

THREE UNITED STATES ARMY MANHUNTS: INSIGHTS FROM THE PAST

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

THREE UNITED STATES ARMY MANHUNTS: INSIGHTS FROM THE PAST, by MAJ Joshua Y. Noble, USA, 104 pages.

This study examines three manhunts from the United States Army's past. The manhunts highlighted in this thesis are the Punitive Expedition to capture the Mexican revolutionary leader Francisco Pancho Villa, Operation Just Cause to capture the Panamanian strongman Manuel Antonio Noriega, and the intervention in Somalia to capture the warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed. A comparison of the three case studies yields four characteristics that are applicable to military manhunts. The characteristics are the necessity of detailed intelligence, the desirability of neutralizing the group to isolate the individual, the decentralized nature of this type of operation, and the political nature of overt manhunts.

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## ACRONYMS

FM	Field Manual
JP	Joint Publication
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
PDF	Panamanian Defense Forces
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
SNA	Somali National Alliance
TF	Task Force
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operations in Somalia II
US	United States
USC	United Somali Congress
USFORSOM	United States Forces Somalia

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Introduction

Mr. Rumsfeld, who routinely cautions that the American military is not designed for manhunts, also said that some of the Iraqi population may be withholding support for the new, American-appointed government in Baghdad because of fears Mr. Hussein may return to power. (7 November 2003, 1)

Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, *New York Times*

In the aftermath of the tragedy that occurred on 11 September 2001, the United States (US) Army found itself conducting a global manhunt, in conjunction with other services and agencies, to apprehend or kill key terrorist leaders in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Since the administration stated the apprehension or death of key terrorists was an objective of the Global War on Terrorism, the administration's measure of success is the military's ability to carry out the mission. Subsequently, the US Army must expend a tremendous effort in materiel, time, and labor to hunt key terrorists.

In spite of the Army's effort, key terrorist leaders identified by the administration continue to elude capture, and these terrorists continue to plan and execute operations that are harmful to American citizens and foreign nationals. Additionally, the terrorist leaders are obstacles to peace and stability in many regions of the world, such as Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia. Therefore, the US Army is pressured to find individuals in order to show signs of progress in the Global War on Terrorism or as signs of progress in establishing and maintaining regional stability.

As noted by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, the military is not designed to conduct manhunts; however, this fact is not surprising because Title 10 of the



*United States Code* states that the Army “shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land” (United States 1998, 83). Even though the US Army is not designed to conduct manhunts, an examination of the Army’s history reveals many examples of manhunting operations; therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to study three of the Army’s past manhunts to identify recurring patterns associated with this type of mission. From the patterns identified through the research, this thesis will subsequently develop and recommend manhunting operational planning considerations to apply to current and future manhunts.

### The Research Question

The primary question of the thesis is: What are the lessons to learn from the US Army’s past manhunts that are applicable to current and future manhunting operations? In order to answer the primary question, a number of secondary questions need answers. The secondary questions related to the thesis are:

1. What was the historical context of a given operation?
2. Why did the US Army conduct the manhunt?
3. What was the operational environment?
4. How did the US Army conduct the operation?
5. What were the successes and failures?

### Background

The US Army’s involvement in the Global War on Terrorism generated this thesis topic. In this endeavor, the Army has found itself conducting manhunts to apprehend or kill key terrorist leaders. The Army has been successful in capturing or killing many lower-tier leaders, and it has significantly degraded the effectiveness of insurgent and

terrorist organizations by denying these organizations sanctuary in certain countries. Unfortunately, as the name implies, the scale of the Global War on Terrorism spans numerous regions and continents, which makes it difficult to mass friendly forces and to defeat or contain the enemy. Often, insurgent and terrorist leaders elude capture, so the Army appears to be unsuccessful in running the most important terrorists to ground. This fact begs the questions, Why does the Army continue to hunt for key leaders when it is not designed for this task, and why has the Army often been unsuccessful in capturing them?

There is one main reason to continue to hunt for key insurgent and terrorist leaders: the leaders retain a base of power that enables them to rally and direct malcontents against the US and other countries, and their organizations continue to remain a threat, intimidating many populations. Key leaders continue to organize, finance, equip, and train terrorist and insurgent operatives, and their organizations maintain an intelligence collection capability for targeting. This capability combined with their trained operatives leads to the conduct of small-unit or terrorist actions. Terrorists and insurgents direct these actions primarily against the US and its partners. Their goals are to intimidate and to kill Americans and their allies.

Beyond the intimidation of people, the presence of these key leaders and their organizations cause regional instability. In fact, instability and chaos present an environment in which these organizations thrive. As of this writing, insurgents and terrorist are continuing their cycles of violence and are perpetuating their existence in lawless countries. Additionally, key terrorist leaders galvanize large populations into a hatred of the US. Many secular and moderate leaders in Southwest Asia and Southeast

Asia, with ties to the US, govern polarized countries. The insurgent and terrorist organizations then threaten many of these governments.

The protection of American lives and interests is the reason why the US Army must hunt for key terrorists in the Global War on Terrorism; however, it is more difficult to answer the question pertaining to the Army's lack of success in manhunting operations. The only logical answers appear to be the scope of the problem and an absence of collective understanding on how to conduct manhunts.

From the viewpoint of many Americans, a perception exists that the US military's progress in the Global War on Terrorism is slow. Concrete signs of progress for the public in this difficult endeavor would be the apprehension or death of key terrorist leaders. Yet, it is easier to state this task than it is to conduct it. A manhunt is also easier to conduct as compared to neutralizing entire terrorist organizations or addressing the conditions that have caused the problem. Therefore, it is important to study past manhunting operations because the topic is relevant to the Army and may provide insights into current operations. The Global War on Terrorism is the immediate and future mission for the US military. Organizational structure, equipment, and training will not rapidly change, so a broader, conceptual understanding of how to conduct manhunting operations is essential for leaders. One way for military leaders to improve decision making is through historical understanding of past operations that are similar in nature; and a greater understanding of past manhunting operations may facilitate changes in tactics, techniques, or training for such operations.

#### Assumptions

The following assumptions are applicable to this thesis:

1. Most, if not all, US Army combat units will conduct manhunts because of the scope of the global terrorist threat.

2. Manhunting operations are not the responsibility of a single branch within the US Army.

3. The historical case studies used as a basis for this thesis are representative of current and future manhunting operations.

### Definitions

The following are terms and definitions relevant to this study:

Counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism (JP 1-02 2003, 130).

End State. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives (JP 1-02 2003, 182).

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02 2003, 260).

Legitimacy. In military operations other than war, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions (*Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* 1997, 456).

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war (JP 1-02 2003, 334).

Perseverance. The measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims (*Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* 1997, 578).

Political Objectives in MOOTW. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political considerations influence strategy, operations, and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. First, all military personnel should understand the political concerns and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political concerns that may warrant a change in military operations (JP 3-07 1995, 1-2).

Posse Comitatus Act. A law that prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military personnel. It was amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased Department of Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities (JP 1-02 2003, 413).

Restraint. The prudent and appropriate application of military capability. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary (*Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* 1997, 621).

Strategic End State. The set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. The term “end state” simply represents the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments (JP 3-0 2001, 3-2).

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (JP 1-02 2003, 531).

Unity of Effort. Unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the Executive Branch, between the Executive and

Legislative Branches, nongovernmental organizations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition. National unified action is influenced by the Constitution, federal law, international law, and the national interest (*Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* 1997, 720).

### Limitations

The following are parameters regarding the research for this thesis:

1. The research only examines three case studies of manhunting operations from the US Army's past.
2. The time constraint in which to produce a written answer to the thesis question limited the scale of the research.
3. The research does not examine any of the current manhunts conducted in support of the Global War on Terrorism. There is a lack of written information that yields insight into these manhunts because either they are too recent or they are classified operations. This prevents an accurate comparison to determine if lessons from past manhunts are applicable to current or future manhunting operations.

### Delimitations

The following are constraints imposed on the scope of the research to make the thesis feasible:

1. The research does not examine manhunts conducted by other US military departments.
2. The research does not examine manhunting operations of other agencies within the Executive Branch of the government.
3. The research does not examine manhunts of foreign militaries.

### Significance of the Study

Completion of this thesis will assist the US Army in two ways. The first contribution is education. This thesis describes three historical case studies of US Army operations. The second contribution is to a broader understanding of manhunts, which in turn, serves as a tool in planning and in decision making during the conduct of future manhunting operations. Since the research in support of this thesis did not discover established manhunting principles or doctrine, a gap in the body of knowledge of US Army operations may exist.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Three operations from the US Army's history are the foundation for this thesis. The operations involved military action to capture or kill the Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa in 1916, the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega in 1989, and the Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed in 1993. This chapter reviews the literature used for this research. The chapter's organization concentrates on one operation at a time with the intent of consolidating the literature reviews for quick reference to assist those who may study these operations in the future.

#### Francisco Pancho Villa

The "Report of the Punitive Expedition" by Major General John J. Pershing is an authoritative account of the Punitive Expedition to capture Pancho Villa. The report begins with telegrams and letters directing General Pershing to form and "to command expedition into Mexico to capture Villa and his bandits" (Pershing 1914, 1). Copies of the General Orders establishing the organization, chain of command, and troop list of units involved in the expedition follow the initial documents. Next is an account of the actions of the expedition to capture Villa. This portion of the report is succinct, and it focuses on documenting events in a chronological order. An interesting feature of the report is the appendices from each of the staff departments. In these appendices, each staff officer from the headquarters reviews the data significant to the expedition and makes recommendations for future operations. These recommendations provide insight into the problems experienced by the expedition, such as the US Army's first use of airplanes and trucks in military operations.



Another firsthand account of the expedition is Colonel Frank Tompkins' book *Chasing Villa: The Story Behind the Story of Pershing's Expedition into Mexico*. Colonel Tompkins commanded one of the columns of cavalry that pursued Villa. His book is not only a subordinate commander's account of the expedition, but also a reminiscence of the old cavalry and the frontier army. Colonel Tompkins freely states his opinion of the operation and of the political decisions surrounding it; in doing so, he is critical of President Woodrow Wilson's Mexican policy.

John S. D. Eisenhower wrote *Intervention! The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917*, which is an easy to read account of the US military's story in Mexico, but the book does not go into detail to explain the political and diplomatic actions of the US's involvement in the Mexican Revolution. A distinguishing feature of Eisenhower's *Intervention!* is the maps depicting the military actions of the Punitive Expedition as well as the landings at Veracruz in 1914.

The book *Border Conflict: Villistas, Carrancistas and the Punitive Expedition 1915-1920* by Joseph A. Stout Jr. fills in the details regarding the Carrancistas, the faction loyal to the Mexican president. He portrays Carranza's army as incompetent and ineffective in dealing with the Villistas. According to Stout, the problems of that army stemmed from poor command and control, garrison duties, and a propensity for soldiers to join Villa's band (Stout 1999, 119). Stout's book also provides more detail of the joint diplomatic commission between the US and Mexico, which the two governments organized to resolve the larger problem of border security.

Two additional books that cover the account of the Punitive Expedition are *The Great Pursuit* by Herbert Molloy Mason Jr. and *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars*

*and the Rise of American Power* by Max Boot. *The Great Pursuit* is a well-researched account of the entire expedition, and *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* contains the chapter “The Dusty Trail: The Pancho Villa Expedition, 1916-1917” recounting the Punitive Expedition. Both works provide a general history of the expedition, but Boot’s book concludes with the assertion that small wars make up the majority of the US’s military commitments, as compared to large-scale conflicts. He also states that the American military resists training for small wars and committing to small wars after the experience of the Vietnam War.

Other sources include theses from the Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs at the United States Army Command and General Staff College. Both “A Strategic Examination of the Punitive Expedition into Mexico, 1916-1917,” by Major John M. Cyrulik and “The Punitive Expedition into Mexico, 1916: Political-Military Insights,” by Major Charles J. Dorsey provide an overview of the political objectives, as well as the military objectives of the campaign.

Manuel Antonio Noriega

*Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just Cause* by Lieutenant General (Ret.) Edward M. Flanagan Jr. is a history of the operation from the initial planning stages through the redeployment of troops to the US. Flanagan had access to the personnel who planned and conducted the operation and to the official after-action reviews. The sources at the end of the book contain an impressive listing of interviews, private papers and letters, military documents and publications, and magazine articles that he used to write the book. The book does not focus on the contributions of one service; rather the author credits all of the military departments’ contributions to the success of the operation.

Additionally, the last chapter in the book makes the case that Operation Just Cause was the coming of age of the US's all-volunteer military.

*Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* by Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker is another book that chronicles the operation from the planning stages through the actual operation to the troops' redeployment to the US. The authors' description of the actions and reactions between General Manuel Noriega and the US leading to the decision to invade is useful. They also describe how General Noriega stole the elections in Panama and emerged as a threat to American citizens and to the US. One aspect of the book that is frustrating is that the authors jump around in trying to tell the story from many perspectives simultaneously, which at times is confusing.

Frederick Kempe's *Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega* is an account of the dictator's failed relationship with the US. The book begins with his early recruitment by the Central Intelligence Agency and ends with his trial in Miami. The significance of Kempe's book in the research process is that it provided insight into the policy disputes between the Department of Defense and the Department of State over how to deal with Manuel Noriega.

*Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988 – January 1990* by Ronald H. Cole is a product of the Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The document traces the involvement of the Joint Staff and the United States Southern Command in the planning and execution of Operation Just Cause. Cole's focus is the planning process of the Joint Staff and United States Southern Command, as well as the linkage of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the president of the US in his role of military

advisor. Another monograph used in this thesis research is from the School of Advanced Military Studies at the United States Army Command and General Staff College titled “OOTW, Raids and Tactical Surprise” by Major Todd A. Megill. Megill explains the nature of the Operation Other than War (OOTW) environment and examines the concept of tactical surprise by raiding forces. One of the case studies in the monograph is the operation in Panama to capture Manuel Noriega, and the other case study is the operation in Somalia to capture the Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed.

#### Mohammed Farrah Aideed

In addition to Major Megill’s “OOTW, Raids and Tactical Surprise,” the research uses a thesis from the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College by Major Brent R. Norquist titled “Somalia: Origins of Conflict and Unintended Consequences.” Major Norquist’s thesis discusses the United Nations and US intervention in Somalia from December 1992 to October 1993. One of his points is that the United Nations and the US failed to work effectively with Mohammed Farrah Aideed, which in turn led to unintended consequences for the US. An interesting point in Major Norquist’s thesis is that interpersonal conflict between the United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Aideed was a significant source of tension between Aideed’s Habr Gedir subclan and the United Nations.

John Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley’s *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* is something of a memoir of the two career diplomats’ involvement in Somalia. The content of the book provides insight into the political and diplomatic initiatives behind the US’s involvement in Somalia. The book does not go into great depths about the military action in Somalia, but a recurring theme

throughout the book is the success of the humanitarian aid effort, later overshadowed by the tragic events leading to the unsuccessful raid on 3 October 1993.

*Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* by Mark Bowden is a gripping account of the actions of the soldiers in Task Force Ranger, the Special Operations Force assembled to hunt for and capture Mohammed Farrah Aideed. The book details the events of a failed raid to capture high-ranking deputies of the Aideed faction of the Somali National Alliance. Unfortunately, Bowden does not place the operation in historical context or offer any significant analysis. However, in describing the action of 3 October 1993, Bowden exposes the lack of unity of command and effort within the military operations to capture Aideed and its fatal consequences.

