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| 14. ABSTRACT The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the lives of every American. With the horrible loss of life came a wake-up call that our country was embroiled in a war with wily, determined enemies. These enemies are fighting asymmetrically and are intent on destroying our way of life by any means possible. Future attacks on our nation are inevitable and our mindset must not be "if weapons of mass destruction are used, but rather how are we going to respond to the aftermath when they are used". The USNORTHCOM Commander is responsible for providing military assistance to civil authorities, which includes consequence management operations in response to attacks using Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE). This joint Department of Defense mission must be able to respond with all the available resources that are needed in the most expeditious way possible. Presently, there are logistical resources from the United States Army Reserves (USAR) that are scarcely being implemented into the National Response Plan. This paper proposes uses for the combat support and combat service support elements of the USAR that could significantly assist the efforts of the consequence management team during a WMD catastrophic attack. | | | | | |
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI**

**The Future Role of the United States Army Reserves in a Catastrophic
WMD Attack on the Homeland.**

By

**John J. Gallagher
Lieutenant Colonel
United States Army Reserves**

**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy or the
Department of the Army.**

Signature: _____

Advisor: Dr. Elizabeth A McIntyre

18 May 04

ABSTRACT

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the lives of every American and most of the freedom loving people of the world. With the horrible loss of life came a wake-up call that our country was embroiled in a war with wily, determined enemies. These enemies are fighting asymmetrically and are intent on destroying our way of life by any means possible. Future attacks on our nation are inevitable, and our mindset must not be “If weapons of mass destruction are used, but rather how are we going to respond to the aftermath when they are used.” As the combatant commander for all U.S. Armed Forces located in the continental United States and Alaska, the USNORTHCOM Commander is responsible for providing military assistance to U. S. civil authorities, which includes consequence management operations in response to attacks using Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE). This joint Department of Defense mission must be able to respond with all the available needed resources in the most expeditious way possible. Presently, there are logistical resources from the United States Army Reserves (USAR) that are scarcely being implemented into the National Response Plan. This paper proposes uses for the combat support and combat service support elements of the USAR that could significantly assist the efforts of the consequence management team during a WMD catastrophic attack.

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SECTION ONE

INTRODUCTION

End of the duty day September 10, 2004---Thoughts of a New York City First Responder

Well we have done everything in our power to be prepared to respond to another terrorist attack. I believe the intelligence sources are correct this time and Al Qaeda will try to influence our Presidential election results the same way they did in March in the Spanish elections. After all, they achieved their goals by swaying the election. In response Spain completely withdrew all its military forces from Iraq. I wonder if the same tactic would work in America? With only two months left before our elections and on the anniversary of America's most horrific day, my gut tells me that tomorrow is the day that I have been praying that I would not have to live again.

Our department has made significant progress since 9-11 towards being prepared to respond to another terrorist attack. We have worked hard, trained tough and rehearsed every possible scenario. We are completely self-sufficient for 72 hours and just as I experienced three years ago adrenaline will make those 72 hours pass as if they were only a few agonizing minutes. Unfortunately, the nightmares will last forever.

The only scenario that really worries me is if weapons of mass destruction are used. Once Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives are used, a hysterical situation will turn into nothing but murdering mass confusion and a wasteland of hell. Just look at what happened when a small amount of nerve gas was released into a Japanese subway in 1995. Over 5,000 civilians were injured and two of the local hospitals were shutdown because of being contaminated by self-evacuation cases.

How would we contain personal movement in a large contaminated area? Where will the mass decontamination teams come from? Which hospitals will treat contaminated patients? Are there any portable hospital units that can be used to treat contaminated patients? Where will we get our food, water and equipment after the first 72 hours? How will our mortuary system handle casualties that number in the tens of thousands? What transportation assets will we have to move to and from the incident site? How will we move contaminated patients?

It is readily obvious to me that the city will quickly become overwhelmed and State and Federal officials from outlying areas will have to be brought in quickly to help control the chaos and to save as many lives as possible. I pray to God they are ready.¹

Thesis: How can the NORTHCOM Commander ensure he has effective logistical enablers in the event of a catastrophic WMD attack on the homeland?

¹ Futuristic story derived from an interview of a current NYC first responder who was present during the attacks of September 11, 2001. He requested that his name remain anonymous.

