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14. ABSTRACT

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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<u>Public Affairs: An Operational Planning</u>
<u>Function to Safeguard Credibility and Public Opinion</u>

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department

The content of this paper reflects my own personal views and opinions expressed within are not
necessarily endorsed by either the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signed:_____

9 February 2004

"Public opinion is everything. With it, nothing can fail. Without it, nothing can succeed." Abraham Lincoln, 16th President of the United States[1]

THESIS AND INTRODUCTION

The 16th president of the U.S. recognized over a century ago that public opinion is a strategic center of gravity. Today, the speed of military operations and the advances in the global media's real time communications technology significantly affect the operational commander's ability to communicate to a variety of audiences and influence public opinion. Traditionally, the commander has used public affairs (PA) activities to communicate to US audiences and information operations (IO) to influence enemy decision makers. With national and international media reporting from the battle field in real-time, 24/7, the operational commander must prepare for media presence and reporting and consider its impact on public opinion.

The recognition of the power of public information and its influence on public opinion has brought the discussion of public affairs and information operations into greater relevance. Recently, General John Abizaid, Commander, US Central Command told the Washington Post, "This (the conflict in Iraq) is not a military battle, per se. It's going to be won on the political, economic and information playing field, because there is no military contest."[2] Consequently, the debate surrounds the best way to deal with the "information playing field:" through PA operations or IO activities?

Current joint doctrine does not clearly describe how an operational commander should employ communication tools to best maintain public opinion. Specifically the doctrine does not define PA and IO as complimentary war fighting functions, nor does it provide detailed guidance on coordination of these tasks. Moreover, the doctrine, cultures and practices of the individual services are disparate in how these disciplines function. The result for the joint commander is

lack of consistency, guidance, and differing perceptions about how to execute these functions. The joint commander must be able to clearly communicate his purpose and mission to a variety of audiences in order to garner and maintain public support, therefore, message alignment, coordination and deconfliction between PA and IO is essential.

The thesis of this paper is that PA must be considered, planned and used as an operational function that coordinates the dissemination of information released in the public domain. Because the media now play such a prominent role in military operations and it is a means by which national and international audiences get their information, PA must be planned in an operational context throughout all phases of conflict. Although the target audiences may differ when a commander is considering message dissemination through either the PA or IO methods, the consistency of the messages is important to preserve credibility and therefore communication coordination is vital.

This paper will first examine the evolution of media presence during military operations. It will then evaluate current joint and service doctrine in terms of providing appropriate guidance to commanders for properly managing the PA and IO relationship. Finally, it will look at PA lessons learned from recent military operations that demonstrate why PA and media involvement must be treated as an operational function and provide to the operational commander to protect from threats to the credibility of his message.

Milan Vego, the author of *On Operational Art*, defines an operational function as a theater-wide process that allows a commander to plan, prepare, conduct and sustain military actions across the full range of military operations.[3] PA activities, (media relations, command information, community relations) like logistics and intelligence, must be established early in theater and be well synchronized because the media are likely to be present before the military.

Too often, PA operations are believed to produce little more than hometown news stories or facilitating the occasional interview and little operational planning is acknowledged. This mindset must change because the conflicts in which the US is involved today are not ones where "military might" is the determinate of the outcome. Rather, media coverage of any military operation will shape both world and domestic public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead.

Public affairs and information operations activities take place in the global information environment (GIE). The GIE is defined in Army Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations as including "all individuals, organizations or systems, most of which are outside the control of the military that collect, process and disseminate information to national and international audiences."[4] Because the GIE has increased demand and competition for information, and is so important in shaping the public's perception of the desired end state, PA has become another operational function the combatant commander must skillfully manage in order to achieve the military conditions that, along with other instruments of power will allow him to achieve his desired end state.

The environment of the modern battle space has changed drastically and so has the media's ability to transmit information from the operating area. In today's GIE, the media have the capability to use the Internet or satellite feeds to transmit instantaneous reports directly from any where in the Joint Operating Area. This reality must be considered when planning any type of operation. Failure to adequately plan for and accommodate media representatives will not stop them from reporting; it will simply create a vacuum to be filled by others, perhaps even enemy propaganda. Commanders gain and maintain the initiative by providing fast, complete, truthful information to the media first. This requires adequate and thorough operational PA planning.

