NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN SOUTH ASIA:  
A STRATEGIC FAILURE OR BEGINNING  
OF REGIONAL STABILITY

by

Brigadier Agha M. U. Farooq  
Pakistan Army

Colonel Edward J. Filiberti  
Project Advisor

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# Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: A Strategic Failure or Beginning of Regional Stability

**Authors:** Agha Farooq

**Performing Organization:** U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

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ABSTRACT

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The paper examines nuclear non-proliferation and deterrence theories and applies those to the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict. The strategic issues driving India and Pakistan’s nuclear programs are examined together with the implications for both the international environment and long-term regional stability. The paper highlights both the benefits and disadvantages of the development of theater nuclear weapons by each of these antagonists as a possible precedence for further proliferation and as a means by which to deter and prevent a regional conflict. It also identifies related regional issues such as prestige, stability, and long-term strategic consistency and finally draws some conclusions in regards to the strategic implications for Pakistan and India.
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The aspect of nuclear capable nations juxtaposed in conflict prone South Asia adds a new and dangerous dimension to the geo-political and military tensions of the region. This transforming phenomenon in South Asia is both complex and intriguing. I decided to choose this topic for my SRP, though I am well aware of the inherent contradictions and the strategic ambiguities that shroud the nuclear programs as well as non-availability of an officially recognized nuclear doctrine by either India or Pakistan. I owe my gratitude to my Project Advisor, COL Ed Filiberti, as I could embark upon this complex topic only because of his support, mentoring and intellectual guidance.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN SOUTH ASIA: A STRATEGIC FAILURE OR BEGINNING OF REGIONAL STABILITY

“Deterrence means any strategy, force position or policy which is intended to persuade a potential enemy not to attack. This is the belief that a weak country can deter attack by a strong one as long as it can impose a damage outweighing in proportion to the expected gains of the aggressor. Deterrence is a function of capability, credibility and will.”

—Dived Robertson, Dictionary of Modern Defense and Strategy

From 1968 to 1970, at the apex of the cold war and under imminent threat of a possible nuclear exchange by the opposing super powers, 187 nations of the world scrambled to sign the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This watershed agreement provided relative stability for decades. Then, in May of 1998, India shook the international community by exploding a nuclear weapon. This development also seriously tilted the strategic balance in the South Asia region. Faced with this overt threat, Pakistan was compelled to demonstrate their nuclear capability just two weeks later at Chaghi. Within a span of less than three weeks, the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime appeared to have been irreparably damaged and its future placed in serious jeopardy; not only in South Asia but also internationally. These tests have raised serious doubts about the credibility of non-proliferation and associated arms control regimes. Essentially these tests revealed that arms control regimes are only a small part of an effective nonproliferation strategy.

To be effective, the world community must also concentrate on resolving conflicts and issues between nations that have the capability to develop nuclear weapons programs. There are two distinct aspects of nonproliferation that have dominated the international community. One is the rather discriminatory principle of distinguishing between horizontal and vertical proliferation as specified in the existing Non-Proliferation Treaty and creating different sets of restrictions for each grouping. To remain effective, this approach requires a much more aggressive enforcement of sanctions to counter proliferation events.

The second is a more measured approach towards nuclear proliferation. This approach seeks to stabilize and slow down proliferation at the global level by focusing on the sources of instability in the candidate regions. Within this paper this approach is termed “regional proliferation containment.” This approach allows different regions to develop their own non-proliferation regimes while the international community works to resolve the disputes or issues driving proliferation or the source of potential conflict. Given existing regimes and the international inertia of current non-proliferation agreements, the feasible response to growing
proliferation is likely a combination of these two approaches. This research paper examines each of these approaches within the context of existing treaties and provides insights into their potential affect on long term stability. Next the paper examines the conceptual framework of deterrence together with the adoption of aggressive counter-proliferation measures with a focus on their possible impact on the India-Pakistan proliferation failure. The paper concludes with a proposal for implementing a combination of these approaches as applied to South Asia as a means to contain proliferation once it occurs.

