.jhtml?doid=615574>, accessed 14 December 2003, slide 14.

⁶⁶*Field Manual 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)*, Washington: Department of the Army, 23 December 2002), 1-6.

UAV platoon, a ground sensor platoon, and a NBC platoon. These systems provided the squadron commander with the ability to collect imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT) and measurement and signature (MASINT) intelligence.⁶⁷

The UAV platoon consists of a headquarters section, a ground control section, and a launch and recovery section. The ground control section and launch and recovery sections each have two teams. The platoon has four Shadow 200 tactical UAVs. The Shadow 200 has a wingspan of 13 feet and carries a 60-pound payload and is currently equipped with an electro-optic/infrared suite of sensors. The system can fly for five to six hours at a maximum altitude of 15,000 feet. Controlled by a line-of-sight ground control station, the aircraft can operate at a maximum range of 50 kilometers, with an average loiter time over its target area of four hours.⁶⁸

The ground sensor platoon is manned by thirty personnel and consists of a headquarters element and four multi-sensor sections. Each two-vehicle section consists of a SIGINT team and a MASINT team.⁶⁹ The SIGINT teams operate the Prophet collection system, a vehicle mounted voice intercept system. The Prophet can operate on the move or can be dismounted for ground use. It can collect line of sight voice intercept on unencrypted single-channel push to talk transmissions. Upgrades are currently under development to enhance the systems ability to collect other types of communications.⁷⁰

Each MASINT team is equipped with a Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) and Improved Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor String (IREMBASS) systems. The

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, G-1.

⁶⁸ "Army's Shadow Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to Begin Full Rate Production," Army Release R02-063, 1 October 2002, <http://www.tuav.redstone.army.mil/UAVWN%20Shadow%20Full.htm>, accessed 14 December 2003; and Lawlor, Maryann, "Unmanned Aircraft Spread their Wings, Missions Continue to expand for latest military platforms," *Signals Magazine* (February 2003), <http://www.us.net/signal/Archive/Feb03/unmanned-feb.html>, accessed 14 December 2003.

⁶⁹ *Field Manual 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)*, G-11--G12.

⁷⁰ Peterson, Colonel Kevin, "Prophet: Tactical SIGINT for the 21st Century," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (July-September 2000), 40-41.

GSR is a day/night radar system that allows the four-man team to provide early warning out to a range of 20 kilometers.⁷¹ IREMBASS is capable of detecting and classifying moving targets by using seismic acoustic, Infrared, or magnetic sensors. IREMBASS sensors are employed in “strings” of three or more sensors, which are camouflaged, and monitored from a location up to 15 kilometers away.⁷²

The last platoon in the Surveillance Troop is the NBC Reconnaissance Platoon. This platoon has twelve soldiers manning four vehicles. The mission of the NBC Reconnaissance Platoon is to identify life-threatening chemical and radiological contaminants. It also conducts analysis and planning to identify any weapons of mass destruction in the brigade’s area of operation.⁷³

Summary

Intelligence operations within the Stryker Brigade are a critical aspect in developing situational awareness for the brigade.⁷⁴ In view of this requirement, the intelligence structure extensively developed. Using the advanced communications structure within the brigade, the S2 Section is able to receive, collect, and disseminate information throughout the brigade.

Reachback operations and organic collection capabilities will provide the SBCT with large volumes of information to analyze. While the MI Company has a dedicated analysis platoon, its capabilities may be maximized by the large amount of reports it will receive. To provide additional analytical support, the brigade’s reachback capability

⁷¹The GSR can detect ground movement out to 10 kilometers and vehicle movement out to 20 kilometers. Gourley, Scott, “Stryker Test Highlights Advanced Electronics,” *Military Information Technology, Online Edition*, <http://www.mil-kmi.com> accessed 13 August 2003.

⁷²The monitoring range for these systems can be extended by the use of ground or air retransmission equipment. The number of collection sites possible is based on the size of the coverage area. The platoon is equipped with eight ground sensor sets. *Field Manual 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)*, G-26--G-37; and “Briefing for LTG Alexander, Army G-2, Stryker Brigade Combat Team,” Slide 14.

⁷³*Field Manual 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)*, G-37--G38.

⁷⁴Major General John Thomas, “The Initial Brigade Combat Team,” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (April-June 2000), 2.

allows it to send requests and raw data to an out-of-theater analysis cell to exploit.⁷⁵

Considering the current world situation and the deployment of multiple divisions, which out-of-theater headquarters or agency will have the assets and manpower to support a single brigade's intelligence requirements, is not known. While a JTF, corps headquarters staff, or a division intelligence staff will likely support a deployed SBCT, the brigade would still benefit from a dedicated, habitual higher headquarters intelligence element to refine the intelligence data received.

The following chapter will look at a current division and maneuver brigade intelligence structure. The chapter will focus on the intelligence capabilities of a division ACE and capabilities of a Direct Support MI Company. The capabilities of a corps ACE are also reviewed to determine its capabilities to support a SBCT when serving in the role of a JTF Headquarters.

⁷⁵Carrington and Schlabach, 18.

CHAPTER 3 - Division and Corps Intelligence Capabilities

*This organization is unique in that it will spend more time looking for the enemy than fighting the enemy.*⁷⁶

Lieutenant General (RET) William Steele

This chapter reviews the structure and doctrinal capabilities of a division and a corps ACE. The ACE structures are examined to review their capabilities and doctrinal mission. The structure and capabilities of a direct support MI company and the deployable intelligence support element are also addressed to establish their doctrinal capability within the division's intelligence structure. The chapter ends with a brief review of ACE support to brigade operations in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Division ACE Mission and Structure

The division ACE, is the primary organization within a division for coordinating intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations and producing intelligence. The doctrinal mission of the ACE is to perform collection management; produce all-source intelligence; provide IEW technical control; and disseminate intelligence and targeting data. The ACE supports the commander in executing battle command and mission planning.⁷⁷

While the ACE structure of most divisions is similar, for purposes of comparison in this monograph, the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for an airborne/air assault division ACE is used. The forced entry division ACE structure was selected for comparison due to the unique requirement of the SBCT to deploy as an early entry

⁷⁶Statement by Lieutenant General (RET) William Steele, cited in Carrington and Schlabach, 15.

⁷⁷*Field Manual 34-25-3, All-Source Analysis System and the Analysis and Control Element*, Washington: Department of the Army, 3 October 1995, 2-1.

force. This requirement most resembles the 18 to 36-hour deployment sequence for an early entry division.⁷⁸

A division ACE is assigned to the headquarters and headquarters operations company of a division military intelligence battalion. The total authorized strength for an airborne/air assault division ACE is 90 soldiers. This number includes four officers and six warrant officers.⁷⁹ According to the TOE for an airborne/air assault division, the ACE provides five functions:

1. Production and dissemination of all source intelligence and intelligence collection management for the division.
2. Asset and technical management of intelligence counterintelligence and electronic warfare assets organic or attached to the battalion.
3. Maintenance of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) database for the division.
4. Receive and process imagery from a variety of imaging systems.
5. Target nomination team to support division fire support planning.⁸⁰


To perform these functions, the ACE normally has a headquarters element, three large subordinate sections and five other sub-elements.⁸¹

⁷⁸The mission statement of the 311th MI Battalion ACE, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), calls for the ACE to support an 18-hour deployment sequence. Other 101st Airborne Division Documents cite a 36-hour deployment sequence. *ACE TTP*, 311th Military Intelligence Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY, n.d., Introduction, 1; and "Joint Targeting Conference," 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 1 May 2002, Slide 3.

⁷⁹USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34355A100 HHOC, MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [Airborne MI Battalion MTOE], <https://www.usafmsaradd.army.mil/protected/products/toe/toe.cfm?toenumber=34356A100>, accessed 16 December 2003, 18-36.

