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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, RI**

**The Evolving Role of the Army National Guard in Homeland  
Defense and Civil Support**

**By**

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LTC, ARNG**

**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

**18 May 2004**

## **ABSTRACT**

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 have refocused the United States on the daunting challenge of securing and defending the homeland. The newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal agent in this endeavor. Moreover, DHS has developed a National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) that integrates the Armed Forces as the critical military instrument of the overall strategy. To further unify the military effort U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has been created as a North American combatant command charged with the dual missions of *homeland defense* and *civil support*.

The Army National Guard as a part of the overall Armed Forces will play a necessary role in homeland defense and civil support. The more pressing questions for the Army National Guard are how much of a role should it play, and how should it, as part of the Army's full-spectrum force meet this new challenge while continuing to fulfill the ever expanding array of missions.

This research will build on recent assessments of the Army National Guard's operational role in support of NORTHCOM's missions. It will propose an expanded role in support of homeland defense and civil support, while further realigning a balanced coverage of other critical State and Federal missions.

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## INTRODUCTION

*We need to change the way we think,...It doesn't mean that we will walk away from our traditional war-fight role. We will leverage existing capabilities so that we are able to defend the homeland, whether we have to defend it as an away game, abroad, or whether we have to do it right here in our homeland.*<sup>1</sup>

- Lieutenant General Steven Blum  
Chief, National Guard Bureau  
May, 2003

The Army National Guard coupled with homeland defense and civil support, seem to be an obvious match. When you consider that the National Guard's historical roots lie within the militia and the militia by its very nature was a homeland defense the apparent match seems even clearer. The clarity of this view becomes more clouded as you begin to consider the more complex question of *how* will this obvious match be carried out? It is the intent of this research to provide a workable *how* for the ARNG in its future operational role under NORTHCOM.

This research will initially provide a brief background of the ARNG's current involvement in NORTHCOM's missions of homeland defense and civil support. Further analysis of the ARNG's operational role will be presented through a framework of the instruments of national power—namely, *political* (diplomatic), *informational*, *economic*, and *military*. The political instrument is provided as a logical substitute for the diplomatic instrument due to the more appropriate political environment (homeland) of this research.

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<sup>1</sup> "National Guard to Undergo Major Overhaul", [GovExec.com](http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0503/051803kp1.htm), May 18, 2003  
<http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0503/051803kp1.htm>, [2 May 2004].

Additionally the instrument of the military will be framed in the context of how the ARNG interacts as a nested part of the Department of the Army (DOA) and the Department of Defense (DOD).

Within the framework of the analysis the two missions of homeland defense and civil support will be evaluated. Recommendations will consider the appropriate rebalancing of the ARNG to facilitate the demands of NORTHCOMs missions while further balancing the needs of other critical State and Federal missions.

## **BACKGROUND**

*The threat posed by well-financed, sophisticated and determined international terrorist groups has raised the bar as to what the National Guard must be able to do.*<sup>2</sup>

- Thomas Hall  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Reserve Affairs  
April 2004

The creation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) sprang from the DOD realization that in order to organize effectively to meet the expansive military demands of the recently formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) a unified and focused command was necessary. Before defining the mission of NORTHCOM it is helpful to identify the contributing role of DOD to homeland security. The figure 1-1 is from the newly published Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, (JP 3-26) and provides an operational description of homeland security and mission areas.

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<sup>2</sup> "Pace of the National Guard Deployment Threatens Homeland Defence", 30 April 2004, [http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp\\_world/view/82554/1/.html](http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/82554/1/.html), [2 May 2004].




Figure 1-1

DOD established NORTHCOM as a single unified combatant command designed to tackle the evolving military challenges of homeland security. NORTHCOM defines its mission as;

The command's mission is homeland defense and civil support, specifically:  
Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and  
As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> "Who we are; Mission;" The U.S. Northern Command Website, [http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?useaction=s.who\\_mission](http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?useaction=s.who_mission), [12 April 2004].



