REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
05-02-2004	FINAL	

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

A Campaign in the Air

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

Phillip T Hamilton, Major, USAF

Paper Advisor: Dr. Milan Vego

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. ABSTRACT

Current theory of combat force employment states that air is not a medium for the conduct of a campaign because it is not capable of accomplishing national strategic objectives in the absence of either land or maritime forces. NATO's Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999 is presented as a counter argument to this theoretical construct. It accomplished national strategic objectives, and the label air campaign is an appropriate term to describe not only the level of objective but the preponderance of force used in the conflict. Other terms either downplay the complexity and level of effort, or fail to accurately describe the event.

Beyond the terminology, there are certain conditions that might make an air campaign alone a realistic course of action in the future. Proper consideration of the type of strategic objective, geography, and form of government could aid in the coercion of an adversary without the traditional cost in blood and treasure associated with a ground or maritime campaigns.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Air power, air campaign, medium

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			Chairman, JMO Dept
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED		18	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(include area code)* 401-841-3556

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

A Campaign in the Air

By

Phillip T. Hamilton
Major USAF

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

5 February 2004

_____
Faculty Advisor
Dr. Milan Vego

Abstract

Current theory of combat force employment states that air is not a medium for the conduct of a campaign because it is not capable of accomplishing national strategic objectives in the absence of either land or maritime forces. NATO's Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999 is presented as a counter argument to this theoretical construct. It accomplished national strategic objectives, and the label air campaign is an appropriate term to describe not only the level of objective but the preponderance of force used in the conflict. Other terms either downplay the complexity and level of effort, or fail to accurately describe the event.

Beyond the terminology, there are certain conditions that might make an air campaign alone a realistic course of action in the future. Proper consideration of the type of strategic objective, geography, and form of government could aid in the coercion of an adversary without the traditional cost in blood and treasure associated with a ground or maritime campaigns.

Table of Contents

Preface

As we celebrate the centennial of flight, the promise and reality of air power continue to be the subject of intense debate. History has provided us with fierce advocates of air power as a war winning capability, and yet there remain equally fierce dissenting views on the subject. Much of the disagreement centers on semantics, but underlying those semantics are some core beliefs that keep the debate alive. Significant differences exist when it comes to understanding what air power can accomplish and how it should be applied in relation to land and maritime forces.

There are many papers and a few books that deal with operational art, and sometimes what may seem obvious proves otherwise. This is indeed the case with the issue of mediums as they relate to campaigns in war. Current theory states that the physical medium of air is not a medium for a campaign. Instead, air is something that is inherently linked to the two mediums in which campaigns take place: land or maritime.[1] While this may appear to be an appropriate and inconsequential linkage of air to the other physical mediums, it comes as a surprise to an airman studying the subject for the first time, and it implies that there are broader implications for future planners. The most important of which is the notion that a land or maritime campaign is a prerequisite to accomplishing national strategic objectives with military forces.

This paper seeks to demonstrate that 'air' is a separate medium from 'land' or 'maritime' for the conduct of campaigns, and that air attacks on Kosovo in 1999 represented an air campaign with the requisite accomplishment of national strategic objectives. A brief discussion of the 1999 Kosovo conflict will help demonstrate the validity of the construct,

[1] Milan Vego, Operational Warfare (Naval War College 2000), 377.

and it will be followed by an analysis of circumstances that might make a stand alone air campaign appropriate and effective.

The Strategic Objective

Before evaluating methods of combat force employment, it is worth discussing the larger framework of operational war fighting. Campaigns and operations should not be conceived or conducted in a vacuum. There should be a clear understanding of why they exist and how they seek to support or accomplish national goals. This is not intended to confuse the issue by substituting the use of military force with the use of other instruments of national power. Instead, it is assumed that a campaign or major operation will be used to accomplish strategic or theater-strategic objectives in concert with political and diplomatic efforts.

One model for campaign design begins with the articulation of the desired end state by the political leadership.[2] The desired end state should be a vision of what the theater should look like at the end of hostilities, and it should encompass areas beyond military to include social, economic and diplomatic. Once this is complete, the military strategic (or theater-strategic) objectives are derived from the desired end state. Again, the political leadership plays the key role in defining what the military is to accomplish and what level of effort will be made. From this, the operational commander determines the methodology. In the case of strategic objectives, a campaign is usually appropriate, and the commander spells out the forces and assets required to accomplish the objectives. The next step in the planning process is to identify critical factors which lead to the identification of the center of gravity.