Two other books containing material about the raid on 3 October 1993 are Kent DeLong and Steven Tuckey's *Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy* and Daniel P. Bolger's *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s*. *Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy* is an account of the raid on 3 October 1993 from the perspective of actual participants. The book describes how a quick mission to capture some of Aideed's lieutenants turned into a protracted engagement in which eighteen American soldiers lost their lives. Daniel Bolger's *Savage Peace: American s at War in the 1990s* is a study of America's small wars in the 1990s accompanied by his observations regarding the success or failure of operations other than war. His conclusion is that small wars deserve study because they are what great powers must undertake to stay great. "Down among the Dead Men: Failure in Somalia, 1992 to 1994" is one chapter in *Savage Peace* that recounts the action in Somalia. In the chapter's summary, he writes that the commitment of Task Force Ranger in Somalia "seemed to promise victory without much of a commitment, a short-cut to

success, an almost nonmilitary surgical strike, the mythical grail sought by many in Washington's policy elite" (Bolger 1995, 329).

*Somalia on \$5.00 a Day: A Soldier's Story* by Martin Stanton covers the involvement of the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry in Somalia from December 1992 to May 1993. The book is an account of the battalion's efforts to aid in the distribution of relief supplies and maintain order in the Marka humanitarian relief sector. The period the book covers precedes the hunt for Aideed, so it provides good background information regarding the initial phase of the US's military operation in Somalia. This period of intervention is in marked contrast to later operations characterized by escalations of violence. Significant points made by Martin Stanton are that the troop limits enforced by the administration had an effect on the military's ability to complete all of its assigned humanitarian tasks and maintain security simultaneously and that powerful warlords, who did not have moral or legal authority to rule, oftentimes replaced traditional clan leaders.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies published Kenneth Allard's *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. The book's lessons focus at the operational level of war. For a reader unfamiliar with military terminology, the book is full of confusing acronyms. One of the more notable lessons learned is that "forcible disarmament is the 'bright line' of peace operations: when you cross it, you have entered a de facto state of war" (Allard 1995, 66).

The Center for Military History's *United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994* is the official after-action report for the US Army's involvement in Somalia. The report provides a systematic account of the actions that drew the US deeper into the internal

affairs of Somalia. It concludes with observations and lessons learned from a working group headed by Lieutenant General Thomas M. Montgomery, Commander of United States Forces in Somalia.

In 2003, the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas published “*My Clan Against the World*”: *US and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992-1994* by Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington. The case study examines the U.S. military’s experience with urban operations in Somalia; however, the authors address other issues, such as command and control relationships and the difficulties of operating in a coalition environment. Additionally, the authors caution about learning the wrong lesson from a single military operation; rather the U.S. military must broaden the scope and compare multiple experiences over time to learn relevant lessons.

*The United Nations and Somalia, 1992 – 1996* is a manual published by the United Nations’ Department of Public Information. Former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali provides an introduction that explains the United Nations’ decision to act in Somalia. All of the resolutions, letters, and reports produced by the Security Council are included in the manual. In addition to the documents of the Security Council, the manual contains very good maps and a detailed chronology of events in Somalia from 1992 to 1996. This publication is an outstanding source for those interested in learning about operations in Somalia from the perspective of the United Nations.

A gap in the literature discovered during the research is the absence of any written material that studies and analyzes these operations from a manhunting perspective. It is easy to prove that the US military has conducted manhunting operations in the past;

however, a comprehensive study of this type of operation is lacking. Like the principles of operations other than war or the principles of counterinsurgency operations, the principles of manhunting operations are relevant to the current and future operating environments. This thesis is an effort to begin a study of manhunting operations with the goal of providing background information regarding this type of operation, as well as practical steps in conducting manhunting operations, to operational-level planners.



## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis is to illuminate lessons from an examination of the US Army's past manhunting operations. The research methodology used in this thesis is twofold. Overall, this thesis compares and contrasts three case studies of past manhunting operations. Prior to the contrast and comparison stage of the research, the thesis develops each of the case studies as a stand-alone entity. It is necessary for the research process to view the case studies separately to grasp better the salient points of each operation for subsequent analysis.

Chapter 4 develops case studies highlighting three operations of the US Army's past. The selected case studies for this thesis are the Punitive Expedition to capture Pancho Villa in Mexico in 1916, the parts of Operation Just Cause designed to capture Manuel Noriega in Panama in 1989, and the operations of UNOSOM II and Task Force Ranger to capture Mohammed Farrah Aideed in Somalia in 1993. Each operation includes a manhunt conducted by the US Army.

Following its development, each case study is analyzed to identify prominent characteristics applicable to US Army manhunts. The end state for chapter 4 is to have developed and analyzed each case study in a vertical or "stovepipe" manner. Chapter 5 compares and contrasts the case studies in a horizontal manner to determine if characteristics of the manhunts begin to form a pattern. If the comparison identifies patterns, then they will form the basis for the concluding recommendations and planning considerations for manhunting operations in the current and future operational environments.

The thesis's foundation is patterns extracted from three historical case studies of the US Army. Since an analysis of history is critical in this research, the thesis uses the Model for Analysis of Military Operations developed by the US Army Command and General Staff College's Combat Studies Institute. The model is a four-step process (United States Army Command and General Staff College 2004, A-381):

1. Context: Why did this operation occur?
2. Conduct: What were the key events?
3. Analysis: Why did this operation turn out the way it did?
4. Sources.

The following paragraphs describe each of the steps in further detail.

Step 1 of the model reviews the geopolitical and social background between the US and each of the countries involved. An examination of the strategic setting at the outset of the operation places the military operation in context. A review of the geographical setting highlights the location and the terrain for each operation. The identification of operational end states and centers of gravity for each side concludes the first part of the analysis. An additional point added to this step of the model addresses the circumstances regarding the source of power for each one of the enemy leaders featured in the thesis.

Step 2 of the research model begins with identifying the location of each of the forces at the start of hostilities. Once hostilities begin, the model reviews the operational phases of the campaign pertinent to manhunting. To highlight tactical level action, key engagements representative of each campaign are reviewed. Finally, a discussion of the decisive points in the operation occurs at the end of this part of the model.

The third step of the research model is the analysis of the operation. This portion of the model consists of two parts. The first part develops the decisive factors on each side that contributed to the outcome, and the second part concerns implications for future military operations. In regards to the decisive factors, the research highlights the strength of each side; the significant commanders and junior leaders; intelligence collection; multinational issues; warfighting doctrines, weapons, technological, doctrinal, or tactical innovations employed by either force; and any other significant factor.

An analysis, from a manhunting perspective, of the decisive factors listed above determines whether the factors had an impact on the manhunt or not, and the analysis highlights implications for future manhunting operations. The last step in the Model for Analysis of Military Operations is the identification of sources. The reference list for this thesis contains all of the sources for the research conducted in support of this paper.

A shortcoming exists in the research for this thesis in that the amount of time available limited the research to three case studies from the US Army's past. The result is that the recommendations proposed in the final chapter come from a limited examination of US Army manhunting operations, rather than from a comprehensive review of manhunts.

A recommendation for future students of manhunts is to expand the scope of the research. The US Army has conducted other manhunting operations, such as the one in World War II to kill Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in the Pacific theater, or more recently, the operations to capture persons indicted for war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the facts become available, one can include the manhunt for Saddam Hussein in the research pool. One may also consider examining manhunts of the other services in the

Department of Defense. The United States Marine Corps conducted a manhunting operation to capture or kill Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua.

Another way to broaden the research is to look at other departments within the Executive Branch of the US government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the United States Marshalls all conduct manhunting operations. A thorough examination of operations from these organizations needs to include a review of the tactics, techniques, and procedures of law enforcement operations to determine their applicability to military operations. Many practices of these organizations may not apply to the US military because of the *Posse Comitatus Act*; however, US federal law enforcement agencies may complement military operations in certain environments or situations.

A review of the Executive Branch should also include a study of the Central Intelligence Agency's manhunting operations. Document classification may prove to be an obstacle; however, an effort to work through the bureaucracy may prove fruitful. At least two manhunting operations, one to capture or kill Che Guevara and the other to capture or kill Pablo Escobar, have association with the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency's Phoenix Program in South Vietnam hunted and killed leaders of the Viet Cong's shadow government. An interesting point is that the US Army provided support to all of these manhunts.

A final recommendation to expand the scope of the research is to examine manhunting operations of foreign militaries. Two immediate recommendations are to research the United Kingdom's operations to capture or kill operatives of the Irish Republican Army or the Israeli operations to hunt down terrorists of the Hamas or

Hezbollah organizations. Another possibility is to research the Israeli government's efforts to bring former Nazi officials, such as Adolf Eichmann, to justice for their involvement in the Holocaust.

## CHAPTER 4

### THREE US ARMY MANHUNTS

This chapter presents three case studies of US Army manhunts. The studies are the Punitive Expedition to capture Pancho Villa, Operation Just Cause and the hunt for Manuel Noriega, and operations in Somalia to apprehend Mohammed Farrah Aideed. Each section of this chapter focuses separately on the context, conduct, and analysis of the operation, and the patterns found in the case studies will form the recommendations for conducting manhunts in the final chapter of this thesis.

#### Francisco Pancho Villa

On 9 March 1916, the Mexican revolutionary leader, Pancho Villa, conducted a raid into the US and attacked the border-town of Columbus, New Mexico. In response, President Woodrow Wilson ordered the US Army to conduct an expedition into Mexico to capture Villa and his band. To understand the rationale behind President Wilson's order, it is necessary to review the long-term relationship between the US and Mexico to place the military operation into context.

#### Context

Seventy years prior to Villa's raid at Columbus, the US and Mexico signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1846, which ended the Mexican-American War and verified the American victory. The treaty established the Rio Grande River as the international boundary between the US and Mexico. In addition to the new international boundary, Mexico ceded land to the US that included California, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Colorado. Resentment toward the US over the loss of such a great amount of territory permeated Mexico.

Following the Mexican-American War, Mexico experienced a civil war from 1858 to 1860, French occupation from 1862 to 1866, and, after the French withdrew, the establishment of a republic in 1867. This republic lasted until 1876, when General Jose de la Cruz Porfirio Diaz overthrew the government. A period of economic growth and political stability marked Diaz's long reign, and under his leadership, the US became one of the largest foreign investors in Mexico. "By 1910, the United States had purchased seventy-five percent of Mexican exports and owned seventy-five percent of the mines and fifty percent of the oil fields in the country" (Dorsey 1997, 6).

Unfortunately, corruption within the Diaz government led to civil unrest that culminated in the beginning of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. On 20 November 1910, Francisco Madero called for reform and for the overthrow of Diaz's government, which fell in June 1911 (Cyruulik 2003, 3). The Mexican people subsequently voted Madero president in an uncontested election, but his presidency was short lived. General Victoriano Huerta, the leader of a group of regular army officers that wanted to replace the government, ordered Madero's murder on 22 February 1913. After the murder and coup d'etat, the officers appointed Huerta president of Mexico.

An opposition party, called the Constitutionalists, formed in response to the Huerta regime. Three main leaders emerged within the Constitutionalists: Venustiano Carranza, Emiliano Zapata, and Francisco Villa. It was also at this time that the US, which had remained neutral during the Mexican Revolution, changed its policy. President Wilson believed that the Mexican people, not the military, had the right to self-determination in the outcome of the Revolution. The president ordered an arms embargo of Mexico to cripple the Huerta regime in its fight against the Constitutionalists. In April

1914, after Mexican police arrested eight US sailors at Tampico, President Wilson ordered the Navy to occupy the port city of Veracruz. The occupation achieved its intended purpose to pressure the Huerta regime and aid the Constitutionals. General Huerta resigned on 10 July 1913 and fled to exile in Europe. By November 1914, the Navy completed its occupation and withdrew from the port (Cyrulik 2003, 6).

Following the departure of General Huerta, the revolutionary leaders within the Constitutionalist Party started to fight among themselves for control of Mexico. On 15 April 1915, Villa suffered a major defeat at the hands of General Alvaro Obregon, the commander of Carranza's army, at the Battle of Celaya, and Villa subsequently retreated to the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua, his base of support (Eisenhower 1995, 178). In October 1915, the Wilson administration chose to back Carranza as the leader in Mexico, alienating Villa in the process. On 1 November, the US allowed Carranza's army to move forces and supplies through US territory to defeat Villa's forces at Agua Prieta, a Mexican border town across from Douglas, New Mexico. Later in the month, on 22 November, Carranza's army thoroughly defeated Villa's force at Hermilloso, and the remainder of Villa's men fled to the mountains (Eisenhower 1995, 190). Villa was furious that the US supported Carranza, and he vowed to make America pay for its decision (Johnson 1964, 10).

The man making this threat, Pancho Villa, was born Doroteo Arango on 5 June 1878 in the rural village of Rio Grande in the state of Chihuahua. At the age of seventeen, he joined a band of outlaws operating in Durango and southwest Chihuahua. The leader of the band's name was Francisco Villa, and upon his death, Doroteo Arango assumed the name. In November 1910, Villa began to serve as an officer in the revolutionary



army, where others noted his courage, and by late 1913, he had become the leader of the revolutionary army of northern Mexico. On 24 November 1913, his Division of the North captured the city of Chihuahua, and he installed himself as governor of the state. The victory established Villa as one of the three main revolutionary leaders in Mexico. He was publicly hailed as the “the Friend of the Poor,” “the Invincible General,” “the Inspirer of Courage and Patriotism,” and “the Hope of the Indian Republic” (Eisenhower 1995, 72). By the time Villa clashed with General Obregon at the Battle of Celaya in April 1915, his Division of the North numbered more than 20,000 men.

In addition to the revolution in Mexico, the border region between the US and Mexico had been a continuous source of tension. Years of revolution and lack of control enabled bandits and revolutionaries to turn the border area into a lawless region. The State Department reported that from 1910 to 1912, Mexicans had killed forty-seven Americans in Mexico, and the period covering 1913 to 1915 saw seventy-six Americans killed by Mexicans. During the same three-year period, on the other side of the border in the US, Mexican bandits killed thirty-six Americans and ninety-two Mexicans (Cyrulik 2003, 11).

Within this uncontrolled border region, Villa and his men murdered seventeen Americans employed by the Cusi Mining Company at Santa Isabel on 9 January 1916. On 9 March, Villa’s band raided the border town of Columbus, New Mexico, where they killed eighteen Americans: ten were soldiers stationed at Camp Furlong and eight were civilian residents of Columbus. The raid at Columbus was the act that caused the US to form the Punitive Expedition to capture Villa and his armed followers. Fulfilling his promise, Villa had exacted his revenge for American support of the Carranza

government. He also hoped that the attack would provoke armed intervention by the US in Mexico, thus distracting the Carranza government and allowing him time to reconstitute his forces.