General Anthony Zinni, former Commander Combined Task Force United Shield in Somalia, recognized in a 1995 article the importance of this when he said, "Military operations can no longer be defined only in terms of fire and maneuver. The US commander must understand how to deal with the media and the important implications of media coverage."[5]

MILITARY – MEDIA RELATIONSHIP

Much has been written about the tenuous military-media relationship during conflict. It is not this author's intent to restate history. It is appropriate for this discussion, however to note recent trends and look at the PA lessons learned from these to set the framework for where that relationship now stands. Vietnam is considered the first "TV War" where hundreds of reporters had unfettered and uncensored access to battle field operations. Many political and military leaders thought the graphic images and negative stories reported in the press turned public opinion against the military. The military reaction was to attempt to prevent access and control information. The results of media presence in Vietnam revealed to the political and military leaders that the media were the conduit to the people, and the power of public opinion has a formidable influence on public policy. The public abhorrence to media reports pressured the administration to withdraw military forces. This set up mistrust and friction between military and media organizations that would linger for years.

In the early 1980's the military attempted to cooperate with media's desire to cover operations. The Pentagon made rules on accreditation procedures, security review and support for media in combat zones.[6] However, this effort to collaborate failed when numerous journalists appeared within hours to cover combat operations in Grenada only to be barred from operations for the first three days. Rather than remembering that the media are the conduit to the people, the lesson from Vietnam became "keep the press out." After initially being prevented

access, the press was "allowed" in, only to be handed off to a group of public affairs officers (PAOs) who were given no operational information, therefore were unable to provide useful information to the reporters. Additionally, the military was logistically unresponsive to press needs because the media had not been factored into operational planning.[7] A huge outcry forced the military to review its processes for media coverage which emerged as the national press pool; however the friction between the military and the media remained.

The trend toward larger numbers journalists demanding access to military operations continued as more than 1600 media and support personnel were present at the beginning of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. This conflict is often referred to as the first "CNN War" or the first war of live coverage as news viewers world wide watched real time coalition operations. Many consider Desert Storm as a turning point for military and media relations. Media were accommodated during the seven month deployment and many were embedded into units before and during the ground operations. However, many journalists complained afterward that they were not given sufficient freedom to cover all aspects of the conflict since access to much of the operation was limited.

One of the leading PA lessons learned during this time reflects this frustration. "PAOs need dedicated transportation, communication and other equipment to [facilitate] real-time communications capabilities of media covering the battlefield."[8] This lack of support for the media was construed by some as a form of censorship and manipulation. Some media concluded that logistical support for media was low on the military's priorities and that lack of support was intentional. Another key PA lesson from Desert Storm was that senior political and military leaders – including theater commanders – need to be visible to the public and involved in routine briefings to promote public confidence and instill *credibility* (italics added) in public

communications.[9]

Nearly 3500 journalists were registered to cover operations at the height of Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996. Media were embraced by the military during the peacekeeping phase and the relationship seemed to be improving. The PA lessons in Bosnia acknowledged a variety of issues. First and foremost, technology had greatly diminished the time required to file media reports and therefore, it was recognized that public affairs must adapt to the speed of media reporting. This requires proper operational planning. Furthermore, the need to establish close relations between the commander and information activities was highlighted. Additionally, the PA structure should be fully equipped to operate prior to D-Day in anticipation of advanced media interest in a deployment crisis.[10]

Just as it seemed the military – media relationship was improving, along came Operation Allied Force. During the Kosovo air campaign in 1999, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander issued a "gag order" that angered reporters. General Clark was the only senior officer allowed to give interviews to reporter. Many journalists perceived that information was being withheld by the military and accurate information was difficult to access. Without access to senior military leaders, the media focused instead on negative stories and Slobodan Milosevic filled the information vacuum with his propaganda. One of the most important lessons from this operation was that the enemy was far better and more nimble at PA/PI (public information) than the US/NATO. The Serbs deliberately killed thousands of innocent people, but no one saw it. US/NATO forces accidentally killed a few dozen innocents and the world watched.[11] This had a profoundly negative impact on public perception of US involvement in Kosovo. Moreover, US/NATO was continually reacting, investigating and responding to operational questions, while Milosevic relied on interior lines of information to stay ahead of breaking events. Once again, it

seems the lesson of keeping the public informed via the press was forgotten and credibility suffered.

