IS REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY UNDER THE UNIT-OF-ACTION
AND THE UNIT-OF-EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT CONSISTENT
WITH THE ARMY'S IDENTITY?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2004

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

IS REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY UNDER THE UNIT OF ACTION AND THE
UNIT OF EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT CONSISTENT WITH THE ARMY'S
IDENTITY? by Major Thomas F. Talley

Currently, reorganization of the Army under the Unit of Action and the Unit of
Employment (UA/UE) concept has focused exclusively on the mechanics of conversion.
This thesis argues that the process must begin with an appreciation of the Army's identity
as a strategic force for the nation? This thesis argues that reorganization of the Army
under the UA/UE concept is consistent with the Army's identity, provided an end state is
articulated, which is currently lacking. That end state must be a holistic force structure;
one that is based on identity, not on threats or capabilities. This thesis fills the existing
void by providing a force structure that truly reflects the Army's identity.

As a foundation for this force structure, this thesis examines the Army's identity as a
strategic force, the current Army organization, the UA/UE force structure, and the
underlying concepts driving and supporting the UA/UE conversion. The resulting force
structure is then tested against four criteria: doctrine, organization, training, and
leadership.

Two elements are noteworthy. First, this force design rejects the concept of modularity in
favor of a more tailored approach. Secondly, the operational effectiveness of this force
structure is further increased by the development and institutionalization of a force
stabilization system. This thesis demonstrates how a force stabilization system is
integrated into a force structure.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

10 *USC*	Title 10, *United States Code*
2-MTW	Two Major Theater Wars
ABCT	Airborne Brigade Combat Team
AC	Active Component
AFTA-1	Atomic Field Army-1
AIR	Airborne Infantry Regiment
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APOD/E	Aerial Port of Debarkation/Embarkation
ARCENT	US Army, Central Command
ASA	Assistant Secretary of the Army
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
ASG	Area Support Group
ASOS	Army Support to Other Services
ASPG	*Army Strategic Planning Guidance*
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BDE	Brigade
C2	Command and Control
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
CENTCOM	Central Command
CG	Commanding General
COCOM	Combatant Command
CONUSA	Continental US Army

CS/CSS	Combat Support/Combat Service Support
DCG	Deputy Commanding General
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DIVARTY	Division Artillery
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directives
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training (and Education), Material, Leader (Development), Personnel, Facilities
DPG	*Defense Planning Guidance*
DRB	Division Ready Brigade
EA	Executive Agency; also stated as Executive Agent
EUCOM	European Command
FCS	Future Combat System
FORSCOM	Forces Command
GLOC	Ground Lines of Communications
GO	General Officer
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JTF	Joint Task Force
MACOM	Major Commands
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MEU (SOC)	Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MI	Military Intelligence
MOMAR	Modern Mobile Army

MP	Military Police
MRE	Mission Readiness Exercise
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NMS	*National Military Strategy*
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
NSS	*National Security Strategy*
OPB	Operational Preparation of the Battlefield
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PACOM	Pacific Command
PIR	Parachute Infantry Regiment
QDR	*Quadrennial Defense Review*
RC	Reserve Component
ROAD	Reorganization Objective Army Division
SA	Secretary of the Army
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SETAF	Southern European Task Force
SIB	Separate Infantry Brigade
SOCOM	US Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SPOD/E	Seaport of Debarkation/Embarkation
SSC	Smaller Scale Contingencies
TAACOM	Theater Army Area Command
TRANSCOM	US Transportation Command
TSC	Theater Support Command
TSCP	Theater Security Cooperation Plan

UA	Unit of Action
UE	Unit of Employment
UEx	Unit of Employment (operational-tactical levels)
UEy	Unit of Employment (strategic-operational levels)
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
USAREUR	US Army, European Command
USARPAC	US Army, Pacific Command
USARSO	US Army, Southern Command
USASOC	US Army, Special Operations Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

<u>Introduction</u>

The US Army has begun what promises to be its most dramatic and far-reaching

reorganization since World War II. The Army is reorganizing its entire combat force and

the operational level organizations by which it commands and controls its combat

formations. This thesis is a critical assessment of those organizational changes. The thesis

question asks: Is reorganization of the Army under the unit of action/unit of employment

(UA/UE) concept consistent with the Army's identity? The nature of the thesis question

allows for the examination of both the mechanics of the UA/UE concept as well as the

underlying assumptions and foundations of the concept. The value of this two-prong

approach is that it begins with something that is not well understood -- the full expression

of the Army's core identity, and then compares the UA/UE reorganization, and in

particular, its expressed end state, against it. This thesis argues that the UA/UE concept *is*

consistent with the Army's identity, but the commonly expressed end state of the UA/UE

reorganization will not reflect that identity. In that sense, this thesis is both a defense of

the UA/UE concept as well as a criticism for not going far enough.

There are two arguments that are central to this thesis. The first argument is that

the forces that are driving these changes are not well understood. It is a far more daunting

task to understand the forces that are driving these organizational changes than it is to

understand the mechanics of those changes. In a sense, every leader in the Army is a

technician; officers in particular are called upon to be masters of their profession.

Collectively, it falls to all leaders in the Army to "get the job done," to "make it happen,"

to "accomplish the mission." The mental processes which Army leaders have developed to dissect, analyze, and manage any given problem also serve to limit the ability to stop, assess the situation, and ask the more important questions. Questions such as, why are they doing this? And, what is making them do it in this manner? In a fundamental sense, Army leaders are all better at understanding the micro-view versus the macro-view of any given problem.

Furthermore, Army leaders appear to lack a meaningful context by which they can understand and appreciate all the forces driving Army reorganization. The absence of this larger context only serves to reinforce the tendency to favor an inward, detail-oriented mind-set. This thesis argues that Army leaders must first understand what is meant when someone speaks of the Army's identity. It is this identity that provides the Army a context by which its leadership can understand and assess its own force structure. The central question then is, What is the Army's identity? Since the Army is so many different things, at different times, to different people, is it even possible for the Army to possess a singular identity? The answer is yes, unequivocally yes. The Army's singular identity, its singular purpose, is to be a strategic force for the nation. And the definition of a strategic force is one that is capable of doing all that is asked of it. There are three elements to the Army identity: what the Army does (roles and missions), how the Army organizes and prepares itself for those roles and missions, and who the Army is (its defining characteristics).

The second argument, building off the first, is that all Army leaders must take the time to think through these changes to their logical conclusion, and then assess whether or not those changes make sense. Philosophically, you have to know where you are

going, so that you will know you have arrived when you got there. This thesis takes the logic given for Army reorganization under the UA/UE concept and designs a force structure consistent with that logic. It then compares that force design against the commonly expressed end state for the UA/UE reorganization. Based on this comparison, this thesis concludes that it is the Army's force design that is inconsistent with its own identity. In other words, this thesis serves as a litmus test: when the reason why the US Army is changing is compared to the current direction of its changes, it will be found that the two do not lead to the same place.

The value of this approach is not so much to assess consistency, but rather to identify points of divergence before the reorganization gets to them. In other words, is there trouble ahead on the tracks? If so, can the problem be fixed, now? This thesis argues that the divergences between where the Army is going and where it should be going are correctable and are well within the ability of the Army to achieve. This course correction will only occur if the US Army: (1) actually develops a force design more appropriate to its identity and (2) institutes the appropriate systemic processes to institutionalize that force design.

An Early Defense of the Thesis Question

The thesis question suggests that it is possible to reorganize the Army in a manner that is inconsistent with the Army's identity. To those who take issue with this likelihood, let the record speak for itself: on a least one occasion, the Army has reorganized itself in a manner that was inconsistent with its identity. That case in point was the 1956 reorganization of all Army divisions under the Atomic Field Army-1 (ATFA-1) study, better known as the Pentomic division structure. The Pentomic division was so named

because it called for the reorganization of the infantry divisions from the existing three regimental combat teams to five battle groups; a configuration designed to ensure survival on an atomic battlefield. Larger than a battalion, but smaller than the regiment, the battle group consisted of "five rifle companies, a combat support company (including a mortar battery), and a headquarters and service company" (Doughty 1979). Although operating "relatively autonomous and widely dispersed," and "capable of sustained combat on its own" (Doughty 1979). The battle group was to be directly controlled by the division commander, a capability that advances in improved communications seemed to promise; although most of the new equipment that the structure and concept was dependent upon did not appear until the late 1950s. The doctrine for the Pentomic Division stressed "flexibility and rolling with the punch, rather than rigidity" (Doughty 1979). Additionally, the future battlefield would be "cellular," versus linear, not a far cry from the term du jour for the modern battlefield: noncontiguous.

While similarities and parallels exist between the five battle groups of the Pentomic Division and the five Units of Action per division that is envisioned today, these reorganizations are not analogous. The design for five battle groups was really nothing more than an admission of the destructive power of atomic weapons. Atomic weapons are not precision-guided munitions for the very good reason that they do not have to be. With atomic weapons, there simply is no such thing as a near miss. The real purpose for organizing into five battle groups was nothing more than dividing into as small a force package as could reasonably be expected to fight independently, with the expectation that anything larger would be too easily identified and just as quickly destroyed.

The Pentomic Division lasted little more than six years. Efforts to address its shortcomings began almost immediately, all to no avail. The intended successor to the Pentomic division structure was the Modern Mobile Army, 1965-1970 (MOMAR I), unveiled in 1960. This concept called for only two types of divisions, heavy and medium; and called for the field army to directly control the divisions, eliminating the corps. The MOMAR I concept never made it out the gate. Command and General Staff College (CGSC) was given the mission of refining the concept. Rather than refine the product, CGSC argued "the Army had to be capable of operations in a wide variety of tactical circumstances ranging from a limited war without nuclear weapons to a general war with nuclear weapons" (Doughty 1979). CGSC argued against a standardized division structure, opting instead to make the case for the "creation of divisions which could be tailored or custom-made to fit various operational needs;" in effect, a "building block approach" of different types of forces was being called for. These changes were institutionalized in the new concept for the division structure known as the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD). Unveiled in 1961, ROAD introduced the brigade combat teams (vice the battle groups, infantry regiments or armored combat commands), doubled the aviation assets in each division, and introduced the division support command (DISCOM). To this day, the concepts and structures introduced by the ROAD study remain a part of the Amy's divisions.

<u>Limitations, Delimitations, and Definitions</u>

As this thesis is concerned with a current reorganization, it imposes a number of limitations. The first limitation is that this thesis will only consider open-source material. The second limitation is an effective end date for any new material of 1 March 2004.

There are three terms that must be defined: "force design," "force stabilization" and the UA/UE concept. Force design refers to the basic organization, by type and function, of forces in the Army. Force stabilization refers to the institutionalized system by which those forces are trained, deployed, and employed. The first time the term force stabilization was encountered was in the 2003 Army Strategic Planning Guidance.[1] That document did not did not provide a strict definition, but instead used the term loosely to describe a means of providing a sense of balance to the entire force structure. Essentially, a force stabilization system answers the question: how can the Army provide the combat-ready forces that our nation requires without burning out and effectively degrading the force at the same time? Since the term was ill defined and a more appropriate term was lacking, this thesis has appropriated the term. Just as this thesis argues for a force design more appropriate to the Army's identity, it likewise intends to demonstrate that the force stabilization system is the appropriate systemic process to institutionalize that force design referred to above. While a force stabilization system provides a structure for scheduling forces, it is considerably more than just a timeline of when forces train and when they deploy. Indeed, it must become the overarching construct by which Army forces are trained, deployed, and employed. The force stabilization system proposed in this thesis will increase the availability of forces on a routine basis, institutionalize the ability to surge, reduce the turbulence caused by personnel turnover, and increase the predictability of the OPTEMPO with which Army forces must contend. It is precisely improvements of this nature that are critical for an Army that "must assume sustained operations will be the norm, and not the exception" (ASPG, 2003, p2).

The Army has been a division-based force, with its principal fighting element being three combined arms, task-organized brigade combat teams per division. The Army is moving towards a more modular, permanently organized brigade-sized unit known as the Unit of Action (UA). Whereas the Army currently fields ten divisions and a total of thirty-three brigade combat teams (or their equivalent), the intent under the UA concept is to increase the number of available brigade-sized formations to as many as forty-eight, an increase of fifteen; the equivalent of five more divisions! Equally significant is that the new formations will no longer operate under an assigned division, but will be designed to be modular, able to "plug-and-play" into whatever operational level command and control (C2) structure that requires them. Divisions, as they are known today, are quickly becoming an anachronism.

The impact on the operational level C2 structures is not limited to the divisions. C2 of the combat Army (vice the institutional Army) is exercised through a three-tier hierarchical structure, the division-corps-army. That structure, too, has been reexamined, and the process to fundamentally change it has begun. Future operational-level C2 of Army forces will be accomplished through a two-tier, vice three-tier, structure.

Advances in joint interoperability, digital communication, weapons effectiveness and lethality, recent operational experience, and the lack of a peer competitor have converged to compress the battlefield. Even the three-tier structure by which the US military currently conceptualizes conflict, the tactical-operational-strategic hierarchy, has been compressed. While it is still possible to draw distinctions between each level, the increasing compression has made it more accurate to speak of interfaces, such as the tactical-operational interface and the operational-strategic interface, rather than distinct

levels. The move towards a two-tier, operational-level C2 structure reflects this new reality. Operational-level C2 organizations will now be known as UE. Those C2 organizations, which focus upon the tactical-operational interface, will be known as a UEx. Those organizations, which focus upon the operational-strategic level interface, will be known as a UEy. The final limitation of this thesis concerns methodology; this limitation will be addressed in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

Structure of the Thesis

The first half of this thesis is devoted to understanding and appreciating the many forces driving Army reorganization, from the context of the Army's identity. The discussion of these forces is organized into three broad categories: characteristics of the Army (*who*), external factors (*what*), and internal factors (*how*). These three broad categories are distinct, but interrelated. This thesis will demonstrate that who the Army is, and what the Army does, have not changed; but it is how the Army organizes and prepares itself that has changed. The final section of Chapter 1 will introduce the various forces in each category and discuss their relationship to Army reorganization. Chapters 2 and 3 serve this thesis as both a literature review and as an analysis of the internal and external factors, respectively.

The traditional approach for a thesis is to discuss all the existing literature and in particular the seminal works of a particular subject in a single chapter. This has posed two significant challenges for this thesis. First, there is considerable material on the various forces and factors influencing Army reorganization, but none of them put those factors into the context of Army identity, as does this thesis. The second challenge is that there is not any serious discussion or proposal for a force stabilization model. Many

authors have presented proposals for a force structure consisting of X number of units, of X type; and they have gone on to argue that X type of unit is best suited for X type of mission or role. But simply identifying types and numbers of forces, without also demonstrating the larger construct for how those forces are organized, trained, equipped, deployed, and employed offers an inadequate and incomplete understanding of the challenges facing the US Army. Indeed, it appears that the stresses and challenges that the US Army is coping with are so great that the collective writers have focused their efforts at attempting to treat the symptoms but not the disease.

Accordingly, this thesis divides the review of the literature into two chapters. Chapter 2, the "Examination of Internal Factors," will be organized into three distinct sections. The first section will examine the authoritative documents. The second section will examine the broader range of literature. Together, these two sections will demonstrate not only what the nation expects from the Army, but also how the Army is expected to fight, and what constraints are imposed upon the Army. The value of this approach is threefold. First, because the authoritative documents constitute the clearest expression of national intent, and because many of them carry the power of law, this thesis is able to avoid dogmatic and philosophically oriented positions on the purpose of an Army.

Secondly, the examination of the larger body of literature has identified recurring themes. In fact, there are four recurring themes. These include: (1) the Army's relevance to the joint force, (2) the strategy underlying the force structure, (3) the Army's need to support our global engagements, and (4) the need for an expeditionary posture. The last two themes tend to emphasis types, numbers, characteristics, and orientation of forces.[2]

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The third value of this approach is that these internal factors constitute a rather detailed troop-to-task analysis for the US Army.

Chapter 3, "Examination of External Factors," will likewise be organized into three distinct sections. The first section will discuss what and how the US military thinks about the environment. This section discusses the roles of models and how those models allow for the identification and assessment of trends. The second section will discuss what and how the US military thinks about future conflict. This section will focus upon operational preparation of the battlefield (OPB). The third section will demonstrate how these two thought processes are synthesized; namely, how the United States looks at the world, and how the United States military conceptualizes future conflict. This section begins with a brief discussion of how the combatant commands and their theater security cooperation plans (TSCP) represent the structure and the mechanism, respectively, that the US military uses to engage and shape the environment. It then illustrates a specific challenge facing the US in each of the regional combatant commands' areas of responsibility (AOR). The purpose of this is not to digress into a discussion of potential challenges. Rather, this approach illustrates how the OPB concept will generate requirements, in terms of forces, training, and means of engagement, which a force stabilization model must anticipate and resolve.

The second half of this thesis reflects an attempt to "think through" the UA/UE reorganization to its logical conclusion. Chapter 4, "Methodology," begins with an explanation of the UA/UE reorganization and discusses the initial steps and what has been expressed as the end state for the reorganization. This becomes the point of departure for this thesis. Continuing with the logic of the UA/UE reorganization, this

thesis designs a force based upon the UA/UE model and the full expression of the Army's identity (developed in the first half of this thesis). It also introduces the force stabilization elements that are necessary to ensure that this force design is institutionalized. This force structure was developed using criteria from the same model that the US Army uses when it enacts any change: the DOTMLPF model.[3] As an end state, this thesis sketches out a shell of a force stabilization model that discusses types of forces, the orientation of, and the scheduling of those forces. As the purpose of this model is to "think through" the UA/UE reorganization, it will not offer anything new with regard to the types and orientation of forces.

The final limitation of this thesis is that it will only use four of the DOTMLPF factors in the design of the force structure model. These four include Doctrine, Organization, Training (and Education), and Leader Development (DOTL). The intent of this thesis is to demonstrate that, once the identity of the Army is fully understood, it is a fairly straightforward path to designing a force structure that reflects that identity. The Army's identity drives its Doctrine, which in turn drives its Organization. The resulting force structure can only be (effectively) led by individuals who understand not only this connection, but also the technical and tactical details of their profession. This understanding is a result of Training (and Education) as well as Leader Development. For this reason, these four criteria are essential.

This thesis will not discuss Material, primarily because this thesis makes no effort to redesign the existing tactical maneuver battalions. This thesis deliberately avoids any such proposals, for a utilitarian and a philosophical reason. As for utility, this thesis will demonstrate that it is simply not necessary to redesign the battalions to better reflect the

Army's identity. It is true that there exists a great deal of divergence between different types of tactical maneuver battalions; but those differences reflect proven solutions to existing conditions, and should not be discounted or discarded. The existing lack of commonality is a strength of the US Army, not a weakness. Philosophically, the US Army is a small-unit Army; and that is the point of our greatest familiarity and comfort. Unless there is an absolute pressing need, it is best to limit the reorganization to the higher echelons and maintain the stability of the existing small-unit structures. For purposes of this thesis, small units are defined as brigade combat teams and below.

This thesis will not discuss Personnel as it intends to demonstrate that the redesign can occur within the same personnel end strength of the existing force structure. Furthermore, the proposed force structure would not require Congressional support to lift or change current caps on numbers of personnel in specific grades. Finally, this thesis will not discuss Facilities. As the Armed Forces prepares for another Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission, the issue of Facilities is quite the red-hot political issue. But the reason for delimiting Facilities from this thesis is that it lies beyond the scope of this thesis. The intent of this thesis is to demonstrate if it is possible to design a force structure that reflects the Army's identity; not to solve all the associated issue that would arise as a result.

Chapter 5 reflects the result of evaluating the proposed model against the DOTL criterion, as well as against the expressly stated Army end state. It is in the orientation of forces and the scheduling of forces, that the proposed model most diverges from the expressed end state of the Army. Yet it is precisely these two areas that offer the improvements that the US Army is most in need of: an increase in the availability of

forces on a routine basis, an institutionalized the ability to surge, a reduction in the turbulence caused by personnel turnover, and an increase in the predictability of the OPTEMPO that Army units face.

"Peeling the Onion": Understanding Army Reorganization
from the Superficial to the Fundamental

Critical to any understanding of why the Army is reorganizing is an appreciation that there are actually three distinct levels of understanding. The analogy of peeling the onion serves some utility here, as each level peeled provides greater clarity, from the superficial to the fundamental. The first, outermost (and most superficial) level is an appreciation of the current strategic environment. This is the outer layer because, quite frankly, it has the very least to do with the Army itself. Analysis at this level tends to focus upon what the Army does. The second, middle layer, discusses the processes by which the US Army is organized and how it conceptualizes conflict. This level discusses how the US Army responds to both internal and external factors, and how it attempts to shape the strategic environment. The third, innermost level is the most fundamental: it is about the very identity of the US Army. This level of understanding attempts to answer whom the Army is, not just what it does and how it does it. Each of these levels of understanding has its own, unique, set of logic; and a complete understanding of Army reorganization is dependent upon an appreciation of all three levels. It is also important to note that all three levels of understanding Army reorganization require an appreciation of history. With each layer that is peeled away, the greater the degree of historical knowledge that is required. This thesis will discuss each of these levels in turn, from the superficial to the fundamental.

The Outer Layer: The Current Strategic Environment

The central thesis of this layer is that it is important to appreciate that these (organizational) changes, while recent, were in fact triggered by an event that occurred over a decade ago: the collapse of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union is less significant in terms of what happened in Russia and its satellite countries, than its impact on the rest of the world. More precisely, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not just result in the end of an imperial system; it triggered the end of the existing world order. Gone was a bi-polar world noted for its two ideologically opposed poles. With the collapse of that world order, the constraints that had long held other ambitions and forces in check fell away. The world became a far less certain, and far more dangerous place. Since the bi-polar world had been the defining characteristic of the world system for the past fifty years, it was understandable that many strategic planners and policy makers would naturally look to see who would fill the vacuum. But those efforts to identify the next adversary, or peer competitor, blinded many to the reality that not one, but many, forces would compete to fill the existing vacuum; and such a system would become the norm.

The world system today is best understood as having one "hyperpower," several regional powers, a handful of blocs, and many super-empowered individuals or groups.[4] What is important for this thesis is not so much the nature of the world, but rather, what roles and positions the United States has decided to play. This thesis will discuss the topic of external factors and the subsequent roles and missions of the US Army in greater detail in Chapter 3, but for now it is sufficient to say that the United States recognizes its unique position and fully intends to perpetuate that position for as long as possible. It is in

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response to this policy that the US Army, and indeed, the entire United States Armed Forces, has begun the process that will significantly reorganize itself.

