REORGANIZING THE ARMY FOR 21ST CENTURY NEEDS: SIMULTANEously ADDRESSING STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND HOMELAND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

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There is a mismatch between the demands of today's strategic environment and the force structure of the Army. Today, the Army is not adequately structured for stability and support operations (SASO) or homeland security (HLS) requirements, two mission areas of increasing importance. The post-Cold War frequency of conflict finds the U.S. military conducting an increased number of missions to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability at the same time the threat of international terrorism and attacks on the U.S. homeland continues. Advances in technology and joint warfighting have reduced the number of troops with the appropriate skill sets available in theater to transition to post conflict reconstruction. Additionally, the requirement to respond to multiple and simultaneous weapons of mass destruction (WMD) events and consequence management missions at home have not been accurately determined. The Army must create a force that enables a rapid transition from conflict to post conflict reconstruction to set the conditions for strategic success, as well as maximize Army capability to respond when needed in support of lead federal agencies for consequence management. The capabilities and skills required to address these missions are identical enough in nature to recommend one solution to address both needs.
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REORGANIZING THE ARMY FOR 21ST CENTURY NEEDS: SIMULTANEOUSLY ADDRESSING STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND HOMELAND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

The U. S. Army must be capable of acting rapidly in support of U.S. national interests across the full spectrum of conflict with highly trained forces. However, there is a mismatch between the demands of today’s strategic environment and the force structure of the Army. The ‘swiftly defeat’ Army is not adequately structured for stability and support operations (SASO) or homeland security (HLS) requirements, two mission areas of increasing importance. While reorganizing a portion of the Army for SASO is currently being discussed, no organized effort for tailoring forces for HLS is currently being considered. It is not enough to organize, train, equip and provide forces for high-end conflict. Army transformation must include reorganizing to fully address SASO and HLS requirements. The capabilities and skills required to address these missions are identical enough in nature to recommend one solution to address both needs.

WHY ORGANIZE FOR STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS?

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of U.S. military interventions worldwide. During the Cold War, the U.S. averaged one major intervention every ten years, but since has averaged one every two years, with two occurring in the last 18 months. With a security strategy focused on rapid decisive operations and preemption, this trend can be expected to continue for some time. Indeed, this is an international trend with nearly 80 percent of the peace operations conducted by the United Nations since 1945 beginning after the end of the Cold War.

This increase demonstrates the need for a U.S. Army not only capable of conducting decisive combat operations, but increasingly to conduct SASO to set the conditions for strategic success. Whether before, during, or after decisive combat operations or as a stand alone effort, the Army Transformation Roadmap 2003 states that stability operations are critical to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability, provide humanitarian assistance, establish new governance, restore essential services, and assist in economic reconstruction. It is during the transition from decisive combat operations, a Department of Defense (DOD) led effort, to post-conflict operations or nation-building, an interagency or internationally led effort, that strategic success is vulnerable.

Using case studies from Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the National Defense University (NDU) Center for Technology and National Security Policy studied factors that contribute to success in post-conflict operations and outlined certain lessons learned. A principal conclusion, containing the central recommendation of a working paper titled
“Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations”, is that these case studies "make a strong argument for creating a standing stabilization and reconstruction force as part of the U.S. military". As envisioned, this force would be a dedicated stability and reconstruction joint command (S&R JCOM). The S&R JCOM would be organized, trained and equipped for SASO in order to close “the gap between major combat operations and the beginning of nation building.”

The NDU study emphasizes that recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate the success of ongoing U.S. military transformation and the importance of conducting a rapid transition to post-conflict reconstruction. The swift defeat of enemy forces in both countries demonstrates the enhanced capability of relatively small numbers of troops enabled by information and technology. However, one result of the rapid collapse of the enemy military was that “the U.S. was caught without a mature plan for post-conflict operations and without an adequate complement of the skills needed to begin reconstruction promptly.” Dr. Hans Bennendijk pointed out during the presentation of the NDU study at the 34th Annual IFPA-Fletcher Conference, that because of our overwhelming success in transforming how we conduct decisive combat operations, "we need another military transformation, and that is to deal with post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction."

The traditional model for military operations includes the build up of large numbers of forces in theater to conduct offensive operations. In the past, larger combat formations, augmented with additional military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, engineers, and medical capabilities for protracted warfare, could turn to stability operations as combat subsided. This arrangement worked well for slow transitions from combat to stability operations. “Because conflict was protracted and involved large forces” this allowed “time to plan for stabilization and reconstruction operations and to begin them as the conflict wound down.”

