

**Passing the Baton: Minimizing Disconnects
During Peace Operations**

A Monograph

by

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AY 03-04

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 26 MAY 2004	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Passing the baton: minimizing disconnects during peace operations		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
		5b. GRANT NUMBER	
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) John Hoppmann		5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
		5e. TASK NUMBER	
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army School for Advanced Military Studies, 250 Gibbon Ave, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER ATZL-SWV	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited			
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.			
14. ABSTRACT The purpose of this monograph is to justify the change in staff structure for Army brigades in order to mitigate the complexity of the Peace Operations environment. With peace operations increasing in frequency, Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will provide a bulk of the forces that are executing these missions. While the environment that the BCTs operate in has changed, the fundamental organizational structure that enables effective functioning in that environment has not. As the army looks to redesign its staff structure for the future force, the Army should account for the increased complexity of the operating environment in its organizational design. This study offers Mintzberg's organizational design methodology as a way to design an organization for a complex environment. This monograph recommends an increase in rank of the planners at the BCT level. This change will enhance operational cognition at the tactical level, enhance parallel and collaborative planning capabilities and enable this echelon to conduct campaign plan maintenance. These capabilities are key in minimizing the "operational disconnects" that are occurring during Peace Operations. These "operational disconnects" at the brigade level are hindering the United States from achieving policy objectives.			
15. SUBJECT TERMS			
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 1
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	
			18. NUMBER OF PAGES 63
			19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Abstract

PASSING THE BATON: MINIMIZING DISCONNECTS IN PEACE OPERATIONS
by MAJ John M. Hoppmann, U.S. Army, 50 pages.

The purpose of this monograph is to justify the change in staff structure for Army brigades in order to mitigate the complexity of the Peace Operations environment. The complexity of the Army's operating environment is increasing and the current staff structure has to change to maximize the unit's effectiveness. Peace Operations, a component of this operating environment, are increasing in frequency. The international environment points to an increase in the frequency of Peace Operations.

With peace operations increasing in frequency, Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will provide a bulk of the forces that are executing these missions. While the United States Army may not like peace operations, they are a fact of life. The Peace Operations environment offers unique challenges to the Brigade Combat Teams that operate in them. While the environment that the BCTs operate in has changed, the fundamental organizational structure that enables effective functioning in that environment has not. As the army looks to redesign its staff structure for the future force, the Army should account for the increased complexity of the operating environment in its organizational design. This study offers Mintzberg's organizational design methodology as a way to design an organization for a complex environment.

This monograph applies a threefold methodology for looking at the BCTs organizational design in order to answer the research question: How can "Operational Disconnects" in Brigade Combat Team Peace Operations be minimized? First, a bias against Peace Operations is identified, which may hinder redesign efforts. Next, complex environments are defined. The Peace Operations environment is qualified as a complex environment by examining the increase in actors, their competing aims, and varied effects within the BCT area of operations. An organizational model is developed that examines the emergent qualities of an organization based on Mintzberg's generalized organizational components. This organizational model is then used to compare the staff structures at brigade and division. This comparison is required to forecast the effects of organizational changes. Finally, historical case studies are used to illustrate the requirement for campaign planning in a Peace Operations environment, which is enabled by organizational change.

This monograph recommends an increase in rank of the planners at the BCT level. This change will enhance operational cognition at the tactical level, enhance parallel and collaborative planning capabilities and enable this echelon to conduct campaign plan maintenance. These capabilities are key in minimizing the "operational disconnects" that are occurring during Peace Operations. These "operational disconnects" at the brigade level are hindering the United States from achieving policy objectives.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Like it or not, Peace Operations (POs) have the potential to be a major element of foreign policy for the foreseeable future. These operations require units to interact with, leverage and focus the efforts of many different people, agencies and organizations by adhering to a campaign plan that reacts to changing local conditions. The complexity of this operating environment demands that headquarters use a campaign plan in order to progress towards a verifiable end-state. By failing to appreciate the complexity of the PO environment, the US Army routinely fails to organize the brigades it sends on these missions with the capabilities required to engage the relevant actors across the spectrum of operations. By failing to resource, organize and train units to engage in peace operations across the informational, political and diplomatic levels, we are not maximizing the inherent potential of POs. When brigades fail to synchronize and adapt those disparate efforts with a flexible campaign plan, we fail to influence those forces most responsible for creating the conditions for US forces to achieve policy objectives.

This monograph seeks to increase the effectiveness of brigade-sized units engaged in POs by applying the campaign planning methodology in order to maximize the continuity of effort during extended operations. When stated as a research question: How can "Operational Disconnects" in brigade unit Peace Operation Campaigns be minimized? This monograph: will outline the strategic context and complexity of POs, establish the relevancy of campaign planning to address the inherent complexity in this environment, conduct a comparative analysis of current force structure to determine existing capabilities and shortfalls with respect to campaign planning and, finally, examine a historical case study in order to apply criteria and draw conclusions from unit performance.

Peace Keeping Bias

The United States Military Establishment has a problem with conducting Stability Operations and Support Operations (SASO). During a presidential campaign speech in 2000, then candidate George W. Bush declared, "Superpowers do not do windows."¹ This was a veiled reference to the POs being executed in the Balkans and a signal that his administration would not support extensive, long-term SASO missions. This attitude has resonated in a military hierarchy immersed in the Powell Doctrine.²

This section of the monograph seeks to establish that there is a bias in the military against considering Stability and Support Operations as a viable mission. General Shalikashvili, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was cited as saying, "Real men don't do MOOTWA."³ In the context of the passage, the quote was used to illustrate the US Army's reluctance to accept that post-cold war role. Recent news articles point to the military hierarchy's reluctance to form peace keeping units simply because, "We just do combat, and stability ops is a sideline."⁴

The administration's attempted closing of the Peace Keeping Institute (PKI) in 2001 further illustrates the low regard that the Department of Defense (DoD) holds the PO mission. A report from the Partnership for Effective Peace operations news release outlined the reason for the closure was budgetary. Combatant Commanders utilized the Institute for theater engagement planning. The Institute also served as the US military's link to the UN peacekeeping

¹ Donald Kagan, "War and Aftermath," *Policy Review*, No. 120, August 2003[journal online]; available from <http://www.policyreview.org/aug03/kagan.html>, Internet; accessed on 29 August 2003.

² Robert M. Cassidy, "Prophets or Pretorians: The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary," *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): 131. Powell Doctrine: also Weinberger-Powell doctrine, as articulated in the article, the use of force that "essentially proscribes anything other than conventional war."

³ Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping the Peace with American Military* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 56.

⁴ Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," *Washington Post*, [accessed online]; <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Nov2003>; Internet; accessed on 24 November, 2003.

organizations.⁵ The PKI has been recently reopened, perhaps signaling that the functions could not be easily transferred or that the institute is now more important than it was first perceived.

The comparison of the manuals dedicated to operationalizing the concept of SASO is paltry compared with the sheath of manuals dedicated to high intensity conflict. In FM 3-0, the keystone doctrinal manual, the combined pages dedicated to Stability and Support Operations are two-thirds the pages dedicated to offensive and defensive operations.⁶ While given passing mention in many manuals, Stability and Support (SASO) operations have only four Army doctrinal references and seven joint doctrinal manuals.⁷ By comparison, FM 3-90, *Tactics*, has thirty-four manuals directly related to tactics listed in its bibliography.⁸

Public statements, policy decisions and minimal doctrinal support demonstrate that the Department of Defense has a bias against the Stability and Support Operations. The purpose of highlighting this bias is to establish that the Department of Defense and the U.S. Army do not give enough consideration to the different requirements of the peace operations mission.

Establish Past History

It is necessary, early in this argument, to describe Peace Operations (POs), where these operations fall into our current doctrinal framework, and establish what characteristics these operations have. The focus on POs is to narrow the scope of the problem examined in order to give the subject sufficiently detailed treatment. However, this does not limit the conclusions of

⁵ “US Army to Close its Peacekeeping Institute in 2003,” Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping website, [database online] <http://www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/docs/PKI-updated.pdf> ; Internet; accessed 4 February 2004.

⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, FM3-0, *Operations* (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, June 2001), ii-iii.

⁷ Ibid., Bibliography 1-2.

⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-90, *Tactics* (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, July 2001), Bibliography 2-3.

the paper to the narrow mission set of PO's. The conclusions drawn should be applicable across the stability and support spectrum of conflict.

Peace Operations fall under the umbrella concept of Stability Operations according to FM 3-0. Other operations grouped under the Stability Operations concept are: Peace Operations, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Assistance, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Support to Insurgencies, Support to Counter-Drug operations, Combating Terrorism, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, Arms Control, and Show of Force.⁹ The grouping of these missions is temporally arrayed around the occurrence of "hostilities." In relation to "hostilities," Stability Operations can: deter, preempt, provide resolution, prevent escalation, limit conflict scale, bolster allied forces, and secure the environment.¹⁰ After establishing what associated concepts are grouped with POs, it will be easier to outline the defining characteristics of POs.

Peace Operations, according to doctrine, have the following characteristics: support diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace, support policy objectives, support diplomatic activities supporting those policy objectives.¹¹ The doctrine emphasizes the planning for transition requirements from Peace Keeping to Peace Enforcement, should hostilities resume between competing factions. The transition from unilateral to multilateral interventions, and lead agency changes are also highlighted as important aspects of mission planning for Army units.¹² These doctrinal points are highlighted because they imply a level of sophistication within the staff to be able to plan for these transitions. This type of planning adds to the complexity of the mission. It also assumes a staff planning capability in the unit executing these tasks.

⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, June 2001), 9-1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 9-6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

Having described what a PO is; I will describe under what geopolitical conditions they occur. Max Boot described the broadest perspective on intervention with military forces, in the economic concept of supply and demand: "... when the cost is low, the demand is high."¹³

The United States is without peer, in terms of military and economic power.¹⁴ In *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Paul Kennedy described in interrelation and relativism of a country's power by examining a broad swath of history. His argument is that economic production has a positive correlation with strategic power.¹⁵ The rise of the British Empire in the post Napoleonic period was offered as an example.¹⁶ That strategic power is also relative among the nations and flows to where the economic growth is occurring.¹⁷ The trends outlined in his book pointed to a rising of multiple powers after the eventual collapse of the bipolar (US versus Soviet) world order. With the collapse of the USSR, the United States emerged as the greatest world power. With our competitor's demise, the "cost" of intervention decreased dramatically. Going back to Kennedy's analysis of future economic growth, however, rising powers will be competing with US interests, once again striving to create a multi-polar world.¹⁸ These factors point to an increase in Peace Operations as a cost effective way of shaping the international environment to satisfy US interests.

Strategic Context

The strategic environment has changed drastically, since the end of the Cold War. A brief look at what international factors may influence the operational environment will set the

¹³ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), xx.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 349.

¹⁵ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Changes and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 539.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, xviii.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 540.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, xxi.

stage for the discussion of POs. In the post Cold-War World, there is no shortage of theories about what international relations will consist of. This section will outline the ideas in Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, Kaplan's *The Coming Anarchy* and Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* to give credence to the idea that, in a uni-polar world, conflicts are becoming increasingly complex.

In Samuel Huntington's theory of the *Clash of Civilizations*, changes in interstate behavior after the demise of the Cold-War structure adds to the depth of complexity in international relations. In a simplified form, Huntington's argument is that, after the passing of the bi-polar cold war world, the next largest "grouping" of nation state interests was at the civilization level.¹⁹ This paradigm recognizes the tension between integration and cultural awareness that affects the individual nation states decision-making, and points out that the cultural "fault lines" are flash points for conflict.²⁰

Kaplan's views of new driving forces in conflict as the confluence of demographic, environmental and societal stresses integrate sub- and trans-nation state pressures into the international paradigm. In Kaplan's analysis, the demographic explosion will exacerbate the perilous conditions of the environment in many developing countries, thus becoming the source of future foreign policy challenges.²¹ He further forecasts the erosion of the nation state's power as private security firms vie for the right to provide security through violence.²² While events in other parts of the world may appear distant, the interconnectedness of societies is growing, making the world increasingly interdependent.

¹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 21.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 23.

²¹ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War* (New York: Random House, 2000), 7,20.

²² *Ibid.*, 7.

Central to Friedman's thesis in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* is the tension between modernity and tradition generated by the growing interconnectedness of the entire world. While the interconnectedness may or may not make conflict less likely, it will force geographically separate, but interdependent, areas into a more global world-view. Friedman acknowledges the contributions of Huntington and Kaplan, while giving the forces they describe a place in his theory of globalization.²³ No longer is the balance of power a function of nation states, the balance is between the trinity of nation states, markets and individuals.²⁴

Kennedy's research establishes the additional power associated with the United State's geopolitical position. Kaplan and Huntington's ideas outline the increased potential demands on that power in order to maintain geopolitical stability. Friedman's ideas on globalization emphasize the broader impacts of the application of that power in pursuit of national objectives. The reason for linking Huntington, Kaplan and Friedman into the strategic environment discussion is to illustrate the increasingly complex nature of the international relations environment in the post-cold war world. The above theorists only have to be partially correct in their musings about the global environment to cause a significant increase in the difficulty of making policy decisions.

The complexity and interconnectedness of the international environment places a heavier premium on the ability to: forecast the effects of operations understand the actors affected by operations and grasp the overwhelming interconnectedness of the diplomatic, informational, economic and military systems. These characteristics paint the picture of a military environment, which demands: extensive interagency integration, embedded analysis capabilities to forecast effects, and an acute awareness of the appropriate level of force required. The views of these

²³ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999) xviii.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.

trends in international relations presented in this section set the framework for the complexity associated with military operations conducted in this environment. While each writer's vision may not perfectly represent the "real world," when taken together, the pictures they present characterizes the apparent trends within the international environment.

Methodology

Units do an excellent job transitioning the physical aspects of the mission (patrols, checkpoints, force protection) while not effectively transitioning the progression of long-term projects.²⁵ This monograph postulates the existence of “Operational Disconnects.” “Operational Disconnects” refers to the breaks in the continuity of a campaign plan resulting in the loss of information, cultural awareness and experience in the area of operations. The operational disconnect term is used to show the abrupt breaks in the continuity of the campaign plan supporting POs. These discontinuities prevent the progress towards the political and military conditions required to succeed.

This monograph answers the research question with the following qualifications or limitations. This paper will use the first two years of KFOR operations in the US sector ('99-'00). This limitation is necessary because it represents the most fluid conditions in the area of operations during the existence of KFOR. I will examine the current US Army Brigade Combat Team and Mechanized Division organization and compare the capabilities from those organizations, as they currently exist, with respect to planning capabilities. This study will examine campaign planning as outlined in joint and army doctrinal manuals and explain why such planning is especially critical to POs. Once the problem has been examined, some

²⁵ Larry Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense Command and Control Research Project, 2002), [accessed online]; available from <http://www.dodccrp.org>; Internet; accessed on 3 January 2004, 283.

recommendations for organizational or policy changes will be made to minimize "Operational Disconnects" by enabling campaign plan maintenance.

This study will rely on primary source documents from three sources. First, the campaign-planning framework will be laid out using a combination of Joint US military doctrine and US Army doctrine. While joint doctrine has primacy, the study uses concepts and definitions from both to establish the relevancy of its application to a PO environment. Second, the organizational theory will be integrated from Mintzberg's theories on management and organizational structure. These theories will be used to examine current army tactical organizations and capabilities. Third, Task Force Falcon after action reviews will be integrated to illustrate the need for campaign planning at the lowest levels.

Relevance

Operation Iraqi Freedom has illustrated that, not only will this superpower "do windows"; but that we will also replace the windows we destroy. POs are hard missions. They deserve a harder look and more rigorous doctrinal treatment; a treatment that is comparable to the examination of high intensity conflict. The current geopolitical environment suggests that these operations will increase in frequency. It would serve military planners well to operationalize current doctrinal concepts with respect to the Stability and Support mission. The US military does not perform its best during POs, possibly because of the cultural bias that it is not "our job." The skills required in POs are also very similar to those required in post-combat stability operations. With the advent of the Bush administrations "pre-emptive strike" policy, the Army will likely see more and more requirements for these extended missions. Like it or not, the mission is on the Army's plate.

Chapter 2

ESTABLISHING THE COMPLEXITY OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace Operations occur in a complex environment that requires a campaign plan to reach policy objectives. This chapter will: define a complex environment, describe the PO threat environment, describe the different actors within the environment and their effects on a BCT, and finally postulate the compression of the strategic, operational and tactical echelons within this environment.

Defining Complexity

Before establishing the relative complexity of the PO mission, I will outline a common definition of complexity in a systems construct. Dorner, in *The Logic of Failure*, identified the characteristics inherent in complex situations as: interdependency, intransparency, internal dynamics and mistaken hypotheses.²⁶ Dorner defined complexity as the existence of many interdependent variables within a given system.²⁷ Dorner further defined the complexity by stating that an increase in the number of variables coupled with an increase in their interrelations increases the complexity of the system.²⁸ These characteristics are summarized by visualizing the problem as a multivariable problem, in which all the interrelations amongst the variables can always change (dynamic), if they can be seen at all (intransparency).²⁹ Some assumptions have to be made about the interrelations. Those assumptions have to be revisited in order to confirm them (avoiding a mistaken hypothesis).³⁰ If complexity is not well defined in doctrine, then a

²⁶ Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 37-42.

²⁷ Ibid., 38.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

relative complexity of the mission can be determined by examining the increase in the number of actors present in a unit's area of operation during Peace Operations.

Complexity in a Peace Operations Environment

As stated earlier, the PO environment is complex due to the increase in the number of "threats" that the BCT has to be aware of, the increase of friendly capabilities and requirements within the area, and the presence of external actors within the BCT Area of Operations. These facts are required to illustrate that the BCT has the physical resources to perform the mission, but not the inherent capability to cope with the complexity.

The Threat Environment

The "threat" environment in a PO is an amorphous one.³¹ FM 3-0 cautions commanders to not label any opposing factions during a peace operation as "the enemy."³² The neutrality and international legitimacy of the peacekeeping force rests on all sides perceiving the PO force as evenhanded and not allied with any side. From the definition of PO operations, we know that there exist at least two former warring factions.³³ The existence of two competing entities doubles that tracking requirements of the BCT relative to conventional conflict. These groups often have "aims" that compete with the aims of the BCT. Army doctrine advises commanders to be ready to switch from Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) to Peace Enforcement Operation (PEO) and back as required.³⁴ The competing aims require the BCT to rely on more human intelligence

³¹ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 9-5.

³² Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations* [DRAG](Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 February 2002), 1-15.

³³ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 9-6. Peace Operations encompass Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement Operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish or maintain peace.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 9-6. Albeit, only after a change in mandate or force structure has been approved.

because of the nature of the threat.³⁵ This includes monitoring attitudes and intentions of the population are more than physical presence of soldiers and equipment.³⁶ The bottom line: the threat is that it is no longer an echeloned threat the attacks methodically. The entire force structure of the army is structured to oppose the logic of the former soviet block system. This leads to the examination of the logic of the threat system.

Threat forces are assumed to be organized. With leadership, cells, hierarchical organization, they have all the characteristics of a complex and adaptive system. In POs involving the separations of former warring factions, such as the on the Sinai, the systems are well established.³⁷ In POs involving former insurgents, the structure that enabled the insurgency prior to the PO can still provide capabilities after the arrival of the peace operation forces.³⁸

The Increase in External Actors in the BCT AOR

The presence of and increased relative effects of other actors in the BCT area of operations adds to the complexity of the mission. In a Peace Operations environment, the BCT typically has special operations forces (SOF), civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (Psyops), military police (MP), and governmental and non-governmental organizations operating in the BCT area. This was the case in Haiti during Operation Restore Democracy. SOF personnel have served as liaisons with coalition partners and the community while working in the Area of Operations.³⁹ The SOF personnel also provided a sense of security in the outlying areas.⁴⁰ The civil affairs units provided infrastructure assessments that identified the most critical

³⁵ Ibid., 9-5.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 9-6.

³⁸ Ibid., 9-7. e.g., Somalia, 1992-1993 is the example used in the manual.

³⁹ Walter E. Kretchick, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 169.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

needs of the local populations and were key to enhancing the legitimacy of the Host Nation.⁴¹ Pysops forces created a climate conducive to missions, such as cordon and search.⁴² During operations in Haiti, operations linked conventional forces with CA, Pysop and SOF to reinforce the legitimacy of returning regime.⁴³ In Kosovo, these same forces were used to shape the security environment in Task Force Falcon's area of operation.⁴⁴ These examples are cited to highlight the increased number of units operating in proximity to a BCT in a PO. Further complexity is added through the presence of governmental and non-governmental organizations that the BCT does not control but creates effects on the population.

NGO and PVO Effects on the Environment

The primary Governmental Organization effecting peace operations is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The primary mission of USAID is to manage humanitarian, civil assistance and developmental activities in order to improve economic and social conditions.⁴⁵ By law, this organization manages its programs by planning and implementing programs overseas.⁴⁶ Resources may come from other agencies within the US Government, but the orchestration of this effort rests with USAID.⁴⁷ This adds the unique twist of interagency cooperation to the PO environment.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are not controlled by military or governmental representatives, but conduct operations and produce effects in the Area of Operations. While NGO activities may be influenced by military forces through persuasion, cooperation can only be

⁴¹ Ibid., 123-124.

⁴² Ibid., 125,129.

⁴³ Ibid., 125.

⁴⁴ Wentz, 428-429. The presence of SOF, CA, PYSOP and other combat multipliers.

⁴⁵ Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations* [DRAG], A19.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., A10. The paragraph explains the relationships between other government departments and USAID.

obtained by showing a clear confluence of interests for certain projects. FM 3-07 points out that discovering the common ground and identifying mutually supporting objectives with these organizations can ensure unity of effort.⁴⁸ These organizations add to the complexity of the operation by their long-term presence, their resources and their knowledge of the local conditions.⁴⁹

These actors can affect the BCT operations within its AO, increasing the requirement to monitor effects and adjust unit actions. Without positive control of all the actors, the Peace Operation begins to exhibit the characteristics of a complex situation as outlined by Dorner. Intransparency is present with the inability to understand or quantify population and NGO motivations. Assumptions have to be made about effects of operations; therefore mistaken hypothesis can appear if assumptions are not revisited. The dynamic nature of the system is apparent in both the shifting aims of the former warring factions and the shifting aims of the NGOs. All three moving targets need to be monitored and BCT operations adjusted to prevent reactive vice proactive responses. FM 3-07 states that predictive intelligence allows military forces to maintain situational understanding and keep the initiative.⁵⁰

Media Effects on the BCT Environment

The increased presence and influence of media on the mission have contributed to the compression of the strategic, operational and tactical considerations in the AO, thereby increasing the complexity of the mission. The tactical level is linked more tightly to the strategic level. Doctrine identifies that the "Global Information Environment will extend down to the man on the street and the soldier on checkpoint."⁵¹ Events at the local level can now have international

⁴⁸ Ibid., A-12.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 4-20.

⁵¹ Ibid., 4-23.

repercussions.⁵² The doctrine emphasized that the information environment is not controlled, as in wartime. The military is an active participant, competing with other active participants to broadcast its message.⁵³ Information will generate perceptions at a faster rate (due to connectivity) shortening required analysis and reaction times. This was a major problem in Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo.⁵⁴ The speed of information flow, the proliferation of information sources and the breadth of the audiences consuming the information all point to an expansion of the strategic and operational realms into the tactical area.

Summary

The increased complexity of the threat environment, increased numbers and relative effects of other non-BCT actors and the expanded and overlapping strategic, operational and tactical considerations require a headquarters to be capable of monitoring, controlling and processing information into situational understanding so that the effects of all actors can be focused towards the achievement of long term policy objectives. The simultaneous integration of varied capabilities with different effects at the lowest tactical levels is imposing a greater planning and forecasting requirement on the lowest tactical echelons. Unit efforts that were orchestrated by higher headquarters in the echeloned battlefield are now compressed into the BCT area of operations. An information environment that amplifies these tactical actions can be attributed to the increased connectivity of the world.

This chapter described the complexity of the PO environment. The institutional bias against the mission has retarded our development of thought on how to deal with this complex problem. The variety of actors, the diverse effects and varying conditions of employment also

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., 4-24.

⁵⁴ Wentz, 431-432.

pose greater complexity than in traditional combat roles. The compression of the strategic, operational and tactical levels created by the transparency of operations, the presence of the media and the requirement for interagency and international cooperation is a condition embedded in the mission. This monograph will now examine the utility of campaign planning methodology and terminology to Peace Operations as a means to address the inherent complexity of the mission.

Chapter 3

USING CAMPAIGN PLANNING TO ADDRESS COMPLEXITY

The campaign planning terminology needs to be broadened in order to apply it to POs. This section will outline the changes to the definitions of the campaign planning tools as outlined in Army and Joint doctrinal manuals. I will integrate the critical factors analysis as described in joint doctrine, the Effects Based Operations (EBO) theory as described by the Air Force and the Army elements of operational design. This integration is necessary in order to integrate the most current thoughts on targeting and analysis into the campaign design process for POs. First, the relevant elements of operational design will be defined or clarified. Next, the concepts of centers of gravity and decisive points will be examined and broadened using the more current thoughts on critical factor analysis and effects based operations. The resulting definitions and concepts will be used later in the paper when examining the case study.

Campaign Planning Scope

Because POs are so complex and long term, they may require a campaign plan at the lower tactical levels. Campaign planning is usually done by Joint Task Forces because of the complexity, scope, duration and size of the operations.⁵⁵ Operations in a PO environment should leverage interagency effect, enhance host nation legitimacy, enhance forecasting of consequences and enhance the effects of violence when applied. These criteria suggest the need for campaign planning at lower levels to synchronize effects that differ temporally, physically and psychologically to achieve campaign objectives.

⁵⁵ Department of Defense, JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* [Second Draft](Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 December 2002), IV-6.

As mentioned in the introductory portion of the chapter, the doctrinal basis of the analysis is FM 3-0's elements of operational design. While these have broad applicability to peer competitor conflicts, the integration of these tools into POs is mentioned only tangentially. This section will examine the definitions and applicability of all the elements of operational design with respect to POs. Initially, the definition, context and components of campaign planning should be outlined. This process will focus the discussion by establishing the characteristics and boundaries of the current concepts. This will facilitate the expansion of the concepts to lower tactical levels.

What is campaign planning? Joint Publication 5-0 defines campaign planning as a "process whereby the Combatant Commanders, Joint Force Commanders translate theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans."⁵⁶ These plans are conducted when "...military operations exceed the scope of a simple major joint operation."⁵⁷ They are inherently joint.⁵⁸ The joint publication goes further in distinguishing campaign plans into global, theater subordinate and major operations plans. The subordinate campaign plans are warranted when..."the assigned missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be conducted within the framework of a joint operation."⁵⁹ After having developed what campaigns, and campaign plans are, the accepted conceptual tools for campaign planning are examined.

⁵⁶ Ibid., IV-1.

⁵⁷ Ibid., IV-2.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., IV-6.

The Starting Point: FM 3-0 and the Elements of Operational Design

The elements of operational design are used to help visualization and linkage of ends, ways and means.⁶⁰ While the design process is intellectual, influenced by experience and judgment, the tools or elements of operational design are essential in describing the campaign design process.⁶¹ FM 3-0 outlines nine elements of operational design, which this monograph will use to examine a campaign plan. The Army Field Manual is used because the scope of the paper is limited to the BCT level. Because the BCT will be operating in a joint environment, the elements of operational design definitions are expanded in the following paragraphs to update the concepts with more current and emerging joint doctrine (which has primacy in our doctrinal system).⁶² While the Army's elements of operational design are key to campaign planning, in order to integrate the criteria of the study (Rephrased Considerations for Stability Operations found in FM 3-0),⁶³ the system based concepts of Effects Based Operations and Critical Factors Analysis need to be integrated. These two components broaden the current campaign plan concepts from FM 3-0 by integrating systems theory into the PO campaign-planning environment.

