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MAJOR GREGORY D. PETERSON

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Approved by:

Monograph Director

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

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Abstract

THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE IN ALGERIA, 1954-1962: BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. OPERATIONS IN IRAQ by MAJOR GREG PETERSON, 57 pages.

In 1954 the French Armed Forces began a campaign in Algeria against the insurgent Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) which had started a bloody uprising against French sovereignty. Initially, the French military did not have a viable counterinsurgency doctrine that was effective in defeating the FLN and destroying its network. It took them four years of trial and error to develop a doctrine and operational concept able to defeat the FLN inside Algeria and prevent outside assistance from reconstituting the FLN. By 1960 it was apparent the FLN could not win the liberation of Algeria militarily. However, the political situation respective to France and Algeria internally and internationally by then had changed to the point that military operations in the field were not going to affect the political outcome in Algeria. The French Armed Forces took too long to adopt an effective doctrine to combat the insurgent threat and by the time they were effective it was irrelevant.

Currently the U.S. is in occupation of Iraq and exercising sovereignty in that state. The U.S. Armed Forces are conducting counterinsurgency operations to defeat and dismantle the Former Regime Loyalists and various Islamic fundamentalist organizations inside the country. U.S. Armed Forces do not have an overarching counterinsurgency doctrine that is applicable to their operations in Iraq and similar to the French in Algeria they are going through a learning process. Even though the U.S. will turn sovereignty back over to the Iraqis it is likely that U.S. forces will remain in the country for the foreseeable future. It is the author's assertion that by studying the French experience in Algeria the U.S. Armed Forces can learn from the mistakes and victories of the French and hasten the learning process for counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. The U.S. cannot afford to waste time through trial and error in developing doctrine and operational concepts to defeat the enemy. The French experience in Algeria demonstrates what can happen when a military takes too long to adapt to a changed battlefield. The U.S. must look at the operations and doctrine the French employed in Algeria and apply those applicable concepts now to develop a successful doctrine for current operations in Iraq.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

On November 1 1954, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) began a long insurgent campaign against French sovereignty in Algeria. France had exercised control over Algeria since the 1830s and Algeria was considered part of the French Union and the Fourth Republic. Initially, the French military did not have a viable counterinsurgency doctrine that was effective in defeating the FLN and destroying its network. It took the French four years of trial and error, along with applying their experience in Indochina, to develop a doctrine and operational concept and framework able to defeat the FLN inside Algeria and prevent outside assistance from reconstituting the FLN. By 1960, it was apparent the FLN could not win the liberation of Algeria militarily. However, the political situation internal to France and Algeria, and the international political situation had by then changed to the point that military operations in the field were not going to affect the political outcome in Algeria. Part of the dilemma was the French Armed Forces took too long to adopt an effective doctrine to the insurgent threat. By the time the French Armed Forces had defeated the FLN militarily it no longer mattered. International politics abroad and domestic politics in France had determined that Algeria was no longer worth the cost for France. The military victory had become irrelevant to the outcome of the war.

The United States along with its Coalition partners and allies invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003 and overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime. The U.S. is currently the sovereign power in Iraq and conducting counterinsurgency operations against remnants of the Baath Party and various affiliates of Al Qaeda. The U.S. currently finds itself in a situation somewhat similar to the French in Algeria in 1954. These similarities are 1) the

U.S. is a Western power exercising sovereignty over an Arab state, just as France did over Algeria. 2) This sovereignty faces opposition by a political/military organization whose expressed purpose is to force the Western nation to leave the Arab country. 3) The sovereignty of the Western power/Coalition is not looked upon favorably internationally, especially in the Muslim world. 4) The issue of Iraq is a divisive topic in domestic politics in the United States, just as Algeria was in France. 5) Both Algeria and Iraq possess long borders with neighboring states through which supplies and manpower are able to get into the country. 6) The majority of the United States military, especially its Army, just as the French military in 1954, is designed to engage in mid-high intensity conventional operations against a conventional foe. 7) The French at the start of the insurgency in 1954 did not have a viable counterinsurgency doctrine applicable to the situation in Algeria, understood by all its soldiers, or taught at service schools, designed to defeat and neutralize the FLN. Currently, the U.S. military does not have a viable counterinsurgency doctrine, understood by all soldiers, or taught at service schools, designed to defeat and neutralize the Baathist and Al Qaeda, which is applicable to their situation on the ground in Iraq.

Although there are many similarities there are two glaring differences between the French position on Algeria and the U.S. position on Iraq. That first difference is one of ultimate aims. France wished to maintain sovereignty over Algeria and keep it a part of France. The U.S. aim is to return sovereignty to a stable and democratic government in Iraq. There is no desire in the U.S. to maintain sovereignty indefinitely in Iraq. The second difference is there is not a substantial minority of American civilians living in Iraq as there was of French citizens living in Algeria. Approximately one in nine persons

living in Algeria was French and they exerted a huge influence on the government in Paris. Any hopes of a political settlement had to take them into account and they were very often not amenable to a peaceful power sharing agreement with the insurgents or talk of an independent Algeria. This would be the equivalent in Iraq of having about 2-3 million U.S. citizens living in Iraq and many of them having the feeling Iraq should become the 51st state.

For the U.S. military, there is not a stand alone Joint Publication that provides guidance to operational planners on the planning and conduct of counterinsurgency operations. According to Joint Pub (JP) 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is defined as an Operation Other Than War and as “support to counterinsurgency”¹. In JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Operations Other Than War, counterinsurgency is lumped together with Nation Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense, (FID)². In JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) counterinsurgency is defined as a category of FID³ and discussed in the context of directly supporting a Host Nation’s internal defense. U.S. doctrine does not address how to conduct counterinsurgency operations when there is not a Host Nation government, the U.S. is exercising political sovereignty, and U.S. forces are the lead agents in combating the insurgents. The U.S. cannot afford to waste time through trial and error in developing doctrine and an operational concept from ‘scratch’. The French experience demonstrates what can happen when the military instrument of power cannot come up with a solution to defeat the insurgency in a timely manner. Therefore, the

¹ Dept. of Defense, JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001), V-13.

² Dept. of Defense, JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Operations Other Than War (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 1995), III-9.

³ Dept. of Defense JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 1996), I-2.

hypothesis of this monograph is: Is the French experience in conducting counterinsurgency operations in Algeria a viable blueprint for U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and operations in Iraq? If so, how?

To effectively research the hypothesis, this monograph will first examine French operations in Algeria and analyze the conduct of those operations. It will trace the evolution of their operational approach to the counterinsurgency problem and how they developed their doctrine to combat the insurgents. Next it will analyze the effectiveness of the doctrine and operations focusing in particular on the Challe Plan of 1958-60. This monograph will also focus in depth, on additional related topics such as urban terrorism, legal concerns in combating the insurgents, the use of native auxiliaries, the activation and use of reservists in operations, and special schools organized to train French soldiers in counterinsurgency.

The monograph will examine current U. S. doctrine for counterinsurgency, focusing on the U.S. Joint Publications, which are currently the basis for all the U.S. Service Publications. It will scrutinize the Joint Doctrine for its applicability to the situation in Iraq and will review current U.S. operations in Iraq, using unclassified sources. The monograph will also inspect the same specific topics of urban terrorism, legal concerns, use of auxiliaries and reservists and special schools and training.

Finally, the monograph will address the areas where U.S. doctrine is ineffective and provide potential solutions based upon an assessment of the French approach to counterinsurgency utilized in Algeria. Once again focusing on the Challe Plan of 1958-60 and the specific topics mentioned above.

To provide a basis for the examination the monograph will use the following criteria:

- (1) Does the doctrine provide an operational framework that connects tactical engagements on the ground to the National Strategy?
- (2) Does the doctrine provide commanders an operational framework that combines tactical engagements on the ground in a manner designed to defeat the insurgents and dismantle their organization?
- (3) Does the doctrine address civil/political matters, or is it strictly military focused?
- (4) Is the doctrine a combined arms approach or is it tailored to certain types of forces?
- (5) Do the Armed Forces have an institutional approach to teaching this doctrine or is it done by 'on the job training'?

To ensure clarity in this discussion, the following terms need clarification:

- (1) Insurgency – An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.⁴
- (2) Counterinsurgency-Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.⁵
- (3) Terrorism-The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.⁶
- (4) Subversion-Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological strength or morale of a regime.⁷
- (5) Unconventional Warfare-A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized trained and equipped by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, covert or clandestine operations as well as indirect acts of subversion and sabotage.⁸

⁴ Ibid, GL-5.

⁵ Ibid, GL-4.

⁶ Ibid, GL-7.

⁷ Ibid, GL-6.

⁸ Ibid, GL-7.

CHAPTER TWO

The French in Algeria, 1954-62

Background

France's involvement in Algeria began in 1830. Charles X, the ruler of France, ordered an invasion of Algeria to avenge an insult given by the Dey of Algiers against the consul of France. The real reason behind the expedition was to turn the public's eye away from his unpopular regime and regain their support through a grand military victory.⁹ Charles failed in his intent as he was deposed later in the year, but France stayed in Algeria.

Initially the French military clung to beachheads along the coast, but in the face of increased resistance, particularly that led by the charismatic Abd-el-Kader, the French were forced to move into the interior in order to conduct pacification. By 1847 Abd-el-Kader was defeated and in the following year France declared Algeria a part of the Second Republic and organized it into three departments.¹⁰ The fighting did not end there as it took until 1857 before the entire country was occupied and until 1881 before it was entirely pacified.