SECTION TWO

MEETING THE DEMANDS FOR CIVIL SUPPORT

“There is an overriding and urgent mission here in America today, and that’s to protect our homeland. We have been called into action, and we’ve got to act. Our enemy is smart and resolute. We are smarter and more resolute. We will prevail against all who believe they can stand in the way of America’s commitment to freedom, liberty, and our way of life.”²

- President George W. Bush
July 2002

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, dated February 2003, states: “The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principle Federal Official for domestic incident management...The Secretary shall coordinate the Federal Government’s resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks.”³ The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is a direct reporting agency to the Department of Homeland Security, and is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for consequence management within the United States.⁴

Given the threat environment of the 21st Century, all components of the nation’s efforts will be needed to mitigate and recover from the effects of a catastrophic WMD terrorist attack. All potential means that may possibly be of assistance in response scenario, must be identified, resourced, trained and coordinated. This includes critical assets found in the Department of Defense (DoD).

² “Northern Command Internet Homepage”, Who We Are – Mission.
<http://www.northcom.mil_mission> [26 March 2004]

³ “Department of Homeland Security”, National Response Plan (draft), (Washington, DC, 25 February 2004), 4. Department of Homeland Secretary Tom Ridge has stated that Final National Response Plan will be completed by 1 Jul 04 and that it will supercede the Federal Response Plan (FRP), the United States Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) and the Initial National Response plan (INRP).

⁴ “Federation of American Scientist, United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism”, Concept of Operations Plan, (January 2001) 11.

Involving DoD in a terrorist consequence management operation is very complex since there is a combatant commander that is relying on that military resource if it is needed in his overseas area of operations. Because of this fact, the Secretary of Defense maintains authority over all DoD elements. He and the President are the only people that can authorize military support for domestic incidents.

The provisions of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act dictate that the use of federal military troops is prohibited in domestic law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress.⁵ Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in response to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.⁶ Under the provisions of the Stafford Act, DoD is permitted the authority to provide disaster relief if, and only if, assistance is requested by the civil authorities.⁷

DoD will normally only provide support when other tribal, local, state or federal resources are unavailable, the support does not interfere with DoD's primary mission or its ability to respond to operational contingencies. There are three circumstances under which DoD may provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA):

1. In emergency circumstances, such as managing the consequences of a terrorist attack. In this instance DoD could be asked to quickly provide capabilities that other agencies do not possess, have been exhausted or are overwhelmed.
2. DoD may also provide support in non-emergency circumstances of limited scope or planned duration, such as security support for a special event like the Super Bowl.⁸

⁵ General Accounting Office, Report on Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions (Washington, DC), 2-3.

⁶ General Military Law, U.S. Code, Title 10, secs. 124 & 382 (2002).

⁷ Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (draft), (Washington, DC: 25 February 2004), p. 4.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 37.

3. Any commander in the chain of command may invoke Immediate Response Authority (IRP) when serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. When such conditions exist and there is insufficient time to obtain prior approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders are authorized to take necessary action to respond to request of civil authorities.⁹

The most severe domestic threat facing the United States today is the effect of simultaneous CBRNE events. These events could have a negative impact on the ability of forces to project power from the Homeland, as well as being a severe danger to the citizens of the United States. To counter this possibility, DoD will require forces and assets that are well qualified to deal with CBRNE threats to our military bases and installations. In an emergency situation our forces could expect to augment local and federal civilian capabilities. Some of the services that these forces could help support are to provide; agent detection and assessment, agent containment, quarantine, evacuation, force protection, decontamination, medical operation in a contaminated environment, and medical surge capabilities. These response and support capabilities must be trained, capable, reliable and ready to be implemented in a matter of hours, not days. Our military must be capable of supporting civil response authorities by completely sustaining ourselves in a possible contaminated environment.¹⁰

⁹ Ibid., 38.

¹⁰ Department of Defense, Homeland Security: Joint Operating Concept (draft), (Washington, DC: 27 October 2003), 17.