The elements of operational design to be expanded are: Centers of Gravity, Decisive Points, Lines of Operation and Endstate and Military Conditions. These concepts are expanded because they are all affected by the integration of the systems approach taken by Critical Capabilities-Critical Requirements-Critical Vulnerabilities (CC-CR-CV) analysis and Effects Based Operations (EBO) outlined in the following paragraphs. The application of EBO and CC-CR-CV allows these four concepts to be linked and interdependent.

⁶⁰ Ibid., IV-8.

⁶¹ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-1.

⁶² Department of Defense, JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, i.

⁶³ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 9-5.

The center of gravity definition is the central concept around which all other campaign design concepts are arrayed. FM 3-0 defined the center of gravity as: "those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight."⁶⁴ The doctrine stated that COGs will be protected, there are many approaches to the COG and the once neutralized or destroyed, victory is near.⁶⁵ The definition is military focused, and not amenable to Peace Operations.

The decisive point, in relation to a COG, is "not a center of gravity; they are the key to attacking or protecting them"⁶⁶ The army doctrinal definition is "...a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over and enemy and greatly influence the outcome of the attack."⁶⁷ This term has even more of a tactical flavor than COG. Doctrine cites that Decisive Points have a different flavor in stability operations, but stops short of defining what the change actually is.⁶⁸

Lines of operation provide a linkage between various decisive points while progressing to influence a COG. By doctrine, Lines of Operation are: "the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objective."⁶⁹ The following paragraph links decisive points along lines of operations the defeat of an enemy force.⁷⁰ Doctrine introduces logical lines of operation as means of linking decisive points when positional meaning has little meaning.⁷¹ The logical lines of operation offer

⁶⁴ Ibid., 5-7.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 5-7.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 5-7.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid., 5-9.

a way to link military and non-military means.⁷² While lines of operation provide a vector or trajectory, they do not provide a target or endpoint.

Endstate and military conditions provides an endpoint to the operational concepts outlined above. At the operational level, the definition is "...the conditions that, when achieved, attain the aims set for the campaign or major operation."⁷³ In operations where endstates are not defined in military terms, or are vague, measures of effectiveness are used to gauge progress towards and endstate.⁷⁴ Doctrine acknowledges that this concept is not often used, is vague or changes.⁷⁵ The commander examines operational objectives through measures of effectiveness to measure progress.⁷⁶ Of all the definitions; this has the most flexible and able to accommodate POs. Endstate and military conditions also encourages the establishment of a feedback loop to monitor progress. A tenuous linkage among the four concepts is established in the doctrine, especially in the illustration of logical lines of operation from figure 5-3 of FM 3-0. But how do we integrate these concepts into POs, given the heavy focus of doctrine on decisive operations with an enemy force to provide positional focus?

Expanding Operational Design with Joint Doctrine

By integrating the elements of critical factor analysis from the Joint Planning publications, the definitions can modified, expanded and interconnected. Critical factors analysis applies a systems approach to determining the methods of attacking a center of gravity.⁷⁷ The analysis, first written about by Dr. Strange and eventually incorporated into joint doctrine,

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., 5-6.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 5-7.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 5-6.

⁷⁷ Dr. Joe Strange, *Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building a Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2002), 33.

identifies the Center of Gravity, Critical Capabilities (that allow the COG to function), Critical Requirements (essential resources, conditions or means for a Critical Capability to be fully operative) and Critical Vulnerabilities (the critical requirements or components of requirements that are vulnerable and produce decisive results).⁷⁸ The decomposition of the CG-CC-CR-CV links friendly capabilities with enemy vulnerabilities.⁷⁹ Considerations for attacking these vulnerabilities, as outlined in the joint manual, are criticality, accessibility, vulnerability and redundancy.⁸⁰ This lends a temporal aspect to the vulnerabilities, implying an adaptive response by the opposing COG.

The Critical Vulnerability translates to decisive points when the COG cannot be neutralized in a single operation and assets are capable of affecting the vulnerability. The joint publication establishes this to account for the inability to defeat the COG directly, accounting for cumulative effects of operations thru the vulnerabilities.⁸¹ Once the vulnerabilities have friendly capabilities dedicated against them, they become decisive points.⁸² The extended nature of Peace Operations implies that forces in this operation will use decisive points. The joint publication links these concepts in the following excerpt: "The essence of the operations art lies in being able to mass effects against an adversaries Critical Vulnerabilities in order to destroy or neutralize them, employing both kinetic and non-kinetic means of attack."⁸³ The above quote provides the doctrinal basis for integrating Effects Based Operations into the campaign-planning paradigm.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 3. Or Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, IV-13.

⁷⁹ Strange, 152.

⁸⁰ Department of Defense, JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* [Second Draft], IV-13.

⁸¹ Strange, 152.

⁸² Department of Defense, JP5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* [Second Draft], IV-20.

⁸³ Ibid., IV-15.

Closing the Feedback Loop with EBO

The basic concepts for Effects Based Operations (EBO) are outlined in the Air University's booklet, *Thinking Effects*. These concepts are essential to improving this studies criteria of "enhance the forecasting of consequences." The heart of effects based operations is the understanding and qualification of the results of dedicating friendly capabilities against decisive points.⁸⁴ This concept emphasizes the assessment process after a decisive point has friendly capabilities dedicated against it. The theory, by qualifying the different types of effects, it invites the campaign planner to integrate the results of operations into the functioning of the COG. In effect, EBO completes the feedback loop in the campaign planning process.

The effects based methodology advocated in *Thinking Effects* extent ends the CG-CC-CR-CV analysis by examining the cumulative effects of operations against Decisive Points. The concepts links actions through causal linkages to effects on a COG.⁸⁵ By articulation and integration of multiple effects the concept enables a more precise articulation of effects and their inter-relations.⁸⁶ By advocating a deeper analysis of interactions, the theory expands the breadth of analysis, enabling forces to accurately model complex interactions, forecast cumulative effects, and establish the feedback loop from the Decisive Points to the Center of Gravity to account for second and third order effects. Effects Based Operations acknowledges the difficulty of forecasting "higher order" effects. The theory notes that some effects, such as psychological, are much harder to measure.⁸⁷ The theory accommodates the complexity of effects by the feedback (assessment) that integrates the assessment, evaluation (positive and negative) and adaptation of operations with a view to maximizing adaptation.

⁸⁴ Edward C. Mann III, Gary Endersby, Thomas R. Searle, *Thinking Effects— Effects Based Methodology for Joint Operations* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, October 2002) 49.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 52-53.

Modifying FM 3-0 Elements of Operational Design

Finally, the modification of definitions and their arrangement to produce a campaign planning methodology that allows the Kosovo case study to be examined through the criteria based “lens”. The modifications include expanding the COG concept to a system that can be analyzed through the CG-CC-CR-CV analysis. The CVs that are targeted (by whatever means) are then assessed through the effects based methodology to account of adaptations of the targeted system. This dynamic assessment process leads to a deeper analysis of the effects produced (outcomes) that feed back into to CG-CC-CR-CV analysis to account for systems adaptation with respect to lines of operations and targeted endstates and military conditions.

Summary

This previous section modified and broadened the terminology used for campaign planning in order to make it more applicable to the PO environment. This was necessary to provide the tools for the campaign analysis later in this monograph. The elements of campaign planning are tool to examine the actions of a unit during execution. So the four elements of operational design can be linked through purpose by visualizing a center of gravity around which decisive points are arrayed along lines of operations whose trajectories are limited with endstates and military conditions. This planning is a method to deal with the complexity inherent in the PO, as explained in Chapters Two and Three.

Chapter 4

ANAYLYZING THE BRIGADE STRUCTURE TO DEAL WITH THE COMPLEXITY

This section examines how current BCTs are organized to conduct operations and compares how well they are resourced to conduct campaign plan “maintenance”. Campaign plan maintenance is the adaptation of operations based upon outcomes of operations against an adaptive enemy. This chapter explores the theoretical basis for the functioning of the organization using Mintzberg’s theory on organization and functions. The current organization of BCTs and Divisions are then compared to highlight differences in functions with respect to organization. Finally, this monograph will advance the theory that BCTs are not organized to conduct campaign plan maintenance in a PO environment.

Mintzberg’s Theory on Organizational Dynamics

Mintzberg's theory on organizational archetypes identifies characteristics and environmental influences on organizations. These archetypes are the synthesis of many graduate studies that supported a lifetime of teaching and researching organizational design and redesign.⁸⁸ The theory’s strength is that it applies a systems approach to organizational design by providing a typology for an organization’s structure and the interrelations and interactions of that structure both within the organization and with its environment.⁸⁹ By examining the organizational gestalt, he provides a macro view of how organizations effect, and are affected by their internal structure and their environment.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Henry Mintzberg, *Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World of Organizations* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 2.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 96.

