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**JAPAN'S STRATEGIC FUTURE: COALITION
OPERATIONS**

by

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ABSTRACT

The evolution of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) over the past fifty years has created debate in Japan's Parliament over its legality, purpose, direction and normalization. The JSDF appears to be taking steps to "normalize." If so, what are the indicators and have any of the steps been achieved? This thesis analyzes the trends of the JSDF in its evolution from a National Police Reserve to a self-defense force as to the roles and missions that it has chosen to accept or reject. Also, the issues that arise out of Article 9 in Japan's Constitution are examined to determine if there is a conflict in interpretation. Japan's major political parties' views on Article 9 and the JSDF are presented in order to determine where they stand on the issues. Japan's regional neighbors and their possible reactions to a normalization of the JSDF are presented, in addition to other factors that will either aid or impede the normalization of the JSDF. Finally, recommendations regarding the United States' approach to engaging a normalized Japan are presented. The basic conclusion of the thesis is that Japan will normalize the JSDF and United States policy should be to encourage and engage Japan's normalization.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the event of a regional crisis in Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific, Japan's participation in coalition operations may be pivotal to a successful United States military effort. The scope of this thesis will be to provide a framework for determining the likelihood of Japan assuming roles and missions at the request of the United States based on various political-military factors.

As a major economic and potential military force in East Asia, Japan is in a unique position to support and provide direct military assets to any type of regional crisis. Due to events in the last few years, Japan has increasingly stepped up its level of participation in coalition operations, up to and including deploying troops to Iraq as part of the humanitarian and reconstruction effort taking place there following the United States led effort in the Global War on Terrorism. These activities may set the stage for greater Japanese participation in areas adjacent to its home islands.

A. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT

In order to evaluate what sets of political-military factors may yield certain outcomes in terms of Japanese participation, this thesis shall assess the comparative national interests of Japan, China, Taiwan, the two Koreas, Russia and Southeast Asia. Given these various sets of political-military factors, what are the possible scenarios that may evolve as a result? The hypothesis that shall be examined is: if current Self-Defense Force operations are successful and favorable legislation is passed to support enhancing Japan's military capability, then the United

States can expect Japan to participate in more and further expanded roles and missions in future coalition operations.

The basic approach to be utilized is comparative case studies comparing Japan to its neighbors within the context of a U.S. influenced strategic situation. The independent variable will be the requests that the United States Government would ask for in a military operation. The dependent variable would be the possible roles and missions that Japan assumes in reaction to U.S. pressures. The intervening variable is the various combinations of political-military factors stemming from other countries' interests. A level of analysis approach will be taken to examine factors at the domestic politics and alliance levels. The opinions of experts on Japanese foreign relations from books, official reports and interviews will be utilized.

B. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II will provide a history and background of the Japanese Self-Defense Force and the roles and missions that it has and has not participated in since its creation to determine whether trends exist. This chapter will look at the capabilities of the JSDF. What is Japan's current military capability? What are their planned capabilities? Do these planned capabilities support the roles and missions that Japan and the United States may want to conduct?

Chapter III will analyze the domestic policies level. The ongoing policy debate regarding Japan's Self-Defense Force will examine the following: Is there a proposal for legislation to allow preemptive attacks? What is the status of the initiative to reinterpret the Japanese

Constitution's Article 9? What impact will this have on its ban on collective defense? Who supports revising Article 9 of the Constitution and who does not? What are the issues surrounding the revision of Article 9?

Chapter IV will examine the histories and relationships that Japan has had with the People's Republic of China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Russia and Southeast Asia. These countries national interests will be compared to those of Japan's to determine if they are congruent and parallel or if there is any disparity between Japan becoming a "normal" country. Questions, such as, "What are Japan's national interests? Do these interests conflict with other countries' national interests?" will be addressed. Long and short-term factors that will either aid or impede the revision of the Constitution's Article 9 will be presented based on the research in chapters II - IV.

Chapter V will summarize the findings and present conclusions and apparent trends. Recommendations for what United States should do to either assist or observe will also be presented. Finally, further research areas will be proposed.

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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF JAPAN'S SELF DEFENSE FORCE

The defense of Japan is primarily the mission of its Self-Defense Force. Created initially with the intention to deal with internal, domestic affairs,¹ the Self-Defense Force's role has expanded to include the defense of the nation from regional threats, humanitarian and disaster relief in Japan, regional operations other than war, out-of-region operations other than war, humanitarian and disaster relief out-of-region and regional crisis response.² The history of Japan's Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is an important aspect of its transformation from a purely self-defense force to a "normal" military. This chapter will examine the JSDF's history in order to determine how that history will affect the JSDF's future roles and missions in and out of Northeast Asia. This chapter will begin by looking at the period of the American Occupation following World War II and the environment that was in place at the time of the creation of the JSDF. General Douglas MacArthur's policies would have a dramatic impact on the type, size and purpose of the JSDF. Next, the creation of the National Police Reserve, the forerunner of the JSDF, and its roots in the Japanese Constitution will be examined. The roles and missions that the JSDF has chosen to accept or not accept will be considered to determine if a trend is emerging in the types of roles and missions that

¹ Malcolm McIntosh, *Japan Re-armed*, (New York: St. Martin's Press 1986), 31.

² Torkel Patterson, *Future Roles and Missions of the Japan self-Defense Forces*, Prepared for a conference: Restructuring U.S Japan Relations. Okazaki Institute/Pacific Forum CSIS Tokyo. January 11-13, 1996.

it chooses to pursue. This will be important in analyzing the evolution of the JSDF's role from a guarantor of internal security to its participation in out-of-region operations other than war. Finally, these trends will be analyzed on a historical, military and political level to try and determine the next phase of the JSDF's development. The last section of this chapter will present some of the key ideas to understand regarding the JSDF's steps towards transformation.

A. THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION 1945-1952

The American Occupation of Japan began at the conclusion of World War II and officially lasted until 1952. (However, there are some who would argue that because there are still a large number of United States military bases and armed forces stationed there, the occupation has not really ended.³) At any rate, General MacArthur was appointed the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers and was responsible for the mission of rebuilding post-war Japan. General MacArthur had a vision of turning Japan into "the Switzerland of the Far East," a vision to make Japan both rich and neutral.⁴ Thus, General MacArthur's policy thrusts focused on economics and on demilitarizing Japan. The attitude that Americans had toward Japan would have an

³ Chalmers Johnson, a prominent specialist in Japanese affairs, is an outspoken opponent of "American Empire." He has authored a number of books including *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*, and *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic [The American Empire Project]*. Most recently Johnson penned an article for the Los Angeles Times on 18 February 2004 in which he quotes an acquaintance and former official of Japan's Ministry of Education and now a university president, "We are still occupied by the American military." Johnson goes on to call Okinawa a "Pentagon colony" during its 25-year occupation from 1955-1972 and states that presently there are still some 38 U.S. military bases on the island.

