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14. ABSTRACT

Network-centric warfare, precision guided munitions, and special operations forces have ushered in the capability to find and strike time sensitive targets in ways unimaginable a decade ago. Combatant commanders can maximize the use of this capability by carefully planning and communicating procedures for engagement of these targets. While the short fuse of crisis action planning presents challenges, early consideration of target lists and procedures will facilitate a readiness to prosecute these targets, particularly those elements of the global terror network that will consistently be among the mission objectives of operations in the future. Establishing well-thought-out approval authorities for time sensitive targets, then decentralizing command and control to support decision and execution at the lowest command echelon practical, will streamline responsiveness and achievement of objectives. By identifying targeting guidance and defining command and control early, joint forces commanders can ensure operational plans will prove effective in the dynamic and unpredictable battlespace of the future.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS IN CRISIS ACTION PLANNING FOR TIME SENSITIVE TARGETS

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Network-centric warfare, precision guided munitions, and special operations forces have ushered in the capability to find and strike time sensitive targets in ways unimaginable a decade ago. Combatant commanders can maximize the use of this capability by carefully planning and communicating procedures for engagement of these targets. While the short fuse of crisis action planning presents challenges, early consideration of target lists and procedures will facilitate a readiness to prosecute these targets, particularly those elements of the global terror network that will consistently be among the mission objectives of operations in the future. Establishing well-thought-out approval authorities for time sensitive targets, then decentralizing command and control to support decision and execution at the lowest command echelon practical, will streamline responsiveness and achievement of objectives. By identifying targeting guidance and defining command and control early, joint forces commanders can ensure operational plans will prove effective in the dynamic and unpredictable battlespace of the future.

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INTRODUCTION

Robert Kaplan, critiquing Operation Enduring Freedom in the December 19, 2003 *Washington Post*, complained that the long promised military transformation proved to be only hollow words. He noted that after starting well, the military returned to its accustomed mode of cumbersome bureaucracy. Kaplan highlighted that during the war in Afghanistan, striking quickly at fleeting high value terrorist targets was the keystone to success. Coalition forces initially achieved this capability by using a handful of embedded special operations forces (SOF) to locate targets, and providing direct communication with aerial based strike forces to bring in firepower. However, as the operation matured, more forces arrived in the theater. Additional layers of military hierarchy arose, restoring central control and hamstringing the military's ability to react quickly enough to hit these fleeting targets.[1]

Are Kaplan's complaints justified? Using lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), this paper will propose steps to be included during crisis action planning to improve the command and control (C2) of time sensitive targeting. Counter-terrorism applications will be given particular attention. The roles of special operations forces, air forces, and command structures will be examined. Moreover, the capabilities of network-centric warfare to support operations will be considered.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush announced the United States would lead the world in a Global War on Terror (GWOT). Part of this war effort would be tracking down and eliminating terrorist individuals. To that end, the mission objectives for both OEF and OIF addressed targeting terrorists. It is reasonable to expect that any significant future engagement of United States forces in troubled areas of the world will include objectives to root out sponsors of terrorism. Combatant commanders will be faced

with decisions on how to best accomplish this objective. Because many of these engagements will spring up as crisis situations, commanders will have little time to develop their response plans. In order to ensure adequate provisions are made in these plans for quick action on time sensitive targets (TST), crisis action planning needs to include robust C2 guidance for such targets.

Douglas Hart, reviewing a recent RAND publication edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, emphasized that the terror organizations faced by the United States consist of networks with many nodes. While targeting the "leadership" of such terror networks may hold some morale value, the surest way to degrade a network is to cripple it by eliminating as many nodes as can be identified. The authors suggested identifying these nodes by engaging the network through introduction of some stimulus, then observing nodes where the network reacts.[2]

Arquilla and Ronfeldt, joined by Michele Zanini in the RAND publication *Countering the New Terrorism*, further stated that the Air Force is ideal for prosecution of network node targets. The study cited air power's flexibility, rapidity of strike, and use of precision weapons as the primary reasons for favoring the use of strikes from the air. Later in the same volume, Ian Lesser named the global reach and speed of air power as crucial elements in combating terror. Lesser added that a strategy for deterring terrorists may include targeting things the terrorists value. He lists "bank accounts, safe houses, or the individuals themselves."[3] Some of these clearly would be potential TSTs for air strike.