Shortly after the initial invasion, various successful attempts at European colonization to Algeria were conducted. France not only sponsored her own citizens to settle in Algeria but also those of other Mediterranean countries. Colonists from Spain, Malta, and Italy predominated in addition to Frenchmen from Corsica and metropolitan France. The colonists or *pied noirs*, as they were called, established farms and cities, often taking land

⁹ Edgar O' Balance, The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962 (Hamden, Conn., 1967), 21.

¹⁰ Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 30.

from the Algerian Moslems, causing great resentment. Over the decades, the *pied noirs* became the political power in Algeria, and through their delegates in the National Assembly were able to maintain their power in Algeria. France attempted to extend the franchise of French citizenship to the Moslem Algerians at various times throughout the 19th and 20th centuries but it was always met by opposition from the *pied noirs*, who would thwart it.

Resentment by Moslem Algerians manifested itself over the years with the organization of various groups supporting the rights of the Moslems. Some of these organizations supported peaceful means to achieve their goals and others were not afraid to preach violence. On May 8, 1945, (V-E Day), a protest in the town of Setif turned violent with Moslems attacking colon farmers. The French authorities responded in kind and at the end of the violence over 200 colons were killed and wounded along with 1000 to 6000 Algerians.¹¹ Over the next several years things were relatively quiet, but by 1954 the freedom movements organized themselves under the name of the National Liberation Front (FLN is the French acronym) and called for open rebellion on midnight, All Saints Day, 1 November 1954.

1954-1956 Struggling with the Problem

On 1 November 1954, the FLN was believed to have approximately 2000-3000 fighters,¹² ill armed, ill equipped and poorly trained. They launched some 70 attacks, killing seven individuals and wounding four others. The attacks were centered in the

¹¹ Ibid, 27.

¹² Edgar O' Balance, The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962 (Hamden, Conn., 1967), 29.

Aures Mountains with other operations in Algiers and Oran. The FLN had as its stated goal national independence through:

- 1) Restoration of the Algerian state within the framework of the principles of Islam.
- 2) Preservation of freedoms, without distinction of race or religion.¹³

This goal and its principals were to remain the same throughout the insurgency.

The insurgency was by no means a mass movement. The overwhelming majority of the Moslem population was not involved and watched events from the sidelines. The insurgency was driven by a small group of determined men who initially had very little external support. When they approached Egypt and President Nasser for aid they were told, “Start the revolution first, then aid will follow.”¹⁴

In November of 1954, the French military numbered roughly 56,000 soldiers.¹⁵ France and its military were preoccupied by the ending of the war in Indochina, and continuing unrest in Morocco and Tunisia all of which required a substantial amount of troops. In addition, France had a NATO commitment requiring the stationing of combat divisions in West Germany. Algeria was considered a quiet area (after all it was a part of France) and the troops stationed there were for garrison purposes.

The outbreak of violence was not considered by the French authorities in Algiers to be threatening. Rather, in their mind, it was the work of bandits and outlaws. In response to the violence the Governor-General for the department of Algiers issued a proclamation

¹³ Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 95.

¹⁴ Ibid, 85.

¹⁵ Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 79.

demanding that order be restored, the guilty punished and no weakness tolerated.¹⁶ Since the outbreak was centered in the Aures Mountains, a punitive expedition, reinforced by paratroops from France, was organized to conduct a *ratissage*, a 'rat sweep'. Secretary of the Interior Francois Mitterand, ordered there be no promiscuous bombings or bombardments by napalm or high explosives of suspected rebel villages.¹⁷ The operation was conducted by large NATO style formations that were ambushed and hung up in the narrow mountain roads. The French army was able to gain and hold the main towns and roads but unable to destroy the insurgents, who faded into the rough mountain country. The operation was also assisted by a psyops campaign that included leaflet drops that threatened doom on those who joined the insurgents. However, this had a negligible affect as the locals saw that the French were unable to destroy the insurgents.

In addition to military action, the French authorities conducted Operation Bitter Orange, a police sweep of all suspected subversive elements in the Moslem population. It was a brutal operation with torture commonly used to extract confessions. Not all of the individuals arrested were associated with the FLN. Some individuals were moderates and had simply campaigned through peaceful means for equal rights for the Moslems. The main target of the sweep was the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques* (MTLD), the most vocal of the Algerian independence groups but not associated with the FLN or with the current insurgency. Even after the French authorities realized the MTLD was not associated with the current unrest, they continued to hold MTLD members as prisoners. The bottom line of this operation is that it drove many moderates into the FLN camp.

¹⁶ Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 97.

¹⁷ Ibid, 100.

Throughout the remainder of 1954 and 1955, a pattern began to emerge in Algeria. The French would concentrate in suspected areas of rebel activity and conduct a *ratissage*; the insurgents would get wind of the operation and escape after inflicting some casualties. After the French army would leave the area, the insurgents would return and kill those Moslems who assisted the French and intimidate the rest of the population into submission. Two examples of this are operations Violette and Veronique, conducted in the Aures Mountains.¹⁸

At the highest levels of the French government, there was a reluctance to accept the insurgency for what it was, and accept the fact the nation was at war. Soldiers were not fighting a war but conducting “operations for the maintenance of public order.”¹⁹ The insurgents were outlaws and traitors to France. But at the same time there were proposals in France to allow Moslem Algerians more say in the government of Algeria, and a realization by many in the French government there must be real economic reform for the Moslem Algerians.²⁰

This caused confusion for commanders in the field in Algeria. If the insurgents are outlaws, why conduct pacification and occupy villages? Many commanders were reluctant to occupy villages and engage in a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. They were not trained and equipped for it, and were not comfortable with the idea. Some of the Indochina veterans tried to mention ideas, but most of them were just returning home from Southeast Asia, and had not begun to show up in Algeria in large numbers. Most of the French commanders in Algeria felt all that needed to be done was to ruthlessly

¹⁸ Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 101.

¹⁹ John Talbot, *The War Without a Name* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 51.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 42.

destroy the guerrillas. It was easier to consider the insurgents as *fellagha*; ‘outlaws’ and to hunt them down and kill them as this fit into their mode of meeting the duties of a soldier.

Eventually the policy to not engage in the indiscriminate bombing of villages was routinely ignored and suspected pro-FLN Moslem villages became targets in the *ratissages*. In addition, a policy called ‘collective responsibility’ was enacted.²¹ This policy ordered that if a village was known to harbor or assist the FLN then that entire village would suffer a punishment, often times resulting in the entire male population in the village going to jail.

By the end of 1955, the FLN had not only survived but had spread. This success for the FLN can be attributed to not only the tenacity and determination of their fighters but to also a faulty French approach to the problem. In analyzing French operations during this time frame and utilizing the criteria in Chapter One the following conclusions can be made:

- 1) The French Army did not possess a doctrine that connected tactical engagements on the ground to the national policy. Even though the government declared the insurgents as outlaws, there were attempts at political reconciliation with Algerian moderates. This confusion resulted in French commanders falling back on what they knew best and that was a doctrine of conventional troop and firepower intensive operations designed to kill *fellagha*. This heavy-handed approach combined with collective responsibility turned many Moslems into FLN supporters. In addition, because of Operation Bitter Orange, the moderate

²¹ Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 114.

Algerians needed to enact any political reform were either killed or became alienated and joined the FLN.

- 2) The French Army did not conduct operations designed to dismantle the FLN organization. The French Army did try to defeat the FLN on the battlefield in a conventional manner by simply trying to kill as many of them as possible. However, they would conduct a *ratissage* and then leave. There was no systemic effort to try to protect the Moslem population from the insurgents. This was fatal as it ensured the FLN the ability to recruit and spread.
- 3) The French Army conducted combined arms operations in the conventional sense of infantry/armor/artillery/air ops. They did include psychological operations and what we now consider Information Operations but with minimal success. What was lacking was a Civil Affairs component.

1956-1957: The Search for an Answer

By early 1956, the FLN was believed to number between 15,000 to 20,000 active supporters and fighters in the field.²² The French government could no longer ignore the fact it had a full-blown insurgency on its hands, nor could it blame the acts of violence as the work of a few outlaws. In February of 1956, the government of French Premier Guy Mollet, made the decision to deploy 500,000 troops to Algeria to quash the insurgents.²³ This was a move of great political risk, both internationally and domestically. Meeting the deployment requirement required calling up reservists and extending the service time of conscripts, an act not popular at home in France. It also included transferring two

²² Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 141.

²³ Ibid, 151.

divisions from West Germany to Algeria, a move not popular with France's NATO allies. By the end of 1956, there were approximately 250,000 troops in Algeria.

The newly appointed Governor-General of Algeria, Robert Lacoste, was tasked by Mollet to "first win the war."²⁴, then the government could work on economic and political reform. Lacoste was astute enough to realize that reform and military victory were two sides of the same coin. The Governor-General instituted many new policies intended to bring true reform to Algeria and a better way of life for the Moslem population. However, Algeria would remain a part of France.