The inadequacy of this level of understanding is that its focus upon external factors tends to present the US Army as a victim of circumstances. Reorganization, viewed only through this prism, tends to be viewed as a result of the increased demands placed upon the Army. In other words, an observer is left with the impression that Army reorganization is entirely reactive, vice proactive, in nature.

The Middle Layer: The Paradigms That Drive Army Processes

Understanding of Army reorganization at this level focuses upon the processes by which the US Army is organized and how the Army conceptualizes conflict. Granted, it is important to concede that both Army organization and the conceptualization of conflict occur within the larger context of the Joint Vision; but it must be stressed that the Army has a considerable say in how that Vision is articulated. What is really being discussed here is the overarching strategy. But, rather than use the term strategy, this thesis will use the term paradigm. The reason for this choice of terminology is deliberate and twofold: first, a paradigm is more than a mental process; it is the entire mental framework, and it tends to be all encompassing. As such, it is essentially a filter, and most people are unaware of the filters through which they see and explain the world; whereas most people believe that a strategy is something outside of themselves that they can deconstruct and analyze at their leisure. The second reason for this approach is that it is necessary to draw a distinction between strategy as an idea and strategy as an explicit statement, such as is found in those documents that this thesis will be discussing in Chapter 2. By keeping this distinction, this thesis is able to demonstrate the difference between what the document

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is, and what it says. These documents are the product of a mind-set (a paradigm), and the ideas they articulate are filtered through that paradigm.

The central thesis of this layer is that these organizational changes are a reflection of two important paradigm shifts. This thesis employs the term paradigm in both its strict definition as "one that serves as a pattern or model," as well as its more loosely-defined sense of "the prevailing view of things." Essentially, a paradigm is the generally agreed upon view of how things are. A paradigm shift refers to a significant change in that perception. The two paradigm shifts this thesis focuses upon concern changes in how the Army conceptualizes and mentally prepares for combat, and how the Army organizes its combat force structure. These two paradigms are distinct, but their impacts are, understandably, interrelated.

The first paradigm that discussed is how the size of the force is decided upon. The previous paradigm was known as the Two-Major Theater Wars (2-MTW). It emphasized the requirement to conduct two nearly simultaneous major theater wars; one in Northeast Asia, and another in Southwest Asia. The 2-MTW served as the foundation for force sizing since the collapse of the Soviet Union.[5] As mentioned, the relevance of the 2-MTW construct ended on September 11, 2001. The US response to the terrorist attacks was the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the articulation of a new national strategic policy, Preemption. But the responsiveness of the military to this new war was, in large measure, inadequate. This was, and remains, true of both the combat forces as well as its institutional and bureaucratic processes. Accordingly, a new force-sizing construct was required. The 2003 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) describes

the new force sizing paradigm as the "1-4-2-1" model. In this model, the US Army has

four competing requirements:

> Defend the U.S. homeland against external attacks (the enduring first priority);
> Deter aggression and coercion in four critical regions: Northeast Asia, East Asian
> Littoral, Middle East/Southwest Asia and Europe;
> Swiftly defeat the efforts (SDTE) of adversaries in two overlapping wars while
> preserving the President's option to call for a decisive victory in one of those
> conflicts - including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and
> Conduct a limited number of lesser contingency operations. (p. 17)

It is rather self-apparent that the 2-MTW model and the "1-4-2-1" model reflect a

different and unique set of circumstances. But it is patently unfair to suggest that a

different circumstance, in and of itself, warrants the pain and turbulence that a change of

paradigms triggers. After all, there are first, second and third order impacts of changing

paradigms, any one of which can cause the whole structure to collapse if it is not properly

handled. In fact, there are three strong justifications, of sufficient detail and nuance, to

explain not only the rationale but also the imperative for switching paradigms.

The first justification is that the 2-MTW construct was never a reflection of either

actual threats or US strategy; it was simply a worst-case scenario.[6] In the absence of a

strategy, this scenario became the strategy. It was espoused for one simple reason: its

ability to preserve force structure in an otherwise ambiguous geo-political environment.

In fact, for a military that had been designed for and preoccupied with defeating an

adversary of comparable strength, the absence of a peer competitor in the near-term left

the entire force structure open to questions of relevance. The clearest proof that the 2-

MTW was never a strategy is evidenced by the fact that, throughout the entire decade it

was in existence (1993-2003) the Armed Forces neither exercised it nor invested in the

one element that was critical to its success: strategic lift, whether airlift or sealift.[7] But,

despite the duplicity of its nature, the 2-MTW construct served its purpose well: it preserved a degree of capabilities and availability of forces without which the US Armed Forces would have been incapable of conducting its recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This leads to the next point.

The second justification is that the "1-4-2-1" model is a succinct and coherent description of the challenges facing the Army. This new paradigm takes the military away from a force structure that was threat-based, to one that is capabilities-based. This change is significant in that it not only allows, but also encourages, debate about the questions and assumptions underlying the current force structure. Even more than questioning the types of forces, it permits questions concerning the means by which the Army employs those forces, as well as the systems used to manage the Army. This last point is perhaps the most important - the systems used (to manage the Army) should not be a source of friction, but in fact, they are.

Speaking of friction, it is important to examine it (friction) because it has relevance to our force stabilization model and to our understanding of what the US Army is dealing with today. There is widespread agreement on two points. First, that the US Army is busy; and secondly, that the US Army is stressed. But it would be a logic error to assume that the Army is stressed because it is busy. In fact this particular form of logic error is known as a coincidental correlation (in Latin, "post hoc ergo prompter hoc," or "after this because of this"). The challenge, then, is to understand why the US Army is stressed.

There is no arguing that the US Army is busy, and it is instructive to appreciate the degree to which the US Army is busy. It is busy with homeland security missions

throughout the United States. It is busy conducting a counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. It is busy conducting a transition from combat to post-hostilities operations in Iraq. It is busy conducting peacekeeping in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sinai. It is busy deterring aggression and conducting peacetime military engagement operations in support of the engagement plans of the Combatant Commanders. And it is busy doing its day-to-day functions such as recruiting, training, equipping, sustaining, and mobilizing forces.

There are two key points essential to understanding why the Army is stressed. First, nothing the US Army is doing is either a new role or mission for the US Army, or beyond its ability. The second point is that it was never imagined that the Army would be called upon to do so many different things, at some many different locations, all at the same time. And therein lies the problem. The Army force structure is highly stressed because its own force structure and management systems are not designed to accommodate this level of busyness. The Army can do all these things; it just cannot do them all without simultaneously degrading itself.

Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Army has had to surge; and the Army has surged. But these surges all tend to be one-time events, with little or no attention given to the resultant ripple effects. The problem with this approach is that it runs counter to the central assumption that the 2003 Army Strategic Planning Guidance makes concerning Army OPTEMPO, that the Army "…must assume sustained operations will be the norm, and not the exception (ASPG, 2003, p2)." The Army requires a force stabilization system that allows it to surge repeatedly, for sustained periods of time, and limits or at least mitigates the ripple effects.

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As mentioned, the "1-4-2-1" model is a succinct and coherent description of the challenges facing the US Army. This model shifts the Army from a threat-based approach to a capabilities-based one. The level of capabilities and utility demanded of the Army in the "1-4-2-1" model is considerably greater than the 2-MTW model. The need to manage and reduce the friction generated by these sustained operations aptly demonstrates the criticality of a force stabilization model.

The third justification for switching paradigms is perhaps the most important, but it is also the least obvious. That is, the "1-4-2-1" model is designed as much for future threats as it is for the current threats. In fact, the imperative for changing the Army's force size is not so much that the enemy has changed but that the world has changed…and the United States is on a collision course with other regional powers. This topic will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, both concerning the nature of the world and future threats. But for now, it is important to note that the United States has essentially three choices concerning the likelihood of future conflict. The first choice is that the United States can ignore the threat; wish it away, if you will. History suggests that a course of action that permits a state of unpreparedness only guarantees both the likelihood and the severity of future conflict. The second choice is that the United States can accept future conflict as inevitable, and spend its efforts today preparing for conflict tomorrow. Again, this may be a self-fulfilling prophecy; for one who grows accustomed to perceiving all others as threats may wake to find that their imagined adversary has accepted that role. The third choice facing us is to shape the environment; ostensibly in an effort to forestall or prevent future conflict. This third option must be the only acceptable choice. But the requirement to shape the environment demands a force that is

considerably more engaged. The definition of an engaged force must be more than just the presence of US forces "over there." It must speak to US forces actively working to strengthen alliances, limit or prevent conflict, and deter aggression. It must speak to US forces that are culturally aware of their environment and are comfortable dealing with the challenges of interoperability with multinational task force. The need for engaged forces highlights the criticality of a force stabilization model.

This discussion of shaping the environment leads nicely into the second paradigm that has changed: how the United States military conceptualizes and prepares for future conflict. Take note that this paradigm combines two distinct processes: conceptualizing, and preparing. Why is the distinction stressed? There are two reasons. The first reason is that one can only prepare for what one can imagine. The second reason is that preparation requires resources, and even the wealthiest nations must prioritize how it spends its resources.

Since the founding of the United States as a nation, Americans have been content to conceptualize warfare as primarily the purview of states. Most (but not all) of America's experiences have reinforced the notion that there existed a clear and unmistakable link between the actions of an enemy force and the decision-making apparatus at the national level. Admittedly, those incidents that threatened to discredit this belief system were discounted, wished away, and considered as one-time exceptions; although the rate and frequency of their occurrence should have sufficed to give one pause and thought to reconsider.

Today, the United States has (finally) come to accept that conflict can occur without the imprimatur of a nation-state. It has begun to recognize that such conflict can

be bloody, protracted, and can spread like a wildfire. National borders and other boundaries have proven to be neither obstruction nor impediment to their spread; entire regions can be consumed, quickly, into the conflagration.

Previously, the Army was content to believe that it was adequately preparing for a future threat by studying a threat's order of battle; and fielding a force that was comparable, but qualitatively superior. Today, the Army has begun to recognize that its fixation with the order of battle must be put aside, and its leaders must first come to an understanding of the cultural, environmental, socio-economic, and historical nuances of a country or a region before they are even able to conceptualize the nature of the conflict.

A point that must be stressed, repeatedly, is that the US is not attempting to shape the environment because it can, but because it must. The nation is at war, and the adversary respects none of the borders or boundaries by which Americans have grown accustomed to dividing and understanding the world. Indeed, the US military has begun developing an operational concept defining its approach to shaping the environment: operational preparation of the battlefield. If the reader accepts that words have both precise meanings and less-precise connotations, and that those words are chosen with care; then consider the weight of the words that the Army has chosen to describe its efforts to shape the environment. The Army is at war. The world is not some ambiguous environment,[8] it is a battlefield. And while the Army may not yet be on that battlefield, it is equally clear that the Army believes it intends to be, and that it intends to win. The other truly noteworthy aspect of this doctrine is its clear appreciation of the limitations of military power. Repeatedly, this doctrine makes clear that US forces be employed judiciously. That is to say, military forces are only to be committed concurrent with other

instruments of national power, and in support of clearly articulated objectives and goals. Just as the outer layer provided a compelling but inadequate explanation for the totality of Army reorganization, so too does this second layer.

The Inner Layer: The Army's Identity as a Strategic Force for the Nation

As mentioned earlier, with each layer that is peeled, the demand for historical knowledge increases. The first layer required an understanding of what has impacted the Army in the last decade and a half. The next layer required an understanding of how the Army was organized before the collapse of the Soviet Union. This final, innermost layer requires that an understanding of what has been asked of the Army since it was founded.

The central thesis of this layer is that these organizational changes are neither a reflection of OPTEMPO,[9] nor strategy, but of identity; specifically concerning the characteristics of the Army's identity. As stated in the beginning, the US Army has a singular identity, a single purpose: to be a strategic force for the nation. This thesis further defines a strategic force as one that is capable of doing all that is asked of it.

What does it mean to be a strategic force for the nation? The current Army reorganization is usually associated with four phrases: joint, expeditionary, campaign quality, and full spectrum operations. So the real question is, if being strategic is doing what is asked of you, do these phrases really reflect what is being asked of the US Army?

The unequivocal answer to this question is, yes, the Army is right on the mark. Consider that the clearest expression of what has been, and continues to be asked of the US Army is found in Title 10, *Unites States Code*, Section 3062:

> (a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of
> (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas

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occupied by the United States;
 (2) supporting the national policies;
 (3) implementing the national objectives; and
 (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.
(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war. (10 USC 3062)

Subsection (a) makes clear the four-fold purpose of the Army. Equally

noteworthy, the very first sentence of 10USC 3062(a) states explicitly what must be the

principal characteristic of the Army: the Army is but a component of a joint force. The

US Army cannot allow itself to view itself as distinct from the joint force; such a mind-

set puts the Army first. The Army is not simply a ground force that may fight under the

direction of a Joint Force Commander; it *is* the land component of a Joint Force. To argue

that "joint-ness" must be central to the Army's identity is not a philosophical argument; it

is acknowledgement of the law by which the Army is based. Reading further, 10 USC

3062(b) states that the Army is primarily "organized, trained, and equipped…for prompt

and sustained combat incident to operations on land." If we substitute expeditionary for

prompt, and campaign quality for sustained, we see, once again, that the Army clearly

knows what is being asked of it.

Integral to the campaign quality characteristic of the Army's identity is theater

logistics. The Army has been given explicit guidance, both in 10USC and in any number

of DOD Directives, to provide theater logistics support to the entire joint force. Whether

this is expressed as support to the Combatant Commands, Executive Agency

responsibilities, or simply Army Support to Other Services, the US Army is the principal logistics provider for the joint force. As such, the US Army must organize its forces to support the JFCs. The inescapable conclusion is that US Army will be called upon to conduct substantial logistics-related tasks in future operations without regard to any other role it may fill, such as a land combat force. The implication of this is that the US Army force structure, and particularly its deployable force, must include far more logistical capability than a FedEx-inspired "just in time" capability for supply support to the maneuver force; which was the direction that the previous vision for Army logistics was headed.

The fourth characteristic of the Army is the need to be capable of conducting operations across the entire spectrum of conflict.[10] Look again to the order of specified tasks listed in subsection (a). It is the contention of this thesis that that order of tasks reflects a deliberate prioritization by the authors of this legislation. In particular, note that actual combat operations against an opponent are listed fourth, after the requirement to support national policies and implement national objectives. The importance of this cannot be overstated. Too often we hear the role of the US Army reduced to a slogan: "o fight and win the nation's wars." The critical importance of fighting and winning wars goes without saying; but reducing the Army's role to what is essentially a bumper sticker does a great disservice to the US Army. It repudiates past achievements and contributions of the Army in operations other than war, reduces its relevance in the present, and threatens its future by discouraging thoughtful study about the complex and challenging nature of the world. Clearly, Congress intends for its armed forces to be a dynamic, relevant, and adaptable tool by which they can engage other nations.

Keeping Army Reorganization in Perspective

The challenges facing the Army are immense. The effects of this reorganization have begun to impact every single aspect of how the Army trains, equips, organizes, mans, deploys and fights. Like so many things, the current Army transformation effort is a mix of good news and bad news. The bad news was alluded to in the first two points that this thesis intends to make. That is, firstly, so many leaders in the Army do not truly understand, at the fundamental level, why the Army is changing. Secondly, that the Army has not thought through and identified the inconsistencies inherent in the underlying assumptions that form the expressed end state for the UA/UE reorganization. While this thesis seeks to address what needs to be fixed, it should not take away from an appreciation of what is most decidedly not broken. The good news is that the Army has identified the need for change and has begun to make those changes. What this effort says about the US Army cannot be understated. Indeed, the superlatives associated with changing the entire combat force structure and operational level C2 structures are actually less noteworthy than what this effort says about the values, character, and ability of the US Army. The US Army is engaged in a fundamental reorganization of its entire combat force at the very moment that it is more fully engaged than at any time since World War II. This is hardly what one would expect from an organization that has been derided by some as risk-averse. Indeed, this effort is exceptionally risky. Not only is the US Army remodeling its forces while in the thick of a war, it is remodeling what is arguably the most successful land combat force in the history of warfare. The US Army is demonstrating its intellectual capacity to envision a way ahead, its awareness for the necessity for change, its willingness to make tough decisions, its institutional ability to

manage change, and its commitment to providing the nation with capable, ready, and

relevant combat forces, now and in the future.

CHAPTER 2

AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTERNAL FACTORS OF ARMY
REORGANIZATION AND FORCE DESIGN

Introduction

The Army does not exist of, by, and for itself; it exists because it was called into

being by the nation, to do the nation's bidding. Accordingly, any force design must serve

the Army's processes of organizing, training, deploying, and employing its forces reflect

the will of the nation, vice its own particular preferences. Albeit rather glib and lacking

specificity, the phrase "to do the nation's bidding" is nonetheless an accurate statement of

the purpose of the Army. An Army force structure that demonstrates either an inability or

unwillingness to tackle an assigned mission is a rejection of the Army's purpose. Simply

put, the mission comes before the structure. If the structure is incapable of accomplishing

the mission; change the structure, not the mission. This chapter discusses the internal

factors that impact upon a force design in general, and are driving the UA/UE

reorganization in particular. Internal factors speak to what a nation expects of its Army,

how it expects that Army to fight, and what other constraints it imposes on that Army.

There is a substantial body of literature that speaks to these internal factors and

that literature shall be reviewed in this chapter. This chapter has three distinct sections,

and the first two relate to that body of literature. The first section will focus on the

authoritative documents. In a very real sense, the literature review with this section alone,

as the authoritative documents are both the clearest expression of the nation's will and

have, in large measure, the power of law.

Despite the authority by which these documents literally define the internal

factors, this thesis will also review the contributions made to this subject by a wide field

of strategic thinkers, policy makers, and other commentators. Interestingly, there exists a considerable consensus exists among these writers. A brief summation of this consensus would read: the US Army is a critical component of the US military, which is itself only one of the instruments of national power.[11] The US Army must continue to participate, as part of a joint force, in operational deployments in support of US interests, irrespective of how they are defined.[12] This requires an Army that is both engaged and expeditionary.[13] Finally, there is a pronounced sense of urgency expressed in this literature.

What makes this consensus and sense of urgency so interesting is the fact that what these writers are calling for is no different than what is directed by the authoritative documents. The reader is left with the impression that either the Army has not been doing these things, or that the Army is deliberately slow-rolling the process.

While this may in fact have been a valid conclusion in past years, the third section of this chapter will demonstrate that the Army does indeed understand its role as part of the joint force, and its current transformation efforts are designed to reflect the will and intent of the national leadership, as reflected in those same authoritative documents. When this thesis speaks of current transformational efforts, it is referring only to the Unit of Action and Unit of Employment (UA/UE) concepts. It is specifically not referring to the Stryker Brigade Combat Team or the Future Combat Systems (FCS).

This thesis will discuss the UA/UE concepts in greater detail, in Chapter 4. But it is important to note that this concept represents an almost total rejection of the traditional means of organizing combat formations and conducting operations. Previously, the US Army developed a fixed, hierarchical structure, which allowed for greater capabilities at larger formations, and served to limit the ability of subordinate units to operate

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autonomously or independently. The UA/UE concept reduces the hierarchical levels and pushes combat capability down to subordinate levels. This is accomplished through advances in information technology, joint warfighting techniques, and an emphasis on maneuver warfare. This then meets the definition of transformation:

> Transform. Verb. 1. To alter markedly the appearance or form of. 2. To change the nature, function, or condition of.

> Transformation. Noun. An act or instance of transforming or the state of being transformed. (Webster's 1994)

> The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) is essentially nothing more than a

medium-weight combat force; most akin to a light cavalry regiment. It is designed to fill a void in a force that had become either too heavy to get to a battlefield quickly, or too light to do much of anything once it arrived. Through substantial investments in emerging technologies, the SBCT is expected to deliver significant increases in combat capability and effectiveness over other brigade-sized formations. But the SBCT is not transformational. It is, at most, evolutionary:

> Evolution. Noun. A gradual process in which something changes into a different and usually better or more complex form. A movement that is part of a set of ordered movements. (Webster's 1994)

> The distinction between what is transformation and what is not needs to be made.

Words have meanings. And efforts to apply the definitions of one word to another are counterproductive and usually fruitless. There are three reasons why the US Army should discourage this trend. First, such an effort discredits the entire intellectual heritage of the US Army. If the US Army cannot be trusted to use accepted definitions, everything the Army says will become suspect. Essentially, people are forced to ask, "Is the Army speaking the same language as the common man? If not, why not?" The second reason is

that it promotes duplicity. When *transformation* is the official theme, suddenly everything becomes *transformational*. Quite often the word transformational has been used as less of a defining characteristic and simply another adjective, added on to a given program or project to ensure continued funding. The third reason is that discourages the study of history. If everything we do is transformational, then the implication is that the past no longer has relevance. In fact, nothing could be farther from the truth. The US Army has constantly changed, and will continue to change. This change is driven by a solid assessment of internal and external factors; and the willingness of the US Army to change, demonstrated repeatedly, is one of its greatest strengths, and may well be the principal reason for its continued existence.

<div align="center">The Authoritative Documents</div>

The principal advantage of examining the authoritative documents is that they allow this thesis to answer the question, what is the purpose of an army, without having to approach the question from either a politically or ideologically driven position. When asked, "What is the purpose of an army?" most respondents tend to ignore the Army itself and instead base their answer upon their view of America's role in the world. For example, those who hold to the "no entangling alliances"[14] viewpoint believe that America should remain a nation apart, beholden to none; America's Army should be a predominantly civilian militia, called upon only in times of great distress, and only to preserve the republic. On the other side of the debate stands those who believe that America is the world's last, best hope; imbued with a missionary sense, they see the use of America's military as a legitimate means of overthrowing those forces who stand in the way of the spread of representative democracy, the rule of law, and free market

capitalism. Believers in this credo tend to view the military as the modern-day equivalent

of the Roman legions: professional career-soldiers, equally adept at fighting conventional

foes and suppressing insurgents as they are in building the infrastructure of the state,

securing the peace, and fostering the growth of commerce. As with most things, the truth

lies between these two extremes, and the willingness to support the use of force in any

particular endeavor depends upon a great many things; not least of which is the perceived

legitimacy and necessity of the endeavor.

The US Army draws its guidance for its force structure from several authoritative

documents. The first of these, not surprisingly, is the *Constitution of the United States*.

The remaining sources include certain sections of Title 10, *United States Code*, certain

Department of Defense Directives (DODD), the *National Security Strategy* (*NSS*), the

National Military Strategy (*NMS*), the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (*QDR*), and the

Army Strategic Planning Guidance (*ASPG*).

