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DoD Chemical/Biological Defense Program Overview

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Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Chemical and Biological Defense

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"The grave threat from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons has not gone away with the Cold War. It has evolved into many separate threats, some of them harder to see and harder to answer. And the adversaries seeking these tools of terror are less predictable, more diverse."

President George W. Bush Norfolk Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia February 13, 2001 "We need to prepare, as an Alliance, for the full range of asymmetric threats: new forms of terrorism, ... and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. All of these are emerging dangers. None can be ignored.

It should be of particular concern to all of us that the list of countries which today support global terrorism overlaps



today support global terrorism overlaps significantly with the list of countries that have weaponized chemical and biological agents, and which are seeking nuclear, chemical and biological weapons—and the means to deliver them."

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, NATO North Atlantic Council, <u>December 18, 2001</u> "The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.... My budget nearly doubles funding for a sustained strategy of homeland



security, focused on four key areas: bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and border security, and improved intelligence. We will develop vaccines to fight anthrax and other deadly diseases. We'll increase funding to help states and communities train and equip our heroic police and firefighters."

President George W. Bush State of the Union Address 29 January 2002

CBDP Vision

Ensure U.S. military personnel are the best equipped and best prepared force in the world for operating in future battle spaces that may feature chemically and biologically contaminated environments.

Chemical/Biological Defense Program (CBDP)

- Established by Congress
 - Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act Public Law 103-160, Sect. 1703 (50 USC 1522)
- "The Secretary of Defense shall ... Assign responsibility for overall coordination and integration of the chemical and biological warfare defense program and the chemical and biological medical defense program to a single office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense."
 - Provides visibility for many relatively low-cost items
 - · Eliminates redundancy


Chemical/Biological Defense Program Global Proliferation

- More than 20 countries working toward CW capability
 - Relatively cheap and readily obtainable
 - · Blister Nerve Blood Choking
- More than 10 countries developing BW capability
 - Equipment not unique
 - · More potent than most deadly chemical agents
 - No need for large stockpiles
 - · Easy to hide
- At least 25 countries have delivery capabilities or are developing them
- Legitimate global trade of many precursors & equipment
 - Difficult to limit production with export controls
- Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs)
 - Any chemical with LCt50 less than 100,000 mg-min/m3 and produced in quantities exceeding 30 tons annually at one facility (ITF-25 definition)

The Chemical and Biological Agent Threat

- First, chemical and biological agents, when properly prepared, are <u>extremely toxic</u> or <u>potent</u> and could be disseminated to incapacitate or kill thousands of individuals.
- Second, chemical and biological agents, in contrast to other destructive means, are suitable to attack large areas.
- Third, because chemical and biological agents may be disseminated over such a large area, they are <u>indiscriminate</u>. Effects can be particularly insidious in that they can be delayed, the onset occurring even after the person believes they are in a safe area. Chemical and biological agents are truly <u>terror weapons</u>.
- Fourth, chemical and biological agents are relatively inexpensive and available. In addition to the classic agents, many toxic industrial chemicals may be acquired either through legitimate means or by theft and used as terror weapon.

CBW Agent Spectrum



Chemical Threats

Vesicant Agents:

- HD-Mustard
- H-Mustard with Impurities
- HN-Nitrogen Mustard
- L-Lewisite
- CX-Phosgene Oxime

Blood Agents:

- AC-Hydrogen Cyanide
- CN- Salts of: Sodium, Potassium, Calcium
- CK-Cyanogen Chloride

• Nerve Agents:

- GA-Tabun
- GB-Sarin
- GD-Soman
- **GF**
- VX


Respiratory Agent:

Phosgene

Chemical Agents and Their Effects

Class of Agent	Symbol	Symptoms	Effects	Rate of Action
Nerve	GA GB GD GF VX	Difficulty breathing, sweating, drooling, convulsions, dimming of vision.	Incapacitates at low concentrations. Kills in sufficient dosage. VX is persistent and a contact hazard. The other agents are non-persistent and present an inhalation hazard.	Vapors— seconds to minutes Skin—2 to 18 hours
Blood	AC CK	Rapid breathing, convulsions, and coma.	Kills in sufficient dosage. Non- persistent and an inhalation hazard.	Immediate
Blister	HD HN HL L	No early symptoms. Searing/stinging of eyes and skin.	Blisters delayed hours to days; eyes and lungs affected more rapidly. Immediate pain, delayed blisters. Persistent and a contact hazard.	Vapors—4 to 6 hours Skin—2-48 hours
Choking	CG DP	Difficulty breathing; tearing of the eyes.	Damages and floods lungs. Death can result. Non-persistent and an inhalation hazard.	Immediate to 3 hours

Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs): A Potential Hazard in the Battlespace





TICs – Any chemical with LCt_{50} less than 100,000 mg-min/m³ and produced in quantities exceeding 30 tons annually at one facility

Smoke from power stations in Belgrade



Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICS)

HIGH RISK		MEDIUM RISK		LOW RISK		
Ammonia	Acrolein	Phosphine	Allyl isothiocyanate	Iron pentacarbonyl		
Arsine	Acrylonitrile	Phosphorus oxychloride	Arsenic trichloride	Isobutyl chloroformate		
Boron trichloride	Allyl alcohol	Phosphorus pentafluoride	Bromine	Isopropyl chloroformate		
Boron trifluoride	Allyl amine	Selenium hexafluoride	Bromine chloride	Isopropyl isocyanate		
Carbon disulfide	Allyl chlorocarbonate	Silicon tetrafluoride	Bromine pentafluoride	n-Butyl chloroformate		
Chlorine	Boron tribromide	Stibine	Bromine trifluoride	n-Butyl isocyanate		
Diborane	Carbon monoxide	Sulfur trioxide	Carbonyl fluoride	Nitric oxide		
Ethylene oxide	Carbonyl sulfide	Sulfuryl chloride	Chlorine pentafluoride	n-Propyl chloroformate		
Fluorine	Chloroacetone	Sulfuryl fluoride	Chlorine trifluoride	Parathion		
Formaldehyde	Chloroacetonitrile	Tellurium hexafluoride	Chloroacetaldehyde	Perchloromethyl mercaptan		
Hydrogen bromide	Chlorosulfonic acid	tert-Octyl mercaptan	Chloroacetyl chloride	sec-Butyl chloroformate		
Hydrogen chloride	Diketene	Titanium tetrachloride	Crotonaldehyde	tert-Butyl isocyanate		
Hydrogen cyanide	1,2-Dimethyl hydrazine	Trichloroacetyl chloride	Cyanogen	Tetraethyl lead		
Hydrogen fluoride	Ethylene dibromide	Trifluoroacetyl chloride	Dimethyl sulfate	Tetraethyl pyroposphate		
Hydrogen sulfide	Hydrogen selenide		Diphenylmethane-4'- diisocyanate	Tetramethyl lead		
Nitric acid, fuming	Methanesulfonyl chloride		Ethyl chloroformate	Toluene 2,4-diisocyanate		
Phosgene	Methyl bromide		Ethyl chlorothioformate	Toluene 2,6-diisocyanate		
Phosphorus trichloride	Methyl chloroformate		Ethyl phosphonothioicdichloride			
Sulfur dioxide	Methyl chlorosilane		Ethyl phosphorous dichloride			
Sulfuric acid	Methyl hydrazine		Ethylene imine			
Tungsten hexafluoride	Methyl mercaptan		Hexachlorocyclopentadiene			
	Nitrogen dioxide		Hydrogen iodide			

Potential BW Agents

Bacteria/Rickettsia

Anthrax-

Brucellosis

Cholera

Plague

Shigella

Tularemia

Q-Fever-

Typhus

Viruses

Smallpox

Rift Valley Fever

Crimean-Congo

Hemorrhagic Fever

VEE



Toxins

Botulinum



Ricin

SEB

T2 Mycotoxins

Saxitoxin


C. perfringens toxins

Neurotoxins

Aflatoxin

Weaponization Of Biological Agents

FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP OF AGENTS, MUNITIONS AND DELIVERY



AGENT

acquisition)