The Army's primary role as a military service within NORTHCOM is the same as it is under any combatant command, namely to fight and win our nation's wars. This being said however, it fails to point out the fact that the Army has almost always in recent history planned for fighting and winning the *away-game*. NORTHCOM is tasked with the *home-game* and the Army has been active in adjusting and increasing support to handle many of the emerging missions (U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM] has the homeland defense and civil support mission for Hawaii and the U.S. territories in the Pacific).<sup>4</sup> For instance, ground-based air defense artillery around the nation's capital, mobile units ready to provide consequence management augmentation, border security, and protection of critical infrastructure are some of the missions the Army has handled since the September 11 attacks.<sup>5</sup>

The Army National Guard (ARNG) as part of the overall Army, trains to the same core competencies, and has participated in, and continues to participate in, all of the aforementioned emerging Army missions. This is by design, and firmly a part of the ARNG mission, namely to remain a full-spectrum force, and a readily available force to the active Army.

Where the ARNG differs from the active Army is in their State mission. The ARNG can function in a non-federal status under certain circumstances (i.e. natural disasters, local civil disturbance). In this non-federal status a guard member is under the direction, funding, and control of the respective governors. The second difference occurs when a guard member is serving under Title 32 of the U.S. Code. In this status they are federally funded, but still remain under State control. Finally, when a guard member is serving under Title 10 of the

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<sup>4</sup> Report to Congress on The Role of the Department of Defense in Supporting Homeland Security, (September 2003), 9.

U.S. Code, they are considered to be on “active duty”, meaning federally funded and controlled, and specifically considered a part of the total active duty force. All three statuses play a role for the ARNG when performing homeland defense and civil support missions for NORTHCOM. There are both advantages and disadvantages to employing the ARNG in federal or non-federal status and the possible options and future considerations will be explored in the analysis section of this research.

## ANALYSIS

*Efforts to restructure the National Guard are focused on its primary federal mission and do not address the individual state Guard’s critical role in homeland security.*<sup>6</sup>

- GAO Testimony before the Committee on  
Government Reform, House of Representatives  
29 April 2004

The above testimony is drawn from a recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) study. Why was the study conducted? It is rooted in concern. Concern over the significant increase in National Guard activations and the ever expanding number of missions both at home and overseas. The GAO study places the National Guard in a comparative context by stating, “As a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the National Guard has experienced the largest activation of its forces since World War II.”<sup>7</sup> Moreover, concerning the Guard’s dual role (State and Federal) the GAO study states, “Since September 11, the Guard’s missions have expanded, raising concerns about its ability to simultaneously perform all of these functions.”<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 1-7.

<sup>6</sup> “Reserve Forces, Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges”, United States General Accounting Office, GAO-04-760T, (April 29, 2004), 21.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

The GAO study further identifies three major challenges for the Guard's future role both in defending the homeland and for missions overseas. They are generally identified as the erosion of readiness, how to be structured and funded, and how to balance requirements. This research will consider these future challenges through the framework of the instruments of national power--political, informational, economic, and military.

## **Political**

*The Constitution authorizes the federal government to suppress and restore order but identifies the militia, not the regular army, as the force to be used for such tasks.<sup>9</sup>*

-Policy Analysis, December 17, 2003

The United States has a long tradition of wary caution when committing the active military to domestic issues. Why does the Constitution favor the militia (ARNG) over the regular army in this matter? The difference may lie in the original intent of the framers of the Constitution. Their early born fears were that of a *standing* army and the protracted use of soldiers to maintain domestic law and order. Considering the constitutional framers past history with the British their concerns were well founded. But is this relevant today? Although since the September 11 terrorist attacks the active army has been tasked with missions throughout the United States it still does not resemble anything close to being a domestically deployed standing army. Furthermore, as the security threats abated over time the active duty soldiers were redeployed to their respective Army posts. Although some would argue that the recent involvement of active military in domestic concerns portends a

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<sup>9</sup> Healy, Gene, "Deployed in the U.S.A. The Creeping Militarization of the Home Front", Policy Analysis, No. 503, (December 17, 2003), 2-3.

creeping militarization<sup>10</sup> much of this perception could be dispelled through a greater use of the ARNG in domestic operations (homeland defense and civil support) at the State level.

On one level it is simply a matter of perception. Namely, the hypothetical Guard member called upon to provide security in their State is viewed as a ‘local’, or ‘a neighbor called to duty’. Furthermore, at the end of their duty (or shift if operations are around the clock) they simply go home as anyone else would do locally after finishing work. Again, this may only amount to a matter of perception; certainly the active duty military can perform the same function with possibly the only difference being a larger burden on logistics, transportation, and billeting, among other things depending on location.