These documents can be better understood by grouping them into three broad

categories. In the first category are those documents that speak to the America's values

and its organizing principles. The *Constitution of the United States* and the *National*

Security Strategy (*NSS*) are in this first category. The second category consists of those

documents that speak of the linkages between ends, ways, and means. The *National*

Military Strategy (*NMS*), the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (*QDR*), and the *Army*

Strategic Planning Guidance (*ASPG*) are in this second category. It is worthwhile to note

that the *NMS* and the *QDR* are very much concerned with the here and now, while the

ASPG is focused on the future. The third category consists of those documents concerned

with the mechanics of how we do business. The body of law and regulations known as DOD Directives and Title 10, *United States Code*, comprise this third category.

The *Constitution of the United States* makes clear not only the need for an Army to come into existence, but also the division of authority and responsibility of the US Army between the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 gives to Congress the "power to . . . provide for the common defense and general welfare." Further clauses detail the mechanisms that Congress intends to employ to fulfill that obligation; to wit, the power to declare war (Clause 11), the authority to "raise and support armies" (Clause 12), and the authority to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces (Clause 14). Other clauses in that section spoke to Congress' authority and obligations to the militia. Later known as the National Guard, the militia represented the majority of America's combat power well past the middle of the twentieth century. Another indication of Congressional intent to maintain a strict oversight of the roles and missions of the US military is demonstrated in the latter portion of Clause 12, which indicates that "no appropriation of money to that use (raise and support armies) shall be for a longer term than two years." But while Article I of the Constitution makes clear the role of the people in raising and supporting armies, the Constitution also recognizes that the execution of war requires both a unity of purpose and a unity of command. To that end, we see in Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1, that "the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States."

As this section demonstrates, the Constitution represents both the values (power derives from the people) and the organizing principles (unity of effort, accountability to civilian authority). Previously, this thesis looked to Title 10, *Unites States Code*, Section 3062 for a further understanding of the role of the Army. That section listed the four-fold purpose of the Army. The importance of 10 USC 3062 cannot be overstated, if for no other reason than it reflects Congress' intent today; whereas the world and the United States' relation to it were considerably different when the Constitution was penned. As mentioned in the last chapter, from the very first sentence the intent of Congress was clear: the Army is but the land component of the joint force, and cannot be envisioned as distinct from the joint force.

This requires a fundamental reappraisal of traditional Army thinking. Previously, Army leaders were content to claim that "what is good for the Army is good for the nation." Now the mind-set holds that, "It is all Title 10,"[15] and "what is good for the nation is good for the Army." This change in mind-set is indeed another paradigm shift, but as this shift was generated by the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (commonly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act), this is hardly a recent paradigm shift, and hence, not one of the two paradigm shifts that this thesis addresses. But it is instructive to note that still, twenty years later, the Armed Forces struggles to institutionalize that change in mind-set. Indeed, because the changes generated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act principally impacted the relationships between the Services and the Unified Commanders, and the effects were principally felt at the more senior operational levels, the change in mind-set literally requires the length of a career.

This is a particularly compelling argument for establishing a holistic force design: if what is required is a fundamentally different approach to the way business is done, then fundamental changes to the structures by which forces are organized, trained, equipped, deployed, and employed must be enacted. Essentially, the choice is simple: bear all the cost up front, and get it over with, or adopt a nickel-and-dime approach and find yourself still fighting the same fights twenty years later.

Another thing that should be understood is that, in a very real sense, the US Army, as an institution, does not actually have any assigned tasks. All tasks related to the US Army are given to a single individual. Under Title 10, United States Code, Congress organizes the Department of the Army under the Secretary of the Army (10USC 3011). It is to this politically appointed civilian that, per 10 USC 3013(b), responsibility for the entire range of functions associated with raising, training, equipping, and sustaining an Army are given. Furthermore, the duties of the Secretary of the Army do not stop at Service boundaries. The Secretary of the Army must ensure that Army activities are conducted with an eye towards integration as part of the joint force:

> (c) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army is also responsible to the Secretary of Defense for -
> (4) carrying out the functions of the Department of the Army so as to fulfill (to the maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands;
> (5) effective cooperation and coordination between the Department of the Army and the other military departments and agencies of the Department of Defense to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication;
> (6) the presentation and justification of the positions of the Department of the Army on the plans, programs, and policies of the Department of Defense. (10USC 3013(c))

This Congressional directive to orient the Army towards integration and employment as part of the joint force is further reinforced when the actual organization of Army forces is discussed:

> Except as otherwise prescribed by law or by the Secretary of Defense, the Army shall be divided into such commands, forces, and organizations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army. (10USC 3074(a))

Additionally, the US Army force structure must have the ability to accomplish those specified tasks for which the Secretary of the Army (SA) has been named the Executive Agent (EA). The determination of executive agent is the means by which the Department of Defense prevents duplication of efforts. This responsibility is defined as:

> DoD Executive Agent. The Head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components. (DODD5101-1(3)(1))

As noted, DOD only designates executive agent status to the head of a DOD component (i.e., the Secretary of the Army); but that responsibility is further tasked down to the appropriate individual, office, or headquarters. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA (M&RA)) and Installation, Logistics and Environment (ASA (I, L &E)), the Commanding General, Corps of Engineers (COE), as well as the Army G1, G2, G3, G4, the Chief, Public Affairs, the Director, Army Safety, and the Director, Army Staff, each serve as the Secretary of the Army's proponent for a specific executive agent function. The complete listing of all functions for which the Secretary of the Army has been designated can be found in Department of the Army Memorandum 10-1.

Many of these EA tasks are mostly administrative and require little more than coordination for establishing of standards. These tasks generally fall within the capabilities of existing units. Some examples of these tasks include: the Armed Forces Courier Service (the SA proponent is the G1); the Biological Defense Safety Program (Director, Army Safety); Psychological Operations (G3); environmental restoration of active army installations and formerly used defense sites (ASA I, L &E)); Military Customs Inspection Program (the G4, per DODD 5030.49); DoD Immunization Program for Biological Warfare Defense (per DODD 6205.3); Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) (per DODD 4140.25-M); and COMSEC monitoring for the Joint Staff.

While each of these tasks are important in their own right, their impact on force structure is, at best, minimal. What is not minimal, however, are those executive agent tasks that are logistical in nature and are often referred to under the title of Army Support to Other Services. Army FM 100-10-1, *Theater Distribution*, speaks to these requirements. In all Theaters of Operations, the US Army bears the responsibility for Veterinary Service Support; Food Safety Service; Mortuary Affairs; EPW Detainee Program; Management of Conventional Ammunition; Controlled Disposal of Waste, Explosives, and Munitions; Military Troop Construction Support to OCONUS USAF; Inland Logistics Support to the USMC; and Overland Petroleum Support Management, to name but a few. Additionally,

> A JFC may designate a Service, usually the dominant user or most capable Service, to provide common item/service support for the entire theater, areas within a theater, or specific operations. . . . Responsibilities may include: Wartime Class I, II, III(B), IV, and IX in-theater receipt, storage, and issue; Medical

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evacuation on the battlefield; Transportation engineering for highway movements; Finance, banking, and currency support; Chemical ammunition; Airdrop equipment and systems; and Billeting, medical, and food service support for transient personnel during other than unit moves. (FM 100-10-1, App B, 1 October 1999)

As a general rule, if the US Army is involved, it will have these additional tasks.

The bottom line is that the US Army does not organize itself; the US Army is organized under the direction and authority of its civilian leadership, to accomplish tasks assigned to its politically appointed civilian leadership. Additionally, with the exception of those forces needed to conduct service-unique obligations, such as recruiting and training, Army forces are to be assigned to combatant commanders for integration and employment as part of a joint command:

Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands or to the United States element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command to perform missions assigned to those commands. Such assignments shall be made as directed by the Secretary of Defense, including direction as to the command to which forces are to be assigned. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that such assignments are consistent with the force structure prescribed by the President for each combatant command. (10 USC 162(a)(1))

As for the Combatant Commands, they sit atop the military hierarchy. Again, as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the operational chain of command passes from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders (JP 0-2, UNAAF, page I-6). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) assists the President and the SECDEF by transmitting their orders to the combatant commanders. In this operational chain of command, the Service Chiefs fill an advisory role. While the input of the Service Chiefs is both valued and solicited, there is no getting around the fact that this structure was deliberately designed to counter Service parochialisms that had only served to delay decisions, frustrate the national civilian leadership, and had resulted in costly duplications

of effort in some areas, and the complete abdication of other roles and missions, such as special operations (Locher 1996).

But the role of the Combatant Commands is not limited to the operational sphere. In fact, the Combatant Commanders have the authority to task the Services. In precise military terms, the relationship between the Combatant Commands and the Services (Departments) is understood as *Supported* and *Supporting*. The Combatant Commands are the supported commands, while the services do the supporting. Department of Defense Directive 5100-1 makes clear the roles and authority of the Combatant Commanders, to include:

> 5.1.1. To give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;
> 5.1.2. To prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command;
> 5.1.3. To organize commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;
> 5.1.4. To employ forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;
> 5.1.5. To assign command functions to subordinate commanders;
> 5.1.6. To coordinate and approve those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and
> 5.1.7. To exercise the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial, as provided in 10 U.S.C. (reference (b)). (2002)

Further indication of their primacy of position over the Departments is evidenced by the fact that the DOD has "directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments to provide or arrange for the administrative and logistic support of the headquarters of the Combatant Commands and the U.S. Element, North American Air Defense Command… (and, with a few exceptions, this responsibility) . . . extends to the headquarters of all

subordinate joint commands established within the Combatant Command (DODD 5100-3. (4)(1)).” Under this directive, the US Army has the responsibility to support the following Combatant Commands or subordinate unified commands: US European Command, US Southern Command, US Forces, Korea, and the Joint Special Operations Command. This same directive goes on to stress that the military departments

> shall program and budget to fund, without reimbursement, the administrative and logistic support required by the supported joint headquarters to perform their assigned missions effectively. This non-reimbursable support shall include essential base operating support per reference (d) and direct support of Major DoD Headquarters Activities per reference (e), except that USCINCSOC shall program and budget for those specific direct support costs of its own Major DoD Headquarters Activities for which funds have been transferred from the Military Services to Major Force Program 11. (1991, (4)(2))

The importance of this discussion of support to the Combatant Commands, Executive Agent status, and Army Support to Other Services, can be summarized as follows: consistent with its identity as a component of the joint force, the US Army must organize its forces to support the JFCs. The US Army is the principal logistics provider for the joint force. These responsibilities suggest that US Army may well be called upon to conduct substantial logistics-related tasks in future operations without regard to any other role it may fill, such as a combat force. The implication of this is that the US Army force structure, and particularly its deployable force, should reexamine its existing logistical structure and the capability of those organizations. This has important implications for any force design.

The Constitution, Title 10, *United States Code,* and the Department of Defense Directives reflect the role of the legislative branch in shaping the identity of the US Army; and indeed the entire Defense establishment. The next set of documents this thesis

will discuss are those documents that reflect the role of the executive branch in shaping that identity.

The National Security Strategy is the document that speaks to what the United States is today; what it intends to accomplish, what it stands for; and what it stands against. It is the clearest expression of our collective values. The latest version was written in September, 2002. A simple reading of the table of contents makes this point irrefutably. Each chapter speaks to another value and objective. They include: Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity, Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends, Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts, Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction, Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade, Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy, Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power, and Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century.

The *National Security Strategy* recognizes that military power is but one instrument of national power. And it should come as comfort to many that it recognizes our own limitations:

> We have finite political, economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities. The United States will approach each case with these strategic principles in mind: The United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge. The United States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when

people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively. (*NSS* 2002, 9)

But that recognition of limitation is an expression of the limits of engagement and should not be applied to the determination of the nation to persevere its way of life in the face of a threat. The determination to preserve not only its way of life but also its interests, as defined solely by the United States and no other, is clearly articulated:

> Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.
> To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. (*NSS* 2002, Foreword)

The *National Security Strategy* forms the foundation by which the next two documents, the *Defense Planning Guidance* and the *National Military Strategy*, build upon.

The latest version of the National Military Strategy was published in 1997. A draft copy of the next edition is in circulation; but as the document has yet to be released, one of the limitations of this thesis is that it will not discuss works not in public circulation. Until a new edition is released, the 1997 version remains authoritative. Despite that it was written before the terrorist attacks, and in a previous administration, much of what it speaks to remains relevant. The 1997 *NMS* was labeled *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now*. While these terms are no longer in favor, these three concepts do have some utility in explaining the roles and missions of the joint force. They speak to the need (and challenge) of remaining globally engaged, and thereby shaping the

international environment by creating conditions favorable to US interests and global security. It recognizes that, to protect US national interests, the entire joint force must respond rapidly and with appropriate capability to crises across the full spectrum of operations. Finally, it recognizes the opportunities and challenges facing the military to leverage new technology and transform itself into a force that was envisioned in Joint Vision 2010.

The strategic environment, as defined in the 1997 *National Military Strategy* (NMS), has not changed appreciably. In the *NMS*, the authors wrote that "regional conflict remains possible, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a major concern, and we face a number of nontraditional, transnational, and unpredictable threats to our security." While none of that was particularly prescient, we now live in a world where the caveat "possible" can be discarded.

In recognition of the threats facing the US, the *National Military Strategy* discussed the characteristics of the force:

> US Armed Forces as a whole must be multi-mission capable; interoperable among all elements of US Services and selected foreign militaries; and able to coordinate operations with other agencies of government, and some civil institutions. (1997)

The *National Military Strategy* focused upon four strategic concepts. The first is Strategic Agility, which

> requires our Armed Forces to be versatile, that is, to conduct multiple missions simultaneously, across the full range of military operations, in geographically separated regions of the world. This versatility, and the equally important abilities to orchestrate, command, control and support dispersed joint forces permit the decisive application of our strengths against enemy weaknesses. Strategic agility is essential if we are to remain globally engaged but not find ourselves improperly positioned or otherwise unable to respond to crises. (1997)

Unlike Strategic Agility, the next three strategic concepts, Overseas Presence, Power Projection, and Decisive Force, are rather self-descriptive. But while these three are easily understood, their application is clearly being changed. Consider that Decisive Force speaks of the

> commitment of sufficient military power to overwhelm all armed resistance in order to establish new military conditions and achieve political objectives. . . . Decisive force in the early stages of a crisis can be critical to deterring aggression. The concept does not promise quick or bloodless solutions to military challenges, but does require that, where the actual commitment of military power is anticipated, such force will be clearly superior to that of any potential adversary. (*NMS* 1997)

The campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have clearly demonstrated that what constitutes "sufficient military power" is subject to a wide interpretation. Likewise, the definition provided for Overseas Presence: "permanently stationed and rotationally or temporarily deployed forces promote security and stability, prevent conflict, give substance to our security commitments, and ensure our continued access", sounds straight-forward enough. But a closer examination of this concept and comparison with current events demonstrates that what was thought to be a permanent arrangement one year may be open to a different interpretation only a few years later. Perhaps the best utility of this strategic concept is the feature that it shares with "Power Projection." Both make options available to the decision makers.

The *Quadrennial Defense Review* was intended to be the most specific of the documents; it was meant to be a troop-to-task document, demonstrating the forces required to achieve specific tasks. The origin of the document was the 1993 *Bottom-Up Review* (BUR). Initiated during the first Clinton administration, the *BUR* was charged with determining what force structure would be appropriate for the post-Cold War world.

This document was followed by the 1997 *QDR*, the first document to bear that name. By congressional mandate, the *QDR* must be completed by the thirtieth of September every four years. However, that suspense means that the document must be completed within the first year of each new presidential administration. This becomes a problem when the administrations change.

> In fact, Secretary Rumsfeld later argued that defense reviews should be conducted in the second year of a new administration, essentially acknowledging that he had not had enough time to fully digest all the issues before him in time for the September 30, 2001, deadline imposed on him and implying that he would come up with further policy proposals in the months ahead. (O'Hanlon 2002, 11)

All documents are products of their time and captive to the prevailing mood of the time. The 1990s were a time of unrealistic optimism. The lack of a peer competitor seemed to take off the constraints that had earlier held back the employment of US armed force in support of humanitarian interests. Additionally, it was widely held that as-of-yet-unrealized advances in technology would indeed allow fewer forces to actually do more. The active Army component was reduced from 18 divisions and five corps to ten and four, respectively. By early 2001, the argument was repeatedly heard that the active Army could be further reduced to as little as seven divisions.

The 2001 *QDR* followed the 1997 *NMS* pattern of discussing the threats and the strategic environment, and then announced that the optimum force was nothing more or less than the force that was at hand. The 2001 *QDR* provides no troop-to-task analysis; no refinement of the discussion presented in the 1997 *NMS* of the link between national objectives and military strategy. The 2001 *QDR* seemed to be primarily concerned with ensuring that no more force structure was lost.

> The Bush Administration chose not to cut existing weapons programs, streamline the combat force structure, or reduce overseas deployments of the American

armed forces. In fact, the absence of almost any change in any of these areas was striking. The 2001 QDR contained the fewest programmatic and force structure initiatives of any of the four major U.S. defense reviews since the end of the cold war (as it contained virtually none). Before September 11, Secretary Rumsfeld had essentially settled on a conservative Quadrennial Defense Review document. (O'Hanlon 2002, 10)

The 2001 *QDR* achieved its objectives; no further force structure was lost. But the 2001 QDR paid the price of this success by abdicating its purpose and forfeiting its value as an instrument for determining Army force structure.

If the premise that the best educated are the last educated has any credence, then the *ASPG*, published November 2003, should be the best source of identifying internal factors that affect a force stabilization system. And, as mentioned in the Introduction, it is the first document found to actually use the term *force stabilization*. There is a clear hierarchy of these documents. The *NSS*, *NMS*, and *QDR* reflect the national and DoD-level view. The *ASPG* reflects the view one step down. This is not criticism; actually it is an advantage. Because the *ASPG* is able to build off the preceding guidance, it is able to provide greater clarity on what actions the US Army will take, and what challenges and changes await it.

There are two important points to make about the *ASPG*. The first is the tone it sets in its Introduction. Everything within the *ASPG* begins from a single starting point: "We are a Nation and an Army at war." This is the Army's reality. The need to win this war and increase the Army's relevance to the joint force means that everything is on the table for consideration.

> We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready force – a campaign quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mind-set. (*ASPG* 2003, 1)

The result is a tone that views the coming changes as both necessary and positive, considers those changes as proactive, and encourages a "leaning forward in the foxhole" attitude. This Army intends to fight and to win, and will demonstrate its relevance in the manner in which it does both.

The second tone is that readers are being prepared for many more changes ahead. Indeed, only some of the necessary changes have been articulated, but they have not yet been instituted. In this new world, mental flexibility is not just a good idea, it is an imperative. The changes the *ASPG* hint at speak to doctrinal as well as organizational changes. The tone of the *ASPG* clearly infers that this is a thinking man's Army.

In particular, note the section titled "The Army's Purpose and Role in National Security," in Annex A: National Strategic Guidance. At first glance the reader may feel they are reading about the Army Mission Essential Task List (METL), as discussed in Chapter One, FM 3-0, *Operations,* June 2001 edition.[16] But while similarities exist, the *ASPG* clearly defines the Army in terms of its contributions to the Joint Force.

> The Army possesses essential capabilities that directly support the Joint Force in achieving the goals of the National Security and Defense Strategies by:
> …Providing Support to Civil Authorities at Home and Abroad.
> …Providing Expeditionary Capabilities to Joint Force Commanders.
> …Providing Dominant Land Power Forces and Capabilities Required by Joint Force Commanders to Reassure Friends, Allies and Coalition Partners.
> …Providing Dominant Land Power Forces and Capabilities Required by Joint Force Commanders to Dissuade and Deter Adversaries.
> …Providing Dominant Land Power Forces and Capabilities Required by Joint Force Commanders to Compel and Decisively Defeat Adversaries Across the Full-Spectrum of Conflict.
> …Providing Domi nant Land Power Forces and Capabilities Required by Joint Force Commanders to Win the Peace (ASPG, 2003).

This brief review of the authoritative documents that apply to the US Army is designed to demonstrate that the US Army must raise, train, and equip forces that are capable of conducting combat and peacetime activities across the full spectrum of operations, subordinated to a unified commander for employment as a fully integrated part of a joint force; strategically mobile; and logistically robust; and possessing a mind-set that recognizes that their ability to conduct tactical and operational tasks is important only insofar as they both support national policies and implement national objectives.

<u>The Literature Review</u>

Having analyzed the authoritative documents to determine what the national civilian leadership expects from the US Army, this thesis now turns to the larger body of literature on this subject. It is instructive to note that a large number of prominent strategic thinkers, policy makers, and other concerned commentators have written on this subject. In such a case, one could rightfully expect that for every person who agreed on a subject, an opposing viewpoint could be found. This makes it all the more noteworthy that this literature review has found that there exists a remarkable consistency among the majority of these writers. In particular, this thesis notes the existence of four specific themes that are commonly touched upon. These four themes are the Army's relevance to the joint force, concerns about the strategy underlying the force structure, the need for Army forces to (continue to) support the nation's global engagements, and the need, given an ambiguous environment and uncertainty as to the next threat, to adopt a more expeditionary mind-set and posture. Equally noteworthy is that the discussion of each of these themes includes equal parts criticism and prescription.

The First Theme: The Army's Relevance

The first theme is perhaps the most disturbing: the need that so many writers feel to argue for the Army's continuing relevance (both to the nation and as a member of the joint force). Time and again, writers have felt compelled to state the obvious, such as "An important tool for broadening strategic options for the United States is highly capable conventional forces….(Lind, 1985)."

The repeated assertions of the Army's relevance cannot help but make the reader question why an Army that is arguably the most successful in history, and is consistently held in the highest regard by its fellow citizens, feels compelled to argue, again and again, for its own relevance? The need to make these assertions has nothing to do with the Army's performance or (obvious) utility. Rather, this angst is caused, to a large degree, by the tendency of both our national political system and the Pentagon's own internal bureaucratic infighting to view appropriations as a zero sum game. This view is expressed by BG Kaufman, Dean of the Academic Board, USMA at West Point, when he writes:

> While the largest Service in terms of manpower, the Army consistently garners the smallest share of defense dollars relative to the other Services. In 1989, the US Army budget was 26.8% of the total budget, while, by 2007, the Army budget should total only 25.3% of the annual defense budget. In addition, over the 1989-2007 time frame, there also is significant growth in Defense-wide Agency budgets, which climb from 7% of the budget in 1989 to 16.0% in 2007. (2002)

The most appropriate response to this is, "So what?" The issue is not what percentage of the total budget the Army is appropriated, but on whether or not the Army is getting what it requires to carry out its assigned tasks. This fixation upon the share of money relative to the other services is not only petty and pointless; it is a waste of time.