Lacoste issued directives to the Army to win over the population. This was translated to mean conduct pacification. But the hard question was, 'how to conduct pacification?' France was reinforcing Algeria with more troops but the number of troops in theater was not the real problem. The dilemma was what to do with them once they were in Algeria. As one officer put it, "the sad truth was that, in spite of all our past experience, we had no single, official doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare. Instead there were various schools of thought, all unofficial, some quiet vociferous."²⁵

The influx of new troops into Algeria had the benefit of bringing in new commanders, many of them veterans of Indochina, into the country. With these new commanders came new ideas. In late 1955, an experiment in pacification in the Aures Mountains using Natives Affairs Officers (who spoke Arabic or Berber) leading native troops proved to work.²⁶ The results of this experiment were analyzed and as a result, the Special Administrative Sections (SAS) were organized. SAS detachments were very small units,

²⁴ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 155.

²⁵ David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*. (Santa Monica CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), 105.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 39.

led by a lieutenant or captain, whose purpose was to re-establish contact between the government and the people.²⁷ These soldiers had the required language and cultural skills needed to get along with the population. They would be assigned to a village or geographical area and “could deal with every conceivable aspect of administration; from agronomy, to teaching and health, to building houses and administering justice.”²⁸ The SAS detachments also had an intelligence gathering function. By the end of 1956, over 400 SAS detachments had been formed and utilized to great affect.²⁹

New ideas for combating the insurgents resulted in new operational approaches. General Andre Beaufre, commander of the Constantine East area in 1956, divided his sector into *zones de pacification* and *zones interdites* and *zones d’operations*.³⁰ *Zones de pacification* were secure areas that were fertile and populous. General Beaufre concentrated the bulk of his static forces, consisting mainly of conscripts and reservists, in these zones. *Zones interdites* had small populations and these in turn were relocated to *zones de pacification*. In *zones interdites* French soldiers could fire on any individual found. *Zones d’operations* were areas where General Beaufre’s mobile forces actively pursued and hunted FLN bands.

Gradually this approach, with modifications, became institutionalized and was called the *quadrillage* system. The *quadrillage* system was based on three principles: 1) Cutting off the insurgent from the population that sustained him. 2) Render the guerilla zones

²⁷ Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 147.

²⁸ Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 109.

²⁹ Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 147.

³⁰ Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 166.

untenable. 3) Coordinate these actions over a wide area and for a long enough time period so that results will happen.³¹

The first principle of cutting off the insurgent from the population that supported him involved several steps. To begin, you must gain control of the population by conducting a census. The intent of the census is to identify everyone in the area, where they live, and what they do. Next, establish an organization to monitor and control the population. Identify reliable citizens, appoint them to positions of authority, and use them as the building blocks of the civilian organization you are creating. After one has conducted the census and organized the citizenry, one must enlist the population to engage in its own defense. Task the civilian organization to conduct simple police missions such as surveillance and detection of insurgents. The biggest asset gained from a solid and reliable civilian organization is intelligence. A reliable civilian organization on one's side allows the counter-insurgent forces to find out whom the insurgents are, where they are, and from whom and where they are drawing their support. Once the counter-insurgent forces have this knowledge, they can then attack the insurgents and their organization.

The second principle is to render guerilla zones untenable. To accomplish this one must destroy the revolutionary political-military organization in the immediate area. This is achieved by first arranging the defense of an entire village into a strategic hamlet. Using the techniques outlined in the first principle, you will eradicate the revolutionary political-military organization of the village. Next, one trains and arms the villagers to defend the village/strategic hamlet. This frees up the military troops who first established the strategic hamlet to begin conducting mobile operations in the immediate area. These

³¹ Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counter-Insurgency. (Ft Leavenworth KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), 64-65.

operations will include destroying the revolutionary political-military organization in the area and destroying the armed bands of insurgents. A good technique for destroying the armed bands is to target their supplies and supply sources. In addition to these missions, the troops will also bring in new people to the strategic hamlet and if necessary create new hamlets.

The third principle was to coordinate the actions over a wide area and long enough period so that desired results could be achieved. First, an area must be divided into zones and sectors. Each sector commander would designate for occupation all the important points and principal towns. In addition, the commander would identify the lines of communication that must be opened and maintained. When these areas are occupied, the procedures outlined in the first and second principles could then be executed to bring the areas under control.

The French also had to deal with the problem of the FLN setting up sanctuaries across the borders in Tunisia and Morocco. When these two countries achieved independence they allowed the FLN to establish training bases, depots and hospitals within their borders. The French government protested the presence of these facilities to no avail as the two host nations denied their existence. With these sanctuaries outside of Algeria, the FLN could reconstitute, reorganize, train and recover from any losses they might incur inside Algeria. In the case of Tunisia, the number of FLN insurgents in the host nation began to outnumber the Tunisian's own military to the point that even if they had wanted to eject the FLN, they probably would have been unable to accomplish the task.³² As long as the FLN could funnel men and material into the country the war could go on indefinitely.

³² "Short of War," Time, 3 March, 1958, 26-27.

In addition to providing the FLN sanctuaries the bases in Tunisia and Morocco ensured for the FLN a presence on the international stage. As long as there were FLN fighters under arms and as a minimum threatening the French in Algeria, the question of Algerian sovereignty would not go away.

Faced with this dilemma, the French Minister of Defense Andre Morice took action in June of 1957. He ordered the construction of two lines of defenses, called *barrages*, one along each border to prevent the infiltration of men and material into Algeria.³³ The intent was to seal off the country and establish “a closed field in Algeria.”³⁴ The priority of construction went to the Tunisian border and by September of 1957, 320 kilometers of defenses had been established from Bone to the Sahara desert. This defensive work, dubbed the ‘Morice Line’, consisted of an eight-foot high electric fence with a 50-meter wide minefield on either side. Behind this strip were two parallel strips of barbed wire, seeded with mines. Approximately every 200 to 3000 meters was a manned strongpoint, linked together by a road. The entire line was covered by searchlights and ground radar. The radar was linked to artillery and to the French Air Force master radar on the Tunisian border. Located between the *barrage* and the Tunisian border were outposts designed to disrupt the insurgents before they reached the minefield and electric fence. Behind the strongpoint troops were local sector troops, usually mechanized, designated to locate and destroy any FLN forces that got through the *barrage*. Behind the sector troops were more mobile units, usually paras or Foreign Legionnaires, designated to hunt down any insurgents who managed to escape the sector troops.³⁵ The whole purpose of the

³³ Charles R. Shrader, The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria 1954-1962. (Westport Conn: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 206.

³⁴ Ibid, 206.

³⁵ Ibid, 208.

barrages was not so much to immediately stop the insurgents from crossing the border, but rather to identify them, slow them up and disrupt their movement. This allowed the sector troops to maneuver and vector in on the insurgent groups and destroy them. The *barrages* would continue to be manned up until the end of the war and 80,000 troops committed to their defense at any one time.

To train its leadership in challenges of operating in Algeria, General Lorillot, commander of the French Army in Algeria, , ordered the establishment of the Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerilla Warfare (CICPG)³⁶ in the spring of 1956. To reflect the changes in operations the curriculum of the school was changed in the summer of 1957. More about this school and its curriculum will follow in a later section.

By the end of 1957, French operations were beginning to gel into an effective doctrine. Militarily the tide began to turn in their favor. In analyzing French operations during this period against the criteria the following conclusions can be made:

- 1) French doctrine established a framework that connected tactical engagements to the National Strategy. The National Strategy was to win the war first. This meant the defeat of the FLN. Governor General LaCoste realized that in order for this to happen the Moslem population must be won over. Therefore a two-sided approach was developed. One side was the military aspect, the other was the economic and political reform initiated by the Governor-General. The two had to compliment one another and work in tandem. There was still room for

³⁶ Frederic Guelton, LTC. "The French Army Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare (CIPCG) at Arzew," in France and the Algerian War 1954-62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy, (ed. Martin S. Alexander. Portland Oregon: Frank Cass, 2002), 37.

improvement in this regard but there was a realization at the highest levels of leadership that success hinged on this approach.

- 2) The doctrine of the *quadrillage*, combined with the work of the SAS detachments, provided commanders on the ground with the operational framework needed to combine their tactical engagements in a manner designed to defeat and dismantle the FLN organization at the lowest levels. By concentrating at the grass roots level of civil reform with the SAS and the *quadrillage* providing security the French were able to begin to win back the population. The establishment of the barrages on the borders ensured that insurgent bands hunted down and defeated did not have a way to reconstitute and come back again.
- 3) The doctrine was not strictly military focused. The organization of the SAS detachments demonstrated the realization of the French authorities to establish a balanced approach to the problem.
- 4) The doctrine was combined arms and utilized units to their strengths. Mobile and mechanized units were used to hunt down insurgent bands. Less mobile units, regardless of type, manned more static positions and sectors. Along the *barrages* artillery and air power were focused on interdiction. An example of a unit adapting to its sector mission is case of the 27th *Division d Infanterie Alpine* (DIA). The Division's signal battalion, anti-aircraft battalion, cavalry regiment and one of the artillery battalions were assigned their own sectors. All those units had the same missions as the infantry battalions.³⁷

³⁷ David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958. (Santa Monica CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), 54.

- 5) With the establishment of the CICPG, the French Army began an institutionalized approach to training for the mission in Algeria and the curriculum kept current to operations and conditions in the country.