Allied PAOs had developed a strategic plan for Allied Force, modeled after successful public information plans used in previous Balkan operations. But, many senior US and allied commanders were not familiar with the plan or failed to devote sufficient attention and resources to ensure its effective implementation. One key lesson from Kosovo was that PAOs suffered from a lack of access to information needed to respond to rapidly breaking news stories. This breakdown may have been attributed to a failure to properly integrate and coordinate information functions (e.g. operations, intelligence, and psychological operations) within the staff or between services and nations; or reluctance among operators to share certain classified operational details with PAOs. Despite the reason, it must be overcome or PA operations cannot be fully effective.

During the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Defense Department granted over 4,000 interviews and responded to more than 7,000 media queries. To present a timely and accurate picture of the war on terrorism to the American people, nearly 500 reporters were embedded into units actively involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Because of multiple media representatives reporting real-time from a variety of operating areas, the entire world audience watched American forces drive unopposed into Baghdad.   While the commander needs to maintain operational security, protect lives and preserve military options, the trend toward openness and inclusion of live reporting media will likely continue.

Lessons from Vietnam to Iraqi Freedom show the military continues to recognized the significance of media presence during military operations, however, each operation seems to reveal the same mistakes are repeated. An observation by Dr. Lawrence Yates of the US Army Command and General Staff College is worth considering: "Like it or not, the news media have

more impact than most other agencies on how an operation is perceived by the outside world."[12] The issue for the joint commander is recognizing that public information, communicated through the media is going to shape public opinion. To maintain positive control of public information and use it effectively, operational planning for PA must be done.

CURRENT JOINT DOCTRINE

Joint Publication 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations* says that PA activities are an operational function;[13] however, when it comes to planning PA functions, media operations in particular, it is not well explained. It states the mission of joint public affairs is to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about activities of US joint forces to the public and internal audiences.[14] It also affirms that the military is accountable and responsible to the public for performing its mission of national defense. The news media are the primary means of communicating information about the military to the general public. PAOs are the commander's connection to the news media. The media, however, are also reaching the same audience that IO activities are targeting. This conduit to enemy audiences can be alluring to IO practitioners to use the media to disseminate their messages.

Joint Publication 3-13 *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations* defines IO as actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and systems.[15] These actions are further categorized as offensive and defensive measures. While defensive IO is just that, those actions necessary to protect and defend information and information systems, offensive IO applies perception management actions such as psychological operations, operational security, military deception, electronic warfare, physical destruction and computer network attack. The doctrine then becomes unclear when it says "other activities that may contribute to offensive IO include, but are not limited to PA…"[16]

Interestingly, Joint Publication 3-61, doctrine on public affairs, does not mention any relationship IO activities; however, the joint publication on IO identifies the following key offensive IO PA *tasks*:

- Expedite the flow of timely information to internal and external audiences.
- Create an awareness of the military goals during a campaign or operation.
- Satisfy the desire of the internal and external audiences to be kept informed about the campaign or operation.
- Inform internal and external audiences of significant developments affecting them.
- Through the media, allow a joint force commander to inform an adversary or a potential adversary about the friendly forces' intent and capability.[17]

The IO and PA tasks listed are embedded in the fundamental policies, guidelines and responsibilities defined in PA doctrine, but PA doctrine doesn't recognize the IO association. This may be a result of the 18 month difference in publication of each. Nonetheless, the Joint IO doctrine could lead one to believe that PA activities, media in particular, are IO elements. If that is the case, then it should be clearly reciprocated in the Joint PA doctrine. Joint Publication 5-00.1 *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* states IO should be integrated into the normal campaign planning and execution process.[18] If the joint commander desires to have consistent communication of public information reach the strategic center of gravity, public opinion, doctrine should reflect the integration of PA planning in just the same manner as IO.

THE SERVICES

All of the services' PA doctrines recognize that implicit in a government of the people, by the people and for the people are the concepts that the people have a right to know about the activities of the military. One of the most significant conduits through which information is passed to the people is the free press guaranteed by the Constitution. However, in this age of "information superiority" there is contention and ambiguity in how to use the media. Some argue it is an IO function, some argue it must remain separated from IO to maintain credibility.

Army and Air Force doctrine on PA and IO indicate PA as a subcomponent of IO. Marine Corps doctrine recognizes the "contributory" element of PA on IO. Navy doctrine simply does not address the issues. The difficulty with contrary service doctrine is the joint commander's staff is comprised of the various services whose perspectives and practices can be incongruent and therefore could fail to achieve the desired end state.