⁸⁰USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34355A100 HHOC, MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Section 1 – Master, [Airborne MI Battalion MTOE Operational Data], <https://www.usafmsaradd.army.mil/protected/products/toe/toesec1.cfm?toenumber=34356A100>, accessed 16 December 2003, 2.

⁸¹*The ACE Chief Handbook* divides the ACE into three major sections, the headquarters, the Technical Control and Processing Section (TCPS), and the All-Source Intelligence Section (ASIS). The ACE structure described in this paper is based on ACE operations, MTOEs, and SOPs in the 101st Airborne Division. *The ACE Chief Handbook*, Fort Huachuca: Department of the Army, 1999, B4--B5.



Air Assault Leader's Intelligence Handbook, page 7

While it is assigned to the MI battalion, the ACE is under operational control of the G2 during both garrison and deployed operations. Its major sections include the Intelligence Production Section, the Collection Management and Dissemination Section, and a Command, Control, Computers and Communication and Intelligence Section.⁸² The headquarters section contains the ACE Chief, (a major) and the senior non-commissioned officer (a master sergeant).⁸³ These two leaders provide oversight for ACE activities and are the primary interface with the division staff.

The Intelligence Production Section (IPS), also called the all-source fusion section, is the largest section in the ACE and produces the bulk of the intelligence reporting and analysis within the division. The mission of the ISP is to develop and maintain databases on threats determined by division contingency plans; prepare

⁸² *G2 S2 Handbook, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)*, Fort Campbell: United States Army, November 2000, 14

⁸³ USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34355A100 HHOC, MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [Airborne MI Battalion MTOE], 18.

intelligence products for use by the division staff to support mission planning; respond to requests for information from subordinate units, and analyze battlefield information from all sources. While developing a threat database, the IPS Section analyzes and combines information received from higher and lower echelons into a coherent intelligence picture and develops products for briefings and dissemination throughout the division.⁸⁴

To conduct analysis and synthesis of information, the IPS has five subordinate teams. These include a Production Team, a Targeting and BDA Team, a Human Intelligence Team, an Imagery Intelligence Team and a Signals Intelligence Team. The Signals Intelligence Team is further broken down into several sub-elements. These include a Communications Intelligence Team (primarily voice intercept analysis), an Electronic Intelligence Team (primarily radar intercept analysis), a Trojan Spirit Team, a Common Ground Station (CGS) team, a Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal team (receives secondary imagery and ELINT data from corps and national assets), and the Communications Control Set.⁸⁵

Each team within the IPS maintains databases and situational awareness on their specific area of expertise. As information is received from the various teams, it is processed into the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) by electronic spot reports. These reports are analyzed and correlated into a current threat picture in the All-Source Correlated Database.⁸⁶ Within the ACE, the Communications Control Set (CCS), using the Trojan Spirit communications link, receives externally generated reports and

⁸⁴*ACE TTP*, Introduction, 5.

⁸⁵Although dated, *Field Manual 34-2*, "Appendix C," gives a usable definition for most intelligence systems in the Army inventory. *Field Manual 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning*, Washington: Department of the Army, 8 March 1994, C-1--C-12; and *Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Mission Brief*, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 14 January 2002, Slide 3.

⁸⁶Reports are sent and received electronically via an ASAS Remote Work Station, which are located down to the Brigade level. Incoming reports from higher and lower units populate the ASAS databases, and are integrated into a common division picture. *ACE TTP*, Annex G (All Source Operations), 1-2.

forwards them into the ASAS database. The CCS also provides an electronic means to determine the classification of reports within the ACE and routes them to the proper analysis station.⁸⁷

The IPS Production Team, manned with two warrant officers, four NCOs, and six enlisted soldiers (all intelligence analyst), develops intelligence products for distribution throughout the division.⁸⁸ Included in the products developed are written and graphic Intelligence Summations (INTSUMS), BDA totals, and current division target lists and their status. The IPS also develops counter-intelligence threat assessments, monitors the division's HUMINT resources and develops databases from HUMINT reporting.⁸⁹

The mission of the Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D) Section is to plan and coordinate all-source intelligence collection for the division and to answer the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). This section conducts mission management (assigns and tracks collection tasks) for all organic intelligence collection assets within the division and process's requests for intelligence information from subordinate echelons. To answer division PIR, the CM&D Section also requests support from corps, theater, and national level collection assets. After receiving intelligence information from higher and lower sources, the CM&D Section processes that information into the ASAS database and disseminates time sensitive reports directly to subordinate warfighting units.⁹⁰ The CM&D Section is manned with a captain, a warrant officer (a CW4), two NCOs, and four enlisted soldiers.⁹¹

⁸⁷"All Source Analysis System [ASAS]," *Global Security.org*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/asas.htm>, accessed 6 January 2004.

⁸⁸USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34355A100 HHOC, MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [Airborne MI Battalion MTOE], 34-35.

⁸⁹The frequency of reports sent out is based on SOPs for that division. Normally reports are sent out every 6-12 hours. *ACE TTP*, Annex B (Battle Captain Operations), 6-7.

⁹⁰*ACE TTP*, Introduction, 6.

⁹¹USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34355A100 HHOC, MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [Airborne MI Battalion MTOE], 36.

Due to the large number of communications systems in the ACE, it maintains an internal Command, Control, Computers and Communication and Intelligence (C4I) Section. The mission of the C4I Section is to provide direct support to the communication and dissemination functions of the ACE. It builds and maintains a Local Area Network (LAN) to facilitate timely and accurate posting and retrieval of intelligence products across the division staff and subordinate elements. The C4I Section hosts a web page as a platform to share information in garrison and field environments.⁹²

Within the ACE, the C4I Section is responsible for ensuring all systems communicate and are able to transmit intelligence and combat information to subordinate units in the division. This section is also responsible for establishing the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems (JWICS) web site, used to disseminate reports to corps and higher echelons.⁹³ The C4I Section has two Satellite Communications SATCOM Teams, two Communication Control Teams, and an ACE Communications Team. This section is authorized six NCOs and seven enlisted soldiers, including a communications repair specialist.⁹⁴

The primary consumers for ACE products are the division staff and the subordinate maneuver brigades. During daily operations, the ACE defines and describes the threat situation in the division area of operations by analyzing reports from division subordinate units and from higher levels. After synthesizing these reports, the ACE disseminates its analysis in text and graphic form to all units within the division. The ACE is located with the division main command post and is linked into the ABCS network to transfer intelligence data to other ABCS systems. With this integration into

⁹²ACE TTP, Introduction, 6.

⁹³Both of these secure Internets interface through the Trojan Spirit. *Ibid.*, 7; G2 S2 Handbook, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 1.

⁹⁴USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34355A100 HHOC, MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [Airborne MI Battalion MTOE], 18-22.

the ABCS system, the ACE supports the development of a common operating picture across the division.⁹⁵

Analysis and Control Team

A Direct Support (DS) MI company supports each maneuver brigade in a division. The DS MI companies are organic to the MI Battalion, but are tasked organized to the brigades when deployed to provide combat intelligence.⁹⁶ The DS company in an airborne / air assault division is relatively small (41 authorized personnel), but is designed to conduct multi-disciplined intelligence collection and counterintelligence operations in support of brigade operations.⁹⁷

The DS MI company has a six-man headquarters section, an Operations Platoon, and an Analysis and Control Team or ACT. The Operations Platoon contains a Counterintelligence (CI) Team, an Interrogation Team, a REMBASS Team, a Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) Section, and an Imagery Processing Team. The CI and Interrogation Teams are each lead by a warrant officer and are the brigade's primary HUMINT collectors. The Interrogation Team can conduct field interrogations of enemy prisoner's of war (EPWs) prior to sending them to the division EPW cage to gain combat information for the brigade. The REMBASS Team employs its sensors in support of the brigade's collection plan, but can also support the GSR Section when conducting radar

⁹⁵ *Field Manual 3-91, Division Operations, Final Draft, 2-14.*

⁹⁶ *Field Manual 34-25-3, All Source Analysis System and the Analysis and Control Element, 2-3*; USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34357A100 MI CO (DS), MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Section 1 – Master, [MTOE, DS MI Company, Airborne MI Battalion], <https://www.usafmsaradd.army.mil/protected/products/toe/toesec1.cfm?toenumber=34357A100>, accessed 16 December 2003, 1.

