

A Stability Force: The Missing Link in Achieving Full-Spectrum Dominance

**A Monograph
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Abstract

A STABILITY FORCE: THE MISSING LINK IN ACHIEVING FULL-SPECTRUM DOMINANCE by MAJOR Frank L. Andrews, U.S. Army, 60 pages.

To better face the changing operational environment, the U.S. Army should dedicate a portion of the force to conduct stability operations. The decline of the relatively stable, post-Cold War world order has led to increased involvement in stability operations for the Army, a trend expected to continue for the foreseeable future. Active Army units, structured to conduct or support major combat operations, must perform short-notice stability operations with little specialized training. Conversely, they must retrain and reorganize for stability operations when given advance notice. The increased number of stability operations, some of which have lasted for several years, has led to greater reliance on the reserve component, which contains units with the capabilities required for stability operations.

The Army seeks to achieve full-spectrum dominance – the ability to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations. Current operational and training doctrine maintains that the best method of preparing units for full spectrum operations is to conduct battle-focused training on wartime tasks, and train for stability operations in the time available after alert. This monograph examines two historical case studies to determine the effectiveness of this approach. The first case study involves 10th Mountain Division, a light infantry unit that conducted battle-focused training in preparation for Operation Uphold Democracy, a short-notice stability operation. The second case study looks the turbulence created in 1st Cavalry Division, as it restructured and retrained for an ongoing stability operation in Bosnia. Finally, an alternative model, with certain units dedicated to conducting stability operations, is considered. The effectiveness of each of these three approaches is evaluated against criteria drawn from the Army's principles of training.

This monograph concludes that the Army's "just in time" training approach remains a valid technique to prepare units to operate in uncertain environments, with the exception of the headquarters units, which have required significant augmentation to function effectively during operations other than war. The Army should avoid retraining and reorganizing active duty units for long-term stability operations. This approach disrupts the readiness of two additional units for every unit deployed, since one unit is preparing for the mission and another is retraining to regain proficiency in wartime tasks. Furthermore, the Army requires restructuring to balance the number of combat arms, combat support, and combat service supports units in the active and reserve component. Finally, dedicating certain units to conduct major combat operations and others to conduct stability operations is a superior method to enable the Army to achieve full spectrum dominance.

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INTRODUCTION

As the U.S. military continues to wage the war on terrorism while simultaneously securing the homeland and engaging in post-conflict stability operations, it is critical to examine how the Army is structured to meet the numerous and competing challenges of the 21st century. The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC), approved in November 2003, provide a conceptual framework to guide the Department of Defense (DOD) as it moves away from a force development process which was driven by requirements needed to defeat known threats and moves towards a force planning process driven by concepts and based on required capabilities.¹ The Joint Operations Concepts also explain how the Joint Force anticipates operating in the next 15 to 20 years, and envisions a future Joint Force capable of achieving full spectrum dominance.² At the operational level, the Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) “describe how a Joint Force Commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain a joint force given a specific operation or combination of operations.”³

Currently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have identified four Joint Operating Concept categories: major combat operations, stability operations, homeland security, and strategic deterrence. The stability JOC includes military operations, as well as the other elements of national power, to maintain or re-establish order and stability.⁴ The main objectives of stability operations are “restoring or reestablishing order, providing humanitarian assistance, establishing new governance, restoring essential services, and assisting in economic reconstruction.”⁵ While the Joint Operating Concepts may portray how Joint Force Commanders will employ future joint

¹Department of Defense, *Joint Operations Concepts* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Vision and Transformation Division, November 2003), 3.

²Ibid. The JOpsC defines full spectrum dominance as “the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations.” Ibid., 8.

³Ibid., 18.

⁴Department of the Army, *Army Transformation Roadmap* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 4-1. Stability operations include: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense operations.

⁵Ibid.

forces, the Army has been conducting major combat operations, stability operations, homeland security, and strategic deterrence for over two hundred years. In fact, the United States Army has a proud, if often ignored, history of conducting stability operations, executing these missions following the Mexican-American War, the Civil War, the Indian Campaigns, the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, the Boxer Rebellion, and after World War II, occupying both Japan and Germany.

Despite the Army's extensive experience, long-term stability operations conducted since 1991 have been extremely disruptive to the Army for several reasons. First, all of the Army's conventional units are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct or support major combat operations. When called upon to perform stability operations, the Army relies on a "just in time" training methodology to prepare units for deployment. While certain Army units possess some of the capabilities required to conduct stability operations, no conventional forces have been permanently dedicated, structured, or trained for these missions. As a result, the Army conducts stability operations on an ad-hoc basis, retraining and reorganizing various units for specific missions. Secondly, because of unit rotation policies, long-term stability operations have affected the combat readiness of two additional units for every unit deployed – one unit is preparing for the mission, one unit is conducting the mission, and one unit is regaining its combat proficiency after completing the mission. Finally, force structure decisions made after the Vietnam War created an active Army with a disproportionately large percentage of combat arms units. Since stability operations generally require capabilities normally found in combat support (CS) or combat service support (CSS) units, Reserve Component units have been activated with increasing frequency. Short-notice stability operations normally pull CS and CSS units out of the active Army, which reduces the divisions' and corps' ability to conduct combined arms operations and perform sustainment activities, ultimately degrading their war fighting ability.

As the Army transforms, it seeks to become a "force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of

conflict.”⁶ Can the Army achieve full spectrum dominance by following the same approach used in the past to prepare units to conduct stability operations, or, would a restructured army, with certain units dedicated to and optimized for stability operations, provide the President and the regional combatant commanders with precisely the right tools for the job? To face the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century, the United States Army needs to dedicate a portion of the force to conduct stability operations in order to be truly capable of full spectrum dominance.

This monograph will first explain how changes in the operational environment have created a need to change the way the Army prepares units to conduct full spectrum operations. It will also explore the common characteristics of recent stability operations and determine the capabilities required to operate effectively in this environment. Next, it will review Army operational and training doctrine in order to examine how the Army prepares its units to conduct full spectrum operations. Then, it will assess the effectiveness of the Army’s current method of training units to conduct stability operations by evaluating two historical case studies against criteria drawn from Army training doctrine. The first case study shows the problems experienced by 10th Mountain Division, a light infantry organization conducting stability operations as part of a short-notice contingency mission during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The second case study, 1st Cavalry Division’s rotation to Bosnia in support of Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1999, looks at the turbulence created by the “just in time” training model on a unit with several months notice before deployment. The four evaluation criteria – train as a combined arms and joint team, train for combat proficiency, train to sustain proficiency, and train to develop leaders – come from the Army’s principles of training. Finally, this monograph will conclude by offering an alternative solution to enable the future Army to achieve full spectrum dominance.

⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 1.

Why the need for change?

Current force structure and design, one cause of stability operations' disruptive effect on the U.S. Army, is a direct result of the Army's participation in the fifty-year long Cold War that began after World War II. Since 1945, two generations of soldiers prepared to deter wars, or if deterrence failed, fight and win the nation's wars, which everyone assumed would take place on the plains of Central Europe against a quantitatively superior Warsaw Pact. When the United States faced a clearly defined adversary, it was a comparatively straightforward process to develop a national military strategy, design and build a force structure, and focus military training on defeating the perceived threat to our national interests and security.

However, the disintegration of the relatively stable bipolar world order created something of an identity crisis within the Army. Organized, trained, equipped, and structured to defeat Soviet-styled opponents, the Army struggled in an effort to come to grips with its *raison d'etre* following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The United States, as the world's sole superpower, called upon the Army to perform military operations other than war (MOOTW) with increasing frequency.⁷ After deployments to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and numerous humanitarian relief operations at home and abroad, the oft-repeated mantra that "the Army exists to fight and win the nation's wars" began to ring hollow. To be sure, Army leaders at all levels continued to prepare their units to fight wars; however, the reality of what the Army was actually *doing* was something entirely different. The Army once again had to be proficient in operations occurring across the spectrum of conflict – both war and operations other than war.

⁷Joint Publication 1-02, p. 334, defines MOOTW as "operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war." JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, p. I-1, states the MOOTW "may involve elements of combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, combat, and noncombat operations," and "focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities."

The emphasis on training for major combat operations while requiring its soldiers to operate either in a combat or a non-combat environment, or in some hazy combination of the two, created a dilemma for military planners and leaders as they struggled to prepare the Army to fight and win wars, while at the same time, effectively conduct MOOTW. The solution was simply to continue to organize, train, and equip the Army, in accordance with Title 10, to conduct major combat operations, and accept risk in MOOTW. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, summed up the philosophy used to determine the amount and frequency of training units for operations other than war as “*just enough and just in time* [italics in original].”⁸ However, ignoring the unique conditions of the MOOTW environment meant that the Army would conduct these operations in a less than ideal fashion, initially deploying hastily prepared and poorly equipped units, followed-up months later by units retrained and reorganized specifically for the mission.

Many people consider conducting MOOTW and stability operations in a sub-optimal manner a small price to pay to maintain combat readiness, since the risks of losing a war are greater than “losing” a MOOTW or a stability operation. On the other hand, does it make sense to accept risk in what has become, and may continue to be, the Army’s most common mission? Recent operations to remove authoritarian regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the requirement identified in the Joint Operations Concept for a capability to conduct stability operations. After these nations’ governing institutions have been overthrown, a secure environment must be provided to allow a successful transition from an authoritarian regime to a stable, representative government. Furthermore, the potential for an increased number of operations other than war exists. According to Martin Van Creveld, Robert D. Kaplan, and Samuel Huntington, future conflicts are less likely to involve the armed forces from nation-states and are more likely to involve non-state actors, such as gangs, terrorists, or warlords, and take

⁸Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23 *Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 86.

place along ethnic fault lines or in failed states where the governments do not function effectively.⁹ If these authors are correct, the requirement to conduct stability operations is virtually assured. As the chances of a large-scale war or a conventional military threat to American security decrease, U.S. involvement in stability operations has increased dramatically. In fact, “since mid-1993, the American military forces have engaged in 170 separate SSCs [small-scale contingencies], ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping, averaging between 20 and 30 a month.”¹⁰

In an effort to reform and remake itself to remain relevant, meet these new realities, and to increase strategic responsiveness, the Army began the process of transformation. The development of the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) was originally the first step in the transition from the current Army to the future force. Today, the SBCTs bridge the capability gap between the heavy mechanized and armored divisions, and the light divisions. The creation of the SBCTs, optimized for small-scale contingencies, is a good first step towards achieving full spectrum dominance.¹¹ However, the SBCTs, while able to provide security, lack many of the combat support and combat service support elements required to be truly effective in many stability operations.