Another example of this line of thinking is offered by the former Chief of Staff and

current President of the Association of the United States Army, General Gordon Sullivan:

> What I have witnessed is a continual lack of money for research, development, and acquisition of systems and an uncanny focus on Army items being developed vice the total system procurement when one buys a new airplane or ship. (2003)

General Sullivan's comments point to a preference within the Army for a large

pot of money to commit to the research, development, and fielding of Army systems, free

from outside (read: congressional) interference. Essentially the Army is telling the nation,

"If you want a world class Army, then give us the money, stay out of our way, and we'll

build it for you." The problem with this approach is threefold. First, an examination of

the Army's track record in acquisitions neither inspires confidence nor credibility in the

idea that the Army is a reliable steward and can be trusted to deliver the product.[17] The

second problem with this approach is that it focuses upon the Army's preferences, and

disregards the contributions of the other services to the joint fight. This was essentially

the case in the Crusader program. Designed to meet operational limitations identified

during Desert Storm, the Crusader quickly became the poster boy for yesterday's war. Its

own immense weight was cause alone to kill it; but the Army argument for indirect fire

tended to emphasize that the Army cannot count on the Air Force when it is raining. The

third problem with this approach is that it is an example of "biting the hand that feeds

you." As mentioned earlier, Congress appropriates the money for the land and naval

forces. If the principal concern of the congressmen and congresswomen is to look out for

the interests of their districts, so what? Telling Congress to, in effect, "butt out," is hardly

conducive to good relations or building the relationships needed when its time to ask for

additional funding.

But there is another reason as well for this angst, and once again, the Army bears

much of the responsibility for it. The Army has, time and again, sought to define the

debate over the proper role of the Army by establishing limits or by insisting (publicly)

upon such a large force package that the option (to employ the Army) is effectively

removed from consideration by the national civilian leadership.[18] The United States

Marine Corps, on the other hand, hangs out a shingle that proudly and vocally proclaims,

"We do windows."[19] What appears to have occurred is that the Army has priced itself out

of the game. Rather than preserve the force for what the Army deems to be its core

missions, such as fighting major conventional wars, this approach has served to send the

Army into a downward spiral. Denied the opportunity to employ the Army, the

impression is that the national civilian leadership views the Army budget as the bill payer

for other, more utilitarian and accommodating, Services. Facing a shrinking budget - after

all, what civilian leader wants to spend money for an instrument of national power that he

is effectively denied the use of - the Army now finds itself so eager to demonstrate its

value that it will do anything to get back in the game.[20]

Perhaps the clearest articulation for the concern that so many writers have for

ensuring that the Army is properly resourced, particularly as compared to the other

services, is offered by Robert Scales (Major General, retired), when he writes that

> The Cold War is over. America dominates the air, sea and space mediums. Only
> the ground will be seriously contested in a future limited war. (2003, 166)

In fact, "the question is not whether American landpower is essential to American

strategic dominance. The question is how landpower should be organized to operate

jointly with airpower and seapower to preserve America's strategic dominance in the

next century" (MacGregor 1997, 25). This point of view is echoed by McNaugher when he writes that the "Army (must) design its new combat systems in terms of how they complement the weaponry of the other military services" (2003, 303).

It is difficult for someone not steeped in the Army bureaucracy not to leave without having a sense that the Army is neither a particularly effective nor supportive member of the joint team. On this point the record is clear: this impression is both false and easily refutable. But it is nonetheless an easily construed impression. It may just be a result of repeatedly arguing for the Army's relevance. So what does it mean for designing a force when one of four central themes is arguing for the Army's relevance? Maybe it means that, despite all its talk about being a part of the joint force, the institutional Army continues to put its preferences ahead of programs that support the joint warfight. One solution is to integrate that portion of the Army that focuses on developing future combat systems into a larger, joint system that focuses first on validating weapon systems in the joint warfight.[21]

The Second Theme: Criticism of the Two Major Theater War (2-MTW) Strategy

The second recurring theme is, essentially, a criticism of the Two Major Theater War force-sizing paradigm. There are essentially three criticisms. The first is that the Army cannot afford to have forces built and tailored for specific threats, or a specific strategy, which was the case with the 2-MTW scenario. What is called for is a capabilities-based force, composed of more modular units that can be tailored for specific operations.

> In the geopolitical environment forecast earlier, strategic success will place a
> premium on military versatility. . . . [T]he United States cannot afford to maintain
> capabilities tailored discretely for every potential military challenge, nor will any
> single capability accommodate all such challenges. Instead, American military

forces must be capable of rapid adaptation to a broad and constantly varying range of strategic tasks and conditions. Ground forces remain the indispensable foundation of that strategic versatility. (Scales 2000, 36)

As an aside, read again the last sentence -- once again, an author feels compelled to articulate the Army's relevance. Returning to the call for more modular, vice scenario/threat-based force structure, this thesis found that this is not a particularly new argument. In his 1985 essay on "Conventional Forces: Framing the Issues," William S. Lind posited four theses. His third thesis speaks to this issue,

Thesis 3. The "scenario" approach to force structuring is false, because we cannot predict where, when, and against whom we will fight. Strategies and commitments change more p rapidly than force structure. A sound structure can only be built around generic qualities.
A goal of force planning should be to have forces of each type so that appropriate packages can be task organized for whatever situation develops. (Dunn 1985, chap. 6)

The second criticism of the two-MTW scenario strategy is that it is not only an unlikely scenario; it does not even represent the real worst-case scenario. In fact, a much more likely, and far more challenging scenario is an Army engaged in two or more combat operations, in addition to stability and support operations, as well as actively supporting the numerous peacetime military engagements (PME) that support the Combatant Commander's engagement plans as articulated in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). This argument is neatly presented by Michael O'Hanlon when he suggests that:

Instead, it should suffice that the United States have the capability for a single all-out operation on the scale of Desert Storm that would include such an overthrow-and-occupy mission, together with a more limited capability for a nearly simultaneous bust smaller war-fighting operation elsewhere. In addition, it should have a force structure adequate for a third mission on a modest scale, most likely a peace operation. This overall concept might be described as a "Desert Storm plus Desert Shield plus Bosnia/IFOR" posture (IFOR was the initial, relatively

large NATO operation in Bosnia), in contrast to the current two-Desert Storm framework. (2002, 64)

The third criticism is that the very notion of the two-MTW scenario is itself a whitewash and, in fact, the strategy itself was only contrived to ensure retention of a certain level of force structure. Once again, Michael O'Hanlon presents this argument neatly when he writes that:

> The current two-Desert Storm war-fighting framework had its ancestry in the base force concept of Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. It became truly prominent in the Pentagon's 1993 Bottom-Up Review under Secretary Les Aspin, and it was retained in similar form in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
>   Throughout this entire decade-long period, the framework has frequently had its critics. Notable among them was the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel (NDP). It produced its report in 1997 - about six months after the QDR was completed. In the report the National Defense Panel stated, "The two-theater war construct has been a useful mechanism for determining what forces to retain as the Cold War came to a close. . . . But, it is fast becoming an inhibitor to reaching the capabilities we will need in the 2010-2020 time frame." The National Defense Panel appeared to view the two-Desert Storm concept as little more than a bureaucratic device with more relevance to the Department of Defense's internal politics and organizational requirements than to real-world threats. Similarly, the April 2000 (second) report of the congressionally mandated U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCN/21) stated without elaboration: "This Commission believes that the 'two major theater wars' yardstick for sizing U.S. forces is not producing the capabilities needed for the varied and complex contingencies now occurring and likely to increase in the years ahead." (2002, 65)

As with the first theme, the cumulative effect of these criticisms is staggering. The thoughtful reader can hardly avoid one of three negative impressions: that the Army is preparing for the last war; the Army is not fully prepared to meet its prescribed full range of missions; or that the Army is more interested in preserving a force structure than in building a more credible and useful force; or, worse, some combination of all three of these arguments.

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It is reassuring to note that the "1-4-2-1" model for force sizing and the UA/UE concept effectively counters these criticisms. The relevance of this theme to a force stabilization system is rather straightforward. The Army needs a mechanism that demonstrates its ability to organize, train, equip, deploy, and employ its forces is synchronized with the national strategy. The Army needs a mechanism that allows it to "tell its story:" that the Army is a ready, relevant part of the joint force, fully capable of doing the nation's bidding.

<div align="center">The Third Theme: Accepting A Broader Mission</div>

The third theme is that the Army must accept a broader role; and its force structure should reflect that expanded role. This increased role is necessitated by the global commitments and obligations of the United States. The issue is more than simply adopting a global posture of existing forces, but a realization that the opportunities to engage other nations constructively are themselves legitimate missions, and not simply distractions from a primary mission of preparing to fight wars.

> [T]he United States must accept the reality of its global involvement. We cannot do everything everywhere but will be required to do a great deal in a great many places. We do not have a choice. (Peters 2002, 138)

The oft-repeated word heard throughout all discussions of this theme is one that the American people are decidedly reserved about: empire. Time and again, commentators speak of the United States as an empire, albeit not in the traditional sense of the word.

> The United States is now an empire in all but name - the first case in history of an empire in denial. (Ferguson, 2003)

> The United States is, indeed, an empire, if a newfangled one with no interest in occupying territory or ruling foreign populations. We wish to do business around the world, to be safe, and to influence the future to our benefit.

<div align="center">55</div>

. . . America must accept the mantle of empire it long has found
uncomfortable. Greatness has been thrust upon us, although we like the role as
little as do our jealous allies.

Of course, our empire is cultural and economic, a matter of influence and
the occasional exercise of military power, and not one of conquests and
exploitation. But it is an empire nonetheless. (Peters 2002, 18).

Despite the allure of the word to writers and commentators, *empire* is not, nor has

it ever been, the issue. The issue is *interests*. As a global power, the United States has

global *interests*. And it must have a military that is capable of supporting and defending

those interests.

There are good reasons why the United States should spend far more than any
other country on its military. The United States has unique global interests and
multiple military commitments far from its national territory. It maintains
worldwide military deployments to keep alliances credible. It rightly desires a
military so unambiguously strong that it can generally deter war and, failing that,
win decisive victories with minimal casualties. Finally, given that its armed forces
are not particularly large (constituting only about 6 percent of global military
manpower), it relies on high-quality and thus expensive equipment and manpower
rather than sheer size for its war-fighting edge. (O'Hanlon 2002, 3)

[I]solation is an impossible dream. The world is now too much of a piece, its
interlocking systems too complex and binding. American interests are
everywhere, or nearly so. We are condemned to work for global betterment.
(Peters 2002, 109)

These writers are speaking to the same issues that the authors of the authoritative

documents wrote of when they stressed that the Army would support the combatant

commanders' TSCP. Both the second and third themes argue for a force design that

reflects the nation's strategy and its commitment to remain engaged.

The Fourth Theme: An Expeditionary Army

The fourth theme speaks to *how* the United States military can best support the

nation's global interests in a time of ambiguity and uncertainty, by defining one of the

principal characteristics that the armed forces must possess: expeditionary.

Our forces must return to their lithe expeditionary and constabulary traditions in order to effectively and more efficiently cope with our global involvement. This means that the anomalous legacy of the Cold Wart must be cast off--in organizations, acquisitions, and personnel policies. (Peters 2002, 138)

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, the US Army has not chosen to define what it means when it says expeditionary. The advantage of this approach is that it means whatever the speaker intends for it to mean. The disadvantage is that the audience is often at a loss to what the speaker meant in the first place. A referral to the dictionary leaves the reader with the vague notion that the Army intends to be prompt (as defined by 10USC3062) and responsive; which makes the reader wonder how this is so new and different from the Army METL task "Respond Promptly to Crisis" that was articulated in FM 3-0. And the US Army already has rapid-response contingency forces. So what is new?

In fact, the US Army is actually attempting to say three things. First, the US Army intends to get in the game at the beginning, vice in the later stages as was evident in Afghanistan. Secondly, the US Army intends that its rapid-response contingency forces are more accessible to operational planners at the Combatant Commands, vice being held at the strategic-level as is the current case. Third, and perhaps most important, the US Army does not intend to go in on the cheap, but rather, to come in hard and heavy and quickly dominate the ground dimension of the battlefield. The US Army is not abandoning any of its ability to conduct sustained campaigns. On the contrary, the US Army intends to deliver the capability for campaigns to JFCs faster than it has previously.

Delivering the right Army forces at the right place and time is vital to the Joint Force commander's ability to defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. As the Army repositions and reconfigures its forces, we will expand the Joint Force commander's ability to rapidly deploy, employ and sustain forces throughout the global battlespace in any environment

and against any opponent. A Joint and Expeditionary Mind-set recognizes that we are an Army in contact, engaged in ongoing operations and ready to rapidly respond to the next crisis as it evolves. (*ASPG* 2003)

The implication of this fourth theme for any force design is the ability to *surge*. Identifying, resourcing, and positioning contingency forces is the easy part. The ability to quickly generate additional combat power is decidedly more difficult. Additionally, while much of the emphasis may be on the build-up of combat power, that is only one third of the equation. The other two elements of the equation include having contingency-ready C2 elements (JTFs) as well as logistics forces capable of responding just as fast and capable of providing tailored support.

Conclusion

This review of the authoritative documents and the existing literature demonstrates, repeatedly, that the central elements required in any force design are well articulated. The authoritative documents stress the following characteristics *must* be integral to the Army: capable of conducting combat and peacetime activities across the full spectrum of operations; operate as part of a fully integrated joint force; strategically responsive and mobile; logistically robust; and understanding of their relationship to national policies and objectives. The literature review reinforces each of these requirements, but, interestingly, adds no new requirements. Instead, the literature review focuses more upon attitudes, perceptions, and policies that have only served to estrange the Army from the political leadership. Three such negative attitudes stood out: the attitude that appropriations are a zero sum game; that discussions of appropriate roles, missions, tactics, and equipment are best left to the Army's uniformed leadership; and discussions of force structure place a greater importance on the number of general officer

billets than on providing capabilities for the nation. There is no getting around that, in the event of a ground war, it is the Army that will likely bear the brunt of casualties. And there is no getting around the fact that Army equipment does cost less, and so generates less excitement among congressmen and congresswomen, than does the big ticket items of the Air Force and Navy. While both of these serve as a source of concern and frustration for the Army's leadership, the Army is no Rodney Dangerfield: the Army should not be crying out that it gets no respect. Instead, the solution, both in terms of gaining adequate funding and appropriate missions, is to integrate its force design so completely with the joint force that the two are indistinguishable.

CHAPTER 3

AN EXAMINATION OF THE EXTERNAL FACTORS BEARING ON ARMY
REORGANIZATION AND FORCE DESIGN

This chapter is an examination of how external forces impact on Army

reorganization and force design. There are three distinct sections of this chapter. The first

section will discuss what and how Americans in general and the American military in

particular think about the world. As will be demonstrated, any attempt to describe and

understand the world, demands that an arbitrary order is imposed; this is usually done

through the development of models (which may or may not have much utility). It is

through the filter of these models that the effects of existing and emerging trends and

global drivers[22] are viewed. The second section will discuss an emerging doctrine for

what and how the United States military thinks about and prepares for future conflict, a

process known as Operational Preparation of the Battlefield (OPB). The third section will

discuss the role of the Combatant Commands in synthesizing these two sections, that is,

how the American military views the world with how it prepares for conflict.

The Inadequacies of Models: "Thinking About" the World

As mentioned, the world is only understood through the context of the models that

is used. All models attempt to explain; models built to explain the nature of the world

must deal with incredibly complex and interrelated issues. Perhaps the greatest challenge

is the demand placed upon these models to predict such variables as the effects of

existing and emerging trends and global drivers. The role these models play in shaping

worldviews cannot be overstated.[23] The problem with such models is recognizing their

built-in inadequacies. All models attempt to explain; but all models also act as filters. The

challenge is twofold: recognizing that the filters do exist; and recognizing that they are self-imposed.

Today, the American military is developing new models to explain and understand the world. The reason for developing new models is that the old models no longer apply; the world has changed. The previous models were built to explain events in a bipolar world. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not merely signal the end of an ideologically driven economic, social, and political system; it marked the transition from a bipolar world to one that remains undefined. As an aside, it is interesting to note that the collapse of the Soviet Union was unique in that everyone knew that the world had, somehow, changed. Historically, such transition points tended to be transparent to contemporaries.

What nobody knew, and what remains still in dispute, is the nature of what will follow. There are three things that are widely known. The first thing is this: the bipolar world held too many tensions, aspirations, feuds, struggles, and a host of unresolved issues in an artificial stasis. The second thing is this: now that the restraints have been lifted, and the issues have sprung forward, the world will never go back to what it once was. The third thing that is widely known is that there exist many powerful trends and global drivers that will continue to reshape and change the world in ways that are difficult to predict. Granted, there is nothing particularly new about change, in and of itself. What is important about the change the world is witnessing today is its three defining characteristics: its scale, the rate of that change, and the resultant disparity. Disparity always exists. What makes it so noteworthy now is that the levels of disparity are becoming readily apparent to everyone, everywhere. Furthermore, disparity needs to be

understood both in terms of the rates of change (some places are changing faster than others) and in the impact of that change (some changes are more dramatic than others).

It is extremely difficult, and may well be impossible, to fully comprehend the scale of the change that is occurring. The same holds true for the rate of change. The disparity of change, however, is all too often readily apparent. Part of the problem in appreciating the scale of the change is that there are so many root causes, or sources, of this change. Just as there was no single cause for the collapse of the Soviet Union, so there is no single cause for the changes that are occurring. And, as it goes to reason, with each source there are a number of variables. And with each variable there are a number of interactions, which generate even more changes. There are theorists who believe that it is possible to develop models to explain such complex systems. But such models do not exist, save as theories themselves.

Lacking such models, there is the very real danger that a person can become overwhelmed and then unable to (effectively) process any of the information. To prevent against such an occurrence, the American military must impose a semblance of order, if for no other reason than to assist in its own understanding. But the challenge facing the American military is to constantly keep in mind that it is viewing the world, not as it is, but as the American military perceives it to be. The point of this discussion is that one must always be mindful that one's efforts to impose a sense of order will be, to a certain degree, inadequate. And that has to be acceptable. One must either live with this uncertainty and ambiguity, or collapse from paralysis.

To illustrate this point, consider the following excerpt from an editorial by Mortimer Zuckerman, editor-in-chief of *US News and World Report:*

Everybody knows that this is the American century. Some love it, and some, of course, hate it. Why? Because our dominance seems ordained for decades, given the relative youth of our population compared to those of Europe and China, not to mention our widening technological gap with the rest of the world.

Not surprisingly, this has caused other big powers to rethink where they fit. Russia dissolved its empire and now lives within borders that reflect no historical precedent. It seeks a new relationship with the West and with the former satellite states of the Soviet Union. China is emerging from centuries of decline as a major power. Europe is redefining whatever political entity will emerge from the European Union. As Henry Kissinger has pointed out, "Never before has a new world order had to be assembled from so many different perceptions of the world, or on so global a scale. (2003)

In essence, Mr. Zuckerman has presented a model for understanding the world. There are four items of note concerning this model. First, through the subtle deference to Dr. Henry Kissinger, the model recognizes the uncertainty in the world. Secondly, note that this is a very ethno-centric model. This is not a criticism, but a simple acknowledgment that the model places the US in the center, as the only actor with the ability to move and act independently, and all the other actors are placed around the US. Their actions, decisions, and power are all considered relative to the position of the US. The third item of note concerning this model is that it is very much concerned with the present. The fourth item is that it focuses on the major powers as the principal actors. Again, none of this is meant as criticism, but it does make the point that models tell more about the one using them, and their attempt to impose order upon ambiguity, than about the world they are trying to depict.

Global Trends and Drivers

As mentioned earlier, the third thing that everyone knows is that there exist certain trends and global drivers that will continue to reshape the world in ways that are difficult to predict. The best articulation of these trends and global drivers can be found in the various reports of the National Intelligence Council (NIC). The NIC manages the

Intelligence Community's estimative processes, and its various reports draw upon the very best expertise, both governmental and nongovernmental, that is available. As a general rule, the NIC focuses its efforts at understanding the world and identifying the emergence of threats fifteen to twenty years out. As to the difference between a trend and a global driver, consider the railroad analogy. A trend refers to the general direction, i.e., the tracks. A global driver is the engines on a train, pulling (and in many cases) pushing the train down the track. To complete the analogy, the world is not the train; the world is the entire railroad network: some tracks are coming together, integrating; others are diverging, pulling apart.

This thesis draws upon three NIC reports: *Global Trends 2010* (*GT2010*) (Revised Edition, November 1997), *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts* (*GT2015*) (December 2000), and *Global Humanitarian Emergencies: Trends and Projections, 2001-2002* (August 2001). A fourth source that will be drawn upon is a speech presented on 1 February 2000, by John C. Gannon, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, to the Smithsonian Associates' "Campus on the Mall," titled, "The CIA in the New World Order: Intelligence Challenges Through 2015." These reports offer value in three distinct areas. First, they offer an exhaustive degree of detail as to the current situation. Secondly, they demonstrate the first-order effects of existing and emerging trends. Third, they allow the reader to derive second- and third- order effects. These reports are books in their own right, and while this thesis will briefly mention their principal areas of study, and demonstrate their value to the reader

In the case of the population trend, these reports demonstrate that the population is growing in the least capable areas. This is the current situation. This population increase is resulting in a youth bulge that is severely taxing the ability of the education and health systems, overwhelming the social infrastructure, and negatively impacting the job markets. These are all first-order effects. Cheap labor may be easy to find, but it provides little compensation, little security, and little opportunity for those fortunate enough to get the job. The likely result is a social disaster in the making: large populations of disaffected, underemployed males who see no prospect or potential for advancement in the current structure. Such populations tend to be ripe recruits for criminal organizations and insurgencies. These are the apparent second- and third-order effects.

The same logic can be applied to the inverse situation. Europe and Japan are facing a population implosion. Due to the overly generous social net they provide, these countries have actually discouraged growth. This is the current situation. As their populations age, it will prove harder and harder to maintain the social services they have grown accustomed to. The ability to make painful decisions will quickly erode over time, as the elderly population will use their votes to ensure that their needs are met. These are first-order effects. The impact is that the industries of Europe and Japan will face a labor shortage, which will have to be remedied through immigration. This will lead to issues of identity and citizenship, and give rise to extremist fears and xenophobia. Ethnic diversity is a challenge for any culture, particularly one that has defined itself by its ethnicity, as have the Japanese and the countries of Europe. And the challenges will only be compounded by the spread of infectious diseases, as new immigrants tend to introduce

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new strains of disease (as our own native Indian populations could attest to, by their tragic deaths in overwhelming numbers). These are all the apparent second- and third-order effects.