NON-PROLIFERATION RELATED TREATIES

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

The Non-Proliferation Treaty reflects a rather discriminatory approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament. The Treaty has different sets of rights and obligations for nuclear weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. While the non-nuclear nations are forbidden to acquire nuclear weapons technology and weaponry, the ones that possess programs are simply required to pursue negotiations towards reduction and elimination of their nuclear weapons. The Treaty also places mandatory restrictions only on those nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards that have an imported component - which basically means the reactors of developing states. The treaty has a relatively rigid definition of a nuclear weapon state: a state that tested a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967. This clause makes the Treaty redundant for new nuclear weapons states like Pakistan, India and Israel. However, the two articles that do impose a binding obligation on nuclear weapon states have never really been practically implemented. These provisions stress the right of all parties to the Treaty to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and insure the right of all parties to receive the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions at reduced cost from the established nuclear weapon states. Notwithstanding, India approached this provision by attempting to link NPT with time constrained global disarmament instead of dealing with the disarmament issue on a regional basis. During a conference on disarmament in 1995, India’s adamant opposition to the applicable provisions in the NPT created the present impasse. Correspondingly, India’s position placed Pakistan in a strategic untenable regional posture. For Pakistan, signing the NPT would imply accepting the status of a non-nuclear weapon state and therefore leave it permanently disarmed against India’s nuclear capability. Pakistan, on becoming a member of NPT, would forever close her options of becoming a nuclear power. Moreover, for largely economic reasons, Pakistan could not hope to develop the conventional capability that would compensate for or act as a deterrent to India’s newly acquired nuclear capability. Thus, nuclear deterrence
emerged as Pakistan’s only logically and effective means of security. Its only other feasible recourse is to attempt bilateral (India-Pakistan) nuclear disarmament. Pakistan, therefore consistently seeks: a declaration of South Asia as a nuclear free Zone; commitment by both nations to sign the NPT as a package deal after resolution of regional issues; and an agreement by all parties to pursue multilateral efforts for conflict resolution in South Asia.5

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a follow-up of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963. Pakistan, like India, has signed and ratified the PTBT, which forbids nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.6 The CTBT does not distinguish or discriminate between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states.7 The CTBT has been signed by 155 states, but only 51 have so far ratified it. The CTBT will enter into force only after ratification by 44 designated states that possess nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors. Out of these candidate nations, 41 have signed the CTBT but only 26 have ratified it, including Britain and France while the USA has not.8 India refused to sign the CTBT on the pretext that it does not contain a time constrained disarmament framework, is discriminatory and the comparative formula is unacceptable to India. Correspondingly, Pakistan must consider India’s intransigence as being linked to the regional geo-political balance of power and is compelled not to restrict its own programs by signing the treaty.9

FISSILE MATERIAL CUT OFF TREATY (FMCT)

Indian stance towards Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) was similar to NPT and CTBT but, after 1998 nuclear tests, India modified her position and now supports establishment of an ad hoc committee. India now favors FMCT because it legitimizes the existing stockpiles of fissile material at regional levels. However, India declines to sign the treaty unilaterally.10 Through the proposed ad hoc committee, Pakistan is attempting to focus attention on the global and regional stockpile imbalances. Yet, a mere cut off in future production would result in numerous inequities. Additionally, the difference in stockpiles at the regional levels in South Asia and the Middle East is potentially destabilizing. A fissile material freeze could just as likely accelerate nuclear proliferation, as nations would probably pursue other related programs to address the established inequities. Consequently, the treaty could comparatively disadvantage Pakistan and increase regional instability.11 Before seriously considering signing this treaty, Pakistan will need more time to produce sufficient fissile material to attain a level consistent with that needed to deter possible regional aggressors.12
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Pakistan has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and is focusing negotiations with a view toward developing suitable procedures to mitigate the adverse impact on its security. Pakistan does not possess a chemical weapons program hence ratification does not have a material effect on its security. The treaty will affect the Indian position considerably.  

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) affects the availability of missiles. It is an arrangement where possible producers of military and dual-use missile technology agree to refrain from exporting this capability. So while it does not impinge upon a country's own missile development, it reassures the rest of the world that such a country will not aid in the proliferation of missile production. It is an effort to coordinate national export restrictions prohibiting transfer of missiles and technology for missiles capable of delivering a 500 kg payload over a range of 300 kms. India maintains that her space and missile program is indigenous in nature hence is not subject to MTCR. Pakistan supports a US initiative for establishing a “zero missile zone” in South Asia. Consequently, Pakistan has serious concerns over India's development of the nuclear capable ‘Prithvi’ and intermediate range ‘Agni’ missile systems. MTCR does not apply to indigenous production of missiles; hence Pakistan also maintains that her missile program is an indigenous effort. Overall, the MTCR will essentially thwart the civilian space program in the third world.