But today the reality is different. The current success of joint operations combined with technological advances, better integration of capabilities and smaller more lethal formations, place downward pressure on the size and number of combat formations required in theater. This leaves fewer troops on the ground available to begin the immediate transition to labor-intensive post-conflict operations. Indeed, this trend runs counter to one of the principal conclusions of a RAND study titled, “America's Role in Nation-Building: from Germany to Iraq.” This study compared key determinants of success in nation-building operations from WWII to present and concludes among other findings that military presence, defined by the number of U.S. soldiers per thousand inhabitants, is one of the controllable factors that influences the ease or difficulty of nation-building.
In support of the National Military Strategy and based on theater level campaign analysis, the Army builds a force to execute the ground campaign. However, formal modeling in the Total Army Analysis process to determine the number and type support forces required ends at the conclusion of decisive combat operations. Traditionally, the forces required to conduct SASO are not thoroughly analyzed and resourced.\textsuperscript{10} In 1999 the General Accounting Office criticized the Army for not including fourth and fifth phase campaign requirements in its analysis. Stating that by not incorporating requirements for all five campaign phases “the Army does not know its total requirements and cannot fully assess its risk in implementing the strategy.”\textsuperscript{11}

Instead, the current method of allocating forces focuses on the use of troops available at the end of decisive combat operations in lieu of an accurate determination of forces required to begin post conflict reconstruction. The result is a less than optimum matching of skills on-hand and skills required.\textsuperscript{12} Large numbers of the skills required to rapidly transition to post conflict reconstruction reside in combat support and combat service support units. These skills, previously integral to the formations of large scale conflict, are not available in sufficient numbers today. To be successful in transitioning to post conflict reconstruction, the right skills in sufficient quantity must be “in the theater to begin their operations concurrently with the surrender or collapse of the enemy military.”\textsuperscript{13} Admiral (R) Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, is recently quoted in the Washington Post as saying, “This mission is too important and too hard to rely on cobbining.”\textsuperscript{14}

**CREATING A STANDING SASO CAPABILITY**

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict drafted a response to the question: “Should the Department of Defense try to fashion a Phase IV or post-combat capability of some sort? If so, what would you propose?” The response to the Secretary of Defense’s “snowflake” of August 2003 recommended that DoD “should work to establish specialized Phase IV capabilities.” The reply contained a conceptual piece that advocates establishing four separate Stability Operations Brigades permanently focused on peace operations as part of the Army force structure. These brigades would consist of military police, motorized infantry, civil affairs, psychological operations, intelligence, signal and engineer units, totaling 3,000 to 4,000 personnel. These brigades would be trained and equipped specifically for peace operations to relieve the operations tempo pressure on current maneuver units. Although not a formal, staffed response, the concept was shared with the Joint Staff and the Army Chief of Staff’s initiatives group. After initial examination, these offices expressed reservation against creating organizations without full-spectrum combat capability.
should the environment shift from stability to combat operations.\textsuperscript{15}

Thought on this along this line began five years ago in a 1998 study titled “Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster Relief.” In this study RAND assessed the post-cold war need to conduct those type operations without “detracting from the nation’s ability to prevail in major theater warfare.”\textsuperscript{16} One of the ten options included in the report recommended the creation of Army Contingency Brigades that would be activated as needed. These brigades would be rapidly deployable and capable of operating independently with integral support. Reviewing operations from 1989 to 1996, RAND points out that force requirements for Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia shared common characteristics. From this, RAND argues that requirements during the initial phase of small scale contingencies are predictable enough to create contingency brigades. RAND recommended that these brigades include organic light infantry, armor, field artillery, special forces, aviation, signal, military police, engineer, intelligence, civil affairs, medical, ordnance, and logistics units, totaling 8,301 personnel. Although not a standing capability, this organizational model would better prepare the Army to respond quickly with a defined structure and established planning factors and doctrine for deployment. These robust brigades would be well suited to conduct interventions and peace operations, as well as be adjusted for specific post-conflict responsibilities.\textsuperscript{17}

The NDU study cited earlier in this paper takes a comprehensive look at the need for creating dedicated SASO capable units and offers the S&R JCOM as a possible solution. The study argues in part that the Army rebalance the active component and reserve component mix and reorganize existing forces to better prepare for and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations, creating one active component and one reserve component S&R JCOM. As proposed, only the S&R JCOM and subordinate S&R Group headquarters would require permanently assigned personnel; sub-units would not need to be permanently assigned.\textsuperscript{18}