According to a December 2003 National Defense University report, the United States’ overwhelming conventional military superiority has changed the post-conflict operational environment, making it imperative for the U.S. military to “transform how it prepares for and executes stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations.”¹² The ability to defeat an adversary in a

⁹See Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*, and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* for a more detailed discussion about politics and conflict in the post-Cold War world.

¹⁰Conrad Crane, “Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies during the 1990s” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January, 2001), 1.

¹¹Michael Mehaffey, “Vanguard of the Objective Force” *Military Review* (September-October, 2000): 6-7.

¹²Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stability and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2003), 5.

rapid, decisive manner using a relatively small military force has created two problems for post-conflict stability operations.¹³ First, by compressing the duration of major combat operations and resolving conflicts much faster, the Army must start conducting stability operations much earlier, leaving less time to plan and prepare. Furthermore, political objectives, the presence of international news media and public opinion now seem to dictate that stability operations begin concurrently with, or immediately following, the commencement of major combat operations.

Secondly, since the U.S. can deploy a smaller force and still achieve military victory, fewer troops are present to conduct post-conflict stability operations. In the past, large numbers of troops were needed to fight and win long, drawn-out wars. World War II is an example of the old pattern of conflict, when America and the Allied Powers required several years to build-up combat power to defeat the German and Japanese armed forces in lengthy campaigns. This long combat phase provided planners adequate time to develop and implement an occupation plan. As Allied forces neared victory, major combat operations declined in intensity, permitting senior commanders to divert excess manpower and resources to create a Constabulary Force, allowing a nearly seamless transition between war fighting and stability operations, as illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Traditional Pattern of Conflict¹⁴

¹³Ibid., 16.

¹⁴Figure from Binnendijk, *Transforming for Stability and Reconstruction Operations*, 6.

By comparison, the U.S. and coalition partners' overwhelming conventional military superiority led to relatively quick defeats of enemy forces in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, reducing the amount of time available to plan, prepare, and train follow-on forces to conduct stability operations to just a few months. These operations were marked by a short, intense period of major combat operations, followed by a slow build-up of the stability effort. Figure 2 highlights the security gap created between the point where major combat operations concluded and stability operations and the nation-building mission began. All three of these conflicts involved defeating an authoritarian regime, which created a power vacuum, since the forces that maintained law and order in the area were removed or driven from power. Additionally, since fewer ground combat units are required to achieve victory during major combat operations (or in the extreme case of Kosovo, no ground forces were required), fewer soldiers were available to conduct stability operations. U.S. troops in Iraq, trained and prepared for war fighting, found themselves having to quickly improvise and adapt once given the stability mission following the cessation of major combat operations.




Figure 2. New Pattern of Conflict¹⁵

¹⁵Ibid., 7.

What is now required, as proposed by Hans Binnendjik and Stuart Johnson, editors of the *Transformation for Stability and Reconstruction Operations*, is a dedicated force to bridge the gap between major combat operations and the nation building mission (see figure 3). This force would be modular, and consist of four Joint Stability and Reconstruction Groups, each with a joint headquarters element, a military police battalion, a civil affairs battalion, an engineer battalion, a medical battalion, and a psychological operations battalion.¹⁶ The separate headquarters would be able to plan post-conflict stability operations concurrently with the planning efforts for major combat operations. Units conducting major combat operations would not have their war fighting capabilities degraded, since they would retain their full complement of CS and CSS units. Combat forces in theater could provide security for the stability force in a post-conflict scenario. During contingency operations, an attached or organic tactical combat force, consisting of a maneuver force, reconnaissance elements, artillery, and an attack aviation unit, could provide security.¹⁷




Figure 3. Bridging the Stability and Reconstruction Gap¹⁸

¹⁶Ibid., 59.

¹⁷Ibid., 58-59.

¹⁸Ibid. 7

Another point illustrated by these figures is the fact that the military's involvement in a crisis does not end with the conclusion of major combat operations. Dr. Conrad Crane has identified four operational phases that occur in the course of small-scale contingency operations: engagement, deterrence, hostilities, and stabilization.¹⁹ Successful engagement and deterrence may preclude the hostilities phase; however, the stabilization phase is required whether or not hostilities took place since "the aftermath of any crisis will normally require significant military involvement to stabilize the situation and maintain policy gains."²⁰ Without the stabilization phase, it is quite likely that the conditions that initially created the crisis will return.²¹

The stabilization phase may last for several years or more. Historically, successful U.S. post-conflict stability operations have required a minimum of five years to ensure a lasting transition to democracy.²² It is important to note that "during the last decade any major deployment of military forces to resolve a crisis in a theater has ended by creating new long-term requirements for U.S. forces to keep the situation stabilized and to maintain progress towards American foreign policy goals."²³ This has clear implications across the DOTMLPF for the U.S. Army, since the Army is the military service with the preponderance of capabilities to conduct long-term stability operations and support operations. In order to become capable of full spectrum dominance, it is imperative that the Army is able to conduct stability operations effectively in the unique environment of military operations other than war.

Characteristics of the Environment

Although stability operations take place under many different conditions and in a wide variety of environments, U.S. stability operations since 1991 do have several common

¹⁹Conrad Crane, "Landpower and Crises," 3.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²James Dobbins, et al., *America's Role in Nation Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 166.

²³Conrad Crane, "Landpower and Crises," 8.

characteristics.²⁴ First, they have been relatively small operations in terms of manpower. This is due in part to the second common characteristic – a politically imposed force cap, which limits the number of military personnel in the area of operations. Despite the small number of troops involved, stability operations generally impose a burden on the headquarters element due to an increased span on control, caused by the wide variety of type of units employed, many coming from different services, organizations, and bases, that do not habitually operate or train together. Furthermore, multi-national participation, non-governmental organizations, and interagency involvement all impose additional coordination requirements on the controlling headquarters.

Additionally, during stability operations the area of operations is much larger than what the units would normally operate in during wartime under current doctrine.²⁵ Since a relatively small number of forces are deployed, units are more dispersed and operate in a decentralized fashion. To compensate, extra communications units and equipment are required. Since the area of operations is larger, may be noncontiguous, and lack a well-defined rear area the need to secure extended lines of communications and maintain freedom of maneuver assumes greater importance; otherwise, unprotected supply convoys become vulnerable to interdiction. Finally, most stability operations take place in failed states or in nations where the government cannot provide essential services, thus the need for the intervening force to provide security, assist in re-establishing or supporting the local government, and help restore basic services to the population.

Fortunately, many of the tasks conducted in stability operations by combat support and combat service support units are similar to the tasks these units perform during major combat operations. Law enforcement responsibilities, such as providing or maintaining law and order

²⁴Some of these characteristics are taken from Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army and Operations Other than War,” in Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., *The Future of the Army Profession* (New York: McGraw Hill Inc., 2002), 157-8.

²⁵For example, in Somalia the Area of Operations assigned to the 10th Mountain Division was “some 200 kilometers on a side.” The division was normally expected to “cover a 30-kilometer front in wartime.” Ibid., 158.

and crime prevention, while common to military police, must be done on a much larger scale. The shortage of military police units in the active force dictates that these tasks must be done by units unfamiliar with these missions, especially those whose wartime functions may not be required once major combat operations are concluded, such as, infantry, armor, artillery, and air defense artillery units.²⁶ Securing key facilities and providing humanitarian support, either directly by offering medical assistance, indirectly by escorting relief convoys, or through coordination with NGOs and IOs, are tasks with similar parallels in major combat operations; however, units must conduct these missions under different conditions in stability operations. Tasks such as restoring basic services (electricity, water, waste removal, phones), opening schools, establishing local governance, and transitioning to local control have few similarities to a wartime Mission Essential Task List (METL), but may be required in post-conflict stability operations.²⁷ Finally, information operations, while essentially the same as wartime, take on added significance during stability operations, given the need to gain the support and cooperation of the local population.

Perhaps the most salient difference is the amount of contact soldiers have with civilians. Most stability operations require soldiers to develop what A.B. Fetherston referred to as “contact skills” to better interact with the local population. In 1994, Fetherston concluded that military personnel generally seem to lack these interpersonal skills and that military training offers few opportunities for soldiers to acquire this skill set.²⁸ This problem was later identified in a Special

²⁶Military Police comprise only 3 percent of the Total Force. As of August 2003, 90 percent of the 12,000 MPs in the Guard and Reserve were on Active Duty, with many approaching their 2-year service limit. One-third of all MPs were serving in Iraq. Christopher Cooper, “As U.S. Tries to Bring Order to Iraq, Need for Military Police is Rising” *The Wall Street Journal* August 21, 2003, A1, A6.

²⁷This partial listing of tasks conducted during stability operations is based on one battalion commander’s experience in Kosovo. See LTC Joseph Anderson, “Military Operational Measures of Effectiveness for Peacekeeping Operations,” *Military Review* (September-October 2001): 36-44.

²⁸Edward Moxon-Browne, ed., *A Future for Peacekeeping?* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 36.

Report from the United States Institute for Peace, which reported an abundance of stories from Bosnia about “times when a flag officer’s inability to deal with civilians in the international community on a personable basis impeded the peace process and impaired the mission.”²⁹

Additionally, since the Army generally conducts stability operations under more restrictive rules of engagement than major combat operations, soldiers are required to change their mindset. Trained to destroy enemy personnel and equipment, soldiers must interact with civilians and maintain a secure environment. Personnel conducting stability operations in a higher intensity environment, such as peace enforcement, may be required to make instantaneous decisions regarding the use of deadly force. An incorrect decision can have tragic implications not only for noncombatants, but also for popular support for the mission, given the presence of the media. Finally, stability operations require soldiers to perform different duties, learn new skills, and perform tasks different than those trained on at home station under a wide variety of conditions.³⁰

Capabilities Required for Stability Operations

From the preceding section, one can determine that a robust headquarters element is necessary for a unit to effectively conduct stability operations. The wide dispersal of units, increased span of control, and higher level of joint, interagency, and multinational involvement have stretched the ability of conventional division and brigade sized headquarters to coordinate these operations. The relatively small force deployed must be mobile to operate in a larger area, have increased communications ability, be able to secure itself, and have sufficient firepower and protection to defeat low level threats. Units conducting stability operations may also require the capability to conduct offensive and defensive operations to defeat aggression, respond decisively

²⁹Howard Olsen and John Davis, “Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia,” Special Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, October 29, 1999), 3.