Mintzberg's organizational archetype examines an organization in relation to common organizational parts, coordinating mechanisms (internal) and external characteristics (Graphical depiction, Appendix A).⁹¹ According to Mintzberg, the organization has six basic parts. The *operating core* is the basis of the organization. This is the organization's interface with the environment. In the army, these are the task forces that compose the BCT that interact with the environment. The *strategic apex*, at the top of the organization, is where the organization is managed and directed. This is analogous to the Commander. Between the operating core and the apex is the *middle line*, which develops as the complexity of tasks at the operating core increases. From an army perspective, the commanders and staffs at the task force levels form the middle line. The *support staff* provides internal services to all levels of the organization, but has no influence over the tasks performed by the operating core as it operates in its environment. This is analogous to personnel service battalions, finance battalions, tenant units and installation staffs. The *techno-structure* personnel form the planners and operations staffs that, while outside the command hierarchy, perform coordinating functions that effect performance of the operating core, with guidance from the strategic apex. These are the functions performed by the planning sections. *Ideology* is the final organizational component that embodies the organizational culture, traditions and beliefs of the organization.⁹² The author highlights organizational culture as the "glue" that unifies the actions of the separate parts of the organization.⁹³ After explaining the parts of the organization, the author examines the interactions within the organizational parts.

The interactions within the organization are termed coordinating mechanisms. These mechanisms are defined in Appendix A.⁹⁴ The coordinating mechanisms types are: mutual

⁹¹ Ibid., 99.

⁹² Ibid., 98.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 101-103.

adjustment, direct supervision and forms of standardization. As the operating environment increases in complexity, the coordinating mechanisms move from mutual adjustment to direct supervision to forms of standardization.⁹⁵ As the environment simplifies, the coordinating mechanisms descend the hierarchy, moving back to mutual adjustment.⁹⁶ The primary coordinating mechanisms that the techno-structure influences are: the Standardization of Work and Standardization of Outputs.⁹⁷ As noted above, the organization's environment affects these interactions.

Mintzberg's theory on organizational design and behavior outlines general hypotheses on the external environment's effects on organizational structure. As the external environment becomes more complex, the organization tends to: increase organic structure, decentralize decision-making, divisionalize the operating core, and increase centralization.⁹⁸ A more dynamic environment results in a greater reliance on direct supervision and forms of standardization.⁹⁹ What does this mean in a PO scenario? Operating core units become more distinct and independent as they adapt to their local environment. The operating core requires more technostructure to standardize outputs (or effects) as the organization adapts to local complex environments.

Establishing parallels with US Army Organization

In a mechanized division and brigade's organization in a PO, using Mintzberg's organizational structure, the units generally perform the following functions. The task forces

⁹⁵ Ibid., 101-102.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 102.

⁹⁷ Ibid. Standardization of Work achieves coordination through specifying how to carry out specific tasks. Standardization of outputs achieves coordination through specifying the results *or effects* of interrelated tasks. (*effects* added by the author)

⁹⁸ Ibid., 108.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 102.

form the operating core. These units are how the organization interacts with the environment on a daily basis. In Kosovo, these were the organizations that were given “areas of operation.”¹⁰⁰ The Task Force Falcon’s commander, an assistant division commander from the division providing the BCT for the operation, formed the strategic apex.¹⁰¹ The Brigade commander of the BCT and his immediate staff formed the middle line. The planning staff, and the remainder of staffs of organizations that were organized into the task forces that controlled the terrain in their area of operations, formed the techno-structure. This techno-structure included planners from the division.¹⁰² The support battalion, finance, medical, property book and supply units are analogous to the support staff of Mintzberg’s archetype. By showing how the elements of Task Force Falcon, and task organized US Army Units in general, are analogous to the organizational archetype, we enable a comparison between a brigade and a division’s structure.

With campaign planning and maintenance taken as a given for a complex situation, such as during POs, and the comparison of organizational structure using Mintzberg’s archetype and typology allows a baseline to be developed to compare the divisional and brigade planning structures. The chart in Appendix B shows the organization, education, and available experience pool of the planning staffs at both Brigade and Divisional level.¹⁰³ Important differences in size may be lost if the education level and experiential pool are left out of the analysis. The breadth and depth of knowledge available in order to forecast effects in complex situations is critical to the ability of the unit to manage its environment, versus being managed by it.

¹⁰⁰ Department of the Army, *Task Force Falcon Interim Report*, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, 15 November 1999, 1.

¹⁰¹ Wendt, 437.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 429.

¹⁰³ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Command and Control [DRAG]*(Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Army, March 2001), C-6, C-7.

The army's staff organizational structure, graphically depicted in Appendix B, is predicated on the assumption that at lower levels, the operational problems are simpler and do not require as much "brainpower" to solve.¹⁰⁴ Hence, the staffs rely on more informal processes and can be smaller. The different organizations assume that the tactical problems get simpler at lower levels of command. As described earlier, the contemporary operations environment is increasing in complexity at the lower levels, increasing the requirement for "operational cognition" in order to forecast effects and conduct campaign plan maintenance.

Deducing Capabilities from Size and Composition

This chapter used Mintzberg's theory on organizations to examine current US Army staff structures at divisional and brigade levels to determine if a capability deficit could exist. Mintzberg's theory allows the current force structure of both organizations to be conceptualized and compared. The lack of operational training present at the BCT level severely limited that organization's ability to perform in peace operations, such as TF Falcon during Operation Joint Guardian.¹⁰⁵ The techno-structure holds a unit's ability to understand and maintain a campaign plan in order to forecast and synchronize effects, leverage interagency support, enhance the legitimacy of the host nation. The structure may be under-resourced at the brigade level. The TF Falcon case study will shed some light on this potential "maintenance" problem.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., C-6.

¹⁰⁵ Department of the Army, *Task Force Falcon Interim Report*, 15 November 1999, 2-3.

Chapter 5

KOSOVO CASE STUDY

Previous chapters have reviewed the complexity of the operating environment, and offered campaign planning as a means to maximize the criteria set forth in the beginning of the paper. Operations of Task Force Falcon provide a well-documented historical example of how this framework could be used to optimize organizational design to perform the Peace Operations. This case study sketches the background of the conflict, extrapolates and analyzes the campaign plans, establish the linkage between the campaign plan and the study's criteria. To avoid a recitation of historical events, this study will examine how KFOR forces managed specific events within the Multinational Brigade (East) (MNB(E)) area, KFOR 2 is presented first. It is assumed that the units participating in KFOR 2 learned lessons from the previous rotations and those improvements are a direct result of hard lessons, learned early on. For KFOR 2, the developing insurgency in the Ground Safety Zone on the border of Serbia and the Task Force response are examined. For KFOR 1, the study focuses on the mitigation of ethnic terrorism after the initial deployment. The criteria of the monograph will be applied to determine the effectiveness of campaign planning with respect to unit operations.

A Brief Background of the Conflict

The ethnic tensions between Serbian and Albanian people have a long and complicated history that spans centuries. The most recent manifestation has been the war and following international peace operations in Kosovo. The history is relevant because it establishes a long-

term nature of the conflict. The revocation of Kosovo's autonomous status in the 1980's began the slow descent into the current manifestation of the long running ethnic conflict.¹⁰⁶

A brief history of the area will establish the complexity of the threat environment. Albanian claims to the region may go as far back as Illyrians, who settled the area during the time of Ancient Greece.¹⁰⁷ The Serbian claim to the region is based on the establishment of the Serbian empire in the Middle Ages, cemented in the Serbian mind in the fourteenth century by the defeat of Serbia by the Ottoman Empire on the Field of Blackbirds (1389).¹⁰⁸ The subsequent defeat of the Serbian forces by the Ottoman Turks began the slow erosion of the Serbian empire that resulted in Ottoman rule that persisted from 1459 until after World War I.¹⁰⁹ Both parties have historical claims to the area that have been intensified through long term struggles that appeal to the passions of nationalism. Peace Operations have to factor the long-term struggle with nationalistic roots into the planning for Peace operations.

Factional Operational Patterns

The general aims of the factions can be deduced from their actions during the case study's timeframe. The general aim of the Albanian faction was to maintain the autonomous status of Kosovo, and expand the province if possible.¹¹⁰ The Serbian aim was to keep the province of Kosovo as a part of Serbia.¹¹¹ These aims will be articulated in terms of the campaign plan design used in chapter three.

¹⁰⁶ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2000), 2.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 4,8.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 8,21.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 301.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 295-296.

Albanian politico-military organization's aim was focused on preparing the province to maintain its autonomy from Serbia. Initial line of operation focused on total ethnic cleansing of other ethnic groups the province. This aim was supported by an increase in ethnic violence, arson and murder in order to solidify the Albanian claim to the province by removing other ethnicities.¹¹² Once US forces established their presence in sector, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) developed multiple lines of operation focused on establishing Albanian legitimacy¹¹³, consolidating control of the population through terrorism,¹¹⁴ and building an insurgency for territorial expansion.¹¹⁵ The KLA established a shadow government that conducted law enforcement and collected protection money from returning Albanians.¹¹⁶ The KLA used terrorism to extract taxes, maintain control and influence the ethnic compositions of towns under its control.¹¹⁷ The KLA withheld arms and ammunition during its demobilization that enabled the budding insurgency in the Presevo valley in early 2000.¹¹⁸ These lines of operations supported the overall aim of maintaining Kosovo as a separate nation.