The more deeply rooted perception may be one of scale. The average citizen will understand the nature of the threat (possible terrorist attacks, civil disturbance) or the nature of the disaster (hurricane, flood, tornado), but also wonder ‘why have the active components been called to task’? Is there not enough Guard members or has the incident exceeded their capacity? In some cases the answers are yes. Two recent examples are the Los Angeles riots of 1994 following the verdict of the Rodney King trial and the 1992 Hurricane Andrew in Florida.<sup>11</sup> Whether it was necessary or not is a question that has been hotly debated,<sup>12</sup> however, it is a judgment call of the civilian leadership, namely the effected Governor, or the President.

Considering the greater threats facing our future security environment and the heightened security demands placed on the system at all levels (municipal, state, federal) a more decentralized system would be more responsive and adaptable. The military element

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Weiss, Aaron, “When Terror Strikes, Who Should Respond?”, “Parameters, US Army Quarterly” – Autumn 2001, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Weiss.htm> , [23 April 2004], 4-5.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

within this framework plays a vital role. NORTHCOM has the primary mission of homeland defense and civil support. The ARNG provides the most effective structure, or link to execute these two primary missions. One of the biggest stumbling blocks to effective execution are the limitations written into Title 32 of the U.S. Code (federal funding-State control). Title 32 allows for the use of a full-time manning force (Active Guard Reserve-AGR) to perform the functions necessary (administration, training, logistics) for maintaining specified levels of unit readiness. The code also covers the training requirements for National Guards during training (weekend drills). There are only three recent amendments to the code. The three areas allowed for the use of Guard members in the counter-drug missions, the creation of the new Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs), and the use of Guard members for military funerals. An additional amendment is necessary for homeland defense missions at the State level.<sup>13</sup>

The amendment will afford the respective Governors greater autonomy and control as well as facilitate a more decentralized military organization within the NORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR). They will have the access to a federal funded force (ARNG) while still maintaining State control of the forces. The current system requires federal authority to “federalize” Guard members to a Title 10 status. The process is slow, burdensome and bureaucratic in nature.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, it fails to meet the need of rapid response, and in today’s environment that failing could come at the cost of lives.

An additional consideration in favor of the amending of Title 32 of the United States Code involves the nature of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. The act states:

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<sup>13</sup> COL Aylward, Deputy J3-Domestic Operations, NGB & COL Louis Abbenante, Deputy J3- Military Support, RI ARNG. Numerous telephone interviews conducted between 3 April-9 May 2004. Indicated the Title 32 of the U.S. Code operational issue for homeland defense was being vigorously worked up through the OSD level.

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.<sup>15</sup>

Many supporters of the act simply believe it reaffirms what has already been spelled out in the Constitution. Its roots again can be found in the framer's reluctance to commit federal troops for domestic action, specifically for Posse Comitatus-law enforcement action.

However, Posse Comitatus does not prohibit the individual Governors from committing ARNG soldiers under Title 32 or State status when the need arises. This played out in an ad hoc manner following the attacks of September 11, 2001. National Guard troops were deployed throughout the nation's airports (at the President's request) under State control with a promise from the President to follow up with federal funding to cover all costs incurred.<sup>16</sup> This need dictated a 'work-around' that was both leadership driven and necessary to meet the unprecedented aftermath of an unforeseen terrorist attack. It is now almost universally accepted that more terrorist attacks on the homeland will follow. We now have a precedent set and future attacks are foreseeable. A potential streamlining solution is to amend Title 32 of the United States Code to facilitate federal funding and empower the Governors and their respective ARNG organizations the decentralized control necessary to rapidly respond.

## **Informational**

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 1385.

<sup>16</sup> Healy, 4-5.