⁹⁷ USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34357A100 MI CO (DS), MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Section 1 – Master, [MTOE, DS MI Company, Airborne MI Battalion], 1, and USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34357A100 MI CO (DS), MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [MTOE, DS MI Company, Airborne MI Battalion], <https://www.usafmsaradd.army.mil/protected/products/toe/toe.cfm?toenumber=34357A100> accessed 16 December 2002, 1-23.

missions.⁹⁸ The Imagery Processing Team operates the CGS for the brigade, providing access to secondary imagery, ELINT data, some types of SIGINT data and access to JSTARS feeds when the aircraft is flying. The CGS is capable of sending intelligence reports directly into the ASAS system to support the common operational picture.⁹⁹

During operations, the ACT is located at the brigade TOC and supports the brigade S2. The ACT provides the brigade with automated intelligence processing, analysis, and dissemination capabilities. The brigade S2 uses the ACT to assist in asset management and tracking and for submission of reports to the ACE. The ACT is equipped with an ASAS workstation that enables the brigade to access ACE databases, and to send and receive reports, graphics, imagery, and other products.¹⁰⁰ Along with the company commander, a lieutenant, two NCOs, and two enlisted soldiers man the ACT. The NCOs and soldiers are trained intelligence analysts.¹⁰¹ The ACT cannot send digital reports down to the battalion level due to current technology shortfalls.

Other division intelligence collection assets can augment the DS MI Company in supporting the brigade. SIGINT assets, as well as HUMINT and ground surveillance systems may be attached to the DS MI Company from the MI Battalion's General Support Company.¹⁰² In the future, the DS MI Company MTOE will be modified to include a tactical UAV platoon.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ *Air Assault Leader's Intelligence Handbook*, 311th Military Intelligence Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, 25 February 2002, Slides 35, 37-43; USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34357A100 MI CO (DS), MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [MTOE, DS MI Company, Airborne MI Battalion], 14-19; and USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34357A100 MI CO (DS), MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Section 1 – Master, [MTOE, DS MI Company, Airborne MI Battalion], 5.

⁹⁹ *Air Assault Leader's Intelligence Handbook*, Slides 51-53.

¹⁰⁰ *Field Manual 34-25-3, All Source Analysis System and the Analysis and Control Element*, 2-3.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*; USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34357A100 MI CO (DS), MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [MTOE, DS MI Company, Airborne MI Battalion], 7-8.

¹⁰² *Air Assault Leader's Intelligence Handbook*, Slide 35.

¹⁰³ USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34357A100 MI CO (DS), MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Section 1 – Master, [MTOE, DS MI Company, Airborne MI Battalion], 2, 5.

Corps ACE Structure and Mission

The corps ACE is the focal point of military intelligence support for the corps. Like a division ACE, a corps ACE develops and tracks critical targets, performs all-source analysis, manages collection, produces and maintains IPB products, and disseminates intelligence to users.¹⁰⁴ While the structure of a corps ACE is similar to that of the division ACE, the scope of corps ACE operations is much broader. One of the primary missions of the corps ACE is to serve as a bridge between division intelligence requirements and intelligence collection capabilities at the national level.¹⁰⁵

A corps ACE is responsible for providing all-source intelligence necessary to support corps planning and operations. The XVIII Airborne Corps' ACE mission statement includes the requirement to support military contingency operations, specifically addressing an early entry capability.¹⁰⁶ For purposes of comparison, the organization and structure of the XVIII Airborne Corps ACE as a contingency corps intelligence provider, will be described briefly below.

The corps ACE is organic to the operations battalion of a corps MI brigade. Due to its size, the ACE at the corps level is established as a company size element. The ACE company is authorized 106 soldiers. Included is a company headquarters with five personnel and an ACE headquarters element with an authorization for a military intelligence Lieutenant Colonel and a Sergeant Major (96Z Intelligence Analyst). In addition to the ACE's dual headquarters leadership, it is authorized five additional officers, 13 warrant officers, and numerous noncommissioned officers.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ *Field Manual 100-15, Corps Operations*, Washington: Department of the Army, 29 October 1996, 2-9.

¹⁰⁵ *Field Manual 34-25-3, All Source Analysis System and the Analysis and Control Element*, 2-2.

¹⁰⁶ "XVIII Airborne Corps Analysis and Control Element," Information Briefing, Fort Bragg, NC, n.d., Slide 2.

¹⁰⁷ "MTOE, MI BN (OPS) (ABN CORPS)," Input Analysis Report MTOE – Type B, Document Number 34405AFC18, 16 October 2001 [Current MTOE], 5-10.

There are three major subdivisions within the XVIII Airborne Corps ACE. These are the Intelligence Production Section (IPS), the Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D) Section, and the Systems Control (SYSCON) Section. The largest section is the IPS.¹⁰⁸

The IPS contains two situation development teams (which include SIGINT, IMINT, ELINT, and IMINT cells), a targeting/BDA team, a CI/HUMINT team, and the ASAS database management team. Each of these teams is better equipped than their equivalents at the division level, and each has a larger contingent of warrant officers and NCOs to provide leadership and analysis. The IPS is lead by a major.¹⁰⁹

The CM&D Section performs the same tasks that a division CM&D section conducts, only at a higher echelon. In addition to tracking the collection plans of its subordinate divisions, the corps CM&D Section also develops the collection plan for the corps MI brigade's Theater Exploitation (TE) Battalion and Aerial Exploitation (AE) Battalions. The section also requests support from national collection agencies. To manage the larger mission of the corps CM&D Section, it is authorized a major as the collection manager, four warrant officers and six enlisted soldiers.¹¹⁰

The SYSCON Section is the smallest section in the corps ACE. It consists of the ACE Communications Section, three Satellite Teams, and two Communications Support Teams, with a total of six NCOs and ten enlisted soldiers.¹¹¹ The SYSCON Section operates the internal local area network, and ensures the ACE has connectivity to higher

¹⁰⁸"XVIII Airborne Corps Analysis and Control Element," Information Briefing, Fort Bragg, NC, n.d., Slide 8.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*; "MTOE, MI BN (OPS) (ABN CORPS)," 7-10; and Major David Wright, IPS Chief, XVIII Airborne Corps ACE, interview by author, 13 January 2004.

¹¹⁰"MTOE, MI BN (OPS) (ABN CORPS)," 10.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 6-7.

and lower echelons. The ACE's primary communications path is through the Trojan Spirit using JWICS and SIPERNET connectivity.¹¹²

The expanded nature of the systems architecture of the corps ACE allows it to tie into multi-service collection systems. Using its organic systems and other corps MI brigade assets, the corps ACE is also able to tap into numerous national agencies. ISR support for the corps includes access to national imagery and ELINT data as well as airforce and navy collection platforms.¹¹³ In addition, the corps MI brigade has a collection and processing company, which provides the ACE with additional connectivity theater and national assets.¹¹⁴

While the corps ACE has a wide array of intelligence capabilities, it is designed to perform intelligence operations to support corps level operations.¹¹⁵ The products developed by a corps ACE are generally less refined than those of a division ACE and are focused on situational awareness across the corps area of interest.