Following the raid at Columbus, President Wilson ordered the US Army to pursue and capture Villa. Major General Frederick Funston, Commanding General of the Army's Southern Department, expressed his fellow officers' reaction to the raid in a telegram sent to the War Department the morning after:

It is the opinion of Colonels Dodd and Slocum, in which I concur, that unless Villa is relentlessly pursued and his forces scattered he will continue raids. As troops of the Mexican Government are accomplishing nothing and as he can make his preparations undisturbed, he can strike at any point on the border, we being unable to obtain advance information as to his whereabouts. If we fritter away the whole command guarding towns, ranches and railroads, it will accomplish nothing if he can find safe refuge after every raid. (Mason 1970, 66)

Later in the day on 10 March 1916, after an emergency cabinet meeting, the State Department publicly announced:

An adequate force will be sent at once in pursuit of Villa with the single object of capturing him and putting a stop to his forays. This can and will be done in entirely and friendly aid of the constituted authorities in Mexico and with scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of that country. (Mason 1970, 69)

In turn, Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker ordered General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff of the Army, to start an expedition to capture Villa. General Scott, a respected soldier, advised the Secretary of War to pursue an alternate end state:

Baker sat down in front of Scott's desk and said, "I want you to start an expedition into Mexico to catch Villa." "Mr. Secretary," Scott replied, "do you want the United States to make war on one man? Suppose he should get on the train and go to Guatemala, Yucatan, or South America. Are you going to go after him?" "Well, no, I am not," Baker, replied. "That is not what you want, then," Scott pointed out. "You want his band captured or destroyed." "Yes, that is what I really want," Baker said. (Mason 1970, 70)

Scott telegraphed the finalized instructions to the Army's Southern Department at Fort Sam Houston, Texas:

You will promptly organize an adequate military force of troops under the command of Brigadier General J. J. Pershing and will direct him to proceed promptly across the border in pursuit of the Mexican band which attacked the town of Columbus and the troops there on the morning of the 9th instant. These troops will be withdrawn to American territory as soon as the de facto Government of Mexico is able to relieve them of this work. In any event the work of these troops will be regarded as finished as soon as Villa's band or bands are known to be broken up. (Pershing 1916, 3)

It is interesting to note the discrepancies between the public statement of the State Department and the orders of the War Department. The War Department believed the measure of success for the operation was the destruction of Villa's band, whereas, the State Department's opinion was that Villa needed to be captured. Despite the departments' differing views, the public believed the object of the expedition was to capture Villa, and the public would judge the outcome of the expedition on that basis (Dorsey 1997, 29).

The Punitive Expedition consisted of units stationed in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, so it took six days to assemble the force prior to pursuit. Once constituted, the Punitive Expedition entered Mexico in two separate columns. The west column's base was at Hacita, New Mexico, and the east column's base was located at Columbus, New Mexico (Pershing 1916, 6). Under the command of Brigadier General John J. Pershing, the pursuit began with three provisional brigades and support units. The First Provisional Cavalry Brigade consisted of the 11th Cavalry Regiment, the 13th Cavalry Regiment, and Battery C, 6th Field Artillery. The 7th Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Cavalry Regiment, and Battery B, 6th Field Artillery formed the Second Provisional Cavalry Brigade. These two brigades formed the cavalry columns that conducted the pursuit of Villa. The First

Provisional Infantry Brigade included the 6th Infantry Regiment, the 16th Infantry Regiment, Companies E and H, 2nd Battalion of Engineers, and 1st Battalion, 4th Field Artillery. The provisional infantry brigade's tasks were to secure bases of operation and the lines of communication (Pershing 1916, 5).

The state of Chihuahua was the operational area of the Punitive Expedition. Chihuahua borders the US, specifically Texas and New Mexico. The area covered by the state is 89,974 square miles, making it the largest state in Mexico. The 1910 estimate of the population of Chihuahua was 405,265 people. Nature divided the state into two parts. In the east are the tablelands with an elevation of 3,000 to 6,000 feet, and in the west are the Sierra Madre Mountains with an elevation from 6,000 to 10,000 feet. The capital city is Chihuahua, which is approximately 225 miles from El Paso, Texas (War Department 1914, 55-56).

Eventually, the cavalry columns of the Punitive Expedition reached more than 300 miles south into Mexico during their pursuit of Villa and his band. The center of gravity for the expedition became the lines of communication from Camp Furlong located at Columbus, New Mexico, to the town of Santa Cruz in Chihuahua, Mexico, which was the farthest point south the expedition reached. This center of gravity became even more critical when Pershing's force realized that the Mexican people harbored hostile intentions following a clash between American cavalrymen and Mexican soldiers loyal to Carranza at Parral, Mexico.

Villa's center of gravity, on the other hand, was his band of outlaws coupled with the local support of the population in the state of Chihuahua. Both the Carranza government and the US wanted to destroy Villa's band. With it gone, the Carranza

government would be able to consolidate its power within the state of Chihuahua, a first step toward creating a more stable border region between the two countries.

### Conduct

The Punitive Expedition consisted of four operational phases. The first phase was the initial pursuit that lasted from 15 March to 29 April 1916. In this thirty-seven-day period, the expedition neutralized Villa's band, but was unable to capture Villa. The most notable engagement of this phase occurred on 29 March 1916 at Guerrero, Mexico. Colonel George A. Dodd, commanding officer of the Second Provisional Cavalry Brigade, received a report that Carranza's forces had wounded Villa in a clash at Guerrero. Because Dodd's guide was unfamiliar with the terrain, the colonel marched his cavalry column fifty miles to the vicinity of the town, taking a circuitous route. Between six and seven o'clock in the morning, Dodd had his forces in place to launch an attack. At the sight of the cavalymen, the Mexicans hurriedly fled in many directions. Dodd's men were able to kill thirty Villistas and capture two of Villa's machine guns; however, the column was unable to capture Villa. Dodd reported to Pershing, "In order to reach this point the command marched 17 hours out of 24 covering 55 miles and then kept up the fighting for five hours" (Pershing 1916, 15). This engagement was the closest that the Punitive Expedition came to capturing Villa, and had Dodd known how to go directly to Guerrero, he would have encountered Villa's wagon on the way (Eisenhower 1995, 250).

A second noteworthy engagement occurred at Parral, Mexico, on 12 April 1916. Major Frank Tompkins' column clashed with a Carranza garrison, after the Mexicans duped the Americans by offering them a place to rest. Initially, the cavalymen displayed the restraint characteristic of the expedition by attempting to leave the area. The

engagement began only when the Mexicans shot at the cavalrymen. In the end, forty Mexicans and two Americans were killed, and six others were wounded. This engagement also signaled to the White House and Pershing that Carranza's forces, resentful of foreign troops upon Mexican soil, were willing to commit hostile acts against Americans. At this point, active pursuit of Villa ended, while he recovered in hiding.

The second phase of the operation lasted from 29 April to 21 June 1916. During this phase, General Pershing divided the expedition into detachments to patrol and maintain pressure on the remnants of Villa's band. An extract from General Orders Number 28 captures the essence of this phase of the expedition:

As a result of arduous and persistent pursuit of Villa by various columns of this command, his forces have suffered losses of approximately one hundred killed with an unknown number of wounded, and have been broken into smaller bands and scattered to different sections of the State of Chihuahua and elsewhere. The situation has changed to the extent that our troops no longer pursue a cohesive force of considerable size, but by surprise with small, swiftly moving detachments, they must hunt down isolated bands, now under subordinate leaders and operating over widely separated portions of the country. For this purpose, the territory to be covered for the present is accordingly divided into districts and apportioned to organizations available for such duty. (Pershing 1916, 24-25)

General Pershing subsequently divided his area of operations into five districts, and a cavalry regiment, numbering approximately 370 men, patrolled each one (Pershing 1916, 94). Additionally, a majority of the infantry and artillery moved to the front and consolidated at the expedition's sub-bases at Colonia Dublan and El Valle. At the tactical level, General Pershing issued these instructions:

He stipulated five points upon which the success of the expedition rested: continued occupation of as many districts in Chihuahua as possible; securing of reliable native informants; total reconnaissance of the search area; expanded and stabilized lines of supply; and the guarantee of enough men and animals to occupy territory and to keep columns moving in pursuit. (Mason 1970, 143)

Given the hostile Mexican attitude, Pershing could not risk sending long-range patrols in pursuit of Villa, but he could deny Villa the use of Chihuahua. The commanders of the five districts at Namiquipa, Bustillos, Satevo, San Borja, and Guerrero, were to limit Villa and his followers' freedom of action and to supply their troops from the district (Pershing 1916, 25-26). Regarding informants, the district commanders were to organize their own agents and provide Pershing's headquarters and adjacent districts information that might influence other units' operations. Specifically, Pershing directed that commanders would act on tips that could lead to otherwise unobtainable information about Villa or the capture of any of the Villistas that participated in the Columbus raid, regardless of the districts' boundaries (Pershing 1916, 25).

The most pressing problem facing Pershing was that of supply. To sustain a methodical search, he needed food, ammunition, and equipment in large quantities. His Quartermaster organized the transport of supplies using rail, truck, wagons, and mules to sustain 10,000 men and 6,000 horses. The horses alone required 60,000 pounds of grain and 84,000 pounds of hay daily (Mason 1970, 143). Eventually, 10,000 tons of supplies made their way into Mexico by truck alone (Eisenhower 1995, 253). The transition to patrolling districts also allowed the troops of the expedition to become more familiar with the terrain and to develop some informants to continue the hunt for Villistas.

In one case, the townspeople of Cusihiuriachic requested the cavalrymen to rescue them from two Villista leaders and 120 men. In response, Major Robert L. Howze, operating in the San Borja district, set out with his cavalrymen on 5 May 1916 to Ojos Azules. In the subsequent engagement, Howze caught the Villista bandits by complete

surprise. After marching all night for thirty-six miles, the US cavalrymen attacked half an hour after daylight. The Americans killed forty-two bandits and did not receive any casualties. In the words of Major Howze to General Pershing, “We surprised Julio Acosta, Cruz Dominguez and Antonio Angel; jumped them. Had a running fight for two hours; drove their bands into the hills...” (Pershing 1916, 27). It is noteworthy that this engagement occurred during the “district” phase of the campaign upon the plea of reliable informants, which highlights the fact that the US cavalrymen continued to pressure the Villistas, thus following Pershing’s intent.

The third phase of the operation, which lasted from 21 June 1916 to 12 January 1917, saw a consolidation of forces and negotiations with the Carranza government. The event that triggered the transition from the second phase to the third phase was a clash between an American cavalry detachment and Mexican soldiers on 21 June at Carrizal, Mexico. Captain Charles T. Boyd, against orders, attacked a Mexican garrison that denied him passage through Carrizal. The ensuing firefight resulted in nine Americans killed, ten others wounded, and twenty-four soldiers captured. The Mexicans reported thirty-nine Mexicans killed and approximately forty Mexicans wounded. This clash between the Americans and Mexicans at Carrizal was the critical point in the campaign. As a result of almost bringing the two countries to war, the American political leadership forced the US Army to consolidate its forces within Mexico, which ended active pursuit of Villa’s armed followers.

After Carrizal, diplomatic message traffic passed back and forth between the two countries attempting to clarify the military action. The US demanded that Mexico release the American prisoners, and Carranza demanded that American forces leave Mexico. At



the same time, Mexican bandits struck near Fort Hancock, Texas, killing two Americans (Mason 1970, 217). Carranza was still unable to control the border, and he realized that the expedition would not leave because of this fact. He could not risk a war that he could not win with the US, so he ordered the prisoners released. Foreign Minister Candido Aguilar sent a note to the Secretary of State summarizing the situation between the two countries, which stated that Americans believed border insecurity was the problem and that Mexicans considered US troops in Mexico the cause of the controversy (Mason 1970, 217).

Foreign Minister Aguilar further proposed that three commissioners from each country meet to negotiate an agreement that would satisfy both First Chief Carranza and President Wilson. By 24 November 1916, the Joint High Commission reached such an agreement, which allowed pursuit of bandits on either side of the border for a hundred miles and stipulated that General Pershing's men would withdraw from Mexico after the protocol's ratification "...provided northern Mexico was considered free of the Villista menace at the time" (Mason 1970, 229).

Meanwhile, on the same day the Joint High Commission reached agreement, Villa had healed his wounds, reconstituted a force, and captured the city of Chihuahua. President Wilson knew that Pershing's force, experienced in guerrilla warfare and the terrain, could deal with Villa, but relations between the US and Germany had deteriorated to a point where US entry into the Great War appeared inevitable. Therefore, Wilson ended the Punitive Expedition on 12 January 1917 after establishing a mechanism to protect the border but falling short of capturing Villa. Wilson ordered the Army to depart Mexico and return to the US on 12 January 1917. This date marked the beginning of the

last phase of the operation, redeployment, which lasted from 12 January to 4 February 1917. Returning by foot to the US were 10,690 soldiers, 9,307 horses, 197 American citizens, and refugees totaling 2,030 Mexicans and 533 Chinese (Mason 1970, 231).

The Villista bands included a number of generals and colonels as leaders subordinate to Pancho Villa. Of the subordinate commanders who participated in the raid at Columbus, New Mexico, the Army executed General Pablo Lopez in Chihuahua, wounded General Juan Pedrosa at Guerrero, and killed Colonel Candelario Cervantes at Alamillo; however, General Francisco Beltran and Colonel Nicolas Hernandez survived the expedition. Pershing's report also lists twenty-five other subordinate leaders who participated in the Columbus raid as either killed or wounded in action during the Punitive Expedition (Pershing 1916, 96). Although the Punitive Expedition did not capture Villa, it did degrade his command and control by killing or capturing his lieutenants, which helped to neutralize his band during the course of the expedition.

Finally in 1920, the Mexican government negotiated peace terms with Villa. The government offered him a 25,000-acre hacienda in the state of Durango, just across the border with the state of Chihuahua, and a retirement income of 500,000 pesos a year. In addition, the Mexican government granted 700 of his followers one year's pay. Villa retained fifty loyal followers at the government's expense, and other of his fighters that chose to serve in the Mexican army entered service at the same rank they held in Villa's band (Eisenhower 1995, 322). Although Villa embarked on a peaceful life, he had to answer for many of his past actions. On 20 July 1923, assassins gunned him down as he left Parral, Mexico, in a touring car.

## Analysis

At the beginning of the campaign, an estimated 485 men in Villa's force raided Columbus, New Mexico (Pershing 1916, 98). Although Villa's band did not compare numerically with the Punitive Expedition, it operated in familiar, though rugged terrain, and with the support of a sympathetic populace. The size of Chihuahua and the nature of the terrain made it easy for Villa and his band to hide from the US Army. Conversely, the Army found it difficult to move through the terrain. Men and animals tired quickly of movement at high altitudes in the mountains. Moreover, it was difficult for the cavalry columns to forage for food and find shelter during the cold nights, and General Pershing found it just as difficult to keep horses and men supplied. Added to the difficulties of complex terrain was a population that aided Villa. Villa's band could travel light and easily find food and a place to rest, while the local populace provided him early warning of approaching cavalry columns. Often, the local inhabitants provided misinformation to confuse the Army, therefore, when hired to follow Villa's trail, they guided the cavalry over circuitous routes.

Serving the US Army at the time of the Punitive Expedition were a number of experienced leaders. At the top was General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff of the Army. Scott, a veteran Indian fighter, persuaded Secretary of War Baker to destroy Villa's band as opposed to capturing Villa and negotiated with the Mexicans at different points during the expedition. Next in the chain of command was Major General Frederick Funston, Commanding General of the Southern Department. Funston was a veteran of the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, where he earned the Congressional Medal of Honor, and the occupation of Veracruz, Mexico. In the Philippines, he had developed a

daring plan to capture General Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the Philippine insurgents (Eisenhower 1995, 126). Based on his experiences, Funston supported early and swift pursuit of Villa, and likewise, he conducted negotiations with the Mexicans during the campaign. Commanding the Punitive Expedition was Brigadier General John J. Pershing. Pershing was also a veteran of the Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, and the campaign against the Moro in the Philippines. A noteworthy trend in the service of the three senior leaders was experience with manhunts.