³⁰Thomas McNaugher, “The Army and Operations Other Than War,” 157-8.

to attacks, and serve as a credible deterrent, although this varies with environment and the mission.

Stability operations also require more combat support and combat service support units and capabilities than are resident in the current divisional structure, which has been optimized for supporting major combat operations. In stability operations, these units must support not only the friendly forces, but also help provide basic services to the indigenous population given the lack of functioning local institutions and infrastructure. Finally, soldiers and leaders must have the proper mindset to deal with civilians, local authorities, news media, and non-governmental organizations, and be able to peacefully resolve a wide variety of situations.

Most of the capabilities discussed are present in both the active Army and the Reserve Component. However, the Army has had to rely more heavily on Reservists because the increased frequency and duration of stability operations have overwhelmed the limited number of active duty CSS and civil affairs units. Since the active divisions and corps are structured to conduct or support major combat operations, the Army must reorganize existing organizations to conduct stability operations, severely disrupting units, personnel, and command and control elements. Because the Army must retain significant war fighting ability to serve as a deterrent and defeat potential adversaries, it would not be prudent to restructure the entire Army to conduct stability operations. However, given that stability operations are a mission the Army has historically performed, and will continue to perform, it makes sense for the Army to explore better methods of conducting these missions in the future.

Arguments Against the Creation of a Stability Force

The case against a dedicated force for stability operations has many facets. Some opponents of creating a stability force base their argument on Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which

mandates the Army “be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war.”³¹ Proponents of this argument reason that stability operations fall outside the realm of sustained combat operations on land; therefore, the Army should not dedicate forces exclusively for conducting stability operations. However, Title 10 leaves the method of how the Army is organized, trained, and equipped to meet national security requirements to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.³²

Another aspect of the argument against a stability force relies on the assumption that the end strength of the Army will remain constant, and that units created for stability operations will be taken out of the current force, reducing the Army’s ability to fight and win wars. While this is certainly possible, a recent Congressional report has called for the military in general, and the Army in particular, to increase its capability to conduct small-scale contingency operations. In its Phase III report published in February 2001, the U.S. Commission on National Security (also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission) recommended that the military improve its ability to deal with small and medium sized conflicts, “as well as long-term stability operations in tense, post-conflict scenarios” by organizing and training for these missions.³³ The Commission based this recommendation on the prospective security environment it anticipated for the next ten to twenty years, which included an increased demand for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.³⁴ Specifically, the Commission proposed that “constabulary capability should be vested primarily in the Army and Marine Corps elements trained and equipped with weapons and mobility resources that will enhance the conduct of such missions, *which should be additive to*

³¹U.S. Congress, Title 10 United States Code (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). 10 USC § 3062.

³²Ibid., 10 USC § 3013 (b).

³³U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, “Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 15, 2001), 76.

³⁴Ibid.

other force structure requirements [italics added].”³⁵ Furthermore, a stability force will help regional combatant commanders shape their environment, possibly precluding future conflicts. The ability to use this dedicated force for stability operations, without degrading the combat readiness of other Army units, would allow the United States to maintain a credible deterrent force.

Some critics of creating a stability force have instead suggested the Army develop multifunctional units capable of conducting all operations in any environment, as opposed to creating specialized units that would be unavailable for major combat operations. In fact, this is the approach now used by the Army, and espoused in current Army training and operations doctrine, which posits that units prepared for major combat operations are effectively prepared to conduct stability operations. Implicit in this argument is that war fighting is inherently more difficult than operations other than war, and that the tasks conducted in combat are similar to tasks conducted in operations other than war. At the tactical level, combat support and combat service support units perform many of the same tasks during both stability operations and major combat operations. Likewise, some wartime tasks for certain combat arms units are similar, or can be readily adapted to stability operations, although the conditions may be quite different.

According to General Montgomery Meigs, “about 70 percent of the collective tasks [performed by combat soldiers in MOOTW] are the same things you do in combat.”³⁶ This figure corresponds closely to a survey of active duty Army officers attending the Army War College, in which 64 percent of those surveyed “reported that ‘most’ or ‘all’ of the tasks required by peace operations were in their unit’s METL.”³⁷ The other 36 percent said “‘few’ or ‘none’ of their

³⁵Ibid., 77.

³⁶Thomas McNaugher, “The Army and Operations Other Than War,” 160.

³⁷Congressional Budget Office, “Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations” (Washington, D.C.: CBO, December 1999), 24-5.

METL tasks supported peace operations.”³⁸ Additionally, 37 percent of those surveyed believed at least one critical task for peace operations was outside the scope of their METL. Some of these critical tasks included “crowd control, route clearance operations, negotiating skills, riot control, use of graduated force, civil affairs, law enforcement, coordination with nongovernmental organizations, humanitarian assistance, and movement of small convoys.”³⁹

The tasks required for the headquarters elements, however, may be extremely different from those they routinely train on in peacetime and conduct in wartime. A 1999 study by the Congressional Budget Office concluded that, “at the staff level, tasks performed in peace operations have relatively little overlap with conventional warfighting tasks” because the analysis and coordination requirements differ significantly from wartime.⁴⁰ Similarly, the 10th Mountain Division’s after-action review from Operation Uphold Democracy stated that while most of its units were at a high state of training four months after returning from Haiti, the division still needed some work on “synchronizing all the [battlefield] operating systems in a wartime environment.”⁴¹

Regardless of the similarities, a unit’s or staff’s ability to attain the required level of proficiency in both wartime tasks and tasks performed in operations other than war is directly related to the amount of available training time and resources. While commanders should strive to make training as realistic as possible by including elements of the contemporary operating environment into METL-based training events, training tends to be a zero sum game. Time and resources expended training on one set of tasks is not available for other training on others. The challenge facing the Army is how to remain prepared for war, as well as successfully conduct stability operations when directed by the President.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., 56.

⁴¹10th Mountain Division, *Operation Uphold Democracy, Written After-Action Report*, 16.

ARMY DOCTRINE

To create an Army ready to fight and win the nation's next war, training doctrine must support the Army's operational, or war fighting doctrine. An example of when this link was broken occurred in 1973. General William E. DePuy, the first Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), believed that America's next war "would likely be unexpected, sudden, localized, and 'turned off' by the politicians as quickly as possible."⁴² Operating under the assumption that the "U.S. Army must prepare to fight outnumbered and win and to win the first battle," DePuy directed the revision of the Army's capstone war fighting manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*.⁴³

Unfortunately, the Army's training program was still based on the approach used in World War II, which assumed the size of the Army would be dramatically increased after the outbreak of hostilities, requiring a massive amount of new troops to be quickly trained and integrated into the Army. DePuy realized that the lethality of modern warfare, as illustrated by the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, meant that America's next war might be over before the Army could mobilize, train, and deploy a large number of soldiers and new units from the United States. Therefore, the new Volunteer Army would have to be ready to fight and win by itself. In order to achieve this goal, "the training establishment would have to produce soldiers and officers who were thoroughly proficient in the skills required of them immediately after graduation."⁴⁴ This was a radical departure from past policies, which focused professional education on preparing officer for jobs one or two levels higher than their current rank, since they would be rapidly promoted when the Army increased in size following mobilization for war.⁴⁵

⁴²Paul H. Herbert, "Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations," *Leavenworth Papers*, Number 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army CGSC, 1988), 26.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 7.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 27.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

DePuy revised the institutional training and schools while Brigadier General (later General) Paul F. Gorman rewrote training doctrine, beginning with training circulars, that later evolved into field manuals. Gorman also created the Army Mission Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) manuals, which included the tasks, conditions, and standards for the tactical tasks Army units are required to execute in combat.⁴⁶ The Army now had a comprehensive training system that synchronized education, institutional training, and unit training to support its new war fighting doctrine.

Given the necessity for training doctrine to support war fighting doctrine, how closely are these two linked today? Current war fighting doctrine, FM 3-0, *Operations*, “establishes the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations” and describes how the Army conducts operations across the spectrum of conflict now and in the near future.⁴⁷ FM 3-0 defines full-spectrum operations as “the range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war.”⁴⁸ These operations include offense, defense, stability operations, and support operations. “Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war and some SSCs” [small-scale contingencies], while “Stability operations and support operations predominate in MOOTW that include certain SSCs and PME [peacetime military engagements].”⁴⁹

⁴⁶Ibid., 38.

⁴⁷Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), vii.

⁴⁸Ibid., 1-4.

⁴⁹Ibid., 1-15.




Figure 4. The Range of Army Operations⁵⁰

Stability operations include peace operations (composed of peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations, and operations in support of diplomatic efforts), foreign internal defense (FID), security assistance, humanitarian and civil assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counter-drug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, and show of force.⁵¹ Currently, specially designated and trained units are responsible for conducting or supporting some of these stability operations. In fact, four of the nine Special Operations Forces core tasks (foreign internal defense, counter-terrorism, unconventional warfare, and civil affairs operations) are stability operations.⁵² However, this still

⁵⁰Figure from FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1-15.

⁵¹Ibid., 9-6.

⁵²United States Special Operations Command, "Posture Statement, 2003-2004: Transforming the Force at the Forefront of the War on Terrorism," 36-7; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic>; Internet.

leaves conventional forces with the requirement to conduct significant stability operations, such as peace operations.

FM 3-0 articulates the Army's doctrine for full spectrum operations and "holds warfighting as the Army's primary focus."⁵³ The objective of this war fighting focus is to produce a full spectrum force, capable of not only winning wars, but also conducting operations other than war.⁵⁴ The theory that enables these seemingly mutually opposing goals is that "warfighting skills developed and honed in training form the basis for mission success" in operations other than war. A combat-ready unit "can adapt readily to noncombat situations" since "the knowledge, discipline, cohesion, and technical skills necessary to defeat an enemy are also needed in environments that seem far removed from the battlefield."⁵⁵

FM 3-0 recognizes that "effective training is the cornerstone of operational success."⁵⁶ To prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to fight and win the nation's wars, the Army relies on FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, which establishes Army training doctrine, and FM 7-1 *Battle Focused Training*, which assists unit leaders in the development and execution of training programs.⁵⁷ FM 7-0 divides training into three domains: institutional, operational, and self-development.⁵⁸ The theory that tough, realistic training correlates to success on the battlefield serves as the basis for current operational training doctrine.⁵⁹ From this theory, the Army derived the ten principles of training – a formula to help commanders develop and execute effective training. Although FM 7-0 emphasizes that the Army's primary function is war fighting, it acknowledges the requirement to train for MOOTW, since future conflicts will likely include combination of both

⁵³Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, vii.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 1-3.