⁴ Malcolm McIntosh, *Japan Re-armed* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1986), 19.

important impact on the types of policies that were made and the impact of these policies on Japanese society.

The Allied treatment of Japan at the conclusion of World War II was far different than the treatment Germany received. The reasons are many, however, here are a few probable ones. The lack of ties by Americans to the Japanese in any large numbers was one of the major reasons that Americans treated the Japanese far harsher than they did the Germans even though Americans citizens recognized fewer of the Japanese hierarchy than compared to Germany.

At the Tokyo Tribunal on Japanese war crimes only [Prime Minister] Tōjō and the Emperor [Hirohito] were identifiable to the American public and, although in 1945 70 per cent of Americans supported punishment without trial for the Emperor, he was never tried.⁵

The war trials illustrated the strong American dislike of the Japanese compared to the Germans. In one particular trial, where both the United States and Britain required unanimous verdicts in order for the death sentence to be carried out, seven of the charged Japanese men were hung on a vote of only seven to four. War trials were also held in Germany; however there was no ambiguity in the voting that would cause any questions to be raised later. This inconsistency seems counter to General MacArthur's declared policy of turning Japan into a "peaceful, just and affluent society - a symbol of world peace."⁶ This apparent lack of consistency could be contributed to the Americans' stronger dislike of Japan than Germany.

⁵ Ibid, 19.

⁶ Ibid, 20.

The intensity and method of the fighting in the Pacific campaign is another reason for the harsher treatment that the Japanese received. The fighting in the Pacific was ferocious and Americans faced an enemy that would rather fight to the last man than to surrender. This warfighting mentality was not something that Americans had experienced in the European theater and thus made the Japanese seem to be as blood-thirsty and violent as characterized in the American wartime, anti-Japanese propaganda film *Know Your Enemy, Japan*. It was aptly put in the film that "we will probably never know the tough little mind of the Japanese completely."⁷ Another indicator of the ferociousness of the Pacific campaign was the Japanese tactic of *Kamikazes*. First used in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the *Kamikazes* inflicted horrible death and damage to U.S. ships and their crews. The climax of the *Kamikaze* attacks was in the American invasion of Okinawa, where over 1,900 suicide attacks occurred and of those 355 in a two-day period. This aspect of the war was yet something else that Americans were not accustomed to.

[T]here was stunned disbelief on the part of American sailors that other men would be willing to kill themselves in order to destroy them.⁸

The image of the Japanese was not made any better by the stories that filtered back to the Americans about the way that the Japanese treated their prisoners and especially women. Stories were often told of the mistreatment of prisoners and how they were pressed into slavery. The Japanese treatment of women was of particular distaste to

⁷ Ibid, 19.

⁸ Robert A. Germinsky, *The Divine Wind: Japanese Kamikazes* (Washington, D.C.: Navy & Marine Corps WWII Commemorative Committee, 1993), 2.

Americans since the Japanese pressed female prisoners of war into service as prostitutes for the Japanese Army as their own female population from back home began getting scarce.⁹

General MacArthur's economic policies echoed President Wilson's earlier declaration to American businessmen.

Carry liberty and justice and the principles of humanity wherever you go, go out and sell goods that will make the world more comfortable and more happy, and convert [these people] to the principles of America.¹⁰

Thus, the idea of opening up Japan's markets to the world economy became a primary policy pursuit for General MacArthur. His approach was not new by any means; Commodore Perry and his Black Ship Fleet had done this in the past. Perry had been sent to Japan to "bring to Japan an era of enlightenment and progress."¹¹ General MacArthur focused on the break-up of big business conglomerates or *zaibatsu* that had dominated the economic landscape that led to World War II.

Japan's system of "private property," he (MacArthur) asserted, permitted ten family groups comprising only fifty-six families to control directly or indirectly every phase of slavery of the remainder of the Japanese people, permitted higher standards of life only through sufferance, and in a search of further plunder abroad furnished the tools for the military to embark upon its ill-fated venture into world conquest.¹²

⁹ Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000), 655.

¹⁰ Malcolm McIntosh, *Japan Re-armed* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1986), 20.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 21.

¹² Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000), 686.

He believed deconstructing the economic structure that had existed prior to and during the war would enable Japan to refocus its economy towards a more peaceful end. Although General MacArthur attempted to break-up the *zaibatsu*, he ultimately succeeded in breaking up only 28 of the original 1,200 that he had targeted. The staunchness of the Japanese to retain their holdings and influence on economic matters could not be stymied by General MacArthur, however the form that they would take, *keiretsu* - a network of firms centering around one of the great banks, was the result of his antimonopoly measures.¹³

The demilitarization aspect of General MacArthur's policy was to remove any influences that could continue or restore the previous military regime. When American occupation forces arrived on the island, they were surprised by the lack of resistance and almost warm welcome they received. This could probably be explained by the fact that Japan had experienced fifteen years of "psychological pressure" and eight years of "wartime conditions" which had essentially left them "spiritually drained."¹⁴ The general attitude of common Japanese citizens towards their government and military was that they were inseparable. The Emperor was the mysterious, deified leader of the people that had only spoken to the public once, at the formal radio speech surrender of Japan. Japanese citizens cultivated dependence or *amaeru* on the Emperor and their parents that would later be transferred to Americans and

¹³ Ibid, 688.

¹⁴ Malcolm McIntosh, *Japan Re-armed* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1986), 21.

later still diminish altogether.¹⁵ This complete integration of military and political forces made it difficult for General MacArthur to weed out the dissidents, thus some 180,000 people from various administrative and business positions were removed from their positions if they were suspected of being right-wing, nationalistic or militaristic.¹⁶ The intent of this policy was to limit the ability of Japan to remilitarize to any degree near the level of its pre-war status. This pursuit of limiting Japan's military potential will be discussed further within the context of the Constitutional restraints.

Further changes during the occupation period saw the reformation of the education system, the enfranchisement of women, and land reform. Although these changes were significant, they will not be discussed in any great detail here. What is important to note is the political and cultural environment that was created because of the policies that were in place at the time of the creation of the JSDF. Since General MacArthur's focus was on the economy and demilitarization, the National Police Reserve did not get the attention that it deserved and it was not until four years after the American Occupation that the JSDF began to direct its own course. Thus, the JSDF was born in a time that saw little use for a "military"-type

¹⁵ For an excellent study of *Amae* refer to Takeo Doi's *The Anatomy of Dependence* (1973, Kodansha International, San Francisco). His book provides an in-depth study of the Japanese sense of self-indulgence or the need to fit in with one's surroundings. This feeling is at first individualized and then can be seen permeating all levels of social interaction up to ties with the Emperor. In this particular case the average Japanese citizens' need to feel that they are a part of their country, similar to a type of pseudo-nationalism.

¹⁶ Malcolm McIntosh, *Japan Re-armed* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1986), 22.

force and the focus of the country was on the economy and rebuilding while security was left to the United States.