The Serbian aim was to reintegrate Kosovo as a province of Serbia or partition the province.¹¹⁹ The initial lines of operation developed into maintaining a Serbian presence in the province, hindering the legitimacy of KFOR established governmental structures, and containing the Albanian influence within the borders of the province.¹²⁰ Initial operations focused on maintaining a Serbian presence in the province, which would facilitate the reoccupation of the

¹¹² Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *Task Force Falcon Interim Report*, 15 November 2000, 1.

¹¹³ Judah, 286.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 292.

¹¹⁵ Gary Dempsey, "The Real Kosovo," [Database online]; Internet; accessed online at <http://www.balkanpeace.org>. on 15 March 2004. From the author: "The KLA has an underground network and more than enough weapons to start another war."

¹¹⁶ Priest, 321-322.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 329.

¹¹⁸ Dempsey, 1.

¹¹⁹ Judah, 296.

¹²⁰ Judah, 306.

province after the departure of KFOR.¹²¹ The Serbian presence in Kosovo was focused around main transportation hubs in sector in order to facilitate a Serbian reoccupation.¹²² The Serbian Government threatened to discontinue pensions for Kosovo Serbs if they cooperated with UNMIK hindered KFOR legitimacy.¹²³ Albanian containment was accomplished by maintaining Serbian military presence outside the ground safety zone dictated under the military technical agreement that ended the air war over Serbia. The Serbian forces were to insure the territorial integrity of Serbia.¹²⁴ These competing and mutually exclusive aims generally describe the environment that KFOR and Task Force Falcon found themselves in after deploying into Kosovo.

KFOR 2 Campaign Planning/Execution

While not sequential, an examination of the KFOR 2 campaign plan allows an examination of how MNB(E) campaign plan was developed and implemented. The campaign plan was fully articulated by the beginning of KFOR 2, enabling the BCT to operate in a complex environment and articulate impacts that evolving operational requirements had on other missions. This campaign plan maximized the case study's criterion by: leveraging interagency resources, enhancing the legitimacy of the host nation (UNMIK in this case), enhancing the forecasting of consequences and, when applied, enhancing the effects of violence. In the KFOR 2 MNB(E) AAR, the command considers an important element of its success to the operation was the unit's campaign plan.¹²⁵

¹²¹ Ibid., 294, 307.

¹²² U.S. Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Command and Control* [DRAG](Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Army, March 2001), C-6.

¹²³ Priest, 311.

¹²⁴ Judah, 306.

¹²⁵ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *After Action Review*, June 2001, vii.

The campaign plan established trust in the capabilities of MNB(E) as the Center of Gravity.¹²⁶ The three critical requirements for trust were: knowledge of MNB(E) capabilities, a knowledge that those capabilities would be used if required, and a knowledge that a safe and secure environment would be maintained. The first two critical requirements were aimed at groups opposed to MNB(E). The last requirement was aimed at the general population.¹²⁷

Four lines of operation supported the maintenance of the COG in the campaign plan. Strengthening multinational teamwork and Joint Implementation Commission Management enhanced the deterrence of external aggression. “Establishing a Safe and Secure Environment” focused on conducting elections, “Enhancing UNMIK Capabilities and Legitimacy,” “Reducing Security Missions” (checkpoints, static site guards, detention facility operations) commensurate with an increase in UNMIK capabilities, and the “Continuation of Demining.” The Support to UNMIK line of operation focused on: return of Serb refugees, ethnically integrating the healthcare system and completing school restoration. Finally, the sustaining the force line of operation aimed at decreasing the cost of the mission through fiscal discipline and forward positioning of forces.¹²⁸ These lines of operation and decisive points form the framework of the campaign plan. Information Operations was integrated into operations as a “weapons system.”¹²⁹ This established the feedback loop to the COG, allowing MNB(E) to monitor effects on targeted populations. The task forces ability to deal with the complexity of the campaign is best illustrated by the resolution of the Presevo Valley insurgency, a point where the competing aims of the Albanian, Serbian and KFOR forces clashed early in KFOR 2's rotation.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 5-1.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 2-8.

Early in the KFOR 2 rotation, an Albanian insurgency developed in the Presevo Valley.¹³⁰ This event marked the collision of the Albanian expansionist aim with the Serbian containment/reintegration aim.¹³¹ Both parties' actions impacted KFOR's ability to maintain regional stability and Task Force Falcon's ability to maintain trust as a center of gravity.¹³² Albanian insurgents, exploiting the security vacuum created by the Ground Safety zone in the Presevo Valley of Serbia, formed the Army for the Liberation of Presevo, Nedvedya and Bujanovac (UCPMB).¹³³ These insurgents were supplied from Kosovo and established training bases within the GSZ, exploiting the inability of the Serbian Army from operating in the area.¹³⁴ The cascade of actions leading to the deliberate collapse of the GSZ illustrates the utility of the campaign plan in dealing with complex operational problems with strategic implications.

Task Force Falcon reacted to these changes in the political environment (Milosevic deposed), military environment (insurgency in the Presevo Valley) by coordinating a politico-military solution through KFOR and Serbia.¹³⁵ To accomplish the collapse of the GSZ, the task force had to coordinate closely with Serbian Military forces, the Albanian Community, and KFOR headquarters for additional soldiers to seal the Kosovo border.¹³⁶ Task Force Falcon accomplished this by using its campaign plan to project the disrupting effects of the reallocation of forces for the emerging missions and planned mitigation measures.¹³⁷ Information Operations

¹³⁰ Steve Bowman, *Kosovo and Macedonia: United States and Allied Military Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 2003), 7.

¹³¹ Judah, 301, 295-296.

¹³² Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *After Action Review*, June 2001, 2-2.

¹³³ Bowman, 7.

¹³⁴ Steven Erlanger, "Kosovo Rebels Regrouping in Nearby Serbia," *The New York Times*, Thursday, 2 March 2000, [accessed online]; Internet; <http://www.balkanpeace.org/monitor/koskss/kss32.html>; accessed on 10 February 2004.

¹³⁵ Bowman, 8.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

¹³⁷ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *After Action Review*, June 2001, 2-7.

were used to induce the surrender of the Albanian Insurgents, calm the fears of Albanian residents of the Presevo Valley, to prevent an Albanian refugee flow and mitigate the effects of the operation on the Albanian perceptions of TFF within Kosovo.¹³⁸ The Serbian Information Operations complemented TFF efforts, minimizing the refugee flow into the Kosovo province.¹³⁹ Interagency efforts and Host Nation legitimacy were synchronized through scheduled briefings between UNMIK, KFOR HQ and TF Falcon.¹⁴⁰ These briefings focused on goals and measures of effectiveness derived from the MNB(E) campaign plan.¹⁴¹

These observations from KFOR 2 showed the effectiveness of campaign planning paradigm into BCT level operations. The impact of conducting counter-insurgency operations was articulated in probable effects on the mission of providing a safe and secure environment.¹⁴² Operations in collapsing the GSZ were conducted with information operations used to allay the fears of Albanian residents in Serbia, preparing for a refugee flow, coordinating the information campaign with Serbian forces and KFOR and UNMIK.¹⁴³ This clearly illustrates the utility of campaign planning to forecast effects, enhancing the effects of violence applied, integration of interagency operations and enhancing host nation legitimacy.

Simple organizational changes that enabled this coordination were the treatment of IO as a "weapons system," the addition of experienced planners from outside the BCT and additional units not traditionally associated with a BCT. The IO as a weapons system used the Field Artillery Structure and processes around which, the IO process was built.¹⁴⁴ The additional

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 2-8.

¹⁴⁰ Wentz, 428-429.

¹⁴¹ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *After Action Review*, June 2001,

vii.

¹⁴² Ibid., viii.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 2-5 through 2-6.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 2-7 and Wentz, 318.

planners added the capability, experience and training to visualize the contest of wills at the operational level. While additional units, such as Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, were grafted on to the MNB (E) structure, the core of the Task Force remained the Maneuver Task Forces with their assigned sectors. With the exception of the integration of information operations, these capabilities were present for the first rotation of troops for MNB(E).

KFOR 1 Operations

A review of the TFF force structure expands the complexity of the situation, by virtue of the different capabilities applied in the confined TFF Area of Operations. A quantitative description best describes the complexity facing the BCT. MNB(E) controlled and coordinated with 50 subordinate organizations, as opposed to the 12-20 organizations normally controlled by a division.¹⁴⁵ Some of these organizations were from other countries, with different levels of training, which effected how they were integrated into the operation.¹⁴⁶ Also, different national contingents were constrained by their individual country's interests, which could result in a unit refusing to perform a mission.¹⁴⁷ Non-Governmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations also flooded the area of operations.¹⁴⁸ The variety of units and organizations emphasizes the complexity, intransparency and interdependency of the entire operation.

Upon deploying into sector, the Task Force Falcon mission quickly shifted from establishing a secure environment for Albanians to preventing ethnic cleansing by Albanian militants and preventing or co-opting the parallel security structures established by the KLA.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *Interim Report*, 15 November 1999, 2.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁴⁷ Wentz, 431.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 269. Note: There were 650 NGOs and PVOs operating in the KFOR area of operations as of September 2000.

¹⁴⁹ Gary T. Dempsey and Roger W. Fontaine, *Fools Errands* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2001), 140.

Units initially occupying the sector established the organized nature of the ethnic terrorism.¹⁵⁰ July and August of 1999, Serbs were systematically pushed out of towns by forces linked to the KLA.¹⁵¹ The KLA established parallel structures to extract taxes and begin administering the province.¹⁵² The complex task facing of MNB(E) would be a task that faces any expeditionary oriented army.