1958-1960 The Answer

By the beginning of 1958, the French had the elements in place to defeat the insurgency. The Morice Line was having a telling affect as is evidenced by the multiple attempts by the FLN to breach it. These attempts were called the ‘Battle of the Barrages’ or the ‘Battle of the Frontier’ and were the largest battles of the war. The FLN used battalion-sized units in Tunisia and Morocco to try to breach the lines and transport arms and supplies into Algeria but were no match for the superior firepower of the French military. By the end of March, FLN forces crossing from Morocco into Algeria were getting only 10 miles before being destroyed.³⁸ After seven months of concentrated effort, the FLN lost over 6000 men³⁹ and the decision was made by the FLN to stop the attempts. The French had clearly won a major military victory as the FLN inside Algeria was clearly cut off from outside support.

Although the FLN had received a major military setback it still maintained the camps in Tunisia and Morocco and would so up until the end of the war. These camps were a powerful political symbol for the FLN and ensured the FLN would at least have some sort of international presence outside of Algeria that was untouchable by the French military. The French victory in the ‘Battle of the Barrages’ was a great tactical and operational victory for France. But it could not carry over to a strategic victory. France lacked the diplomatic and political strength required to force Tunisia and Morocco to stop

³⁸ Charles R. Shrader, The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria 1954-1962. (Westport Conn: Preager Publishers, 1999), 210.

³⁹ Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 266.

their support for the FLN. This can be tied to the French aim in the war which was to maintain sovereignty in Algeria which was unacceptable to the Arab world and the international community. Combined with this was anger in the Arab world for the French involvement in the Suez Crisis.

In May of 1958, Charles De Gaulle returned to power and the French Fourth Republic fell, to be replaced by the Fifth Republic. This was accomplished with the backing of many military officers in Algeria in the form of a military putsch. These officers were frustrated by the Fourth Republic's refusal to broaden the war and go into Tunisia and Morocco to destroy the FLN sanctuaries. They felt that De Gaulle would provide the strong leadership needed to win the war.

De Gaulle's strategy was similar to his predecessors in that it had military and political sides. The military goal was to neutralize and then destroy the insurgent's guerilla bands, terrorist cells and organization. The political goal was to win the support of the Moslem population with economic, political and social reform.⁴⁰ The two sides were to feed off the success of the other.

The military effort was not intended to destroy the insurgents for the purpose of stacking up body counts. Rather, it was designed to bring pressure against three sets of people. The first set was the FLN fighters themselves. The intent was to convince them they could not win militarily and that they had no other alternative but to lay down their arms and go home peacefully. The second set of people was the Moslem population. By demonstrating the superiority of the French military in destroying the insurgents, they would be shown that violence was not an option and this would erode support for the

⁴⁰, Constantine Melnik, The French Campaign Against the FLN, (Santa Monica CA: The RAND Corp., 1967), v.

insurgents. The third set of people was the FLN leadership living outside the country. Here the intent was to show them the impossibility of hoping for a successful armed revolt.⁴¹

In November of 1958, General Maurice Challe was appointed as the commander of French forces in Algeria. General Challe was an Air Force officer, (all his predecessors had been Army officers), who had not served in Indochina. After analyzing the situation, General Challe drew some conclusions: 1) French operations would have to concentrate on the ‘conquest’ of the population. 2) This conquest could not occur until a military offensive had hit the guerilla bands hard enough that they were no longer a threat. 3) Only after the bands were no longer a threat could a political/military offensive be conducted at the grass roots level designed to root out the FLN organization. This would allow the population to be ‘conquered’.⁴²

In order to meet the requirement of destroying the guerilla bands, General Challe determined the following criteria had to be met: 1) the borders must remain sealed. 2) The *quadrillage* must be maintained but must not remain static. *Quadrillage* forces were to actively hunt for insurgents in their sectors and harass and pursue them. Insurgent forces could not be allowed to rest or recruit. In addition, the *quadrillage* forces were to increase the training of local self-defense forces. This would free more French forces to hunt down insurgents and facilitate the rooting out of the FLN organizations at the grass roots level. 3) Offensive operations must be conducted against those areas where the FLN was firmly entrenched.

⁴¹ Ibid, 5.

⁴² Ibid, 29-30.

To meet these requirements General Challe ordered a reorganization of French forces. Less French troops were put on the *quadrillage* this allowed General Challe to form a mobile General Reserve of eventually three divisions and two separate regiments.⁴³ To compensate for the loss of troops in the *quadrillage*, General Challe had to appeal to President De Gaulle himself to increase the number of *harkis*, (native Algerian soldiers and auxiliaries) from 26,000 to 60,000.⁴⁴ In addition, special company sized units called *Commandoes De Chase* were formed. These were mixed French/Moslem units, with many of the Moslems consisting of former FLN members.

With his analysis and reorganization completed General Challe was ready to execute his plan. The Challe Plan began in February of 1959 in the Ouarsenis mountains in western Algeria with the first of many offensives designed to root out the FLN in their entrenched areas. The basic modus operandi for all the operations was for the *Commandoes De Chase* to be assigned a guerilla band and hunt for it non-stop. The *Commando De Chase* was to pursue this band regardless of where it went. Once it had tracked down the band and pinned it, the General Reserve would be called in to finish off the kill. Once the band had been destroyed, the *Commando De Chase* would be assigned a new band in the area and the hunt would start all over again. What separated these hunts from the former technique of the *ratissage* is that the French did not leave the area after destroying the band. The *quadrillage* in the newly liberated area could then focus on training local self-defense forces and in destroying the grass roots FLN organizations in the village.

⁴³ Ibid, 40.

⁴⁴ Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 333.

By April of 1960, the French had killed over 26,000 FLN fighters and captured another 11,000⁴⁵ under the Challe Plan. The FLN as a military force was shattered and forced to operate in less than platoon-sized elements for the rest of the war. The political organization of the FLN inside Algeria was likewise wrecked and forced to reduce its activities. Recruitment to the FLN began to dry up. One leader of the FLN later admitted that he saw no military solution to the question of Algerian independence.⁴⁶ The Challe Plan had succeeded in meeting the military side of President De Gaulle's strategy.

With all the success of the Challe Plan, there was a negative aspect to it. General Challe continued the policy of *regroupment*, designed to move the population away from the areas of FLN entrenchment and deny the insurgents the support of the population. This policy had been in place for the last two years and resulted in the internal displacement of approximately one million Moslem Algerians. The refugees lived in squalid concentration camp like conditions, and when this became public knowledge in mid 1959 there was a huge national and international outcry. Because of this outcry the French had to make a huge investment to improve the camps.

In analyzing French operations and doctrine during the entire war the following conclusions can be made:

1. The French initially did not have an effective operational doctrine that connected tactical engagements on the ground to the National Strategy. Through a gradual trial and error process a doctrine and mode of operations emerged. President De Gaulle's military focus was to neutralize and destroy the insurgent bands and organization and show the FLN the futility of fighting against the French. General

⁴⁵ Charles R. Shrader, The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria 1954-1962. (Westport Conn: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 228.

⁴⁶ Edgar O' Balance, The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962 (Hamden, Conn., 1967), 136.

Challe connected that strategy to tactical engagements through the implementation of the Challe Plan.

2. The doctrine initially did not provide the commanders on the ground an operational framework that combined tactical engagements in a manner designed to defeat the insurgents and dismantle their organization. With the development of the *quadrillage* system and the development of the Challe Plan this deficiency was corrected.
3. The doctrine at first did not address civil/political matters as well as military matters. This shortfall was corrected and throughout the war the work of the SAS continued and expanded. More schools and clinics were constructed from 1958-1960 than at any other time since the beginning of the insurgency.
4. The eventual doctrine that emerged was combined arms and incorporated the use of special forces type units in the form of the *Commandoes De Chase*.
5. In the beginning the French approach to learning counterinsurgency was in essence 'on-the-job' training. With the establishment of the CICPG the French developed an institutionalized approach to teaching their counterinsurgency doctrine.

Urban Terrorism

In late 1956, the leadership of the FLN made the decision to widen the battlefield and move it into the cities, focusing on the capital of Algiers. In December alone there were 120 terrorist incidents in Algiers⁴⁷ conducted by an FLN network of about 1400 operators.⁴⁸ The *pied noir* population of the city conducted retaliation attacks against the

⁴⁷ Edgar O' Balance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962* (Hamden, Conn., 1967), 80.

⁴⁸ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, (New York: History Book Club, 1972), 184.

Moslem population and things escalated so far out of control that the 10th Para Division was deployed into the city to root out the insurgents and restore order.

Upon entering the city, the division divided it and its suburbs into four sectors and assigned a regiment to each sector.⁴⁹ A curfew was immediately established and the Casbah, a Moslem slum area, identified as the hotbed of the insurgents and cordoned off from the rest of the city.

The police force of Algiers had collected an intelligence file of 2000 names of FLN sympathizers and operators but had been unable to act on it because of manpower shortages and simply being overwhelmed by the problem. This file was promptly confiscated by the 10th Para and within 48 hours, the first suspects were rounded up.

Utilizing techniques from the *quadrillage*, the French conducted a census of the Casbah, issuing identification cards to the inhabitants. To get in and out of the Casbah through the checkpoints of the cordon, the identification card was required. On every block, a warden was appointed who was responsible for that block. For every household the senior occupant was responsible for everyone in that house. If according to the census someone was in a household who was not accounted for, the head of the household and the individual were taken in for questioning. Every day teams consisting of an intelligence officer and a police detective would question the various block wardens on the activities on their block. Based on the intelligence, that evening after curfew, squads of soldiers would fan out across the Casbah and round up suspects for questioning and conduct raids against FLN safe houses.