B. FROM NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE TO SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

As mentioned in the introduction the National Police Reserve was the forerunner to the modern day JSDF. Created in 1950 at the behest of the United States, the original force was 75,000 strong. Created to fill the absence of the United States' forces that were deployed to Korea as a result of the Korean War, the National Police Reserve's role has since shifted from internal domestic affairs to encompass a much broader range of roles and missions. In 1954, the National Police Reserve was renamed the National Security Agency and subsequently the National Defense Agency and then finally the Self-Defense Force.¹⁷

The origins and controversies of the Self-Defense Force lay in Article 9 of Japan's Constitution. Adopted by the Japanese at the urging of American authors, the Japanese Constitution has echoes of the United States' own Constitution. The ideas of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," "all men created equal" and the separation of church and state can all be seen as direct examples of concepts taken from the United States' Constitution.¹⁸ These ideas are further refined in the unique, peaceful aspect of Japan's Constitution in Article 9.

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people *forever renounce war* as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to

¹⁷ Michael D. Bellows, ed., *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.), 171.

¹⁸ Malcolm McIntosh, *Japan Re-armed* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1986), 28-29.

accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The *right of belligerency* of the state *will not* be recognized. [Emphasis added]¹⁹

This single article has been a point of contention for the Socialist Party of Japan (JSP), which argued that the legality of the JSDF is highly questionable given the phrasing of Article 9. Despite the debate, the JSDF's mere existence today suggests that the socialist party was not fighting a winning battle and furthermore there are discussions to revise or even completely do away Article 9. These discussions have been amplified by the September 11 terror attacks on the United States. This is discussed further in the next section.

In 1957, the first Defense Buildup Plan was announced and has been followed subsequently by additional plans every five years. The course of the JSDF is highly regulated. However, there is an outside factor that must be taken into consideration, namely Japan's ties to the United States in the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty. This treaty places a restriction on the JSDF of only being a force that is defensive in nature.²⁰ This places the bulk of the responsibility for the external security of Japan on the United States. This arrangement has benefited the Japanese economy enormously because Japan has had to spend relatively little on its defense budget, the United States has continued to promote international trade with Japan and because of direct access for Japan to the American markets

¹⁹ The Constitution of Japan.

²⁰ Michael D. Bellows, ed., *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.), 173.

and technology.²¹ One reason for the tremendous economic boom that the Japanese economy experienced was the "Yoshida Doctrine." Simply put, this policy focused on the opposite of its pre-war policy of military buildup, which is economic investment in technology and trade in order to develop Japan's economic power. In 1951, then-Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru signed two treaties that would set the stage for Japan's economic development. First, the San Francisco Peace Treaty laid the foundation for its release from occupation and pledged their alliance to the U.S. during the Cold War. Second, the Security Treaty gave the U.S. military basing facilities in Japan in exchange for external security while not committing to aid the U.S. if it came under attack. The next few years would solidify the policies that Yoshida had put in place. Whenever an advocate of focusing on security instead of economics attempted to tip the balance, something would occur that would favor the economics side. For instance, in 1960, when then-Prime Minister Kishi tried to push through a revised security treaty he was called "undemocratic" and a protest that had been organized around the Diet (Japan's Parliament) ended with the death of one of the protestors. Americans interpreted this to mean that the situation was too unstable for a revised security treaty to be signed and thus elected not to go ahead as planned.²² Most importantly for the success of this doctrine was its appeal to the people, economic growth and recovery while strengthening

²¹ Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000), 754.

²² Leonard Schoppa, "Japanese Domestic Politics: The Challenge of Turning off the Cruise Control" *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, Professor Schoppa spoke on this topic at FPRI's [History Institute on Teaching About Japan](#), October 19-22, 2003.

the alliance with the United States, which in turn would increase the overall value of Japan to the United States, making it worthwhile to protect.²³ The lack of emphasis on defense or military matters was also important because after the years of "pressure and strain" that the Japanese had endured up to and including the war, they were ready to focus on something different.

All of this has been true up to the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the perception of threats around Japan from the Soviet Union has all but disappeared and with it the United States' level of support for protecting Japan from a Soviet threat. The United States' demand now is that Japan begin to take more responsibility for its own protection. Thus, the roles and missions of the JSDF that were originally meant to only protect the country in self-defense have seen an expansion as discussed in the next section.

C. ROLES AND MISSIONS

The roles and missions that the JSDF has chosen to either accept or not indicate the level of commitment that it is willing to make towards becoming a more "normal" country. This section will cover the operations that the JSDF has participated in and furthermore will differentiate between military and non-military roles and missions. The distinction is important in evaluating whether Japan is maintaining its pacifist stance or if it is coming out of its "shell" and taking a more active role as a major player in world affairs.

²³ W.G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change Since 1850* (New York: St. Martin's Press 2000), 230.

1. Military Roles and Missions

The first and foremost military operation that will be discussed is the Korean War. As stated earlier, the National Police Reserve was created as a direct result of American troops being pulled out of Japan to mobilize in Korea. The initial mission of the National Police Reserve was to "cope with internally fomented Communist insurrection."²⁴ Thus, the National Police Reserve did not directly contribute to any combat action in Korea. However, there were Japanese participants in the Korean War who were in the employ of the United Nations Command as paid contractors.²⁵ This particular operation did not feasibly offer the opportunity for Japan to get involved because of the sensitivity of its history of annexation in Korea. The idea of sending Japanese troops was considered but ultimately deemed a bad idea by Prime Minister Yoshida.²⁶ The role of the Japanese in the Korean War was therefore limited to contract-type work versus any active military roles or missions. Also, at the request of the United States, Japan resumed production of defense equipment to support the United Nations Command in the Korean War.²⁷

The next military operation was the Vietnam War. Again, Japan did not have any direct involvement but did provide basing support for the United States.²⁸ In addition,

²⁴ Malcolm McIntosh, *Japan Re-armed* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1986), 31.

²⁵ Edward A Olsen, *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985) 75.

²⁶ Malcolm McIntosh, *Japan Re-armed* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1986), 31.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 51.

²⁸ For a detailed history on U.S. basing refer to *Island Of Military Bases: A Contemporary Political And Economic History Of Okinawa* by John Michael Purves. <<http://www.niraikanai.wvma.net/pages/base.html>> [27 February 2004].

the production of defense equipment was again requested by the United States and Japan answered the call.²⁹ What is important to note in both of these cases is that Japan did not contribute any personnel or equipment from its own forces and what was provided was at the request of the United States and was bought and paid for, whether it was equipment or services. Another important aspect is that during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Japanese economy benefited heavily from U.S. investments in equipment, services and from troop spending while on Rest and Recuperation (R&R).

The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 was another possible regional contingency that the JSDF could have chosen to respond to. While the United States Seventh Fleet was deployed to monitor the situation, Japan stated that it was committed to maintaining the United States-Japan alliance, however, could not support the United States in the form of ships, aircraft or personnel because of Constitutional restraints.