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[1] Robert D. Kaplan, "Think Global, Fight Local," *Washington Post*, December 19, 2003: A-14.
[2]Douglas M. Hart, review of *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Survival* 44 (Summer 2002): 176.
[3] Ian O. Lesser, et. al., *Countering the New Terrorism*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999, 78, 131, 144.

The twin tools combatant commanders can employ in C2 systems responsive to TSTs are the commander's intent and decentralized execution. At the same time, these need to be balanced against the need to ensure that military actions are proportional and appropriate to the political expediencies of the operation. While much of this can be addressed in the commander's intent and rules of engagement, decentralized execution can still encounter situations not spelled out clearly. Proceeding with engagement of targets in these situations could trigger an event that would result in strained relations with host nations or coalition partners. Thus, care needs to be taken to craft a plan that provides for quick decentralized execution in many situations, while identifying the types of targets for which decisions need to be elevated to higher command authorities.

To address this balanced planning approach, this paper will determine how the time sensitive targeting successes of OIF can be extended into the C2 of crisis actions. This will offer the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) the tools needed to conduct joint operations against sponsors of terrorism in the future. The Global War on Terror will be central to American interventions around the world for years to come. It is essential that every instance of American force projection include effective and timely methods to bring joint fires to bear on time sensitive terrorism targets, whenever and wherever met.

ANALYSIS

In the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom, the American and coalition footprint in Afghanistan was minimal. The operation order developed through the crisis action planning cycle called for 5th Special Forces Group operatives to infiltrate the countryside and work with indigenous contacts to locate and target Taliban and al Qaeda members. Where possible, these targets could be engaged directly. In many cases, however, SOF initiated air strikes to quickly and lethally deal with the targets.[4] Milan Vego highlighted the effectiveness of this combination of SOF on the ground with swift strikes from the air. He noted that precision guided munitions, in particular, were a good match with the targeting information that SOF provided. He concluded that while major theater conflicts might not be good candidates for operations of this sort, the combination of SOF with air will likely have application in GWOT operations that may be expected in the foreseeable future.[5]

The OEF special operations forces deployed in twelve man teams. While these teams remained few in number, and easy to keep track of, little effort was needed to deconflict strikes and prevent "blue on blue" incidents. As more teams began operating in the country, and Afghan Northern Alliance coalition forces became more organized, the days of free-wheeling calls for air strikes came to an end. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) created an Air Control Element to provide more rigorous procedures for selection and deconfliction of targets, and apportionment of air strikes.[6]

OEF broke new ground. SOF had not previously been used on this scale working with joint components for air strikes. When the 10th Mountain Division and Marine ground

[4] Michael A. Longoria, "Joint Command and Control of Battlefield Air Operations: OEF/OIF Lessons Learned," (lecture presented at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, April 21, 2004).
[5] Milan N. Vego, "What Can We Learn From Enduring Freedom?" *United States Naval Institute. Proceedings* 128, no. 7 (July 2002): 29.

elements began action in Afghanistan, the need for more central control increased. The CJSOTF found it did not have sufficient ground forward air controllers (GFAC) to maintain this control. The Combatant Commander, U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM) as the JFC requested and received Air Force pilots to be assigned on the ground with the SOF teams. With their experience striking targets from the air, these drafted GFACs interfaced with the air control element to achieve the flexible control needed. As the operation grew, it became unwieldy to control all this activity from a single command. The JFC split the CJSOTF in two, one responsible for the northern portion of the theater, the other the south.[7] From the beginning of OEF, the seeds were sown for C2 friction. The CJSOTFs reported to the CENTCOM sub-unified SOF command (SOCCENT), while other task forces reported directly to the JFC. This resulted in ambiguity, and conflicting task force assignments from the JFC and his SOCCENT.[8]

There was another aspect to the centralization of C2 that hampered effective joint fires as the chain of command lengthened. For a variety of reasons, approval of targets was in many cases held by the JFC himself. This resulted in delays getting approval to strike targets. The C2 process that had been patched together as the operation progressed and grew was a culprit in this delay as well. The flow of information from sensor to commander back to shooter was too long and drawn out.[9] Kaplan's criticism seemed to be justified, though not his solution. Kaplan suggested keeping the coalition footprint small as the answer to preserving the decentralized execution of joint fires.[10] As the operation matured and the

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[6] Longoria.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Denis P. Doty, "Command and Control of Special Operations Forces for 21st Century Contingency Operations," (unpublished research paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, February 3, 2003), 11, 13.
[9] Donald K. Hansen "Can Decentralized Command and Control Doctrine Compliment Network-centric Warfare?" (unpublished research paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, February 9, 2004), 12.
[10] Kaplan, A-14.

enemy forces concentrated in defense, a larger footprint was the agreed-upon course of action. Clearly, another solution for this problem needed to be found.