The S&R JCOM, roughly a division equivalent sized force, would consist of training and security assistance, aviation, communications, intelligence, transportation, and explosive ordnance battalions and four S&R Groups. Each S&R Group would consist of military police, civil affairs, engineer, medical, and psychological operations battalions. If augmented for independent operations as an S&R Joint Task Force with support units and tactical combat forces, the size of the S&R JCOM could reach 18,200 personnel.\textsuperscript{19}

The operational concept for the S&R JCOM would be to execute stability and reconstruction operations in tandem with combat operations forces or as a stand alone force.\textsuperscript{20} As Dr. Binnendijk noted at the IFPA-Fletcher Conference, the goal is to “create this force as a force multiplier which serves as a bridge to nation building.” He continued, “this is more about
focusing, reorganizing and rebalancing, than it is about creating new capabilities²¹

ROLE OF DOD IN HOMELAND SECURITY - NEED FOR STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT

Discussions about homeland security predate the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks. By definition, homeland security is not exclusively a DOD task; securing the homeland is a concerted national effort, including federal, state and local governments. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission) took a hard look at the entire range of U.S. national security policies and processes and recommended a coordinated strategy across all U.S. national security institutions. The Phase III report published in February 2001 outlined specific reforms along five key areas, the first of which is "ensuring the security of the American homeland."²² The Commission viewed the growing threat of international terrorism directed against the U.S. homeland as a new strategic reality and recommended creation of a National Homeland Security Agency "to consolidate and refine the missions of the nearly two dozen disparate departments and agencies that have a role in U.S. homeland security."²³

The call for the Army to accurately determine the forces required for homeland security missions followed. In a monograph published by the Strategic Studies Institute in March 2001, Lieutenant Colonel Antulio Echevarria questioned whether the Army had the forces required to conduct homeland security missions "while carrying out its other responsibilities under the national security and national military strategies."²⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria argued the two major theater war force sizing metric had outlived its usefulness and recommended the Army consider alternative force-sizing metrics that include addressing homeland security requirements.²⁵

In response to the new strategic environment made clear by the attacks of 9/11, the Strategic Studies Institute published a compilation of short studies addressing issues in the war on terrorism in January 2002. In "Defining Preparedness: Army Force Structure in the War on Terrorism," Colonel John Martin argued that "significant growth of the Army force structure will be required to prosecute the war on terrorism successfully."²⁶ Colonel Martin points out that the new strategic reality requires increased force structure for two mission categories, the war on terrorism abroad and homeland security, both defense of the U.S. and consequence management. Colonel Martin notes that earlier efforts at addressing homeland security requirements had been given a low priority during program development in order to focus limited resources on major war-fighting, readiness and transformation.

At the time of the attacks, the DOD did not have a clear definition of homeland security and its role. In the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002, the Congress
directed the DOD to clarify its role with respect to homeland security.27 The subsequent DOD report defined the role of the military as twofold: (1) homeland defense, conducting military missions to protect the U.S. "territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression"; and, (2) civil support, employment of federal and state military forces under the broad category of military assistance to civil authorities.28

Increasingly, the focus of attention on DOD capabilities to conduct homeland security missions is on the second portion of that definition, particularly military assistance to civil authorities and consequence management. Colonel Steven Tomisek at the Institute for National Strategic Studies published a comprehensive look into the role of DOD in homeland security in February 2002. Colonel Tomisek points out that DOD employment within the U.S. has primarily fallen under the category of military assistance to civil authorities. In this role, the DOD acts at the request and in support of a lead federal agency. In such cases, requests involving the use of forces assigned to combatant commanders require the approval of the Secretary of Defense to ensure non-interference with primary war fighting requirements. Colonel Tomisek recommends that the DOD "ensure that its force design process accounts for all mission requirements or accept the operational risk associated with an insufficient resource allocation."29

The General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded in its July 2003 report titled “Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions”, that the DOD is not well tailored to perform domestic military missions. The report points out that DOD has made progress, specifically in establishing new organizations, such as U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and that it had recently completed a campaign plan for domestic military missions. As the unified combatant command responsible for the defense of the continental United States, NORTHCOM is also responsible to provide military assistance to U.S. civil authorities as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. To accomplish that dual purpose, NORTHCOM conducts domestic military missions using military combat capabilities, as well as non-military missions using DOD assets and capabilities in support of lead federal agencies. However, the report criticizes the DOD for failing to evaluate or adjust its force structure to perform the second portion of its mission statement. The GAO strongly urged the Secretary of Defense to move rapidly to determine what steps should be taken to better structure U.S. forces to perform domestic military missions.30