[2] Milan Vego, "Wake-Up Call in Kosovo," Proceedings, (October 2000): 66

It is the understanding of the enemy center of gravity that guides the remaining steps of identifying the strategic/operational direction and developing the operational idea. Throughout this type of campaign design the guiding principle must be the desired end state as spelled out by the political leadership, and each successive part of the planning process must originate from and support the preceding step. A failure to link the means (campaign) with the ends (strategic objective) could risk a scenario where military success leads to a larger political failure in the transition to post-hostilities.

Theory of Combat Force Employment

In "Operational Warfare," Dr. Vego discusses methods of combat force employment on the spectrum from tactical actions to major operations to campaigns: tactical actions are conducted to accomplish tactical objectives, major operations accomplish operational (and sometimes strategic) objectives, and campaigns accomplish strategic objectives.[3] As you move along the spectrum, the complexity of the objective, planning, and action increase, and it reaches a point where it is unlikely that a "…single service or single type of force can accomplish a properly defined and articulated strategic objective by employing its forces alone."[4]

While this may appear obvious, Vego expands on this required cooperative effort even further by creating a linkage between the level of combat force employment and his definition of medium. Specifically, while tactical actions and major operations can be conducted in any of the mediums (land, sea, air), campaigns can only be conducted in two of the mediums: land or maritime. Vego's perspective is that in a campaign air power is a

[3] Vego, 373-381.
[4] Vego, 376.

supporting part of the joint/combined effort, and he speaks to this apparent slight of air power by saying, "The apparent nonrecognition of the air campaign has to do with the fact that a campaign can take place predominantly on land or in a maritime theater."[5] Further discussions with Dr. Vego revealed his belief that the predominant features of the terrain were the defining issue when he arrived at the previously stated conclusion.[6]

To put it another way, while all three mediums offer a *means* of maneuver, only land and sea offer a *destination*. This emphasis on using the characteristics of the destination to define a campaign is two dimensional, and it closes off a way of thinking about air power. This certainly appears to be unintentional as he writes, "In each case, the third dimension-airspace…is an integral and indelible part of a land or maritime campaign."[7] Nevertheless, a construct that allows for only land or maritime campaigns fails to account for and properly label scenarios that involve a series of major air operations that are not coincident with either land or maritime operations.

Rethinking the Air Campaign Definition

For most of the history of air power, coincident land or maritime operations were the norm, but NATO's air attacks on Kosovo in 1999 have caused historians and air power theorists to evaluate and label this very scenario. In what has been called history's first stand alone air campaign, Serbia was bombed for 78 days before President Slobodan Milosevic accepted the terms of the Rambouillet Agreement.[8] It would appear at first glance that air

[5] Vego, 377-378.
[6] Dr. Milan Vego, Professor of Operations, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 28 January 2003.
[7] Vego, 377-378.
[8] Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica: RAND 2001), 224.

power had the answer, but there are two points of contention. The first is that Russian diplomatic intervention rather than air power forced Milosevic to accept terms, and the second is that even if air power accomplished a national strategic objective that does not mean that it should be labeled a *campaign*. Rather, as Vego puts it, "NATO forces conducted a major joint and combined air offensive *operation* in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999."[9]

Regarding Russian diplomatic intervention, Milosevic did not maneuver diplomatically away from the effects of the air campaign. In fact, his discussions with Viktor Chernomyrdin appear to have reinforced the idea that NATO's bombing would intensify and leave Serbia in a state of ruin.[10] The Russian role seems to have been relegated to trying to convince Milosevic of the futility of his situation.

The second and more difficult point regarding the use of air power in Kosovo is whether or not it crossed the threshold between major operation and campaign, and whether or not it makes sense to label it as an air campaign. Here, the evidence is somewhat less clear. According to Vego, a major operation is "a series of related battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, and other tactical actions."[11] While this construct or definition may seem readily understandable in ground or maritime mediums, it seems to have less usefulness when examining air power. Because air operations reach across the depth of the battle space with little restriction, and because air power has the ability to simultaneously pursue tactical, operational or strategic objectives, a different standard must be used when describing the level of combat force employment. It would be simplistic and incorrect to state that air

[9] Vego, 375.
[10] Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided To Settle When He Did (Santa Monica: RAND 2001), 102-103.
[11] Vego, 374.

power always conducts campaigns, but rather than using a geographic template that links a group of tactical actions to form the model for major operations and campaigns, an air operation or campaign should be judged by the level of the objectives that it is tasked with accomplishing. Essentially, the measure of air power should in some way be tied to the promise. If air power is being used against a strategic center of gravity to achieve the associated strategic objective, then recognition of that fact is found in the label *campaign*.