To find the Villista bandits during the expedition, the US Army relied on Apache Scouts as guides. The Army sent twenty scouts to Mexico from Fort Apache, Arizona. The scouts were most effective when time permitted a cavalry commander to dispatch them to find a location, return, and then guide the column to its destination. It was difficult for the Apaches to guide a cavalry column to a town or village when acting on a piece of time sensitive information because they did not know the quickest routes from one place to another; however, the scouts were formidable trackers in the mountainous terrain in pursuit of fleeing Villistas. The other method in which the cavalry commanders employed the scouts was in an economy of force role, such as security or a blocking position, which allowed the commander to mass most of his cavalymen for a raid (Toulmin 1935, 85-88). Another source of guides and information were the Americans living in the state of Chihuahua, many of whom worked for mining companies or cattle ranches. There was also a Mormon settlement near Colonia Dublan where the expedition recruited guides. The Americans living in Chihuahua easily guided the cavalry columns from town to town, and they were adept at reading the mood of the local population.

In addition to relying on Americans, the Army paid members of the local population for information; however, this practice more often than not did not favor the cavalrymen. Inhabitants of the area generally sympathized with Villa, so they purposely lied to or misled the cavalry columns. General Pershing reported, “the people in general were but following Villa’s well known methods in using his means to assist him to escape.” Additionally, “several Mexicans have frankly said that they would consider it a national disgrace if the Americans should capture Villa” (Pershing 1916, 11). Villa, on the other hand, relied on the population for intelligence regarding American movements and early warning outposts for local security.

The multinational issue that permeated the operation was border security. The Punitive Expedition began 15 March 1916 and by 24 November 1916, the Joint High Commission had reached an agreement that allowed both countries to pursue bandits on either side of the border for one hundred miles. Initially, the US pushed the limits on a proposition from the Carranza government to pursue Villa. On 10 March 1916, Carranza agreed in principle to reciprocity of hot pursuit of bandits on either side of the border “...if the raid at Columbus should unfortunately be repeated elsewhere along the border” (Mason 1970, 71). The problem was that the raid occurred on 9 March. A proposition for future action existed, but the US chose to misinterpret Carranza’s proposal in order to pursue Villa immediately.

In return, Carranza directed his commanders to impede the progress of the Punitive Expedition. Some commanders were openly hostile and engaged the Army in firefights, and others either intentionally misled or subverted the efforts of the expedition. Clashes between the Mexicans and Americans at Parral and Carrizal demonstrated the

Mexican's hatred of the American intervention in Mexico. At one point during the expedition, Carranza ordered his generals to dispose the "troops so that they shall be in a position to cut off American expeditionary forces now in Chihuahua" (Mason 1970, 152). Another, non-military example of Carranza thwarting the American pursuit was the refusal of Mexican railroads to contract for the movement of the US Army within Mexico. This forced the cavalry to ride mounted deep into Mexico and ultimately to wear out the horses, and it gave Villa's band time to distance themselves from the cavalry.

The doctrine used by the Americans during the Punitive Expedition was to employ independent columns of cavalry, within a mutually supporting distance, to pursue Villa's band. Since the separated cavalry columns were operating in a semi-permissive to hostile environment, restraint in dealing with the local population was essential to the operation. The intent was to neutralize Villa's band and to capture Villa, not to alienate the Mexicans. Once the columns outran the lines of communication and supply, and the leadership realized the full extent of Mexican hostility, the pursuit culminated. At this point, the Americans reorganized into districts to sustain the operation better over time and apply continuous pressure on Villa's bands. Continuous reconnaissance and patrolling characterized this phase of the operation.

Dividing Chihuahua into districts also enabled the troops of the expedition to become familiar with the terrain and location of villages and towns. At the same time, the cavalry continued to pressure the Villistas, and soldiers killed many of Villa's lieutenants during this phase of the campaign. Unfortunately, the expedition found it difficult to find reliable informants. The locals either supported or feared Villa. Often, the cavalry columns reacted to information that Villistas had been at a location and were heading in a

general direction. Rarely did the information allow the expedition to predict specific Villista movements that would present US cavalrymen opportunities for ambush.

For the first time in US history, the Army used the airplane in an operation. Unfortunately, the airplanes at the time had limited carrying capacity and were of limited use given the high altitudes and strong air currents in the mountains. The First Aero Squadron also suffered from a limited supply of equipment for repair and maintenance. None of the eight airplanes survived the campaign; however, the expedition used the airplanes for aerial reconnaissance and maintaining communication with distant cavalry columns early in the operation. This capability was valuable in that General Pershing was able to direct his distant, independent columns from a central base. In another capacity, the airplanes served as reconnaissance assets, specifically in the capacity of photographic mapping during the “district” phase to aid the cavalry’s pursuit of Villistas.

After examining the Punitive Expedition to discover implications for future military operations, several characteristics of the operation appear relevant to manhunts. The first characteristic is to organize the force for quick pursuit of the individual and group. The force must be able to match the speed of the enemy and contain enough firepower to defeat him. If the operation should occur in a semi-permissive to hostile environment, the force must be able to counter a threat from the “host nation’s” military, paramilitaries, and population. During the mission analysis, the commander must consider the means to sustain decentralized operations over time and within large areas of operation. Significant to the conduct of the operation is unity of effort. A single commander must direct all forces involved in the manhunt in order to adapt to changes in the environment, maintain focus, and sustain the force.

A second characteristic is that decentralized operations complement the pursuit. Commanders should consider covering as much territory as possible without sacrificing the security of the operation. Pershing's concept of dividing the territory into districts, assigning a unit responsibility for the terrain, establishing intent, and trusting commanders to act without approval from his headquarters is an excellent example. A third characteristic is that local intelligence and reconnaissance patrols are essential to finding information about the enemy. Commanders must consider the reliability of information from local sources. Expatriate Americans or third party nationals may provide actionable information or assist by other means. It may take time, money, or both to develop reliable native informants. Unfortunately, informants might not be able to provide the detailed information necessary for manhunts, so commanders must be able to conduct combat operations to gain intelligence to continue the manhunt.

A fourth characteristic is the necessity of restraint in dealing with the local inhabitants. The support of the populace in rooting out small bands and individuals is essential to this type of operation; therefore, the force must make every effort not to alienate the population by means of unnecessary roughness or treatment. The fifth, and most important characteristic, is the importance of destroying the organization rather than the leader. Combined with constant pressure, the destruction of Villa's band prevented Villa from conducting effective operations against the Punitive Expedition or from raiding across the border into the US. Villa was only able to reemerge as a serious threat when the political leadership in the US restricted military operations for diplomatic purposes. The final characteristic is that a commander conducting a manhunt must always



keep in mind the political nature of the operation and be prepared to react to political developments at the expense of military practicalities.

### Manuel Antonio Noriega

On 20 December 1989, the US conducted an invasion of Panama to protect the lives of American citizens, to defeat the Panamanian Defense Forces, to restore democracy in Panama, and to capture General Manuel Noriega. It was an unusual invasion because the two countries had a close relationship that began at the turn of the 20th Century when the US helped Panama gain its independence from Colombia and developed the Panama Canal to link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. An offshoot of the canal was the American controlled Canal Zone, paralleling both sides of the canal from Panama City to Colon. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter concluded the Panama Canal Treaty with Panama, which ceded the canal and the American controlled territory to the Panamanians in the year 2000. Before this date, however, the two countries would become involved in a crisis at the center of which was Manuel Noriega, Panama's dictator.

### Context

Manuel Antonio Noriega Morena was born in 1934 in a poor neighborhood in Panama City. Deserted by his parents by the age of five, his godmother raised him as an orphan. He attended one of the more prestigious high schools in Panama, and upon graduation, a half-brother who was an official at the Panamanian embassy in Peru helped him get a scholarship to the Peruvian Chorillos Military Academy. While he attended the military academy, a US intelligence agent recruited him to provide information on leftist Peruvian cadets and placed him on a monthly stipend (Flanagan 1993, 4).

When Noriega returned to Panama, he received a commission in the Panamanian National Guard. His first assignment was at Colon, Panama's second largest city, where he worked for Captain Omar Torrijos, the future leader of the Guard and Noriega's future benefactor. Noriega's early training consisted of an intelligence and counterintelligence course provided by the US military at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, a psychological operations course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and another military intelligence course at the School of the Americas in Panama (Flanagan 1993, 4).

Noriega's rise to power began in October 1968. On 11 October, Omar Torrijos led a military coup that toppled the presidency of Arnolfo Arias. Noriega supported Torrijos by seizing radio and television stations in the Chiriqui Province of Panama. When another group of officers attempted to stage a countercoup against Torrijos a year later, Noriega once again supported his old boss by coordinating Torrijos' return to Panama from a trip in Mexico. For his loyalty, Torrijos promoted Noriega to lieutenant colonel and placed him in charge of Panamanian military intelligence (Flanagan 1993, 5).

Noriega's position as chief of military intelligence brought him into contact with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. During the 1970s, he was on the payroll of both; however, the Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner, ended the relationship in 1977 after hearing of Noriega's brutal methods of dealing with opposition in Panama. The severed ties with American intelligence agencies was short lived, because by 1981, during the first Reagan administration, Noriega was back on the payroll of the CIA, at \$185,000 per year (Flanagan 1993, 7).

Over time, Torrijos became a dictator by abolishing opposition political parties and securing legislation that permitted the military to control the ports, airports, police, and immigration and customs (Flanagan 1993, 5). Increasingly, the US became concerned with Torrijos' relationship with communists in Central America and drug traffickers in Colombia. As a trusted subordinate and chief of intelligence, Noriega shared in Torrijos' associations throughout Central and South America. In 1981, Torrijos perished in a plane crash, and a struggle for power within the military followed his death. Noriega was able to outmaneuver other higher-ranking officers to emerge as the leader of the military, and he promoted himself to general and consolidated all of the elements of military power under his control in the newly formed Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) (Flanagan 1993, 7). Over time, the PDF gained control of the entire country, and by 1985, Noriega was the strongman of Panama.

On 26 June 1987, Colonel Roberto Diaz-Herrera, a disgruntled former chief of staff of the PDF, accused Noriega of complicity in Torrijos' death and of electoral fraud in the 1984 elections. At a subsequent protest, Noriega's riot police ruthlessly suppressed unarmed demonstrators. The same month, the United States Senate passed a resolution calling for Noriega to step down. In response, a pro-Noriega mob attacked the American embassy in Panama. The US, in turn, cut off economic and military assistance to Panama. Less than a year later, on 5 February 1988, Federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa, Florida, indicted Noriega on numerous counts of involvement in drug trafficking (Flanagan 1993, 10-11).

For the remainder of 1988, Noriega supported the harassment of US citizens living in Panama and hindered the implementation of treaty rights under the Panama

Canal Treaty. He also looked to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya for economic and military assistance to make up the loss of American support. Cuba and Nicaragua shipped weapons and instructors to Panama to help create the paramilitary Dignity Battalions for intelligence collection and population control. Libya gave Noriega \$20 million in return for permission to use Panama as a base to coordinate terrorist activities and insurgents throughout Latin America (Cole 1995, 6). Domestically, however, Noriega's power was crumbling in light of the loss of economic support and strained relations with the US. Increasingly alienated from the general population, his principal supporters were political appointees and the military. To make matters worse, the unrest in Panama triggered foreign depositors to withdraw billions of dollars from Panama's banks, affecting the economy negatively (Flanagan 1993, 10).

An uneasy tension ensued in Panama until the spring of 1989, when a series of events occurred one after the other that increasingly frustrated the US. On 21 March, the PDF stopped and ticketed twenty-one Department of Defense school busses with American children still on board; on 5 April, the PDF arrested and imprisoned Kurt Muse, a US citizen, for operating an opposition radio station; and on 10 May, Noriega overturned the election results that had selected Guillermo Endara as president. In response to the post-election violence, most nations in the region condemned Noriega and his government. More important, President Bush sent additional troops to Panama to reinforce the ones stationed there in May 1989. To deny the US an excuse to engage in hostilities, Noriega instructed the PDF to avoid confrontation with the built-up American force.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1989, the Organization of American States attempted to negotiate an agreement between the political opposition and Noriega. On 24 August, the organization issued a statement condemning American military pressure, calling for Noriega to step down, and requesting a settlement by 1 September 1989 (Flanagan 1993, 18). On 1 September, Panama's ruling party installed a provisional government, but the US refused to recognize it. Major Moises Giroldi, the commander of Noriega's headquarters security who had crushed a coup against Noriega in 1988, led another coup on 3 October. The US provided minimal support, and the attempt failed. Still, after the annulled election results in May and the coup attempt in October, General Noriega was weaker and more isolated than ever before (Kempe 1990, 351).

On 16 December 1989, Panamanian soldiers at a checkpoint shot an American officer, Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz, and later that night, Paz died of his wounds. The PDF also arrested witnesses to the shooting, United States Navy Lieutenant Adam J. Curtis and his wife. While in custody, the PDF assaulted the lieutenant and abused his wife. The death of Paz and poor treatment of Curtis and his wife were the events that convinced the White House to invade Panama.

The US's strategic end state for the invasion was the restoration of democracy and the removal of General Noriega from power (Flanagan 1993, 40). The military's operational end state was to safeguard the lives of nearly 30,000 Americans, to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal, to help establish democracy, and to bring Noriega to justice (Cole 1995, 29). To accomplish these key tasks quickly, the US military operated in a decentralized manner against several critical PDF targets. The center of gravity, then, for the US was small unit leadership, training, and readiness.

General Noriega's political objective was to remain in power. His center of gravity was the PDF. The Department of Defense understood the importance of the PDF and planned accordingly:

General Powell explained that even if U.S. intelligence could locate Noriega, an operation to snatch him would not solve the problems with Panama. The entire PDF leadership was corrupt, and there were Noriega clones who would replace him. The entire PDF must be dismantled. (Cole 1995, 29)

It is noteworthy that the plan for Operation Just Cause called for a surprise assault to simultaneously neutralize the PDF in many different parts of Panama, as well as conduct parallel operations to capture Noriega. Military planners, therefore, designed the invasion as a coup de main to neutralize the PDF, and the second order effect was that the Americans isolated Noriega from his base of support.

For the invasion, American military forces were under the operational control of Joint Task Force (JTF) South located at Fort Clayton, Panama. Army forces participating in the invasion were the 7th Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 193rd Infantry Brigade. The United States Marine Corps component of the joint task force was the 6th Marine Expeditionary Battalion, and the United States Air Force component was the 24th Composite Wing (Donnelley, Roth, and Baker 1991, 81-83).

Special Operations Forces formed a subordinate headquarters to JTF-South, called the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Components of the JSOTF were the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 7th Special Forces Group and other Army special operations forces, the US Navy SEALs, and the 1st Special Operations Wing (Donnelley, Roth, and Baker 1991, 81-83). The tasks assigned to the JSOTF were to neutralize the PDF companies at the Rio Hato and Torrijos-Tocumen airports, to rescue American hostages,

to capture Noriega, to deny Noriega the use of the Punta Paitilla Airport, and to disable PDF coastal patrol craft and the television tower in Panama City (Flanagan 1993, 44).