⁴⁹ Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957, (New York: Enigma Books, 2001), 93.

Through this painstaking process, the French were able to defeat the FLN network inside Algiers. By the autumn of 1957, Algiers was bomb-free and would remain relatively so until almost the end of the war.

Legal Concerns

In addressing legal concerns, we will focus on two topics that are interrelated and have immense moral and ethical dimensions. They are the use of torture as an interrogation method and the treatment of prisoners.

Almost synonymous with the memory of the French in Algeria is the topic of torture. The fact torture occurred is for the most part not disputed. The question posed here is why did it occur? In addition, what was the effect on the overall war effort?

Torture occurred as a means to elicit intelligence information. Borne out of a sense of frustration and a desire to gather information in a time sensitive environment in order to prevent further terrorist attacks, torture began to rear its head most notably during the Battle of Algiers. Those who did it and condoned the practice justified it out of a sense of duty to the nation, its people and the cause for which they were fighting.⁵⁰ The belief was that torture used against a terrorist in order to get information that would protect the lives of innocents was a lesser evil than the terrorist getting away with that act and killing the innocents.

The effect that torture had on the overall outcome of the war was negative. Although information gained from torture was in the short term helpful, in the long-run torture turned more Algerians and Frenchmen against the war and eroded national and international public support for the French effort.

⁵⁰ Ibid, xiii.

The treatment of prisoners revolved around the dilemma of whether or not the prisoners were outlaws and terrorist or enemy combatants. French prisons in Algeria became overwhelmed and had horrid conditions, and the French legal system was not equipped to handle all of the cases. The prisons became prime recruiting grounds for the FLN and many prisoners upon release became active supporters for the FLN, if they had not already been a supporter before arrest. Many French soldiers became frustrated with this problem and in effect took the law into their own hands, executing prisoners thought to be FLN members or terrorists. As one officer put it, “The justice system would have been paralyzed had it not been for our initiative. Many terrorists would have been freed and given the opportunity of launching other attacks.”⁵¹ This treatment of prisoners also eroded public support for the French cause and in the long term was self-defeating.

Use of Reservists

When Premier Mollet made the decision in February of 1956 to call up reservists for the war, he was taking a step that was not taken in the war in Indochina. The act was not looked upon favorably by all the public in France and by some of the soldiers activated. Some reserve units actually rioted when they received their orders. Eventually all the uproar died down and the reservists began to perform their duties without further protest. Many commanders elected to use the reservists to hold static positions within the framework of the *quadrillage*. This resulted in the reservists interacting with the populace and conducting pacification and civil affairs type missions, which in turn allowed many reservists to use their civilian skills to rebuild and secure Algeria.

⁵¹ Ibid, 127.

The decision to activate the reservists was looked upon favorably by the regular army. The belief was that the “reservists are France itself”⁵² and that the nation was now truly involved in the war, not just a portion of the armed forces. From now on the war had a direct impact on many families back in France in a way that Indochina had not.

Many regular Army officers discovered that with their reservists they had to conduct info operations to explain to the reservists why France was in Algeria.⁵³ Many reservists held their own political beliefs as to the justness of the war (accurately representing the divisions within French society on the subject), and the enemy conducted propaganda campaigns to erode the reservists will to fight and support the war.

The overwhelming majority of reservists served admirably during the war and demonstrated they were up to the task of conducting counterinsurgency operations. In 1961, when units and officers of the paras and the Foreign Legion plotted against the De Gaulle government, it was the reservists who refused to join the putsch and thereby helped facilitate the coups collapse.

Native Troops

Algerian *harkis* had served with distinction and honor in the French Army since Algeria had been colonized. Ben Bella, one of the founding leaders of the FLN was himself a WWII veteran of a North African unit, twice decorated for heroism, and rising to the rank of warrant officer.

Harkis were used in Algeria in three different ways. The first was in all Algerian units, commanded by French officers but with junior Algerian officers and NCOs. The second way was in mixed French-Algerian units such as the *Commandoes De Chase*. The third

⁵² Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *Lieutenant in Algeria*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1957), 88.

⁵³ Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 176.

was platoon or below sized units recruited by and attached to battalion-sized or below French units.

The greatest asset the *harkis* brought was their language skills and the fact they were Algerian. This helped put a native face on the French Army. *Harkis* proved to be great gatherers of intelligence and the small units at the French battalion level often worked for the intelligence officer. As discussed earlier, the mixed *Commandoes De Chase* were one of the reasons for the success of the Challe Plan.

There were problems with desertions in the *harki* units and these often received much bad press and visibility. Overall, the story of the Algerian *harkis* is success story for the French military. In fact by the time the war was over 180,000 *harkis* had fought on the French side.⁵⁴ This was greater than the number of Algerians who fought on the side of the FLN.

Special Schools and Training

As stated earlier the French established the Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerilla Warfare (CICPG) in the spring of 1956. Its mission was the following:

“provide teachings that are as concrete as possible about the Muslim psychology and sociology, as well as about the political bases of the Algerian rebellion. It must do so with a view to giving the cadres the essential fundamentals they will require to carry out pacification activities with success, in accordance with the directives of the minister of Algeria. It must furthermore provide instruction in counter-guerilla methods that will enable those cadres to conduct, at different levels and in any type of terrain, at night as well as by day, nomadic actions as well as offensive or defensive operations.”⁵⁵

There were two separate courses at the school. The first was for sector, district and sub-district commanders. The second was for junior officers. In addition, the school

⁵⁴ Edgar O' Balance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962* (Hamden, Conn., 1967), 65.

⁵⁵ Frederic Guelton, LTC. “The French Army Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare (CIPCG) at Arzew,” in *France and the Algerian War 1954-62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*, (ed. Martin S. Alexander. Portland Oregon: Frank Cass, 2002), 37-38.

provided classes in leadership for the headmen of Algerian villages and various other civic organizations and helped provide trainers to Reserve Officer training Schools.

The effectiveness of the curriculum is testified to in that the overwhelming majority of attendees gave the school favorable ratings in end of course critiques.⁵⁶ In addition, when the school opened is also when the French Army started to become more effective in counterinsurgency in Algeria. There is no doubt that the CICPG had a role in that increased effectiveness.

So why did the French lose?

If the French military eventually did so well then why did they lose Algeria? The ultimate solution to Algeria was political not military. The French could not come up with a political solution to the question of Algerian sovereignty that was acceptable to the French public, (especially the *pied noirs*), the Algerian Moslem public, (especially the hardcore members of the FLN) and the international community, (especially the Arab countries). In particular the *pied noirs* were not going to accept giving up Algeria and all they had built.

By 1960 the French military reigned supreme in Algeria and there was no doubt that the FLN could not win a military victory. But that military victory was inconsequential to the political solution. The FLN did not have to defeat the French to win, they just had to survive. When the FLN established camps in Tunisia and Morocco that were untouchable to the French military and because of diplomatic reasons the FLN was ensured of having a sanctuary that would always allow them a place and venue to trumpet their cause. If the French military had been as effective in early 1956 as it had been by 1960 in sealing the border and conducting counterinsurgency operations they could not only have prevented

⁵⁶ Ibid, 45.

the FLN from getting outside aid but could also have prevented them from getting out of the country to set up their sanctuaries. This would have established a truly ‘closed field’ in Algeria that could have stopped the FLN from both getting in or out. But because the French military took six years to reach that peak of effectiveness they could not defeat the insurgents in their infancy and the insurrection was able to survive and gain international support. This international support kept the question of Algerian sovereignty alive. As long as that question of sovereignty was alive it would have to be dealt with by the French government and people. In addition the recruitment of new FLN members could continue as there were always hardcore supporters for independence amongst the Algerian population. This meant France faced the prospect of fighting against the FLN indefinitely and that became a price that France eventually was unwilling to pay.

CHAPTER THREE

U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Operations in Iraq

U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Counterinsurgency is defined by the Department of Defense Dictionary as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency”⁵⁷ The U.S. military according to Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, classifies counterinsurgency as one of the 18 different types of Military Operations other than War⁵⁸ (MOOTW) and discusses it in the context of supporting a Host Nation to conduct counterinsurgency operations. It is not discussed in the context of U.S. forces themselves actually conducting the counterinsurgency operations.

⁵⁷ DOD dictionary, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/c/01344.html> (5 June 2003).

⁵⁸ Dept. of Defense, JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001), V-6.

Joint Publication 3.07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, classifies 16 different types of MOOTW, creating a disconnect with JP 3-0 which categorizes 18. In JP 3.07 counterinsurgency is not even its own category but is categorized together with Nation Assistance.⁵⁹ The combined category of Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency has three subcategories. They are Security Assistance, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Foreign Internal Defense. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is defined as “the total political, economic informational and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency.”⁶⁰ It also states that FID “has traditionally focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government.”⁶¹ Finally, JP 3.07 writes “FID is a principal special operations mission.”⁶² Once again there is no reference in the Joint Pub that discusses U.S forces actually conducting counterinsurgency operations themselves. It is talked about in the context of supporting a Host Nation and that the primary supporters are Special Forces.

The Joint Publication designated for FID is JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense. It states “U.S. involvement towards FID has been traditionally focused on counterinsurgency.”⁶³ It also defines a framework for FID in that it has four elements, Diplomatic, Economic, Informational and Military.⁶⁴ The Military element is further subdivided into three categories: Indirect Support, Direct

⁵⁹ Dept. of Defense, JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Operations Other Than War (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 1995), III-1.