Unfortunately, this position is refuted by Vego on the grounds that a campaign is not the only way to achieve the strategic objective in a given theater. He points to major operations as a means of accomplishment, and he reiterates that desired end state should guide major operation design when a "major joint or combined operation is planned to achieve a partial, non-conventional, and highly ambiguous strategic objective, as was NATO's Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999."[12] One problem with Vego's assertion is that it is filled with caveats that make it increasingly difficult to delineate between a campaign and an operation. If the level of objective is the determining factor, then the confusion arises when the theory allows for operations with strategic objectives. Terms like 'major joint or combined operation' imply a level of complexity in objective, planning and action that sound a lot like a campaign, and to downplay the strategic guidance by declaring it to be an "ambiguous, poorly articulated and unrealistic strategic objective" is to shift the focus from what happened to what was intended.[13]

Regardless of the service or type of military power, the isolation of any one component of military force potentially indicates a linkage between the strategic objective (if it exists) and that military force. Again, the determining factor is whether that military

[12] Vego, 469.
[13] Vego, "Wake-Up Call in Kosovo," 66

component is being used to accomplish a tactical, operational, or strategic objective. Another way of thinking about the issue is that on land or at sea it is easier to assess the level of combat force employment by counting troops, measuring the size of the operating area, or developing a matrix of objectives that shows how the accomplishment of tactical objectives combines to support operational objectives which in turn combine to support theater-strategic objectives.

The label 'air campaign' is an acknowledgement of the primary characteristics of the *means* rather than the *destination*. It provides a term that is readily understandable, and readily accepted if the writings of air power theorists and observers are canvassed. Most importantly, it should convey the unique way that the strategic objective was accomplished. Given the laws of gravity, air power is unlikely to provide a staying power and permanence in the medium of air that typifies the capabilities of ground and maritime forces in Dr Vego's construct, but a different perspective resolves the conflict when making the jump from operations to campaigns.

Prerequisites for an Air Campaign Alone

Having established that an air campaign is possible, it is important to examine whether broader implications about the potential efficacy of a stand alone air campaign can be drawn from these experiences. It would be immensely useful if we could describe conditions that lend themselves to the application of air power alone either because we lack the willingness or ability to jointly employ land or maritime forces. Of course, this sounds a lot like scriptwriting for another Kosovo, but the discussion will broaden while still making sparing use of relevant historical examples.

In describing what conditions must exist for an air war alone, it is important to note that there are two sides of the equation. The first is the circumstances or characteristics of our adversary, and the second is the situation we as a nation find ourselves facing in the potential conflict. Additionally, while both keen insight and accurate intelligence gathering play a major role in the assessment of these circumstances, it is beyond the scope of this paper to address all of the potential shortfalls in that process. It would also be pure folly to believe that future events would play out in a way that appeared to complete a checklist for an air war alone. Rather, these are considerations that are unlikely to be entirely met in their entirety or matched in detail. They are a guide not a recipe.

The major premise of this discussion is that air power offers a unique ability to engage and destroy targets throughout the battle space. It has a degree of inherent speed and mobility that can not be matched by land or maritime forces. With the continuing development of precision weapons, air power also has the ability to achieve effects in a highly discriminate manner. We can now destroy individual buildings rather than entire blocks, and we can create effects that are meaningful without being unnecessarily destructive. The net effect of this ability to discriminately target the enemy is that the application of military force (in this case bombs, missiles, electronic jamming, and psychological operations) has the potential to move beyond the paradigm of brute force in all cases and genuinely consider effects that are derived from coercion rather than destruction.[14]

One of the first conditions that must exist in order to contemplate an air war alone is related to our strategic objectives. They must be limited rather than unlimited. These objectives could include forcing a nation to abide by international agreements such as treaties

[14] Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (Washington, DC: 17 November 2003), 21. Available at http://afpubs.hq.af.mil

or United Nations security resolutions, or they could involve the termination of certain activities such as threatening another nation or subpopulation such as the Kosovars. Not all scenarios with limited strategic objectives are conducive to the use of air power, but scenarios with unlimited objectives require the threat or application of force across a broader spectrum of military capability.