(+ testing)

MEANS

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Characteristics of Selected Pathogens

Pathogen	Routes of Infection*	Dissemination	Untreated Mortality (%)	Incubation Period	Treatment	
Anthrax	S,D,R	Aerosol	S – less than 25% R – approaches- 100%	1-4 days	Antibiotics (limited effectiveness after symptoms develop)	
Plague	V,R	Aerosol or vectors	Bubonic – 50% Pneumonic – 50 – 90%	2-3 days	Antibiotics	
Tularemia	V,S,R	Aerosols	30 – 40%	1-10 days	Antibiotics	
Q Fever	V,R	Covert or aerosols	less than 1%	14-26 days	Antibiotics	
Brucellosis	D,R	Aerosol	<6%	5-21 days	Antibiotics	
Viral Hemorrhagic: Fevers (e.g., Ebola, Marburg, etc)	DC, uncertain	Aerosol	40-90%	4-21 days	Supportive care only	

^{*}S-skin, D-digestive, R-respiratory, V-vector, DC-direct contact.

Characteristics of Selected Toxins

Toxin	Natural Source	Rate of Action	LD50 (mg/kg)*	Effect
Botulinum	Clostridium botulinum bacteria	1 to 12 hrs.	0.0003 to 0.01	Dilated pupils, double vision, dry mouth, paralysis
Tetanus	Clostridium tetani bacteria	1 to 12 hrs.	0.0025 in humans	Muscle spasms, frequently in the jaw muscles
Palytoxin	Palythoa soft corals	5 mins.	0.08	Muscle contractions, heart irregularities, rigid paralysis
Batrachotoxin	South American frog	5 mins. to 1 hr.	0.1 to 2	Loss of coordination, numbness, headache, irregular heart rate, respiratory paralysis
Ricin	Castor Bean	5 mins. to 1 hr.	3.0 (oral)	Nausea, vomiting, cramps, bloody nose, diarrhea, difficulty in breathing, twitching
Saxitoxin	Shellfish	5 mins. to 1 hr.	5-12 (oral), 1 (aerosol)	Tingling, numbness, weakness, flaccid (limp) paralysis
Tetrodotoxin	Puffer fish	5 mins. to 1 hr.	30 (oral)	Vomiting; tingling; numbness; lack of muscle control; loss of voice; paralysis, especially of the arms and legs
Tricothecene (T2) mycotoxin	Fusarium mold on infected grain	1 to 12 hrs.	50 to 240 (aerosol)	Itching, tingling, vomiting, hemorrhaging, bloody diarrhea
Staphylococcus Enterotoxin Type B (SEB)	Staphylococcus aureus bacteria	1 to 12 hrs.	200 (aerosol)	Vomiting, cramps, nausea, diarrhea, severe weakness

^{*} Lethal Doses based on mouse model, unless otherwise noted.

Selected Chemical and Biological Defense Technologies

Current and Emerging

Chemical Detection Current Capability


 M22 Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm (ACADA)

 Automatic point detection and identification of nerve and blister agents

Man-portable vapor alarm


 Provides enhanced capability over M8A1 alarm

 Based on Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) technology



Chemical Detection Current Capability

- Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) & Improved CAM
 - Detects, identifies, and provides relative vapor hazard read-outs for G and V nerve agents and H blister agents within one minute of agent exposure
 - IMS technology
 - Missions:
 - Area reconnaissance & surveillance
 - Decontamination operations
 - Medical triage operations



Chemical Detection- Current Capability Advanced Portable Detector (APD) 2000

- Fielded to the National Guard WMD-CSTs
- Portable, hand-held device that can be used as a detector or as a continuously sampling monitor
- Simultaneously detects nerve and blister agents (GA, GB, GD, VX, HD, HN, L, Pepper spray, Mace)
- Powered by six internal alkaline or rechargeable batteries, external ac sources, or 9 to 18 V dc from a vehicle or external power supply
- Tested by SBCCOM Domestic Preparedness Program against live agents and found effective



