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JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS – GLOBAL STRIKE:
PRESERVING, ADVANCING, AND ACCELERATING OPERATIONAL ART FOR THE
JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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09 February 2004

ABSTRACT

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On 10 January 2003, President Bush assigned the newly created mission of “global strike” to U.S. Strategic Command. While streamlining the nation’s crisis planning and execution capabilities, this innovative change to the Unified Command Plan presents several organizational and cultural challenges for the regional combatant commanders. It can be viewed as infringing upon theater unity of command, a potential avenue for increased national level control and interference, and a competitor for finite warfighting resources.

Balancing these competing needs is both challenging and imperative, particularly in the era of smaller force structures and potentially devastating threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. To meet the needs of both the President and regional combatant commanders, U.S. Strategic Command should establish a subordinate element, Joint Force Headquarters – Global Strike (JFHQ-GS), comprised of a standing crisis action planning staff and a small number of assigned joint and service capabilities to provide accelerated, specialized, and integrated global strike operations for the joint force commander.

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INTRODUCTION

We can identify threats, but cannot know when or where America or its friends will be attacked. We should try mightily to avoid surprise, but we must also learn to expect it... DoD must develop the ability to integrate combat organizations with forces capable of responding rapidly to events that occur with little or no warning.

- Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001ⁱ

Surprise is inevitable. From the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the Al Qaida terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, history is replete with clear evidence that despite our best diplomatic, intelligence, and military efforts, our adversaries will develop new or unanticipated methods of conducting warfare that threaten the United States, its interests, or its allies with little or no warning. In the military and geopolitical landscape of the next decade, potential aggressors are also likely to adopt lucrative strategies that incorporate anti-access or counter-coalition schemes, or threaten use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in order to delay or deny the United States its desired response of deploying rapidly into theater, building up sufficient forces, and conducting operations on its terms, timeline, and tempo.ⁱⁱ

Appropriately, the United States is working diligently to compress its planning, deployment, and operational timelines. U.S. Joint Forces Command is establishing Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) in each of the regional combatant commands and creating common deployable command and control systems for their efficient operation.ⁱⁱⁱ Each of the military services is developing longer range, higher precision, and more rapidly deployable forces and weapons systems to bring decisive effects more quickly to the battlefield.^{iv} Even these timelines and capabilities, however, may not be adequate in all situations.

In a bold step to streamline the nation's crisis planning and execution capabilities, on 10 January 2003, President Bush assigned the newly created mission of "global strike" to the

newly reorganized U.S. Strategic Command.^v This profound move—clearly focused on enhancing U.S. security through improved response to unwarned events—presents several cultural and organizational challenges at the operational level of war. It infringes upon the regional combatant commander’s unity of command, is a potential avenue for increased national level control and interference in the operational and tactical levels of war, and is a competitor for finite warfighting resources.

This paper dissects and substantiates the growing need for rapid global strike capabilities, and seeks to resolve these important issues. It proposes the creation of a Joint Force Headquarters – Global Strike (JFHQ-GS), subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command and comprised of a standing crisis action planning staff and small number of formally assigned joint and service capabilities. The JFHQ-GS mission will be to plan and if necessary execute accelerated and specialized operations directly for the joint force commander (JFC).

THE CRITICAL NEED FOR GLOBAL STRIKE

A pivotal tenet of the new defense strategy is the ability to respond quickly, and thus set the initial conditions for either deterrence or the swift defeat of an aggressor.

- Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2003^{vi}

The catalyst for developing a global strike capability is the nexus of four factors: historical precedence, a dynamic and unpredictable threat, the evolving U.S. force structure, and the geopolitical environment. In addressing these factors the global strike concept is not envisioned as a mechanism to win conflict “on the cheap,” but rather as a method to conduct highly accelerated planning and execution of extended range kinetic or non-kinetic missions to preempt, shape, surprise, set conditions, thwart advances, and maintain alliances.^{vii}

Conceptually, it is part of the larger spectrum of capabilities the United States needs, but that have not been possible in the past.