Unlimited objectives imply total capitulation on the part of the adversary. In the classic sense, they involve the invasion of territory with the intent to either occupy or radically change the government. This is the work of a ground force. Barring the use of nuclear weapons, it is difficult to envision both the type and extent of targeting that would be required to force a nation to surrender from aerial bombardment alone when such a surrender carried the potential for prosecution of the ruling elite and loss of property and national prestige. Japan in World War II demonstrated an amazing ability to absorb widespread destruction of major cities without surrendering until not one but two atomic devices had been used.

Moreover, the practical realities of such a campaign by our air forces make that line of thinking borderline absurd. First, the nation would have to maintain an unimaginably large conventional weapons delivery capacity. Large bombers with huge payloads of bombs would be required to decimate cities and their populations. Second, the Law of Armed Conflict requires that targets be of a military nature and that our use of force be proportional. Third, the idea of indiscriminately targeting civilians has become repugnant in a time when even the smallest numbers of deaths as a result of collateral damage become instant headlines. We simply do not have the means, legal basis, nor the will (short of nuclear conflict) to employ air power against the full spectrum of civilian targets that would result in

the surrender of a determined enemy. This is not to say that air power theorists have ignored civilian targeting. One of the first air power theorists, Giulio Douhet, advocated large scale attacks against civilians with the intent to cause mass panic and forge a victory.[15] His approach to the employment of air power has been rejected in modern times for mostly moral reasons, but the idea that air power can achieve unlimited objectives by itself lingers still. In the broadest sense, limited objectives are something attainable without relying on the full measure of your capability or will.

Having described why air power can not achieve unlimited objectives, there remains a central paradox to this issue. The effectiveness of the air campaign is tied to the adversary's belief in your willingness to use *unlimited means* to accomplish your objectives. In other words, the enemy should believe that you are willing to go beyond the conventional or constrained use of air power, either with targeting or with the addition of ground forces. To define and advertise your constraints is to take a weapon from your arsenal and place it in the arsenal of your enemy. For example, when President Clinton expressed his unwillingness to employ ground forces in Kosovo, he unwittingly bolstered the strategic position of Milosevic by removing a direct threat to his power and allowing his ground forces to conduct activities other than defensive preparation. Later, perceptions about the means available and employed had a marked effect on Serbia as the air campaign continued. Hosmer describes how the citizens of Serbia were genuinely shocked at the beginning of the bombing.[16] The targeting of dual-use facilities such as highways, bridges, factories, and oil refineries helped connect the masses to the costs of the bombing campaign, and it built the perception in

[15] Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air translated by Dino Ferrari (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History 1983), 58.
[16] A public opinion poll taken 11 days before the bombing found that almost 80 percent of the respondents did not believe NATO would bomb Serbia. See Hosmer, 50.

Milosevic's mind that NATO was preparing for a massive, unconstrained air attack.[17] Milosevic also came to believe that the marked increase in air strike capability was a precursor to a ground invasion despite a lack of consensus in NATO.[18] All of these things point to how the air campaign produced effects that belied the actual constraints placed on those tasked with conducting the war.

Another condition for the sole use of air power is the geography of the situation. A stand alone air campaign is ideally suited to scenarios where both sides are restricted from employing ground forces against each other. It may be that there are access problems because the enemy is surrounded by nations that are not cooperative, or it may be that a decision has been made to avoid the commitment of ground troops for political or logistical reasons. Either way, there are certain advantages to keeping ground forces away from each other. One of them is that the imposed separation of forces ensures that our adversary does not have the ability to start a ground campaign that we are not interested in fighting.