ACE Support to Brigade Operations

When a brigade task force is deployed from a division, it may receive a support package to provide intelligence. This action, called split-based operations, provides the deployed brigade commander with a reach capability to intelligence databases outside his area of operations. This intelligence package is doctrinally called a Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE).¹¹⁶

¹¹²“XVIII Airborne Corps Analysis and Control Element,” Slide 8 and 9.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, Slide 6.

¹¹⁴*Field Manual 34-25-3, All-Source Analysis System and the Analysis and Control Element*, 2-2; and “MTOE, MI BN (OPS) (ABN CORPS),” 1, 10-12.

¹¹⁵*Field Manual 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence*, Washington: Department of the Army, 28 September 1992, 4-5.

¹¹⁶*Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 1-6.

If the brigade is operating as part of a joint task force, it will receive intelligence from both the JTF joint intelligence center and the DISE.¹¹⁷ During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the Commander of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) dispatched a DISE to augment the intelligence capabilities of the Division's 3rd Brigade Task Force. The DISE consisted of 16 soldiers from the Division's ACE and was lead by a major. The DISE was equipped with an ASAS system and the capability to receive reports from SIGINT, IMINT, ELINT, and other collectors. Upon arrival, DISE provided direct intelligence support to the brigade's ACT.¹¹⁸

The DISE provided many of the functions normally conducted by the ACE only on a much-reduced scale. In addition to serving as a conduit to division intelligence assets in CONUS, the DISE also interacted with other national assets, including a four-man team from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The XVIII Airborne Corps deployed a JWICS Mobile Intelligence Communications System (JMICS) team to further augment the brigade's intelligence reach capability and included a video teleconference (VTC) capability. The DISE was fully integrated into the brigade's combat operations, and played a significant role in Operation Anaconda, one of the largest U.S. ground offensives conducted in Afghanistan.¹¹⁹

The success of intelligence operations in Afghanistan confirmed Army intelligence doctrine and the use of a DISE to support deployed brigade task force operations. The habitual relationship of the division's intelligence assets with its

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-8

¹¹⁸ The ACE initially augmented 3rd Brigade's ACT with three ACE personnel. These three joined the DISE. Major Drew Mores, "The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) in Operation Enduring Freedom," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (October-December 2002), 38.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 38-39.

subordinate brigade's intelligence teams gave an added advantage to the commander in Afghanistan.¹²⁰

Summary

The analysis and control element provides a division and corps with a robust capability to receive, process and disseminate intelligence. The division ACE is designed to interface with brigade intelligence teams (ACTs) as well as higher echelon intelligence elements. When a brigade task force is deployed as a separate combat force, the division ACE is capable of deploying a tailored team to conduct split-based and reach operations (a DISE).

The corps ACE is structured to allow it to provide situational awareness across the corps area of operations. The corps ACE is also capable of deploying a DISE, but normally does so only to support corps force projection operations during pre-deployment activities.¹²¹ While the division ACE develops intelligence to support division staff planning and maneuver brigade execution, the corps ACE develops intelligence products to support a much larger area of operations and provides intelligence that is less refined than that required at the brigade level. To support a maneuver brigade, a corps ACE needs to develop and refine intelligence in greater detail than it normally produces.¹²²

The next chapter will conduct a comparison of the SBCT's intelligence capability with that of a division ACE. The chapter first addresses joint task force functions and then defines the phases of the intelligence cycle. The remainder of the chapter uses the

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, 40.

¹²¹*Field Manual 100-15, Corps Operations*, 3-5.

¹²²One of the challenges addressed by the V Corps ACE during Allied Force in Kosovo was the development of intelligence at a lower than normal level of detail. The V Corps ACE was required to develop intelligence products down to a 1:12,000 scale maps, a level not normally required by a corps headquarters. Major Stephen Iwicki, "The First Combat Deployment of a G2 ACE Team," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (January-March 2000), 23-24.

intelligence cycle to determine if a SBCT can operate directly under a JTF headquarters without intelligence augmentation.

CHAPTER 4 - Comparison of Capabilities and Requirements

*Information dominance is our watchword.*¹²³

Lieutenant Colonel James Cashwell

This chapter establishes criteria to analyze the capabilities of the SBCT intelligence structure to serve under a corps headquarters serving as a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters without a dedicated ACE/fusion cell. The majority of the analysis in this chapter will consist of comparisons between the capabilities of the SBCT intelligence section and those of a division ACE.

The chapter begins with a brief doctrinal overview of a JTF and its structure. This is followed by an overview of the six-phase intelligence cycle.¹²⁴ The body of the chapter uses the intelligence cycle to analyze the capability of a SBCT to work directly under a JTF headquarters without the benefit of a division ACE. Data points for the analysis are drawn from background information presented in Chapters Two and Three of this monograph.

Joint Task Force Design

By definition, a Joint Task Force is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.¹²⁵ While the initial concept for a JTF headquarters

¹²³Statement by Lieutenant Colonel James Cashwell, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, RSTA Commander. Cited in Timothy Rider, "Millennium Challenge 2002, Information Technology Searches for its Proper Place with the Soldier," *Public Affairs Office*, http://www.monmouth.army.mil/monmessg/newmonmsg/aug_232002/m34tim, accessed 10 September 2003.

¹²⁴Joint doctrine adds a sixth phase (Army doctrine calls them steps) to the intelligence cycle. Current Army doctrine states there are only five steps. Since this paper analyzes the SBCT under the control of a JTF headquarters and not an Army corps headquarters, the joint six-phase model is used in this chapter. The phase not defined in Army doctrine as a separate step is number six, Evaluation and Feedback. *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 217; and *Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 2-15 – 2-17.

¹²⁵*Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 240; and *Field Manual 3-31, Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook*, Washington: Department of the Army, December 2001, Glossary 12.

was for it to serve above a corps in an operational chain, in today's environment, a corps is often called upon to perform duties as a joint task force headquarters.¹²⁶ A JTF is normally established with a specific limited objective and is dissolved when that objective is achieved. It can operate across the range of military operations in air, land, or maritime environments. The organization and structure of a JTF varies based on its assigned mission, the environment in which it is to operate, the time allotted for mission completion.¹²⁷

Examples of two standing Joint Task Force headquarters are Combined JTF 180, which is conducting military operations in Afghanistan and Coalition JTF 7, which has operational control over all forces within Iraq. Joint Task Force 180 was formed in June 2002 as a forward headquarters in Afghanistan, and is commanded by a lieutenant general. The JTF is responsible to United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).¹²⁸ Joint Task Force 180 is comprised of approximately 11,000 U.S. personnel.¹²⁹

Joint Task Force 7 is classified as a Coalition JTF, with operational control of all multi-national forces in Iraq.¹³⁰ Joint Task Force 7 was designated in mid-June 2003 to replace the Coalition Forces Land Component Command under USCENTCOM. The Commanding General of Fifth Corps and his staff currently serve as the JTF 7

¹²⁶ *Field Manual 100-15, Corps Operations*, xiii, 1-1, and 1-3.

¹²⁷ *Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 January 1999, I-1, I-3.

¹²⁸ "Joint Task Force 180," *Global Security.org*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jtf-180.htm>, accessed 19 September 2004.

¹²⁹ Recent media reports state there are 11,000 U.S. and a 5,500-soldier NATO force in Afghanistan. David Sands, "Afghans Still Lacking Security," *The Washington Times* (28 January 2003), 13, <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Jan2004/e20040128252636.html>, accessed 28 January 2004; and "News Archive," *Orbat.com*, <http://orbat.com/site/agtwwopen/newsarchivemay 2003.html>, accessed 24 January 2004.