Precedence. More than half of all major U.S. military operations in the last 30 years resulted from unforeseen events, and required rapid planning and execution.^{viii} Although all were successful, the time from event to effects on the battlefield was measured in weeks, not days. In 1983, Operation URGENT FURY and the invasion of Grenada began 12 days after the arrest of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and the initiation of military planning.^{ix} In 1986, Operation ELDORADO CANYON launched its raid on Libya 9 days after the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque, delayed in part by interservice planning challenges.^x In 1990, Iraq took just 36 hours to initiate and complete the invasion of Kuwait, while it took 10 days for the US to deploy the first six squadrons of aircraft, move an aircraft carrier to theater, and establish a small ground contingent in Saudi Arabia.^{xi} And in 2001, the US launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 28 days after the terrorist attacks of September 11th—a full 27 days after the Secretary of Defense directed planning.^{xii}

These timelines are not failings, but rather a measure of operational planning processes, organizational constraints, and geopolitical influences. They also are a reflection of the evolution in “jointness” and operational art, culminating in new approaches such as non-contiguous warfare and employing special operations forces (SOF) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel to conduct specialized preparatory missions—in many ways complementary to the missions envisaged by global strike—while the broader operational plan and basing rights are still being drafted and negotiated by the JFC.^{xiii}

Threat. The gravest dangers to the United States and its interests in the immediate future are weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism.^{xiv} The increasing likelihood of their intersection through rogue or failing nations provides the most compelling case for

establishing trained staffs and forces to conduct unwarned rapid global strike operations in the first few hours and days of crises. If the United States receives warning of an imminent attack of this nature in the future, the President's immediate question to the JFC will not be "Where is the closest carrier?" It will be "What options can I execute today?" At present, there are few answers to this question that create substantive effects on the battlefield.

Anti-access strategies also present a significant challenge for the U.S. military. More than ten nations possess advanced surface to air missile systems such as the SA-10 and SA-12, or advanced fighters such as the SU-35 and SU-37,^{xv} and nations with ballistic missiles can close chokepoints or sea and aerial ports of debarkation for deploying U.S. forces. During the initial stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD, one of the most potentially devastating Iraqi actions would have been an attack on arriving U.S. forces—a concept sharply reinforced in 2002 by the successful Opposing Force (OPFOR) Commander during Exercise MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE.^{xvi,xvii} During future U.S. operations, global strike missions may provide the most effective and efficient mechanism, incorporating surprise by denying warning to the enemy, for "kicking open the door" to gain access and protection for the JFC's warfighting forces.

U.S. Forces. As the United States pursues lighter, more agile, and networked forces, several trends are emerging which argue for enhanced global strike capabilities. First, the Department of Defense (DoD) is reviewing how to better align its smaller force structure.^{xviii} Initiatives such as "multi-apportionment" of forces to several combatant commanders will inherently provide flexibility, but introduce additional risk. Second, through sensor-to-shooter initiatives the U.S. military is making great strides in compressing the factors of time, space, and force in the tactical "kill-chain" (find-fix-target-engage-assess), but have not yet translated this concept to the operational and strategic levels. The only immediate U.S.

global warning and response capability today is for nuclear weapons, which remains a vital element of the nation's deterrence posture but is inadequate and undesirable for almost any conceivable response scenario. Third, there is an increasing focus on effects based operations (EBO), which emphasize rapid, cumulative, and persistent effects on the enemy.^{xix}

Training, exercising and certifying a specialized global strike planning and execution capability is critical in light of these trends. It will reduce the operational risk incurred by apportioning forces to multiple theaters; it will provide non-nuclear immediate response options to the President and JFC; and it will bring decisive effects to the battlefield more quickly in support of effects based operations.