⁶⁰ Ibid, III-10.

⁶¹ Ibid, III-10.

⁶² Ibid, III-10.

⁶³ Dept. of Defense JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 1996), I-3.

⁶⁴ Ibid, I-5.

Support (not involving Combat Operations), and Combat Operations.⁶⁵ U.S. forces should only engage in Combat Operations as a last resort.

If forced to conduct Combat Operations, U.S forces should avoid conducting them unilaterally, and for the most part the objective of their operations should focus on force protection and not on the destruction of the enemy.⁶⁶ Combat Operations should fall within the framework of the Host Nation's Internal Defense and Development Strategy (IDAD). The IDAD is the "full range of measures taken by a nation to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency."⁶⁷ The IDAD has four functions: 1) Balanced development 2) Security 3) Neutralization 4) Mobilization. The two functions that have primarily military elements to them are Security and Neutralization.

Security includes "all activities implemented in order to protect the populace from the threat and to provide a safe environment for national development."⁶⁸ Security must have as one of its objectives the denying of support of the population to the insurgents. This is achieved through protecting and controlling the populace.

Neutralization is a process designed to "make an organized force irrelevant to the political process."⁶⁹ This is achieved by 1) Separating the population from the insurgents, (leading back to security), 2) Defeating the insurgent organization through combat action if needed, 3) Enforcing the law by arresting and prosecuting disruptive and subversive elements, 4) Publicly discrediting insurgent leaders. All neutralization efforts must be done legally so as not to give the insurgents an exploitable issue. Rules of Engagement must be observed and revisited as needed. It is important that neutralization efforts are

⁶⁵ Ibid, I-6.

⁶⁶ Ibid, IV-24.

⁶⁷ Ibid, C-1.

⁶⁸ Ibid, C-1.

⁶⁹ Ibid, C-2.

not perceived as heavy-handed by the populace. Indiscriminate violence or the perception there-of could backfire and push the populace into the insurgent camp.

U.S. Operations in Iraq

In March of 2003, the United States and its Coalition partners invaded Iraq for the purpose of disarming Iraq of its Weapons of Massed Destruction, forcing Saddam Hussein to leave power and liberate the Iraqi people.⁷⁰ On May 1st after the fall of Baghdad U.S. President George Bush declared major combat operations to be over. Almost immediately thereafter, U.S. occupation forces found themselves engaged in an insurgent type struggle with left over remnants of the Baathist regime, Islamic fundamentalists, and criminal elements. Originally classified as ‘deadenders’ and criminals by senior government officials,⁷¹ the insurgents were perceived not to be much of a long term threat to U.S. forces or Coalition goals in Iraq.

The initial U.S. military response to the threat was to conduct large scale sweeps designed to round up insurgents. By the end of August, these operations were deemed to be potentially counter-productive because they alienated the populace. The large sweeps were replaced with smaller raids, designed to be based on better intelligence.⁷² By the beginning of October, U.S. commanders were admitting that the insurgents were better organized and more lethal than what they had originally thought.⁷³

As the occupier of Iraq, the United States and its partners are exercising sovereignty in Iraq and are recognized by the United Nations as being responsible for such. To govern

⁷⁰ Remarks by President Bush in address to the nation, 17 March 2003, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-17.html>>

⁷¹ “Rough Justice.” Newsweek, 18 August 2003, 41.

⁷² “G.I.’s Shift to more Precise and Smaller Raids”, New York Times, 2 September 2003, <<http://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep2003/e20030902213080.html>>

⁷³ “Enemy is ‘More Lethal’, U.S. General Says”, Washington Post, <<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20031003221620.html>>

the country, the Coalition established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under the leadership of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer of the United States. Ambassador Bremer reports to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice who in turn reports to President Bush. The President on September 7th 2003 outlined his three objectives for Iraq and declared the current struggle in Iraq to be the “Central Front” on the War on Terror”.⁷⁴ The three objectives are 1) Destroy the terrorists, 2) Enlist other Nations for a free Iraq, and 3) Help Iraqi’s assume responsibility for their own defense and future.

The CPA states its mandate to be fourfold. 1) Protect the territorial integrity of Iraq, 2) Provide security to the Iraqi people, 3) Rebuild all aspects of the Iraqi infrastructure, and 4) Turnover sovereignty to a democratically elected Iraqi government.⁷⁵ The current intent is to turn over sovereignty on June 30th, 2004 to a provisional government with free elections to follow.

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 7, the American military operational headquarters in Iraq which is built around the nucleus of the Army’s V Corps HQ, defines its mission as providing a safe and secure environment for the people of Iraq⁷⁶. Lieutenant General Sanchez, the commander of CJTF 7, has stated his intent is to “defeat the former regime loyalists, the terrorists, and those people that are attacking the Iraqi people.”⁷⁷ The mission statements of the divisions underneath the CJTF are nested in the CJTF’s mission statement. This is reflected by the statement of one division commander who said “our

⁷⁴ President Bush’s Remarks to the Nation, 7 September 2003, <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20030909_Bushspeech0907.html

⁷⁵ Coalition Provisional Authority, Overview, <<http://www.cpa-iraq.org/bremerbio.html>>

⁷⁶ Coalition Provisional Authority Operational Update Briefing. Brigadier General Mark Kimmit, Deputy Director for Operations. 19 November 2003. <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031120_Nov-19-BG-Kimmit-Briefing-post.htm>

⁷⁷ Coalition Provisional Authority Operational Press Briefing. Lieutenant general Ricardo Sanchez, Commander Coalition Ground Forces. 11 November 2003. <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031111_Nov-12-Sanchez-briefing.html>

charter is to provide a safe and secure environment for the people of Iraq”⁷⁸ with the intent of communicating “to the enemy the high cost of continuing to resist, as well as to assure the good citizens of Baghdad of our resolve.”⁷⁹

In examining the statements and intents from the President down to the division commanders it is clear that there are no breaks in thought patterns, policy and intents. The President has clearly articulated what he wants and the commanders in Iraq are following that guidance.

The commander of the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad, one of the main units to bear the brunt of the counter-insurgency effort since the beginning, has defined how his unit is conducting combat operations as intelligence based combat operations.⁸⁰ He describes what he calls his ‘cycle of attack’ as 1) gain intelligence, 2) attack based on that intelligence, and 3) fight for additional intelligence.⁸¹ As he says “we’re either fighting for intelligence or we’re fighting based on that intelligence.”⁸² The division has focused its efforts on a neighborhood by neighborhood basis by identifying those neighborhoods where the insurgent cells seem to be operating from. Once identified the division conducts raids designed to defeat the identified cell. The cell is considered defeated if its leadership, financiers, suppliers, recruiters and main operators are killed or captured.⁸³ The operations are coordinated and conducted over several neighborhoods at once if needed.

⁷⁸ Coalition Provisional Authority Operational Update Briefing. Brigadier General (Promotable) Martin E. Dempsey, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division. 20 November 2003. <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031121_Nov-20-BG-Dempsey-Briefing-post.htm>

⁷⁹ Ibid, <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031121_Nov-20-BG-Dempsey-Briefing-post.htm>

⁸⁰ Ibid, <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031121_Nov-20-BG-Dempsey-Briefing-post.htm>

⁸¹ Ibid, <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031121_Nov-20-BG-Dempsey-Briefing-post.htm>

⁸² Ibid, <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031121_Nov-20-BG-Dempsey-Briefing-post.htm>

⁸³ Ibid, <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031121_Nov-20-BG-Dempsey-Briefing-post.htm>

The other U.S. Army division that has seen the bulk of the fighting in the counterinsurgency is Task Force Ironhorse, formed around the core of the 4th Infantry Division. From June through November of 2003, the division conducted six major operations that saw them evolve from large unit sweeps to smaller, more precise raids.⁸⁴

Operation Ivy Sweep conducted from mid September to early November saw the shift in emphasis on how the division operated. The focus of the divisions efforts were as follows: 1) Focused raids to eliminate mid-level organizers, financiers and other insurgent forces; 2) IPD driven counter mortar fire and counter IED ambush; 3) Focused recon and counter-recon; 4) Continuous engagement with civic, religious and tribal leaders; 5) Investment for improving infrastructure, basic life services and to create jobs; 6) Train, equip and employ Iraqi police, Border Guards and defense forces to protect key areas, and 7) Identify, seize and destroy enemy munitions.⁸⁵

One of the most effective tools acknowledged by all commanders used in the counterinsurgency effort is the Commander's Emergency Response (CERP) funds. CERP funds are money, allocated to a division, for utilization by the commander for whatever he sees fit. This allows the commander to give immediate monetary support to projects that help the civil/ economic rebuilding of the country. They can be used as rewards for good behavior to those leaders and groups that support the coalition, and withheld from those that are not supportive. A frequent phrase heard is "dollars are bullets."⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Cordesman, Anthony H. "The Current Military Situation in Iraq." Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington D.C.: 14 November 2003, p. 20.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 21.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 28.

The borders of Iraq are large and are seen by many in the Coalition as being impossible to seal because it is too manpower intensive.⁸⁷ It is perceived as being as “pointless as trying to block immigration from Mexico to the U.S.”⁸⁸ This attitude persists in spite of the fact that there are foreign fighters infiltrating in from Syria.⁸⁹ The long-term hoped for solution to this problem is the newly reorganized and retrained Iraqi Border Guards.