Much of the discussion on addressing HLS requirements urges DOD to reorganize the Army’s reserve components for this mission, particularly the National Guard. The Hart-Rudman Commission urged that the within DOD, National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission and that they should be reorganized, trained, and equipped to undertake that
mission. Because of the unique nature, as a dual-missioned state and federal force located in virtually every county in the nation, the National Guard is well positioned as the DOD primary bridge in providing increased military capability to the nation. The National Guard is organized and equipped as a strategic and operational reserve to augment active military forces for sustained overseas combat. Although able to bring large numbers of forces to bear, the current structure of the National Guard does not adequately address homeland security needs. Completion of NORTHCOM OPLAN 2002 and PACOM OPLAN 2005 should further specify capabilities required across services and components and guide further force structure analysis.

SOLUTIONS FOR ORGANIZING FOR HLS EXPLORED

In the nearly two and a half years since 9/11, the only force structure change to address the Army’s capability to respond to homeland security requirements was a Congressionally led effort increasing the number of Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (CST) in the National Guard. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Congress authorized an additional 23 teams, bringing the total to 55. These teams are trained and equipped to support the local incident commander for consequence management. National Guard CST identify Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) substances, assess current and projected consequences, advise on response measures, and assist with appropriate requests for additional military support.

At the conclusion of Total Army Analysis (TAA) 09, the Army had identified 92K spaces primarily from combat support and combat service support type units required for weapons of mass destruction consequence management and military support to civil authorities. In order to resource this capability requirement the Army decided to not inactivate forces from other mission categories that had incurred decreases during the analysis. With no definitive guidance on homeland security available from NORTHCOM, the number of forces required for HLS was reduced to 34K during the requirements phase of TAA 11. To address this mission category, the Army left untouched two ARNG combat divisions that were not missioned against other requirements. This number also included requirements for Missile Defense, Computer Emergency Response Teams, Vulnerability Assessment Detachments, and National Guard Civil Support Teams.

The Defense Science Board Summer 2003 study on “DOD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security” focused on improving areas of overlapping responsibilities between providing homeland security and homeland defense. One of the recommendations made by the
Board focused on consequence management, addressing emergency preparedness and incident response capability. The recommendation encouraged DOD to support several ongoing initiatives within the National Guard Bureau. These initiatives include enhancing National Guard capabilities by expanding the number of Civil Support Teams to all states; creating ten regional Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)-like capable organizations; and, establishing Standing Joint Headquarters in each state and territory.  

The initiatives within the National Guard Bureau were the result of a year-long effort completed in October 2003. The goal was to identify additional capabilities needed for conducting HLS in a CBRNE environment and to develop a comprehensive requirements process for this mission area. Included in the recommendation, coordinated and approved by NORTHCOM, were the following four additional force capability packages developed from existing personnel resources: converting each state National Guard headquarters to a Joint Force Headquarters; task organizing 12 regional National Guard (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages (NGCERFP); and, establishing Full Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (FSIVA) Teams and Quick/Rapid Reaction Forces (NGRF) within each state.  

The NGB also identified mission specific units as a minimum capability within each state to address homeland security requirements. The type units identified are an Aviation Platoon, Engineer Company, Chemical Company, Military Police Company, Medical Company, Transportation Company, Signal Company, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Detachment. These units, identified from existing warfighting structure, bring needed capabilities to respond as required to a broad range of requests for military support to civil authorities and consequence management. To fully operationalize these units the National Guard will seek resourcing to provide additional CBRNE equipment to allow these units to respond in all environments and communications equipment to facilitate interoperability with state and local first responders.  