Geopolitics. Coalition considerations are a driving factor in modern warfare, influencing both how and why nations fight. For example, in 1996 the United States based sizable forces in the Middle East as part of the United Nations-sanctioned "no-fly zone" in southern Iraq, yet was forced to fly B-52's on 34-hour roundtrip missions from the United States—their longest in history and a preview of global strike—because coalition partners were hesitant to respond to the Iraqi seizure of the Kurdish-held town of Irbil in the north.^{xx} Similarly, during the tenuous opening weeks of Operation DESERT SHIELD, any Iraqi SCUD missiles launched toward Israel in an attempt to ignite a broader Arab-Israeli conflict could have provoked a response and scuttled U.S. coalition-building efforts. While Saddam Hussein withheld this tactic until January 1991, it would have had a much more decisive effect in August 1990—a conclusion our future adversaries can easily draw and which argues for global strike for both coalition preservation and third-party escalation prevention.

Collectively these four factors generate a convincing case for narrowing the gap between crisis and response, and for formalizing the extended-range global strike process. In addition, the policy of preemption outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy—

regardless of its controversial nature—places increased emphasis on rapid global strike, and the Department of Defense must develop the organizations, capabilities, and culture necessary to enable a JFC to carry out this mission.^{xxi}

THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL LEVEL INVOLVEMENT

...integrate a wider set of national capabilities than reside in the military alone...

- Unified Vision 01^{xxii}

Consider the following plausible, possible, and increasingly probable scenario. An unwarned event occurs threatening U.S. interests. The Secretary of Defense directs the planning of at least three possible initial courses of action to brief the President in 12 hours. His only guidelines are they must be executable within 24-36 hours, and they must present options from the full spectrum of our arsenal. What would the JFC want or need in the next 12 hours? The answers suggest that direct contributions and coordination at the national and operational-strategic levels may be crucial to his success.

Command and Control. The most challenging technological hurdle for establishing a rapid global strike planning and execution capability is developing the robust, worldwide command and control (C2) architecture. In a global strike scenario, the JFC's staff will require instant access to an infrastructure that supports global collaborative planning, integrates collateral damage assessment and WMD collateral effects software, provides sufficient bandwidth for video teleconferencing and imagery transmission, maintains secure and survivable links with forces worldwide, and enables streamlined decision-making for the President, Secretary of Defense, and JFC. The Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) system under development by U.S. Joint Forces Command for the theater SJFHQs is

a valuable step in the right direction, but it is not designed to bridge the full tactical to strategic spectrum, nor be fully operational until the SJFHQ receives staff augmentation – rendering it less than sufficient for rapid unwarned global strike.^{xxiii}

The most feasible and survivable C2 option for the global strike mission is establishing a stateside architecture to host, support, and connect the regional and deployable systems. The architecture most closely meeting the global strike requirements today is U.S. Strategic Command’s underground command center, which contains or is procuring the global infrastructure to connect the nation’s nuclear, long-range conventional, space, information operations (IO), and missile defense forces, and provides secure and survivable links into the national civilian leadership and all regional combatant commands.^{xxiv}

A primary C2 node external to the theater of operations may legitimately elicit concerns of tactical responsiveness and assured connectivity; however, recent operations demonstrate they do not present insurmountable technical or “unity of command/unity of effort” hurdles. Transparent to the end-user, several of the operations directly affecting the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq were based and controlled in the United States. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as Predator and Global Hawk were operated via joysticks and keyboards at Air Force bases in Nevada and California.^{xxv} Similarly, Global Positioning System (GPS) enhancements perfectly synchronized with tactical operations were controlled from Air Force Space Command units around the globe.^{xxvi} Small, specialized operations have a proven global C2 capability which may be crucial in the timelines required by global strike.

Access to Specialized Capabilities. The ability to reach into specialized capabilities is one of the most compelling reasons for conducting global strike planning at the national level, and in particular, at U.S. Strategic Command. Most information operations (IO)

“weapons” are compartmentalized within the services and are difficult for JTFs to access, understand, and plan for in extremely short timelines.^{xxvii} In a measure to make these capabilities more readily accessible, Unified Command Plan 2002 - Change 2 expanded U.S. Strategic Command’s computer network attack and defense roles to the broader mission of DoD IO integration.^{xxviii} The command subsequently established Joint Force Headquarters – Information Operations (JFHQ-IO) and brought a variety of organizations under its umbrella, including the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) and Joint Task Force – Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO).^{xxix} These organizations—all subordinate to a single unified command—created the ability to rapidly present a JFC the full spectrum of joint and service kinetic and non-kinetic options. The seamless integration of these organizations and capabilities into Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) through “centralized control / specialized execution” validates this unique organizational concept.