The strength of the PDF at the time of Operation Just Cause was 12,800 soldiers, police, and officials. The majority of the PDF were assigned to independent infantry and military police companies, and the ground forces had twenty-nine armored cars. The naval component of the PDF included 400 sailors and twelve patrol craft, and the air component reported 500 airmen and twenty-eight aircraft. Eighteen paramilitary units, the Dignity Battalions, operated in Panama. In contrast, JTF-South's strength was nearly 20,000 troops. Approximately 13,000 troops were already on the ground in Panama. The Air Force airlifted an additional 7,000 troops to Panama on D-Day (Cole 1995, 37).

At the strategic-level, the preparation and execution of Operation Just Cause followed five phases. The first phase was intensive joint planning and preparation that occurred between 28 February 1988 and 5 December 1989. Phase two consisted of national decisions to go to war and the subsequent final preparations, which happened between 17 and 19 December. D-Day, the day the operation began, was 20 December 1989, and phase three was combat operations and the hunt for Manuel Noriega between 21 and 24 December. The fourth phase began on Christmas Eve when Noriega sought refuge in the Vatican's embassy in Panama and the US began to negotiate for his release. The final phase began concurrently with US-Vatican negotiations over Noriega's surrender and included a shift to nation building and to redeployment of forces to their home stations.

At the operational-level, Operation Just Cause can be further broken down into three phases, focusing on specific objectives. The first phase focused on initial combat

operations concentrated on fixing in place and neutralizing the PDF, capturing Noriega, defending American citizens and facilities, and installing a new government. Once JTF-South installed a new government, operations were to shift to the second phase that implemented stability operations to establish law and order to support the new government. When a semblance of stability returned to Panama, operations transitioned to the third phase, which emphasized nation building to restructure and train the new government (Flanagan 1993, 40).

The PDF had three operational plans to counter an American invasion. Two plans, Plan Genesis and Plan Exodus, called for kidnapping American citizens and transporting them into the interior jungles of Panama to hold as hostages. The third plan, Plan Montana, conceived of the PDF retreating to the mountains in the interior to conduct guerilla warfare (Flanagan 1993, 41).

### Conduct

General Frederick F. Woerner, Commander in Chief of the United States Southern Command until 30 September 1989, believed that Noriega was too hard for US intelligence to track. Woerner “occasionally knew where Noriega had been, knew only rarely where he was at any given time, and never knew where he was going to be – a prerequisite to capturing him” (Woodward 1992, 58). Additionally, Colonel Guillermo Wong, Noriega’s chief of military intelligence and a secret intelligence source for the US, told Woerner that plans existed for the PDF to take American hostages and conduct guerrilla warfare in the mountains. This information led Woerner to conclude that an unsuccessful operation to snatch Noriega would lead to “the ultimate nightmare of hostage taking” (Woodward 1992, 59). Likewise, General Maxwell R. Thurman,



Woerner's replacement, believed he knew Noriega's location approximately eighty percent of the time. He also thought that if the "US military went after him and missed him, and he still had his PDF, no American in Panama would be safe" (Woodward 1992, 135). The Central Intelligence Agency also warned that "Noriega would not roll over easily, and that, based on his psychological profile, he would fight harder when cornered" (Woodward 1992, 298).

On 19 December 1989 with the US invasion looming, Noriega flew to Colon in his Learjet to attend political rallies in support of the paramilitary Dignity Battalions. On the return trip, his jet flew back empty to Panama City. A maroon Mercedes decoy car and a Toyota Land Cruiser filled with bodyguards posing as an official motorcade returned to the capital at the same time the jet departed. Meanwhile, Noriega traveled separately in an enclosed white van that proceeded directly to Fort Amador. The decoy vehicles turned and entered Panama City from a different direction and went to a separate location to confuse any American surveillance (McConnell 1991, 24). While Noriega was in Colon, Navy SEALs, wearing civilian clothes and driving commercial vehicles, conducted a pre-invasion reconnaissance of the capital's Punta Paitilla Airport, finalizing the plan to prevent Noriega from using the airport as a means to escape during the invasion (McConnell 1991, 56-57).

Later during the night of 19 December, Noriega left his headquarters at Fort Amador in an inconspicuous white Hyundai sedan and went to the PDF's recreational facility at Ceremi near the Torrijos-Tocumen Airport. At the time of the invasion on 20 December, he was drunk from too much whiskey and was with one of his mistresses in a compound guarded by the PDF. The sound of explosions at the airport alerted Noriega's

bodyguards, and the sight of US Army Rangers parachuting from the sky convinced them that an invasion was underway. Captain Ivan Castillo, the dictator's personal bodyguard, acted quickly and forced Noriega and his mistress into the Hyundai. Castillo directed Lieutenant Pinto, another bodyguard, to drive the vehicle down a perimeter road at the airport followed by the other bodyguards. Soon Army Rangers appeared in the headlights, and Castillo swerved down a side road to avoid the Americans, eventually making it to a main road to escape. The other vehicle was not as lucky and came under fire by the Americans (McConnell 1991, 104-105).

In parallel with the combat operations to neutralize the PDF, the JSOTF applied pressure on Noriega, raiding many of his known dwellings and leisure spots. As the invasion began, four special operations teams were flying low in helicopters over Panama City's affluent eastern suburbs hunting Noriega. The aircraft observed the approaches to Noriega's villa, as well as homes of close associates where he might seek refuge during the invasion (McConnell 1991, 113). The Air Force's combat patrols sealed off his air escape routes to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Colombia, and the Navy SEALs destroyed his Learjet at the Punta Paitilla Airport, negating this option as a means of escape. At the beginning of the invasion, Task Force Gator, a mechanized unit, was under the command of the JSOTF to assist with special operations near the Comandancia during the first phase of the operation. By the end of D-day, the task force reverted to the control of the 193rd Infantry Brigade. However, six armored personnel carriers, two tanks, and two light armored vehicles, nicknamed the "Panzer Gruppe," remained under the control of the JSOTF to provide transport and security for the special operations forces as they moved to trouble spots throughout the city and engaged in the search for Noriega

(Flanagan 1993, 101-107). Unfortunately, the JSOTF did not know Noriega's exact location because of his earlier subterfuge during the return trip from Colon. Over the next few days, intelligence officers would frantically sort through information trying to find the dictator, and members of the JSOTF would get discouraged after running into many "dry holes."

After escaping from the Rangers at the airport, Castillo realized that Noriega did not have an emergency plan or a safe house to go to in case of invasion, so he decided to go to Lieutenant Pinto's home in the northern suburbs of Panama City. When the group was convinced that the house was not under American surveillance, they entered. Once inside, Noriega phoned Vicky Amado, his favorite mistress, and Major Eduardo Lopez Grimaldo, official spokesman of the PDF (McConnell 1991, 186). Grimaldo said that he was going to seek asylum at the Cuban embassy; however, prior to going to the embassy, Grimaldo delivered a prerecorded radio address by Noriega to Radio Nacional, which extorted the Dignity Battalions to assemble and to fight the American invasion. The radio broadcast played throughout the night and into the day, spurring the paramilitaries into action. (The invasion plan targeted the television station as a means of separating Noriega from the PDF, but failed to include the radio station (McConnell 1991, 197).

Eventually Noriega became nervous at Pinto's home, so the small group returned to the Hyundai and drove aimlessly around the suburbs. The next stop for Noriega was the home of Jorge Krupnik, an arms dealer with private bodyguards. Later in the day, Ulysses Rodriguez, husband of Noriega's personal secretary, joined him at the Krupnik home. Rodriguez convinced Noriega that he was not safe at his current location and persuaded him to go to another house in a nondescript neighborhood named Campo

Lindbergh. Rodriguez, Castillo, and Noriega used a small Japanese sedan to travel to the home in daylight, passing mobs of looters at shopping centers. At the new safe house, missing curtains on the windows forced the entourage to crawl on the floor to avoid detection while moving from place to place within the house (McConnell 1991, 233-234).

On 23 December, paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division, led by Lieutenant Colonel Harry Axson, raided Krupnik's home based on an informant's tip. The troopers found evidence that Noriega had been there but not any additional leads (McConnell 1991, 265). Three days prior to the raid, the White House had announced a \$1 million bounty for information leading to Noriega's capture (Buckley 1991, 241). In the meantime, Noriega remained in Campo Lindbergh.

On 24 December, Lieutenant Colonel Luis del Cid, a trusted associate and commander of Military District 5, surrendered himself and his command to the Americans, negating the possibility of guerrilla warfare in the nearby mountains. Additionally, the US had indicted del Cid on drug charges similar to the ones facing Noriega, and after his surrender, JTF-South turned him over to the Drug Enforcement Agency for transport to the US to face criminal charges in court (McConnell 1991, 267). Del Cid's surrender was an example of the treatment Noriega should expect from the US. Later that day, after realizing the futility of continued resistance, both Castillo and Rodriguez left Noriega, not to return. Only two enlisted bodyguards remained.

The neutralization of the PDF and relentless pursuit of Noriega finally forced him to seek political asylum at the Papal Nunciature in Panama City, a move that caught JTF-South completely by surprise. Because the Vatican refused to extradite Noriega to the US, since the two entities did not have an extradition treaty, the White House worried

that the Papal Nuncio might facilitate Noriega's departure to a sympathetic country. During the next ten days, the United States Department of Justice filed paperwork in four countries to freeze Noriega's bank accounts, and the Department of State deterred other countries from granting him asylum.

In the shadow of diplomatic negotiations, Major General Marc Cisneros, Commanding General of United States Army South, maintained an open dialog with Monsignor Jose Sebastian Laboa, the Papal Nuncio. Inside the nunciature, Laboa repeatedly reminded Noriega that he was not a welcome guest and continued to apply pressures to convince Noriega to surrender. He informed Noriega that the Panamanian bishops had written Pope John Paul II, resulting in the Pope's agreement with the bishops that Noriega was a criminal, thus ineligible for political asylum (Flanagan 1993, 223). At the same time, Laboa told him that he would not protect him from US special operations forces if he took hostages in the nunciature. On 2 January, the eve of a large anti-Noriega demonstration, Laboa had two long conversations with the dictator at which he reminded Noriega that he was unable to provide for his security if the demonstration were to get out of hand and that Noriega could possibly meet the fate of the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, which would be an undignified end (Kempe 1990, 412). Later that night, Noriega finally decided to surrender, and Laboa passed Noriega's surrender requests to Cisneros for consideration. The US granted one request, which was to surrender in uniform, but nothing else.

Manuel Noriega surrendered to JTF-South on 3 January 1990. Special operations forces transported him to Albrook Air Station and turned him over to the custody of agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency. JTF-South continued operations to dismantle

the PDF throughout Panama as organized resistance ended, and by 3 January 1990, two weeks after the beginning of Operation Just Cause, combat troops started to return home. In April 1992, a United States District Court in Miami, Florida, tried Noriega, found him guilty, and sentenced him to prison.

Among the factors that were decisive to the manhunt were the capture of the Comandancia, Noriega's headquarters, and the neutralization of the PDF as a fighting force. In capturing the Comandancia, the US destroyed the symbol of the PDF and Noriega, which caused large numbers of PDF to desert their units. If the US had not neutralized the PDF, Noriega and loyal subordinates could have implemented the operational plans to take American hostages or to flee to the mountains to conduct guerrilla warfare. Finally, with the capture of Noriega, organized resistance ended.

#### Analysis

The US was fortunate to have commanders of high caliber planning and directing Operation Just Cause, including Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, the warfighting commander. Prior to assuming command of the US Army XVIII Airborne Corps, which was the nucleus of JTF-South, Stiner's military assignments included command of the 82nd Airborne Division and the Joint Special Operations Command. While serving in a special operations billet, Stiner faced down Egyptian commandos on an airplane in order to capture terrorists involved in the *Achille Lauro* hijacking. As a result, he was intimately familiar with the capabilities of many of the subordinate units in JTF-South, and he had experience with manhunts. In many ways, the invasion was a special operations raid on a grand scale, and General Stiner's ability to integrate special

operations forces and conventional forces into a cohesive command helped lead to the capture of Noriega.

For the US military, Operation Just Cause was a joint operation. It integrated planning and execution among the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The operation also highlighted the integration of special operations forces and conventional forces in a way that maximized their complementary capabilities. Conventional and special operations forces neutralized the PDF, which was Noriega's strength, and secured Panama while other special operations teams relentlessly hunted for him. Additionally, all forces in Panama served underneath one warfighting commander who held the responsibility for the operation's success. The effect was unity of effort in the invasion and the manhunt. In contrast to the actual operation, an officer closely associated with the manhunt believed a military operation could have captured Noriega and rescued Muse without the Rangers or the 82nd Airborne Division because the PDF did not want to fight, but that it would have been a "hell of a gamble."

Detailed intelligence was a significant factor in the success of Operation Just Cause. The US knew the location, strength, and capabilities of the enemy. Additionally, knowledge of Noriega's potential locations and safe houses allowed the JSOTF to maintain pressure on him throughout the operation. Noriega did not have a place to hide for long before the Americans would capture him. A caveat to the success of the intelligence was that the US had a long, friendly relationship with Panama and that military intelligence units were stationed permanently at bases in Panama:

Because SOUTHCOM is based in Panama and has been there in one form or another for thirty years, its combat situation was unique: At the start of combat operations, it was already firmly established in what was to become "enemy

territory” (but with insufficient combat forces to accomplish its assigned missions). Its intelligence division, therefore, had been able to gather and refine detailed information on the strength and location of the PDF and other targets of military and political value. (Flanagan 1993, 41)

However good the signals intelligence was in Panama, human intelligence proved a problem. Many intelligence operatives on the ground were Puerto Rican, and the Panamanians did not respect them. An intelligence official reported that a “relationship with a foreign intelligence service is only as good as your deepest penetration of that service...we just didn’t have Noriega’s G-2 penetrated all the way...he shut us out, and we went along with it” (Kempe 1990, 298). Unfortunately, the US lost a valuable source of information when Noriega arrested Wong as an accomplice in Giroldi’s failed coup attempt (Flanagan 1993, 26). A noteworthy point of the manhunt is the fact that Noriega was able to lose surveillance returning from Colon, to enter Fort Amador, and to make phone calls without being detected, and secretly leave Fort Amador to go to the Ceremi Recreational Center, a known PDF location, on the eve of the invasion. Additionally, he made it to the Papal Nunciature safely because intelligence did not recognize that he had a close relationship with Laboa; nor did it predict that he would seek Laboa’s help.

International charters and US laws and directives provided the justification for the invasion and capture of Manuel Noriega. The United Nations Charter, Article 51, and the Organization of American States Charter, Article 21, recognized the right of self-defense that entitled the US to defend citizens and installations in Panama. Additionally, the Panama Canal Treaty’s Article IV stated that the US had the right and duty to protect and defend the strategic waterway (Cole 1995, 43). These international treaties gave legitimacy to the invasion and manhunt.



Federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa, Florida, had indicted Noriega on charges of drug trafficking. The *Posse Comitatus Act* prohibits federal military forces from enforcing the laws authorized by the Constitution or an Act of Congress; however, Congress amended the act in 1981 to permit increased Department of Defense support of drug interdiction (JP 1-02, 587). Department of Defense Directive 5525.5 further placed approval authority, on a case-by-case basis, with the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense for direct military assistance to law enforcement outside of the territorial US. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney signed a memorandum that stated, “Consistent with Revised DOD Directive 5525.5...I approve assistance by the United States Armed Forces in the apprehension of Manuel Noriega of Panama” (Cole 1995, 44). The amendment to the *Posse Comitatus Act* and the exception to policy allowed JTF-South to hunt for and capture Noriega legally in order to turn him over to the Drug Enforcement Agency.

Many characteristics of Operation Just Cause have implications for future manhunts. The first noteworthy characteristic is action against both the group, in this case the PDF, and the leader, Noriega, simultaneously. The Americans neutralized the PDF quickly and rendered the organization ineffective. Overwhelming force allowed the Americans to dominate the area of operations and counter any potential threats, and decentralized operations were the keys to success. At the same time, the Americans, both by chance and by design, separated Noriega from the PDF. This prevented him from inspiring long-term, organized resistance, as well as taking away places for him to hide. Closely connected to the success of simultaneous operations against both the PDF and Noriega was a unified command structure, which ensured unity of effort. All of the forces

in the operation received orders from one headquarters, and this headquarters integrated the complementary capabilities of the separate services to pressure the PDF and Noriega.

Secondary to neutralizing the PDF was the capture of Noriega. American forces maintained a constant manhunt and continuous observation on locations to which Noriega might flee, such as the Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Libyan embassies. However, Noriega fled to the Papal Nuncio to seek asylum. This presented commanders an unanticipated problem. At this point, political and diplomatic leadership stepped in to conduct diplomacy to freeze Noriega's bank accounts and to gain assurances from countries, which did not have an extradition treaty with the US, that they would not grant him asylum. This diplomatic contribution to the manhunt assisted Cisneros as he negotiated with Laboa for Noriega's surrender.

Restraint in the use of force by the Americans was another factor that influenced the manhunt, because Panamanian informants cooperated with the US by providing tips regarding Noriega's potential location. This exchange of information might not have occurred if the Americans had not respected individual property, nor provided security immediately after the invasion. A second order effect of providing security was that soldiers on patrol collected information.

Intelligence played a significant role in the planning and conduct of the operation. Knowledge of Noriega's patterns, safe houses, and residences allowed the force to maintain pressure on him. Despite US intelligence, the JSOTF still lost Noriega. This fact is a reflection of the difficulty of conducting surveillance on a person who purposely attempts to counter the effort. It also reflects the advantage that urban terrain affords a person who is the object of a manhunt. Still, the conduct of Operation Just Cause allowed

the US to neutralize the PDF, capture Noriega, and restore the democratically elected leaders of Panama to power in two weeks.

### Mohammed Farrah Aideed

The US did not undertake a manhunt to capture Mohammed Farrah Aideed to protect American lives or interests in combination with a larger strategic problem, such as border security or defense of a strategic location. Rather, American intervention started in Somalia as security for humanitarian assistance and subsequently evolved into a manhunt for Aideed. To understand the evolution of the operation, it is necessary to examine the background of American intervention in Somalia.

### Context

Somalia is the easternmost country on the continent of Africa in an area called the Horn of Africa. The country is 246,000 square miles and borders Ethiopia on the west, Djibouti on the northwest, and Kenya on the southwest. The population of Somalia is six and a half million, and the largest city is Mogadishu, the capital. There are six major clans and numerous sub-clans in Somalia. The major clans are the Hawiye, Ishaak, Darod, Raharwein, Dir, and Digil. Loyalty to the clan is the hallmark of Somali society. Clans compete with each other for preeminence, but when threatened by outsiders, band together. A Somali proverb is representative of the attitude of the people: “Me and Somalia against the world, me and my clan against Somalia, me and my family against the clan, me and my brother against my family, me against my brother” (Norquist 2002, 8).

During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union at different times backed the regime of Siad Barre in Somalia. Barre came to power in 1969, and by 1977, he had

started a war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden, a region in southern Ethiopia that Somalia claimed historically. The Somalis lost the war, and economic aid from foreign countries dwindled, so Siad Barre's regime grew increasingly repressive to remain in power. The situation grew so desperate that anti-government rallies began to organize. In 1990, Barre's guards overreacted at one such rally and killed many protestors. The result was that opposition parties and militias began to fight elements of the Barre regime. In January 1991, Barre lost control and fled Somalia (United States Army 2003, 1).

Mohammed Farrah Aideed, a prominent commander of rebel army forces during the civil war, contributed significantly to the ouster of the dictator.

The loss of centralized power after Barre's departure led to a resurgence of clan violence that completely collapsed the government and the economy. Regional warlords emerged based on tribal affiliations and established bases of power throughout Somalia. One of the more powerful warlords to emerge was Aideed.

Mohammed Farrah Aideed was a member of the Hawiye clan, who as an adult, rose to the rank of General in the Somali army. During his military career, he attended professional military schools in both the Soviet Union and Italy. During the war between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden, he was the only Somali commander to enjoy tactical success. In addition to commanding troops, Aideed served as a member of Barre's cabinet and as the Somali ambassador to India. During the 1980s, he fell into disfavor with Barre, who had him jailed as a political prisoner for nearly six years. After his release, Aideed formed the United Somali Congress (USC) with his fellow Hawiye clansmen. Aideed was the USC's principal military commander who twice defeated Barre's forces during the civil war, forcing the dictator to flee. As a leader, Aideed was

intelligent, competent, and widely respected by his soldiers. Additionally, he understood the US because fourteen of his children lived there. One of his sons, a Marine reservist, would end up participating in Operation Restore Hope (Norquist 2002, 24-26).

To make matters worse in Somalia, a prolonged drought occurred at the same time that inter-clan fighting peaked. A large-scale humanitarian crisis began to develop, and the international humanitarian relief agencies could not get enough food into the interior of the country because of a lack of security. The warlords routinely disrupted the distribution of food, seizing much of it to use as a political tool in the inter-clan warfare. On 24 April 1992, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 751. Resolution 751 authorized the immediate deployment of cease-fire observers in combination with a security force for humanitarian operations; the resolution also called on the international community to support a 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (United Nations 1996, 166). The name of the operation was United Nations Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM.

At the time of the Somali crisis, a presidential election between President George H. W. Bush and the Democratic nominee, William Clinton, was in progress. The nation's media was broadcasting images of starving Somalis on television, and the humanitarian crisis became an election issue. President Bush felt obligated, as leader of the world's only superpower, to intervene to prevent the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people (Hirsch and Oakley, viii). On 15 August, the US began Operation Provide Relief, which delivered humanitarian assistance items by air from Nairobi, Kenya, to remote locations in Somalia. Unfortunately, aircraft could not deliver enough cargo to affect the humanitarian crisis decisively.

Overall, the UN effort was also ineffective in organizing the humanitarian relief agencies in a common effort and in providing security for the delivery of food. The US thus proposed to lead a large-scale, short-duration, multinational humanitarian effort to mitigate the famine in Somalia. In response, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 794 that “authorized the Secretary-General and Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” (United Nations 1996, 214). Under Resolution 794, the UN mission expanded to include an effort at peace enforcement and nation building; however, this effort ultimately failed to bring the ethnic clans and political entities together because of the maneuvering for power among all Somali elements.

In December 1992, a US led coalition of forces, ultimately named UNITAF, implemented Operation Restore Hope from 8 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. Troops in Operation Restore Hope, which included the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, the US Army’s 10th Mountain Division, and many foreign military contingents, provided security to open the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo, repaired roads and runways to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian supplies, and prevented looters and bandits from hindering the efforts of relief workers.

Operation Restore Hope was of short-duration. America’s intention from the beginning was to transfer operations back to the UN as soon as a stable environment existed. On the other hand, the UN wanted the US to remain in charge of operations longer and to disarm the population as a precondition to nation building. For a variety of reasons, the US refused to disarm the clans and, from January to March 1993, pressed the

UN to assume responsibility for Somalia. Finally, on 26 March, the UN Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 814 “giving UNOSOM II responsibility under Chapter VII of the Charter for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia, after a transition from UNITAF” (United Nations 1996, 261).

On 4 May 1993, the transfer of authority from UNITAF to UNOSOM II occurred. The mission statement of the UNOSOM II Force Command was “when directed, UNOSOM II Force Command conducts military operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and political reconciliation in Somalia” (United States Army 2003, 27). UNOSOM II’s end state for Operation Continue Hope was to complete the disarmament process; to establish basic social order; to re-establish a Somali National Police capable of maintaining stability and security; and to end the necessity of emergency humanitarian relief (United States Army 2003, 27).

Although the US transferred authority back to the UN and withdrew a majority of its troops from Somalia, US logistic support units and a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of combat units remained in the country to support UNOSOM II. The United States Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) mission was to “conduct military operations in Somalia in support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as outlined in the terms of reference” (United States Army 2003, 33).

UNOSOM II consisted of sixteen thousand soldiers from twenty-one different countries. Troops from coalition countries numbered 11,691, and American forces

numbered 4,309 (United States Army 2003, 63). Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, a Turkish general, commanded UNOSOM II forces. His deputy commander was US Army Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, who also served as Commander, USFORSOM. Thus, US forces retained their own chain of command, and USFORSOM placed the QRF under the tactical control of UNOSOM II only during commitments to combat operations (United States Army 2003, 8-9).

Initially, Aideed acquiesced in UNITAF's intervention in Somalia, and given the size of the multinational force, he knew it was in his interest to cooperate during Operation Restore Hope. However, UNOSOM II was another matter. He was anti-UN and opposed the UN's long-term nation building plans for Somalia. To make matters worse, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his earlier position as Egypt's Foreign Minister, had aided Barre in his struggle to remain in power in Somalia. Aideed and many in his clan now viewed Boutros-Ghali, this time through the UN, as trying to defeat them again; it was thus a personal conflict at many levels (Bowden 1999, 72).

In addition, Aideed wanted the UN to leave Somalia because the operation's mandate called for disarmament of the warlords, as well as the transfer of authority from the warlords to the traditional elders of the clans. The potential result was that power would shift from Aideed and his United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) to the Hawiye clan elders. Therefore, Aideed and a few of his top aides opposed UNOSOM II, and their influence in the USC/SNA enabled them to control the political, financial, and military arms of the organization (United States Army 2003, 162). Aideed's USC/SNA controlled over seventy percent of Mogadishu, notably the southern and western areas. The Habr Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye clan was the base of support



for the USC/SNA. Aideed's militia consisted of 5,000 to 10,000 fighters, who armed themselves with small arms, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, recoilless rifles, and possibly artillery and armored vehicles (United States Army 2003, 65-66).

The strategic center of gravity of UNOSOM II and Operation Continue Hope was the coalition of force-contributing nations. The strategic center of gravity for Aideed was Aideed himself and his power within the USC/SNA. The operational center of gravity for both UNOSOM II and Aideed was the control of Mogadishu. UNOSOM II reported in one of its cables on 3 July, "We view Mogadishu as our center of gravity, we must control it to be successful" (United States Army 2003, 92).

During UNITAF, violence had remained at a low level, occurring primarily in the form of riots at food distribution centers or with bandits attempting to extort tariffs from illegal roadblocks. When UNOSOM II took over with the intent to disarm the Somali militias, the violence escalated. Previously, UNITAF had convinced the militias to store large weapons at Authorized Weapons Storage Sites; therefore, the weapons storage sites were an ideal start point for disarmament.

On 5 June 1993, Aideed's militia ambushed Pakistani soldiers conducting a short-notice weapons inspection at a storage site, killing twenty-four and wounding fifty others (Bolger, 300). The reaction of Aideed's militia indicated the importance of the weapons to the USC/SNA (United States Army 2003, 163). Because of the ambush of Pakistani soldiers, the UN Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 837 on 6 June "authorizing all necessary measures against those responsible for the 5 June 1993 attack on Pakistani troops serving in UNOSOM II" (United Nations 1996, 267). UNOSOM II generally understood "those responsible for the attack" to be Aideed and his followers.

Aideed had become an obstacle to the success of the operation, and the UN needed to remove him in order to move the nation building program forward.

In response to the ambush, UN forces conducted a series of operations in early June to clear roadblocks, to destroy cantonment sites, weapons caches, and Radio Mogadishu, and, it was hoped, to capture Aideed. To follow on the successes of these earlier operations and to keep pressure on Aideed and his militia, UNOSOM II planned an operation to cordon, search, and clear Aideed's enclave on 17 June 1993. French, Italian, Pakistani, and Moroccan troops backed by the American QRF conducted the operation. The Somalis, using women and children as shields, resisted violently, and Aideed slipped away. "Legend on the streets had the general rolling out under the noses of UN troops on a donkey cart, wrapped in a sheet like a dead body" (Bowden 1999, 94). The operation was costly for UNOSOM II, and it displayed the level of violence in terms of combat and casualties that it would take to disarm the Somalis. UN forces suffered five deaths and forty-six wounded in the action, and unverified estimates of Somali losses were 150 deaths (Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2003, 113). Although the UN believed the operation a success, the animosity from the population of Mogadishu toward the UN increased.

The main challenge within UNOSOM II at this point was the fact that it was a coalition. As violence escalated in June, coalition forces became less willing to conduct operations to maintain security in Mogadishu because the mission was evolving from the original commitment to nation building to one of combat operations. Increasingly, the American QRF found itself conducting routine security missions or supporting coalition forces operations. The operational environment eventually reached the point where

coalition forces in Mogadishu would not conduct operations without QRF support (United States Army 2003, 64).

As troop-contributing nations began to question the course UNOSOM II was taking in Somalia, Aideed's militia, in contrast, became more aggressive. Secure in his enclave after 17 June, Aideed was able to regain his strength. His militia's harassing fire against UN compounds increased, signaling the UN forces' vulnerability, and another spike of roadblocks, ambushes, and mine emplacements hampered UN ground movement. In addition to targeting UN forces, militia members terrorized and executed Somalis working for the UN. Aideed's militia, aware of the increased aerial surveillance of the UN, routinely shuffled these roadblocks and mines to keep the UN off balance (Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2003, 115).

On 12 July 1993, UNOSOM II conducted a raid against the Abdi House, a key Aideed command and control facility for planning raids against UN forces. Ground and air elements of the QRF launched the raid, which destroyed much of Aideed's USC/SNA leadership with anti-tank rockets fired from helicopters. One of the dead was Sheik Aden Mohamed, the organization's spiritual leader (Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2003, 118). The effect of the raid outraged the citizens of Mogadishu, thus bolstering Aideed's status and undercutting the UN's legitimacy. Many moderate Somalis rallied behind him, and the Habr Gedir clan viewed itself in a state of war with both the UN and US (Bowden 1999, 95).

### Conduct

In August 1993, UNOSOM II developed a mission statement that reflected the increased dedication to capture Aideed. In part, the statement read that UNOSOM II will

“conduct military operations to locate, capture, and arrest personnel responsible for attacks against UNOSOM forces and civilians, per Security Council Resolution 837” (United States Army 2003, 136). In turn, USFORSOM received permission from the United States Central Command to dedicate elements of the QRF to the manhunt.