Vego expanded on the disturbing trend of centralized execution in OEF. Improvements in communications and information technology were apparent throughout the operation. Critical data and decisions could be passed rapidly from the field to the JFC and vice versa. However, rather than bringing the increased decentralization promised with the advent of these technologies, he concluded that the JFC often used the technologies to reach down and become involved in the workings of his subordinates, rather than push his intent and guidance down, leaving the details for subordinate commanders.[11]

John Jogerst drew a distinction between "network-distributed" and "network-centric" warfare. He maintained that using network-centric capabilities to route information from the field to CENTCOM for analysis and direction was a recipe for disaster. By contrast, distributing the information to the field commanders who need it would provide the capability to seize and hold the initiative by outpacing the enemy's decision cycle time. He identified two crucial elements for attaining this: a clear statement of mission coupled with decentralized execution. The information flow up the chain of command would then fulfill the leadership's need to analyze the progress of operations and provide mission corrections as required.[12] The communications power of networks can perhaps better be used to communicate the JFC's intentions down through the chain of command, rather than to allow reach down and interference in execution.[13] In fact, David Neely argued persuasively that to be successful in a network-centric environment, the commander's intent must be "dynamic,"

[11] Vego, 28.
[12] John Jogerst, "What's So Special About Special Operations? Lessons from the War in Afghanistan," *Aerospace Power Journal* 16, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 99.

with "frequent and precise updates."[14] Rather than a static once-for-all statement, the commander's intent would then become a living guide to forces. It would constantly reflect the needs of the moment, and guide actions consistent with the JFC's real-time understanding of the situation, without cumbersome centralized micromanagement.

Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, a champion of network-centric warfare, stated that "network-centric warfare enables forces to organize from the bottom up—or to self-synchronize—to meet the commander's intent."[15] Its foundation is information flow throughout widely scattered forces. A high speed and robust communication grid is essential. Commander's intent and rules of engagement play critical roles as well. Forces work together to bring the right element of joint fires to bear on a target. Building on Sun Tzu's concepts of war, network-centric warfare offers "high-tempo, lethal operations."[16]

There is no doubt that the sensor and communication components of network-centric warfare contributed significantly to OEF. Robert Ackerman pointed to equipment that allowed targeting information to be gathered by personnel on the ground and readily sent for programming into precision munitions carried by coalition aircraft. He also noted use of satellite communication units to close the gaps between geographically dispersed forces.[17] Ackerman interviewed Lt Gen Joseph Kellogg, then Joint Staff J6, who described how the network between sensors and weapons delivery platforms came together for OEF. SOF

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[13] Patrick M. Haller "Command and Network-centric Warfare: Thoughts for the Operational Commander," (unpublished research paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, January 30, 2003), 7.
[14] David S. Neely, "Network-centric Commander's Intent: The Key to Network-centric Warfare Command and Control," (unpublished research paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 16, 2003), 14.
[15] Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future." *United States Naval Institute. Proceedings* 124, no. 1 (January 1998): 31.
[16] Bobbie L. Randall, *Sun Tzu: the Art of Network Centric Warfare*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 10, 2001, 15.
[17] Robert K. Ackerman, "Technology Empowers Information Operations in Afghanistan." *Signal* 56, no. 7 (March 2002): 18.

teams linked up with both Air Force and Navy air assets to streamline targeting.[18] Finally, SOF deployed with the latest Digital Environment system. This system tied all the SOF C2 components together to facilitate communication and interoperability.[19] The value of SOF as a component of joint forces in counter-terrorism operations cannot be overstated. The *United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2003-2004* affirms that "SOF are most effective when they are fully integrated into a JFC's campaign plan."[20]