The brigade's initial reaction to the violence against the Serbs remaining in sector showed a tactical approach to solving the problem. The tactical focus is best summarized by the MNB(E) commander's methodology captured in the KFOR 1 AAR. The commander determined objectives, articulated endstates, and standards required to achieve those endstates.¹⁵³ If the Serbs want to leave sector, provide them an escort.¹⁵⁴ If militants are attacking churches, assign troops to guard the churches.¹⁵⁵ Serbian enclaves form in and around towns, detail troops to secure them.¹⁵⁶ The coordinated violence against Serbian enclaves drove the task force to task Military Police units to become more involved in searches and interrogations.¹⁵⁷ The task force focused on the objectives of the security mission, expanding its base camps and training junior staff members.¹⁵⁸

The combined effects of the lack of a campaign plan, lack of experienced staff officers and lack of education on equipment hindered KFOR's reaction. While the campaign plan was

¹⁵⁰ Priest, 311.

¹⁵¹ Judah, 295.

¹⁵² Dempsey and Fontaine, 140, 149.

¹⁵³ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *Task Force Falcon Interim Report*, 15 November 1999, 9.

¹⁵⁴ Priest, 286.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 282.

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Army Europe, *Task Force Falcon Trip Report*, March 2000, 5.

¹⁵⁷ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *Interim Report*, 15 November 1999, 16.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 7.

prominent in KFOR 2s AAR, KFOR 1 interim report has no mention of one.¹⁵⁹ The MNB had a more tactical focus, with the commander articulating the mission in terms of tasks, objectives and endstates.¹⁶⁰ CCRP, a group tasked with capturing the lessons of Kosovo from an operational, and command and control perspective, noted a lack of a campaign plan.¹⁶¹ This group based its assessment off of extensive field interviews and visits to the TF Falcon Headquarters.¹⁶² The same group conducted assessments of the Stabilization Forces in Bosnia, which establishes that the researchers probably know what to look for in a campaign plan. The lack of a campaign plan was reemphasized in other sections of the CCRP report dealing with Civil Military Operations.¹⁶³ The implementation of the CMO campaign plan was delayed at the KFOR level during KFOR 1, which caused further lack of synchronization in the MNB(E) sector.¹⁶⁴

The lack of experience of the augmentation staff was a major factor highlighted in the initial KFOR 1 AAR.¹⁶⁵ While division planners were allocated to MNB(E), the complexity and pace of the Peace Operation caused a tactical focus.¹⁶⁶ The lack of experience and training of the staff led to an underutilization of the automation and collaboration tools available to MNB(E).¹⁶⁷ The impact of the inexperienced staff: the senior MNB(E) leaders had to maintain more of a tactical focus, imposed a teaching burden for senior staff members, and hindered the unit's ability to anticipate problems and implement solutions.¹⁶⁸

¹⁵⁹ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *After Action Review*, June 2001, 3-4.

¹⁶⁰ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *Interim Report*, 15 November 1999, 9.

¹⁶¹ Wentz, 430.

¹⁶² Wentz, preface.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 284.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 283.

¹⁶⁵ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *Interim Report*, 15 November 1999, 2.

¹⁶⁶ Wentz, 430.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 435.

¹⁶⁸ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *Interim Report*, 15 November 1999, 2.

The organization of MNB(E), the lack of a campaign plan, and the training and education afforded the task force affected the functioning of Task Force by limiting the organization's ability to leverage interagency capabilities, enhance the legitimacy of the host nation, forecast and enhance effects. Interagency coordination was effected by the sheer scope of the initial mission, forcing the task force into a more tactical focus. The legitimacy of UNMIK was not enhanced, since there was no organic government infrastructure to leverage, outside of what was established by the KLA.¹⁶⁹ The forecasting and enhancement of effects suffered from the lack of a campaign plan to orchestrate the varied agencies, actors and units within the AOR.

Contrasting KFOR 1 and KFOR 2

In understanding the differences between the two MNB(E) rotations, it is important to understand the similarities. The force structure (or organizational structure from Mintzberg), was about the same. There were no noted changes in equipment available to the headquarters. Both rotations had to deal with about the same number of external actors (NGOs, PVOs, and UNMIK). Both rotations also had to engage both ethnic factions, albeit the factions had the opportunity over time to adapt to NATO operations. So what could account for the differences in performance?

The major discriminators between KFOR 1 and 2 were the realistic preparation and campaign planning. Initial expectations were that the KFOR mission would be like the SFOR mission.¹⁷⁰ This significantly altered the KFOR mission from safeguarding the return of Albanian refugees to the prevention of Serb ethnic cleansing.¹⁷¹ KFOR 2 benefited from a years worth of experience in Kosovo and applied it through the use of their campaign plan. The

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 5.

¹⁷⁰ Priest, 171.

¹⁷¹ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *Interim Report*, 15 November 1999, 11.

campaign plan allowed MNB(E) to better articulate requirements, impacts and effects when faced with the insurgency in the Presevo valley.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS

This monograph seeks to address the problem of “operational disconnects” in terms of organizational design. The research question is: How can "Operational Disconnects" in brigade unit Peace Keeping Campaigns be minimized? My conclusions are that Brigade Combat Teams are not trained, organized and equipped for conducting peace operations. The preceding chapters establish that the operational environment is conducive to extended commitments in Peace Operations in order to “secure the victory.” This international environment is not only complex; it is increasing the complexity of the environment that US forces are operating in by increasing the influence of “soft systems.” The increased complexity of the environment can be addressed through the campaign planning methodology. This methodology relates the elements of operational design to emerging joint concepts of Center of Gravity and Effects Based Operations. The capability to perform campaign planning is then examined through Mintzberg’s organizational paradigm to provide a framework for a comparative analysis. As shown by the case study, the ability to conduct campaign planning is critical to progress towards an operational goal that spans multiple unit rotations in a soft system environment. Finally, if campaign planning can minimize operational disconnects, what changes in training, organization and equipment can bring about that change?

Embracing Complexity in a Peace Operations Environment

Complex Peace Operations are problems that are not new to the United States Army. The United States Army has a long history of conducting peace operations. It has been suggested that this has composed a bulk of our missions throughout history, with conventional warfare being the

exception, not the rule.¹⁷² If the Army recognizes that the Peace Operations are becoming more complex, then the Army also has to look at how it will reorganize to become more effective within that environment. Past and current efforts at redesign focus on adding more forces to the operating core with minimal redesign to the other elements of the organizational paradigm. We have bound the operating core to the strategic apex with improvements in communications. We have added additional capabilities to increase the efficiency of the operating core (improved weapons and targeting). These "innovations" fail to leverage other elements of organizational paradigm to increase the effectiveness of the whole.

Increasing Effectiveness and Assessments Through Organizational Design

Mintzberg's organizational analysis provides a framework with which to examine the organization and forecast the effects on the organization as a whole when parts of the organization are modified. Using the organizational paradigm, we can enable the existing structure to perform better in a more complex environment. By resourcing the planning cells (or techno-structure) with greater experience, the effectiveness of the operating core can be enhanced. This enables the use of campaign design methodology that ties effects into decisive points along lines of operation. The planning cells can then better articulate effects (or outcomes) for the operating core.

This expansion will help realize the inherent potential in the BCT organization. The expansion of the techno-structure increases the level of experience that performs collaborative planning from higher echelons. The information technology inherent in the organization is not being utilized to the greatest degree because of a lack of experience with the systems available.¹⁷³ From experience grows realized capability.

¹⁷² Boot, xiv-xv.

¹⁷³ Wentz, 435.

The Brigade Combat Team, as organized, has the operating core (i.e., the task forces) to conduct Peace Operation missions. Enhancing the organization's ability to conduct operational campaign planning would increase its effectiveness across the spectrum of conflict. These considerations are lost to the army along its current transformational path. The size, experience and training of the planning staffs have not changed commensurate with the increased complexity of the peace operations environment. By optimizing the current force structure for decisive operations, we fail to optimize our forces for the full spectrum of conflict.

The national strategy built upon decisive maneuver from strategic distance, with a swift defeat and transition to a multinational peacekeeping force seems to be problematic.¹⁷⁴ Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan point to a continued requirement for US Army forces to conduct Peace Operations of some type after executing decisive operations. The implementation of the doctrine of preemption seems to have caused the international community to be more likely to force the United States to deal with the consequences of its actions by refusing to contribute to the Peace Operations that follow decisive operations.¹⁷⁵

Throwing more people at the techno-structure of the BCT is not the answer, if the education, training and experience of those people are not taken into account. These factors are, in fact, linked. An increase in the training and experience of these personnel may increase the effectiveness of the operating core. The Task Force Falcon interim report highlighted that the augmentation provided to Task Force Falcon lacked to operational experience to be truly useful.¹⁷⁶ Company grade officers, without training in the operational level of war, without experience in knowing how higher and lower echelon's requirements, and without the education to use the equipment available, do not maximize a BCT's effectiveness.

¹⁷⁴ Kagan, 29 of 29.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 3 of 29.

Enabling Campaign Plan Maintenance

By linking training, equipment and resources together at a lower level in our tactical organizations, we are enabling the force to better perform in a more complex environment. The institutional training at the operational level of war occurs at the Command and General Staff College. With the expansion of operational effects of actions to the lower tactical levels, “operational cognition” needs to expand also. Within the current career patterns, this occurs infrequently. Changing this pattern, either through changes in assignments or institutional training programs, will give junior officers more experience at the higher levels of war, allowing officers to better understand the implications of their actions within the operational framework.