STRATEGIC NON-PROLIFERATION FAILURE IN SOUTH ASIA

THE DRIVE FOR WMD

The demand side of non-proliferation is strong. Nation states have a variety of motivations to acquire nuclear capability: fear; the drive for power, influence and prestige; the desire to assure national security and control of their own destiny. Given the appropriate motivation, nearly any modern nation state can acquire nuclear capability. Even desperately poor North Korea apparently has been able to develop a nuclear capability while being isolated from the world by sanctions and multilateral technology controls. The acquisition of medium range ballistic missile delivery capability has proven even easier to obtain or develop.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN ACQUISITION OF WMD

Non-nuclear weapon states observe that nuclear weapons serve an important symbolic function, like the classic role of gold in international monetary system. India, like China, acquired nuclear weapons in order to enhance her political status and prestige. The enhanced
status represents potential political power and influence that can be applied in many non-security related international situations. This appears to be a very important consideration for India’s development of her nuclear program. Conversely, Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is a response to proliferation; and is primarily motivated by a concern for its survival. These two major factors present an almost insurmountable impasse for potential arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. Any possible agreement would be based on disparate foundations. The dichotomy is obvious; Pakistan will not give up its nuclear weapons as long as India does not. India will not as long as China and other nuclear powers retain their nuclear capabilities and she continues to harbor aspirations as a respected world power. Hence, on the issue of non-proliferation in South Asia, the issues stretch well beyond the region.

From a strategic perspective, for Pakistan to ignore India’s acquisition of a nuclear capability requires Pakistan to rely on its inadequate conventional capability to deter potential India provocations; place Pakistan’s national security in the hands of a nuclear capable ally and/or one that would deploy significant conventional assets to assist in countering possible Indian aggression, e.g., the US. However, no nation is predisposed to placing its national security in the hands of an ally and certainly not an ally that has been unwilling to deploy its military where its vital national interests are not at stake. What the US failed to recognize then and now is that counter-proliferation, even within South Asia, is a US vital national interest. To effectively counter proliferation, there must be both deliberate actions taken to impose real sanctions on the regional actor seeking hegemony (India) as well as direct action to provide for the security of the threatened regional ally (Pakistan). This is the basis for the “deterrence” of proliferation.

EMERGENCE OF DETERRENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

“Deterrence is not a strategy of war, it is a strategy for peace, designed to convince the opposition that aggression is the least attractive of all alternatives. Deterrence does not restrain the enemy physically. It restrains him psychologically.”

—John M. Collins

The strategic context of the Cold War was the caldron that refined the strategic concept of deterrence. In general terms, deterrence restrains specific actions of selected or potential adversaries. It accomplishes this by creating a likely consequence that is unacceptable to the actor. To adequately deter the adversary from the action, the response or consequence must be credible: the protagonist must have the means or capability to effect the consequence, the
will to use it and its use “believable” within the strategic or operational context that both nations interact. The concept presupposes the rationality of both actors; fairly open lines of communications; and the relatively accurate assessment by the potential actors of their opposing capabilities and likely responses.

ROLE AND APPLICATION OF DETERRENCE IN THE SOUTH ASIA REGION

In South Asia, India projects China as her primary rationale for Indian security concerns. Despite 100 years of relative peace and a succession of Chinese regimes that have not harbored any expansionist designs or ambitions against any other country of the region, India remains focused on an unlikely Chinese threat. Notwithstanding this claim, the major regional destabilizing issue concerns India and Pakistan. Pakistan claims that the current nuclear developments have re-established a regional balance, whereas India claims that, together with China, their security is more threatened. Consequently, there exists a disparity between what both countries view as regional stability and an equitable balance of power. This difference in perception is fuelling a competitive arms race, i.e., nuclear, conventional and missiles. While regional stability is tenuously maintained, the prospects for continued stability remains problematic. What India perceives as a sufficient capability to deter China and deal with Pakistan looks like an overwhelming superiority to Pakistan; a condition that Pakistan must counter to insure its own security. Thus, the balance of power is dynamic and deterrence is based upon a difficult and disparate assessment of both nations’ capabilities, intentions and activities. Within this regional context, stability can only be maintained through credible nuclear deterrence.