In its report *GT2015*, the NIC identified a total of seven key drivers and interrelated trends. They include: (l) Demographics, (2) Natural resources and environment, (3) Science and technology, (4) the global economy and globalization, (5) National and international governance, (6) Future conflict, and (7) the role of the United States. GT2015 continues to stress the ambiguity of the international arena by stating:

> In examining these drivers, several points should be kept in mind:
> No single driver or trend will dominate the global future in 2015.
> Each driver will have varying impacts in different regions and countries.
> The drivers are not necessarily mutually reinforcing; in some cases, they will work at cross-purposes.
> Taken together, these drivers and trends intersect to create an integrated picture of the world of 2015, about which we can make projections with varying degrees of confidence and identify some troubling uncertainties of strategic importance to the United States. (2000)

Interestingly, the major trends that the NIC articulate bear a striking resemblance to the seven trends articulated in the report "*Future Security Environment 2025*" (*FSE2025*) that the Operational Research Division of the Canadian Department of National Defence issued in September 2003. In *FSE2025*, the seven trends were Population, Resources, Urbanization, Climate Change, Criminal Activity Detrimental to Stability, Pandemic Disease, and Failed and Failing States.

Neither list purports to be all inclusive nor the most detailed, or even more right. But it is worthwhile to note the similarity of certain trends, and to take note of the different audiences each report intends to reach.

Finally, it is instructive to note that, even after all the detailed, scholarly work and serious analysis, the authors still recognize the need to distill everything down into an easily digestible paragraph. This is unfortunate, because, truth be told; efforts to distill a "bottom line" do not add to an understanding of a complex situation, they only obscure the complexity.

> These trends depict a world where the compelling force of growth will collide with the capacity of governments to manage change. There will be growth in population, wealth, communications, technology, and rising demands on food, fresh water, and energy. Economic benefits will be uneven; resources will be available, although short-term disruptions will occur. No government will escape the race to match intellectual and material resources with public expectations.
> In this time frame, no country, no ideology, and no movement will emerge on a global scale to threaten US interests or to build and sustain an anti-Western coalition. (GT 2010 1997)

> So, what, in shorthand, will the picture look like over the next fifteen years? My one-sentence encapsulation would say the following: "Globalization will provide mankind with the unprecedented opportunity to improve the quality of human life across the planet; but progress will be hampered by economic volatility, by the political and security implications of sharpening inequalities in income, and by the growing threat from multiple, relatively small-scale programs of weapons of mass destruction." By contrast with the massive but arguably contained Soviet threat, we now face a serious challenge from lesser developed—and less disciplined—states, well-financed international terrorist groups, and powerful individuals with increasingly easy access to conventional explosives and to biological, chemical, and, to a lesser extent, nuclear weapons, along with the missile systems to deliver them. The bottom line is that these adversaries, who are often motivated by ideological rage or ethnic hatred, will have fewer and less powerful weapons than the Soviets, but are more likely to use them! (Gannon, 2000)

"Thinking About" Future Conflict

Previously, the threat was defined as an enemy's combat forces; conventional, unconventional, and strategic (read, nuclear). The advantage of this approach was that the American military could apply qualitative and quantitative analysis to both the threat's forces and its own forces, and could then develop a fairly reliable gauge of relative

combat strength and capabilities. As US forces began to leverage information technologies, and the US Army and US Marine Corps began to institutionalize maneuver-oriented warfare, the qualitative lead enjoyed by the US grew immensely. The performance of US forces in Desert Shield and Desert Storm only hinted at the dramatic improvements that would be realized by the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a mere twelve years later.

But just as the American military continued to improve upon its warfighting ability, America's potential future adversaries also took note. The lesson they learned was that it was not only prohibitively expensive to compete against the US in a conflict using conventional forces; but also that their own defeat on the battlefield was an all-but foregone conclusion. So America's adversaries demonstrated their adaptability; and began to focus instead on thwarting America's conventional power by any and all asymmetric means available.

<center>Asymmetry</center>

Asymmetry, as defined by the layman, is an imbalance; the lack of symmetry. But asymmetry, in the military sense of the word, refers to something more than just minor differences among adversaries. In its simplest form, it has been used to describe engagements between two dissimilar forces, such as air vs. naval forces, or air vs. ground forces, and so on. Asymmetry has always been a part of the US approach to war, albeit not by that name. This was evidenced by the American propensity to favor a qualitative advantage to offset the quantitative advantage enjoyed by the Soviets. It was only in 1995 that asymmetry began to refer to approaches or tactics that the threat could take (Metz and Johnson 2001, 2). Since then, the very term asymmetry seems to be used more to

describe the enemy's tactics, and as something the enemy does to the American military, than something the American military does to him.

What all this means of course is that the challenge facing the US military has completely reversed. Previously, the US Army focused its efforts on finding and killing large enemy conventional formations. Finding those formations was easy; killing them was hard. Today, the challenge facing America's military is that it must be prepared to find its adversaries in groups of ones or twos, and seldom a group as large as ten to twenty. Compounding the problem further is that the enemy hides himself by effectively blending into a civilian population. Finding them is hard; killing them is easy.

Operational Preparation of the Battlefield (OPB)

The cumulative impact of a changing world order and the challenges of fighting an asymmetric enemy are driving the development of a new approach to how the American military conceptualizes conflict: the operational preparation of the battlefield (OPB). As an emerging doctrine, OPB is not fully defined. The result of course, is that OPB effectively means anything and everything; and runs the risk of meaning nothing. But there are at least four key elements of OPB that are worth understanding, and preserving.

The first element is that OPB recognizes the inherent limitations of military power alone, and calls for the integration of military power with the other three instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic).

> *Diplomatic* pressure—ranging from negotiations, incentives, and international condemnation to loss of diplomatic status—should be employed to end support for terrorism. *Informational* campaigns, focused at delegitimizing terrorist causes and leadership while enhancing coalition legitimacy, should be carefully executed to avoid a backlash. Economic engagement can play a supportive role. Actions— such as market incentives, refinancing or canceling debt, providing loans,

imposing sanctions, preventing financial access to markets, freezing bank accounts and assets, offering rewards to compliant actors, and embargoing goods—may undermine the cause and support structure of terrorist organizations or reprimand sponsor states. Operational preparation of the battlefield will require the United States and its allies to seize the initiative and engage terrorism collectively with all the tools of statecraft in a proactive manner to set the conditions necessary to realize the desired results and end state. (*NDU* 2001)

The second element of OPB, already alluded to above, is that it is aggressive and

proactive.

Operational preparation of the battlefield involves allocating resources, posturing forces, and appropriating or initiating the instruments of power proactively to defeat terrorist groups, disrupt their activities, diminish their cause, and deny them support, sanctuary, or safe haven. (*NWC* 2002)

The American military has recognized that it is in a war, and it must gain and maintain

the initiative in order to win this war. America's military must take the fight to the

enemy; make the enemy react to its moves, make the enemy afraid of moving about,

fearful of being struck at an unexpected time from an unexpected direction.

The third element of OPB is that its activities occur "over there." This is a war,

and America intends to fight it, and win it, on the adversary's soil. America has taken this

approach for the simplest of reasons: it is a whole lot less expensive. America simply

cannot defend everywhere--all the time. In fact, America cannot even defend everywhere

some of the time. The cost to even attempt to do so would be prohibitively high, both in

terms of dollars and in terms of other, less tangible things, such as civil liberties and lost

opportunities. Lost opportunities are those things that America's citizens could have been

achieving had they not been diverted away from them in an ineffective effort at building

walls. And frankly, the US military is considerably better at offensive operations than

defensive operations. These types of operations play to America's strengths, such as its

global reach, and the ability to strongly influence other nations; as well as America's cultural preferences for action.

The fourth element of OPB is that it calls for a deeper level of understanding of conditions and forces in foreign countries than the American military has normally been accustomed to. America is fighting a thinking, adaptive enemy. In order to beat him, America must be either outthink him, or anticipate his moves. Either case requires a deeper understanding of the environment, the enemy, and a host of other factors beyond those that the Armed Forces are currently educated to consider.

<u>Synthesizing Views of the World and Future Conflict</u>

In addition to their role and authority in directing US military operations throughout the world, the Combatant Commands serve another critical function: they represent the one point where the US military actually synthesizes its worldviews with its emerging operational concept of OPB, and translate that convergence of thought into an operational course of action. Although not widely understood, this role is absolutely critical.

The process of synthesizing requires a clear articulation about what the American military is concerned about; essentially, how does America define the threat. And what is the threat that America faces today? The threat must be understood in a micro- and macro-perspective. The distinction between micro- and macroperspective is straightforward. In the micro-perspective, the focus is, exclusively upon the nature of the threat; essentially the first-order effects. In the macroperspective, the focus expands to include the second- and third-order effects. Both the microperspectives and the

macroperspectives include the development of courses of action to either forestall or reduce the destructiveness of those ripple effects.

As mentioned in the introduction, "America has (finally) begun to accept that conflict can occur without the imprimatur of a nation state. America has begun to recognize that such conflict can be bloody, protracted, and can spread like a wildfire. National borders and other boundaries have proven to be neither obstruction nor impediment to their spread; entire regions can be consumed, quickly, into the conflagration." These out of control conflicts threaten America's interests abroad: globalization, regional economic and political stability, and the spread of US values, as articulated in the *National Security Strategy.* This then is the macroperspective: that the US must be as concerned with the second- and third-order effects of a conflict as with the first-order effect; particularly if such a conflict is allowed to roam unchecked.

Concerning the microperspective, the US is, once again, locked in an ideological struggle. Previously it had been with communism, now the challenge comes from theocratic fascism,[24] in the form of radicalized Islam. Theocratic fascism is as violent, oppressive, and authoritarian as the fascism exhibited by the Nazis. What makes theocratic fascism so much more dangerous is its nihilistic element.

> Nihilism. Noun. The belief that destruction of existing political or social institutions is necessary for future improvement. (*Webster's* 1994)

Adherents to this philosophy of nihilism see no moral compunction but rather a sense of obligation to kill those who stand in the way of their political ambitions; they really believe they are doing "God's holy work," and their reward will be in heaven. Just as communism sought to challenge America's interests, so too does theocratic fascism.

Communism sought to challenge American interests using the traditional elements of national power. Theocratic fascism has adopted a different tactic: avoiding symmetrical conflict and, instead, deliberately targeting US institutions, symbols, and individuals. Theocratic fascism has no illusion whatsoever that it is engaged in a war with the cultural, economic, political, and military forces of the US. And theocratic fascism recognizes that it is a war to the death.

While it may appear that the microperspective and macroperspectives are concerned with different things, it is possible to synthesize those perspectives into an operational course of action. In order to fight the threat posed by theocratic fascism, America's military must first find it. Some political pundits find it fashionable to suggest that terrorism has no address, it is global. But a simple continuation of the analogy reveals that while the address may be unknown, the types of neighborhoods that terrorism prefers are well known. That is, where the government is weak, corrupt, and neglectful of local conditions; and a disaffected populace looks to their religion (Islam) for guidance and succor.[25] Where does this synthesis lead the planners at the Combatant Commands? It has defined the three points of convergence that one must look for: (1) small-scale conflict, (2) occurring in countries with weak, corrupt, and neglectful governments, and (3) with at least some parties to the conflict espousing allegiance to the doctrine of radicalized Islamic. And what is it about small-scale conflict in countries with weak, corrupt, and neglectful governments that can consume entire regions? The answer is the very real threat of implosion.

> Implosion. Noun. A sudden, violent collapse inward. Synonyms: Disintegration, closing phase. (*Webster's* 1994).

Implosion, far more than WMD, is the genie out of the bottle. An implosion is most analogous to a black hole: it devours itself, and sucks in everything else within its reach. Each of the Regional Combatant Commands must contend with the possibility of implosion within their areas of responsibility (AOR): to include Nigeria (EUCOM), Indonesia and North Korea (PACOM), Colombia (SOUTHCOM), and Saudi Arabia (CENTCOM), and yes, Saudi Arabia. The thing that makes implosion so feared is not so much its suddenness and violent nature, but rather its shock effect: it affects countries that appear, at least on the surface, to have a lot going for them.

At this point, this thesis has demonstrated that it is possible to synthesize the worldviews with the conceptualization of future conflict, but it has not yet incorporated how America's military prepares for that conflict; how America's military conducts ITS operational preparation of the battlefield (OPB).

So, what guidance does OPB provide? First, it is helpful to reexamine the four elements of OPB: 1) OPB recognizes the inherent limitations of military power alone, and calls for the integration of military power with the other three instruments of national power, 2) OPB is aggressive and proactive, 3) OPB's activities occur "over there," and 4) OPB requires a broader and deeper 'situational awareness' of the operational environment.

Despite the contentions of those who perceive the military's role as solely limited to fighting and winning wars, the US military has always been an instrument of nation-building and social integration throughout America's history. The guiding principle behind all this engagement is not altruism, but rather, it is to win a war before it has to be fought. America needs to be actively engaged throughout the world, particularly in those

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countries that have been mentioned as being prone to implosion.[26] Through bilateral and multilateral exercises, the US military can help develop professional militaries.[27] Through engineering and medical exercises, the US military can reinforce notions of the government's legitimacy and commitment to bettering the lives of its people. Through all of these efforts, America's military will gain on-the-ground experience with the various cultural and societal norms. Through its interaction, foreign citizens will learn that multicultural societies can, in fact, live and prosper together. This in particular will allow America to effectively counter some of the more malicious concepts spread by radical Islam. What must be avoided, under all circumstances, is the recent tendency of deploying US forces to a foreign land, building a fortress there, and hunkering down until it is time to go home.

Conclusion

This purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate that both the reorganization of the US Army and any future or proposed force design must take into account external factors. The ability of the American military to understand those external factors is determined, to a large degree, by the effectiveness of the models it uses; by the ability of those models to identify and chart the impacts of global trends and drivers; and by the intuitive sense that can only be gained by having "boots-on-the-ground." America's ability to impact those external forces is a reflection of how effectively its engagement strategies and the concept of OPB allow for the development of operationally sound courses of action, and the willingness to carry out those courses of action. The lesson is that any force stabilization system needs to weigh heavily towards pushing forces forward, making them accessible to the Combatant Commanders. Additionally, the US

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Army must examine how it organizes its operational levels of command. Perhaps the principle criteria should be a measure of how effective those operational level commands are in supporting the Combatant Commander's ability to shape the environment.

The final comment to make is that America must always define external factors in relation to its own interests. As mentioned earlier, America does not shape the environment because it can, it does so because it must; America is a nation at war. And while one of America's fundamental beliefs, as expressed in the *National Security Strategy*, is that the socioeconomic conditions and values America espouses provide considerable benefit to all, America still needs to differentiate between what is important to itself, and what is important to its allies.

Truth be told, those interests are NOT synonymous. Further, despite all the press reports to the contrary, Western Europe's greatest challenge is not a common, integrated foreign policy, economic policy, or security policy; it is a renegotiation of the social contract. The high cost of providing the current level of social services to an aging population is becoming prohibitive. It is the contention of this thesis that the principal motivation driving France and Germany is to develop, over the next few years, mechanisms that will ensure the retention of their current political and economic might in an integrated Europe, even as those same sources of power decline, relative to other nations.

While these are self-serving, selfish ends, any impartial assessment of the situation from the Franco-German point of view can hardly fault them for trying. But one can certainly fault any other nation if it allows its interests to be seconded to theirs. The US must be open to the aspirations of other nations. US interests are far greater than such

petty concerns; the US interests are global, and emphasize the growth of politically and

economically stable, liberal democratic societies throughout the world.[28]

CHAPTER 4

"THINKING THROUGH" THE UA/UE REORGANIZATION

As explained earlier, the second half of this thesis reflects an attempt to "think through" the UA/UE reorganization to its logical conclusion. There are three sections to this chapter: an explanation of the current Army force structure, an explanation of the UA/UE reorganization, and finally an introduction to the criteria that will be used to think through the UA/UE reorganization to its logical conclusion (the methodology). In the previous chapters the internal and external factors that impact upon the UA/UE reorganization and force design were identified. This chapter will demonstrate how those factors drive the force design, and how a force stabilization system can support such a force design. As has been noted, since the purpose of this model is to think through the UA/UE reorganization, this thesis will not offer anything new with regard to the types and orientation of forces.

The Current Force: Operational- and Tactical-Level
Command and Control Structures

The US Army organization can be intimidating. With fifteen Major Commands, five Armies, four Corps, and twenty divisions,[29] there is certainly a great deal of organizational structure (see Appendix A). While none of it is superfluous, there does appear to be a large "overhead" before you actually get to any operational (i.e., combat) forces

The fifteen Major Commands (MACOMs) essentially fall into two categories. The first category consists of those Major Commands that serve as the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) under one of the Unified Commands. These commands

ensure that the Army's interests are represented and accounted for; and that those tasks for which the Army is responsible for, such as administration and logistics, are provided for. Eight of the fifteen MACOMs[30] fall into this category. The remaining seven MACOMs have responsibility for some of the functions of the US Army.[31] Since the units assigned to these functional MACOMs are not operational (i.e., they do not deploy in support of operations), they do not need to be included in a force stabilization system.

As for the five Armies, note that two of them, the 7th and the 8th US Armies, have essentially been counted twice as they are dual-hatted as ASCCs (Europe and Korea, respectively). Another two of the Armies, the 1st and the 5th, are known as Continental US Armies (CONUSA). Their mission is to fulfill the functional requirement of mobilizing the Army. The 1st US Army has responsibility for the training readiness of all Reserve forces east of the Mississippi River, and the 5th US Army has responsibility for all units to the west of the Mississippi River. Essentially, this leaves only a single Army, the 3rd US Army, as a deployable, senior-level operational headquarters. That is not to suggest that 3rd US Army (3USA) can be deployed worldwide, however, since the Commanding General of 3USA is also dual-hatted as ARCENT, the ASCC for CENTCOM. As an aside, 3USA has the distinction of being the only ASCC that is not also a MACOM. Additionally, 3USA does not have any operational units (i.e., corps or divisions) habitually assigned. This structural overhead, while required, comes at a significant cost in terms of personnel:

> Of the 480,000 total personnel in the Army, 300,000 are in operational units and represent the deployable core of the Army. The remaining 180,000 are people like me—personnel in non-deployable units, headquarters elements, training facilities, and the like. (Kaufman 2002)

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As a general rule, US combat units are located in Corps, Divisions, and Separate Brigades. But there are exceptions to this rule. The 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, EUCOM's rapid response contingency force, is actually a subordinate unit of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF). The same is true for the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade, PACOM's rapid response contingency force. It is assigned to US Army, Alaska (USARAK). The 172nd has three battalions, one of which is an airborne battalion. The 173rd consists of two airborne battalions. Both SETAF and USARAK are commanded by Brigadier Generals; and while neither of those general officers exercise command over their respective brigades once deployed, their responsibilities include the deployable readiness, life support and associated logistics requirements.

It is not until we get down to the four Corps that we begin to see actual combat units. While Corps exercise command and control over divisions and separate brigades; it is important to note what they themselves bring to the fight. That is, brigade-sized elements of functional units such as military police, military intelligence, engineers, artillery, aviation, and multi-functional units such corps support groups; these formations are known collectively as corps troops. In general terms, the four Corps can be thought of as fulfilling the following roles: I Corps (US) supports the Pacific Theater; V Corps (US) supports the European theater. The XVIII Airborne Corps (US) is the rapid response corps, while the III Corps (US) is the heavy reinforcing corps. The qualifier, *in general terms*, is important because XVIII ABN, III Corps, and V Corps have found themselves rotating into Afghanistan or Iraq as the senior-level operational headquarters. Also, it should be noted that the actual pool of forces that make up Corps troops is insufficient to support all four Corps, if they were all deployed simultaneously. Illustrative of this point

is the fact that the entire Corps artillery of the I Corps (US) resides in the reserve component.

The ten active duty divisions reflect the posture of the Corps. Four are deployed overseas (two in Europe and two in the Pacific).[32] The remaining six are based in the United States. While the six in the United States each fall under the control of a Corps, they can be called upon to support contingencies and operations anywhere. The remaining deployable combat strength of the US Army includes four separate brigades. Two of these have already been discussed, the 172nd SIB and the 173rd ABCT. The remaining two are the Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR). The 2nd ACR (L) falls under XVIII ABN, while the 3rd ACR falls under III Corps (US).

<u>Force Stabilization in the Current Force Structure</u>

Understanding the actual organization of the current force structure is necessary in order to fully appreciate the scale of the challenge it is to apply any force stabilization concepts (the scheduling of training, employing, deploying) to it. Traditionally, corps units are pooled; while the actual brigade headquarters might not deploy unless the corps does, the subordinate battalions deploy frequently in support of operations worldwide. So the Army has never seen fit to establish a particular rotation system for its corps units. Because two of the four separate brigade-sized units are corps units (the 2nd and 3rd ACRs), and the other two are the contingency forces (172nd SIB and 173rd ABCT), there is no rotation system built for any of these four units. As for the divisions, it has literally been every division for itself. The 2nd Infantry Division, with two brigades stationed forward in the Republic of Korea, is essentially, at one hundred percent readiness all the time. The other divisions have developed patterns by which one brigade is ready to

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deploy, another is in a training cycle, and a third is in a recovery cycle, having just come off the deployment-ready cycle. The bottom line is that the US Army has effectively developed a system that can only make 1/3 of its forces available at a given moment. The most important thing to keep in mind is that this system of only having 1/3 of the force available was designed for an Army that was a peace, and the only deployments envisioned were regularly scheduled exercises. Not surprisingly, then, this system neither reflects the Army's identity as a strategic force for the nation nor supports an Army at war!

The impact of this current system is that predictability goes right out the window once a major operation, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, commences. The reason for this is that the Combatant Commands do not have forces of their own (once again, there are a few exceptions). The Combatant Commanders request forces through the JCS. And while the JCS makes certain forces available for planning, such as "an airborne division" (of which there is only one), that same capability/type unit may very well be given to another Combatant Commander for his planning purposes, too. If the national strategy were still 2-MTW, then the result would be that whichever started first would be resourced, while the next one would be under-resourced. Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the longest campaign the Army was in was Vietnam. Since then, combat operations have been of such short duration that no rotation system for the forces involved was ever required. To use a boxing analogy, the US Army built itself into a "one round is all it takes" force. But what happens when the Army has to go past the first round? Lacking a rotation plan ahead of time, the Army has had to invent one. Throughout the Spring of 2004, the Army will essentially conduct a relief in place while

in contact. In all, over 250,000 soldiers will be moving into or out of the Iraqi and

Afghanistan theaters (Shanker 2004).