⁵⁵Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 2-21.

⁵⁶FM 3-0, p. 1-17.

⁵⁷Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-1 *Battle Focused Training* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 1-1.

⁵⁸Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0 *Training the Force* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 1-5.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 1-1.

combat and MOOTW.⁶⁰ FM 7-0 realizes that the strategic environment presents challenges to commanders trying to train their units. However, it charges commanders with preparing their units for full spectrum operations, which may include joint, interagency, multinational, and interagency partners, and take place in different environments and over a wide variety of terrain.⁶¹ Given that there is never enough time and resources to train for everything, how can commanders prepare their unit to effectively conduct full spectrum operations?

First, FM 7-0 accepts a degree of operational risk by dictating that Army forces train for war and prepare for operations other than war “as time and circumstances permit.”⁶² Secondly, the Army relies on the METL process to help commanders focus constrained training resources in order to achieve proficiency in tasks their units are required to conduct in combat, thereby linking the wartime mission with training.⁶³ By espousing the concept of a METL, Army training doctrine acknowledges the impossibility of training units to reach the desired level of proficiency in the myriad of tasks required to competently conduct offensive, defensive, stability operations, and support operations. Likewise, the Army’s operational doctrine directs commanders to “focus their METL, training time, and resources on combat tasks unless directed otherwise.”⁶⁴ However, this approach means that the Army is accepting risk by not preparing for unanticipated stability operations.

In order to respond promptly to crisis, Army forces must be versatile, trained to react quickly to any situation or circumstance. Since “crises rarely allow sufficient time to correct training deficiencies between alert and deployment,” commanders must “ensure that their units are prepared to accomplish their METL tasks before alert and to concentrate on mission-specific

⁶⁰Ibid., 1-3.

⁶¹Ibid., 1-2.

⁶²Ibid., 1-3.

⁶³Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, 1-17.

⁶⁴Ibid.

training in the time available afterwards.”⁶⁵ In the 1990s, the Army normally conducted contingency operations in the “sequence of alert, train, deployment, extended build-up, and shaping operations followed by a period of decisive operations.”⁶⁶ Today, however, the Army must follow a train, alert, and deploy sequence to be truly responsive because time might not be available after alert or deployment to correct training shortfalls.⁶⁷ Therefore, commanders must place an increased emphasis on training to ensure their forces are ready now. This concept serves as the “key link between operational and training doctrine.”⁶⁸

In the event of an unanticipated stability operation, Army forces train and rehearse mission-specific tasks, based on the amount of time available after alert.⁶⁹ However, how realistic is it for units to train between alert and deployment? A study conducted by the Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) found that units with little advance warning for a mission spent the majority of the available time after alert conducting routine deployment procedures and had little, if any time for training for the mission at hand.⁷⁰ This was especially true for peace enforcement missions. Ironically, units conducting less dangerous peacekeeping missions usually received sufficient time – from three to six months after alert – to prepare and train.⁷¹

A quick review of stability operations since 1991 illustrates this point. On April 17 1991, 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team (ABCT) was alerted for possible deployment to Northern Iraq. The battalion deployed for Operation Provide Comfort only eight days later. Fortunately, the 3-325 was a rapid deployment force and was able to use some of the available time to train on

⁶⁵Ibid., 3-2.

⁶⁶Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training the Force*, 1-3.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, 3-11. Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training the Force*, 2-29.

⁷⁰Center For Army Lessons Learned, “The Effect of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness” Special Study (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 1996), 2.

⁷¹Ibid.

security related tasks.⁷² Similarly, 10th Mountain Division was “given the JTF mission and accepted the handoff for that responsibility in Somalia *less than 2 weeks after receipt of the warning order* [italics in original].”⁷³ The 10th Mountain Division received more advance notice for possible operations in Haiti; however, the rapidly changing situation in Haiti combined with compartmentalized planning efforts made it difficult for the unit to focus preparations.⁷⁴ The division formally received the mission on July 29, 1994, and formed Joint Task Force 190 to begin planning for the operation.⁷⁵ The division had 45 days between receipt of the order and deployment on September 12. Forces sent to Rwanda in 1994 to conduct humanitarian relief operations “received less than 2 weeks official notification.”⁷⁶ Units deploying to Bosnia and to the Sinai for ongoing stability operations generally receive at least six to eight months notice before deployment, providing ample time to train and prepare for the mission.

These examples highlight one of the potential shortfalls of the new doctrine of train, alert, and deploy. Historically, crises and short-notice contingency operations provide little, if any, time after alert for units to train, or refocus training on mission specific tasks. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* acknowledges, “*the first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting skills* [italics in original].”⁷⁷ However, it also suggests that four to six weeks of specialized training may be required to prepare units for peace operations, although this may vary depending on the type of mission and the unit.⁷⁸ Furthermore,

⁷²John M. Metz, “Training the Way We Fight: Are Tactical Units Prepared for Post Conflict Operations?” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 1995), 12.

⁷³Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, n.d), 62.

⁷⁴Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 190-1.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 100.

⁷⁶Government Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, October 18, 1995), 26.

⁷⁷Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 86.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 87.

“to be effective, the unit has to tailor its entire training methodology toward the tasks required.”⁷⁹

On the other hand, units conducting peacekeeping missions received *four to six months* of specialized training before their deployments. While units should conduct mission specific training and rehearsals for upcoming missions, a full spectrum force should not require so much additional training.

Thus, a disconnection exists between our war fighting doctrine, our training doctrine, and what units have been required to execute. FM 3-0 requires units to be capable of conducting full spectrum operations, with little or no notice, and focus pre-deployment training on combat related tasks. Our training doctrine states each unit must be prepared to conduct tasks without additional training time. This creates a dilemma for commanders, who must train and prepare their units to execute full spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict by conducting battle-focused, METL-based training in all kinds of terrain and environmental conditions. Furthermore, “personnel turbulence, key-leader turnover, high operating tempo (OPTEMPO), and new equipment and systems fielding” add to the list of training challenges.⁸⁰ Finally, time available for training remains constrained.

This method of accepting risk by not training for stability operations, combined with the Army reorganizing units for specific operations other than war, violates several of the Army’s principles of training as outlined in FMs 7-0 and 7-1. This monograph will evaluate two historical case studies using four of these principles of training to determine the effectiveness of this approach. The first evaluation criteria is train as a combined arms and joint team. FM 7-1 states, “The Army provides the JFC [Joint Force Commander] with a trained and ready force able to execute full spectrum operations. This force provides the JFC with the capability to – seize areas previously denied by the enemy, dominate land operations, and provide support to civil

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*, 1-2.

authorities.”⁸¹ Additionally, when committed, “each unit must be prepared to execute operations without additional training or lengthy adjustment periods.” Finally, “peacetime training relationships must mirror wartime task organization to the greatest extent possible.”⁸² This monograph defines a lengthy adjustment period as any period of time the unit spends conducting additional training after alert that delays deployment or interferes with mission accomplishment. This study considers a satisfactory peacetime training relationship to be one that allows units to train together on a regular basis (i.e. and battalion task force or brigade combat team with habitual slice elements).

Training for combat proficiency requires commanders to use performance oriented training conducted under realistic conditions. “Performance-oriented training is hands-on and conducts the task under the conditions and to the standard specified.”⁸³ For best results, soldiers, leaders, and units should repeatedly practice the tasks and missions to standard.⁸⁴ Conditions should be as realistic as possible so units develop confidence and competence in their ability to accomplish the mission in any environment. Doctrinally, unit commanders determine their unit’s level of training proficiency by assigning a status of Trained, Practice, or Untrained (T-P-U) to each METL task.

Training to sustain proficiency is “the key to maintaining unit proficiency,” while “infrequent ‘peaking’ of training for an event does not sustain wartime proficiency.”⁸⁵ “Ramping-up” for combat training center rotations or deployments violates this principle. Ideally, units strive to stay in the band of excellence by periodically retraining on tasks to maintain the desired level of proficiency. Sustainment training can be extremely difficult during stability operations for units whose wartime tasks do not closely correspond to tasks they perform

⁸¹Ibid., 2-3.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid., 2-6.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., 2-9.

during operations other than war. This is especially true for field artillery units, air defense units, armor units, and mechanized infantry units that may not utilize their equipment during stability operations. For many combat support and combat service support units, several of their wartime METL tasks “are the same as those required for a stability operation or support operation that they might execute,” although the conditions may be different.⁸⁶

The final criterion used to evaluate the Army’s model of preparing units to conduct stability operations is “train to develop leaders.” Commanders must “teach their subordinates how to fight” since “nothing is more important to the Army than building confident, competent, adaptive leaders for tomorrow.”⁸⁷ Stability operations provide numerous opportunities to develop junior leaders, since units often operate in a decentralized manner. These benefits are temporary, however, because many experienced leaders depart the unit immediately following deployments. Finally, our current doctrine of training on wartime METL tasks means that these leaders are more closely supervised in training than they are when conducting stability operations.

The first case study, Operation Uphold Democracy, is representative of a short-notice contingency operation and evaluates the effectiveness of combat-related training to prepare units for stability operations in an uncertain or permissive environment. The second case study, a SFOR rotation in Bosnia, examines the disruptive effects a long-term stability operation has on personnel and training for a conventional unit with months of advance notice. These case studies, as well as ongoing stability operations in Iraq, highlight the need to correct shortfalls in the current approach used to prepare for units for stability operations.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid., 2-10.

HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

*The range of possible scenarios complicates training. Army forces cannot train for every possible mission; they usually train for war and prepare for specific missions as time and circumstances permit. The volatile nature of crises requires Army forces to simultaneously train, deploy, and execute. Commanders conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess) operations with initial-entry forces, while assembling and preparing follow-on forces.*⁸⁸

Operation Uphold Democracy

After a September 30, 1991 coup in Haiti unseated the duly elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, U.S. military planners began reviewing plans to conduct a non-combatant evacuation of American citizens from Haiti. The United Nations and Organization of American States mediated an accord at Governor's Island, in which the head of the military junta, General Raoul Cedras, in return for amnesty, agreed to retire and allow the return of President Aristide.⁸⁹ However, the situation began to deteriorate after a Haitian mob prevented the *U.S.S. Harlan County*, filled with U.S. personnel sent to train the Haitian armed forces, from docking at Port au Prince on October 11, 1993.⁹⁰ American involvement in Haiti escalated as the U.S. Navy began a blockade of Haiti in response to Cedras' refusal to honor an October 15 deadline to step down.⁹¹

On January 8, 1994, the XVIII Airborne Corps staff began the development of Operation Plan (OPLAN) 2370, which included a forcible entry operation into Haiti. After the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed an alternative plan be developed, based on a peaceful entry, the staff began development of Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 2380, which was formally assigned to the 10th Mountain Division, as Joint Task Force 190, for further refinement on July 29, 1994.⁹² Planning and preparations for both operations continued throughout the summer. However, a last minute

⁸⁸Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, 3-0, 3-1.

⁸⁹Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions, D-20 to D+40" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 1994), xiv.

⁹⁰Kretchik, *Invasion, Intervention*, "Intervention", 36-8.

⁹¹Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions, D-20 to D+40," xv.

⁹²John R. Brinkerhoff, "Readiness Implications of Selected Aspects of Operation Uphold Democracy" (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2000), 4-5. Kretchik, *Invasion, Intervention*, "Intervention", 57-8.

diplomatic effort, headed by former President Jimmy Carter, averted the invasion by convincing Cedras to step aside peaceably, paving the way for a permissive entry of U.S. forces on September 19, 1994.

The 10th Mountain Division had just completed its redeployment from Somalia in June 1994.⁹³ Because the initial operational plans for Haiti envisioned a forcible entry into an uncertain environment, the training plan developed by the 10th Mountain Division focused on combat related tasks.⁹⁴ In the 51 days between alert and deployment, the division had to form a Joint Task Force (JTF) staff, plan and issue orders, and prepare units for deployment. Forming the JTF staff required the expanding the division staff from 300 to a peak of 880 personnel, with the intelligence section more than doubling in size from 71 to 162 personnel.⁹⁵ Once the division had analyzed its mission, built a mission training plan, and accomplished the myriad of other tasks required to deploy,” only a 15-day period remained available for training.⁹⁶

To prepare the soldiers for the most difficult scenario that might be encountered in Haiti, “such as a night fire fight in downtown Port-au-Prince,” the rifle companies conducted day and night combined arms live fire exercises.⁹⁷ Some units were able to train to a limited extent on tasks that one would expect to encounter during peace operations, “such as dealing with the local populace, crowd control, use of cayenne pepper spray and riot control gear, and specifics concerning the cultural environment.” However, at least one brigade official felt this training did not receive enough emphasis during the train-up period.⁹⁸ The uncertain environment, combined

⁹³Brinkerhoff, “Readiness Implications,” 5.

⁹⁴GAO, NSAID, “*Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*,” 23.

⁹⁵10th Mountain Division, *Operation Uphold Democracy, Written After-Action Report*, 23. Brinkerhoff, “Readiness Implications,” 5-6.

⁹⁶GAO, NSAID, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, 23.

⁹⁷Ibid., 23-4.

⁹⁸Ibid., 24.

with the lack of available time to train and prepare for deployment, influenced the decision to focus training on standard combat skills.⁹⁹

The soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division performed admirably during Operation Uphold Democracy despite the limited amount of time for mission-specific training. However, some observers felt a command emphasis on force protection and directive not to fraternize with the local civilians created a base camp mentality in the 10th Mountain Division.¹⁰⁰ Confusion over who was responsible for security in the country, combined with an ambiguous interpretation of the ROE, led to several tragic incidents of Haitian on Haitian violence. During one of these incidents, “witnessed by television crews and an international audience,” soldiers observed members of the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd’H) beat a Haitian civilian to death.¹⁰¹ The ROE was subsequently re-interpreted in order to clarify what actions soldiers should take in future situations. Dissuading soldiers from interacting with the Haitian people hampered not only efforts to win “the trust and confidence of the populace” but also prevented gathering intelligence and information on the public mood.¹⁰²

The Joint Task Force experienced problems cooperating with government agencies and non-government organizations, during both deployment and execution.¹⁰³ The limited number of civil affairs planners led to failures in operational level planning, as well as coordination problems in Haiti. The lack of sufficient civil affairs personnel was partly a result of DOD fears of getting involved in another nation building mission after the recent experience in Somalia.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Kretchik, *Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”*, 105-6.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 97-8.

¹⁰²Ibid., 109-110.

¹⁰³Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, “Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti – A Case Study,” Report from the Advanced Concepts and Technology Workshop on Haiti (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996), 36, 39.

¹⁰⁴Hayes, “Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions,” 40.

However, military and civilian leaders at the tactical level displayed initiative and worked out ad hoc relationships to conduct effective humanitarian relief operations in cooperation with the over 400 NGOs and relief agencies working in Haiti.¹⁰⁵ Despite coordination efforts, there was also a lack of unity of command between the military and the civilian operations. Ambassador William Swing was in charge of the civilian operations, while the Joint Task Force Commander headed up the military operations; however, they never established a combined headquarters, partly because the State Department and Agency for International Development lacked the staff for such an operation.¹⁰⁶ JTF 190 established an ad hoc liaison team, consisting of one lieutenant colonel and three sergeants on September 20, 1994 to provide a communications link between the JTF Headquarters and the U.S. Embassy.¹⁰⁷

One of the challenges frustrating 10th Mountain Division's efforts to provide security in Haiti was the lack of a professional police force and judicial system. By December 1994, the International Criminal Investigative and Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) vetted and trained a 3,000 man interim police force, composed of former FAd'H members, although a fully trained police force was not ready until March 1996.¹⁰⁸ The judicial system, however, was "not close to being fixed" when the 10th Mountain Division departed in January 1995.¹⁰⁹ By comparison, the Special Forces soldiers, operating with a large degree of autonomy, appointed mayors, judges, and policemen to help maintain security in the countryside.¹¹⁰ These actions helped Special Forces soldiers build legitimacy for the new Aristide government in the rural areas

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 41. 10th Mountain Division, *Operation Uphold Democracy, Written After-Action Report*, 81, 83.

¹⁰⁶Hayes, "Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions," 43.

¹⁰⁷10th Mountain Division, *Operation Uphold Democracy, Written After-Action Report*, 86.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 10.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Hayes, "Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions" 48.

of Haiti, while the military police performed a similar role in the cities, providing a crucial link between the people, local police, and military forces.¹¹¹

In addition to establishing and maintaining a stable and secure environment, the 10th Mountain Division provided numerous critical services for the Haitian people. Besides reopening the Port-au-Prince airport and ocean port, allowing the resumption of humanitarian relief supplies, the division restarted sixteen power plants throughout the country. The Multi-national Force (MNF) moved over 100,000 tons of humanitarian relief supplies for NGOs, PVOs, and IOs operating in the area. The MNF also improved sanitation, the water supply, the road network, and provided vaccinations. Finally, the MNF was instrumental in reestablishing services to many areas of Haiti after Tropical Storm Gordon.¹¹²

The division redeployed to Fort Drum at the end January 1995, after spending four months in Haiti. The division “had reached the highest state of readiness” by March 15.¹¹³ However, in April 1995, “both brigade commanders assessed the movement to contact, attack, and defend tasks as requiring additional training.”¹¹⁴ This comparatively quick recovery was due in part to the relatively short deployment, and the units’ ability to maintain proficiency in wartime METL tasks by conducting live-fire training on a Multi-Purpose Range Complex it constructed in Haiti.¹¹⁵ Air defense artillery and field artillery units required the most training upon return to home station, since they did not use their war fighting skills extensively in Haiti, and the soldiers

¹¹¹Michael Bailey, Robert Maguire, and J. O’Neill G. Pouliot, “Haiti: Military-Police Partnership for Public Security,” in Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, eds., *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), 228, 250.

¹¹²10th Mountain Division, *Operation Uphold Democracy, Written After-Action Report*, 85.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, 15.

¹¹⁴GAO, NSAID, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, 35.

¹¹⁵10th Mountain Division, *Operation Uphold Democracy, Written After-Action Report*, 59.

performed non-traditional missions, such as driving trucks and filling critical vacancies in other units.¹¹⁶ On the whole, the division's "overall readiness improved from operations in Haiti."¹¹⁷

B Company, 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment deployed to Haiti as part of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division. All together, 50 vehicles and 270 personnel deployed to support the 14 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 140 soldiers from B Company.¹¹⁸ After spending seven months in Haiti, the company required three months to regain its previous level of combat readiness, while its parent battalion required a total of four and a half months.¹¹⁹

Finally, the U.S. experience in Haiti suggests that when intervening in failed states, "the forces arriving first on the scene, whether in hostile or permissive entry, are likely to have to play significant roles in providing for basic government services."¹²⁰ Haitian infrastructure and institutions, never robust to begin with, had atrophied due to a combination of the embargo, economic decline, and general lawlessness and corruption. "All that was holding the country together was fear of the FAd'H which, once deposed, was impotent and ignored by the Haitian people."¹²¹ A 1996 National Defense University report concluded that, given the lack of capacity and timeliness of civilian agency support, "the military **will** be called on to assume responsibilities for domestic security and nation-assistance for a limited period of time in most complex emergency operations."¹²² The same report also noted that after the first week in Haiti, the military was not needed as much as police, and if more military police had been available, security could have been established much sooner.¹²³

¹¹⁶Ibid., 5, 15. GAO, NSAID, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, 35.

¹¹⁷10th Mountain Division, *Operation Uphold Democracy, Written After-Action Report*, 5.

¹¹⁸Brinkerhoff, "Readiness Implications," 16.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 7.

¹²⁰Hayes, "Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions," 56.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Ibid., 56-7.

¹²³Ibid., 57.