An important point must be noted that came out of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) paper written in November of 2003 about the situation in Iraq. It describes the belief by many U.S. officers that there is no way to completely stop the insurgent attacks and the U.S. will continue to fight some sort of low intensity conflict as long as it remains in Iraq. This belief holds the Coalition cannot eliminate the threat and the best that can be done is to contain and reduce the threat until the Iraq security forces can take over and the U.S. can withdraw.⁹⁰ If this is in fact an accurate representation of the belief of military planners in Iraq, it is not in line with the President’s first goal for Iraq, which is to defeat the terrorists. Nor is it in line with Lieutenant General Sanchez’s intent either.

By analyzing U.S. doctrine and operations in Iraq against the criteria in Chapter One, the following conclusions can be made:

1. Does the United States have a doctrine that provides an operational framework that connects the tactical engagements on the ground to the National Strategy?

The United States military does not possess a viable counterinsurgency doctrine

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 3.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 12.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 2.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 17-18.

that provides an operational framework connecting tactical engagements on the ground to the National Strategy. Counterinsurgency is a subset of MOOTW and there is no stand alone Joint Publication on counterinsurgency. All discussion in the Joint Pubs points towards the U.S. staying away from actually conducting counterinsurgency operations. The Joint doctrine has U.S. forces supporting a Host Nation in their operations and steers commanders and policymakers away from using U.S. forces in a direct combat role against insurgents. This operational approach obviously does not work in Iraq where there currently is not a Host Nation government and legally the U.S. is the government even though there is an Iraqi Provisional Government. Parts of our stated aims in Iraq are to provide security and destroy the terrorists. The current Joint doctrine provides no practical guidance on how to accomplish that. There is not even anything as simple as a discussion on what the basic tenants or characteristics of counterinsurgency are.

2. Does the doctrine provide commanders on the ground an operational framework that combines tactical engagements on the ground in a manner designed to defeat the insurgents and dismantle their organization? The current U.S. Joint doctrine does not provide commanders on the ground with an operational framework combining tactical engagements on the ground in a manner designed to defeat the insurgents and dismantle their organization. This is again based on the fact the Joint Doctrine does not envision U.S. forces having to actually conduct the fighting themselves. The doctrine points commanders away from combat operations as if it is an evil last resort. Our stated aims in Iraq are to provide

security and defeat the terrorists and the commander on the ground is faced with the very real dilemma of how to do that. Does it mean he puts a soldier on every street corner? Does he conduct mass arrests of suspects? How should he approach planning for raids? The Joint doctrine is woefully inadequate in providing guidance to answer those questions. The IDAD concept as discussed in Joint Pub 3-07.1 does provide the embryo of an operational framework. Unfortunately, it does not go into enough depth. Out of a 149 page publication, the IDAD receives six pages worth of discussion. This is inadequate.

3. Does the doctrine address civil/political matters or is it strictly military focused?

The Joint doctrine does address civil/political matters in a very good manner. Much of the Joint Pubs deal with Civil Affairs support, Information Operations and the importance of legitimizing the government in power. This portion of U.S. doctrine is much more developed than the strictly military portion of counterinsurgency doctrine and is more applicable in Iraq. In Iraq there is a realization that the military portion is just a part of the counterinsurgent effort and that economics and politics are just as important. According to Lieutenant General Sanchez, “It is a political, a military and an economic solution that is necessary in order for us to win this low-intensity conflict.”⁹¹

⁹¹ Coalition Provisional Authority Operational Press Briefing. Lieutenant general Ricardo Sanchez, Commander Coalition Ground Forces. 11 November 2003. <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031111_Nov-12-Sanchez-briefing.html>

4. Is the doctrine a combined arms approach or is it tailored to a certain types of forces? The doctrine in the Joint Pubs is Special Forces centric and does not provide a combined arms approach. This again is based on supporting a Host Nation in their efforts. This is completely unrealistic to the needs of the U.S. effort in Iraq. The counterinsurgency effort in Iraq is huge because the U.S. is the one conducting the operation, not a Host Nation, and every soldier is needed for the effort. Many units have adapted quickly to the situation and have taken such measures as using artillerymen and air defensemen as infantrymen to conduct operations.
5. Does the U.S. Armed Forces have an institutional approach to teaching this doctrine or is it done by ‘on the job training’? The U.S. does not have an institutional approach to teaching the current doctrine. This is probably just as well since it doesn’t apply to our current efforts in Iraq. Much of what is occurring in Iraq appears to be ‘on the job training’.

Urban Terrorism

The U.S. is engaged in a large urban fight against the Former Regime Loyalists and Islamic Fundamentalist terrorists in Iraq. A large portion of this is in Baghdad, a city of over 5 million people. The city is broken down into nine districts and 88 neighborhoods. In November, when discussing his operations the Commander of the 1st Armored Division identified six to eight of these neighborhoods as being less than secure and the

focal points of where the insurgents were.⁹² Operation Iron Hammer conducted in November focused on them. Utilizing their ‘cycle of attack’ that was discussed earlier, the 1st Armored Division massed their efforts and attacked the insurgent cells operating in those neighborhoods.

U.S. operations against the urban insurgent are precise operations and in some respects resemble law enforcement efforts against the Mafia. The operations are focused on people, not weapon systems, require accurate intelligence to conduct raids, and are designed to dismantle the entire organization from top to bottom.

Legal Concerns

To address legal concerns, we will look at, as in the previous chapter, the use of torture as an interrogation method and the treatment of prisoners.

To date there have not been any accusations against U.S forces accusing them of using torture in a systemic manner to elicit information. There has been the widely reported case of Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Allen West, a battalion commander in the 4th Infantry Division, who shot his pistol near the head of a prisoner to get him to confess information. LTC West was relieved of command and charged with aggravated assault.⁹³ After an investigation, he received non-judicial punishment and was sent back to the United States. Although LTC West’s actions were intended to gain information to protect his troops, the U.S. military has not condoned his actions. In the court of public opinion, both international and domestic, the U.S. is trying hard to maintain the image of not

⁹² Coalition Provisional Authority Operational Update Briefing. Brigadier General (Promotable) Martin E. Dempsey, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division. 20 November 2003. <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031121_Nov-20-BG-Dempsey-Briefing-post.htm>

⁹³ “Army Files Charges in Combat Tactic”. Washington Times. 29 October, 2003, p.1.

engaging in illegal behavior to suppress the insurgency. The case of LTC West was an important step in conveying that intent.

As of January 2004, there were approximately 9500 Iraqis detained in Coalition detention facilities.⁹⁴ They are considered to be a combination of insurgents and criminal elements. The Coalition, in partnership with the Iraqi judicial system, has implemented a vetting process that determines the status of the detainee and what is to be done with them.

Within 72 hours of capture, a determination is made on whether the detainee is a criminal or involved in the insurgency. If he is a criminal, he is turned over to the Iraqi court system for adjudication. If the detainee is not a criminal and determined not to be involved in the insurgency but somehow picked up by mistake he is released.⁹⁵

If it is determined the individual is involved in the insurgency he is evaluated as to what extent his involvement has been. If deemed a low-level, non-violent supporter the individual can be released if vouched for by a tribal elder or community leader. The person who vouches for them is then the guarantor of that individual's behavior.⁹⁶ The belief is these newly released and vouched for individuals can be won over.

This process is very systemic and positive in the fact that uses the Iraqis to police themselves. It adds legitimacy to the Coalition's efforts by showing respect for the law. As expressed by LTG Sanchez, "we've got to remember that we're in low-intensity conflict where the laws of war still apply."⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Coalition Provisional Authority Operational Update Briefing. Brigadier General Mark Kimmit, Deputy Director for Operations. 8 January 2004. <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/Jan8_KimmittSenor.htm>

⁹⁵ Ibid, <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/Jan8_KimmittSenor.htm>

⁹⁶ Ibid, <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/Jan8_KimmittSenor.htm>

⁹⁷ Coalition Provisional Authority Operational Press Briefing. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander Coalition Ground Forces. 29 November 2003. <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031211_Nov-29_LTG_Samchez_Briefing.html>

Use of Reservists

Approximately 35% of U.S forces in Iraq are National Guardsmen or Reservists.⁹⁸

Although they have been performing admirably there have been complaints of problems with pay and equipment. Many Reserve/National Guard units have older equipment than active duty units and this has caused problems with morale and the feeling of being second-class. There have been some issues in regard to readiness, and recently the deployment of a National Guard Brigade from Washington State was delayed due to unpreparedness.⁹⁹

The massive call-up has caused disruption in the lives of many reservists who never felt they would be called up for such a length of time or so far away from home. This combined with the divisive feelings about the war and its moral justifications within the U.S has caused concerns about retention in reserve units returning from the war. There is a widespread belief that many reservists will leave the military rather than continue in support of a cause that they may deem to be unjust and cause much personal hardship in their lives.

Native Troops

The U.S. Congress mandated to the CPA to form 36 battalions for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps¹⁰⁰ (ICDC) and training began in September of 2003. This process is fully in line with the President's objective of making the Iraqi's responsible for their own defense.

⁹⁸ "Inequity of Reserves at Issue." Washington Times. 13 January 2004, p.

1.<<https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Jan2004/e20040113248362.html>>

⁹⁹ "Are Reserves Getting the Raw Deal?" Houston Chronicle. 11 January 2004, p. 1.