Army

Army Field Manual (FM) 46-1, *Public Affairs*, recognizes the impact of media on operations. It states that PA is a fundamental tool of competent leadership, a critical element of effective battle command, and an essential part of successful mission accomplishment.[19] However, it strongly links PA operations to IO activities in its IO doctrine.

Army Field Manual (FM) 100-6, the Army's Information Operations doctrine says IO, in their simplest form are the activities that gain information and knowledge and improve friendly execution of operations while denying an adversary similar capabilities by whatever means possible. Effects of IO produce significant military advantage for forces conducting such operations.[20] The Army doctrine places public affairs in a "unity of effort" triad with Command and Control Warfare (C2W which comprises operational security, deception, electronic warfare, destruction and psychological operations), and civil affairs. It considers PA operations as one element of a larger information strategy. "Participation in information operations integrates PA into operations planning at all levels and across the full spectrum of operations."[21] However the doctrine does not specify what "participation" means. Some could deduce it means coordination and synchronization; others could interpret it as intentionally using the media to propagate false information. That is against the law.

Articles written by Army officers purport the use of PA as an IO function. General

David Grange in a 1997 article by titled "*Information Operations for the Ground Commander*"

he stated, "During operations, PA and CA (Civil Affairs) have a direct impact on IO. A

coordinated IO plan that incorporates PA and CA is critical for building legitimacy for host

nation, coalition, US and world support. PA must be integrated with IO to present accurate,

balanced and credible information.[22]

In a recent article in Parameters, Army Lt. Col Margaret Belknap argues the media can be

strategic enabler in various ways, "to communicate the objective and end-state to a global

audience, to execute effective psychological operations, to play a major role in deception of the

enemy, and to supplement intelligence collection efforts."[23] This philosophy threatens to destroy

the credibility of the commander. Without credibility, the commander's ability to protect the

public opinion center of gravity is jeopardized. Associated Press reporter Robert Burns

commented on the inclusion of PA in IO when he said:

> "It strikes me as dangerous to put a PAO into the realm of information operations
> if by that we mean manipulation of information or psychological operations.
> Obviously a PAO is in the information business, but it must not be -- either in fact
> or in appearance -- part of a campaign to manipulate or deceive. I would advise a
> commander and PAO to keep in mind who it is they are supposed to be working
> for -- the American people -- with truth and honor as their guides."[24]

Air Force

The Air Force considers information superiority as a core competency to war fighting.

As such their doctrine suggests using "information strategies" to overcome the adversary. In

short, that means that PA is considered an element of IO.

Air Force Doctrinal Document 2-5.4 *Public Affairs Operations* says that the Air Force

conducts PA operations to communicate unclassified information about Air Force activities to

Air Force, domestic and international audiences. It further characterizes PA "as a weapon in the

commander's arsenal of information operations, PA operations use timely and accurate

information to help deter war, drive a crisis back to peace or wage war."[25] This is true across the

services. There certainly are operational benefits of PA operations. Again, just like Joint and

Army doctrine, the Air Force IO doctrine specifically addresses PA as an IO element, but PA

doctrine does not address IO as thoroughly.

Air Force Doctrinal Document 2-5 *Information Operations* defines IO as "actions taken

to gain, exploit, defend or attack information and information systems." All the activities that

make up PA operations are part of information-in-warfare, the "gain and exploit" pillar of IO.

"Adding PA to IO planning, coordination and execution enhances the credibility and coherence

of information reaching a world wide audience."[26]

An example of Air Force viewpoint with respect to PA and IO can be found in an

Aerospace Power Journal article by Major Gary Pounder which discussed the IO/PA

relationship during NATO's air campaign over Kosovo. He concluded, "that despite

reservations about lost credibility, PA must play a central role in future IO efforts – the public

information battle space is simply too important to ignore."[27] He went on to observe that "IO

practitioners … must recognize that much of the information war will be waged in the public

media, necessitating the need for PA participation. PA specialists…need to become full partners

in the IO planning and execution process, developing the skills and expertise required to win the

media war."[28]

Many savvy media representatives who have covered military operations understand that

IO planning is an essential part of battlefield preparation. However, as NBC's national security

correspondent, Jim Miklaszewski advised, "Dealing with the media should NOT involve