Chemical Detection – Current Capability - Hapsite

 Fielded to the National Guard WMD-CSTs and the USMC CBIRF



HAPSITE Field-Portable GC/MS

- Field-portable gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS) for analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs)
- Weighing about 35 lbs
- Windows-based software allows customized data analysis and methods development
- Battery-powered

Chemical Detection- Emerging

Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD)

- Real-time detection, identification of nerve blister, and blood agents
- Miosis-Level detection capability
- Calculates accumulated dosage
- Stores up to 72 Hours of detection data
- May be networked and remotely controlled
- May be operated by primary battery, rechargeable battery, DC or AC power.
- Replaces M8A1 Alarm,
 M22 ACADA and CAM/ICAM
- Requires more R&D




Chemical Detection- Emerging Technology


- Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD)
 - Detects nerve, blister & blood agent vapor clouds
 - Mounts on land, sea & air platforms
 - Provides 360° x 60° on-the-move coverage
 - Provides 5 km detection range
 - Automatic Warning/Reporting through JWARN
 - No operator required
 - Requires more R&D



SCANNER




INTERFEROMETER



Defense Technology Objective - Laser Standoff Chemical Detector


Joint Service Warning and Identification LIDAR

- Detection, identification, quantification, and mapping of CW agents in vapor, liquid rain, and aerosol forms
- Frequency Agile Laser (FAL)




- 10-20 km range, 360 x 90 degree hemispherical coverage (less for aerosols/rains)
- Rapidly tuned laser emits 2 or more wavelengths that penetrate cloud
- Light is differentially absorbed/scattered upon transmission as well as reflection
- Light reflects off of topographic/aerosol/rain targets & detected at receiver
- Agents identified since each has a unique absorption/scattering spectrum

Biological Detection Current Capability



Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) (Land System)

- "Large Area" Coverage
- ID 8 BW Agents
- ID Time <45 Min (Multiple Technologies)



Interim Biological Agent Detection System (IBADS) (Blue Water System)


- · "Local Alarm"
- · ID 8 BW Agents
- ID Time <25 Min (Single Technology)
- Semi-Automatically Detects Background Particulate Change

Biological Detection Current Capability



Portal Shield System (Fixed Site Protection)

- ID 8 BW Agents Simultaneously
- ID Time <25 Minutes (Network)
- Chemical Sensor(s) Interface






DoD Biological Sampling Kit (Quick Screen of Suspect Packages/Samples)

- ID 9 BW Agents
- ID Time <15 Minutes
- Low False Positive Rate (.5%)

Biological Detection Current Capability




Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) Block I

- Fully automated
- Simultaneous ID of 10 agents
- Operates as individual detector or as network
- <18 minute process time</p>
- < 30 minute setup time
- Sample Isolation
- Block modifications to improve

Common Suite For All Services

Emerging Technology - JBPDS Block II Development



Individual Protection Current & Emerging Technology

Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST)

- Protective Suit
 - · Fielded system
 - Provides improved chemical protection, including overgarments, boots, gloves
 - 45 day protection and launderable
 - Planned improvements include <u>new materials</u> (selectively permeable membranes) to reduce weight and thermal stress and <u>improved closures</u> to prevent leaks
- Multipurpose Overboot
 - Wet weather and CB protection
- JSLIST Glove Upgrades (developmental)
 - · Replace butyl rubber gloves
 - Improved dexterity
 - CB aviation glove
 - · Liner or all-in-one glove



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Joint Service Sensitive Equipment Decontamination – Emerging Technology

- Block I Requirement
 Decon sensitive
 equipment without
 adverse effects to the
 decontaminated items
- Sensitive equipment includes electronics, avionics, environmental control systems, and life-support systems
- Objective:
 Transportable system
 able to process
 electronic and night
 vision equipment rapidly
 for immediate re-use
- Block II Requirement
 Decon aircraft / vehicle interiors and cargo
 without affecting aircraft / vehicle / cargo
 operation or service life
- C/B agents may penetrate porous materials, presenting residual agent offgassing problems requiring periodic decon
- Objective: System
 which can be equipped
 on or with all existing
 airframes / vehicles for
 on-demand Decon
 operations