COUNTER-PROLIFERATION PROTOCOLS CONTROLLING HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION

Within the current vertical and horizontal non-proliferation regime, it is informative to postulate what could have prevented India from developing a nuclear capability and what correspondingly could have prevented the Pakistani response. This analysis provides insights into what is causing the current regional impasse, constitutes a roadmap for resolving this regional issue and provides a possible template to avoid future non-proliferation failures within the current vertical non-proliferation regimes.

To effectively stop the proliferation of WMD, the international community or non-proliferation regime must institute a counter-proliferation response component that sanctions violators and secures regional actors placed at risk by the proliferation. Lt Col Don Jurewicz proposes some potential protocols to guide US responses to proliferation that would deter and, if deterrence failed, punish the violator and preclude other regional actors from obtaining that
The non-proliferation regime or international community, as an effective response to proliferation events, could adopt these same “protocols.” They include:

- Extending a retaliatory response commitment of current nuclear capable nations to the threatened nation and thus providing protection. This would have required the unequivocal extension of the nuclear “umbrella” to Pakistan once India exploded the nuclear weapon. Retrospectively almost nothing was done by the existing regime to place India at risk or secure Pakistan.
- Employment of security systems within the threatened theater. This would include the deployment of appropriate theater warning and theater missile defense systems to Pakistan to protect against or neutralize India’s newly developed nuclear weapon systems. However, in this instance, it would still have left India with an overwhelming military conventional superiority.
- Announcing the strategic nuclear re-targeting and/or deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the threatened nation. This would introduce India to the “nuclear community” and bring to light the real liabilities associated with the development of a nuclear capability. It also places “state-of-the-art” tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in support of the threatened nation (Pakistan) more than negating the development of WMD by India.
- Employing consequence management and force protection capability within the theater and providing the same capability to the threatened nation (Pakistan) through foreign military sales or assistance programs. This is a force protection measure for the non-proliferation regime and other forces deployed to Pakistan and would further demonstrate both the futility of a potential attack by India and the resolve of the regime to counter India’s newly acquired nuclear capability.
- Conducting an information campaign aimed at the populaces of the regional actors highlighting the negative consequences of proliferation and positive aspects of choosing not to develop WMD. This might have had a profound affect on the Indian population who would have been placed at risk by state of the art strategic nuclear missiles.
- Conducting selective pre-emptive strikes to neutralize the threat. Although a radical step in this situation, the threat of possible strikes by the international community would in and of itself be a real deterrent that may have prevented India from developing this capability to begin with.

Within the conceptual context of deterrence, these measures or protocols provide real negative consequences for nations acquiring nuclear capability while concurrently obviating the need for other regional actors to respond with their own development of similar WMD capability for protection. The response or sanctions are credible in that nuclear capable nations have this
capability, their employment of one or more of these measures would be in their interests, and they would have previously agreed to implement these measures as a response to incidents of proliferation. The open adoption of these protocols by the non-proliferation regime would also provide the transparency needed to communicate clear and unambiguous consequences to the regional actors that would facilitate their rational and accurate strategic assessments of the possible consequences of proliferation. If adopted as counter-proliferation protocols by the international community or even the US, they would likely have deterred India from developing their nuclear capability to begin with. However, though this hypothetical application of the proposed strategy might have effectively deterred proliferation in South Asia, its application today is infeasible. The security mechanism offered by Lt Col Don Jurewicz does not currently satisfy Pakistan due to the prevailing public perception of betrayal by the US at critical junctures like 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and the imposition of post Cold War sanctions that placed Pakistan at serious disadvantages vis-à-vis India. The discriminatory treatment, concern and suspicion meted to Pakistan’s nuclear endeavors while virtually ignoring Indian and Israeli nuclear developments has also caused great anxiety and mistrust within Pakistan, negating the applicability of these protocols. The existing animosity and mistrust further complicate efforts of containment or prevention thus leaving the alternative of a super power mediated conflict resolution as the only realistic means of ensuring stability and security for the weaker states like Pakistan.