It is also not necessary to commit resources to the physical security requirements of ground forces thereby eliminating what could prove to be a liability. This point was demonstrated earlier in Bosnia when "Serbian forces arrested and/or threatened to kill UN peacekeeping troops in Gorazde and Bihac if NATO attempted to use force to stop the violence there."[19] Again, these are only potential outcomes. There are an infinite number of scenarios that could put our allies or innocent population groups at risk due to their geographic proximity to an aggressive enemy, and steps would have to be taken to ensure

[17] Hosmer, 66-67 & 103.
[18] NATO strike capability increased from 214 aircraft at the start of the air campaign to 535 aircraft as the campaign drew to a close. Open source reporting regarding deployments and ongoing debate during this period was available to Serb leadership. Hosmer, 99 & 110.
[19] Philip S. Meilinger, "The Future of Air Power: Observations from the past Decade," Air Power Review, Vol. 3 No. 1 (Spring 2000): 65.

that our adversaries' power projection abilities are targeted in such an event.

The next condition for the use of air power alone is that the form of government must be particularly vulnerable to the effects of aerial bombardment. This may appear obvious, but new research is uncovering how both the style of Serb government and the apparent targeting of that government greatly contributed to air power's success in Kosovo. In an unpublished thesis titled "Crony Attack: Strategic Attack's Silver Bullet?" prepared for the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Major Julian Tolbert discusses the "targeting of key elite supporters of an enemy leader in order to effect policy change in the attackers favor."[20]

Tolbert places the evolution of air power theory and air strategy development models in the context of international relations theory to describe how certain forms of government are affected by coercive military power, specifically air power. He describes a spectrum ranging from democracy to strict autocracy with specific emphasis on the utility[21] function of the various parts of each government.[22] The major thrust of his analysis is that control and utility of public or private goods holds the key to whether a regime can be targeted with air power and what parts of the regime should be targeted to achieve the objective.

A democracy with a "loose concentration of power around the leader…more dominated by the public goods distributed to all," is difficult to target for policy change because there are fewer cronies (if any at all) that receive government-distributed private

[20] Julian H. Tolbert, "Crony Attack: Strategic Attack's Silver Bullet?," (Unpublished Draft Thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 2003), v.
[21] For the purposes of this paper and the associated reference to Tolbert, *utility* is defined as satisfaction derived from consumption: the amount of satisfaction or pleasure that somebody gains from consuming a commodity, product, or service. In classical economics this was considered to be an absolute measurement, but in modern economics it is considered to be a matter of relative preference. See <http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/Dictionary/DictionaryHome.aspx>
[22] Tolbert, 26.

goods.[23] Leaders of autocratic regimes at the opposite end of the spectrum are "typically surrounded by a smaller group of elites," but the personal risk to such elites of promoting policy change means that the threshold of coercive force to leverage them is exceedingly high.[24] It certainly appears that this was true of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. In the middle of the spectrum is what Tolbert describes as a "'loose autocracy' or junta" where "the possibility for pressure is greater."[25] Because the severity of risk and the disparity between public and private goods may be less, attacks on the cronies that support the regime might be more productive. He is careful to point out that regime change (unlimited objectives) may not result, but "the greater chance of regime change enhances the chance of crony attack to induce policy change short of regime change" (limited objectives).[26] Serbia had this last form of government in 1999, and it appears that this strategy of crony attack was employed in Operation ALLIED FORCE.[27]

The disposition of the enemy military forces has been intentionally ignored. Apart from the issue of force protection and security, the enemy military forces do not represent an obvious target set in this type of scenario. It is the leadership and their ability to leverage private and public goods that will bring about policy change. Military forces may be an enabling mechanism for policies that you seek to change, but their destruction is unhinged from the decision making process of the leadership. This can occur for a number of reasons. One reason is that the leader fails to feel the impact of air power on his forces. Despite technological advances, air power directed at fielded forces can be blunted through

[23] Ibid.
[24] Tolbert, 26-27.
[25] Tolbert, 27.
[26] Tolbert, 28.
[27] Tolbert, 43.

dispersion and camouflage (although a dispersed and hidden force is relatively ineffective). Another reason is that there may not be a concern on the part of the leadership because no credible alternative to a destroyed military exists. In the case of Kosovo, "Serb officials, when addressing the reasons for Belgrade's decision to yield, mention neither the attrition of the FRY's military forces nor the supposed deterioration of the military balance in Kosovo as major reasons for Belgrade's decision to yield."[28]

Conclusion

Air power operates in a distinct medium across all levels of war and combat force employment. It is part of the joint and combined effort in most scenarios, but it is not necessarily relegated to the supporting role when the desired end state and strategic guidance suggests a campaign over a major operation. The attachment of such labels needs to carefully consider the unique characteristics of each medium before carving out a particular niche for ground or maritime forces.