SECTION THREE

THE CURRENT USAR STRUCTURE

“The Army Reserves we have today – an Army Reserves more ready, more prepared and stronger than at any time since World War II – is due to the hard work, uncompromising dedication and selfless sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of men and women who serve today, around the world, wherever and whenever needed”.¹¹

- LTG James R. Helmly
Chief, Army Reserves

The mission of the Army Reserves, under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, is to provide trained and ready soldiers and units with critical combat service and combat support capabilities, wherever and whenever required to support national strategy during peacetime, contingencies and war. Of the eleven specific missions that the USAR has on its mission essential task list, two are directly related to consequence management. They are:

1. Overcome aggressive acts from nations and terrorist groups that imperil the peace and security of the United States.
2. Giving back to the community by providing civil support, i.e. food, shelter, safe drinking water and medical attention to our citizens during emergencies and natural disasters.¹²

There are 211,000 active United States Army Reservists and nearly 60,000 of which are currently serving on active duty in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, in the continental United States and elsewhere around the world as part of America’s global war on terrorism. In

¹¹ “Army Reserve Command Internet Homepage”, Soldiers.
<<http://www4.army.mil/USAR/mission/statement>>, [28 March 2004].

¹² “Army Reserve Command Internet Homepage”, Mission Statement.
<<http://www4.army.mil/USAR/mission/statement>>, [26 March 2004].

2003, the Army Reserves called to active duty and deployed nearly 70,000 soldiers, more than 30% of the Reserves end strength.¹³

Our deployed Army Reserves soldiers did the majority of their pre-deployment training at one of the more than 900 Army Reserve Centers, which are located across our country in hometown America. Each Reserve Center Commander is responsible for the pre-mobilization training and preparing soldiers for deployment. The Reserve Center Commander also serves an important role in maintaining communications and relationships with local authorities. This relationship will become extremely important when providing immediate response support.¹⁴

The Army Reserves is introducing a new initiative that will emphasize operational readiness while at the same time introducing deployment predictability which will have a positive effect on retention. It is called a five-year training management cycle. This training cycle will place emphasis on the following:

- Year one: Individual soldier training and recovery from deployment.
- Year two: Small team, squad or section level training.
- Year three: Platoon and Company level training.
- Year four: Company and Battalion level training.
- Year five: Unit deploys overseas.

¹³ LTG James R. Helmly, "Statement," U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Army National Guard and Reserve Programs, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Defense, One Hundred and Eighth Congress, Second Session, 7 April 2004, 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

SECTION FOUR

THE USAR RESPONSE CAPABILITY

DoD and USNORTHCOM are committed to Total Force, Active Component and Reserve Component integration for consequence management. One of the major advantages that the Reserve Components bring to the table is being community based, which is the same thing as being forward deployed in any other Combatant Commanders' AOR.¹⁵

The Army National Guard is a state-level organization in a unique position to be the first military organization engaged at the incident area. The National Guard's main limitation of being Title 32 (bound by state borders and funding constraints) will most likely not be a factor in the aftermath of a CBRNE attack, because the area will immediately be declared a Federal Emergency disaster area. A disadvantage the Guard must always overcome is the fact that many of their soldiers are also local civilian leaders and emergency first responders.¹⁶

The Army Reserves is an integral component of our nation's response capability and should therefore play a key role in all of DoD's responsibilities associated with consequence management. The USAR has inherently assigned Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities, which are found in limited quantities in the Active Army and Army National Guard. Being Title 10 means the USAR is a national asset without political or state boundaries. The main advantage of this situation is the ability to cross state lines for training and coordination purposes. Another concern shared with the Guard is many of Reservists are

¹⁵ Department of Defense, Homeland Security: Joint Operating Concept (draft), (Washington, DC: 27 October 2003), 18 & 26.

¹⁶ Jack Spencer and Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D., "The Role of the National Guard in Homeland Security," The Heritage Foundation (8 April 2002): 3-6.

also civilian leaders and first responders. This situation can easily be overcome if the tasked Reserve unit is from outside the local crisis incident area.