¹³⁰ As of January there were 35 countries represented in JTF 7. "Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF 7)," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/cjtf-7.htm>, accessed 19 January 2004; and "The Coalition Forces," <http://www.cjtf7.army.mil/the-coalition/coalition-forces.htm>, accessed 24 January 2004.

commander and staff.¹³¹ Joint Task Force 7 is responsible for approximately 130,000 U.S. and 22,000 foreign military troops serving in Iraq.¹³² The 3rd Brigade (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division is currently conducting operations under Coalition JTF 7 in northern Iraq.¹³³

The Six-Phase Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle is a process that is focused on supporting a commander's mission and concept of operations. Each phase within the cycle must be synchronized with the commander's decision-making cycle and operational requirements.¹³⁴ The six-phases of the intelligence cycle outlined in joint doctrine are:

1. Planning and Direction. The planning and direction encompasses the determination of intelligence requirements and the development of appropriate intelligence architectures. During this phase, collection plans are developed and requests for collection support are submitted to outside agencies.¹³⁵

2. Collection. Collection operations acquire information about an adversary and provide that information to intelligence processing and exploitation elements. Collection

¹³¹Lieutenant General David McKiernan, "On the Cutting Edge of the War on Terrorism," *Army* (October 2003), 204.

¹³²George Edmonson, "Size of Military Sets the Stage for Big Political Battle," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* (25 January 2004), <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040126251941.html>, accessed 28 January 2004; "US Still has about 130,000 forces in Iraq," *Hot News* (01 October 2003), http://quickstart.clari.net/qs-se/webnews/wed/ag/Qiraq-us-forces.RvTF_DO1.html, accessed 24 January 2003; and "The Coalition Forces."

¹³³"101st Transfers Authority to 2nd Infantry Division," <http://www.cjtf7.army.mil/media-information/january2004/040118d.htm>, accessed 24 January 2004.

¹³⁴Joint doctrine uses the intelligence cycle as a "simplified conceptual model of how intelligence operations are conducted." The Army definition shown above is more specific in its purpose. *Joint Publication 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 09 March 2000, II-1; and *Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 2-15.

¹³⁵The Army definition states that planning and directing involves task organizing MI assets; identifying personnel, logistics and communications requirements; identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence requirements; developing a collection plan and synchronization matrix; issuing specific orders or requests (SORs) for collection and production; and monitoring the availability of collection information. *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 217; and *Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 2-15.

management includes the positioning of collectors on the battlefield to answer intelligence requirements.¹³⁶

3. Processing and Exploitation. Processing and exploitation is the conversion of raw data into information that can be used by analysts during phase four, the production phase. Actions taken during the processing and exploitation phase include initial imagery interpretation, data conversion and correlation, and document translation and decryption. The same teams that collected the information often perform the processing and exploitation of that data.¹³⁷ Processing must be prioritized and synchronized with the commander's priority intelligence requirements. Effective processing management ensures that critical information is extracted for analysis ahead of information of lesser immediate value.¹³⁸

4. Analysis and Production. Analysis and production is the conversion of processed information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all-source data and the preparation of intelligence production in support of known or anticipated user requirements.¹³⁹

5. Dissemination and Integration. Dissemination and integration is the delivery of intelligence to user in a suitable form and the application of the intelligence to appropriate missions, tasks, and functions.¹⁴⁰ Dissemination of intelligence can take place by a variety of means, from radio spot reports to video-teleconferences.

6. Evaluation and Feedback. Evaluation and feedback is the continuous assessment of intelligence operations during each phase of the intelligence cycle to

¹³⁶FM 34-1 mirrors this definition of the collection phase. *Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 2-15; *Joint Publication 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 November 1996, III-9; and *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 217.

¹³⁷*Joint Publication 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, II-7.

¹³⁸*Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 2-16.

¹³⁹*Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 217.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*

ensure that the commander's intelligence requirements are being met. This phase, which overlaps all other phases, can be measured by the seven attributes of intelligence. These attributes evaluate intelligence to see if it is timely, accurate, usable, complete, relevant, objective, and available.¹⁴¹ The next section will look at the phases of the intelligence cycle for comparison and analysis.

Planning and Direction Phase and the Collection Phase

The first two phase of the intelligence cycle are conducted by the same elements within a division ACE and the SBCT. The ISR integration platoon in the SBCT MI company and the CM&D Section in a Division ACE are primarily responsible to support actions during this phase. Due to this correlation, these two phases are addressed together here.

During the planning and direction phase, threat forces, their capabilities, and their likely courses of action are identified. To answer the commander's critical information requirements, PIR are developed. The initial collection plan is then developed to synchronize collection efforts and answer those PIR. The initial collection plan registers, validates, and prioritizes all collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements within the force. Once approved by the commander, the collection plan defines subordinate unit collection requirements and delineates the intelligence support needed from external organizations and agencies.¹⁴²

During the collection phase, the collection plan developed in the planning and direction phase is executed to confirm information about the threat and the battlespace.¹⁴³ The key to a successful collection plan is the evaluation of reported data

¹⁴¹ *Joint Publication 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, II-14.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, II-4 –II-5.

¹⁴³ *Joint Publication 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, II-7.

and the modification of the collection plan to cover any shortfalls discovered during the collection phase.

Within the SBCT, the ISR integration platoon of the MI company has a ten-soldier team responsible for developing, monitoring, and adjusting the brigade's collection plan.¹⁴⁴ This team, the ISR Requirements Team, is lead by a first lieutenant with two non-commissioned officers (a staff sergeant and a sergeant) and six soldiers to conduct daily operations.¹⁴⁵ The size of the SBCT area of operations (50 x 50 kilometers) will significantly test the abilities of a junior officer and two junior non-commissioned officers in developing and evaluating a brigade's collection plan.

By comparison, the CM&D Section is lead by a MI captain and a chief warrant officer four as the section's technical expert. The section also has two non-commissioned officers (a sergeant first class and a sergeant) and four soldiers for daily operations.¹⁴⁶ The CM&D Section supports the tasks defined under the planning and direction phase, with a specific emphasis on the development of the collection plan. After the collection plan is developed, the CM&D Section evaluates the reporting and adjusts the plan as necessary.

While the training level of soldiers in a CM&D Section versus a ISR Requirements Team will vary, a comparison using their rank structure as a gage, shows a distinct difference in experience levels. The CM&D Section with a captain and a chief warrant officer four, clearly has an advantage over the ISR Requirements Team lead by a first lieutenant and a staff sergeant. Due to the importance of the planning and direction and collection phases to an operation, the ISR Requirements Team will likely

¹⁴⁴USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34143F300 MI CO, (BCT), TOE Section Master, [SBCT MI Company MTOE Operational Data], <https://www.usafmsaradd.army.mil/protected/products/toe/toesec1.cfm?toenumber=34143F300>, accessed 16 December 2003, 6-7.

¹⁴⁵USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34143F300 MI CO, (BCT), TOE Detail, [MTOE, SBCT MI Company], <https://www.usafmsaradd.army.mil/protected/products/toe/toe.cfm?toenumber=34143F300>, accessed 16 December 2003, 9.

¹⁴⁶USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34355A100 HHOC, MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [MTOE, HHOC, Airborne MI Battalion], 36.

receive assistance from the SBCT S2 or other officers in the Section. This assistance, however, will come at the penalty of those officers not focusing on other brigade requirements.