A tactical innovation employed by USFORSOM was the creation of an element within the QRF to capture Aideed alive with minimal friendly casualties and collateral damage. The concept of operation for the force was to maintain continuous observation of Aideed and conduct an air assault raid to capture him in the open moving from point to point. The new element consisted of Team Attack, Team Secure, and Team Snatch. Team Attack included one Blackhawk helicopter with a sniper team on board and three attack helicopters. An infantry Scout Platoon, two Blackhawk helicopters, and a Medical Evacuation helicopter with an emergency medical team, including a surgeon, composed Team Snatch. Team Secure had an infantry Rifle Platoon and two Blackhawk helicopters. A supporting force of attack helicopters would isolate the area during a raid. Although USFORSOM alerted this element numerous times, it never had the chance to catch Aideed because the criteria required to execute the plan were never met. On the other hand, attempts to capture the warlord drove him further underground (United States Army 2003, 136).

Eventually, the manhunt for Aideed exceeded the capability of UNOSOM II, and commanders determined the task required a surgical strike capability associated with units trained for hostage rescue. At the request of Major General Montgomery, Task Force (TF) Ranger deployed to Mogadishu to conduct the manhunt (United States Army 2003, 136). This special operation force included elements of the 160th Special

Operations Aviation Regiment, the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, and an elite assault force (Bolger 1995, 307). TF Ranger further complicated command and control in Somalia because it did not report to the UNOSOM II or the USFORSOM chain of command. The task force reported directly to the Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command; however, it coordinated with USFORSOM and UNOSOM II and dispatched liaison officers to these headquarters. In other words, there was no unity of command, only a common purpose.

TF Ranger arrived on 28 August 1993 and planned to conduct the hunt for Aideed in three phases. Phase one was to last four days and consisted of setting up operations, conducting rehearsals and area familiarization, and exchanging liaison officers with other headquarters. Phase two of TF Ranger operations concentrated all assets and effort on the exclusive capture of Aideed. If phase two were unsuccessful, the task force would switch to capturing Aideed's six top aides to flush him into the open. If necessary, TF Ranger would go after Aideed's infrastructure (United States Army 2003, 137).

The overt, although low-key, arrival of the task force sent a clear message to Aideed and his clan that the US intended to capture him to bring him to justice for the Pakistani ambush. The message, however, negated any chance of strategic surprise for the force. TF Ranger conducted its first operation on 30 August against the Lig Ligato House. Intelligence reported that the house had replaced the Abdi House as an Aideed command and control center and planning location. Sources claimed that Aideed had visited the house in the past twenty-four hours and sometimes used the facility as a place to sleep. However, the house turned out to be the residence of United Nations Development Program personnel and their Somali guards. The embarrassing mistake

resulted in a decision to have TF Ranger notify USFORSOM of impending raids to deconflict the location of friendly elements within Mogadishu (United States Army 2003, 138).

On 7 September, TF Ranger launched its next raid in downtown Mogadishu and captured seventeen Somalis identified as Aideed militia members. A week after the raid in downtown Mogadishu, the unit conducted another operation on 14 September in north Mogadishu. A Ranger driving in a convoy triggered the raid when he reported that he had spotted Aideed in a line of cars outside of the Italian Embassy (Bowden 1999, 27). The task force reacted quickly and apprehended the individual, but the man turned out to be General Ahmed Jialow, former police chief under Siad Barre and a UN ally. TF Ranger released him quickly.

On 16 September, TF Ranger launched its fourth raid at a suspected USC/SNA command and control location, and during this raid, the Americans killed one Somali and detained several others. Two days later, on 18 September, the task force conducted a fifth raid, this time to capture Osman Atto, Aideed's financier. The task force missed capturing Atto, but they detained eight other Somalis. On 21 September, TF Ranger launched a second raid to capture Atto. The operation was successful, but as a consequence, Aideed and his remaining lieutenants went further underground (United States Army 2003, 138). Additionally, TF Ranger's helicopters came under heavy rocket-propelled grenade fire for the first time during the second Atto raid. Another significant event was the downing of the first American helicopter, on 25 September, by a rocket-propelled grenade (United States Army 2003, 156).

After Atto's capture, TF Ranger received information that Aideed was to visit the Sheik Aden Adere compound. A servant who worked at the compound told a local spy of the pending trip. In response, the Americans had an observation plane, a Navy P3-Orion, and two observation helicopters placed on alert, waiting for firmer intelligence. Major General William F. Garrison, Commanding General of TF Ranger, wanted the spy to enter the compound, positively identify Aideed, and then mark the building with an infrared strobe light for the observation aircraft. (Garrison's background included extensive experience in special operations and covert operations, most notably as a participant in Project Phoenix, the program to hunt for and kill members of the Viet Cong's shadow government during the Vietnam War.)

The spy entered the building, but departed without accomplishing either task. He claimed there were too many guards inside, but continued to insist that Aideed was in the compound. When the spy attempted to go back in the compound and accomplish his mission, the gates were locked, and he did not know the password to enter. Later in the night, the spy contacted TF Ranger to report that Aideed had departed in a three-vehicle convoy moving with lights out. The spy claimed to have followed the procession, but lost it close to the Olympic Hotel on 21 October Road in Mogadishu. The observation helicopters, still in the air, did not see any of the activity reported by the spy. Previously, Garrison had developed mission launch criteria that stipulated, "if [a member of the local spy ring] reports he has seen Aideed or his lieutenants, our RECCE [reconnaissance] helo picture approximates what is being reported, and the report is current enough to be actionable" then TF Ranger would conduct a raid (Bowden 1999, 25-28). Only one of the criteria, albeit shaky, was met this night.

On 3 October 1993, TF Ranger launched a raid to capture a group of Aideed's lieutenants near the Olympic Hotel. Omar Salad, Aideed's political advisor, attended a rally in the morning where informants identified him and followed him to a house north of the Olympic Hotel. The informant confirmed that Salad was in the house and holding a meeting with another major target. By this time, TF Ranger had transitioned from an exclusive focus on capturing Aideed to one of targeting his lieutenants in order to get to him. The informant was instructed to mark the target building by parking an automobile near it, to be identified by observation helicopters (Bowden 1999, 28-29). After meeting Garrison's launch criteria, the subsequent raid netted twenty-four detainees, but during the operation, Aideed's militia downed two TF Ranger helicopters with rocket-propelled grenades. The raid turned into a rescue mission and then a fight for survival. TF Ranger called on UNOSOM II for assistance to force its way into downtown Mogadishu to help the task force break out of the city. Early in the morning on 4 October, the rescue columns reached one crash site finally, recovered the dead, and evacuated the wounded. The Americans did not recover anyone from the second crash site. The toll of the operation was eighteen Americans dead and eighty-four wounded. Aideed's militia captured one American pilot. The Somalis suffered an estimated three to five hundred deaths and seven hundred wounded (United States Army 2003, 139).

In response to American public and political opinion regarding the deaths of American soldiers on 3 and 4 October, President Clinton announced on 7 October that the US would withdraw from Somalia by 31 March 1994. In the interim, the Department of Defense activated and deployed JTF-Somalia. JTF-Somalia consisting of two infantry task forces, an armor task force, an aviation task force, a joint special operations task



force, and support units doubled US troop strength in Somalia. The mission of JTF-Somalia was to “provide force protection for U.S. forces in Somalia and facilitate continued support of UN operations. As required, conduct operations to secure lines of communication to ensure the continued flow of supplies. Be prepared to redeploy U.S. forces” (United States Army 2003, 141).

In addition to combat forces, the US dispatched a high-level diplomatic team led by Ambassador Robert Oakley. Ambassador Oakley negotiated with Aideed for the release of the American as well as a Nigerian prisoner. Oakley also established a non-confrontational policy for dealing with the USC/SNA. The violence that marked June to October 1993 was over. Aideed and the rest of Somalia knew it was in their best interest to de-escalate the violence until the Americans withdrew in March 1994.

On 16 November, the UN Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 885 that established “a Commission of Inquiry to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II and requested the Secretary-General to suspend arrest actions pursuant to resolution 837” (United Nations 1996, 336). In effect, the UN suspended the arrest of Aideed and supported the US’s policy of including the USC/SNA and Aideed in the political process in Somalia (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 133). Aideed, in response, declared a unilateral cease-fire. He also moved to consolidate his image as having stood up to the US and the UN to block the political gains of his rivals; however, he still did not cooperate with the UN regarding nation building.

### Analysis

The phases of UNOSOM II involved the reception and consolidation of forces from 4 May to 5 June 1993. From 5 June to 28 August 1993, UNOSOM II conducted

combat operations in Somalia against the warlords, principally Mohammed Farrah Aided. TF Ranger, a special operation force with the mission to capture Aided, arrived in Somalia on 28 August 1993. The intense search for Aided occurred from 28 August to 4 October 1993. After the engagement between TF Ranger and Aided's militia, the US entered a period of strategic reset from 4 October 1993 to 25 March 1994. During this window, another American force, Joint Task Force Somalia, deployed to the country until the US withdrew its forces on 25 March 1994. The UN remained in Somalia for another year, and the US assisted with the redeployment of UNOSOM II during Operation United Shield in March 1995.

Aided's intent during the conflict with UNOSOM II and the US was to force the UN operation to leave Somalia. His end state was to be in a position of power to control Somalia after the UN's departure. The longer the UN remained in Somalia, the weaker Aided would become because of the UN's intent to transfer power to the clan elders. His actions were an attempt to assert his position of authority:

First, Aided probably perceived it to be in his interest to escalate the crisis to further split the coalition and weaken its resolve. There were indications that UNOSOM II operations in Mogadishu and in the rest of Somalia were seen by most Somalis as continuing signs that Aided would ultimately lose his struggle with UNOSOM II. As a result, support for him within his clan was eroding. (United States Army 2003, 108)

Aided's militia was critical during operations in Somalia. When Aided was displeased with the political process, he would resort to violence using his militia. The militia increasingly attacked the coalition, weakening the resolve of the UN force to carry out its mission. Some troop-contributing nations refused to conduct operations in Mogadishu, and others would not conduct hostile operations. Aided attacked the will of the coalition decisively (United States Army 2003, 163).

The militia also capitalized on the weakening resolve of the coalition by attacking US forces. As American casualties grew the political will in the US weakened. It reached a decisive point on 3 October 1993, when an elite unit suffered eighteen deaths and eighty-four wounded soldiers. In response, President Clinton made the decision to withdraw from Somalia.

The decision to withdraw forces from Somalia benefited Aideed in that the pressure on him and his militia ceased. His militia had suffered a significant loss and “evidence suggests that Aideed’s capability to conduct organized military operations against UNOSOM II reached a culminating point, or at least an operational pause, on 3 October after the battle with TF Ranger devastated his militia” (United States Army 2003, 163). Militarily, UNOSOM II and the US should have continued the pursuit for Aideed when he was weakest; politically, Aideed was able to declare a cease-fire, not only to shore up his political position, but also to reconstitute his militia for future use.

Intelligence played a significant role in the manhunt, but UNOSOM II and USFOR SOM did not have the ability to develop the detailed intelligence necessary to capture Aideed. When UNITAF departed in 1993, most of the intelligence assets had returned to the US. A small Central Command Intelligence Support Element remained with USFOR SOM. This element was able to provide limited intelligence to the operation, but the manhunt required detailed local intelligence. In a Third World society that lacked technical communication infrastructure, human intelligence became dominant; however, it was difficult to penetrate the tribal culture and develop relationships with persons who could provide accurate information on the location of Aideed. On the street, UNOSOM II

personnel stood out, and thus they were unable to conduct surveillance to gather accurate information on Aideed and his lieutenants (Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2003, 132).

As the hunt increased in intensity, Aideed went further underground complicating intelligence matters. Somali observers and contract employees of the UN were able to pass information quickly to Aideed and his commanders, negating any chance of UN stealth or surprise. Additionally, some members of the coalition were perceived to pass information to Aideed and his militia, which tore at the unity of the force (Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2003, 133). General Montgomery requested additional intelligence assets in August 1993 with other forces, but the Secretary of Defense denied the request.

When TF Ranger arrived, it brought its own intelligence assets. Early in the task force's operation, the Central Intelligence Agency's lead Somali spy killed himself playing Russian roulette. This spy was to have presented Aideed with an elegant, hand-carved cane that contained a beacon for the unit to use in locating him (Bowden 1999, 23). After that, the task force's intelligence operations were largely as follows: "a source was to provide continuous observation of the target and trigger the employment of the task force" (United States Army 2003, 136). As highlighted earlier, this type of intelligence operation was difficult to achieve, so the command established criteria to verify the accuracy of information reported by Somali informants.

Multinational issues regarding operations in Somalia centered on the UN. Security Council Resolutions authorized the different operations in Somalia, such as UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II, and chains of command and force structure changed with each new operation. Most importantly, an attack on Pakistani soldiers

prompted the UN to pass a resolution authorizing all necessary measures against those responsible for the attack. Resolution 837 triggered the manhunt, not an event that required the US to protect American lives or interests.

Since Somalia was the first time the UN had conducted a peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operation, the UN did not know how to organize properly for this type of mission. To make matters worse, the authorization to capture Aideed complicated the overall mission. The evolution from the original mission to a manhunt overwhelmed the capacity of UN forces. This is the reason why UNOSOM II increasingly relied first on the QRF, and then on TF Ranger to capture Aideed. Another problem of the coalition forces was that a lack of consensus and parallel chains of command hampered the effectiveness of UNOSOM II. The USFORSOM after-action report stated:

In any future Chapter VII operation, the existence of parallel lines of authority will be a reality for the force commander and should be anticipated. This condition underscores the importance of defining clear, achievable objectives and tasks in designing a UN mandate. It also emphasizes the importance of developing and sustaining consensus on a coordinated strategy among contributing nations prior to deployment of their forces to the theater of operations. It further highlights the risks to consensus posed by hasty course changes that prevent thorough policy assessment, mission analysis, and revalidation of consensus among the coalition. (United States Army 2003, 239)

The UN failed to revalidate policy and consensus when it started the manhunt, which affected the effectiveness of the operation.

After examining the manhunt to capture Aideed, several characteristics appear noteworthy. First, UNOSOM II, USFORSOM, and TF Ranger focused on capturing Aideed, rather than neutralizing his militia. After the 17 June raid in his enclave and the resulting hostility of the local population, troop-contributing nations ceded the initiative to Aideed and allowed him to create a sanctuary within Mogadishu.

A second characteristic is the fact that because none of the military forces neutralized Aideed's group early in the conflict, no one separated Aideed from his base of support and power. He still had the ability to lead, inspire, and direct the operations of his militia. His rise in folk-hero status alienated the UN from the moderate population in Mogadishu, and his clan was able to shelter and protect him more effectively while he avoided the UN and US forces. This popular protection, in combination with the complexities of operating in an urban environment, made the manhunt extremely difficult. It was easy for Aideed to hide.

The organization of the force in Somalia was another characteristic that affected the manhunt. The willingness of coalition forces to participate in combat operations equaled the amount of pressure that the UN could place on Aideed's militia. Because some nations did not want to escalate the violence, it was difficult to pressure his sanctuary and force him to move, and thus be more vulnerable to capture. The consequence of failed unity of effort was that, with the available American forces, the US was only able to conduct surgical strikes to capture Aideed based on detailed intelligence, rather than pressure his entire organization with the help of the additional manpower and firepower of the coalition.