SOUTH ASIAN PROLIFERATION CONTAINMENT STRATEGY

THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Historically, the conflicts in South Asia stem from the region’s economics, competition for resources, ethnic and religious hostilities, ecology and power politics. Resource sharing and control issues play the dominant role in furthering residue conflicts and existing regional instability. Arguably, the tensions, mistrusts and hostilities in south Asia are rooted in the contradictions of India’s security perceptions with that of the rest of the countries of the region...especially Pakistan. Many of the other South Asian Nations do little to challenge India’s increasing desire for regional hegemony, however, Pakistan perceives India as the source of many of its troubles and as its primary security threat. Both have already fought three major wars and live with a simmering and bleeding Kashmir issue. Tensions remain high with the real potential of a fourth full scale war; possibly involving nuclear weapons. The overall situation is precarious because there is a vast disparity in their comparative conventional forces. There existed a precarious balance in the Region, which has been seriously tilted in India’s favor due
to her acquisitions of Russian nuclear powered submarines, aircraft carrier and sophisticated high tech military hardware. Pakistan has receded to further strategic disadvantage due to US-India-Israel strategic grand alliance and a US pledge to provide India with space and nuclear technology including a missile defense shield. This places Pakistan in a highly vulnerable position because US non-proliferation policy actually is only enforced against Pakistan, which amounts to tying Pakistan’s hands at its back while India remains unchecked. It is unlikely that Pakistan could ever develop the conventional capability to adequately deter a provocation by India. Moreover, to do so would probably increase the likelihood of conflict by both sides if the consequences of a nuclear response were also removed.

THE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY NON-SOLUTION

Pakistan launched its nuclear program to establish a deterrent against India and to compensate for India’s conventional military advantages. The Indian Army is structured around five regional commands comprising of twelve corps. Out of these twelve corps, nine are either deployed along the Line of Control (LOC) or poised against mainland Pakistan. These corps also include the three strike corps built around armored divisions, mechanized divisions and the RAPID divisions. The remaining three corps, as part of the Eastern Command, are deployed at Siliguri (West Bengal), Dimapur (Nagaland) and Tezpur (Assam).\textsuperscript{19} The Indian Navy has three main Commands: Western (headquarters at Bombay), Southern (headquarters at Cochin), and Eastern (headquarters at Vishabhapatnam). Besides these, it also has a Far Eastern Sub Command with headquarters at Port Blair and the Naval Aviation with headquarters at Goa. The locations of the bases suggest that the Indian Navy’s area of concentration is the western coast. The Indian Navy is operationally divided into two fleets: Western and Eastern. Reports suggest that the Western Fleet has around the same number of vessels as the Eastern Fleet if not more.\textsuperscript{20} The Indian Air Force is organized into five Commands: Northern, Central, Southern, Southwestern, and Eastern. It has around 72 bases across India.\textsuperscript{21} The concentration of the bases in the west and northwest under the Central, Western, and Southwestern Command indicates that over two-thirds of the Indian Air Force is positioned near Pakistan.\textsuperscript{22} The allocation of air force wings and squadrons to these bases along with the bulk of India’s most modern aircraft, the Su-30 MK, Su-30 MKI, Mirage 2000, Jaguar, MiG 29, and MiG 27, point to the strategic advantage these bases provide from an Indian perspective. Given Pakistan’s geophysical vulnerability with the proximity of major cities such as Lahore and lines of communication to the international border, the strength and technological superiority of the Indian armed forces pose a serious threat to Pakistan in the event of a conventional war.
Furthermore, India’s ability to move forces from the Eastern and Southern Commands to the western front within two weeks time and concentrate all three elements of the armed forces at the point of application against Pakistan further accentuates the conventional military imbalance in India’s favor. The mobility of India’s armed forces has been facilitated by the recent Sino-Indian rapprochement and desire to resolve the border dispute on the northeastern front. Thus, India is now more capable than ever of mustering sufficient numbers of its conventional military forces near Pakistan for offensive operations, thus further jeopardizing Pakistan’s security and integrity. Pakistan’s bitter memories of its defeat at Indian hands and the lack of US and Chinese assistance in preventing its break-up in the 1971 war, along with India’s growing conventional military superiority, has forced Pakistan to look for other options to restore the strategic balance with India.

Moreover, conventional parity could make war both feasible and the potential consequences acceptable vis a vis the previous three conflicts. Consequently, to reach conventional parity, Pakistan is faced with the option of spending an almost infeasible amount of resources increasing its conventional forces with the result that it may ultimately also increase the likelihood of conflict. In contrast, it can retain its present nuclear capability, and comparatively small conventional force, and reinforce the credibility that she would have to resort to nuclear weapons as a response to either a conventional or nuclear attack by India. Stability in South Asia now necessarily depends upon the credibility of nuclear deterrence: which partially depends on Pakistan’s comparative conventional vulnerability to India. Its vulnerability ultimately lends credibility to Pakistan’s possible use of nuclear weapons should India attack it and thus is a compelling deterrent to Indian provocations.