By doctrine, joint intelligence planning occurs as part of a command's overall planning process, well ahead of a force deployment.¹⁴⁷ The amount of detailed tactical intelligence developed during this process is limited due to the larger theater focus of a joint planning staff. The development of threat courses of action at the tactical level requires a higher degree of detail than normally observed at the higher levels of military operations.¹⁴⁸

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB) differs from Army Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) in relative purpose, focus, and level of detail. While Army IPB generally requires microanalysis and a finer degree of detail to support maneuver operations, JIPB uses a macro-analytic approach, looking for an opponent's strategic vulnerabilities.¹⁴⁹

The lack of fidelity in initial intelligence support from a JTF staff to a SBCT may be a critical shortfall at the tactical level for mission analysis and planning. Due to the streamlined nature of the SBCT intelligence staff, the brigade is reliant on higher headquarters support for the development of its IPB products.¹⁵⁰ If a JTF headquarters is required to conduct crisis action planning and execution under an abbreviated timeline, a Stryker Brigade could be committed with an inadequate level of resolution on the threats in that theater.

¹⁴⁷ *Joint Publication 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, II-2.

¹⁴⁸ *Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 May 2000, I-8.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, I-3.

¹⁵⁰ Captain E. Lee Goodman, "Doctrine for the Initial Brigade Combat Team," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (October-December 2000), 52.

During the Collection Phase, an SBCT has an advantage over conventional brigades in gaining information about a threat. The RSTA squadron provides the SBCT with an organic collection element unparalleled in any brigade and almost equal to a division's capabilities (minus its air cavalry capability). The high density of communications systems across the brigade and in the RSTA squadron allows near real time submission of reports to the commander and S2. This robust communications architecture also provides the SBCT's intelligence section the ability to query higher echelon intelligence databases.

In a division, the CM&D Section is solely responsible for monitoring and updating the collection effort. In a Stryker Brigade, the S2 Section evaluates the collection plan for effectiveness with support from the ISR integration team from the MI company.¹⁵¹ The lack of experience and knowledge in the SBCT team may keep the brigade from reaching its full collection potential, regardless of its collection capabilities.

Processing and Exploitation

At the division level, the ACE is structured to support this phase in conjunction with the collection phase. After receiving information based on the division's collection plan, the CM&D Section processes that information into the ASAS database. Reports from other internal and external collectors (SIGINT, IMINT, ELINT) are also entered into the ASAS database by those sections. Once this information is correlated, it is exploited during the analysis and production phase to develop a common threat picture.

The SBCT communications structure allows it to receive reports from a variety of internal and external collectors. Like a division ACE, the SBCT is equipped with the ASAS analysis system. Unique to the SBCT is ability to access and input data into the

¹⁵¹ *Student Text 2-19.402, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations (Final Draft)*, paragraphs 3-45, 5-2, 5-34, and 9-19; and USAFMSA Requirements Document, 4143F300 MI CO, (BCT), TOE Section Master, [SBCT MI Company MTOE Operational Data], 6.

ASAS down to the battalion level (most divisions are fielded with ASAS only to the brigade level). This allows for a quick exchange of intelligence across the brigade, further exploiting its technological advantages.

Access to ASAS at the battalion level, however, presents two problems for the intelligence section of the brigade. First is the requirement to ensure the use of ASAS for all intelligence reporting. While time sensitive information should be passed by fastest method available (often radio), all reports received must be entered into the ASAS database for future analysis. In the “heat of battle,” a critical piece of information sent by radio to a unit for action could be misplaced or lost prior to being entered into a database. Failure to input these or other reports will result in an inaccurate threat picture later in the analysis and production phase.

The second requirement is tied to the first. The brigade must ensure that each report is entered correctly (in the proper electronic format) into the ASAS database. This problem occurs with any automated database system. Simply termed, it is the “garbage in---garbage out” theory. With increased automation, comes an increased dependence on that automation for routine actions. If a report is incorrectly entered into a database, it may be lost or deleted, resulting in a missed opportunity for exploitation.

A second and third order effect of increased information, is the problem of information overload. Even if 100 percent of all reporting is accurate, the vast amounts of information received quickly increases the burden of the SBCT S2 Section in analyzing information. While information overload is equally a concern in a division ACE, its larger structure and higher number of senior analyst allows it to compartmentalize data for easier processing and analysis.

While the SBCT has a technological advantage during this phase in the receiving and transmitting data, its streamlined manning structure may limit the number of reports entered into ASAS as well as inhibit the ability to exploit the data received. A division

ACE, due to its size and structure, is better manned and organized to enter, analyze, and then synthesis data. The complexity of daily operations on today's battlefield, will inhibit the effectiveness of the SBCT intelligence structure.

Analysis and Production

During the analysis and production phase, there is a large disparity between the number of personnel in the ACE and within the SBCT conducting pertinent tasks. The Intelligence Production Section (IPS) in the division ACE is responsible for the majority of the analysis and production in the division. The largest section in the ACE, the IPS has numerous subordinate teams' lead by officers or warrant officers to conduct analysis and develop products. Each team is designed to handle a specialized area of analysis and is given the capability to query higher echelon databases for intelligence support. Within the seven major teams of the IPS, there are two captains, five warrant officers (chief warrant officer 2 to chief warrant officer 4), 26 non-commissioned officers, and 34 enlisted.

Similar to a division ACE, the Stryker Brigade has access to large amounts of intelligence data. In addition to the S2 Section, the ISR Analysis Platoon provides support to analysis and production tasks for the brigade. The platoon is lead by a first lieutenant, with two warrant officers (chief warrant officer twos) trained in ASAS database management, six non-commissioned officers, and 12 enlisted.¹⁵² These warrant officers greatly enhance the brigade's ability to query and manage data and produce reports. The total number in the platoon, and the experience level, however, is substantially less than in the IPS of the ACE.

A significant advantage that appears in the SBCT is its HUMINT operations capability. The S2X Team in the SBCT gives the SBCT an advantage over traditional

¹⁵²USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34143F300 MI CO, (BCT), TOE Detail, [TOE, SBCT MI Company], 5.

brigade task force units to conduct HUMINT operations in support of small-scale contingency operations. The S2X Team is manned with a major as the Team Chief, two HUMINT warrant officers (chief warrant officer twos) and two enlisted soldiers.¹⁵³ In support of the S2X is HUMINT platoon headquarters from the MI company. The platoon headquarters contains a captain and a sergeant first class to assist in analysis of HUMINT reports.¹⁵⁴ The S2X is responsible for coordinating all CI/HUMINT operations across the brigade, receiving reports directly from the HUMINT platoon's Operational Management Teams and tactical HUMINT reports from the RSTA squadron.¹⁵⁵ The S2X Team primarily focuses on analysis, with the two operational management teams coordinating collection requirements and taskings for the brigade's HUMINT collection four teams.

By comparison, The CI / HUMINT team in a division ACE is manned with one chief warrant officer three, three non-commissioned officers, and four enlisted soldiers.¹⁵⁶ The team conducts mission planning and analysis for the division's CI / HUMINT mission. At the brigade task force level, a chief warrant officer three, a chief warrant officer two, two non-commissioned officers, and three enlisted soldiers support the CI / HUMINT mission.¹⁵⁷ While the SBCT is generally disadvantaged in comparison to a division ACE structure, its HUMINT capability gives it an advantage over the ACE in a small-scale contingency environment.

¹⁵³USAFMSA Requirements Document, 47102F300, HHC INF BDE (BCT) TOE Detail, [TOE, HHC, SBCT], <https://www.usafmsaradd.army.mil/protected/products/toe/toe.cfm?toenumber=34357A100> accessed 30 January 2004, 13.

¹⁵⁴USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34143F300 MI CO, (BCT), TOE Detail, [MTOE, SBCT MI Company], 12.

¹⁵⁵*Student Text 2-19.402, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations (Final Draft)*, para. 3-7.

¹⁵⁶USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34356A100 HHOC, MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [MTOE, Airborne MI Battalion], 27.

¹⁵⁷USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34357A100 MI CO (DS), MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [MTOE, DS MI Company, Airborne MI Battalion], 14, 16-17.