A fourth characteristic was the lack of detailed intelligence. The US's superiority in technical intelligence was neutralized in the low technology environment in Somalia. Neither the UN nor the US had the ability to penetrate effectively the tribal society to gain the human intelligence it needed to hunt for Aideed. To make matter worse, the UN and many of the international officers "harbored a cultural aversion to the very idea of intelligence gathering during a nation building operation" (Baumann, Yates, and

Washington 2003, 104). Underlying the whole operation was a lack of cultural understanding of the Somali society, in particular, a “failure to appreciate the depth of clan loyalties and the profound repercussions of making Aideed the focal point of the mission” (Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2003, 121).

The fifth characteristic of the manhunt for Aideed was the reason why the US conducted the operation. Aideed’s militia ambushed and killed Pakistani soldiers in response to the UN forces’ attempt to disarm the Somalis. In response, the UN passed a resolution calling for the capture of Aideed. A similar act did not work its way through the American public and political process. In turn, the willingness of the American people was not as strong as the desire of the Security Council to capture Aideed. The images of dead American soldiers dragged through the streets in Mogadishu horrified America. The public questioned the transformation from humanitarian assistance to a hunt for a Somali warlord and found the answer lacking solid reasoning. The final point of the hunt for Aideed was that overt, publicized manhunts are political in nature. Commanders must keep this fact in mind and be prepared to react to political pressure and to shifts in the political environment.

## CHAPTER 5

### RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

About 600 soldiers of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and special operations forces of Task Force 121 conducted the raid in Ad Dawr, near a group of ramshackle buildings. They found Saddam hiding in a 6-to-8 foot deep hole, equipped with a basic ventilation system and covered with bricks and dirt. (14 December 2003)

*CNN.com*

This thesis has examined three examples of past US Army manhunts to capture Pancho Villa, Manuel Noriega, and Mohammed Farrah Aideed. Many conclusions can be drawn from the case studies that are applicable to military manhunts; however, the remainder of the thesis will focus on answering the primary and secondary research questions as a basis of analysis. The primary question is: What are the lessons to learn from the US Army's past manhunts that are applicable to current and future manhunting operations? In order to answer this question, the thesis will first examine the secondary questions, which are: Why did the US Army conduct the manhunt? What was the operational environment? How did the US Army conduct the operation? What were the successes and failures?

#### Comparisons

Each of the manhunts had different root causes, but all began with a decision made at the highest strategic levels and with the concurrence of the White House to undertake an overt military manhunt. In the case of the Punitive Expedition, Villa and his band had attacked and killed eighteen Americans in Columbus, New Mexico. The number of deaths is not staggering, but the raid pushed the limits of American tolerance



in a lawless border region that the Mexican government could not control. Therefore, the underlying cause of the expedition was border security coupled with a right to protect American lives and interests. President Woodrow Wilson ordered the expedition into Mexico to capture Villa and to neutralize Villa's band so that it could not conduct any more raids. A secondary effect was to signal to the Carranza government that it needed to address the lawless regions on the common border. Although the Punitive expedition did not capture Villa, it did prevent his band from conducting additional raids into the US, and it ultimately forced the two countries to resolve border security.

In the case of Operation Just Cause, Noriega and his PDF increasingly harassed American citizens living in Panama, ignored the provisions of the Panama Canal Treaty, and posed a larger problem in the region because of the dictator's connections to communists in Nicaragua and Cuba and drug traffickers in Colombia. The death of a US Marine first lieutenant was the proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back" and convinced President George H. W. Bush to invade the country and enact regime change. The United Nations Charter, the Organization of American States Charter, and the Panama Canal Treaty recognized the US's right either to defend the Panama Canal or to protect American lives and interests abroad. The federal indictments of Noriega for drug trafficking gave the White House an additional justification to capture the dictator. The amendment to the *Posse Comitatus Act* and Department of Defense Directive 5525.5 allowed the US military to capture him legally, so long as he was turned over to civilian authorities to face criminal charges. The invasion met all of its objectives, captured Noriega, and restored the democratically elected leaders of Panama.

The manhunt to capture Aideed differed from the ones to capture Villa and Noriega in that the basis of the operation was not to protect American lives and interests. Rather, the death of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers killed in an ambush by Aideed's militia caused the UN to pass a resolution to apprehend those responsible for the deaths, interpreted to mean Aideed. This evolution in the mission was necessary to remove Aideed so that the UN's nation building program in Somalia could continue. However, the requirement exceeded the capabilities of the UN force on the ground, so President William Clinton ordered TF Ranger to Somalia to capture Aideed. The battle that occurred in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, at which eighteen US soldiers died, resulted in a strategic victory for Aideed when the White House subsequently ordered the US military to withdraw from Somalia without having captured the warlord. Since Aideed remained as an obstacle to the UN's program for the country, the UN force eventually left without accomplishing its mission.

Like the reasons for conducting the manhunts, the operational environment for each mission differed. The Punitive Expedition operated over a large area, of which the expedition did not have detailed maps, and over rugged, mountainous terrain, which had a tremendous impact on the physical endurance of the US cavalymen and their horses. For Villa and his armed followers, the terrain offered many places to hide. In addition to inhospitable terrain, the expedition encountered a non-permissive environment, facing hostile inhabitants and military forces. The local populace, the majority of which strongly supported Villa, often misled the cavalymen in their pursuit of him or lied to troopers about his location. Twice during the expedition, US cavalymen and Carranza's, not Villa's, forces clashed. Fortunately, the engagements did not affect American public

opinion or national will negatively; however, each firefight altered the US military's plan for the expedition. A significant factor permeating the expedition was the political nature of the operation, as each clash with the Mexican national military caused the White House to intervene in the expedition. The reaction to the first clash effectively ended the pursuit of Villa, and the reaction to the second clash ended operations to neutralize Villa's band completely. Once the border dispute was resolved, the President ordered the expedition home.

In contrast to the Punitive Expedition, the manhunt to capture Noriega occurred in a largely urban environment; however, Panama City, like the mountains for Villa, offered Noriega numerous hiding places. Despite the detailed intelligence the US military had accumulated on his potential whereabouts, the intelligence was not so complete to allow the soldiers hunting Noriega to find him once the invasion began. Unlike the Mexicans, many Panamanians did not support the dictator and provided information willingly to the US military to help find him. The long, friendly history of the two countries and the professional conduct of US soldiers also shaped the Panamanians' attitude in this regard. Only Noriega's most trusted associates and the PDF supported him, and the overwhelming force of the invasion quickly eliminated the enemy's limited resistance. As in the case of the Punitive Expedition, the US political leadership became involved at the end of the operation, conducting negotiations with other countries to negate any means of Noriega seeking asylum elsewhere. In the end, direct political involvement in the manhunt helped set the conditions for the US military's negotiations with the Papal Nunciature, which resulted in Noriega's surrender.

The hunt for Aideed also occurred in an urban environment, but the main difference between the operation in Panama and the operation in Somalia was the attitude of the population. The US underestimated Somali tribal loyalty, so Aideed was able to disappear in the urban terrain, protected by his clan. US intelligence found it very difficult to find him in Mogadishu using technical intelligence collection means. The alternative was human intelligence, but the US could not penetrate the tribal culture effectively to gain the detailed intelligence necessary to find Aideed. Furthermore, the warrior culture of the Somalis contributed to the hostility of Aideed's clan toward foreigners and the clan's willingness to fight to protect him. Another factor contributing to the complex situation in Somalia was the UN force, which was a coalition committed to a nation building program. As the mission evolved into combat, many of the forces did not want to participate. This led to conflicting interests and a loss of unity of effort in the manhunt. Aideed recognized the weakness of the coalition, and attacked its will and resolve, which eventually led to the US pulling out of Somalia in March 1994 and then UN forces a year later. As in the other two cases, direct political intrusion at the end of the operation affected the outcome. In reaction to the loss of eighteen American soldiers, the White House ordered the US military to cease the manhunt without capturing Aideed.

The US Army conducted each one of the manhunts differently. The Punitive Expedition focused initially on the pursuit of Villa and his band, and then it transitioned to a phase, characterized by constant patrolling to neutralize the remainder of Villa's band. The force consisted of cavalry, which conducted the pursuit and patrols, and infantry and artillery, which protected the expedition's bases and lines of communication. Operation Just Cause was a coup de main designed to neutralize the PDF quickly and

capture Noriega. Different types of infantry units, special operations forces, and aviation units fought the PDF, and special operations forces mainly conducted the manhunt, coordinating with adjacent infantry units for support as necessary. In Somalia, a small force conducted the manhunt to find Aideed, operating from a fixed location without patrolling and choosing instead to wait for intelligence that would trigger a raid. In contrast to the other two operations, the manhunt for Aideed did not pressure his militia in such a way that would separate him from his base of support.

Lastly, successes and failures are apparent in each manhunt. In the case of the Punitive Expedition, one of the major operational successes was the decentralized nature of the operation, which allowed the force to maintain pressure on the Villistas. This, in turn, led to Villa's band being neutralized as a fighting force even though the expedition did not capture Villa. On the negative side, the small-unit clashes between the US and Mexican militaries almost resulted in a war between the two countries. Finally, inopportune political decisions reigned in the manhunt at the height of the pursuit, and soon thereafter, ended the manhunt altogether.

Operation Just Cause's successes were the neutralization of the PDF, the capture of Noriega, and, through both actions, the establishment of a democratic government in Panama. In order to accomplish these tasks, the mission required decentralized operations and small-unit action. Military planners designed the force to take advantage of the complementary effects of conventional and special operations forces, which complicated the environment and overwhelmed Noriega. Unfortunately, despite the best intelligence picture possible, the force lost Noriega, and when he surfaced at the Papal Nunciature, it took commanders by complete surprise. This development led to direct political

involvement and unanticipated military/diplomatic negotiations, which in the end did secure his surrender to US authorities.

The hunt for Aideed offers additional insights to military manhunts. Of the three operations, this one had the most centralized control. The force did not patrol to gain information on Aideed's location, nor did it attempt to neutralize Aideed's militia to isolate the warlord. In defense of the force conducting the manhunt, it was beyond its capabilities to separate Aideed from his militia because this would have entailed taking on his entire clan. However, the result was that Aideed was able to hide in a secure enclave to avoid capture. Intelligence was a problem in all three manhunts, but least effective in the hunt for Aideed. Intelligence operations in Mogadishu relied primarily on native informants, whose reliability was questionable. In Somalia, it was ironic that a tactical fight with Aideed's militia had such far-reaching consequences. The costly fight on 3 October 1993, resulted in a strategic defeat for the US in the media, but more importantly, the White House ordered an end to the manhunt when Aideed was weakest, cementing Aideed's victory.

### Recommendations

The primary question of this thesis asked: What are the lessons to learn from the US Army's past manhunts that are applicable to current and future manhunting operations? The answers to this question form this thesis' recommendations to military planners and commanders. The overriding recommendation of a manhunt is for the political leadership to enter upon it for the right reason and ensure that it is in the national interest of the US. Military commanders must then recognize the restrictions placed on the operation and inform the political leadership of the capabilities required for the

operation's success. The hunt for Aideed is an example of an operation that did not work its way through the American political process to ensure public acceptance and confirm that it was in the interest of the US. The political leadership also denied requests for additional forces to counter Aideed's militia in an effort to maintain a cap on US troop strength. When the manhunt experienced a setback, Aideed was able to attack the American national will, forcing a US withdraw from Somalia. Another planning recommendation is that commanders must recognize the political nature of a manhunt and the possible political consequences. In all three case studies, the White House committed the US military to a manhunt for political purposes, and at the end of every manhunt, the political leadership affected the outcome. In the Punitive Expedition, political negotiations ended the manhunt but resolved the border dispute; during Operation Just Cause, the administration intervened after Noriega sought asylum in the Papal Nunciature and, with the help of military negotiators, reached a successful conclusion; and the manhunt for Aideed witnessed the White House ordering the manhunt to end when the warlord was most vulnerable.

Operationally, the US military should conduct a swift pursuit. The force's organization must facilitate decentralized operations and contain adequate force structure to maintain continuous pressure. The force must also contain the firepower to combat hostile militaries, paramilitaries, or populations, and at times, all three simultaneously. Pershing's force is an example of one that conducted a quick pursuit in a decentralized manner. Likewise, JTF-South had to operate at the small-unit level to dismantle the PDF throughout Panama simultaneously, and the task force had the necessary force structure to overwhelm the enemy. In contrast, TF Ranger appeared to remain in a central location

waiting for information leading to a raid because it lacked adequate manpower and firepower to maintain continuous pressure on Aideed and his militia. In addition to decentralized operations, the commander of the manhunt must ensure unity of effort. The manhunts to capture Villa and Noriega were unified efforts, but three separate chains of command affected the manhunt in Somalia, not all US military components and UN partners worked toward the same objective.

Another planning recommendation is to anticipate manhunts in complex terrain, such as urban areas, mountains, or jungles. All environments offer places for targets to hide and make US intelligence collection difficult, so commanders and planners should request the forces to dominate the terrain. Closely related to the physical terrain is consideration for dealing properly with the local population, or human terrain. Commanders in Operation Just Cause stressed proper soldier conduct with the populace, protection of private property, and establishing a secure environment, with the second order effect being the local inhabitants provided information about Noriega's possible locations. As in the case of physical terrain, to control the human terrain, a commander must have the required forces.

The second most important planning recommendation for a manhunt is recognizing the critical role of intelligence, which is the key enabler. It is remarkable that the US military in Panama lost Noriega on the eve of the invasion, despite a surveillance effort and knowledge of his potential locations. The Punitive Expedition exemplifies commanders conducting operations to gain intelligence to continue the pursuit, albeit with problems regarding the information's reliability. Additionally, the manhunt for all three men highlights the importance of human intelligence. Commanders should consider



recruiting informants from the local inhabitants, expatriate Americans, or friendly foreign nationals living in the country; however, reliance solely on others for operational intelligence could affect the manhunt negatively because of the credibility of sources. Ideally, commanders, recognizing that some information requires immediate action, will verify an informant's tip with US intelligence assets to preclude mistakes and wasted effort.

The number one manhunt planning recommendation is to plan to neutralize the target's group or base of support and, thus, to isolate the target. In all three case studies, the base of support was the center of gravity for the operation. The Punitive Expedition was able to break up Villa's band in the initial pursuit, and then maintain pressure on his followers to isolate Villa from them for a sustained period. Operation Just Cause quickly neutralized the PDF, thus separating Noriega from his support, and helping to lead to his capture; however, operations to catch Aideed never focused on isolating the warlord from his militia because the US military was able only to pressure Aideed and a few of his lieutenants.

#### Suggestions for Further Research

The examination of the case studies in this thesis focused on identifying broad operational planning considerations for current and future military manhunts; however, several other topics are important to providing a complete picture of manhunts. One topic should examine the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to conduct manhunts.

Another suggestion is to research the reasons why political leadership makes the strategic decision to undertake a military manhunt, the restrictions placed on the operation, and the military capabilities the political leadership approved for the manhunt, followed by an

analysis of whether or not the manhunt achieved the intended strategic objective. Lastly, the role of the media and public opinion in manhunts merits examination to determine the impact each has played in decisions to begin a manhunt and the effect each entity has had on the course of the operation.

### Conclusions

This thesis has presented three case studies focusing on US Army manhunts, with the purpose of providing insight into this type of operation. At the most basic level, each case study educated the reader on the historical context of the operation and the conduct of the manhunt. The paper also recommended operational planning considerations for military manhunts to assist military planners and commanders involved in this type of mission. The author concludes that manhunts have been and will be unique operations for the US Army and recommends additional study and reflection by military professionals to help ensure their successful completion in the future.

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