*We need to change from the ‘need to know’ Cold War mentality to the ‘need to share,’ in my view in this global war on terrorism, where we’ve used all the instruments of national power for both the away game and the home game.*<sup>17</sup>

-General Ralph Eberhart  
Commander U.S. NORTHCOM

The United States comprises a structure of federal, state, and local government, consisting of over 87,000 different jurisdictions.<sup>18</sup> When NORTHCOM is faced with responding to a homeland defense mission or providing military support to civil authorities the challenges of communicating and sharing information become daunting. The National Response Plan (NRP) further identifies fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESF) where DOD (albeit NORTHCOM) is a support agency. In most large scale actions involving homeland defense and/or civil support the military (active, guard, or reserve) will find themselves on the scene. In events like the attacks of September 11, it does not take long to exhaust and exceed the capabilities of the first responders (local fire, police, and emergency). When the military arrives on scene the need to be interoperable with the myriad of agencies already there becomes paramount. Moreover, the possible limitations of the military to understand the different operational cultures and the lexicon in which they communicate can further exacerbate the situation.<sup>19</sup>

How does the ARNG fit into this scenario? In a recent Report to Congress, DOD said the following, “The National Guard is postured to provide support and information sharing to NORTHCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM, in accordance with existing law as required.”<sup>20</sup> To simply continue to provide support and information as ‘business as usual’ may not be

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<sup>17</sup> “Defending the Homeland is a ‘Must Win’ Game” Joint Task Force Civil Support, American Forces Press Service, <http://www.jtfcs.northcom.mil/pages/news200403092.html>, [2 April 2004].

<sup>18</sup> Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, (July 2002), 11.

<sup>19</sup> “Homeland Security Trips Over Language”, The Washington Times, [www.washingtontimes.com](http://www.washingtontimes.com), [April 25, 2004].

enough in the new ‘post 9/11’ environment. The ARNG has in the last two years received additional funding to help upgrade the communication infrastructure within their respective States.<sup>21</sup> This will certainly have a positive effect on the interoperability at the State level.

More can be done however, with the ARNG and its focus at the State level down through the municipal level. This is a direction the ARNG has shied away from for much of the last two decades. In a conscious effort to overcome the stigma of being viewed as a separate force during the Vietnam conflict, the ARNG (in particular) in conjunction with the Army in the late 1970s launched into a ‘Total Force’ concept. The intended result was to produce ‘one fighting force’ trained to one standard with equally shared core warfighting competencies. The Army and the ARNG were successful. It took much of the Cold War era and involved extensive funding and man-power, but the end result was a significantly strengthened ARNG with solid warfighting credentials. The 1990s further fleshed this out with the ARNG’s participation in all overseas operations. However, in the ARNG quest to become an equal partner in the war-fight, some ground has been lost in their military support to their States and community, their militia roots.

The ARNG needs to reconnect with the communities and agencies that are comprised within their State. This will take additional man-power and funding to ensure it doesn’t detract from the required readiness levels of their federal mission. Without this reconnection the necessary sharing of information and the critical interoperability will be insufficient or ineffective. The recently created National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) offer a good template to follow in developing greater interoperability and information flow throughout the respective States. The WMD-CST is

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<sup>20</sup> Report to Congress, 8.

<sup>21</sup> Aylward and Abbenante.



not enough in and of themselves to tackle this mission. They are specifically designed to work with local, state, and federal agencies, however this work is primarily in the realm of chemical, biological, or radiological responses.<sup>22</sup> The ARNG needs to grab this template and overlay it on their area of responsibility (meaning their respective States) with the intent of building a strong organization committed to military support to civil authorities (MSCA) which further enhances a solid flow of information . The template contains three critical elements (full-time manning, federal funding, and command emphasis), all three of which are necessary for success.

Many key leaders are claiming a solid correlation between homeland defense and the National Guard. Paul McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security stated; "...that homeland defense is a natural fit for the Guard."<sup>23</sup> Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau also stated "...some of the Guard's most important contributions to the nation will be in homeland defense".<sup>24</sup> In many respects these statements ring true, however the ARNG has some lost ground to recover if it intends to be the logical and effective military informational bridge for the community and state on one side, and NORTHCOM and DOD on the other.

## **Economic**

*Enhancing the near-term readiness of Army Guard units will be difficult because the Army Guard is still operating with peacetime funding. In the long term, the Army Guard's ability to restructure its forces to meet the requirements of the new security environment will depend on whether it is given adequate resources and funding priority.*<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Report to Congress.