<<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20040112248055.html>>

¹⁰⁰ Coalition Provisional Authority Operational Update Briefing. Brigadier General Mark Kimmit, Deputy Director for Operations. 3 December 2003. <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20031204_Dec-03_BG_Kimmit_Briefing.htm>

Recruits for the IDCD are vetted to insure they were not Baathists or connected to the Saddam regime, or have a criminal past. The formation of the IDCD has been plagued with desertions, in large part because of poor pay and the belief by the recruits they are not properly equipped. IDCD forces have conducted operations long side U.S. forces and with good results. But before the IDCD can be turned into a truly effective force the issues of pay and equipment must be addressed.

In addition to the IDCD, the U.S. is also utilizing local militias recruited through tribal sheiks.¹⁰¹ These militias are used to secure static sites, and if there is a problem with that security the sheik who recruited the militia is held responsible. The only dilemma with this program is the militiamen are paid more than soldiers in the IDCD, adding to the IDCD retention problems. The Coalition must develop a universal policy in regards to pay scales for Iraqi troops of all types.

Special Schools and Training

With the continuation of operations in Iraq the U.S. military has conducted courses and adjusted training to prepare soldiers for the environment of Iraq. A cultural awareness course was conducted by the Jordanian military to train soldiers for the upcoming OIF 2 rotation in subjects ranging from basic language skills to dealing with Arab women at checkpoints.¹⁰² The curriculum for this course was based on feedback from troops in Iraq.

¹⁰¹ "Soldiers and Sheik Force Battle Saboteurs." Miami Herald. 16 January 2004, <<https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Jan2004/e20040116249520.html>>

¹⁰² "Jordanian Course Preps Soldiers on Arabic Culture." Army News Service. <http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/print.php?story_id_key=5395>.

The Army is also adding changes to its Initial Entry Training for recruits based on experiences in Iraq. These changes will include more weapons training, convoy defense, how to counter improvised explosive devices and how to fight in urban areas.¹⁰³ Changes have also been done at the National Training Center. More towns have been added, as have more civilians and guerrillas. The intent of the training is to show “winning these battles requires a mix of raw firepower and political savvy, coaxing cooperation from local mayors and religious leaders, and winning civilian loyalty with the right balance of friendship and forces.”¹⁰⁴

The U.S. military is doing a good job of adjusting how it prepares for combat in Iraq. This adjustment is being institutionalized at training facilities, but there needs to be more emphasis at service schools. Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the Command and General Staff Officers Course need to include counterinsurgency operations and tactics into their core curriculum.

CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusions and Recommendations

At the beginning of this monograph the hypothesis asked if French operations in Algeria could be used as a model for U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and operations in Iraq. The answer is yes. The French developed a doctrine that included civil as well as military operations. It ensured there was security throughout the country and attacked the FLN, leaving their organization in Algeria defeated and dismantled. It did eventually

¹⁰³ “Army May Revise Basic Training at Ft. Jackson.” Columbia (SC) State. 7 January 2004, <<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20040108247181.html>>

¹⁰⁴ “Training for the New Warfare: Smile, Shoot, Smile.” Newhousw.com. 19 November 2004, <<https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Nov2003/e20031120235156.html>>

succeed in preventing outside assistance from coming to the FLN inside Algeria. It failed in that it took too long and they failed in preventing the FLN from getting out of the country and setting up sanctuaries. In addition it was in support of a political goal that as more time passed became unrealistic. Because of the inability to address the political dilemma in Algeria it was ensured there would be feelings of discontent in the Algerian Moslem population that could transform into support for the FLN.

Conclusion: France developed over time a comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine in Algeria. Initially it did not have one but through a several year maturation process it took ideas and experimented with them to flesh out concepts that would work. Eventually these concepts and ideas coalesced into a doctrine and mode of operations. The French dilemma arose from the fact that it took too long to develop and disseminate their doctrine and that allowed the FLN to survive.

The U.S. military is in a similar situation to the French in 1954-1955 timeframe. It does not have a viable counterinsurgency doctrine that is applicable to its current situation in Iraq. Officers are developing and trying new ideas to meet the threat and one can only assume that they will eventually fuse into a doctrine.

Recommendation: The U.S. military must write a comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine that discusses how U.S. forces conduct counterinsurgency operations and not just support it. This doctrine must have a combined-arms focus and not just a Special Forces focus. It must intellectually accept that counterinsurgency is not a category of SASO but is in fact war. It must have its own stand alone Joint Publication. The IDAD concept is a good place to start the development of the doctrine. It must happen quickly.

The longer the insurgency is allowed the last the greater potential there is for the insurgents to gain legitimacy in parts of the world and in Iraq itself.

Conclusion: The French *quadrillage* system is an effective way to provide security in a counterinsurgency. The *quadrillage* denied freedom of maneuver to the FLN and prevented the insurgents from coordinating their attacks over a wide area. It also prevented the FLN from reconstituting and recruiting. These ideas are in line with the function of security as outlined in the IDAD plan in Appendix C of JP 3-07.1.

Recommendation: The U.S. military take the principles of the *quadrillage* and use them to expound upon the function of security as outlined by the IDAD in JP 3-07.1.

Conclusion: The Challe Plan was effective in defeating the insurgent bands inside Algeria and led to the dismantling of much of the FLN organization. How this was conducted has much in common with the neutralization function of the IDAD.

Recommendation: The U.S. military examine the Challe Plan and use it its mode of operation to set forth details on how to neutralize an insurgency.

Conclusion: The French experience in Algeria demonstrates the absolute need to quickly seal off the insurgents from outside assistance and prevent the insurgents from getting out of the country to set up untouchable sanctuaries. The French did it but it took to long. The FLN ability to establish bases in Tunisia and Morocco ensured that there would always be an FLN organization. As long as there was an FLN the question of Algerian sovereignty would remain alive. The U.S. must seal the border of Iraq with

Syria. Failure to do so could allow the current insurgency to stay alive by letting in outside assistance and allowing the insurgents a sanctuary in Syria from which they can carry out attacks, fund raising and other activities.

Recommendation: The U.S. military analyze the Morice Line in Algeria as a potential way to stop the infiltration from Syria. The Morice Line used the latest technology of the day and was not designed to completely halt the infiltrators. Rather it was intended to detect and slow up the insurgents, allowing French troops to intercept them.

Conclusion: The French experience illustrates what can happen when reservists in a free democratic society are activated for a war that some of them may disagree with. An army is a reflection of the society from which it comes. If the society is divided on the purpose for the war the army will reflect that. This is even more so for reservists. The reservists are the link between the army and the society. If the reservists don't understand the 'why' for the war, then they cannot articulate to their friends and families the purpose of their being away from home. This in turn helps to erode public support for the war.

Recommendation: The U.S. military needs to initiate a program to explain to activated National Guardsmen and Reservists the reasons for the war and why their activation is important. The U.S. military should develop a "Why We Fight" series, similar to the WWII program to explain to Guardsmen and Reservists the importance of their mission. In addition the U.S. military must quickly address the problems of pay and equipment inequity.

Conclusion: The CICPG was effective in training French leadership to combat the FLN. The U.S. military needs a similar permanent school or course on Middle Eastern culture, Islam, and counterinsurgency.

Recommendation: The course have as its core curriculum classes the following subjects:

1. History of the region.
2. Islam, its beliefs, tenants and splits within the Islamic world (Shia v. Sunni).
3. The ideology and reasons behind Islamic fundamentalism.
4. The Baathist ideology.
5. Case studies in counterinsurgency.

The course can be modified to also include operations in Afghanistan. The course should be designed for officers and NCOs of all branches and should be a requirement for any unit or individual deploying to those conflicts. Also recommend giving an Additional Skill Identifier upon completing the course. This will allow the U.S. military to develop a cadre of regional experts that can be tracked through the personnel system.

Conclusion: France had an institutionalized approach to train their military in counterinsurgency. It developed over time but was influential in the eventual effectiveness of the French military in conducting counterinsurgency. Currently the U.S. military does not have an institutionalized approach in its service schools to train their officers and NCO's of all branches on counterinsurgency operations.

Recommendations: Counterinsurgency operations be included in all service school curriculums for all officers and NCO's. This connects back to the concept that the U.S

military must intellectually accept that counterinsurgency is not a form of MOOTW but is war.

Conclusion: A key to the success of the Challe Plan was the use of Algerian *harkis*. Whether in mixed Algerian/French units such as the *Commandoes de Chase*, or in their own units the *harkis* provided valuable manpower and intelligence capabilities.

Recommendation: The U.S. military continue to recruit and train Iraqis to serve in their security forces. This is being done and the French experience shows the success of such a program.

Conclusion: The mixed Algerian/French units such as the *Commandoes de Chase*, were some of the most effective in fighting the counterinsurgency in Algeria because of the unique skills such a unit could possess through language skills and intelligence gathering capabilities.

Recommendation: Allow each U.S. battalion to recruit and train up to a separate platoons worth of Iraqis to serve with that unit. The separate platoon can work for the S2 or S3. It could be utilized for intelligence gathering purposes, translating and to serve as guides for the battalion. If needed, place an American officer or NCO in charge of the platoon. Not only would it benefit the current counterinsurgency effort but it would also give the Iraqis who work for the U.S. forces daily lessons on how a modern professional military functions in a democratic society.

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