The US Army has to become a more adaptive, learning organization. Senior leaders realize this imperative. A recent article in *Army Magazine* outlines that adaptive dynamic between two opposing forces.¹⁷⁷ A force at a given level of complexity will attempt to repair itself to that level.¹⁷⁸ Forces and nations are watching us continually to determine vulnerabilities that are exploitable. We are being forced to adapt current operations based on effects of previous operations. Campaign planning closes the loop between actions on a decisive point and the effects desired and achieved. Peace Operations are becoming more of a feedback and effects centric process.

A method of increasing the rate of adaptation is to resource planning cells at lower tactical levels. The army currently tasks existing structures to accomplish those tasks, such as the “Effects Cell.” The conflict comes when the cells have two functions to perform in a complex

¹⁷⁶ Operation Joint Guardian, Task Force Falcon Headquarters, *Interim Report*, 15 November 1999, 2.

¹⁷⁷ William S. Murray, “A Will to Measure,” (Parameters:Autumn, 2001)[accessed online]; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Murray.htm>; Internet; accessed on 23 September 2003.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

environment. Units in Kosovo were able to resource their techno-structure by reconfiguring: future battlefields will not be so kind. At a small personnel cost, the army can invest in effects based operations, enable campaign planning at lower levels, and increase the effectiveness of the existing organizational structure.

Chapter 7

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to minimize “operational disconnects” the army needs to reconsider the implications of the complex operational environment that Brigades are functioning in. By implementing the Mintzberg’s aspects of organizational design, the Army can better address the problem of training, resourcing and equipping of BCTs to perform in this environment and enhance the capabilities of brigade level formations to achieve operational endstates.

The training shortfall to enhance “operational cognition” is being addressed with the implementation of the Intermediate Level Education system where all majors are educated at Fort Leavenworth. This standardizes the education system and exposes all majors to the strategic and operational levels of war. This is the first schooling where the interagency capabilities and effects are introduced. This training also illustrates the linkages between the levels of war, expanding the scope with which operational planners define and solve problems at every echelon.

The equipment for minimizing operational disconnects is present. The problem, outlined in the case study, is that the expertise is not available to translate the available technologies into greater capabilities. The increasing complexity of the systems minimizes the impact of increasing the number of untrained and inexperienced personnel. Experience and training are the keys to producing a new capability. In an expeditionary military operating in a complex environment, on the job training is no longer the answer.

Organizational design, as advocated by Mintzberg, can be used to analyze current headquarters organization in order to increase the effectiveness of the organization’s planning capability. Mintzberg’s framework provides an organizational framework, a standard taxonomy, and probable results that are backed up by graduate research. The framework also articulates internal organizational tensions that occur between each element of the hierarchy. This enables

force programmers to forecast second and third order effects of changes within the organization with respect to both the elements within the hierarchy, and with the environment.

Redesigning to the techno-structure within the BCT by expanding the planning staff will enhance the entire force's capabilities to articulate and forecast effects, and integrate those effects with external organizations operating within the BCT area of operations (such as Host Nation and Interagency elements). Experience and training is required to integrate the effects of all agencies that have the potential of operating in the BCT AO. These organizations have different methods of making decisions, different timelines and different levels of effectiveness. These variables, possibly different for every organization, add to the complexity of the situation and the range of effects that each organization may achieve. Resourcing lower tactical levels with more experienced and trained personnel as planners can increase both awareness of and comprehension of the range of effects produced.

Secondary effects of enhancing the techno-structure are: impacts on personnel requirements, enabling collaborative planning, enabling more flexibility within a more dynamic environment. Increased personnel requirements in the required grades could: force a reallocation of scarce assets or increase the numbers required of the required grades. While this part of the solution is moderately painful, the increase in effectiveness is a worthwhile tradeoff. Higher experience at lower levels will expand the collaborative planning capabilities lower. The lower tactical level units underutilize collaborative planning because of the discomfort of having a higher headquarters monitor the subordinate planning process.¹⁷⁹ Resourcing like grade planners at lower levels will enable the vertical and horizontal integration required by collaborative planners without the experience/rank gap being a consideration. Enhancing organizational

¹⁷⁹ T.J. McKearney, Collaborative Planning for Military Operations: Emerging Technologies and Changing Command Organization (San Diego, CA: Kapos Associates, Inc.), Section 2.3.

flexibility with greater experience in the techno-structure is the final secondary effect.

Experience and training are required to enable this type of performance in complex situations.

Revisiting Dorner, experience mitigates the urge to over-control complex situations.¹⁸⁰

Manning impacts have to be minimized, given the pressure to not increase the manpower of the services and utilize what is present for efficiently. The proposal to expand the techno-structure enables a more efficient use of resources within the current structure. This minimizes the broader personnel management impact (specifically end strength) while increasing the unit's capabilities.

By increasing the techno-structure, collaborative planning is enabled by integrating more operational experience at lower tactical echelons. While the technology for collaborative planning is in maturing, the basics are present. The training that enables the utilization of the tools available is present in the current education system is present. Only the experience that fuses the technology and training into a new capability at a lower level is missing.

Increasing the techno-structure has some downsides, also. Techno-structures tend to want to empower themselves at the expense of the midline managers and the operating core through rationalization.¹⁸¹ The pull to rationalize is defined as the drive to standardize work processes and minimize horizontal decentralization.¹⁸² This can dilute the traditional hierarchical command structure. This pull to rationalize has legal and training issues. The commander is responsible for the success or failure of a unit. The legal responsibilities tied to that cannot be divested. The hierarchical structure must be preserved to some extent because this responsibility acts as a brake on the organization's behavior. Legal consequences can follow from operational

¹⁸⁰ Dorner, 193.

¹⁸¹ Mintzberg, 111.

¹⁸² Ibid.


decisions. Awareness of this tendency to rationalize can be mitigated through training in conjunction with the organizational changes.

This monograph advocates a review of the organizational structure of all headquarters to enhance the ability of those formations to function in a Peace Operational Environment. For a relatively small manpower price, the service will be able to enhance a BCT's performance in Peace Operations, minimizing "Operational Disconnects" that hinder progress towards policy objectives. This enhancement will translate to a broader capability of all echelons to adapt, collaborate and dominate all situations across the spectrum of conflict.


APPENDIX A (Mintzberg's Organizational Archetypes)

This appendix includes a graphical depiction of Mintzberg's organizational archetype and graphical depictions with text definitions of coordinating mechanisms within the archetype.

(Mintzberg, 99) The following diagram is a graphical representation of Mintzberg's organizational archetype. Parallels to army organizations are established in the text. This picture of an organization as a system allows a framework and typology to be developed to compare similar army organizations.




The following graphics portray the common coordinating mechanisms within organizations along with their definitions. Modifications are in *italics*.




Mutual Adjustment: Informal coordination amongst elements of the operating core.

(101)




Direct Supervision: Formal coordination through one person issuing orders or instruction to elements of the operating core.


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
Standardization of work processes: Achieves coordination through specifying how to carry out interrelated tasks. (101)



Standardization of outputs: Achieves coordination through specifying the results or *effects* of interrelated tasks. (101) *Effects* added to author's definition.



Standardization of skills or knowledge: Different work is coordinated through *common* or related training the workers have received. (101) *Common* added to the author's definition




Standardization of norms: Norms infusing the work *at the operating core* are controlled, so that everyone functions according to the same set of beliefs. (101) *Italics* implied by Mintzberg, added for clarity.

APPENDIX B (Organizational Comparison)

The purpose of this appendix is to highlight the acknowledged differences in G staffs (at corps and division level) and S-Staffs (at brigade and battalion level). The stated reason for these differences is that staff activities at lower levels (planning, coordinating and supervising) are more informal at small units than at higher levels. Implicit in this statement is the fact that the higher echelons are dealing with problems that are larger in geographic, organizational and temporal terms. This relationship does not hold for Peace Operations. In fact, the requirements may be inverted.

The organizational charts for G and S level staffs are presented to illustrate the experiential base that the core planning staffs can draw on at each level. The ability to properly synchronize and integrate the inputs from these disparate elements is a function of training and experience.



The table below summarizes the differences in the techno-structure of the G staff and S-staff organization. These Brigade numbers were derived from Brigade Field manuals

(Specifically the Striker Brigade Staff Organization brief) that outlined the plans organization within the S3 shop. The Division organization was derived from the Division Operations manual (FM 71-100-2) and yearly SAMS graduate distribution. Differences in education are highlighted because planners must be cognizant of the operational level of war before they can plan in it. This does not take place in any advanced course. Available experience highlights the expertise available to a planning group that is organic to the organization. A simple comparison of the organization charts highlights the division's broader experience base.

Echelon	Organization	Education	Available Experience
Division	2-3 O4 Core Planners Surge to 7 O4, 4 O3	O4 MEL 4, SAMS O4 MEL 4, and O3 MEL 3	Elements of the Division staff sections w BCT experience.
Brigade	1-2 O3 Core Planners Surge limited to special staff O4s who are primary staff officers at the lower echelon.	O3 MEL 3 Surge capacity adds O4 MEL 4 from specialty staff, at the expense of current operations.	Elements of the Brigade Staff Sections May or may not have experience above company level.

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