The model for campaign design properly accounts for the role of political leadership in determining the desired end state and strategic objective. If employed in a linear fashion, it offers clear guidance for the determination of each step before moving ahead, and it serves to constantly remind planners about why they make the choices that they make.

Current theory is centered on two main ideas. The first is that the complexity of the objective, planning, and action largely determine what level of combat force employment is being used. The second idea is that the term 'medium' in reference to a campaign is based on the predominant characteristic of the terrain. The emphasis is on the destination for the

[28] Hosmer, 90.

use of force rather than the means by which that force arrives. As such, land and maritime are the only mediums recognized at that level of combat force employment.

NATO's air attacks on Kosovo were an example of an air campaign that accomplished limited national strategic objectives without the use of land or maritime forces. Despite descriptions of the strategic objective as being unclear or changing, the complexity of the air attacks combined with the planners' intent to produce effects against both operational and strategic centers of gravity support the label campaign over operation. Furthermore, to deny the use of the term air campaign because the bombs and missiles struck the ground is to confuse the issue and challenge common sense.

Using a broad array of support and attack aircraft, NATO forces cobbled together a coalition bombing plan that increased in intensity and complexity over the course of the war. Milosevic accepted the terms of the Rambouillet Agreement following 78 days of bombing that sought to coerce rather than overthrow his government. Despite the role of the Russians in creating and continuing a dialogue with Milosevic, he submitted to the will of NATO not because his fielded forces had been defeated but because the punishment of aerial bombing threatened to loosen his grip on power.

Given that air power is capable of accomplishing national strategic objectives in this way, there are certain conditions that might make an air campaign a realistic course of action. The most important of these is that the objectives must be limited. Unlimited objectives imply a level and character of effort that quickly encompasses other services and types of military power. A lack of geographic proximity may help ensure that the adversary is unable to commence land or maritime operations, and the form of government may prove to be the key to moving from objective to desired end state to task list to targets.

In the end they are all useful points to examine in trying to determine if the promise of air power is to be realized in the manner of Kosovo. The fact that Kosovo does not fit neatly into the current theory of operational art should signal that new thinking is required, and a more complete understanding of what air power can and can not accomplish will immeasurably aid the planning and conduct of future wars.

Recommendations

1. Operational art theory should acknowledge that air is a medium for the conduct of a campaign, and that there can be an air campaign alone. Air power should not be relegated to a support function in name or practice because a more complete understanding about the way that it can coerce our adversaries will open the door to quicker accomplishment of strategic objectives.
2. Despite the emphasis on the potential of 'air power alone,' the full complement of military capabilities should be made available in any conflict. A determined adversary will always seek to diminish the effects of military power brought to bear, and the robust, joint capabilities that we have developed represent the most asymmetric advantage for our nation. Taken as a whole rather than in parts, the United States military is at its best. The aim of the coercive efforts that have been described is to exploit an adversary without the traditional cost in blood and treasure associated with ground or maritime campaigns.

Bibliography

Carter, John R. Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1998.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983.

Fancher, Judson. A Blind Eye: The Consideration for Terrain and Environment in Air Force Doctrine. SUNY Stonebrook: AFIT-CIRK, 1993.

Givens, Robert P. Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2002.

Hosmer, Stephen T. The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided To Settle When He Did. Santa Monica: RAND, 2001.

Lamb Sr., Michael W. Operation Allied Force: Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2002.

Lambeth, Benjamin S. "The Technology Revolution in Warfare." Survival, 39, Iss. 1 (Spring 1997): 65-84.

Meilinger, Philip S. "The Future of Air Power: Observations from the Past Decade," Air Power Review, Vol. 3 No. 1 (Spring 2000): 48-68.

Mortensen, Daniel R. Airpower and Ground Armies. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1998.

Pivarsky, Carl R. Airpower in the Context of a Dysfunctional Joint Doctrine. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1997.

Tolbert, Julian H. "Crony Attack: Strategic Attack's Silver Bullet?" Unpublished Draft Thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL: 2003.

Vego, Milan. Operational Warfare. Naval War College, 2000.

Vego, Milan, Professor of Operations, U.S. Naval War College. Interview by author, 28 January 2003.

Vego, Milan. "Wake-Up Call in Kosovo." Proceedings, (October 2000): 66-70.

Wells, Mark K. Air Power: Promise and Reality. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2000.