Intelligence Support. The current drive to field heavily networked forces operating from a common relevant operational picture (CROP) will increasingly rely on a completed and thorough operational net assessment.^{xxx} In the event of unwarned attack, this level of information may not yet exist, nor may the networks and relationships with the broader intelligence community that are needed to create it in the timelines required. Formal links from the global strike planning process to the national intelligence community, and its allied intelligence-sharing networks, are likely to become invaluable during strategic crisis action planning. U.S. Strategic Command’s existing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integration mission provides a ready and robust conduit for this rapid collaboration.^{xxxi}

Interagency coordination. While traditional thought is military action occurs after other tools of national power fail, recent operations prove otherwise. Currently, each of the regional combatant commands is establishing a Joint Interagency Coordination Group

(JIACG) to streamline integration of the military, diplomatic, economic, and information instruments that are so crucial to effects based operations.^{xxxii} This interagency process is necessary not just during combat operations and the transition to post-hostilities, as is evident in Afghanistan and Iraq today, but also during the rapid transition *into* hostilities that may require global strike operations. With the worldwide operational missions of missile defense and global strike, the JIACG at U.S. Strategic Command may be uniquely suited among all JIACGs to specifically organize and train for the role of accelerated crisis coordination.

Intangibles: Moderating “Interference” and Preserving Operational Art. In the era of UAVs and speed of light communications, it is increasingly challenging to maintain the delineation between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Although perhaps counter-intuitive, “subcontracting” global strike operations from the JFC to U.S. Strategic Command may assist in moderating national-level pressure and preserve operational art for the JFC during the first few hours of crises. Operational art theory maintains an effective operational commander should focus on objectives, integration, force deployment, and campaign planning, carefully responding to the strategic guidance and avoiding task saturation at the tactical level.^{xxxiii} In an unwarned attack scenario, a specialized global strike crisis action planning staff could and would draw and temper the immediate national-level pressures, as well as monitor the detailed tactical execution of any approved immediate response option. This intentional subcontracting would free the JFC to conduct the more rigorous and comprehensive operational-level crisis action and campaign planning, as he does today. As long as there is a formal process for the JFC’s staff to collaborate and the global strike plan is coordinated as an element to the JFC’s emerging plan, it may prove beneficial and highly efficient to delegate these preparatory missions. The example of SOF operations in Afghanistan and Iraq—validated by the vastly increased autonomy recently

granted to U.S. Special Operations Command to operate as the “supported” commander in a regional combatant commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR)—shows this is not only possible, but once exercised and proven can provide synergistic effects for the JFC.^{xxxiv}

With the substantial role the national community can and must play in unwarmed and time-sensitive crises, the concept of assigning the global strike mission to U.S. Strategic Command becomes operationally sound, and the challenge becomes how to best organize for successful operations. Currently, its headquarters structure is as an outcropping of the 2002 unification with U.S. Space Command, and is geared specifically for the space, nuclear, IO and missile defense missions.^{xxxv} It should be tailored for more effectively and efficiently presenting specialized global strike planning and execution capabilities to the JFC in ways that enhance the JFC’s effectiveness and preserves his unity of effort.

ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS: ESTABLISHING JFHQ-GS

The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.

- National Security Strategy, 2002^{xxxvi}

By definition, global strike operations attempt to produce strategic and operational effects through tactical operations, and the “ideal” global strike organization, processes, and forces should bring together the positive elements of all three levels into a single entity. It should capture the robust C2, intelligence links, interagency connections, special access programs, physical security, and “strategic” focus possible in a centralized stateside unified command. It should reflect the flexibility, regional expertise, integration, and operational unity of effort inherent in regional JFCs. And it should have the responsiveness, detailed unit training, and employment tactics found at the tactical level. Ideally, it would not be ad hoc in

organization, planning or execution, but rather bring rigorous planning, streamlined decision-making, embedded logistics, and end-to-end ISR. It would ensure the sound application of operational art found in deliberate planning, but at the accelerated timelines of crisis action planning and execution. Importantly, it would be trained, exercised, certified, and on call with staff and forces able to plan and execute in hours.