MOVEMENT TOWARDS STABILITY AND CONTAINMENT

The resulting consequences of possible conflict dictate certain areas of possible co-operation between India and Pakistan: (1) Each side must accept that the consequences of conflict is unacceptable; (2) Neither side must attempt to use the fear of nuclear war to coerce favorable territorial and political concessions; and (3) Both countries should avoid initiating or escalating bilateral crises. In this regards Pakistan’s offer of a non-aggression pact with India is a feasible approach that could defuse the possibility of a nuclear war, meet each others need for retention of nuclear weapons and eventually provide the basis for diffusing and resolving other bilateral issues. This offer requires international support and pressure for Indian agreement. Of late, a process of implementing a bilateral approach towards conflict resolution has been re-initiated due to US persuasion. However, the possibility of a resolution of the conflict with equal
justice and mutually advantageous to both parties is unlikely because of the strong strategic position of India compared to the relatively weak but resolute posture of Pakistan. The importance of deterrence and stability is further magnified and there is a dire need to embark upon deliberate confidence building measures: strengthening deterrence and maintaining a stable nuclear environment.

Presently, a precarious state of nuclear balance but a tenable state of deterrence exists between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s imperatives should be to continue to balance Indian hegemony in South Asia, maintain a rough strategic nuclear parity and retain the “nuclear” bargaining chip to empower sincere negotiations at multilateral forums for addressing its security concerns. That balance assures both stability and containment of “proliferation” within the region. Correspondingly, it is within the vital interests of the non-proliferation regime to support the resolution of the major issues creating tension within the South-Asia region.

The non-proliferation regime or the UN, with perhaps the US in the lead (the remaining superpower), needs to directly undertake diplomatic efforts to resolve the major areas of dispute to include improving the India-China relationship. The goal should be to establish a stable regional environment, which would require Pakistan and India to develop a stable mutual nuclear deterrence capability. This, by definition, would require both countries to come to some agreement over missile deployments. Using associated counter-proliferation protocols as a lever to maintain “nuclear parity” would both deter Indian and Pakistan’s further WMD developments while insuring genuine negotiations on the major areas of dispute. There is no expectation that Pakistan would demand a missile-for-missile balance from India given India’s claimed security concerns in relation to China. However, in the case of missiles that are Pakistan-specific, such as the Prithvi, India should accept an equitable Pakistan capability. An equitable solution would also include the consideration of India’s entire “triad” of nuclear capable systems that may translate in a comparative advantage in some Pakistani land-based systems. Continued nuclear parity with the corresponding backing of the international community would insure both stability and proliferation containment.

CONCLUSION

The threat to Pakistan’s security and sovereignty emanates mainly from India. A hostile relationship has existed between Pakistan and India due largely to the unsettled Kashmir problem and centuries old mistrust and alienation. Pakistan’s unilateral acceptance or endorsement of the arms control regimes and NPT would create serious security and nuclear instability concerns. Presently, a precarious state of nuclear balance yet effective minimum
deterrence exists between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s imperatives should be to continue to balance Indian designs in South Asia and maintain strategic nuclear near-parity as a bargaining chip for sincere negotiations at multilateral forums for addressing its security concerns. The involvement of international community in general, and USA in specific, is essential for real progress.

The non-proliferation regimes are a noble cause and are in the best interest of humanity in general and possibly the poverty-stricken populace of India-Pakistan. However, within the South Asian region, Pakistan cannot compromise its national security and potential survival pursuing universal principles. Because of the clear and dangerous threat and on-going Kashmir dispute all Pakistani actions must be juxtaposed against possible Indian actions and reactions. Pakistan should thus pursue a regional approach to strategic non-proliferation issues while seeking to redress conventional force imbalances through alternative bilateral arrangements with India.

The current stability between India and Pakistan depends, in large measure, on the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Paradoxically, whether this stability is maintained will depend on comparative nuclear vulnerability. This precarious balance requires certain areas of cooperation between India and Pakistan. Each side must recognize the unacceptable consequences of conflict and the futility and danger of increasing the development of WMD. The road to improved stability, reduced risk and the containment of WMD proliferation will reside in bilateral agreements that limit WMD development, guarantee security and resolve the source of dispute, e.g., the Kashmir issue.
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., 45.

3 Ibid., 47.


5 Ibid., 18.

6 Shireen, 2.


8 Ibid., 233.

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