Evaluation

The 10th Mountain Division's battle-focused training program appears have produced a trained and ready force able to execute full spectrum operations, thereby validating the Army's doctrinal approach used to prepare units for stability operations. The division was able to execute operations with only two weeks of training before deployment. However, closer scrutiny reveals some shortcomings. While the companies and battalions in the 10th Mountain Division were able to train as a combined arms team using peacetime training relationships before deploying, the division received many attachments in Haiti, including engineer units that had not been included in the planning process, and a composite military police company that was hastily assembled from numerous other units.¹²⁴ Additionally, the division staff required significant augmentation to form and operate not only as JTF staff, but also as the Multinational Force headquarters. Similarly, the division's artillery brigade headquarters served in a non-standard role, both as a maneuver and as an ARFOR headquarters, while many of its soldiers filled vacancies in other units or drove trucks.

The brigades trained for combat proficiency during a 15-day METL focused training plan, which prepared soldiers and units for tasks they might have had to execute; however, the security environment in Haiti was different than anticipated. Additional emphasis should have been place on cultural and language training, as well as crowd control and rules of engagement. While the 10th Mountain Division's after action review cited the division's high level of combat readiness as a main reason for their ability to execute the operation successfully, the limited time available between alert and deployment did not allow sufficient time to train to standard on the tasks the units had to execute under conditions similar to those in Haiti.

¹²⁴Kretchik, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion"*, 101.

The tasks conducted by the 10th Mountain Division during Operation Uphold Democracy did not allow all of its units to sustain proficiency in their wartime METL tasks during deployment. This was especially true for air defense and field artillery units, which did not execute METL tasks during deployments and their combat skills suffered accordingly. These units required the most training time to regain proficiency after returning to home station.¹²⁵ Likewise, the infantry brigades, despite having the opportunity to conduct live fire training while deployed, still required practice in three key METL tasks months after returning to Fort Drum.¹²⁶

While participation in Operation Uphold Democracy increased the confidence and competence of leaders in the division, the emphasis on force protection diminished the ability of small-unit leaders to interact with the population and develop contact skills essential to effective stability operations. The division's training plan did prepare leaders for combat-related tasks, although additional training on the rules of engagement and culture would have been more beneficial, given the environment. The fact that 40 percent of the enlisted personnel, and a large number of officers had recently conducted operations other than war in Somalia undoubtedly influenced the 10th Mountain Division's approach to the mission in Haiti.¹²⁷

Stabilization Forces in Bosnia

Since World War II, American experiences in nation building suggest a high level of effort in terms of capital, manpower, and time are required to create an enduring stable environment.¹²⁸ The Army's experience with a long-duration stability operation such as Bosnia may serve to highlight some challenges currently facing the Army in Iraq. In the late 1990s, an active Army of 485,000 soldiers and a total force of 1.2 million soldiers had difficulty supporting

¹²⁵ 10th Mountain Division, *Operation Uphold Democracy, Written After-Action Report*, 5.

¹²⁶ GAO, NSAID, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, 35.

¹²⁷ Kretchik, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion"*, 107.

¹²⁸ Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation-Building*, 165.

a mission requiring only five to ten thousand soldiers.¹²⁹ A unit rotation policy, supported by the Army's individual replacement system, combined with the lack of low density/high-demand units in the active Army were the primary causes of this problem.¹³⁰

Following the old alert, train, and deploy model, 1st Cavalry Division was notified of its Bosnia rotation in January 1998. After conducting pre-deployment training, to include mission rehearsal exercises, the division deployed two brigades to Bosnia for six-month rotations from September 1998 until September 1999.¹³¹ The effect of these deployments on the division's personnel readiness approached catastrophic. Under the peacetime policies that governed deployability criteria, 40 percent of the soldiers from two of the deploying armor battalions were considered nondeployable. Two factors contributed to increasing the traditional wartime nondeployable rate of 3.5 or 4 percent to 40 percent. The first was the policy that stabilized soldiers returning from an unaccompanied tour (i.e. Korea, or another deployment) for an amount of time equal to the length of their tour or deployment.¹³² Secondly, soldiers within 135 days of their expiration term of service (ETS) or a permanent change of station (PCS) were exempt from deployment. This allowed soldiers to deploy to theater for three months, and then have 45 days to return to home station and prepare to change duty stations or leave the Army.¹³³ Utilizing only soldiers available for the entire six-month mission increased the nondeployable rate to fully 50 percent of the unit. Conversely, requiring soldiers to deploy to theater for only two months reduced the rate by only 4 percent.¹³⁴

¹²⁹J. Michael Polich, Bruce R. Orvis, and W. Michael Hix, *Small Deployments, Big Problems* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2000), 1.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*

¹³¹Hershell L. Holliday, "Training Management and Peacekeeping Operations: Challenges to the Band of Excellence" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 2000), 31.

¹³²Bruce R. Orvis, *Deployability in Peacetime*, Documented Briefing (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, n.d.), vi.

¹³³*Ibid.*, v.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, 13, 18.

The remaining armor units in 1st Cavalry Division provided 211 deployable soldiers in return for 211 nondeployable soldiers. This created a nondeployable rate of 64 percent in the stay behind units, which, in turn caused even larger problems for successive deployments for 1st Cavalry Division units, not to mention the impact on unit collective training and tank crew training and stabilization.¹³⁵ In fact, “the most pressing requirement” before deployment was conducting tank gunnery to certify crews.¹³⁶ One should note that these 211 soldiers were not from low density/high demand units, but rather for soldiers with a military occupation specialty (MOS) of 19K, armor crewman.

Today, this problem has been addressed through the implementation of the “stop-loss” policy, which prevents soldiers assigned to deploying units from PCSing or ETSing while their units are deployed until ninety days after return to home station. This policy is similar to actions taken by the Personnel Command to support various Bosnia deployments. In an attempt to increase the number of deployable soldiers, PERSCOM reduced or deleted existing PCS orders in the deploying unit, reduced the number of personnel from unaccompanied tours moving to the installation, and reduced the post-deployment/unaccompanied tour stabilization period.¹³⁷ The net result of these activities decreased the nondeployable rate by only 10 to 15 percent.¹³⁸ Certainly, a better solution is to implement a system of unit manning, in which a units are formed, train together, and are available for employment or deployment for a prescribed length of time. The drawback to this approach is that it would cause cyclical periods of degraded readiness when a unit would be unavailable for deployment after it stands down to transition personnel.

¹³⁵ Polich, *Small Deployments, Big Problems*, 3.

¹³⁶ Center for Army Lessons Learned, “1st Cavalry Division’s Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures on Return to Readiness,” *Newsletter No. 01-17* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, July, 2001), v.

¹³⁷ Orvis, *Deployability in Peacetime*, 16.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

However, it is certainly no worse than the old technique, which created unacceptable high levels of personnel turbulence not only in the deploying unit, but also in those remaining behind.

1st Cavalry Division, despite having more robust combat support and combat service support units than light divisions, still required augmentation from 2,000 soldiers in corps and theater units to support operations in Bosnia, specifically, medical, engineer, military police, signal, and aviation units.¹³⁹ In addition to serving as the ARFOR headquarters for these units, as well as its one brigade from Fort Hood, the 1st Cavalry Division also controlled brigades from Russia, Turkey, Norway, Denmark, and Poland.¹⁴⁰ This was similar to operations in Somalia and other Bosnia rotations where parts of the division staff deployed to serve as the headquarters element, even though the entire division was not required for the mission. Deploying a portion of the division staff reduces the command and control capability of the division for the units left at home station. With the large numbers of ongoing stability operations, headquarters have become a low density/high demand element.

Evaluation

Although units in the 1st Cavalry Division did train as a combined arms team before going to Bosnia, the extensive reorganization and lengthy train-up period did not produce a trained and ready force able to execute full spectrum operations. The division's war fighting ability declined during the train-up and deployment because it had restructured, reorganized, and re-equipped for stability operations in Bosnia. While peacetime training relationships did mirror wartime task organization to the greatest extent possible, extensive personnel moves were required to fill deploying units to the required strength levels, and the division required significant augmentation from external units.

¹³⁹McNaugher, "The Army and Operations Other Than War," 159.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

Ironically, the 1st Cavalry Division's train-up period for Bosnia was longer and more intensive than the 10th Mountain Division's preparations for a more complex mission in Haiti. Units deploying from the 1st Cavalry Division conducted extensive training at home-station, as well as conducting a full-scale mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana.¹⁴¹ During the MRE, soldiers trained in a replicated area of operations, which included the use of Bosnian and Serb role players who lived in towns modeled after those in Bosnia. All deploying units conducted performance-oriented training under realistic conditions. Platoons negotiated situational training lanes before the exercise, while the companies' conducted tasks they would be required to execute in Bosnia during the MRE.

Despite developing a plan to sustain proficiency in combat-related tasks during deployment, the demands of peacekeeping, limited training opportunities, lack of organic vehicles and equipment, and the limited similarity between tasks conducted in Bosnia with wartime METL made it difficult for the 1st Cavalry Division to maintain proficiency in its METL tasks.¹⁴² A CALL team visiting the 1st Cavalry Division in November 1999 determined that "for the most part, combat support and combat service support units had practiced most of the items on their mission essential task list while deployed to Bosnia."¹⁴³ However, the ability of combat arms units to execute their METL tasks "diminished since they were not trained in Bosnia."¹⁴⁴

To return its brigades to a high level of combat proficiency, 1st Cavalry Division developed a six-month re-integration plan, culminating in a National Training Center rotation. This plan required 189 days of training over a 230-day period (the corps commander and division

¹⁴¹Conducting mission rehearsal exercises at home-station places a large burden on nondeploying units that must support the train-up with role players, observer/controllers, equipment, etc. For an in-depth review of the effects of these exercises on the 3rd Infantry Division as it prepared for a rotation to Bosnia, see William Langewiesche, "Peace is Hell," *Atlantic Monthly* October 2001.

¹⁴²For a more detailed discussion of the effect of 1st Cavalry Division's deployment to Bosnia on readiness and sustainment training as it relates to MOOTW, see Holliday, Hershel L. "Training Management and Peacekeeping Operations: Challenges to the 'Band of Excellence.'" SAMS Monograph, 1999

¹⁴³Center for Army Lessons Learned, "1st Cavalry Division," iii.