- Block III Requirement Decon aircraft / vehicle interiors and associated cargo "Onthe-Move"
- On-demand decon operations without adverse effects on crew, mission, or platform performance
- Objective: Block II upgrade which is capable of safe operation in-flight

Emerging Chemical and Biological Defense Technologies: Modeling & Simulation


CBW Computational Fluid Effects Model General Description


Capabilities

- Full 3D Navier-Stokes equations (coupled flow field and transport)
- Multi-phase flow with full diffusion equations
- Droplet evaporation, surface deposition and weathering effects

<u>Uses</u>

- CB threat studies and analyses (shipboard, urban environments)
- Detector placement
- Contamination of external structure surfaces
- Validation tool for less complex methodologies






Medical Chemical Defense: Current Capabilities

- Pre-treatment
 - Pyridostigmine Bromide (NAPP)
 - Inhibits "aging" of GD
 - Not licensed
- Treatment
 - Atropine (Mk I)
 - · Blocks nerve agent
 - Pralidoxime Chloride (2-PAM CI) (Mk I)
 - Regenerates Cholinesterase
 - Diazepam (CANA)
 - Anti-convulsant
 - Skin Exposure Reduction Paste
 Against Chemical Warfare Agents
 (SERPACWA)
- Diagnosis
 - Field Cholinesterase Kit












Chemical Agent Prophylaxes Emerging Technology


- A genetically engineered human cholinesterase for use as a pretreatment for nerve agent exposure.
- Protein-based bioscavengers were identified that protect against five LD_{50s} of nerve agent in animal models without additional therapy or operationally significant physiological or psychological side effects.
- Currently a technology base effort





Medical Biological Defense: Current Capabilities – Therapeutics

- Various antibiotics for treatment of exposure to bacterial agents
 - Ciprofloxacin
 - Doxycycline
 - Tetracycline



Cell wall destroyed by antibiotic

The Civilian vs. Military "Threat"

- The very nature of a civilian population—especially in a free and open democratic society—makes chemical or biological agents both very effective and very deadly
- Civilian populations, in contrast to the military:
 - Are unorganized and have no chain of command,
 - Have no special equipment for detection, protection, or warning,
 - Have no specific training, and hence may be unaware of the threat or symptoms indicating an attack has occurred (especially for biological agents),
 - Are highly diverse, representing all ages, social and ethnic groups, sick and healthy,
 - May be susceptible to agent delivery through a variety of means, including through building ventilation, food or water, or dispersal in enclosed areas

Cross-cutting CB Technology Needs

- Chemical agent detectors that provide "real-time" quantitative vapor concentrations in the Lowest Observable Effects Level (LOEL) to Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) range
- A "close-standoff" / "non-contact" technology for identifying liquid chemical agent surface contamination (e.g., M8 / M9 paper replacement)
- Actual (vs. extrapolated) in vivo "low-level" chemical agent toxicity studies
- "Real-time" or "near-real-time" biological detection that is not dependent upon wet—chemistry consumables (e.g., "solid-state detection)
- <u>Validated</u> biological markers of chemical or biological agent exposures (e.g., animal surrogate markers and clinical human specimens)
- <u>Validated</u> chemical and biological agent dispersion and effects models for post-attack hazard prediction

DoD Chemical Biological Defense Program Summary

Coordinated and integrated joint requirements respond to validated chemical and biological threats resulting in research, development, and acquisition of defensive equipment fielded to all Services

- Point detectors
- · Remote and Standoff detectors
- Warning and reporting system
- Reconnaissance vehicles
- Masks and protective clothing
- Filters and shelters
- Vaccines/Drugs and Other Medical Countermeasures
- Decontamination equipment

Evolving Challenges

- Supporting homeland security roles and missions
 - Executing programs as strategy evolves
- Enhancing CB installation force protection
- Acceleration of CB defense technologies
 - Spinning off appropriate technologies for civilian applications
- Maintaining current programs to respond to warfighter requirements
 - · Balance of competing priorities within current budget authority
- Cooperation/strategy with HHS on Vaccine Development and Deployment

Questions?

"Today's problems cannot be solved with the same thinking that created them."