<sup>23</sup> "Guard Staffed WMD Civil Support Teams Slated for Increase", Joint Task Force Civil Support <http://www.jtfcs.northcom.mil/pages/news20040209.html>, [12 April 2004].

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> United States General Accounting Office, 1.

During most of the Cold War the ARNG provided the Department of the Army with a very cost effective force. Although the ARNG during this time period constituted nearly 40% of the total Army strength it could operate adequately on about 10% of the Army's total budget. As a strategic reserve for a Cold War mission the 10% was sufficient for manning, equipping, and training the ARNG. This fifteen-year old economic Cold War paradigm however, does not adequately address the needs of the ARNG in today's Global War on Terrorism, replete with its significant challenges.

Another disparity can be found in the significant budgetary emphasis being given to the First Responder Initiative where a more than tenfold increase took place between fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 (\$272 million to \$3.5 Billion).<sup>26</sup> Although this is a noteworthy increase in an area that is absolutely critical to the enhancement of the local and state level first responders, it also stands in sharp contrast to other increases. Comparatively, the Pentagon's fiscal year 2005 defense budget for the National Guard and Reserve has identified only a 2.8% increase over fiscal year 2004.<sup>27</sup>

It isn't simply a question of more money however; the larger issue is identifying the ARNG role (or mission) in homeland defense and civil support, and then funding it appropriately. DOD, DOA, or NORTHCOM to date have not provided specific plans or requirements for the ARNG in terms of defining homeland defense and civil support

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<sup>26</sup> Office of Homeland Security, 45.

<sup>27</sup> Pace of the National Guard.

missions.<sup>28</sup> In fairness to DOD they are addressing this as it pertains to homeland defense (for all the armed forces) with a sense of urgency and with due diligence<sup>29</sup>. In the current absence of clear requirements however, accurate funding cannot be identified for organizing, equipping, and training the ARNG for these vital missions.

## **Military**

*Everyone knows that the Pentagon is not in the business of providing an armed force for the United States, but when an event occurs we get the phone call and why do we get the phone call? Well, because the Department of Defense is considered the Department of Defense. They know that they've got troops. They've got people who respond. They're organized and they can be of assistance.*<sup>30</sup>

-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld  
July 2002

The ARNG has worked long and hard for credibility and acceptance as a recognized fighting force mirroring the Army's full-spectrum of capabilities. So should they put this all aside and follow the recommendation of the Hart-Rudman Commission report on homeland defense? Part of the commission's recommendation stated the following; "...the National Guard should be given homeland security as a primary mission, as the U.S. Constitution itself ordains."<sup>31</sup> This recommendation was made prior to the United States launching into Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Since September 11, 2001, more than 51% of the Army National Guard's 350,000 soldiers have been activated<sup>32</sup>-the majority of them for overseas operations in South West Asia. This majority is working along side their active army

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<sup>28</sup> United States General Accounting Office, 14.

<sup>29</sup> Gilmore, Gerry J. "DOD Ready to Assist in Event of Homeland Attack", United States Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service News Articles, [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/n04122004\\_200404126.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/n04122004_200404126.html), [22 April 2004].

<sup>30</sup> Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security; JP 3-26 ; Final Coordination, (26 March 2004), IV-1.

<sup>31</sup> Roxborough, Ian. "The Hart-Rudman Commission and Homeland Defense", September 2001, 17.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

counterparts in a war-time role. Unless you choose to consider this part of the homeland defense ‘away-game’, it certainly doesn’t meet the commission’s idea of fitting the Guard cleanly into the homeland role, per the U.S. Constitution.

The ARNG’s heavy use in OIF is the result of necessity. The post-hostility realities in Iraq were not completely understood beforehand and the United States Army found themselves in dire need of more ‘boots on the ground’. The ARNG became the largest provider of the much needed troops and they were able to do so because as a force they have continued to train and prepare for the full spectrum of operations. This does not mean there has not been a price to pay for the ARNG. The recent GAO study made the following observation on the ARNG regarding the numerous deployments:

The Army Guard has experienced significant difficulties in responding to these excessive and ongoing requirements because much of it was funded and equipped as a later-deploying reserve force rather than an operational force designed for continued overseas deployments.<sup>33</sup>

The GAO study touched on several critical points. The ARNG has been structured for use as a *strategic* reserve versus its more current use as an operational force. Moreover, the ARNG is still funded and equipped under an outdated Cold War construct. Before significant changes are made to the ARNG to potentially correct these shortcomings it is first essential to determine what the ARNG’s primary role will be. As previously stated the DOD planning is in progress. The DOD plan has been described as a “comprehensive homeland defense strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century”;<sup>34</sup> it further stated the plan would “provide the framework for pursuing operational capabilities to prepare for tomorrow’s challenges.”<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> United States General Accounting Office, 1.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>35</sup> Gilmore, 2.