Potentially the most controversial military operation that Japan did not participate in was Desert Storm. Although, Japan contributed almost \$13 billion to the coalition effort, later to be known as "checkbook diplomacy," it did not contribute any personnel or equipment even after intense diplomatic pressure by the United States.³⁰ This would be a negative international image that would stick with Japan until the September 11 terror attacks in the United States. Operation Southern

²⁹ Malcolm McIntosh, *Japan Re-armed* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1986), 51.

³⁰ The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, (Tokyo: 2002), 37.

Watch directly followed Desert Storm and Japan did make a minimal military contribution in the form of minesweepers deployed to the Arabian Gulf.³¹

The next military operation that the JSDF has participated in is Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). When the September 11 terror attacks in the United States had concluded, Japan's leaders called for an extraordinary session of the Diet to enact the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.³² This allowed for up to three escort ships, two supply ships, 1,200 Maritime Self-Defense Force personnel, six transport aircraft, two multipurpose aircraft and 180 Air Self-Defense Force personnel to be allocated and deployed in areas in Pakistan, the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, Australia, Guam as well as in Japanese territory. Although these units and personnel were not authorized to take part in any direct combat operations, their missions were in the support roles of supply, repair and maintenance, medical services and seaport services.³³ The JSDF forces were crucial in re-supplying Allied ships and other non-Japanese units that were participating in the Arabian Sea, a designated hostile fire zone.³⁴ This dramatic increase in participation in OEF can be seen as Japan's attempt to cast off the negative image it acquired with its "checkbook diplomacy" in Desert Storm. The September 11 terror attacks could also be seen as a unique opportunity

³¹ Michael D. Bellows, ed., *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.), 172.

³² The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, (Tokyo: 2002), 309.

³³ *Ibid*, 320-321.

³⁴ I was aboard the USS CUSHING (DD 985) just prior to entering the Arabian Gulf in 2002, when the JDS Tokiwa refueled and sent supplies to us as part of an emergent supply demand.

for Japan to seize the initiative in enhancing its Self-Defense Forces missions outside of Japan. Without the attacks the ability for Prime Minister Koizumi to push for legislation allowing the JSDF to participate in missions outside of Japanese territory and more specifically in military related operations would probably have been much more difficult. Also, as alluded to earlier, the terrorist attacks and continuing war on terrorism may serve as an impetus to allow for legislation to either alter or delete Article 9 altogether from the Constitution.³⁵

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is the most recent military operation that the JSDF has participated in. Legislation was passed in July 2003 to allow 1,000 members of its Ground Self-Defense Force to assist with rebuilding in Iraq. The actual deployment of those troops was mired in political and real world hang-ups. The most probable explanation of this is due to Japan's "Five Principles" that stipulate Japan's participation in OIF is dependent upon the following conditions being met:

1. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties in conflict.
2. Parties under conflict, including its territorial states(s), shall have given their consent to the deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan's participation in that force.
3. The peacekeeping force shall maintain strict impartiality, without favoring any of the parties in conflict.
4. Should any of the above requirements cease to be satisfied, Japan's unit must be able to withdraw from the operation.

³⁵ "SDF terrorism response joins war emergency bills," *The Japan Times*, 4 February 2004. <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040204b7.htm>> [4 February 2004].

5. Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect personnel's lives.³⁶

The issue that arose out of the non-deployment of these forces is that a cease-fire had not been established and even today random bombings and shootings are occurring in Iraq. Also, the possibility of Japanese troops being drawn into some type of conflict had delayed the deployment of troops. However, despite resistance from opposition parties, Prime Minister Koizumi was finally able to get the legislation required passed through the lower house of the Diet. Additionally, Japan has offered \$1.5 billion in reconstruction aid and more at a later date.³⁷ The extent to which Japan will offer to keep its Self-Defense Forces in Iraq will probably depend on the extent of the fighting that is still occurring, the duration of the reconstruction period and the will of the Japanese people to support their troops in Iraq.

2. Non-Military Roles and Missions

The non-military roles and missions that Japan's Self-Defense Force have participated in began in 1992 and can be seen as a result of its nonparticipation in Operation Desert Storm. Because of its lack of participation in Operation Desert Storm and its minimal participation as noted earlier in Operation Southern Watch, Japan took steps to immediately increase its participation in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Relief Operations. Japan was also motivated by its allies to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security

³⁶ The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, (Tokyo: 2002), 316.

³⁷ Hans Greimel, "Japan Answers U.S. Call for Aid in Iraq." *Yahoo! News*, 15 October 2003.
<http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20031015/ap_on_re_mi_ea/japan_iraq_6> [15 October 2003].

Council. A 1997 bid alongside Germany to gain a seat at the council had the support of the United States but ultimately the bid failed.³⁸ As recently as May 2003, the United States, France, and Britain provided "solid backing" for Japan's bid to gain a coveted seat on the council.³⁹

Beginning in September 1992 the Japanese Self-Defense Force has been involved in UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, and East Timor and has authorized forces for a UN peacekeeping mission in Iraq when conditions warrant. The range of participation has included personnel and components from the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces. International humanitarian relief operations include operations in Rwanda, East Timor and Afghanistan, again to include personnel and components of the Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces. Below is a list of the operations that Japan and the JSDF have participated in.

Peacekeeping Operations

- Cambodia (UNTAC), September 1992- July 1993: Cease fire observers, Civilian police officers, two engineer units, two transport and one supply ship, six C-130Hs.
- Mozambique (ONUMOZ), May 1993 - January 1995: five staff officers, 3 movement control units, one C-130H.
- Golan Heights (UNDOF), February 1996 - present: two staff officers, one transport unit, one C-130H.

³⁸ James Paul, "As Reform Negotiations Reach Fever Pitch, Germany & Japan Push For Permanent Security Council Seats." *Global Policy Forum*. <<http://globalpolicy.igc.org/security/reform/secref97.htm>> [18 February 2004].

³⁹ Alan Boyd, "UN's Elite Club A Closed Shop." *Global Policy Forum*. <<http://globalpolicy.igc.org/security/reform/cluster1/2003/0503elite.htm>> [18 February 2004].

- East Timor (UNAMET), August 1999: three civilian police officers.
- East Timor (UNTAET/UNMISSET), October 1999 - present: 10 headquarters staff personnel, one engineer unit, one transport and one escort ship, one C130H.

International Humanitarian Relief Operations

- Rwandan refugees, September - December 1994: GSDF medical personnel, C-130H.
- East Timorese Displaced Persons, August 1999: Air transport.
- Afghan refugees, October 2001: six C-130H transports and two coordination and liaison personnel.⁴⁰

Japan has increased its level of participation in both Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Relief operations. There is an apparent increase in the level of participation since 1991 which would indicate that given the proper situation and possibly diplomatic pressure from the United States, Japan may be willing to participate in more coalition operations, however, that remains to be seen and will be discussed in the conclusion.

D. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JSDF

United States Joint Forces Command defines transformation as the process of changing form, nature or function.⁴¹ Transforming the JSDF is an enormous step in changing the role of the JSDF from a self-defense force to a full-fledged military. However, transforming the JSDF is not simply restating its missions and then executing them. The JSDF is mired in politics and Japan's unique Constitution and more specifically Article 9, makes

⁴⁰ Compiled from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan's Homepage on UN Peacekeeping Operations.

⁴¹ "What is Transformation?" USJFCOM: About Transformation. <<http://www.jfcom.mil/about/transform.html>> [10 Nov 2003].

transforming the JSDF a contentious issue in Japan. Understanding the form, nature and function of the JSDF is essential to understanding its transformation.

1. Form

In 1950, at the behest of the United States, Japan was told to create a National Police Reserve consisting of 75,000 men to take the place of United States' forces that were engaged in fighting the Korean War. The original purpose of the National Police Reserve was to deal with a potential communist uprising.⁴² In 1954 the National Police Reserve was renamed the National Security Agency and subsequently the National Defense Agency and then finally the Self-Defense Force.⁴³ The simple changing of the name of the JSDF over time implies that its form has changed as well, from a "National Police Reserve" that implies handling domestic issues and problems to a "Self-Defense Force" that is intended to maintain the safety and security of the nation from both domestic and external threats. The JSDF has evolved to include ground, air and maritime components that can operate jointly although they mostly operate independently of one another.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is probably the most forward thinking of the services. It has participated in various operations and exercises with the United States and is consistently involved in Peacekeeping Operations. The MSDF has been involved in RIMPAC, ANNUALEX, and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.⁴⁴ The MSDF has deployed

⁴² Malcolm McIntosh, *Japan Re-armed* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1986), 31.

⁴³ Michael D. Bellows, ed., *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.), 171.

units to participate in Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia and East Timor.⁴⁵ The JMSDF has enjoyed staying apace with technological leaps as demonstrated by a maritime force that is ranked in the top ten of the world's navies. Specifically of note are its *Kongo* Class, Aegis Guided Missile Destroyers, *Harushio* Class submarines and P-3Cs. In addition the JMSDF seeks to add a new destroyer class as well as two new aircraft carriers.⁴⁶ The JMSDF is probably the most formidable naval force in the Pacific second only to the United States.

The Air Self-Defense Force is second to the JMSDF in participating in combined exercises. The ASDF routinely participates in exercises with the United States and has participated in every Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Relief Operation since Japan became involved in these in 1992. The ASDF has sent units to Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights and East Timor in support of Peacekeeping Operations and to Rwanda, East Timor and Afghanistan in support of International Humanitarian Relief Operations. The ASDF was the first of the three services to arrive in the Middle East in support of the United States-led effort to rebuild Iraq. The ASDF also enjoys having relatively modern equipment to include F-15s, E-2s, and C-130s. The ASDF is also planning to purchase and build the new Joint Strike Fighter.

⁴⁴ Exercises. U.S. Pacific Command.
<<http://www.pacom.mil/ops/exerlist.shtml>> [10 Nov 2003].

⁴⁵ Compiled from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan's Homepage on UN Peacekeeping Operations.

⁴⁶ Richard Halloran, "Japan departs from pacifist stance, plans two aircraft carriers." *The Straits Times*, 16 July 2003.
<<http://straitstimes.asial.com.sg/storyprintfriendly/0,1887,199865,00.html?>> [16 July 2003].

The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is probably the least revolutionary of the three forces. Its equipment is fairly modern including Type 90 tanks and Type 89 fighting vehicles, however, joint operations and combined exercises outside of Japan rarely occur and only engineering and medical units of the GSDF have participated in Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Relief Operations. The GSDF is making headway in participating in reconstruction efforts in Iraq, beginning with a 30-man advance team deployed to Kuwait City in late January 2004 to make preparations for the 550 GSDF personnel that are scheduled to arrive in April 2004. Since their arrival, an additional 90 troops have arrived and been deployed to Samawah.⁴⁷

2. Nature

The evolution of the nature of the JSDF began at the end of World War II. In 1947 Japan adopted what would become its modern day Constitution. The most important aspect of the Constitution that applies to the defense of Japan is Article 9. Thus, the nature of the JSDF was established at its birth with Article 9. This pacifist stance that Japan has taken on military matters may have been appropriate for the post-war period, however in today's changing security environment it is necessary for the JSDF to change its nature and look beyond mere self-defense. Article 9 acts as a barrier on the potential of the JSDF.

The reevaluation of Article 9 has occurred once in 1976 and again in the 1980s. In 1976 it was determined that Japan would not have to rely solely on the United States

⁴⁷ "First group of core GSDF troops arrives in Kuwait." *The Japan Times*, 4 February 2004. <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040205a3.htm>> [4 February 2004].

for its defense but that Japan's forces could respond to an attack on a limited scale. In the 1980s it was again re-evaluated that in the event of a wider conflict that the United States' support could not be wholly counted on.⁴⁸ The legality of the JSDF has also raised questions in Japan. The Japanese Socialist Party questions the existence of the JSDF given the phrasing of Article 9 and wishes to either eliminate the JSDF or reword Article 9.

3. Function

The function of the JSDF is the most controversial issue for Japan. While most people in Japan believe in, and more importantly like, the idea of the pacifist nature of the constitution, events such as the September 11 terror attacks on the United States are an all too bitter reminder of the Japan's own terrorist attacks in 1995 by Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subways and that Japan is just as susceptible to attack as any other country in the world. However, while the United States military is prepared to respond to an event like the September 11 terror attacks, the JSDF had little if any involvement in responding to the Tokyo subway attacks. The JSDF has participated in search and rescue operations and relief operations in the JAL flight 123 crash in 1985 and the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995. While on paper the function of the JSDF is clear, namely the defense of the nation, in reality the JSDF has done little more than provide a deterrent to would-be aggressors in the region. The JSDF instead participates in disaster and relief operations and combined exercises with the United States while putting on public awareness and community events in attempts to bolster its own image.

⁴⁸ Alan Boyd, "Awakening Japan's sleeping defense giant." *Asia Times*. <<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html>> [10 Nov 2003].

However, the current North Korea nuclear issue is beginning to put in question what the function of the JSDF should be in the event of the threat or use of nuclear weapons by North Korea. This will be examined more thoroughly in chapter 4.

E. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

The establishment of the JSDF came from a request by the United States and has been constantly "nudged" by the same to take some new direction. In the period immediately following its creation, the JSDF has evolved from coping with aggression within its own borders to deterring it in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1980s saw a period where the attitude of Japan shifted from its Meiji Restoration slogan of "rich country, strongly armed" to "rich country, strongly protected" as it began to see the benefits of the United States - Japan Security Alliance. However, this did not prevent them from shifting their mentality from strictly "self-defense" to "comprehensive security." This shift would be a downturn for the normalization of the JSDF because "comprehensive security" places equal emphasis on all instruments of national power; diplomatic, information and economic, not just the military. Thus, the JSDF did not receive the attention it desired for increasing its roles and missions since the other instruments of national power were being stressed. The United States - Japan Security Alliance was also a reason not to focus on the JSDF since the United States could provide military support when necessary. The 1990s was a breakout decade for the JSDF beginning in 1991 with Operation Desert Storm. Despite not having contributed any actual units or personnel, a roughly \$13 billion monetary contribution to the coalition efforts helped Japan cement its position in the international arena

as a nation that could be a key contributor to any type of cause. Also, during this decade, Japan made a giant leap into the United Nations' Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Relief Operations, signaling that Japan was not going to just sit on the sidelines anymore. The September 11 terror attacks were probably the single most important impetus towards reforming the role of the JSDF. Immediate legislation was enacted and Japan began sending JSDF units to directly participate in the Global War on Terror. As the war in Iraq concluded, Japan again took a bold step in announcing that JSDF troops would be sent to help in the rebuilding of Iraq. The deployment of those troops signals a big step from Japan's traditional nonparticipation stance so criticized after Operation Desert Storm. Thus, one can see that from its inception to the present, the JSDF has been taking steps to becoming more of a participant in coalition operations. What is interesting to note, from an East Asian perspective is that of all the roles and missions that the JSDF has participated in, none of them have been in East Asia. Perhaps this is an indicator of Japan's reluctance to overstep its boundaries by putting Japanese troops in any Northeast Asian countries, given Japan's history in the area. Another possibility is that Japan is trying to build up "credit" prior to participating in any roles and missions in Northeast Asia so as not to "startle" its neighbors. Finally, Japan may be counting on the United States to take care of Japan's neighbors while Japan is busy assisting the United States and the United Nations in other parts of the world.

What is apparent in Japan is its emphasis on the JSDF's contributions in non-combatant types of roles and missions. Japan is eager to point to the JSDF's assistance in the JAL flight 123 crash in 1985 and the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995. While emphasizing the importance of the JSDF's non-combatant roles, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) is simultaneously decreasing the size of its standing forces. The JDA intends to reduce the number of its ground forces from 180,000 to 160,000 troops, 60 to 50 ships, 220 to 170 maritime aircraft and 350 to 300 combat aircraft.⁴⁹ The JDA is emphasizing an increase in the technology and quality of its forces and has in its budget in the next several years the construction of two aircraft carriers and a new type of "destroyer" that would increase its at-sea, air rotary wing aircraft capability. These steps can be seen as following in the footsteps of the United States military that is moving away from being a size dominant force to a light, lethal, mobile and technologically superior force.

The JDA seeks to build more streamlined, effective and compact defense, while acquiring necessary capabilities and making qualitative improvement. Steady defense build up is indispensable for secure and peaceful society.⁵⁰

This statement taken from the current Defense Program from the JDA highlights the push to modernize and acquire new capabilities that will only expand the types of roles and missions that Japan can participate in. However, merely possessing the capabilities is not reason enough for the JSDF to become more involved internationally. The question

⁴⁹ "A New Era in Defense." Japan Defense Agency Homepage. <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm> [10 October 2003].

⁵⁰ Defense Agency, Japan. Defense Program for FY2003: An Overview.

of legality, authority and the will of the people will continue to be issues for Japan. Thus, the trends appear to point to Japan taking a more active role in coalition operations, however, when those roles and missions will begin taking place in East Asia is still in question.

The form, nature and function that the three services have evolved into are the result of the operations and exercises that they have participated in over the years. The form that the JSDF has taken in present day is a result of its origins in the National Police Reserve. It has grown into three services that now look beyond Japan's own borders and has grown in size and in the equipment that possesses and utilizes. Meanwhile the nature of the JSDF was well established in 1947 but has been questioned since. The Self-Defense Force should be defensive in nature, however, is it legal to have a Self-Defense Force when the Constitution stipulates not maintaining any military potential? Finally, the function of JSDF as a force to maintain the safety and security of Japan has seemed to do many things beyond that. While participating in Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Relief Operations around the world, the JSDF has yet to participate in any within East Asia possibly due to the fact that the closest United Nations operations would have been in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Also, Japan has faltered when asked to contribute to coalition operations such as Operation Desert Storm, whereas a substitute to sending personnel and equipment, Japan instead played "checkbook diplomacy," contributing some \$13 billion to the coalition effort.

The transformation of the JSDF involves an understanding of where the JSDF presently stands and where it wants to go. However, simply knowing where to go does not mean that the path will not be difficult. In the JSDF's situation, the Constitution is the single largest factor in determining if the JSDF can change to meet new roles and missions. Article 9 needs to be either revamped for the 21st Century or deleted from the Constitution completely. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the terrorist threat require that the JSDF be able to respond to new roles and missions that were not the focus of the Cold War era. Instead, the JSDF must adapt and keep up with the changing security environment.

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III. THE HISTORY AND DEBATE OF JAPAN'S CONSTITUTION

The Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is poised to potentially make the greatest transformation since its creation from a limited form of self-defense force to a full-fledged military. This would represent an extraordinary shift in the roles and missions that the JSDF chooses to participate in and where those missions take place. However, the road to transformation is not without its obstacles. The greatest obstacle in the way of the JSDF's transformation is Japan's own Constitution. Japan's Constitution, specifically Article 9, explicitly prohibits maintaining "land, sea, and air forces as well as any other war potential."⁵¹ Thus, the very existence of the JSDF has been an issue of heated debate from the time of its initial formation as the National Police Reserve to its present form. The history of the Constitution, Article 9 and the political debates surrounding both are issues that are still being fought over today. The first section of this chapter will present the Government of Japan's current interpretation of the Constitution with regard to Article 9, followed by the arguments for the Government of Japan to either revise or reinterpret Article 9 and to either expand the current missions of the JSDF thereby legitimizing the JSDF, dissolve the JSDF or maintain the status quo. The supporters, opponents and their motivations for revising or maintaining Article 9 will also be presented.

⁵¹ The Constitution of Japan.

A. ARTICLE 9

Japan formally adopted its present Constitution on May 3, 1947.⁵² However, it was a Constitution that was written by Americans and there is still some debate as to whether it was readily accepted by the Japanese or forced upon them. Regardless of the origins of the Constitution, the fact remains that the Japanese have lived by it for the last 57 years and have done so with little modification to the original document. Article 9 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the "no war clause," or "renouncement of war clause," is what gives the Constitution its pacifist nature and its nickname, "the Peace Constitution." The Government of Japan (GOJ) has laid out strict and exacting definitions of Article 9 based on their interpretations that dictate the existence, limits and use of the JSDF. The Defense of Japan 2002 White Paper justifies the existence of the JSDF and gives the GOJ's interpretations of Article 9 in relation to the Constitution, self-defense and the type and amount of self-defense capability permitted. The following will layout the basic interpretations and restrictions of Article 9 and the resulting effects on Japanese policy. The text of Article 9 is quoted in chapter II.