Table 1.   Force Stabilization in the Current Force

At best, the "Green-Amber-Red" Cycle makes the following tactical forces routinely available:

	Total # BDEs assigned:	Ready NOW	Training	Recovery
1st AR	3	1	1	1
1st CAV	3	1	1	1
1st INF	3	1	1	1
2nd INF	2	1	1	
3rd INF	3	1	1	1
4th INF	3	1	1	1
10th MTN	2	1	1	
25th INF (L)	2	1	1	
82nd ABN	3	1	1	1
101st Air Assault	3	1	1	1
2nd ACR	1	1/3	1/3	1/3
3rd ACR	1	1/3	1/3	1/3
172nd SIB	1	1/3	1/3	1/3
173rd ABCT	1	1/3	1/3	1/3
1st BDE, 25th ID (L)	1	1/3	1/3	1/3
3rd BDE, 2nd ID	1	1/3	1/3	1/3
	33	12	12	9

Give the Army credit, its own system may force it to "jump through hoops," but

nobody can jump through them any better. But the issue in question is not the Army's

ability to accomplish such a prodigious task. Rather, the issue is whether or not the

resulting friction of such a task could not have been anticipated and reduced. What this

really says is that the Army lacks a holistic schedule for training, deploying, and

employing its forces for sustained operations.

The UA/UE Reorganization

       In Chapter 1, the Army's intent to transform its current tactical and operational

force structure into more modular, capabilities-based formations is introduced. These

formations are known as Units of Action (tactical formations) and Units of Employment

(operational headquarters structures). This thesis has already spoken of the forces that are

driving Army reorganization in general. In addition to identifying those forces driving the

reorganization, it is important to identify those factors that are supporting it. There are

three such factors. The first is that existing and emerging technologies enable smaller

combat formations to dominate the same battlespace that had previously required much

larger units. The second is the promise of greater flexibility, strategic responsiveness

(deployability), increased operational tempo, and increased lethality. The third reason is

that the UA concept provides *more*: more of the basic building-block unit of combat

power. A building block of combat power can be understood as the lowest level capable

of conducting autonomous, combined arms operations for a set amount of time. Today,

that "building block" unit is understood to be the brigade combat team; previously it had

been the division. In all, the Army vision for the future force is to field up to 48 Units of

Action (brigade-sized, tactical formations), an increase from the current active force

structure of 33 brigade combat teams (BCTs).

       The second significant reorganization effort, the Unit of Employment (UE), is

directed at the three-tier, operational-level command and control (C2) structure by which

the Army has organized for combat since the Civil War: the division-corps-army

structure.[33] Operational-level C2 organizations will now be known as Units of

Employment (UE). Those C2 organizations that focus upon the tactical-operational

interface will be known as a UEx. Those organizations that focus upon the operational-strategic level interface will be known as a UEy.

Unlike the divisions, corps, and army structures they will replace, both the UEx and the UEy will be, almost exclusively, headquarters elements. Essentially, the UEx is a Corps headquarters exercising command and control over brigades. For smaller scale contingencies, the UEx is capable of serving as a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters, much as any of the current corps headquarters can today. The UEy, on the other hand, is designed to serve as the Army Service Component Command (ASCC). Figure 1 provides both a comparison of the existing ASCC structure as well as the future UEy structure.

Reference for Current ASCC: US Army FM 11-45, Signal Support to Theater Operations. Reference for Future ASCC: CGSC, Ft Leavenworth, KS

Figure 1. Comparison of Current and Future Army Service Component Command

The UEy model of the ASCC will require two subordinate, special-purpose UEx organizations: one to focus upon the Army's theater logistics obligations, and a second to

handle the increasing complex task of conducting Information Operations. The value of this structure is the dedication of a specific headquarters to support theater logistics and information operations. This dedicated effort is particularly important when the UEy is called upon to serve in the role of Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC), such as 3rd US Army/ARCENT did during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Equally noteworthy, all three UEx organizations in the future ASCC model are being designed to serve as joint force headquarters. The implication of such a structure is that the UEx may be commanded by an officer from a sister service, despite the fact that the Army is providing the preponderance of assets and personnel to each. Among the three UEx in the ASCC, the special-purpose UEx (Information Operations) is the most likely to face such a possibility.

New Concepts Associated with the UA/UE Reorganization

It should also be stressed that the UA/UE reorganization impacts more than organization; it also introduces new concepts and disavows old ones. Three of the concepts being discarded by the UA/UE concept are *span of control*, *habitual relationships*, and *functionality*. Traditionally, Army organization followed a fixed, hierarchical pattern: for any two or more like units, there is a higher headquarters; and that higher headquarters is to be capable of commanding from three to five such units. This is the concept of span of control. Army operational-level headquarters during World War II reflected this: a corps could control up to five divisions, a field army could control up to five corps, and an army group could control up to five armies. Theoretically, an army group could control twenty-five corps, and 125 divisions. Fortunately, improvements in mobility, weapons effectiveness and lethality, and the impact of digital

technology on targeting and communication have all served to increase the amount of terrain a single division could effectively control, thereby significantly reducing the need for such large armies.

Today, span of control is being replaced by complexity. Complexity is best understood as a measure of the number of different decisions that have to be made. For example, in a stability or support operation, one UEx could control easily ten UAs, for the simple reason that much of what the UAs are doing is similar. However, in a situation where the Army is conducting stability operations simultaneously with offensive operations, the level of complexity is significantly higher. In such a case, there might be two or more UEx. The difference between the UE concept and the traditional C2 structure is that the force package is far more flexible and responsive.

The move away from habitual relationships is more reflective of the increasing role that brigades have been fulfilling than a disbelief in the value of personal relationships. The idea of brigades conducting operations under units other than their own parent headquarters has been demonstrated on several occasions as recently as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment (AIR), deployed to Iraq and served under the operational command of the 3rd Infantry Division. Later still, both the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU [SOC]) (a Marine Corps reinforced battalion task force) and the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) deployed to northern Iraq, and both served under the operational control of the Special Forces Group commander. Modularity is the result of this recent operational experience. If additional forces are required, expect to see another UA brought in. Additionally, the larger number of brigade-sized

formations allows for a rotation system of brigades (Units of Action) under operational headquarters (Units of Employment).

The third concept that the UA/UE concept repudiates is functionality. Functional units at division, corps, and army all existed for one purpose: to reinforce the subordinate combined-arms formations. In the UA concept, division and corps troops will be broken down and parceled out to the Units of Action. The concept of slicing out elements of division troops to BCTs is not new. What is new is that the utility and raison d'être of the parent unit is now being called into question. Take for example the artillery organic to a division. Every maneuver brigade has a habitual relationship with an artillery battalion (direct support). That artillery battalion will maintain that relationship under the UA reorganization. But what about the Division Artillery? Even today, as the Army deploys and fights its maneuver brigades, often separated by such distances that they are unable to mutually support each other with indirect fire, this brigade-level headquarters appears vestigial.

<u>The Conversion of the Divisions to the Units of Action</u>

To understand exactly how the Army envisions growing from its current number of 33 BCTs to a future force of 48 UAs, it is necessary to understand the organization of the Army's current brigade-sized formations. Of the 33 BCTs in the current force, 29 are associated with Divisions. The remaining four are separate brigade-sized formations. There are seven divisions with three organic BCTs each (1st Armored, 1st Cavalry, 1st Infantry, 3rd Infantry, 4th Infantry, 82nd Airborne, and the 101st Air Assault). One division, the 10th Mountain only has two BCTs. The 25th and 2nd Infantry Divisions have three, but the third BCT of each is a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Since

these SBCTs have not been under the control of their own divisions since they began the conversion process, it is a rather specious argument to suggest that either SBCT adds to their parent Division's combat strength. For purposes of this thesis, the 25th and 2nd Infantry Divisions are considered as two-brigade divisions, and the two SBCTs are considered as separate BCTs. The remaining four BCTs in the current active force are the 2nd and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR), the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade (SIB), and the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). It is also worth noting that the 172nd SIB and the 2nd ACR are slated to convert to SBCTs, in 2004 and 2005, respectively. As an aside, the last two units currently programmed to convert to SBCTs are the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (2006) and the 56th Brigade (Mechanized), 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized) of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard (2008).

So, how will the Army convert from 33 to 48? Figure 2 presents one possible approach. The intent is not to suggest that this is how it will happen, as that decision has not been made yet, but rather to demonstrate that such a conversion is possible. Central to this approach is the employment of division and corps troops in the reorganization. Further, the non-maneuver brigade-sized formations within the existing divisions (aviation, artillery, and engineer brigades) are all bill payers for the additional UA headquarters. The second element implied is that regardless of how the deck is reshuffled, it appears that the UAs will have less combat power than the BCTs they are replacing

In a sense, converting from one organizational model to another is easy. The harder part is carrying out these conversions while being totally engaged. Once again, this argues for a holistic force design. This challenge facing the Army is to carry out

these conversions orderly, so as not to disrupt the force; and rapidly, so as not to exhaust

the force for years on end. The imperative is to avoid a ten-to-twenty year process that is

still going on when the next call for organizational change comes.

Step 1. Identify those units that will NOT convert (for reasons that they are either uniquely configured or are forward stationed in the Republic of Korea):

2nd ACR (L)	3rd ACR
172nd Separate Infantry Brigade	173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team
1st BDE, 25th INF DIV (SBCT)	3rd BDE, 2nd INF DIV (SBCT)
2nd BDE, 25th INF DIV (L) (scheduled for conversion to SBCT)	
Forward Stationed in Republic of Korea:	
1st BDE, 2nd INF DIV	2nd BDE, 2nd INF DIV

Result: 9 Brigade Combat Teams

Step 2. Identify those Divisions that will convert from a three-Brigade division to a five-Unit of Action structure:

1st INF DIV (M)	1st Armor DIV	1st CAV DIV
3rd INF DIV (M)	4th INF DIV (M)	82nd ABN DIV
101st ABN DIV (Air Assault)		

Result: 44 brigade-size formations; 35 UAs and 9 BCTs

Step 3. Convert the following:
10th MTN DIV (L), convert from 2 BCTs to 3 UAs

Result 47 brigade-size formations; 38 UAs and 9 BCTs

Step 4. Remaining Unit, no need to reconfigure, is the 3rd Brigade, 25th INF DIV (L) [48 UAs]

Result: 48 brigade-size formation; 38 UAs and 10 BCTs

Figure 2.   Converting from 33 BCTs to 48 Brigade-Sized Formations

<u>Proposed Force Structure</u>

Force Structure Design Criteria

Based on the external, internal, and identity factors identified in the first section,

and building off the UA/UE reorganization, there is now a set of criteria upon which to

design a force. This criterion includes: the force structure must support existing joint

structures (as expressed in the UNAAF); it must be capable of unilateral, joint, or

multinational operations; it must be capable of rapidly responding to smaller scale

contingencies (SSC) as well as conducting campaigns as part of Major Combat

Operations (MCO); it must be logistically capable of sustaining forces in either operation, as well as being capable of supporting even more logistics related functions; it must have the capability to be innovative, able to dedicate forces for experiments with emerging technologies and operational concepts. Its operational structures must not be rigid; the total number of maneuver formations must not exceed 48, the amount of internal reconfiguring must be kept at a bare minimum; and the forces must be capable of supporting the Regional Combatant Commander's Theater Security Cooperation Plan. Finally, while this force design must be consistent with the UA/UE reorganization, it must, in some quantifiable way, be better.

<div align="center">The Operational-Level Structures</div>

<u>The Army Service Component Command</u>

The proposed force structure will argue for two types of UEy: one type to serve as the Army Service Component Command of a Combatant Command, the other type to serve as a strategic reserve, or reinforcing combat headquarters; capable of serving as a JTF or as a JFLCC. This proposed model argues for a more tailored purpose for each of the operational-level command structures.

Keep in mind that this proposed structure neither impacts the C2 architecture evident in the Republic of Korea nor the combat forces currently committed. The reason for this limitation is because that command structure reflects a United Nations Command *and* a bilateral command structure. As such, the US Army does not have the authority to tinker with it (unilaterally).

The Army's intent on converting the existing ASCC to a UEy is significant and praiseworthy. The existing ASCC is unwieldy and not well understood. If US Army

personnel cannot readily understand how their own service contributes to a joint fight, they cannot effectively articulate that contribution. Figure 1 presented the current ASCC opposite the UEy structure. The proposed structure for an ASCC is shown in Figure 3. One important caveat; on occasion, this proposed structure speaks of the operational level structures serving as a JTF. It is acknowledged that the Army alone cannot constitute a JTF. The idea is that these structures will be organized and resourced so as to easily transition into those roles, if the need arises

Figure 3.   Army Service Component Command (Proposed Structure)

The senior officer in theater must be dual-hatted as both the Commanding General for an ASCC and the Commanding General for an SSC-capable JTF. As a general rule, this officer should be the grade of Lieutenant General.[34] To accomplish these two missions, he should have three Major Generals directly subordinate to him: one to be the Chief of Staff, a second to be the Deputy JTF Commander (Operations), and a third who

will be dual-hatted himself. One role is as the Deputy ASCC Commander, and the second role is Commanding General of the army garrisons and logistical infrastructure "in theater."

Previously, the Army used the term Theater Area Army Commander (TAACOM) to refer to this type organization. As the emphasis on force projection increased, it necessitated a change from the garrison focus TAACOM to a more forward-leaning focus. Accordingly, the US Army has been reconstructing its TAACOMs into a new organizational structure called Theater Support Commands (TSC). The proposed structure argues for both a TAACOM-like organization *and* a TSC-like Logistics (Joint) Task Force; this is the first of two significant differences between the proposed ASCC structure and the existing structure.

Assigned to each ASCC would be four subordinate commands. The first two, the TAACOM and the TSC, have already been mentioned. Again, reflecting no change from the current organizational structure, the TAACOM-like command would exercise its authority through subordinate commands known as Area Support Groups (ASG).

The TSC-like command is a deployable logistics task force, designed to integrate into a joint or a multinational structure, and capable of supporting either a Major Combat Operation or a Smaller Scale Contingency. Commanded by a Major General, this command has a single-minded focus: support the warfighter. It manages the flow of all forces and logistics into a theater of operations.[35] The value of having a sufficiently resourced unit with a specific purpose should be readily apparent. It is precisely because an SSC or MTW requires a dedicated logistics command with such broad reach and

scope that this proposed structure argues for both a TAACOM-like command and a TSC-like command in each ASCC.

As the first two commands are support commands, it should be no surprise that the next two are maneuver commands. As the tactical-level proposed for structure will discuss, there are three categories of tactical forces: campaign culmination, expeditionary, and contingency. Campaign culmination forces are those heavy, reinforcing forces that allow for the prosecution of a sustained operational campaign. Campaign culmination forces are the only category of tactical combat forces that have no habitual relationship with a specific theater. Accordingly, the next two subordinate commands of the ASCC each focus on one of the two remaining categories: expeditionary, and contingency.

The third subordinate command of the ASCC is the Expeditionary Force Command, and is commanded by a Major General. This command is the second of two significant departures that this proposed force structure makes from the existing ASCC structure. While this command is essentially a division headquarters, its primary purpose is NOT to command and control US forces, but to train and integrate other nation's militaries with our own. In this capacity the Expeditionary Force Command serves as the Combatant Commander's primary tool for employing ground combat forces in support of its Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). To ensure that that the bi- and multilateral exercises are executed in an appropriate manner, and the desired level of integration and cross training is received by all participants, this command will have three deputy commanders (Brigadier Generals). The first is the Deputy Commanding General (DCG) for Logistics. This general officer (GO) billet is also dual-hatted. This officer will

command a multifunctional logistics task force. The remaining two DCGs will each focus on training: one for US forces and another for other countries. Essentially, both will command mobile training teams.

The vision for the Expeditionary Force Command is, in the event of a future conflict, it can be the operational structure at which smaller-sized national forces can be integrated. Consider that the Expeditionary Force Command could be fighting as a division-equivalent force, integrating the operations of as many as five brigades (for example: two US, one each from a different nation, and a fifth brigade composed of three battalions, each from different nations). This vision explains the rationale for the DCG structure: integration of such a degree must be accomplished at the senior levels of the organization; and sustainment of any such ad hoc (multinational) force requires a sufficiently robust, readily deployable, and dedicated logistics force.

The fourth and final subordinate command of the ASCC is the Contingency Forces Command, to be commanded by a Brigadier General. Currently, PACOM and EUCOM each have a separate brigade as their rapid response contingency force (the 172nd SIB and the 173rd ABCT, respectively). While both brigades are commanded by a Colonel when deployed, both have a headquarters element between them and their COCOM that is commanded by a Brigadier General.[36] Neither of these commands exercise any direct control over their subordinate brigade once deployed, in large measure because both commands have significant garrison responsibilities to attend to (for Army forces in Alaska and Italy, respectively). In this proposed force structure, those garrison responsibilities would be conducted by an ASG-type unit that answers to the TAACOM-like command. This allows the Brigadier General to deploy forward. There

are two important reasons for this. First, the current geopolitical environment responds to

the presence of an American general with significantly more attentiveness than to a

colonel; it goes without saying that, in the event of a contingency, political messages are

an extremely important currency. The second reason for designing a structure that

permits the Brigadier General to deploy forward is the inherent capability for that

headquarters to become the nucleus around which other US (and possibly host nation or

coalition) forces begin to build upon or around.

Strategic Reserve Forces

The second category of operational-level forces consists of those that constitute

the active component's strategic reserve. In this proposed force structure, the Army

would field two MTW-capable JTFs (essentially two of the current corps headquarters

would be the bill payer for these two JTFs). In addition to the UEy version of the Unit of

Employment, the Army would establish six of the UEx version of the Unit of

Employment. The UEx' that are designated as part of the Strategic Reserve are, for all

intents and purposes, the equivalent of a division headquarters; Figure 4 portrays the

Strategic Reserve forces and even identifies which current division and corps

headquarters *could* be tapped as the bill-payer for which UE (x or y -version).

Figure 4.   Strategic Reserve Forces

Granted, the UE construct was designed to reduce the levels of command, not simply change the names. But the idea of an MTW differs significantly from the SSC focus that is within the capabilities of the ASCC JTFs. In an actual MTW there may very well be the need for layer upon layer of operational headquarters. Because of that, this proposed force structure recommends that the two MTW-capable UEy commands establish a habitual relationship with the six UEx commands, three each. This allows for all eight of these commands (2 x UEy and 6 x UEx) to collectively participate in corps-level war games with a reasonable degree of assuredness that these relationships may be the same ones they have if deployed.

The total number of operational-level commands in this force structure is 6 UEy (4 serving as an ASCC, and an additional two in Strategic Reserve) and 11 UEx (4 serving as the Expeditionary UEx subordinate to each ASCC, 6 in Strategic Reserve, and 1 in ROK (the 2nd Infantry Division). Since the UE organization reflects a headquarters

organization, and lacks subordinate units, the existing, active duty Army force structure can support this expanded force structure quite easily.

As to the tactical-level forces (the Units of Action) that these Strategic Reserve headquarters would command, they would come out of the campaign culmination category. The specific categories by which the Units of Action are organized will be discussed in the next section. The important note to keep in mind is that the force stabilization system integrated into this proposed force structure makes a considerable number of forces available.

<center>The Tactical Forces</center>

As mentioned, this proposal is based upon a future force of forty-eight brigade-sized units, which is equivalent to what is currently being envisioned. Furthermore, this proposal does not attempt to make any changes concerning previous transformation efforts (in other words, no turning back the clock). Those units that were slated to convert to SBCTs still will, and those that already have, will retain that configuration. The reason for this approach is simple: the US Army needs a force stabilization system; it does not need to keep spinning its wheels reinventing itself. There are two central elements to this force structure. First, a total of five categories of forces are conceptualized. Each category has its own force stabilization system. These categories include campaign culmination, expeditionary, experimentation, and theater forces. The second element is that the Units of Action within each category will be mission-tailored. This is reflected in the campaign culmination and theater forces categories. The theater forces category includes both contingency forces and the commitment of a single Unit of Action to USNORTHCOM,

USSOCOM, and USTRANSCOM. Likewise, the campaign culmination category includes both heavy forces as well as constabulary forces.

The logic for tailoring each of the brigade-sized formations for a specific mission is not so much to limit its utility to a specific role, as it is to properly weight the force. As was mentioned earlier, on a one-to-one basis, the Units of Action will have less combat power than the existing brigade combat teams. The question this presents is, do all forty-eight brigade-sized formations need a similar structure? Or, is it possible that some of the roles require less combat power? This question allows for the examination of requirements based on specific roles, without having to contend with the idea that each brigade-sized formation must be equally adept and resourced for full-spectrum operations. In other words, just because a Unit of Action is akin to a Brigade Combat Team, does it need to have three maneuver battalions, plus an artillery battalion, an aviation battalion, and the full complement of associated support troops? It may very well be that the mission can be done with only two maneuver battalions, plus a more tailored combat support and combat service support organization.

Finally, as has been mentioned, this force structure proposal calls for keeping two brigade size formations in the Republic of Korea. Further, these two brigades are not integrated in any of the four categories, nor has a force stabilization system been developed for them. They remain as they are, always ready.

Contingency forces are rapid-response, forcible-entry capable forces. Expeditionary forces are those forces that are primarily focused on supporting the Combatant Commander's TSCP and serving as the base structure by which multinational forces can be integrated into a US-led command structure. They are theater oriented,

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designed to deploy forward and conduct operations ranging from company to brigade, and participating in division-level exercises and operations with allies. Campaign culmination forces are those forces that essentially, finish the job; hence this category includes both the heavy forces as well as constabulary forces. The idea of designating experimentation forces is useful as it both recognizes the need for continual improvement and makes forces available for that purpose without degrading the overall effectiveness of the force.

Table 2.   The Four Categories of Tactical Forces

Subcategory	Number of Brigade-Sized Units of Action
CATEGORY 1: CAMPAIGN CULMINATION FORCES	
Heavy (AR/Mech INF)	13
Constabulary	6
CATEGORY 2: EXPEDITIONARY FORCES	
	16
CATEGORY 3: EXPERIMENTATION FORCES	
	2
CATEGORY 4: THEATER FORCES	
Contingency Forces	6
Dedicated Unified Command Forces	3
Tactical Forces Not Included in the Above Four Categories	
Republic of Korea	2
	48

<u>Campaign Culmination Forces</u>

Nineteen brigade-sized units would reside in the first category, the campaign

culmination forces (see Table 3). Of the nineteen brigade-sized units, thirteen would be

armor/mechanized infantry. The other six would reflect a more constabulary role (heavy

on the MP, engineer, civil affairs, and CS/CSS). Additionally, given the nature of their

missions, the entirety of the reserve component could, and should, be organized into the

campaign culmination category, as either of the two sub-types. The fifteen enhanced

brigades and eight combat divisions within the National Guard constitute another 39 or so

brigade-sized formations. This represents a considerable strategic reserve capability of

the United States. A force stabilization system for these forces could be easily organized,

consistent with the expressed intent to limit operational deployments of these forces to no

more than one every five years.