To achieve this aggressive goal in the most effective and efficient manner, U.S. Strategic Command should establish Joint Force Headquarters – Global Strike. Its mission would be to “conduct accelerated global strike planning and execution for the joint force commander using the full-range of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities.” JFHQ-GS would consist of a standing crisis action planning staff and a C2 element that provides command and control of a small number of assigned global strike forces. In all instances where the JFC can provide C2 for mission execution, JFHQ-GS will be a supporting command. When the JFC does not have the capability, when there are specialized mission parameters such as IO, or when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, JFHQ-GS would provide U.S. Strategic Command the ability to serve as the supported command for execution.

Planning Process. In his October 2003 press briefing on OIF lessons learned, the Director for the Joint Center for Lessons Learned praised the operational plan in Iraq by commenting, “I would say that the plan is *not* important. It’s the planning *process* that CENTCOM had down.”^{xxxvii} He further elaborated U.S. Central Command was able to react to a highly dynamic situation, recognize changing assumptions, revert to pre-wargamed branches and sequels, use collaborative tools to link distant personnel, and create changes in a very rapid manner as the battle progressed – the very essence of operational art. The key to success for global strike is establishing a similarly detailed and adaptive process that builds on existing plans, wargames, operations, and exercises.

For JFHQ-GS, this would entail creating Global Strike Planning Documents (GSPDs) during peacetime to serve as the backbone of crisis action planning. Leveraging theater operations plans (OPLANS) and concept plans (CONPLANS)—each of which are moving to a one-year review cycle—the JFHQ-GS would develop GSPDs for representative targets in representative regions of the world.^{xxxviii} Each would support a real-world global strike option, and serve as the foundation for adaptive planning of unwarned global strikes. Likely targets include WMD facilities, C2 nodes, known terrorist facilities, ballistic missile units, surface to air missiles, and coastal defense sites. The GSPD would be fully coordinated with the regional combatant commanders, services, and supporting agencies, giving the JFC insight and input into the planning process.

Each GSPD would contain a standardized set of data, including: scenario, potential courses of action (such as air, IO, TLAM, SSGN, and SOF^{xxxix}), weaponing data, target materials, collateral damage estimates, support requirements (ISR, tankers, bandwidth), and warning order templates. It would also articulate assumptions and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to facilitate the review and update process during crisis action planning. Upon completion and approval, the planning staffs and global strike forces would use the GSPDs to train, exercise, and certify for the global strike mission.

While this may appear extensive and burdensome, it is already being accomplished to a large degree. U.S. Strategic Command currently provides comprehensive conventional targeting support to the regional combatant commanders, and produces detailed Theater Planning Support Documents (TPSDs) for their use. It is also conducting ground-breaking work on a new national strategic war plan (formerly the “SIOP”), which by direction of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review will include pre-planned and adaptive conventional options.^{xi}

Creating JFHQ-GS will enable the command's planners to better collaborate, minimize duplication of effort, and maximize the analytical and computing power applied to all efforts.

Crisis Operations. Upon direction of the Secretary of Defense or by request of a regional combatant commander, the JFHQ-GS would initiate a 12-hour global strike crisis action planning cycle. Referencing the library of GSPDs, the staff would use collaborative planning tools linked to the theaters, national agencies, and specialized organizations such as the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) to update or create courses of action. Twelve hours is selected as a feasible window for the operations envisioned in the global strike concept, but could be shortened to match the six-hour Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) if necessary.^{xli} In parallel with planning, alert forces in the possible courses of action would be notified and begin preparing and refining their tactical mission planning. The planning cycle ends with a Commander's Estimate or COA decision brief to the Secretary of Defense or JFC, and may result in an execution order.