DISinformation [sic] planning. Purposely providing DISinformation to the media will almost

always be discovered and destroy credibility."[29] There are legitimate reasons for employing

deception or psychological operations (an element of IO), but not for purposely lying to the media. Intelligence agencies in the past have planted false stories in the foreign media, but today with the explosion of the Internet and around-the-clock cable news, it is impossible to prevent having the story cycle back into the US.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps recently published its *Information Operations/Information Warfare Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook.* It defines PA and IO in much the same manner as the Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations. Specifically it defines the "contributory nature" of PA to IO and does not list PA as one of the six pillars of IO. However, in the table of "Objectives and Targets"[30] (see below) it lists the PA functions as an IO objective, which could allow one to deduce that PA is a function of IO.

IO Element	Primary IO Objective	Primary IO Target
Public Affairs	Countering misinformation and keep friendly troops, enemy troops and populace in area of operations informed of US goals and objectives	American and foreign public, friendly forces, coalition partners, foreign forces and decision makers.

Marine Corps doctrine acknowledges that US force commanders, public affairs officers, staff and troops must become adept at dealing with media representatives to disseminate accurate, timely information to the general public, military personnel, civilian employees and family members. Yet, the doctrine is unclear about the "contributory" nature of PA to IO and fails to acknowledge the impact of large media presence.

The three service doctrines just examined show that each understands the importance of PA and IO but they fail to differentiate how to best employ these functions. The IO doctrine of the services provides much more emphasis on PA being a part of its functions than do the PA

doctrines. Furthermore, none of the doctrine addresses the emphatic need to maintain credibility. The operational commander must fully understand that precautions must be taken to safeguard credibility if public opinion is to be maintained. Despite the fact that joint doctrine on PA and IO fail to emphasize credibility, the Joint Publication on *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* underscores it: "To maintain the credibility of military PA, steps must be taken to protect against slanting or manipulating such PA channels."[31] Virginian Pilot military reporter Dale Eisman's comments on the integration of PA and IO also reflects concern about maintaining credibility:

> "This sort of thing [integration of PA and IO] scares the beejeebers [sic] out of me. Experienced reporters are accustomed to being used, or to attempts to use us, but that doesn't make the experience any more enjoyable. Seems to me the #1 PA rule ought to be "Don't lie and don't mislead either." If you combine PA and information ops you're going to break the rule and break it regularly."[32]

PA LESSONS LEARNED

Many would agree that the success of military operations in the Information Age will continue to be judged as much by political support and public perceptions at home and abroad as by military prowess. To capture the opportunity to shape public opinion, the enormous media embed program of Operation Iraqi Freedom marked the first time reporters were allowed unrestricted front line access with the ability to report real-time. Journalists who agreed to Defense Department ground rules were embedded with units in every military branch. While the official PA lessons learned have not been published, there are some key issues being discussed.[33] Most of these issues surround the need for PA to be an operational planning function.

Among the key issues being discussed, "OIF OPLAN execution indicates that wholly predictable public information/public diplomacy events having significant potential operational impact were not included in the CFC and/or CFLCC war gaming."[34] Put another way, there

were any number of significant situations that PAOs expected, but which caught the non-PA staff by surprise. Such events included fratricides, looting, media deaths, media in danger, embedded media OPSEC violations, major collateral damage. A remedy to this would be to include in the Joint Military Decision Making Process a requirement for war gaming PA events and PA specific synchronization, perhaps a line in the synch matrix."[35] This was a lesson recognized as far back as Desert Storm, "Major exercises must incorporate media play and more involvement of PA personnel in order to realistically train for the next conflict,"[36] but failure to include PA as an operational planning function caused the same mistake.

Another recurring lesson has been lack of logistical support for media access and movement on the battle field. "There are times on the modern battlefield when the PI/PD/IO (public information, public diplomacy, information operations) environment is such that a helicopter load of media at the right time and place will be more valuable to the joint commander than several times their number in traditional combat forces."[37]

Another lesson discussed is the lack of PA staff participation in [commander's] targeting: PA should have a role in the targeting process similar to that of operational law staffs. PA participation in targeting can pay significant dividends by permitting the PA staff to better anticipate and prepare for media reactions to specific targets. This should have been learned in Kosovo, (see Pounder article for complete details) but failure to include PA in all levels of planning resulted in repeating this error.