Table 3.   Campaign Culmination Forces

Force Stabilization Model

unit	availability											
	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Set One	G	G	G	G	R	R	R	R	A	A	A	A
5 AR/Mech Info BDE/UA												
2 Constabulary BDE/UA												
Set Two	R	R	R	R	A	A	A	A	G	G	G	G
4 AR/Mech Info BDE/UA												
2 Constabulary BDE/UA												
Set Three	A	A	A	A	G	G	G	G	R	R	R	R
4 AR/Mech Info BDE/UA												
2 Constabulary BDE/UA												

Legend:
G = Deployable, "on the ramp"
R = Recovery. Can deploy in 4 months
A = Training. Can deploy in 1-3 months

In any event, the nineteen active-duty brigade-sized units shown are not expeditionary; they will be organized into three sets of six to seven brigade-sized units each, and their readiness and training cycle would reflect a more traditional "4-4-4" cycle.[37] Each four-month cycle would see another four to five brigades of armor/mechanized infantry and two constabulary brigades standing on the ramp.

Expeditionary Forces

The second category is the expeditionary force (See Figure 5). Sixteen brigade-sized units would constitute this force. The expeditionary force is designed to aggressively support a Combatant Commander's Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). In this construct, the sixteen brigade size units would be organized into four sets, of four brigade-sized units each. Each set would follow a similar 24-month cycle. The 24-month cycle was chosen as it best supports the TSCP (units are in theater nine out of 24 months) and the two-year command tour. Each of four sets would essentially start their twenty-four month cycle at six-month intervals. At the beginning of each twenty-four month cycle is when the key leader turnover would occur. The advantage of this approach is twofold: that the key leaders come in together, but at no time is any more than twenty-five percent of the expeditionary force undergoing this personnel turbulence. The first four months is home station train-up, working from building proficient small units to battalion-size collective tasks. This is followed by a six-month forward presence deployment (one brigade/UA to each of the four regional Combatant Commands). Using small lily-pad bases, these brigade-sized units are able to engage in bilateral and multilateral exercises as well as conduct collective tasks up to brigade level. The brigade would then return to its home station for eight months. The first four months would allow

for some well-deserved downtime and additional training on individual land small-unit collective tasks. The following four months the brigade would serve as a ready unit, ready to respond to any emerging contingency. These four months on the ramp would be followed by a second overseas deployment, this time for three months. Upon completion of this deployment, the brigade/UA would return home for three months of recovery and individual/small unit training.

Table 4.   Expeditionary Forces, Force Stabilization Model

EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FORCE STABILIZATION MODEL

NOTE: each 'BDE Set' Has 4 Unit of Actions; One per theater	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
BDE SET 1	TRAIN-UP				FORWARD PRESENCE						HOME STATION →	
BDE SET 2	FORWARD ROTATION		RECOVERY			TRAIN-UP					FORWARD PRESENCE →	
BDE SET 3	←HOME STATION	READY UNIT				FORWARD ROTATION			RECOVERY			
BDE SET 4	← FORWARD PRESENCE		HOME STATION				READY UNIT					

The 24-month cycle begins with a 4-month TRAIN-UP, followed by a six-month overseas FORWARD PRESENCE. A four-month return to HOME STATION is followed by a four-month READY UNIT ('on-the-ramp', but not necessarily deployed). The unit goes overseas again for a three-month FORWARD ROTATION, followed by a three-month RECOVERY.   The 24-month cycle then repeats itself.

There are several advantages to this system. In addition to the reduction in personnel turbulence that has already been discussed, this system provides the Combatant Command with a brigade-sized unit at all times to support his TSCP. Because each brigade supports a single Combatant Command, that Command is able to plan its

exercises out far ahead, with a strong sense of confidence that it knows exactly what force is supporting it. The Combatant Command can provide tailored training to that brigade/UA as well. In addition to always having, at least, one brigade-sized unit in theater, the Combatant Command always has, at least, a second, if not a third, brigade in a ready status; and keep in mind that this availability of forces is not counting the theater's contingency force (to be discussed below).

Experimentation Forces

The third category, the experimentation force, would consist of only two brigades. This allows for different configurations in the test and development, as well as sufficient quantities to lower the cost of initial purchases of major end items. These two brigades will not be slated in any other capacity for the duration of the experiment's fielding, testing and validation cycle. Following completion of the cycle, these brigades would be rotated back into its appropriate category of the force structure (which would most likely be the campaign culmination category). As such, this proposal provides no force stabilization system for this category of forces.

Theater Forces

The fourth category, the theater forces, will consist of nine brigade size units, and will be organized into two groups (See Figure 6). The first group, the theater contingency force, is the rapid response, forcible-entry capable contingency forces. A total of six brigade size units are in this group. Four of the brigades are dedicated to a specific Combatant Command, and are more than likely stationed in the theater. But, as it is not truly possible for a brigade to stay ready all the time, this structure allows for another brigade to rotate in. Accordingly, the last two brigades will each "cover down" on two

different Combatant Commands. This allows for a rotation plan of four months on followed by two months off for each brigade.

The second group, consisting of three brigade size units is the dedicated unified commander's force. Essentially, the Army will be providing one brigade-sized unit each to NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, and SOCOM. Granted, there is a degree of ambiguity in the exact nature of this mission, but there are two distinct advantages in this is alignment. First, it allows the supported Combatant Command to tailor that brigade's training to meet his specific needs. Secondly, it reduces the burden on the rest of the force. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, CENTCOM (and SOCCENT) used a mobilized Army National Guard brigade to provide security at its bases. A dedicated unit could be tailored in advance for this mission, thereby reducing the need to mobilize a reserve unit.

In fact, it is quite easy to imagine that these brigades would be used quite a bit. The TRANSCOM brigade/UA may find itself guarding key APODs and SPODs, or critical points along GLOCs, such as bridges and tunnels. The NORTHCOM brigade/UA may find itself organized to support critical incident response teams. Perhaps the most important comment to make about this category is this: the exact nature of the tasks these brigade-sized units do is considerably less important than the message that their alignment sends about the Army's commitment to the joint fight.

Table 5.   Theater Forces, Force Stabilization Model

THEATER FORCES, FORCE STABILIZATION MODEL

NOTE: each Theater Contingency Force UA, shown below, has 2 maneuver BNs	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
SOUTHCOM UA	READY NOW						READY NOW					
PACOM UA			READY NOW					READY NOW				
SOUTHCOM/PACOM UA	← READY			READY NOW						READY →		
CENTCOM UA	READY NOW						READY NOW					
EUCOM UA			READY NOW					READY NOW				
CENTCOM/EUCOM UA	← READY			READY NOW						READY →		

The three UAs in the Unified Commander's Dedicated Force category (one each to NORTHCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM, will develop their force stabilization model With input from their Supported Commander.
    The six UAs in the Theater Contingency Force, shown above, follow a four-month on, two month off schedule. During the four-month ON cycle, one of the two battalions is always 'on the ramp'.

Conclusion

This chapter began with an appreciation of the vastness and complexity of the current US Army's organization. The second part of this chapter discussed how the Army is seeking to convert much of that force, in particular its tactical formations and operational level structures. But the UA/UE reorganization of the US Army lacks a clearly expressed end state. The UA initiative has only just begun, and much of it remains uncertain; the decision to implement the UE concept has yet to happen. This is not to suggest that reorganization under the UE concept is a few years out. On the contrary, such a gradual approach to organizational change reflects yesterday's Army. Just as the UA reorganization demonstrated a remarkably short flash-to-bang time interval, the same should be expected for the UE reorganization. This proposed force structure has utility, if

for no other reason than it reflects a logical conclusion of the UA/UE concepts, and

actually expresses a clear end state for Army reorganization under the UA/UE concept.

ENDSTATE: THE REORGANIZED US ARMY
TACTICAL FORMATIONS AND OPERATIONAL –LEVEL HEADQUARTERS

FORCES DEDICATED TO
THE COMBATANT COMMANDS

FORCES HELD IN
STRATEGIC RESERVE

CONTROLLING HQS

XXXX

NORTHCOM
TRANSCOM
SOCOM

EUCOM
PACOM
CENTCOM
SOUTHCOM

XXXX

Note: PACOM would
continue to have EUSA
and 2nd ID in ROK

XXXX

FORSCOM

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL HQS

ASCC/
JTF/JFLCC

XXX
UEy

AS
REQUIRED

XXX
UEy

X
UEx
(Contingency)

XX
UEx
(Expeditionary)

AS
REQUIRED

XX
UEx

TACTICAL FORMATIONS

X
UA

Dedicated
Forces:
1 x UA per

Campaign
Culmination
Forces

19 x UAs; 13 AR/Mech Inf,
6 Constabulary. Deploy As Required.
(6-7 UAs always available)

Expeditionary
Forces

16 x UAs (4 per RCC; 2 UAs always
in- theater or 'on the ramp')

Contingency
Forces

6 X UAs
(1 UA always Avail per RCC)

Figure 5.   End State: The Reorganized US Army

Having presented the force structure, and introduced the force stabilization

systems for each category of that force structure, the only task remaining is to evaluate its

effectiveness against a set of valid criteria. That criteria is the Army's own DOTMLPF

model; at least four elements of it (Doctrine, Organization, Training, and Leader

Development). The evaluation of this force structure against that criterion is presented in

the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS

This chapter discusses the results of the evaluation of the proposed force structure

against four criterion of the US Army's DOTMLPF model. Those four criteria include

Doctrine, Organization, Training, and Leader Development.

The Evaluation

Doctrine

Regarding the Doctrine criteria, there is, essentially, only one question: does it

match existing joint doctrine? Simply put, if this model does not match joint doctrine, it

is dead on arrival. In fact this construct not only does support the joint warfight, but it

demonstrates an appreciable increase in Army commitment of resources to the

Combatant Commanders. Both currently and in the UE model, the Army limits the

number of forces it makes readily available to any one Combatant Commander. Much of

this has to do with the manner in which joint planning guidance is drafted. But even more

of it has to do with Army preferences and in recognition that the Army does not really

have that many forces (as it is currently structured).

The nine brigade-sized units in the theater forces category alone reflect this

commitment. Whether viewed as nine brigade-sized headquarters or eighteen battalions,

either is a significant commitment of forces. The four division-equivalent headquarters in

command of each of the four expeditionary forces represent a significant increase in that

commitment.

In all, four of the six Corps-equivalent (UEy) units, four of the ten division-

equivalent (UEx) units, and twenty-five of the forty-eight brigade-sized (UA) units are in

a direct support relationship, either because they are assigned to or habitually associated with, the Combatant Commands.

What is important about this structure is the responsiveness of the forces. As discussed earlier, the US intends to win by deploying forces into theater faster than the enemy can establish conditions precluding such a move. Having three brigades in theater at any moment (one contingency brigade and two expeditionary brigades,[38] and an entire set of campaign Culmination forces (an additional six to seven brigades) sitting on the ramp at any time is a significant deterrent to a potential foe (See Table 6: Integrated Tactical Level Force Stabilization Model).

Table 6.   Integrated Tactical Level Force Stabilization Model

INTEGRATED FORCE STABILIZATION MODEL

Number of Brigade-size Formations available, per Month; 1st year of a 2-year cycle	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	
Contingency Forces	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
Expeditionary (Forward; Ready , 'on-the-ramp')	8	8	8 4	4 4	4 4	4 4	8	8	8 4	4 4	4 4	4 4	
Campaign Culmination (Heavy (AR/MECH INF)/ Constabulary)	5 2	5 2	5 2	5 2	4 2	4 2	4 2	4 2	4 2	4 2	4 2	4 2	
TOTAL AVAILABLE:	19	19	23	23	18	18	18	18	22	18	18	18	

NOTE 1: Dedicated UNIFIED CMD Forces: These forces would have a force stabilization system based upon guidance from the Supported COCOM; expect a ½ on, ½ off as each UA has only 2 BNs
NOTE 2: the additional forces 'on-the-ramp' represent the institutional ability to surge; to 'pile-it-on'
NOTE 3: Recall that the current force structure makes only 12 brigades (routinely) available
NOTE 4. The pattern continues to repeat itself; year in, year out

These forces are the equivalent of three divisions, all of which can be in theater within thirty days. That is a significant ability to "pile it on." Adding in the TSC-equivalent in the SSC JTF, and a DISCOM-equivalent in the Expeditionary Force, both assigned to the ASCC, there is a reasonable assurance that the logistics footprint would have already been, at the least, mapped out; if not established.

<center>Organization</center>

The single biggest hue and cry about the UA/UE transformation is that it is a shell game, creating more forces by significantly weakening the ones currently in existence.[39] Keep in mind that the US Army is increasing from 33 to 48 brigade-sized units, an increase of fifteen. The bottom line of this entire reorganization is this: the US Army simply cannot increase the number of brigade-sized maneuver formations and ensure the same level of combat power within each unit without either an increase in its personnel end strength or a decrease in the relative combat power of each unit of action vis-à-vis the brigade combat team.

The advantage of this proposed force structure is that it manages the risk by deliberately creating a structure where the employment of brigade-sized units of less combat power can be mitigated. Of the forty-eight total brigade-sized units in the force structure, this model allows for fully thirty-one of those formations to be less-than-full strength brigades (essentially, they would be two battalion-brigade-sized units). These thirty-one two-battalion brigade-sized units include the following: the six constabulary brigade-sized units in the campaign culmination force, the sixteen expeditionary force units, the six contingency force units and the three brigade-sized units dedicated to the unified commanders. The remaining seventeen brigade-sized units would be full strength

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brigade-sized units. These seventeen brigades include the two brigades kept in the Republic of Korea, the two brigade-sized units seconded to the experimentation force category, and the thirteen armor/mechanized infantry brigade-sized units in the campaign culmination force.

Now this reflects an important advantage of this proposal, because the US Army is not planning on increasing its steady-state end strength (personnel). So any increase in units must be taken out of hide from the corps troops. To appreciate the scale of the problem, consider this: there are only one hundred maneuver (infantry/armor) battalions in the current force structure (See Appendix C for a complete breakdown). If all forty-eight brigade-sized units were to be full-strength (3 battalions each), the active Army would have 144 battalions. Since the Army has only one hundred battalions now, that means the Army would be demanding the equivalent of 44 additional battalions from its corps troops. Recall that earlier is was noted that there is not enough structure at the corps-level to fully support all four Corps simultaneously. The bottom line is that the increase in number of maneuver units will only come at a decrease in relative combat power.

In this proposal, with thirty-one brigade-sized units having two battalions each, that accounts for sixty-two battalions. The remaining 17 brigade-sized units would each have three battalions, accounting for an additional 51 battalions. This is a total force of only 113 battalions; meaning the Army would only be tapping its corps troops for the equivalent of thirteen battalions, considerably easier than 44!

As to the question of where are those thirteen battalions going to come from, keep in mind that this force structure only requires the generation of one additional maneuver

(infantry/armor) battalion. Recall that the six brigade-sized units in the constabulary force are not infantry; they are composed of engineers, military police, logistics units, and civil affairs. These six brigade-sized units all have two battalions. This accounts for twelve of the thirteen battalions. The active-duty Military Police, Engineer, and other brigade-sized units already in the existing corps troops inventory can easily provide the necessary structure for these six brigade-sized units. A key comment to be made is that this proposal is not demanding the non-combat arms branches (MP, engineer, etc) to give up brigade-command slots to a different branch. In effect, all that has occurred is that some corps troops have been re-flagged, given a specific role (i.e., constabulary,) and pushed forward on the battlefield. The key to this force structure is that it minimizes the amount of additional (read: unresourced) combat power that the current force structure would have to generate.

The final comment about this organization is that, by establishing the overarching construct first, it provides clarity of purpose to each unit (corps, division, and brigade) as it transforms (see figures 9 and 10). To illustrate the difference in approach, consider the case of the 3rd Infantry Division, the first division tasked by the Chief of Staff of the Army to see if it could transform from three brigades to five UAs. This proposal calls for the nine battalions to transform into twelve battalions. The three combat brigades would transition to two 3-battlion UAs in the Campaign Culmination Force, an additional two more 2-battalion UAs in the Expeditionary Force, and a two-battalion Constabulary Force UA. Now the primary reason that this proposed force structure has divisions supporting several different categories is because each division has a unique personality and characteristics; which is considered to be a strength of the Army's current force structure

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and this proposal seeks to capitalize upon it. This proposed force structure intends to spread the wealth, so to speak, of those characteristics and attitudes. As a result of the proposed force structure, XVIII Airborne Corps would only have to help the 3rd Infantry Division to come up with one additional combat battalion, as the two constabulary battalions would come from the Corps' Engineer and MP brigades.

Table 7.   UA Conversion: Roles for the Reorganized Formations

UA Conversion – A More Tailored Approach
Roles for the Re-Organized BCTs in the New Force Structure

	Campaign Culmination (HEAVY / Constabulary) *	Theater Forces: Contingency	Theater Forces: Dedicated to Unified Command	Expeditionary Force	Experimentation Force
1st CAV DIV	2/1			2 CENTCOM EUCOM	
1st AR DIV	2/			3 2- PACOM SOUTHCOM	
1st INF DIV	2/1			1 SOUTHCOM	1
3rd INF DIV	2/1			2 CENTCOM EUCOM	
4th INF DIV	2/1			2 CENTCOM EUCOM	
10th MTN DIV			3 TRANSCOM NORTHCOM SOCOM		
82nd ABN DIV	/1	2 EUCOM/ CENTCOM PACOM.SOUTHCOM		2 SOUTHCOM EUCOM	
101st ABN DIV (Air Assault)	/1	2 CENTCOM SOUTHCOM		2 SOUTHCOM EUCOM	

*NOTE: Concerning Constabulary Forces. The UAs listed above in the Constabulary Force Category reflect the HQS only. The actual troops in the Constabulary Forces are drawn from Combat Support/Combat Service Support units among the Corps Troops.

Table 8.   UA Conversion: Roles of the Nonreorganized Formations

UA Conversion - A More Tailored Approach
Roles of the Non-Reorganized Brigade Combat Teams

	Campaign Culmination (HEAVY / Constabulary) *	Theater Forces: Contingency	Theater Forces: Dedicated to Unified Command	Expeditionary Force	Experimentation Force
2nd ACR	X				
3rd ACR				CENTCOM	
172nd SIB		PACOM			
173rd ABCT		EUCOM			
1/25th INF DIV (L) (SBCT)	X				
2/25th INF DIV (L) (SBCT)					X
3/25th INF DIV (L)				PACOM	
1/2nd INF DIV (ROK)	NO IMPACT: REMAIN FORWARD STATIONED IN ROK				
2/2nd INF DIV (ROK)	NO IMPACT: REMAIN FORWARD STATIONED IN ROK				
3/2nd INF DIV (SBCT)	X				

Now, compare this approach to the one that the 3rd Infantry has taken. The division has, quite naturally, approached the issue from a self-serving point of view. The 3rd Infantry Division sees itself as both a heavy and a rapid response force. This duality comes from its alignment with XVIII Airborne Corps (providing a heavy armor/mech company to each DRB) and because it is a heavy, campaign-quality, combat force. Not surprisingly then, the 3rd Infantry Division sees itself as capable of supporting both the Expeditionary and the Campaign Culmination roles. Because of this duality, the 3rd Infantry Division is trying to provide sufficient combat power to all five UAs, so that each can, in effect, replicate the combat power of the brigades from which it came. The problem with this approach is that it leads to the push for 48-full strength UAs, with 144 battalions; because each succeeding division will attempt to follow the lead of the first.

This approach only serves to weaken the entire force. Essentially, the Army faces a choice, it can either be strong somewhere, or it can be weak everywhere.

Leader Development

There are three comments about Leader Development, particularly at the battalion and brigade command level. First, the proposed force structure allows for these key leaders to come in together. This is not to say that turbulence will not occur; only that it will occur at the same time, and at the point of the unit's training cycle that best reduces the negative effect of that turnover. Second, leaders need to be given a more precise focus of what is expected of them. Because the current force structure lacks a force stabilization system, the implication is that all key leaders must be equally adept at all operations across the entire spectrum (Full Spectrum –capable). Not only is this blatantly untrue, but the Army is then forced to spend a significant amount of training resources trying to redirect forces from one threat or mission set to another. Examples of this include the MREs (Mission readiness Exercises) that FORSCOM holds for units rotating into Bosnia, and the extensive retraining that units must undergo after returning from peacekeeping duties in the Sinai. The third comment about leader development is, in many respects, a comment for the Training Criterion as well. That is, joint training opportunities are few and, because the Army does not adequately prepare for its leaders for these assignments, they are usually less rewarding and more exasperating than they could have been. Indicative of this is the propensity for the Army to send its field grade officers to the Joint Staff Officers Course after they have completed a joint tour. This is done, not to improve the officer for the joint assignment, but to "check the box:" that schooling, plus the joint tour, is essential if the officer is to receive credit for a joint tour, a promotion

discriminator. If the Army commits to the joint world by designating its Corps and division headquarters as bill-payers for a JTF, the Army would probably gain considerably more than it losses. In addition to increasing the overall effectiveness of the joint force, and increasing the joint awareness of its officers, it could very well be creating and validating more joint billets: to the betterment of its own officers and those of the sister services.

<center>Training (and Education)</center>

In addition to the joint training, the proposed model has been found to have validity because it recognizes and plans for the presence of the other competing demands that are placed upon the force; to include training, schools, down time at home station, and personnel turnover. The force stabilization model for the expeditionary forces clearly illustrates this point, as that model allows for training before, during, and after major deployments. This training can be unit collective tasks, regionally focused training, or the opportunity for soldiers to attend their career schools (education). This model does not suggest that it can provide as much education opportunities as may be demanded, but it does plan for those opportunities; something the current system does not.

<center><u>Conclusion</u></center>

This thesis reflects a maturation process. The original focus of this thesis was on the mechanics of the UA/UE reorganization. The study of the mechanics led to an appreciation of the technologies and operational experiences that were making the concepts possible, as well as the various forces that were necessitating the reorganization. Further research developed an appreciation that reorganization cannot be simply a reaction to external events, but must begin first with the internal factors that bear upon

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force design and utilization. This latest development in the thesis development ended with the realization that what was missing was an overarching context by which reorganization could be readily understood and accepted by those charged with making it happen. Through this process, this thesis came to realize that the central element driving everything was identity, and that it was the Army's identity as a strategic force for the nation that had to be understood. Indeed, the Army needs its force structure to be based on its identity, not on threats or capabilities.