Forces ("Capabilities"). Global strike forces will be identified and drawn from the small number of "ready forces" the US maintains as part of its overall defense posture. For the global strike mission, this may include the on-call Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF), a Marine Expeditionary Element (MEU), special operations forces, and the attack (SSN) and guided missile submarines (SSGNs) on patrol.^{xlii} As previously discussed, while these forces are always at the ready, the deployment process, operational planning, and decision-making often lags behind. With its embedded logistics, intelligence, planning, and C2, the JFHQ-GS may streamline all three.

The primary challenge in maintaining global strike forces is minimizing the adverse effect alert status creates on a service's already stressed operations tempo (OPTEMPO). To address this difficult issue, the Joint Staff should adopt a "capabilities" apportionment

process for global strike. An improvement over earlier concepts of “modular” force packaging concepts in which the force provider chooses the platforms during crises, a capabilities apportionment process allows the warfighting commander to choose the platforms during deliberate planning, and activate each as required. The service components are then tasked to maintain trained and certified forces on call, but could rotate personnel and platforms as required to fulfill regional commitments.

As an example, U.S. Strategic Command may determine it requires four Air Force B-1s on 8-hour alert to support global strike. It is not necessary for the Air Force to permanently assign the aircraft to U.S. Strategic Command; rather, it could elect to retain them as part of the normal 3-month AEF on-call cycle.^{xliii} What is necessary is 8th Air Force Headquarters, as one of U.S. Strategic Command’s components, is tasked to continuously maintain the “capability” to provide four aircraft and crews in 8 hours, each properly trained, exercised, and certified to JFHQ-GS standards.^{xliiv} Upcoming changes to the Status of Readiness and Training System (SORTS) reporting process—which will monitor and measure units in real-time by their ability to support Unified Command tasks instead of Service-derived criteria—will provide U.S. Strategic Command the visibility necessary to manage and access their “capabilities” and risk while the Air Force manages its OPTEMPO.^{xliv} The three and four-star flag and general officer components to U.S. Strategic Command from all four services will provide similar access to their global strike capabilities.

The immediate concern with this approach is the possibility global strike missions would be required during an ongoing crisis and no “capabilities” would be available. Inherently, the resolution is in the tasking. If the mission is a request from within the same AOR, the regional combatant commander will determine precedence. If the mission is responding to direction from the President or Secretary of Defense, it will naturally take

precedence. And if the mission is a request from another AOR, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) or Secretary of Defense will determine precedence, which is no change from the process required today.

Alternative constructs. There are three alternative constructs for planning and executing global strike by units other than U.S. Strategic Command: assigning the mission to the JFCs, tasking the SJFHQ in each theater (after implementation in 2005), or establishing an ad hoc JTF. The benefits of these options are maximizing operational unity of command, minimizing higher-level control, and ensuring integration with other phases or elements of combat operations. The SJFHQ provides the additional benefits of interoperable C2 at the operational and tactical levels, and enhanced planning in the early stages of conflict.^{xlvi}

When measured against the threat environment and smaller U.S. force structure, however, their disadvantages will discourage their adoption. None provides highly accelerated or specialized planning with the same rigor as is possible with JFHQ-GS. Additionally, maintaining alert forces under each SJFHQ would require either a greater number of forces on alert to provide global strike in each theater, or the centralized alert forces to train and certify under every regional combatant commander. For the alert forces in question, a JFHQ-GS may provide the greatest efficiency and unity of command.

Additional benefits of JFHQ-GS. In addition to an enhanced warfighting capability, establishing a JFHQ-GS also provides a number of important second-tier benefits. These range from lowering the in-theater footprint and force protection requirements, to providing continuity from conflict to conflict, similar to the ease in which U.S. Central Command leveraged its experience and lessons learned from OEF as it progressed to OIF.^{xlvii} Finally, as each of the services continues to develop or evaluate future global strike capabilities—for example, directed energy weapons, the common aerospace vehicle, the Marine Corps'

hypersonic transport,^{xlviii} or conventional ICBMs—JFHQ-GS can provide a joint integration, advocacy, “proof-of-concept” and training function.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To create a feasible global strike capability focused on supporting the regional combatant commanders, the following steps should be implemented:

- U.S. Strategic Command—Establish JFHQ-GS as part of its headquarters structure.
- U.S. Strategic Command and Agencies—Create a permanent, rapidly functioning JIACG empowered to coordinate time-sensitive missions such as global strike and missile defense.
- Joint Staff—Assign service global strike “capabilities” to U.S. Strategic Command through a “Capabilities For” document
- U.S. Joint Forces Command—Add global strike exercise elements to joint training and experimentation, in particular the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course (JFOWC), Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II, and the Millennium Challenge series.
- Joint Staff—Incorporate the concept of “Centralized Control / Specialized Execution” into joint doctrine, focusing on the recent changes in IO, SOF, global strike, and space forces.
- Regional Combatant Commanders—Evaluate global strike missions as flexible deterrent options (FDOs) or forced entry missions during OPLAN and CONPLAN development.
- U.S. Strategic Command—Assign a JFHQ-GS liaison at the regional combatant commands to assist in collaboration and possibly serve on the SJFHQ Joint Fires Element.
- Joint Staff—Transfer JWAC from U.S. Joint Forces Command to U.S. Strategic Command, as it is now more closely aligned with operational missions than training, doctrine, and experimentation, and could provide decisive analytic capability.^{xlix}

CONCLUSION

Establishing JFHQ-GS is an avenue to preserve, advance, and accelerate operational art for the JFC. It can dramatically narrow the gap between crisis and response by providing specialized kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities for the JFC who is tasked with operations beyond the capacity of an ad hoc JTF, or partially manned SJFHQ. It manages risk, and makes the SJFHQ concept more feasible by providing a planning and execution capability in the critical period between SJFHQ activation and augmentation. Most importantly, JFHQ-GS will assist the JFC in three important missions: making the enemy decide to quit, opening access if he does not quit, and conducting specialized operations to help force him to quit.

NOTES

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- ⁱ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: 2001), iii-32.
- ⁱⁱ William F. Kernan, "Statement," U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 107th Cong, 2d sess., 9 April 2002. <http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2002/pa040902.htm> [22 January 2004]
- ⁱⁱⁱ Marc Rogers, "Statement," U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *C4I Interoperability: New Challenges in 21st Century Warfare, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities*, 108th Cong, 1st sess., 21 October 2003, 1-4.
- ^{iv} Gene Myers, "Concepts to Future Doctrine," *A Common Perspective*, (April 2002): 9.
- ^v President, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Change-2 to Unified Command Plan 2002," (10 January 2003).
- ^{vi} Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and Congress* (Washington, DC: 2003), 42.
- ^{vii} James O. Ellis, "Statement," U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Command Posture, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services*, 108th Cong, 1st Sess., 13 March 2003, 8.
- ^{viii} Operations considered include those in Grenada, Libya, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, both conflicts in Iraq, and the intervening enforcement of the southern "no-fly-zone."
- ^{ix} Stephen E. Anno and William E. Eispahr, "Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid," *Air War College Report, No. AU-AWC-88-043* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: U.S. Air University, Air War College, 1988), 38.
- ^x *Ibid*, 50.
- ^{xi} Bruce W. Watson, Bruce George, Peter Tsouras, and B.L.Cyr, *Military Lessons of the Gulf War*, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), 62.
- ^{xii} Tommy R. Franks, "Statement," U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services*, 107th Cong, 2d sess., 7 February 2002.
- ^{xiii} Thomas E. Ricks, "Special Operations Units Already in Iraq: Weapons, Defectors, Communications Links Sought," *Washington Post*, 13 February 2003, A01.
- ^{xiv} George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World," *DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing*, 11 February 2003, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/dci_speech_02112003.html> [2 February 2004].
- ^{xv} John P. Jumper, "Global Strike Task Force: A Transforming Concept, Forged by Experience," *Aerospace Power Journal* 15, no.1 (Spring 2001): 29.
- ^{xvi} The effectiveness of this strategy led to much controversy as the OPFOR commander, General Van Riper, quit in frustration over 1) the exercise control group's refusal to allow him to follow his anti-access strategy because it would completely prevent the US from responding and winning and 2) after sinking the US fleet as it attempted to operate in the littorals, the exercise control group "re-floated" the entire fleet. US Joint Forces Command stresses this was more of an experiment than an exercise—with many unavoidable artificialities—but it nevertheless illustrates the US vulnerabilities to anti-access strategies without prior shaping of the battlefield. Also see endnote 17.
- ^{xvii} William F. Kernan and Dean Cash, "Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned," 17 September 2002, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2002/t09172002_t917millchall.html> [29 January 2004].
- ^{xviii} Department of Defense, *Annual Report*, 43-44.
- ^{xix} U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Online Glossary," <<http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm>> [25 January 2004].