Albert Einstein

BACK-UPS

Key DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Laboratories

Army

- Soldier, Biological & Chemical Command (SBCCOM)
 - Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC)
 - Natick Soldier Systems Command
- Medical Research and Material Command
 - US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
 - US Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense (USAMRICD)
 - Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)
 - US Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM)
- Dugway Proving Ground

Navy

- Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division
- Naval Research Laboratory
- · Naval Medical Research Center

Air Force


- Brooks AFB (Human Systems Center)
- Air Force Research Laboratory

DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Laboratories: Unique Capabilities











DoD Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force

Purpose:

· Provide DoD a coordinated technology plan for combating terrorism

Scope:

- Technologies to address potential terrorist threats from
 - Chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological and high explosives
- Technologies to improve situational awareness and options for DoD action
- · Looking at near, mid, and long-term options

Organization – 4 Working Groups

- Deterrence and Indications and Warning (Protection)
- Survivability and Denial (Prevention)
- Consequence Management and Recovery (Response)
- Attribution and Retaliation (Response)

Initial Approach

- Early emphasis on very near-term technologies available
- Longer-term tech evaluations will include coordination with outside experts (industry, advisory boards,)

Submitting Unsolicited Proposals: Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs)

- U.S. Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command http://www.sbccom.apgea.army.mil/RDA/baa01.htm
- U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command http://mrmc-www.army.mil/
- Air Force Research Laboratories http://extra.afrl.af.mil/bus-opps.htm
- Naval Surface Warfare Center http://www.nswc.navy.mil/dahl.htm
- Marine Corps Systems Command –
 http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/BusOpps.htm
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency <u>http://www.darpa.mil</u> (Especially SPO and DSO)
- Technical Support Working Group http://www.tswg.gov

Acronyms

ASBREM - Armed Services Biomedical Research **Evaluation and Management** BW - Biological Warfare BES - Budget Estimate Submission CAM - Commodity Area Manager CBD - Chemical Biological Defense CBDP – Chemical Biological Defense Program CBTAP - Chemical Biological Threat Agent Program CINC - Commander in Chief CW - Chemical Warfare DARPA - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DATSD(CBD) - Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical Biological Defense) DPG - Dugway Proving Ground DTO - Defense Technology Objective GOCO- Government Owned Contractor Operated IPT - Integrated Product Team JB1GU - JSLIST Blk I Glove Upgrade JBPDS - Joint Biological Point Detection System JBSDS - Joint Biological Standoff Detection System JCAD - Joint Chemical Agent Detector JCBAWM - Joint Chemical Biological Agent Water Monitor

JEM - Joint Effects Model

JOEF - Joint Operational Effects Model JPL - Joint Priority List JSAM - Joint Service Aircrew Mask JSCESM - Joint Service Chemical Environment Survivability Mask JSFXD - Joint Service Fixed Site Decontamination JSGPM – Joint Service General Purpose Mask JSIG - Joint Service Integration Group JSLIST - Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology JSLSCAD - Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector JSMG - Joint Service Materiel Group JSMLT - Joint Service Mask Leakage Tester JSSED – Joint Service Sensitive Equipment Decontamination JSTPCBD- Joint Science and Technology Panel for Chemical/Biological Defense JTCG - Joint Technical Coordination Group JTCOPS - Joint Transportable Collective **Protection System** JWARN – Joint Warning and Reporting Network MCBDR - Medical Chemical/Biological Defense Research Panel MTW - Major Theater War

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Acronyms

MILCON - Military Construction

MPSP - Medical Program Sub-Panel

NBC - Nuclear, Biological and Chemical

NBCRS - Nuclear, Biological and Chemical

Reconnaissance System

OPTEMPO - Operational Tempo

PATS - Protection Assessment Test System

PB - President's Budget

POM - Program Objective Memorandum

QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review

RDA - Research, Development and Acquisition

RDT&E – Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

RSTA – Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

SDS - Sorbent Decontamination System

SOF - Special Operations Forces

TSWG - Technical Support Working Group

O&M - Operation and Maintenance

OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense

TOA - Total Obligation Authority