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*

commander had a policy of minimizing weekend training events after the six-month deployment).¹⁴⁵ The authors of the CALL study wrote this “should be considered as the bare-bones approach” for armored and mechanized units. However, even with this generous amount of time, personnel turnover and support cycle taskings at Fort Hood hindered re-integration training, forcing the unit to train “to time and not to standard.”¹⁴⁶ Personnel turbulence was a major impediment as new commanders and inexperienced staffs created friction for subordinate units during multi-echelon training events.¹⁴⁷ Although the deployment did enhance readiness in combat service support tasks, intelligence, and staff skills, the brigades found it difficult to sustain proficiency in combined arms breaching, brigade and battalion maneuver, gunnery, and deep operations.¹⁴⁸

1st Cavalry Division leaders received training in the local culture as well as conducting negotiations and dealing with civilians during the train-up period. While deployed, the decentralized operations conducted by the squads and platoons provided invaluable leadership experiences for the non-commissioned officers and company grade officers.¹⁴⁹ Upon return to Fort Hood, however, leaders found they had “overestimated their training proficiency in many tasks” such as troop leading procedures.¹⁵⁰ Although units conducted troop-leading procedures on a daily basis in Bosnia, differences in the environment and equipment meant that these procedures were done to a different standard. Leaders also found that they “had to eliminate the peacekeeping mindset and reinstall the warrior ethos back into [their] soldiers.”¹⁵¹ Finally, much of the leader development that occurred during deployment was lost as the unit experienced a

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., vii, 4.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 5.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 2.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Dennis Steele, “The U.S. Army in Bosnia,” *Army Magazine* 49, no. 4 (April 1999): 16.

¹⁵⁰ Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1st Cavalry Division,” 7.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 6.

large turnover in personnel. This hindered the re-integration training process because new leaders and staffs required training since “new replacements did not bring with them the same wealth of experience as the soldiers they replaced.”¹⁵²

Effect of Operations Other Than War on Readiness

While the Army has been following its operational and training doctrine to prepare units to conduct stability operations in the 1990s, what has the effect of this approach been on these unit’s ability to conduct major combat operations? Former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki testified to Congress in February 2000, that “although the Army’s active divisions were ready for war, continuing to use them for peacekeeping operations will increase and raise the price of meeting U.S. major theater war goals.”¹⁵³ In one survey, almost two-thirds of Army leaders who had participated in peace operations felt “their unit’s training readiness had declined” as a result of participating in a peace operation.¹⁵⁴ Traditional peacekeeping missions caused the largest decline in readiness, requiring four to six months to regain proficiency after the operation concluded, while units involved in peace enforcement missions “reported a much smaller drop in training readiness and returned to pre-deployment standards faster.”¹⁵⁵ The length of deployment, the ability to train while deployed, and the similarity of tasks conducted during deployment to wartime METL account for the differences in recovery time. However, U.N. guidelines may prohibit units from training on combat related tasks, as in Operation Able Sentry in Macedonia and the Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai.¹⁵⁶ The amount of equipment left in theater, as well as maintenance requirements, impact the units’ ability to regain

¹⁵²Ibid., 27.

¹⁵³Government Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, *Contingency Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses Challenges* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, July 6, 2000), 9.

¹⁵⁴Congressional Budget Office, “Making Peace While Staying Ready for War,” 36-37.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., 37.

¹⁵⁶GAO, NSAID, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, 29, 32.

required levels of combat readiness after redeployment. Light infantry, and other units without large amounts of equipment, recover faster than heavy or mechanized units do. Finally, personnel turbulence is one of the major factors degrading combat readiness after deployment. Since many units receive personnel fillers to bring them up to full strength, and delay or defer personnel from leaving the unit during deployment, units experience an unusually high level of personnel turnover upon returning to home station.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

As previously identified, shortcomings exist in the current method used to prepare units for both short-notice and long-duration stability operations. Is preparing for war while conducting operations other than war really a zero-sum game, or are there viable alternatives to the Army's current model of having all of its units trained and prepared for combat? Given the lack of a conventional peer competitor, the outstanding performance of relatively small U.S. military forces in recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ongoing post-conflict stability operation in Iraq, now is an appropriate time to reexamine the necessity of having the entire Army dedicated to fighting major conflicts.

Possible alternative solutions for short-notice missions might include deploying an ad-hoc Army unit or a Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable (MEU-SOC), which is trained and certified in 29 separate missions (including several stability operations) as a stopgap measure until an Army unit can retrain, reorganize, and deploy. The use of coalition partners in lieu of U.S. forces may be problematic since the operation might not support their national interests, and political pressures and concerns may limit their ability to contribute in a meaningful and timely fashion. One might argue that the United Nations may be a viable alternative to U.S. involvement in operations other than war; however, recent trends indicate that this course of action may not be a feasible or timely substitute involvement for U.S. involvement. Apart from the obvious problem of obtaining a U.N. resolution, it can take up to three months to

create a military force under U.N. auspices. Additionally, the force may lack the capabilities to resolve situations in a manner that supports U.S. interests. Due to problems with U.N. peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in the early 1990s “since 1995, no major power has put any of its troops under the U.N. flag,” preferring to send money instead of soldiers. The net result of this “subcontracting” has been “much less effective peacekeeping.”¹⁵⁷ The perception of U.N. ability is so low in some areas, that “for many, the U.N. ‘blue helmets’ now call to mind hapless, poorly armed soldiers from small countries who watch ineffectually as war crimes unfold around them.”¹⁵⁸ U.N. forces’ failures in Rwanda and Bosnia helped create this image, reinforced by recent operations in the Congo. On the other hand, multi-national efforts conducted outside the control of the United Nations have a better record, since countries with more robust military capabilities are more willing to support these operations. However, the same drawbacks remain since building a coalition requires time, and other nations’ goals and interests may not align with those of the United States.

Proposed alternative model

The vast majority of people studying this issue over the past several years have rejected the idea of creating a separate force within the army dedicated to stability operations.¹⁵⁹ However, in a 2002 issue of *Parameters*, Kimberly Field and Robert Perito suggested that the army could use the SBCTs as a basis for creating a “US force for stability” by retraining their

¹⁵⁷Robert Block and Alix M. Freedman, “U.N. Peacekeeping Is a Troubled Art, Congo Mess Shows,” *The Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 2003, A15. The top 10 countries that contributed peacekeepers to the U.N. in 2003 were: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, India, Ghana, Kenya, Uruguay, Jordan, Ukraine, and Nepal.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, A1, A15.

¹⁵⁹One notable exception is the CBO study, “Making Peace While Staying Ready for War,” that concluded that the Army should consider “changing some of its organizations or practices to improve its ability to deploy.” Potential changes included: cycling the readiness of units, converting active duty combat units into CSS units, and convert “active brigades into brigades that specialize in peace operations (and creating specialized headquarters for such operations).” 64.

soldiers to deal with civilians or augmenting the brigades with additional military police units.¹⁶⁰

As early as 1995, Mr. J. Matthew Vaccaro proposed that the Department of Defense (DoD) assign a group of active duty units the mission of conducting peace operations in addition to their normal wartime mission.¹⁶¹ One must question the feasibility of these approaches, given the time and resources necessary for units to attain the required level of proficiency in both wartime and MOOTW tasks. Additionally, both of these authors fail to address problems with current force structure, which is the root of many PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO issues facing low density/high demand units.

Colonel George Shull proposed that the Army restructure at least two National Guard divisions into what he refers to as Special Purpose Divisions (SPDs), organized with fewer maneuver units and a preponderance of combat support and combat service support units. These SPDs could serve as a tactical combat force (TCF) for the hostilities phase of a major theater war, and then conduct stability operations following the conflict. Including time required for mobilization and training, Colonel Shull estimates that “in a future MTW, SPDs could easily be ready for deployment by the time strategic air- and sealift become available after having deployed phase 1 and 2 forces.”¹⁶² “The SPD could also be used in smaller-scale contingencies to protect joint force rear areas.”¹⁶³ The SPD concept is an excellent, cost-effective method of increasing critical capabilities currently in short supply in the active component. However, these capabilities must also be resident in the active component to allow the Army to respond quickly to crises that do not provide time for the National Guard to mobilize.

¹⁶⁰Kimberly Field and Robert M. Perito. “Creating a Force for Peace Operations: Ensuring Stability with Justice,” *Parameters* (Winter 2002-3): 82-3.

¹⁶¹J. Matthew Vaccaro, “Peace Operations and Combat Readiness,” in Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach, eds., *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995) 73.

¹⁶²George D. Shull, “Correcting the Force Structure Mismatch,” *Military Review* (May-June, 2000): 36.

¹⁶³*Ibid.*

Another alternative is to permanently designate certain units to conduct stability operations, allowing them to optimize their training, organization, and equipment for these missions. Obviously, since the environment can be uncertain, these units may require a capability to conduct offensive and defensive operations; however, commanders would be better able to execute METL based training plans, focused on stability operations to provide the regional combatant commanders with a trained and ready force. If the stability force were large enough to conduct long-duration stability operations, this approach would reduce or eliminate disrupting conventional divisions' training for major combat operations. Additionally, the dedicated stability force would have minimal pre-deployment training and re-deployment training requirements, since they would be conducting METL related tasks during operations. Preferably, units in the stability force would be able to train together at home station and at training centers on tasks they would be required to conduct when employed. Furthermore, the unit's personnel system should be structured to minimize turbulence before, during, and after deployments and operations.

The model proposed by Han Binnendjik and Stuart Johnson serves as an excellent starting point for creating a force optimized for stability operations. Ideally, the Tactical Combat Force would be an organic unit, allowing subordinate units the chance to conduct combined arms training. A division with four maneuver brigades could be aligned with the four stability and reconstruction groups to allow combined training opportunities and cycled readiness – similar to the 82d Airborne Division's Ready Brigade concept – as well as providing the basis for (ARFOR) staff when deployed as part of a JTF.




Figure 5. Proposed Stability Division¹⁶⁴

Because stability operations encompass a wide range of scenarios, vary in duration, and take place in different sized countries with diverse terrain and environmental considerations, it is extremely difficult to choose a model as a basis for determining the exact size and composition of a stability force.¹⁶⁵ The Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2007, completed in late 1999, included for the first time estimates of the Army's ability to support contingency operations separately from the requirements to conduct major theater wars.¹⁶⁶ The TAA concluded almost 76,000 personnel would be required to support seven simultaneous contingency operations.¹⁶⁷ While seven simultaneous operations may sound excessive, the model used included ongoing operations (peacekeeping missions in the Sinai and the Balkans and support to counter-drug operations), as

¹⁶⁴Figure from Binnendijk, *Transforming for Stability and Reconstruction Operations*, 59.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 45.