The capabilities of the Army Reserve should always be placed in a support role and not planned for as a first responder. Catastrophic CBRNE operations will be logistically intense. Many of the core competencies found in the USAR will play a unique enabling role in a WMD response. The USAR core competencies are:

- Chemical: 63% of all the Army chemical assets; 25 chemical decontamination companies which include 75 mass casualty equipment sets, four chemical reconnaissance companies and two biology detection companies are on the ground today. They do not require any new structure, training or equipment.
- Medical: 59% of all Army medical assets, which include 36 field capable units, 40 units that can medically augment the staffs of 40 civilian hospitals, and five Clinical Operational Equipment Set (COES, 44 bed mobile/deployable hospital units) with five more COES being added in FY05. This will give each FEMA region this desperately needed response capability.
- Aviation: 20% of all Army heavy lift helicopters (CH-47D Chinook) are strategically located in five different locations throughout the country. 30% of all Army VIP airplanes (maximum capacity six/seven passengers with personal equipment) and two medium lift utility companies (UH-60L, Blackhawks). Included in FY05 are five C-27J Spartan cargo planes that will have the range of 1,200 miles and a payload capacity greater than a Chinook.
- Quartermaster: 57% of all the Army quartermaster assets, which includes 38 supply companies, 15 field service companies and 11 water supply companies.

- Mortuary Affairs: 66% of all army mortuary affairs assets; two companies from Puerto Rico.
- Military Police: 19% of all the total Military Police assets, which includes 18 Combat Support Companies (14% of the Army assets) and 17 Guard Companies (46% of the Army assets).
- Signal: 11% of all the Army signal assets; four signal battalions and nine separate signal companies.¹⁷

The most critical person for planning and coordinating all the different Reserve support capabilities to federal, state and local authorities is the Regional or State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (R-EPLO or S-EPLO). Usually a Reserve Colonel serves in the EPLO position as the federal military liaison to the specific region or state. This critical position is responsible for knowing all the key regional/state players and their different response plans. It is imperative that the EPLOs identify all the possible USAR support requirements, keep in constant contact with all the potential USAR supporting units and always know the units' true status/capability.¹⁸

¹⁷ Army Reserve Command, Report on Homeland Defense Capabilities Assessment, (Ft. McPherson, GA: 30 March 2004).

¹⁸ Army Instruction, Introduction to Defense Support to Civilian Authority Operations (draft), (Ft. Drum, NY: 17 May 2004).

SECTION FIVE

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army Reserves must change their Cold War era call-to-active duty mobilization mentality. The existing structure allows for an incremental build-up of the Reserve Component that includes training time built into the equation. The Reserves are successfully dropping the mentality of a “force in reserve” and are changing the way they train, and mobilize. Equally important is to be recognized by our interagency, consequence management partners for the skill-rich capabilities that our soldiers can bring to homeland contingency operations. The following recommendations will capitalize on these capabilities:

- Integrate selected high-priority chemical, medical, transportation and logistical units into consequence response missions during the third and fourth years of the unit’s five-year training plan. The third and fourth years are selected because the unit’s foundation of individual and section/squad level training has firmly been established in the first two years of the training cycle. During the fifth year of the cycle the unit is dedicated to overseas deployment duty. During the third and fourth years, the selected units should be considered to be in an alert status for possible homeland response activation. Their annual training orders should be preloaded into the system with either an open date or a date as far into the Fiscal Year (FY) as possible. This would enable the selected units to be activated quickly for at least two weeks per year for contingency operations without having to go through the cumbersome time-consuming mobilization process. If an incident area is declared a federal disaster area (which is certain in the case of WMD usage), the 14-day

annual training orders could be easily extended for up to 179 days with Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) orders. If three-quarters of the FY passes without a catastrophic attack occurring, then the responsible Training Support Brigade (TSB) should activate an off the shelf, unscheduled, response type scenario. This homeland response training exercise should incorporate as many of the selected regional USAR units and civilian authority first responders as possible in order to capitalize on relations gained through integrating capable units in realistic training.

- Utilize internal USAR heavy-lift aviation assets to transport the selected response units to the incident area. Making these transportation relations habitual between key Reserve response units is the key to success. The five USAR Chinook units all have the capability of using full-time employees (Military Technicians, Active Guard and Reserve and Active Component) to launch three to four aircraft on a daily basis. This would enable the selected response units to have the ability to move with all their immediately needed equipment more than 800 nautical miles; just eight hours after take off. Given the location of the USAR Chinook units (Ft. Eustis, VA, Ft. Hood, TX, Ft. Carson, CO, Ft. Lewis, WA and Olathe, KS [located 50 miles south of Kansas City, KS]), this operational capability would drastically cut the transportation time to the majority of the continental United States. With time being of the essence, this course of action should be constantly exercised with all the selected response units in their third and fourth training cycles.