The first issue that arises out of the text of Article 9 is the very existence of the JSDF. The phrase "land, sea and air forces as well as other war potential, will never be maintained," would seem to suggest that in purely legalistic terms the JSDF should not be allowed to exist since to any casual observer the JSDF is a type of land, sea and air force, although not in name. The name "Self-

⁵² W.G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change Since 1850* (New York: St. Martin's Press 2000), 219.

Defense Force" strictly spells out the role of the JSDF, that of self-defense. And the mission of self-defense would be the argument that those in favor of the JSDF would make to support the present and continued existence of the JSDF, while its opponents would say that merely the name of JSDF does not preclude it from being an "armed force." The GOJ upholds the interpretation that while Article 9 does embrace pacifism through its renouncement of war, non-possession of war potential and rejection of the right of belligerency, the right of self-defense is not denied and is inherently maintained so long as Japan is an independent nation and a sovereign state. Thus, the justification of the existence of the JSDF is to "possess the minimum level of armed strength needed to support the exercise of that right (self defense)." ⁵³ Thus, semantics plays a role in the existence of the JSDF, if the JSDF were to be renamed to any type of "armed force," then its opponents would have cause to further pursue the arguments in abolishing the JSDF's existence.

The question of the "minimum necessary level of armed strength" is the subsequent question that arises from the interpretation above. While "war potential" is forbidden, the GOJ states that while the actual level may vary dependent upon "the international situation, the standard of the available military technology and various other factors," the possession of certain weapons such as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), long-range strategic bombers or offensive aircraft carriers are explicitly denied because of their offensive capabilities and more specifically for their ability to bring wholesale

⁵³ *Defense of Japan 2002*, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2002, 92.

destruction to another country.⁵⁴ What is important to note is that the sum total of Japan's military strength should not exceed the constitutional limit or in other words the "minimum necessary level of armed strength" that is required for self-defense.

The next issue addressed is the set of the conditions that must be met in order for the JSDF to exercise its right of self-defense. The Defense of Japan White Paper spells out three conditions where armed force might be used:

1. There is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan;
2. There is no appropriate means to deal with the act of aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and
3. The use of armed strength is confined to the minimum necessary level.⁵⁵

These conditions exist to reinforce the idea that the JSDF is to be used for self-defense only and not to be used in any type of offensive manner, which is supported by its ban on offensive weapons. These conditions clearly show that Japan's security must be at risk, violence is the last resort and that proportionality must be exercised. This issue is carried into the next question of "what are the limits of geographical boundaries that the JSDF can operate within?"

The Defense of Japan White Paper acknowledges that the actual boundaries of an operation would vary on a case-to-case basis. However, it is clear in pointing out

The Government believes that the Constitution **does not permit** the dispatch of armed troops to

⁵⁴ *Defense of Japan 2002*, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2002, 92.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 92.

foreign territorial land, sea and airspace for the purpose of using force, because such an overseas deployment of troops would generally go beyond the limits of the minimum necessary level of self-defense.⁵⁶ [Emphasis added]

This is an issue that is being hotly debated today with the Government's decision to dispatch troops in support of the reconstruction of Iraq. As of March 7, 2004, Air Self-Defense Force (AJSDF) and Ground Self-Defense Force (GJSDF) personnel are operating in Kuwait and Iraq. Additional GJSDF personnel are scheduled to arrive in April 2004. This marks the first time that Japanese troops have been deployed to an area that is experiencing fighting since World War II.⁵⁷

The issue of the right of collective self-defense is the next question that is raised. While Japan acknowledges that international law recognizes the right of collective self-defense as the right of a state and that Japan is a sovereign state, it should follow that Japan has the right of collective self-defense. However, the Government believes that the right of collective self-defense would be overstepping the boundaries of the "minimum necessary level of armed strength" to protect itself. Thus, Japan believes that if a country that is an ally were under attack, Japan would not be able to come to the aid of that country since it is not in defense of Japan itself but rather another country.⁵⁸ Shortly after taking office in April 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi had considered the idea of revising

⁵⁶ *Defense of Japan 2002*, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2002, 92.

⁵⁷ "GSDF convoy to pass through Kuwait City." *The Japan Times*, 13 January 2004. <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040113a3.htm>> [13 January 2004].

⁵⁸ *Defense of Japan 2002*, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2002, 93.

Article 9 to allow for collective self-defense, but then realizing that a constitutional revision would take some time, opted for a Diet resolution instead as a temporary measure to get the country comfortable with the idea of collective self-defense before pushing through with a revision.⁵⁹

The last issue is the right of belligerency. Article 9 clearly states that the Japan will not recognize belligerency as one of its rights. The Government provides a definition of what is meant by the "right of belligerence",

The general term for the various rights a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy's military force and to occupy enemy territory.⁶⁰

It is not meant to be the right to "exchange hostilities." What is important to note is that this interpretation does give way to the fact that the right of self-defense, as well as collective self-defense, are "quite separate from the exercise of the right of belligerence."⁶¹

B. ALL THOSE IN FAVOR...

The JSDF's first transformation was only four years following its initial creation as the National Police Reserve in 1950, when it was renamed the National Security Agency. Eventually it would acquire its modern name as the Self-Defense Force and along with it the responsibilities

⁵⁹ "Koizumi must deliver before hoopla fades." *The Japan Times*, 24 May 2001. <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20010524b2.htm>> [2 January 2004]

⁶⁰ *Defense of Japan 2002*, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2002, 93.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, 93.

of quelling threats from not only within Japan's borders, but being prepared to handle those from outside its borders as well. Thus, in the JSDF's 54-year history it has already undergone a tremendous transformation, from dealing with only internal threats to a much larger scale and magnitude of external threats.

However, despite the new responsibilities that the JSDF has accepted, there was little that the JSDF could do to actually execute those responsibilities. Article 9 prohibited the very existence of the JSDF and bureaucrats were very wary to even assign the JSDF a mission that could be seen as somewhat militaristic. Thus, the JSDF enjoyed a somewhat protected position, a position of being responsible for the defense of Japan but without having to really do anything unless there was an actual attack against the homeland. Instead they focused on search and rescue and humanitarian assistance operations within their own borders (e.g., JAL flight 123 crash and the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake). This represents quite a different mindset from that of Japan's security partner the United States. Whereas the United States was willing to commit combat power to any conflict that the United States had a national interest, such as Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1965, Japan was not willing to contribute any military power even if there were Japanese national interests at stake. The best example of this was during Operation Desert Storm. Japan did not contribute any combat equipment or personnel but instead contributed \$13 billion to the coalition effort. Obviously, this was a case where one of Japan's national interests was clearly at stake, oil. At the time of Operation Desert Storm, Japan imported

approximately 46% of its oil from the Middle East.⁶² As of September 2003 that figure, as reported by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry had risen to upwards of 91.5%.⁶³ This represents an enormous interest for Japan to take part in operations that would most likely affect the lives of ordinary Japanese citizens.