Without question, OEF achieved its objectives. Coalition forces brought down the Taliban regime, and captured or killed hundreds of al Qaeda fighters. However, the operation exhibited growing pains that reflected the new type of opponent America now faced in the GWOT. CENTCOM recognized a need for improved C2 of joint fires, particularly air strikes on the mobile and fleeting targets that the GWOT would continue to demand. CENTCOM planners went to work, using the deliberate planning model and their lessons learned, on campaign plans within their geographic area.[21]

The planners of OIF realized from the start that decentralized C2 would be pivotal to locating and neutralizing fleeting targets, such as terror operatives, Baath Party leadership, or mobile missile launchers. But rather than less C2, the cornerstone needed to be a dynamic communication architecture married to a flexible command hierarchy. "Jointness" would be the blanket that covered the entire system. One of the lessons applied from OEF was that when the air assets deployed to theater, these aircraft came without their customary C2 support. The SOF already on the ground functioned as their eyes and ears. This "short cut"

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[18] Robert K. Ackerman, "Afghanistan is Only the Tip of the Network-centric Iceberg," *Signal* 56, no. 8 (April 2002): 46.
[19] Robert K. Ackerman, "Special Operations Forces Become Network-centric." *Signal* 57, no. 7 (March 2003): 19.
[20] United States Special Operations Forces. *Posture Statement 2003 – 2004*. Available internet, http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic, 40.
[21] Hansen, 14-15.

promoted the friction that resulted in cumbersome C2 relationships. For OIF, the planners focused on knitting together the joint components, each with its accustomed C2 networks.[22]

Taking advantage of the time before OIF, CENTCOM planners detailed the decisions that could be made in advance, streamlining the process. Planning went beyond simple deconfliction of joint fires, toward achieving true integration of forces. A particular area of concentration was TSTs. The planners determined proportions of daily air sorties to allot to TSTs, and procedures for diverting air strikes from other targets, should a TST present itself during operations. Dividing the TSTs into categories led to establishing the decision authority needed to approve a strike for each category. Some could be made at the combined air operations center as the immediate link between sensor and shooter. Others would need to be elevated to the level of the component commander, while the most stringent category would still need to be forwarded to the JFC or even the President for decision. Establishing these categories in advance, based on their value and mobility, greatly facilitated the process of targeting. The expression of the commander's intent played large in this as well, as the vehicle to ensure the operators at each level of the command and execution structure clearly understood the desired end state and rules of engagement.[23]

CENTCOM captured many of the lessons learned from OEF in the unclassified *USCENTCOM Concept of Operations for Joint Fires,* dated 10 November 2002 (CONOPS). While not joint doctrine for all American armed forces, CENTCOM's pivotal role in the early combat operations of the GWOT make this publication a must read for all unified command staffers. The CONOPS identifies the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) as the hub of the targeting process. The J2 element of the joint or combined staff plays the

[22] Ibid., 13.
[23] Ibid., 15

key role in nominating TSTs to the JTCB. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) ensures that, among other things, effective procedures are in place to accompany the Air Tasking Order (ATO) apportioning air strikes. Among the tasks described for the Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander is identification and prioritization to the JTCB of targets for joint fires. When each of these components operates efficiently within a robust C2 structure, using intelligence guidelines developed by the J2, SOF will relay information on TSTs back to the JTCB for timely application of joint fires.[24]

What steps need to be taken so that the JFC can be sure the TSTs attacked are consistent with his intent, and likewise the shooters can be confident the TSTs attacked are in agreement with the JFC's desire? First, the JFC must be the one who approves the targets. This is accomplished via the Joint Integrated Priority Targets List (JIPTL). The JIPTL is a product of the JTCB. The commander's approval of the JIPTL ensures that joint fires on TSTs are in concert with the commander's intent. Second, the JFC limits the number of TSTs, and controls the proportion of joint fires that will be available for their prosecution, so that the principal targets agreed upon for each day's ATO will not be abandoned. Third, the JFC establishes the delegation of approval level for each category of TST. This is the safeguard that differentiates target selections that can be safely made in the field from those that, due to potential strategic or operational consequences, need to be elevated for decision. Care must be taken not to hold this delegation too tightly. Successfully engaging TSTs hinges on the decision to attack residing at "the lowest echelon that possesses the capability to synchronize, deconflict, and comply with existing Rules of Engagement."[25]

[24] United States Central Command, *USCENTCOM Concept of Operations for Joint Fires, Unclassified,* Tampa: November 10, 2002, 5, 8, 11.
[25] Ibid., 30-31.

RESOLUTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Having shown how the OIF planners took lessons learned from OEF and developed a responsive C2 system for joint fires, including prosecution of TSTs, this paper will now examine how JFCs can ensure these lessons are applied to future crisis action planning. Crisis action planning follows a six phase process: situation development, crisis assessment, course of action development, course of action selection, execution planning, and execution. Three of these phases are the responsibility of the JFC: situation development, course of action development, and execution planning. The other three phases are decision points to be made among the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The first phase, situation development, culminates in production of the commander's assessment. This assessment includes details on the situation, actions currently being taken, forces, timeframe for further action, and constraints. During this phase it is essential that the JFC provide direction to his planning cell to begin identification of the high value targets that could become candidates for time sensitive targeting during operations. The J2 will work with the Ambassador(s) and country team members, particularly the CIA representatives, to list those enemy forces, individuals, and hardware that may qualify. Where targets coincide with GWOT objectives, the target list is appropriate to include in the assessment to assist the decision makers in determining whether the crisis warrants a military response.

Concurrently, this is the time for the J3 to get a head start on matching joint fires to the number and type of targets anticipated. Furthermore, the J6 can begin to identify the technologies, systems, and formats needed to network the sensors, C2, and shooters to efficiently support the operation. While it may seem premature to launch into consideration of joint fires, sensors, and C2 at this point in time, any delay will cost the operation. Friction

will increase due to insufficient planning to implement TST procedures, establish delegation authority, and determine the proportion of joint fires to allot or divert to TSTs.

The third phase, course of action development, results in the commander's estimate of the situation (CES). The planning team completes the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB). This includes estimates of enemy forces and capabilities and projected enemy courses of action. Friendly courses of action are generated and compared. The JFC selects a course of action to recommend to higher authorities, and creates a synchronization matrix to describe the forces employed, timetable, commander's critical intelligence requirements (CCIR), and decision points. He also outlines a C2 structure for the operation.

In this phase, TST planning proceeds in earnest. The J2 needs to flesh out a thorough list of high value targets to include in the JIPB. This list will become an element of the JIPTL. Anticipated locations, actions, and behaviors of these targets need to be detailed as well. The J3 will match forces and weapons systems needed to deliver the joint fires required for the JIPTL. Particular attention will be given to the role SOF may play in identifying and directing TST engagements. The J6 will plan the intelligence resources needed to locate and track these targets, and network-centric communication channels to distribute dynamic changes in the commander's intent and TST guidance. The planning team evaluates the courses of action, weighing the effectiveness of each in prosecuting TSTs. Once the JFC selects his course of action, his staff will note on the synchronization matrix the decision points and joint fires required to respond to the TSTs. From this analysis the JFC can detail his CCIRs to support the prosecution of TSTs.

In order to stay ahead of the power curve, this is when the J3 needs to begin outlining the procedures, authorities, and joint fire proportions for TSTs. Who will be responsible for

managing the TST list? Will a TST cell be created within the J3? How will TST opportunities be flagged for immediate action? Who will be the approval authorities? What categories of TSTs will be assigned to each approval authority? What portion of the available joint fires will be available for TSTs? The answers to these questions will be needed for issuing procedures for TSTs should the planning proceed toward execution.

Once approval of a course of action arrives, the fifth phase, execution planning, begins. The JFC and his staff undertake detailed planning for the operation, and draft an operation order (OPORD). Identification of shortfalls permits exploration of any forces available to fill these needs. This phase concludes with a decision to implement the OPORD and prepare to execute a military course of action.