How should the ARNG fit into the framework and what should their future role be? The framework for the ARNG has always been sound and appropriate. It should continue to remain under the Department of the Army as part of the “One Team, One Fight” concept. Furthermore the ARNG should remain a full-spectrum force. If the Army determines that the full-spectrum capabilities need to change conceptually, in order to stay in tune with transformation and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, then the ARNG should be a full partner in this process of change. Without full partnership with the active Army the ARNG’s relevance as a warfighting force will eventually be compromised. Additionally, it is the full-spectrum capabilities possessed by both the Army and the ARNG that provide the foundation of capabilities necessary for homeland defense and civil support. The question of what the ARNG’s future role within this framework should be is grounded in their full partnership with the active Army and their federalized role as a warfighting force. The ARNG homeland defense and civil support role is an indelible extension of their federalized link.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

*The extensive use of Guard forces and eroding readiness of the non-deployed units suggest a comprehensive reassessment of the Army Guard’s current structure and resourcing assumptions may be needed.*<sup>36</sup>

- GAO Testimony before the Committee on  
Government Reform, House of Representatives  
29 April 2004

Just as it is critical that the ARNG remains a ‘full-spectrum’ force in concert with the active Army it is just as critical that they expand their capabilities to meet the new challenges of homeland defense and civil support. This can’t wait for the completion of the numerous

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

initiatives and the comprehensive studies currently underway.<sup>37</sup> Interim (and immediate) needs can be identified now concurrently with the planning process to address the eminent threat of possible terrorist attacks. The ARNG is considering a rotational deployment model designed to provide the same level of troops for overseas operations (based on current utilization), but also ensuring that the individual Guard soldier is not deployed more than one year out of a six year period. Furthermore, this will be accomplished while still retaining 50% of each State's ARNG force structure for homeland defense and civil support missions.<sup>38</sup> This offers the ARNG an aggressive, but achievable starting point.

Although the active Army is in the mist of restructuring their units into the new modular brigade concept, they have not yet established a set time frame for the conversion of the ARNG units. In this interim period the ARNG should embrace the one year deployment-to-six year served model and additionally free up the identified 50% forces for the homeland missions. Any unit not in a train up cycle for future overseas deployment should (under this new model) be in a train up cycle for homeland defense and civil support. At all levels of Army doctrine the virtues of "train as you fight" are instilled. This should be no different for the ARNGs focus on the homeland mission. This further provides the necessary assurances to the respective Governors and to the commander of NORTHCOM that not only are Guard units identified for possible missions, but they are training as they will 'fight' (or 'support') in response to those missions of NORTHCOM.

Properly equipping and funding the ARNG for an expanded role in homeland defense and civil support is just as critical as identifying and training the units. These necessities should also be addressed immediately versus waiting for the completion of a 'comprehensive

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<sup>37</sup> United States General Accounting Office, 14-21.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 21-22.

review'. Full-time manning for the ARNG needs to increase from its current level of only 59%.<sup>39</sup> The focus of the increase needs to further be directed towards homeland mission readiness. Expanding the scope of Title 32 of the U.S. Code will additionally facilitate federal funding while giving the individual States greater control. Equipment is a twofold issue. Many ARNG units are lacking essential equipment or have outdated equipment necessary to meet their war-time mission. Moreover, the missions of homeland defense and civil support are presenting additional needs for equipment that is not currently part of a unit's normal structure.

The ARNG in the near-term can take the lead role for NORTHCOM and their stated missions of homeland defense and civil support. With the proper focus on manning, equipping , funding, and training the ARNG can provide a formidable force fully capable at both the State and Federal level. With a solid foundation grounded in their federal warfighting role, the Guard should fully embrace an expanded role in the homeland.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

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