Identity, in terms of the US Army, is an expression of its singular *purpose*, and is reflected in *who* the Army is, *what* it does, *how* it organizes itself to do those things. The US Army's singular purpose is to be a strategic force for the nation. That identity is defined by four principal characteristics: a member of a joint force, expeditionary, campaign quality, and capable of conducting full-spectrum operations. In other words, the Army must be many (different) things to many (different) people. It was with this broader appreciation of the Army, and its identity, that the thesis came back full circle and re-examined the mechanics of the UA/UE reorganization. No longer content with merely determining if it was possible to convert from thirty-three brigade combat teams to forty-eight Units of Action, this thesis now focused on presenting a holistic case for reorganization of the Army under the UA/UE concept.

The research for this thesis found that the idea that the Army could and even should convert from thirty-three BCTs to forty-eight UAs has been accepted with relatively little question. Perhaps all the technicians in the Army simply are too busy to stop and question the basic assumptions behind this reorganization. Perhaps they are not even aware of what questions should be asked. The collective focus was, and remains,

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predominantly focused on the immediate problems. The Army's reorganization efforts have been proceeding without having expressed either the nature of the Army's identity (the necessary start point) or a clear, holistic vision of the end state. In essence, the Army has been working from the middle outwards, in both directions.

The value of this thesis is that it thinks through the entire problem of the UA/UE reorganization: beginning with an appreciation of the Army's identity, and emphasizing the necessity for a clearly articulated end state that is consistent with that identity; this thesis has demonstrated that the Army can, in fact, convert from thirty-three to forty-eight brigade-sized units.

However, as this thesis shows, it is simply not possible for the US Army, given its current end strength, to field forty-eight UAs that are comparable in combat power to the current thirty-three BCTs. Even if it were, this thesis demonstrates that merely having forty-eight UAs is in itself of little value unless they are organized into some manner of force stabilization system that manages their training, deployment, and employment in a manner that increase their availability on a routine basis, institutionalize the ability to surge, reduces the turbulence caused by personnel turnover, and increases the predictability of the OPTEMPO. These factors are the root causes of much of the friction that is bedeviling the US Army today. It is the value of this proposed force structure and its integrated force stabilization system that it ensures that those roots of friction are anticipated and their potential effects are mitigated against.

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[1]"Redesigning the force requires a complementary and transformational method of building a cohesive team within those organizations. Force Stabilization for brigade units of action and other modular and scaleable forces will provide combatant commanders with more combat-ready formations. *We will define and develop a plan to*

implement Force Stabilization concepts into the Army beginning in FY 04. Army-wide implementation will complement a rotation-based system of sustained global engagement. This system will also take the Well-Being of Soldiers and families into account. Home-basing will stabilize Soldiers and their families at installations for extended tours" (ASPG 2004, 8-9).

[2]Orientation has two distinct meanings. The first meaning would be concerning a regional orientation (PACOM v. SOUTHCOM). The second meaning would be to their role in full-spectrum operations (are they primarily oriented towards conventional combat (Offensive and Defensive) or are they oriented towards military operations other than combat (Stability and Support Operations).

[3]The DOTMLPF model: Doctrine, Organization, Training (and Education), Material, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities.

[4]The term hyperpower was coined by the French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine to describe the unique position of the United States relative to all other powers; it speaks to a position of dominance in all areas, not just military. The 'great' regional powers include China, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Japan. Their sources of power include diplomatic, informational, cultural, military, and economic, and the relative strength of each varies considerably. The blocs include both mutual defense pacts, such as NATO and ASEAN, as well as economic and political blocs, such as the EU, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA. The superempowered individuals and groups include narco-terrorists, Al Qaeda, multinational corporations, NGOs, etc.; the list is literally endless.

[5]The 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was commissioned to determine the force sizing requirements for the US military after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 2-MTW requirement emerged then, and has been articulated in each of the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) that have followed it (1997, 2001).

[6]This subject will be addressed at greater length in Chapter Two "Literature Review of Internal Factors."

[7]This is not to suggest that either of the respective Unified Commanders did not continuously exercise their own war plans; they did. This comment refers to the allocation, by the JSCP, of the same forces to both scenarios; this practice is hardly consistent with a two-MTW national strategy.

[8]Like so many terms, *environment*, tends to be overused to the point that it loses its meaning. To ensure clarity and understanding, US Army doctrine provides its own definition of the term. FM 3-0, *Operations*, defines the Operational Environment as having six dimensions: the Threat dimension, the Political dimension, the Unified Action dimension, the Land Combat Operations dimension, the Information dimension, and the Technology dimension.

[9]OPTEMPO, an acronym for Operational Tempo. It refers to the pace of operations. In its common usage the word is becoming associated with several intense connotations. The expression we have a high OPTEMPO is Army speak for 'we are really busy, we are really stressed, and we don't know how much more of this we can take, but its likely that we're about to find out."

[10]In FM 3-0, OPERATIONS, The Army categorizes operations across the spectrum into four broad categories: offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.

[11]This thesis uses the DIME model as an acronym for the (four) instruments of national power, wherein the acronym DIME stands for Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic.

[12]The 1997 National Military Strategy defines interests in this 3-tier approach (vital, national, and humanitarian).

[13]Engaged is to be understood as supporting the Theater Security Cooperation Plans, formerly known as the Theater *Engagement* Plans, of the Regional Combatant Commanders. Expeditionary is currently undefined, save by the US Marine Corps. The vagueness of the concept is valuable at this time as it suggests the concept can be anything the author intends for it to mean. As a minimum, it is understood to mean that the US Army possesses the flexibility to respond quickly with the appropriately tailored forces to a contingency. As shall be demonstrated in the discussion of the Army METL, this is not a new concept; but once again, the impression exists of a disconnect between the Army preferences and its own doctrine.

[14]The expression "no entangling alliances" comes from Thomas Jefferson's first inaugural address (4 March 1801): "About to enter, fellow-citizens, on the exercise of duties which comprehend everything dear and valuable to you, it is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its Administration. I will compress them within the narrowest compass they will bear, stating the general principle, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, *entangling alliances with none*; . . . Washington's Farewell Address also spoke of limiting alliances to those already in existence: "*It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances* with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them." Washington's Farewell Address was never given orally, but was published in Philadelphia's "American Daily Advertiser" on September 19, 1796. Recall that Philadelphia had then been the nation's capitol

[15]The expression"It is all Title 10 USC" refers to Title 10, *United States Code.* All statutory guidance for the entire Department of Defense, less the National Guard, is enclosed in Title 10. The five Subtitles of 10USC include: Subtitle A - General Military Law, Subtitle B - The Army, Subtitle C - The Navy and Marine Corps, Subtitle D - The Air Force, and Subtitle E - The Reserve Forces. The National Guard is covered under Title 32. The reason the National Guard is covered in a separate Title reflects their dual role as a State and Federal force. This duality is expressed in Clause 16, Section 8, Article I of the US Constitution, wherein officers of the state militia (read: National Guard) are appointed by the state, and not by the federal government. As an aside, the US Navy used to be covered in Title 34, but was later incorporated into Title 10 by an Act of Congress, 10 August 1956.

[16]The Army METL will be discussed in greater detail in Ch 4, Methodology. The Army METL is the operational expression of the Army's core competencies (expressed in FM 1-0). There are six tasks in the Army METL: Shape the security environment, Respond promptly to crisis, Mobilize the Army, Conduct forcible entry operations, Dominate land operations, and Provide support to civil authorities.

[17]Consider the following five examples. First, over three decades, no less than four successive forward area air defense systems (anti-air) were started (Mauler, Roland, SGT York (M247 DIVAD), and the ADATS) and eventually scrapped at a cost of over $6 billion. Second, the M8 Armored Gun System, cancelled due to branch infighting after 6 prototypes were built. At 17-tons and $3-5 million each, they are more powerful, and lighter (air deployable) that the 20-ton, $2.9 million LAV-III being fielded for the Stryker Brigades. One note about the cost of the LAV-III: the original cost/vehicle was $1.9 million. Notice the price increase. Third, the acquisition program for the Bradley fighting vehicle was so convoluted that it rated its own HBO movie. The fourth example is the Crusader, a self-propelled artillery system. Cancelled after $2 billion of a projected $11 billion program was spent. None were ever delivered. Compounding the problem was the Army's decision in 1996 to cut the number of artillery systems in each battalion from 24 to 18, ostensibly as a cost-saving effort; a classic example of counting your chickens before they're hatched. The final example is the Comanche attack helicopter (The total program cost continues to rise. In FY2003 it was $48.1 billion, for only 1213 helicopters ($38.6 million each!). Currently, we have two prototypes to show for our investment.

[18]In his article "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia", author Jon Western presents the argument that the US military wanted to avoid any intervention in either Bosnia or Somalia that was motivated by liberal, humanitarian ideals. Western argues that the military's tactic was to present military estimates that were so high that they (the costs) effectively removed the military option from the table. This tactic was based upon the military's fears of being placed in a no-win situation: "Powell and his advisors strongly believed that foreign military intervention in limited conflicts would inevitably degenerate into a Vietnam-type quagmire. In Bosnia the Joint Chiefs stressed the inherent military dilemmas associated with any type of U.S. force deployment. For example, during a discussion in June on whether to use U.S. military aircraft in support of an

emergency humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo, senior planners told members of Congress that even such a limited operation would require the presence of more than 50,000 U.S. ground troops to secure a perimeter of 30 miles around the airport. According to then National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, the Joint Chiefs "probably inflated the estimates of what it would take to accomplish some of these limited objectives, but once you have the Joint Chiefs making their estimates, it's pretty hard for armchair strategists to challenge them and say they are wrong." As the pressure for intervention built, so did the military's efforts to prevent it: "On August 11, Lt. Gen. Barry McCaffrey, a principal deputy to General Powell, publicly discussed the Joint Chief's views with ABC World News Tonight, saying emphatically that, despite the tragedy, "there is no military solution." Earlier that day, senior military planners told a congressional hearing that between 60,000 and 120,000 ground troops would be needed to break the siege of Sarajevo and ensure uninterrupted relief. Other commanders suggested that a field army of at least 400,000 troops would be needed to implement a cease-fire." Finally, it must be stressed that the impact of these maneuverings by the Armed Forces cannot be removed from a larger political context: they occurred during a presidential election year; and the outcries for a humanitarian intervention were loudest from the Clinton campaign, which went on to win the election.

[19]In the June 1996, issue of *Marine, The Official Magazine of the Marine Corps,* the editors noted that, unlike previous editions, the magazine would no longer reflect a single theme. "You may notice that, unlike recent issues, this month's *Marines* has a broad "We do windows" theme. It was meant that way. If there is a unique capability of the Corps, it is that it has so many capabilities. No one knows when or why the next call will come. But when it does, the Marines will be ready." The Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time was GEN Charles C. Krulak. Successive Commandants have repeatedly used the mantra, 'We do windows.'

[20]As with Bosnia in 1992, the conditions and force levels the Army demanded for Afghanistan effectively priced the Army out of reach. What followed was an offensive using SOF, Marine, and Air Force and Naval air. The (conventional) Army entered only after the war was effectively won, and now finds itself saddled with the very peacekeeping duties that it so often tries to avoid.

[21]Note that the use of the term 'future combat systems' uses the small-case, so as not to be confused with the concept of a family of future tactical vehicles known as the Future Combat Systems (large case). This thesis does not mean to refer to a particular weapon system or concept but rather to any and all future weapon systems.

[22]The term *global drivers* is used by the National Intelligence Council to describe the various forces that are impacting the world today. Examples of such global drivers include the spread of transnational crime, the rise of extremist ideologies, the spread of infectious diseases, and the large scale population transfers (in particular that of work-related immigration), to name only a few.

[23]FM 3-0, *Operations* (June 2001), discusses the operational environment as six interconnected dimensions: Threat, Political, Unified Action, Land Combat, Information, and Technology. Note that it speaks of an 'operational environment' and not the world. This model is only of value to a military planner. It does not, nor does it intend to, provide a conceptual understanding of the world. The discussion of each dimension does not even merit the title discussion as each paragraph is nothing more than a series of bullet comments. Its only lasting value is as a reminder to military planners of the complex world in which they plan and conduct their operations.

[24]The term Theocratic Fascism was coined by Christopher Hitchens in an interview with the PBS program, *Uncommon Knowledge*, on 18 July 2002.

[25]And this point needs to be stressed. True Islam has a social conscience. It is very much concerned with the here and now. And legitimate social ministry by radical movements is a means of gaining acceptability and allegiance from the populace. All insurgencies recruit from the disaffected (granted, they also recruit from the bored social elite who hold to pretensions of superiority and visions of utopia, too).

[26]Obviously this excludes North Korea. But we can begin preparing for the eventual collapse by developing closer relationships with the Chinese and Russian militaries in the region.

[27]Note that the US defines a professional military as one that is accountable to a duly elected civilian authority.

[28]Liberal is understood to mean the rule of law is paramount.

[29]Ten on active duty, two integrated (active headquarters with reserve brigades), and eight in the Army National Guard

[30]USAREUR/7th US Army (ASCC for EUCOM); USARPAC (ASCC for PACOM); Eighth US Army (EUSA) (ASCC for UNC/CFC/USFK, a subordinate unified command of PACOM); USASMDC (ASCC for STRATCOM); USASOC (ASCC for SOCOM); MTMC (ASCC for TRANSCOM); USARSO (ASCC for SOUTHCOM); FORSCOM (ASCC for NORTHCOM)

[31]Army Material Command (AMC), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Corps of Engineers (COE), Medical Command (MEDCOM), Military District of Washington (MDW), Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and Criminal Investigation Command (CID)

[32]1st ID and 1st AD are in Europe; 2nd ID and 25th ID (L) are in the Pacific. The remaining divisions include the 1st CAV and 4th ID (M), under control of III Corps (US), and the 3rd ID (M), 10th MTN, 82nd ABN, and 101st Air Assault, all under control of XVIII ABN Corps. The 2nd ACR falls under XVIII ABN, while the 3rd ACR falls under III Corps (US).

[33]The Civil War saw the introduction of numbered Corps. There were Armies in the Civil War, but those organizations were essentially Theater Commands. Numbered Field Armies, as we understand them, were introduced in World War I; they came between the Corps and Theater Army levels. With the introduction of Army Groups in World War II, the chain between the Theater Command and the Corps was further increased.

[34]The one exception is Europe, where the ASCC is USAREUR/7th US Army, and is commanded by a full General.

[35]This term is used in its doctrinal context.

[36]US Army, Alaska (USARAK) commands the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade and the 1/501st Airborne Battalion Combat Team; Southern European Task Force (SETAF) commands the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team.

[37]"4-4-4" cycle: Four months 'on the ramp', ready to respond; four months in a recovery cycle; four months in a focused collective training cycle.

[38]As noted in the previous Chapter, there are two, non-consecutive, months in any twelve-month period when the second expeditionary brigade/UA will not be in-theater.

[39]While not preferred, there is some precedence to such a pattern: Germany had ten panzer divisions in April of 1940. All ten saw combat in Operations "Weserubung" (Denmark, Norway) or "Fall Gelb" (Belgium, Holland, France). Pleased with the results of the new 'blitzkrieg' tactics, Hitler raised an additional ten armored divisions in preparation for Operation "Barbarossa" (Russia). The problem is that the increase was gained at the cost of the existing divisions: "All new divisions were formed based on Panzer Regiments of existing divisions and by reducing the number of tanks in those divisions approximately by half." (www.achtungpanzer.com, Accessed 15 April 2004). Of course, the real lesson is not so much that the German Army now had twice as many armor divisions, but that each division was half again as effective; a deficiency that was further compounded by reality of ground combat in Russia: the vast expanses of Russia forced each German division to handle a front that was twice as big as they had in France.

APPENDIX A

THE STRUCTURAL OVERHEAD OF THE US ARMY

The Major Commands (MACOM) of the US Army that serve as the Army Service Component Commander for a Unified (or sub-unified) Command include:

US Army, Europe (USAREUR/7th US Army) (ASCC for EUCOM);
US Army, Pacific (USARPAC) (ASCC for PACOM);
Eighth US Army (EUSA) (ASCC for UNC/CFC/USFK, a Subordinate Unified command of PACOM);
US Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) (ASCC for STRATCOM);
US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) (ASCC for SOCOM);
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) (ASCC for TRANSCOM);
Forces Command, FORSCOM (ASCC for NORTHCOM); and
US Army, South (USARSO) (ASCC for SOUTHCOM)

The Major Commands that are not dual-hatted as an ASCC include:

Army Material Command (AMC),
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC),
Corps of Engineers (USACE),
Medical Command (MEDCOM),
Military District of Washington (MDW),
Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and
Criminal Investigation Command (CID)

The Army's MACOMs exercise authority over the following operational level units:

1st US Army (Continental US Army (CONUSA))
3rd US Army, (dual-hatted as ARCENT
5th US Army (Continental US Army (CONUSA))
7th US Army, dual-hatted as USAREUR
8th US Army (dual-hatted as EUSA)
I Corps
III Corps
V Corps
XVIII Airborne Corps

APPENDIX B

THE COMBAT DIVISIONS OF THE US ARMY

Combat Divisions in the Active Force

1st Armored Division, Wiesbaden Germany
1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
1st Infantry Division, Wurzburg, Germany
2nd Infantry Division, Camp Red Cloud, Korea
3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia
4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York
25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii
82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Integrated Combat Divisions:

7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Carson, Colorado
24th Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Riley, Kansas

Combat Divisions in the National Guard:

28th Infantry Division, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
29th Infantry Division, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
34th Infantry Division, Saint Paul, Minnesota
35th infantry Division, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
38th Infantry Division, Indianapolis, Indiana
40th Infantry Division, Los Alamitos, California
42nd Infantry Division, Troy, New York
49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas

APPENDIX C

THE 100 MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN THE CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE

1st CAV DIV

1st BDE
   2nd BN/5th CAV (INF)
   2nd BN/8th CAV (AR)
   1st BN/12th CAV (AR)
2nd BDE
   1st BN/5th CAV (INF)
   2nd BN/12th CAV (AR)
   1st BN/8th CAV (AR)
3rd BDE
   1st BN/9th CAV (INF)
   2nd BN/8th CAV (AR)
   2nd BN/7th CAV (INF)

1st AR DIV

1st BDE
   1st BN/36th INF
   1st BN/37th AR
   2nd BN/37th AR
2nd BDE
   1st BN/6th INF
   2nd BN/6th INF
   1st BN/36th AR
3rd BDE
   1st BN/41st INF
   1st BN/13th AR
   2nd BN/70th AR

1st INF DIV

1st BDE
   1st BN/16th INF
   1st BN/34th AR
   2nd BN/34th AR
2nd BDE
   1st BN/18th INF
   1st BN/26th INF
   1st BN/77th AR
3rd BDE
   1st BN/63rd AR
   2nd BN/63rd AR
   2nd BN/2nd INF

2nd INF DIV

1st BDE
   1st BN/72nd AR
   2nd BN/72nd AR
   2nd BN/9th INF
3rd BDE
   1st BN/9th INF
   1st BN/503rd INF (AASLT)
   1st BN/506th INF (AASLT)

3rd INF DIV (M)

1st BDE
   2nd BN/7th INF
   3rd BN/7th INF
   3rd BN/69 AR
2nd BDE
   3rd BN/ 15th INF
   1st BN/64th AR
   4th BN/64th AR
3rd BDE
   2nd BN/69th AR
   1st BN/15th INF
   1st BN/30th INF

4th INF DIV (M)

1st BDE
   1st BN/22 INF
   1st BN/66 AR
   3rd BN/66 AR
2nd BDE
   2nd BN/8th INF
   1st BN/67th AR
   3rd BN/67th AR
3rd BDE
   1st BN/68th AR
   1st BN/8th INF
   1st BN/12th INF

10th MTN (Light)

1st BDE
   1st BN/32nd INF
   2nd BN/22nd INF
   1st BN/87th INF
2nd BDE
   2nd BN/14th INF
   4th BN/31st INF
   2nd BN/87th INF

25th INF DIV (Light)

2nd BDE
   1st BN/14th INF
   1st BN/21st INF
   1st BN/27th INF
3rd BDE
   2nd BN/5th INF
   2nd BN/27th INF
   2nd BN/35th INF

82nd ABN DIV

1st BDE/540th PIR
   1st BN/504th PIR
   2nd BN/504th PIR
   3rd BN/504th PIR
2nd BDE/325th AIR
   1st BN/325th AIR
   2nd BN/325th AIR
   3rd BN/325th AIR
3rd BDE/505th PIR
   1st BN/505th PIR
   2nd BN/505th PIR
   3rd BN/505th PIR

101st ABN DIV (Air Assault)

1st BDE/327th INF Regt (AASLT)
   1st/327th INF Regt
   2nd/327th INF Regt
   3rd/327th INF Regt
2nd BDE/502nd PIR (AASLT)
   1st/502nd PIR
   2nd/502nd PIR
   3rd/502nd PIR
3rd BDE/187th INF Regt (AASLT)
   1st/187th INF Regt
   2nd/187th INF Regt
   3rd/187th INF Regt

Separate Brigade-sized Units:

2nd ACR (Light)
   1st Sq/2nd ACR
   2nd Sq/2nd ACR
   3rd Sq/2nd ACR

3rd ACR
   1st Sq/3rd ACR
   2nd Sq/3rd ACR
   3rd Sq/3rd ACR

172nd SIB
   1st BN/17th INF
   2nd BN/1stINF
   4th BN/23rd INF (SBCT)

US Army, Alaska also has a separate
Airborne Battalion Combat Team:
   1st BN/501st PIR
Southern European Task Force (SETAF)
173rd ABCT
   1st BN/508th PIR
   2nd BN/503rd PIR

3rd BDE, 2nd INF DIV (SBCT)
   1st BN/23rd INF
   2nd BN/3rd INF
   5th BN/20th INF

1st BDE, 25th INF DIV (SBCT)
   1st BN/5th INF
   1st BN/24th INF
   3rd BN/21st INF
   1st BN/33rd AR

NOTE: There are the 100 maneuver battalions (armor/infantry) in the active force. The CAV Squadrons listed in the 1st CAV DIV are actually Mechanized Infantry or Armor formations, but carry the Cavalry lineage. These maneuver formations are not to be confused with the aviation cavalry squadrons assigned to each division:

Parent unit:	subordinate unit:
1st CAV DIV	1st Sq/7th CAV
1st AR DIV	1st Sq/1st CAV
1st INF DIV	1st Sq/4th CAV
2nd INF DIV	4th Sq/7th CAV
3rd BDE, 2nd INF	1st Sq/14th CAV
3rd INF DIV	3rd Sq/7th CAV
4th INF DIV	1st Sq/10th CAV
10th MTN DIV	3rd Sq/17th CAV
25th INF DIV (L)	3rd Sq/4th CAV
1st BDE, 25th INF	2nd Sq/14th CAV
82nd ABN DIV	1st Sq/17th CAV
101st DIV (AASLT)	2nd Sq/17th CAV

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