To properly set the conditions to maximize impact of IO campaign, PA must start 5-7 days before IO. PA can set the conditions and planted seed that were leveraged by IO and PSYOP. For example, prior to pushing for capitulation in IO/PSYOP, PAO should arrange for discussions on humanitarian assistance programs and enemy prisoner-of-war processes to plant

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the seed that would potentially have the effect of encouraging capitulation.

A senior military PAO who was intimately familiar with PA operations during Iraqi Freedoms observed, "At the operational level of war, PA was ignored and they [the ground commander] tried to put it (PA) into an IO. The result was loss of credibility in Qatar (location of the coalition press information center). Media felt press briefings were stage-managed. The lines [between PA and IO] were over blurred. We lost credibility in the national and international realm. PA was too tied to IO."[38]

Recommendations:

Commanders must be mindful of protecting public opinion, and therefore, need to understand the true value and meaning of public affairs and media on the battle field. To do this effectively, PA through its ability to disseminate credible public information must be considered in all phase of operational planning. Developments in telecommunications have resulted in media that both friendly and enemy forces will use to shape the battle space and influence world wide opinion.

1. Include PA in all phases of operational planning at all levels of planning. From meeting that determine targeting decisions to inclusion in the desired effects board, PA needs to be able to respond to the actions on the battlefield in a timely and accurate manner.

2. Use PA operations as Informational Flexible Deterrent Options (IFDOs) which are options to commanders as alternative courses of action in accomplishing operations missions other than bombs on target. IFDOs heighten public awareness, promote national and coalition policies, aims and objective for the operation as well as counter adversary propaganda and disinformation in the news. One way that PA operations can be used in an offensive counter information role is by using a virtual force projection IFDO. Carefully coordinated

release of operational information in some situations could deter military conflict.

3.   Training and education of PA and IO practitioners to fully understand each other's mission, capabilities and limitations. Coordination, synchronization and deconfliction will ensure consistent messages are released to the proper audiences without jeopardizing credibility.

The credibility and reputation of the US military in the international media is a strategic center of gravity for combating enemy propaganda. It is absolutely imperative that this credibility is maintained. If credibility is not maintained, the US's operational ability to use PA for combating adversary propaganda, for providing informational flexible deterrent operations, virtual force projection or maintaining national understanding could be permanently and irreparably damaged. First Marine Division After Action Report highlighted the positive result of a media embed that countered enemy misinformation:

> "The presence of embedded media significantly reduced the Iraqi ability to conduct a propaganda campaign. The Iraqi claims that the Coalition forces were 'roasting their stomachs at the gates of Baghdad and committing suicide rather that face the mighty Iraqi Army were quickly dispelled when CNN broadcasted live from inside Saddam's Presidential Palace in downtown Baghdad.[39]

Coordination of PA and IO plans is required to ensure both initiatives support the commander's overall objectives, that's good staff work. But, a large distinction between the functions of PA and IO must be made. These efforts should be synchronized consistent with policy and security. The PA end-state should be to reassure and maintain the trust and confidence of the publics of the US, the US military and in the international community through execution of a proactive public affairs program coordinated with IO. PA must maintain the status as a credible and preferred source of information by the media and the public without any perception of being disingenuous.

NOTES

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[27] Gary Pounder, "Opportunity Lost," *Aerospace Power Journal*, (Summer 2000), 56.

[28] Ibid.

[29] NBC national security correspondent Jim Miklaszewski, interview by author, 27 January 2004, Newport, RI, electronic mail, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

[30] Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Information Operations/Information Warfare, Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook, MCIA-2700-001-03, Washington, DC: June 2003, 6.

[31] Joint Publication 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* (Washington, D.C.: 1996), vi.

[32] *Virginian Pilot* military correspondent Dale Eisman, interview by author, 23 January 2004, Newport, RI, electronic mail, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

[33] The official PA lessons learned being conducted at Joint Forces Command and the Defense Information School are not yet complete. The following information was derived from email and phone interviews of senior Army and Navy PAOs were involved.

[34] Senior military PAO (name withheld on request), interview by author, 16 December 2003, Newport, RI, electronic mail, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Jurkowsky and Van Dyke, "From Desert Storm to Allied Force," 2.

[37] Senior military PAO interview.

[38] Telephone conversation with senior military PAO, (name withheld on request), 30 January 2004, Newport, RI.

[39] US Marine Corps: First Marine Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/1mardiv_oif_lessons_learned.doc

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