Dissemination and Integration

The C4ISR capabilities of the Stryker Brigade are ideally suited to support the dissemination and integration of intelligence. The large number of ABCS and other digital systems across the brigade allows for an almost instantaneous transfer of information.

While the division ACE has a large C4I Section, its ability to get information down to the battalion level is limited due to the restraints of technology in the division structure. The ACE does have ASAS and ABCS connectivity to the division's subordinate brigades, but it cannot make information available to lower echelon units without a change to the division's digital structure.

The C4ISR structure of the SBCT gives it a unique capability to develop situational awareness across the brigade. While certain analysis teams are under resourced with manpower when compared to a division ACE, the ability to receive and transfer data is unequalled in a non-digitized division and brigade structure.

Evaluation and Feedback

One of the hardest aspects of intelligence operations is the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of collection in answering the commander's PIR. At the same time, the intelligence section is expected to provide predictive, relevant intelligence the commander and staff. The ability to "look at the forest" and not at individual trees, is a difficult task, even for a well-trained staff.

The SBCT structure and the task force concept allows the MI company to train together with the brigade and develop a habitual relationship that supports effective operations. The multiple missions conducted within the brigade's intelligence section, however, will keep its members heavily engaged in day-to-day field operations. The streamlined nature of the SBCT intelligence staff (versus a division ACE) could result in

a flawed, reaction based evaluation of intelligence shortfalls during operations over a long duration.

Within a division, the separation of effort between a plans section and a current operations section, as well as the execution of the targeting / synchronization meeting, gives the division the ability to evaluate information in a formal forum. While this same type of meeting is conducted at the brigade level, the table of organization and equipment for the SBCT Intelligence Section does not have a dedicated plans or operations officer billet.¹⁵⁸ The same personnel, who conduct day-to-day operations in the SBCT intelligence staff, attend the various daily meetings. Due to the multi-tasked elements of the SBCT S2 Section and its relative junior rank structure, it may be difficult for the SBCT to properly evaluate its intelligence picture for possible gaps.

As in the other phases of the intelligence cycle, the division ACE has an advantage during the evaluation and feedback phase, especially during sustained operations. While the SBCT and its task force construct gives it the benefit of habitual relationships during initial planning and execution, its structure does not provide the depth necessary for detailed or continuous analysis and evaluation. With its junior rank structure, the SBCT will be limited in its experience level needed to evaluate a collection plan to determine its shortfalls.

Summary

A trend illustrated throughout this chapter is an apparent lack of experienced personnel (based specifically by rank structure) found in the SBCT. While the SBCT intelligence structure is larger and more capable than a traditional brigade, its manning document calls for lieutenants and junior warrant officers versus the captains and senior warrant officers authorized in a division ACE. The size of the operations area for a

¹⁵⁸ *Special Text 2-19.402 (FM 34-80-2), Stryker Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations, Final Draft, para. 3-2.*

SBCT and the type of missions that it may be assigned greatly increase the need for intelligence support. This disparity in experience is further aggravated by level of detail provided to the SBCT from a JTF headquarters. A corps ACE does have the capability to tailor information for a Stryker Brigade, but when called upon to serve as a JTF, its focus will likely remain on strategic intelligence tasks.

A division ACE operates within an established framework that is separated from many of the daily activities seen in a brigade TOC. The ACE operates under the direction of the ACE chief and answers to the division G2, who can remain separated from the hour-to-hour operations of the ACE. Each technical section in the ACE has a senior warrant officer or officer that oversees its operations and who understands the system and its capabilities. These warrant officers provide the ACE experience and a unique ability to integrate the various technology-based systems.

While the intelligence section of the Stryker Brigade is resourced with the same equipment normally found in a division ACE, it is not resourced with same level of experience and knowledge. Although the SBCT S2 Section is lead by a MI major, his time will be divided between daily meetings and actions to manage a large intelligence team. If the SBCT is assigned to work for a corps headquarters without an ACE to further refine its intelligence, its limitations will quickly become apparent.

CHAPTER 5 Conclusions and Recommendations

*The Army is committed to a new vision to better meet the challenges of this new operational environment.*¹⁵⁹

Major General James Dubik

The purpose of this monograph was to determine if a Stryker Brigade Combat Team requires a dedicated Analysis and Control Element/fusion cell to support operations when assigned to a corps headquarters serving as a Joint Task Force. This monograph examined the capabilities of a division ACE and the capabilities of the intelligence section of a Stryker Brigade. The analysis chapter compared these two structures and identified a shortfall in the analytic capability within the SBCT to operate without a higher headquarters intelligence element to refine intelligence.

Conclusions

The Stryker Brigade's intelligence structure is optimized for maximum efficiency in day-to-day operations, but is not structured for optimum effectiveness. To work directly for a corps HQ serving as a JTF Headquarters, the SBCT intelligence structure needs additional support to analyze and synthesize intelligence produced by the corps ACE and turn it into actionable intelligence at the brigade level. After reviewing the structure and capabilities of the SBCT intelligence team, two related shortfalls appear. One is the lack of experience (as demonstrated by its junior rank structure) and the other shortfall is the manning structure itself.

The S2 assigned to the Stryker Brigade is the same rank as a division ACE chief, but his responsibilities as the brigade's senior intelligence officer are greater. Not only is he responsible for current operations, he also oversees planning, collection, analysis, and the evaluation of the brigade's intelligence battlefield operating system. A second

¹⁵⁹Major General James Dubik, "ICBT (sic) at Fort Lewis," *Military Review* (September-October 2000), 17.

major (the S2X) increases the section's capability, but his doctrinal focus is the CI/HUMINT operations.

The general rank structure of the SBCT's intelligence staff is lower than that found in a division ACE. The brigade's doctrinal 50 x 50-kilometer area of operations, however, is very close to the dimensions of a traditional division operations area on a contiguous battlefield (minus the division rear area). The difficulty of managing intelligence assets in a large area of operations is further exasperated by the non-traditional threats found in today's environment and the possibility of increased urban combat.

A division ACE handles many of the planning, collection, and analysis functions that a SBCT is responsible for, but in a supporting role to the division G2 staff. The ACE's primary mission is to analyze, produce, and disseminate timely, fused, and predictive intelligence. To conduct these functions, the ACE leadership consists of a major, three captains, six warrant officers, and 35 non-commissioned officers.¹⁶⁰ While the ACE is an important component of the G2 staff, it is not the lead element for all division intelligence systems.

By comparison, the SBCT intelligence section (including the MI company) has 2 majors (the S2 and the S2X), four captains (one captain is the company commander, and one is the HUMINT platoon/section leader), three lieutenants, seven warrant officers (all CW2s), and 36 non-commissioned officers.¹⁶¹ The Stryker Brigade's intelligence leadership is larger in number than that of the ACE, but a large portion of its leadership is in the CI / HUMINT section (one major, one captain, four warrant officers, and

¹⁶⁰USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34355A100 HHOC, MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [TOE, HHOC, Airborne MI Battalion], 18-36.

¹⁶¹All SBCT MI Company officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers are included in this number. This number is therefore somewhat misleading, as many of the non-commissioned officers are involved in soldier's issues and mission execution, versus analysis. SAFMSA Requirements Document, 34143F300 MI CO, (BCT), TOE Detail, [TOE, SBCT MI Company], 1-16; and USAFMSA Requirements Document, 47102F300, HHC INF BDE (BCT), TOE Detail, [TOE, HHC, SBCT], 1, 4-5.

eighteen non-commissioned officers). This section will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the SBCT in a low intensity / small-scale contingency environment, but does not necessarily enhance operations in other environments.