During this phase, the J3 will prepare draft procedures and rules of engagement to govern TST activities. The procedures need to clearly identify responsibilities, lines of communication, and approval authorities. Major John McDonnell suggests the first question the JFC needs to answer is whether to apportion air sorties in support of TSTs, or divert sorties from lower priority targets. He recommends diversion for most operations to avoid maintaining idle air assets when no TSTs are present. However, he recognizes situations where the advantages of apportionment outweigh the disadvantages, based on the degree of threat posed and the frequency TSTs are expected to be encountered, as described in the JIPB, and the availability of backup targets when TSTs prove absent.[26]

At this time, the JFC will also approve the division of the TST list into categories, and set the approval authority level for each category. The criteria for this division include the value of the target, the duration of time the target's location is expected to remain fixed, the

[26] John P. McDonnell, "Apportion or Divert? The JFC's Dilemma: Asset Availability for Time-Sensitive Targeting," (unpublished research paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, February 4, 2002), 7-8.

political sensitivity of the target, and the target's location in relation to non-combatants or facilities and infrastructure desired to be preserved. The higher the target's value, and the more fleeting the duration that the target's position is expected to remain fixed, the more important it is to include the target in a category with the lowest delegated approval level, to facilitate quick decision and response. However, this must be balanced against political sensitivity and collateral damage issues, which favor a higher approval authority.

It is evident from this discussion that clear and unambiguous guidance must be developed and issued by the JFC, so that operators in the fog and friction of battle can make decisions in an instant, and direct joint fires accordingly. A dynamic, detailed commander's intent statement, together with his advance approval of the TST list and procedures, work together to permit the delegated authority and decentralized execution needed to achieve truly time sensitive prosecution of these high value targets. The final piece to complete this puzzle is the Air Operations Directive (AOD). Produced by the JTCB and the JFACC, the AOD provides an ideal vehicle to synthesize up-to-date TST guidance and authority.[27]

The most detailed discussion of time sensitive targeting in current joint doctrine is in Joint Publication 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, Appendix B. It offers the JFC considerations about TST risk, C2, communications, and integration of forces. C2 can be streamlined by creating suitable awareness of the battlespace and commander's intent at subordinate levels, permitting quick TST response. Responsibility for drafting and issuing detailed "guidance on procedures for coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization" to achieve desired response times and address accompanying risk belongs to the JFC. [28]

[27] Ibid., 14.

CONCLUSION

Network-centric warfare, precision guided munitions, and special operations forces have ushered in the capability to find and strike TSTs in ways unimaginable a decade ago. Combatant commanders can maximize the use of this capability by carefully planning and communicating procedures for engagement of these targets. While the short fuse of crisis action planning presents challenges, early consideration of target lists and procedures will facilitate a readiness to prosecute these targets, particularly those elements of the global terror network that will consistently be among the mission objectives of operations in the future. Establishing well-thought-out approval authorities for TSTs, then decentralizing command and control to support decision and execution at the lowest command echelon practical, will streamline responsiveness and achievement of objectives.

Speed of response is proportional to the degree to which subordinate commanders possess the authority to take decisive action, within the commander's intent and rules of engagement for the operation. The decentralized execution to reach this speed of response was achieved in Operation Iraqi Freedom, largely because planners applied the lessons learned from the patchwork command and control of Operation Enduring Freedom.[29] The next step is to equip combatant commanders and their planning cells with the tools needed to apply these lessons to future crisis action planning. By identifying targeting guidance and defining command and control early in this process, joint forces commanders can ensure the resultant plans will prove effective in the dynamic and unpredictable battlespace of the future.

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[28] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting,* Washington DC: January 17, 2002, B-1.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

A topic for further study that was beyond the scope of this paper is the appropriate personnel and training to fill the role of ground forward air controllers with SOF. The solution in OEF to draft Air Force fighter pilots for this role is not a practical solution in the long run. Jogerst observes that the SOF "with embedded Air Force air-control elements provide a tactical force with a broad range of skills and the maturity to execute mission orders without detailed oversight."[30] Determining how to institutionalize this capability in the most efficient manner promises significant reward.

[29] Hansen, 17.
[30] Jogerst, 99.

GLOSSARY

AOD	Air operations directive
ATO	Air tasking order
C2	Command and control
CCIR	Commander's critical intelligence requirements
CENTCOM	U. S. Central Command
CES	Commander's estimate of the situation
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CONOPS	Concept of operations
GFAC	Ground forward air controllers
GWOT	Global War on Terror
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Forces Commander
JIPB	Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JIPTL	Joint integrated priority targets list
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPORD	Operation order
SOCCENT	CENTCOM sub-unified SOF command
SOF	Special operations forces
TST	Time sensitive targets

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