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- ^{xx} Jumper, 26.
- ^{xxi} President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (17 September 2002), 15.
- ^{xxii} U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Unified Vision 01,” <<http://www.jfcom.mil/about/experiments/uv01.htm>> [22 January 04].
- ^{xxiii} Rogers, 4.
- ^{xxiv} U.S. Strategic Command Public Affairs, “Fact File: USSTRATCOM Command Center,” <<http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/commandctr.htm>> [2 February 2004]; “U.S. Strategic Command SNAP SHOT,” <<http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/SnapShot.doc>> January 2004 [4 February 2004].
- ^{xxv} Robert S. Dudley, “Space Power in the Gulf,” *Air Force Magazine* 86, no. 6 (June 2003): 2.
- ^{xxvi} James O. Ellis, “Statement,” U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Command Posture and Space Issues, Hearings before the Strategic Subcommittee*, 108th Cong, 1st Sess., 12 March 2003, 4.
- ^{xxvii} Ellis, 13 March 2003, 8-9.
- ^{xxviii} President, Memo to Secretary of Defense.
- ^{xxix} U.S. Strategic Command Public Affairs, “SNAP SHOT,” 2.
- ^{xxx} Kernan, “Statement,” 14.
- ^{xxxi} Ellis, 12 March 2003, 4-5.
- ^{xxxii} U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Joint Interagency Coordination Group,” <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm> [18 January 2004].
- ^{xxxiii} Milan Vego, *Operational Warfare* (Newport, RI: Naval War College 2000), 21-25.
- ^{xxxiv} Department of Defense, “Backgrounder with Senior Defense Officials on Special Operations,” *United States Department of Defense News Transcript*, 7 January 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t01072003_t107bkgd.html> [28 January 2004].
- ^{xxxv} U.S. Strategic Command, “U.S. Strategic Command Overview,” <<http://www.stratcom.mil/overview&organization.htm>> [28 January 2004].
- ^{xxxvi} President, *NSS*, 15.
- ^{xxxvii} Robert W. Cone, “Briefing on Joint Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom,” *U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript*, 2 October 2003, <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/tr20031002-0727.htm>> [29 January 2004].
- ^{xxxviii} Department of Defense, *Annual Report*, 47.
- ^{xxxix} Department of Defense, *Annual Report*, 4-7
- ^{xl} Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report: Cover Letter to Congress” (Washington DC:2001) <<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>> [18 January 2004]
- ^{xli} U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Planning Process,” MCWP 5-1, (Washington, DC: 24 September 2001), A-1-3.
- ^{xlii} Department of Defense, *Annual Report*, 4-7.
- ^{xliii} John P. Jumper, “Resuming the AEF Battle Rhythm,” *Chief’s Sight Picture*, 9 May 2003, <http://www.af.mil/media/viewpoints/Resuming_the_AEF_Battle_Rhythm.pdf> [15 January 2004].
- ^{xliv} Eighth Air Force Public Affairs, “Fact Sheet: Eighth Air Force,” (October 2002) 1-3 <<http://www.barksdale.af.mil/8af/news/facts.doc>> [29 January 2004].
- ^{xlv} Department of Defense, *Annual Report*, 45-46.
- ^{xlvi} Rogers, 4.

^{xlvi} Cone.

^{xlviii} Department of Defense, *Annual Report*, 66-67.

^{xlx} U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Joint Warfare Analysis Center," <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/com_jwac.htm> [30 January 2004].

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