A comparison by team shows that while all areas of the SBCT intelligence section have either a warrant officer or non-commissioned officer as its leader, there is a rank difference between these leaders and ACE personnel conducting similar tasks. In the ACE, the majority of the warrant officers are in the rank of CW3 and CW4, which correlates to several years more experience than that found in the SBCT leadership.

Organizationally, the SBCT structure replaces the ACT and DS MI company concept with an integrated company analysis team. The SBCT MI company is double the size of a DS MI company. The ISR Analysis and ISR Integration Platoons replace the DS MI company's ACT (one officer and six enlisted soldiers) with three officers and 34 enlisted soldiers.¹⁶² Conceptually, this is a vast improvement in the capabilities of the SBCT MI company to support maneuver, and does provide the S2 with access to intelligence systems normally found at the division level.

The experience shortfall in the Stryker Brigade S2 Section is twofold. First, the MI company has to maintain the proficiency of its soldiers and develop their skills without the benefit of senior warrants or senior officers to assist in training management. While there will no doubt be resident expertise in the MI company, the separate brigade construct of the SBCT does not include a MI battalion to develop and resource training for the SBCT MI company.

The second shortfall is a lack of senior warrant officers and officers (and their experience) during deployed operations. The transformation of a standing brigade into the SBCT structure requires a large amount of support by contractors and new system

¹⁶²USAFMSA Requirements Document, 34357A100 MI CO (DS), MI BN, (Airborne), TOE Detail, [TOE, DS MI Company, Airborne MI Battalion], 7-8, 11, 19; and USAFMSA Requirements Document, 47102F300, HHC INF BDE (BCT), TOE Detail, [TOE, HHC, SBCT], 1-11.

program officers to conduct initial systems training. Once a unit is certified operational, most of this resident instructor knowledge moves on to field the next unit. Whether the unit is deployed soon after certification (as with the 3rd Brigade (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division) or remains at home station, the training level of soldiers on new technology based systems will quickly atrophy without a dedicated training plan. All intelligence training conducted will have to be developed by the MI company itself, without the overhead of a MI battalion.¹⁶³

Recommendations

There are several options available to increase its analytical capabilities of the Stryker Brigade. An option that would not affect the personnel end-strength in the SBCT is to increase the overall rank structure within the intelligence section. The inclusion of two field grade officers in the S2 Section increases the section's overall efficiency, but does not replace the need for increased experience at section and team level. The use of two platoons and their junior rank structure to replicate the tasks performed by a division ACE (and its senior warrant officer analysts) does not provide the SBCT with an adequate analytical capability in comparison with its stated mission. This structure provides the SBCT with the ability to conduct day-to-day tracking and execution tasks, but its junior rank structure does not facilitate the same level of analysis found in a division ACE.

A recommendation to overcome this analytic shortfall is to change the MI company structure. The ISR integration and analysis platoons could be restructured into several analysis sections lead by senior warrant officers (CW3s and CW4s). Teams and

¹⁶³Training MI soldiers for the first SBCT began in February 2000, three years before its 2003 certification exercise. To train the soldiers and leaders, instruction was conducted at Fort Lewis and at Fort Huachuca. Major Patrick Daniel, "Transition Training—IBCT-1 Cadre and Cohort," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (October-December 2000), 41-44.

sections lead by experienced warrant officers would better support the nature of analysis required within the Stryker Brigade.

A second option to overcome the SBCT's analytic shortfalls is for the SBCT to always operate under an established divisional command and control structure. As discussed in Chapter Two, the SBCT was initially designed operate under an interim division structure, which included a MI battalion.¹⁶⁴ The lack of any reference to an interim division command and control element in *The 2003 Army Modernization Plan* essentially ended any further development of an interim division headquarters. The draft of *Field Manual 3-91, Division Operations*, addresses the augmentation necessary for a division to command and control an attached SBCT, and is currently one of the few manuals to address the complexities of command and control of a Stryker Brigade.¹⁶⁵

During its initial operations in Iraq, the 3rd Brigade (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, was placed under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division (MECH) for operations.¹⁶⁶ This command structure gave the SBCT a higher headquarters that was equipped with technologies similar to those found in the Stryker Brigade.

Currently, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (SBCT) is assigned to a I Corps command and control element. The headquarters element that deployed to Iraq from the I Corps Headquarters (known as Task Force Olympia) took over responsibility of three provinces in northern Iraq on 5 February 2004 to serve as the Multi-National Brigade North Headquarters.¹⁶⁷ Task Force Olympia is a tailored headquarters established to control the Stryker Brigade, four Iraqi Civil Defense Corps battalions, three Iraqi Border Police battalions and several thousand Iraq Facility Protection Security

¹⁶⁴Perkins, 8.

¹⁶⁵*Field Manual 3-91, Division Operations, Final Draft*, Appendix D.

¹⁶⁶Townsell, 4.

¹⁶⁷Gerry Gilmore, "Army Stryker Brigade Moves Into Mosul Area of Operations," *American Forces Press Service* (20 January 2004), <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1061643/post>, accessed 15 February 2004

Forces.¹⁶⁸ The exact makeup of the Corps headquarters and intelligence structure is not currently available, but the I Corps did deploy elements of its ACE to provide intelligence support. In both the early deployment of the Stryker Brigade and the later reorganization in northern Iraq, 3rd Brigade (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, operated under a headquarters subordinate to JTF 7 and not directly for the JTF.

Another option to improve the intelligence capability of the SBCT structure is to establish a standing intelligence headquarters element similar to a division ACE for each or for several SBCTs. The division ACE structure provides a necessary link between corps and brigade operations. An ACE is resourced to refine corps intelligence data and provide that data in an actionable form to its subordinate brigades. When a brigade is deployed singularly from a division, the ACE is capable of deploying a DISE to give the deployed brigade a reachback capability to access ACE databases and analytical teams.

The DISE concept proved effective in both peace and wartime with heavy and light divisions. The 3rd Infantry Division (MECH) effectively used the DISE concept during a 1995 Bright Star Exercise in Egypt. The 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 10th Mountain Division (Light), each used a DISE element to support various combat training center rotations. More recently, the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division used a DISE to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁹

Critical to the success of a DISE is the reachback support of an ACE to refine data from local, theater and national collection assets. During Operation Allied Force,

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*; and Private First Class Thomas Day and Sergeant Jeremy Heckler, "Last 101st Convoy leaves Iraq, I Corps Sets Flag," *Army Public Affairs*, http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?&storyid_key+5665, accessed 15 February 2004.

¹⁶⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Boll, Major Jeffrey Holachek and Captain Jennifer Ellington, "Victory in Egypt: 3d ID (M) DISE," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (October-December 1996), 34-36; Lieutenant Colonel Brian Keller, "Building a Division DISE," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (January-March 1996), 16-33; Lieutenant Colonel Victor Rosello, "The Airborne Division's Initial Entry DISE," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (April-June 1996), 23-25; and Moores, 38-40.

the V Corps ACE was challenged by the requirement to track the ground situation on 1:50,000 and 1:12,500 scale maps and develop actionable intelligence for targeting. A chief concern voiced by the Deputy ACE Chief was a lack of the necessary skill set to conduct this level of detailed analysis.¹⁷⁰ A division ACE provides that capability and the ability to supply that information at the brigade level. The SBCT is already equipped with the technology necessary to access higher echelon intelligence databases, it is not however supported with a sufficient level of experienced analyst.

The Stryker Brigade provides the United States Army with a unique capability to operate on almost every type of battlefield. Using its ISR capabilities, the brigade can position its maneuver forces to exploit the maximum effects of its weapon systems before a threat force knows of its position. To ensure the SBCT can exploit its organic system advantages, it needs an additional analytic support element.

¹⁷⁰Iwicki, 23-24.

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