¹⁶⁶Government Accounting Office, *Force Structure: Army Lacks Units Needed for Extended Contingency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 15, 2001), 7.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 9.

well as contingency operations; such as, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, and other peace operations.¹⁶⁸

The cost of this approach would be the loss of two divisions from the active force, with one conventionally organized to serve as the tactical combat force and one restructured into a stability and reconstruction division.¹⁶⁹ However, the benefit would be having a trained and ready force to respond to operations other than war. This division would also have some ability for long-term deployments – up to a year without impacting the readiness cycle – with similarly structure National Guard divisions that could be alerted, mobilized, trained and deployed for operations that exceed a year in duration. Another benefit is that this approach allows other divisions to focus exclusively on major combat operations, and help break the two for one model currently in place. In large scale conventional conflicts, this stability division could serve as a “follow and stabilize force.” This approach would not be adequate to handle the ongoing operations in Iraq, which currently requires over 100,000 troops, but it would allow combat divisions to return to home station earlier and regain proficiency in combat-related tasks.

Evaluation

Co-locating units in the stability division at one installation would be allow it to train as a combined arms and joint team. Aligning brigades in the tactical combat force with stability brigades would allow the establishment of peacetime training relationships that would mirror those used during deployments. However, one disadvantage is that this alternative approach would not produce a trained and ready force able to execute full spectrum operations, although the organic tactical combat force would have the ability to conduct limited offensive and defensive operations. The stability division would be prepared to execute operations without

¹⁶⁸Ibid.

¹⁶⁹Using the model proposed by Binnendjik and Johnson, 14,273 personnel would be required, not including the Tactical Combat Force. See Binnendjik, *Transforming for Stability and Reconstruction Operations*, 52.

additional training or lengthy adjustment periods, since it would routinely train on its METL tasks before alert.

Commanders in the stability division could tailor their METL, training time, and resources to achieve proficiency in tasks required for stability operations. Additionally, the units could execute performance-oriented training, conducted under realistic conditions during rotations focused on stability operations at the combat training centers. Similarly, the headquarters would train on its tasks during Battle Command Training Center exercises.

During deployments, units in the stability division would be able to sustain proficiency on their METL tasks. Furthermore, they would not require a ramping-up period before deployments, periodic refresher training during deployments, or a retraining period after deployments. The creation of sufficient stability divisions in the active Army and National Guard to conduct long duration stability mission would allow traditional combat divisions to focus on sustaining proficiency in combat tasks.

Finally, creating specialized units dedicated to conducting stability operations would allow focused leader and self-development programs. Ideally, regionally aligning these stability units would allow personnel to study the history and language of the area, and gain a greater understanding of the cultural environment. Additionally, the joint headquarters would eventually produce staffs with the expertise to plan and conduct joint, interagency, and multinational stability operations.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The 10th Mountain Division's experience in Operation Uphold Democracy highlights some shortcomings in the Army's current approach for preparing units for uncertain contingency operations, especially with regards to the headquarters elements. The division's focus on training for combat prepared soldiers for operating in an uncertain security environment; however, concerns over force protection prevented them from engaging the populace, missing an

opportunity to build support for the MNF and the new government. 1st Cavalry Division's preparation for SFOR in Bosnia violates the Army's current doctrine of train, alert, and deploy, as well as training doctrine. While the lengthy train-up period produced a well-trained force for the mission, excessive personnel turbulence and deploying a large part of the division headquarters severely degraded the combat readiness of not only deploying units, but also those remaining at Fort Hood.

The alternative approach would allow all units to follow the new doctrine of train, alert, and deploy as well as allow regional combatant commanders the ability to select precisely the right force for the mission. Creating standing units and headquarters dedicated to conducting stability operations would develop soldiers, leaders, and staffs with expertise in these missions. These forces would be responsive and ready for employment without a lengthy preparation period, since they would be able to routinely practice and train together.¹⁷⁰ The cost of this approach would be the loss of approximately two active duty divisions of combat power, unless the stability divisions are added to the current force. Furthermore, this approach would reduce the need for conventional divisions to conduct stability operations, allowing them to concentrate exclusively on war fighting and not conduct the lengthy train-up and recovery periods now associated with long-term stability operations.¹⁷¹ Two drawbacks to this approach are that stability units would not be as capable of conducting major combat operations and would deploy more often than conventional units. While one or two stability divisions would not be sufficient for post-conflict stability operations in a country the size of Iraq, a dedicated stability division would have provided an additional headquarters with the expertise needed to plan the stabilization phase of the Operation Iraqi Freedom concurrently with planning efforts for major combat operations. Additionally, the stability divisions could have served as a "follow and

¹⁷⁰CBO, "Making Peace While Staying Ready for War," 56.

¹⁷¹Ibid.

stabilize” force, reducing the security gap that existed after the conclusion of major combat operations.

Regardless of what approach the Army takes to achieve full spectrum dominance, correcting the current force structure imbalance by putting more low density/high demand CS and CSS units in the active Army would alleviate some of the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO problems facing many Reserve units. Fortunately, efforts are already underway to correct several of the most critical shortfalls.¹⁷² Likewise, the personnel system needs to align with unit readiness cycles to reduce turbulence in units before and after deployment. While this approach would create periods of degraded readiness as units stand down to transition personnel, it would be offset by periods of increased readiness in terms of manning and training.

By having a trained and ready force for stability operations, regional combatant commanders would have an increased capability to shape their environments through engagement. One concern is that creating a stability force will increase U.S. involvement and commitments around the world. While care should be taken to ensure that the creation of an easily deployed force tailored for stability operations does not preclude public debate about the merits of U.S. military intervention, employment of just such a force may prevent crises from escalating to hostilities. Additionally, a dedicated stability force may actually resolve crises more quickly than the Army’s current approach. In recent operations, the Army’s mindset has been that its primary role in stability operations is to provide a safe and secure environment. While establishing security is critical to reconstruction and rebuilding efforts following conflict or natural disasters, failing to quickly address the cause of the problem may create more unrest, ultimately increasing the security problem. Until other government agencies or organizations can respond as rapidly and effectively as the U.S. Army can, it is in the Army’s best interest to

¹⁷²Eric Schmitt, “Army Retraining Soldiers to Meet its Shifting Needs,” *New York Times* March 11, 2004, A22.

develop capabilities required to effectively conduct stability operations, besides merely providing a secure environment.

Current Army training doctrine remains relevant; however, to increase the Army's ability to conduct full spectrum operations, it must be applied across the spectrum of conflict. To respond quickly and effectively to crises, the Army must correct shortcomings in all three training domains: institutional, operational, and self-development.¹⁷³ Crises do not allow units the time to mobilize, train, and deploy. General DePuy realized that the United States could not afford to lose the first battle of the next war. Today the first battles the Army will most likely face are not battles in the traditional sense, but rather an operation other than war. To prepare Army leaders for this first battle, institutional training conducted at military schools and training centers must do more than teach "the history of battles and campaigns that end with the defeat of the enemy's forces."¹⁷⁴ Stability operations that followed battles and campaigns were just as necessary to secure victories as the defeat of enemy forces. "If the glory of combat operations are all that officers are taught and acculturated to, their understanding of their jurisdiction will suffer, they will misunderstand the breadth of their commitment, and some will leave the profession feeling betrayed."¹⁷⁵ The Army's proud history of conducting operations other than war needs to receive more emphasis at military schools to better prepare soldiers and leaders for these missions in the future. Former SFOR commanding generals felt that they had been poorly prepared for the duties they had to perform in Bosnia. Former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, said that his experience in Bosnia as the Commander, Stabilization Forces (SFOR), was "the most difficult leadership experience I have ever had."¹⁷⁶ General William Crouch agreed, saying that

¹⁷³Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training the Force*, 1-5.

¹⁷⁴Leonard Wong and Douglas V. Johnson II, "Serving the American People: A Historical View of the Army Profession." in Matthews, Lloyd J., ed. *The Future of the Army Profession* (New York: McGraw Hill Inc., 2002), 73.

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶Olsen, "Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations," 1.

he had never been trained on linking military and civilian roles in peace support operations. Similarly, General Meigs expressed frustration at not having been prepared or received specific training for his job as SFOR commander.¹⁷⁷ The Army needs to educate and train junior and mid-level officers, as well as NCOs, on the principles of stability operations, as well as cultural, political, and language training to better prepare them for the future operational environment. Fortunately, experience gained from conducting operations other than war over the last decade will help this process.

The operational training domain needs examining as well. Conventional units participating in stability operations need to be proficient in tasks that may bear little resemblance to their wartime METL, although this varies with the type of unit and the type of operation. Furthermore, units have generally required from four to six months to regain proficiency in combat skills after returning from a stability operation, since these operations, while enhancing some war fighting skills, degrade others.¹⁷⁸ By applying current training doctrine and dedicating forces for the major combat operations and stability operations categories outlined in the Joint Operating Concepts, commanders will be able to develop a mission essential task list and focus training resources to attain proficiency in their respective areas prior to alert and deployment.

In the past, the Army has always adapted to meet changing threats or missions, just as it is currently transforming from a force structured to fight against the Soviet Union in the Cold War to one that is lighter, more deployable, more agile, and more responsive to an uncertain strategic environment. However, the Army needs to ensure the future force evolves into one that is truly capable of dominating operations across the full spectrum of military conflict, so our adversaries are incapable of exploiting weaknesses. Our current training model and force

¹⁷⁷Ibid., 3.

¹⁷⁸Center for Army Lessons Learned, "The Effect of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness" 2. GAO, NSAID, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, 28.

structure fail to effectively prepare units and staffs for no-notice or short-notice military operations other than war. Furthermore, the approach used in the past to prepare units for long-term stability operations is detrimental to units remaining behind in terms of personnel and critical support units. Fortunately, some long overdue changes are currently underway in an effort to correct the imbalances present in the Army's force structure and personnel system. The challenge remains to develop an effective full spectrum force – one that retains sufficient capabilities to win decisive victories on the battlefield as well as in operations other than war.

Ultimately the Army exists to fight wars. In light of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, those now serving will confront a new kind of war in different settings than those formerly thought normal. These will co-exist with a parallel routine of no-war activities. Current training practices will need to be refocused to prepare soldiers for both missions.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹Wong, "Serving the American People," 72.

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