The National Guard Bureau effort described above is consistent with the view of the Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS) and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS). In a point paper on Homeland Security, the associations outlined fifteen key tenants of a successful homeland security strategy related to the National Guard, covering everything from changes in the National Guard Bureau charter to establishment of a joint state task force in each state. While broad in scope, the paper did not identify any changes to the force structure of the National Guard other than the continued establishment of Civil Support Teams in each state. From a force management perspective, recommendations focused on training and equipping existing units for operations in a CBRNE
environment. The Adjutants General requested additional specialized CBRNE equipment and modernized communications and transportation equipment to better enable warfighting units to respond to homeland security missions in support of local first responders. ⁴⁰

Efforts by the National Guard to increase HLS capabilities are not fully assured. On its current Integrated Priority List (IPL), NORTHCOM emphasizes that the National Guard be capable of responding to multiple and simultaneous homeland defense and civil assistance missions. However, NORTHCOM identified inadequate resourcing and training for a transforming National Guard as a capability shortfall which represents risk that is not adequately addressed in the FY05-09 program. ⁴¹

COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONS FOR SASO AND HLS

The three detailed views above of organizing for SASO share a similar viewpoint: the optimum use of existing force structure organized for a specific range of operations to focus effort and relieve demand pressure on combat formations. As proposed by NDU, designating a standing headquarters responsible for SASO and task organizing sub-units as required provides considerable planning and controlling capability toward the SASO mission. The S&R JCOM plans, trains, exercises, develops doctrine, deploys, and is capable of operating under a joint command or as a separate JTF. The figure below depicts the notional S&R JCOM (Figure 1). ⁴²

FIGURE 1. NOTIONAL S&R JOINT COMMAND ORGANIZATION
Many of the Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) currently employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom provide an organizational model that serves to better address the SASO mission. Selected brigades in theater, as well as three National Guard brigades deployed as replacements, have migrated toward a standardized force configuration, task organized, equipped and trained, primarily for SASO. These combat brigades, whether light infantry, mechanized infantry, or armor, have reconfigured to a motorized infantry organization. Throughout these brigades, infantry, armor, artillery, and cavalry soldiers have largely abandoned their tracked vehicles in favor of the up-armored high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). Although motorized, the BCT retain a Bradley Fighting Vehicle equipped company sized tactical combat force within each battalion task force, as well as a Paladin equipped artillery firing battery in support of the brigade, to respond as needed with more lethal force (see Figure 2).

![FIGURE 2. BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM TEMPLATE]

While no formal recommendations to reorganize structure have emerged from the TAA process to specifically address HLS needs, an increased requirement for CS and CSS capability is generally acknowledged. Historically, the National Guard Bureau attempts to proportionately distribute force structure capabilities to the states to address state level requirements under
United States Code (USC) Title 32 (National Guard). The capabilities considered critical by the Adjutants General fall into the following categories: military police, aviation, transportation, medical, chemical, engineer and ordnance/maintenance. As proposed by NGB and described above, creating the enhanced capability packages along with mission specific units continues this process in a formal manner, establishing a standardized capability within each state (see Figure 3). Distributed for use within each state, these forces are immediately available to respond to state and federal requirements.

STATE JFHQ

- WMD-CST
- FSVA
- NGRF
  (Co within 4 hrs. Bn within 24 hrs.)

NGCERFP
  (min one per FEMA Region)

- MP
- CHEM
- EN
- SIG
- AVN
- MED
- TRANS
- EOD

FIGURE 3. STATE CAPABILITY TEMPLATE

The capabilities contained in the organizational models described above are strikingly similar. All three models contain military police, engineer, medical, aviation, and transportation as core capabilities. Although the BCT model above contains motorized infantry in lieu of large numbers of military police, the motorized infantry companies are nearly identical to a military police company in equipment and number of personnel. Additional capabilities such as EOD, chemical, civil affairs, and a tactical combat force, or rapid reaction force, are clearly consistent with both SASO and HLS type missions and should be considered core capability requirements.
RECOMMENDATION

The requirements to address SASO and HLS are similar enough in nature and in sufficient demand to recommend that the Army move aggressively in implementing change. The Washington Post reported on 24 Nov 03 that “language is being drafted for the Strategic Planning Guidance...that would direct military authorities to explore setting up a stability operations force”.46 This is a step in the right direction. However, the Army should not wait. The Army should:

- immediately re-look current approved operations plans and fully model Phase IV capability requirements,
- work closely with NORTHCOM to determine HLS needs and develop appropriate models to build force structure requirements,
- and, reorganize sufficient Active and National Guard forces into SASO/HLS capable structure.

Given the impetus for addressing DOD capability to better conduct SASO on one hand and HLS requirements on the other, one possible solution for organizing can posture a portion of the Army to better satisfy both missions. The maneuver brigade task force, with a command element from the divisional headquarters and augmented with corps assets, has been the solution for most of the contingency operations conducted since 1989.47 The BCT Template as described above, if equipped with additional CBRNE equipment and radios to coordinate with first responders, contains the basic force structure necessary to respond effectively to HLS missions as well as create a standing SASO capability. These units would be capable of responding to WMD events as required by NORTHCOM, as well provide SASO capability in support of overseas conflict. By relying primarily on existing structure, this is a modest, low risk proposal that can easily be undone if the strategic environment shifts.