- A tiered response technique should be employed when time is critical and the situation allows selected response units to be committed in echelon. Time is of the essence in responding to the consequences of a WMD attack. Unit Commanders should be encouraged to establish a response advance party, unit main body and rear support element in

all of their response plans. The tiered type of response takes advantage of getting the first reservists that report to the unit in route to the incident area so they can be a forward liaison to the main body. Both USAR fixed-wing assets and helicopters should be considered for the movement of each selected units advance party. Once the advance party is in place, they should report to the incident command center for command and control purposes. The tiered response enables the main body more time to access the situation, notify stragglers of the emergency situation and allow reservists that live the furthest from the reserve center time to report to duty. Once the main body deploys a small rear detachment should be established for logistical and operational support needs.

- The Regional or State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (R-EPLO or S-EPLO) is the tip of the USAR spear for coordinating contingency and training operations for consequence response with civilian authorities. This talented senior officer is a part-time reservist that usually has another full-time civilian job that is also demanding his total attention on a daily basis. Recommend assigning 10 of the 300 FY04 additional Active-Guard-Reserve positions become Deputy EPLO's. These officers should work in each of the 10 Regional FEMA Headquarters and report directly to the Regional EPLO. This full-time officer should be an experienced field grade officer (Lieutenant Colonel or Major), and have the mission of advising FEMA on a daily basis the USAR capabilities, limitations and priorities for rendering support to civil authorities.

- Maximum use of selected USAR consequence response units should be considered in pre-employment situations. Pre-employment is the technique of positioning response units and equipment to conduct response training that coincides with significant events of national importance that are considered high value targets. By being pre-

positioned, the USAR units can develop coordination relationships with the civil authorities and maximize the effects of the training event. The greatest advantage is that the response unit is in position for a real world contingency that will bring the training experience to a higher level because of the high sense of urgency and realism. This would be a prime time for the Training Support Battalion (TSB) to evaluate and validate the USAR response unit's capabilities.

- The habitual training relationship between the Reserve Center Commander and the local first response authorities must be encouraged and developed because it is so critical to the success of consequence management. Every Reserve Center Commander has a limited full-time staff that will be essential in coordinating the command and control functions between responding Reserve units and the civil authority efforts. Further support of facilities for sleeping, feeding and showering of responders can also be provided by the local Reserve Center.

- A new initiative of the USAR is to develop a Civilian Acquired Skills Database, which will give Army leaders visibility and access for immediate utilization of Army Reserve Soldiers' civilian specialty skills.¹⁹ Recommend this database also include those soldiers that are in critical consequence management positions, so these personnel are not slotted into a selected USAR consequence response unit.

¹⁹ Army Reserve Command. Report on Implementation of Civilian Employment Information Program. (Fort McPherson, GA: 2 April 2004).

SECTION SIX

CONCLUSION

“The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed”²⁰

- President George W. Bush
17 September 2002

To accomplish the above goal, the United States Army Reserves must continue to evolve as an institution by conforming to today’s ever-changing national security environment. Maintaining wartrace readiness and responsiveness to a combatant commander is paramount. Identifying applicable capabilities, while modernizing our tactics, techniques and procedures to assist in the civilian support of a WMD consequence management situation will improve the overall readiness and relevance of the Reserves. The combat support and combat service support elements of the Reserves are capable of becoming a supporting logistical enabler for a homeland defense mission and must be incorporated into every catastrophic CBRNE scenario. Once a dedicated response mission is given to the Reserves, the trust that is built through demanding training will be achieved with the civil authorities.

The global war on terrorism is a long-term campaign with an unknown duration. It began with a wake-up call on 11 September 2001, which continues today and far into the foreseeable future. We will continue to commit our brave soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines to defending our nation’s freedom in Iraq, Afghanistan and anywhere terrorism may

potentially grow and breed. To be effective in the war on terrorism our military must be put in harm's way and willing to risk bloodshed to defend our values and our way of life. But to win the war on terrorism, we as a country must be willing to discard our parochial backgrounds, and bond together in a spirit of interagency cooperation that utilizes all available resources to protect and defend our citizens and our Constitution.

²⁰ President, Proclamation, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," (17 September 2002), 3.

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