Actual composition of the BCT could be adjusted. For example, the number of motorized infantry battalions could be reduced and the MP company could be increased in size to a composite MP Combat Support/Internment & Resettlement battalion as proposed by NDU to ensure better skill to mission match.46 The composite battalion concept could extend to the engineer battalion, where the skills in a construction, as well as combat engineers are needed for SASO and potential consequence management scenarios.

Whatever the structure, sufficient capacity in both Active and National Guard must be created. While urging the DOD to establish analytical standards for determining their size and design, the NDU study recommends two division-equivalents, one active and one reserve component, to ensure a baseline capability to respond to two medium sized contingencies in
moderately difficult conditions. With ongoing SASO operations in the Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a need to have a force capable of responding to HLS missions as required by NORTHCOM, this is clearly not enough structure. The Army should establish two division-equivalents on active duty with an additional two division-equivalents in the National Guard, as the DOD lead for military assistance to state and local governments. The dual-mission nature of the National Guard as a federal and state force make it ideally suited to meet this requirement. This would create surge capability for a large-scale conflict, allow for a reasonable rotation factor for ongoing operations, and maintain forces forward deployed across the U.S. to respond to HLS needs.

The dual focus of these units should not be a problem. Active and National Guard BCT would be identical in structure and capable of deploying in support of contingencies both at home and abroad. Active BCT Headquarters would focus on rapid deployment as part of a contingency force for SASO missions, and National Guard BCT Headquarters would focus on civil-military coordination and exercises with first responders for HLS mission requirements. The mission essential task lists of sub-units would be nearly identical in both active and National Guard BCT. Whether conducting stability operations abroad or responding to natural or manmade disasters at home, tasks for military police, engineer, aviation, transportation, chemical, signal, medical and explosive ordnance disposal units would be similar, only the conditions would differ. By organizing to increase skills available to match mission requirements, as opposed to relying on forces available, erosion of readiness during long-term military missions will be reduced.

CONCLUSION

The National Military strategy has focused US military forces on deterring and preventing aggression abroad with robust war fighting capabilities, and to fight and win if these measures fail. The post-Cold War frequency of conflict finds the US military conducting an increasing number of missions to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability. Additionally, 9/11 has dramatically changed the view and sense of urgency for HLS, moving it into a primary mission area. As a result, the Army must rethink its strategy of organizing.

The Army must create a force that enables a rapid transition from conflict to post conflict reconstruction, critical to the effort of winning the peace. This force must deploy as part of the combat formations required for a ground campaign and be capable of sustaining a relatively secure environment in concert with standard combat divisions. This force must also be capable of assisting civil authorities with the optimum skill sets needed for the homeland security.
Better organizing structure as recommended in this paper will optimize forces available and posture the Army to better transition to SASO when required, as well as respond rapidly with the type forces needed for domestic HLS needs. Wholesale creation of new capabilities is not required. Reorganizing existing structure is a major forward step in optimizing current Army capability and addressing this need.

WORD COUNT = 4,907
ENDNOTES


2 James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), xiv.


4 Binnendijk and Johnson, 20.

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10 Major Clark Heidelbaugh, Force Strategy Division, Center for Army Analysis, interview by author, 12 December 2003, Fort Belvoir, VA.


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15 Colonel Dallas Brown, Director for Peacekeeping, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, interview by author, 12 January 2004, Washington, D.C.

16 Bruce Pirnie and Corazon Francisco, Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster Relief (Santa Monica: Rand, 1998), xiii.

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18 Binnendijk and Johnson, 57.

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21 Binnendijk lecture.


23 Ibid, vi.


25 Ibid, 16-17.


33 *The DoD Role in Homeland Security*, 7-8.


Colonel James Barrineau, National Guard Bureau Force Management Division, interview by author, 14 January 2004, Arlington, VA.

U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board 2003 Summer Study, "DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security," briefing slides, undated; note that the use of the word "state" throughout this paper refers to the fifty states, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of Columbia.


Wright interview.


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Figure from Binnendijk and Johnson, 59.

Lieutenant Colonel Ted Martinell, National Guard Bureau Readiness Division, interview by author, 20 February 2004, Arlington, VA.

Heidelbaugh interview; and, Martin, 45.

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