Despite this lack of willingness to participate in operations outside of Japan, changes within the last decade indicate that Japan is beginning to move towards an expanded role for the JSDF. In 1992 legislation was passed that allowed for participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations. This was the first step in authorizing the JSDF to conduct operations outside of Japan. In 1999, Japan signed a Regional Contingency Security Law that spelled out how Japan would respond and what assistance would be offered to the United States if an emergency arose in areas surrounding Japan.⁶⁴ In 2001, then-Prime Minister Mori signed legislation that would allow Japanese troops to carry arms during UN Peacekeeping Operations. Japan's current Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has made the biggest gains for the JSDF as far as expanding its roles and missions. Koizumi ran for office on the platform of "change the LDP, change the nation." He rallied for the recognition of the JSDF as a military and a revision of the constitution to legitimize

⁶² Alan Dowty, "Japan and The Middle East: Signs Of Change?" *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2000) <<http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/2000/issue4/dowty.pdf>> [3 December 2003].

⁶³ Preliminary Report on Petroleum Statistics, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. <<http://www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/index.html>> [3 December 2003].

⁶⁴ *Defense of Japan, 2000*, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2000.

the JSDF. He also emphasized that a true and equal security alliance with the United States was crucial to Japan and for lifting Japan's ban on collective self-defense.⁶⁵ Since Koizumi took office, he has brought forward a number of initiatives that have advanced the JSDF's move towards increasing its roles and missions and becoming a more "normal" military. The first initiative followed the September 11 terror attacks against the United States. The initiative, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law gave the JSDF the right to shoot at suspicious vessels "in order to stop them."⁶⁶ During the recent September 2003 LDP elections, all four of the LDP candidates supported revising Article 9. All of the candidates agreed that Article 9 was too vague and needed to more clearly stipulate the role of the JSDF and be worded so that people could understand it more easily. One of the candidates, Shizuka Kamei said that there were 23 existing interpretations of Article 9.⁶⁷ The most recent initiative is the deployment of Japanese civilians and JSDF personnel in the reconstruction of Iraq. The deaths of two of Japan's diplomats stalled the actual deployment of those troops. However, Koizumi stresses that

If we wash our hands of it just because it is dangerous and there is no safe place there, it means that we are giving in to terrorists,

⁶⁵ "Morning in Japan Again: Constitutional Reform." *The Japan Times*, 25 April 2001.

⁶⁶ Alan Boyd, "Awakening Japan's sleeping defense giant." *Asia Times*. <<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html>> [10 Nov 2003].

⁶⁷ "LDP candidates all favor revisions to Constitution." *The Japan Times*, 14 September 2003. <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20030914a1.html/12/04>> [2 January 2004].

in regard to his decision to still send troops despite the volatile security situation.⁶⁸ The trend of initiatives appears to indicate that the LDP is pushing for more roles and missions for the JSDF, transforming it into a true military and becoming a true security partner with the United States.

The New Komeito Party, which is currently aligned with the LDP, wants to maintain Article 9, but would like to see a ten-year period on national consensus building before deciding to revise the Constitution. They believe that the maintenance of the Japan-United States security treaty and self-defense of Japan lie at the heart of Japan's defense strategy. One difference from the Democratic Party of Japan is that the New Komeito Party does endorse participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations.⁶⁹

C. ...AND THOSE OPPOSED

Despite the headway that Koizumi has made, there are those in Japan that would like nothing more than to see the JSDF completely dissolved in accordance with the explicit direction of Article 9. Japan's Socialist Party was a major proponent of arguing that the existence of the JSDF is illegal as spelled out by Article 9. However, in 1993-1994, the Socialist Party recognized the JSDF as legitimate within the framework of the Constitution in exchange for one of its members, Toiichii Murayama, being named Prime Minister. Since then and after changing the party's name to the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP), they have given

⁶⁸ "Japan must risk danger in sending troops to Iraq." *Agence France Press*, 02 December 2003.
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/60034/1/.html> [02 December 2003].

⁶⁹ New Komeito web site,
<http://www.komei.or.jp/kensaku_files/english/basicpolicy.htm> [30 November 2003].

notice that they may change their stance and term the JSDF as "almost unconstitutional" and making it their goal to abolish the Japan-United States security treaty. They also want to revise Article 9 to more clearly articulate its antiwar stance.⁷⁰

On January 21, 2000 the Japanese Parliament began a five year review of the Constitution, with its purpose to decide if the Constitution needs revision and if so where. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) argues that the JSDF should not be transformed into a full-fledged military but instead should be scaled back to only the "minimum necessary force" to exercise self-defense of the country. The DPJ believes that in order for the right of collective self-defense to be recognized, a major revision of the Constitution is required not just a reinterpretation, thus completely countering the original intent and nature of the Constitution. The DPJ does not believe in participating in any operations outside of Japan, collective self-defense, or any type of offensive operations.⁷¹ The DPJ is the biggest opponent against revising the Constitution. The DPJ recently won 177 seats during the November elections, up from 137.⁷² The DPJ's stance on the Constitution and the SDF is one of the reasons that the DPJ is gaining the popular support to minimize the role of the JSDF or completely do away with it.

⁷⁰ "SDP set for about-face on JSDF." *The Japan Times*, 7 December 2000. <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20001207a5.htm>> [2 January 2004].

⁷¹ DPJ web site, <<http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic.html>> [30 November 2003].

⁷² "Re-elected Koizumi faces first test over Iraq dispatch." *Agence France Press*, 11 November 2003. [11 November 2003].

The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) is the staunchest supporter of maintaining the Constitution as it is. However, in the recent elections in September 2003, the JCP saw its number of seats drop from 20 to nine. Despite its announcement in July of 2003 to recognize Japan's Imperial system and the JSDF, voters were not swayed and the final tally reflected it. The JCP is also opposed to the troop dispatch as well as the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.⁷³

D. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

The interpretations of Article 9 presented here seem to somewhat overlap and contradict each other at points. One can see the vicious cycle of reasoning that is used to justify the JSDF's existence and purpose, self-defense but only with the "minimum level necessary." Thus, the level of total military strength should be adequate to provide that end, however what is the determinant for the "minimum level necessary?" The conditions of when to exercise self-defense seem clear enough, however, the location to exercise it is vague and can change from case-to-case. The right of belligerency is not recognized, however, the right of self-defense, which could include "inflicting casualties and damage upon the enemy's military force," is recognized. These questions and contradictions are at the heart of the debate over Article 9 and the question to revise, reinterpret or leave it as it is.

The issue of revising or reinterpreting the Constitution is so contentious that there is hardly anyone that does not either favor or oppose a change to the status quo. In a recent poll conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun

⁷³ "SDP, JCP setbacks spell trouble for Constitution." *The Japan Times*, 11 November 2003. <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20031111b1.htm>> [2 January 2004].

newspaper, of 1,036 people polled only nine percent were in favor of still sending troops to Iraq after the deaths of the two Japanese diplomats and their driver.⁷⁴ The same poll shows that 80% wanted the deployment of troops either cancelled or delayed until the security situation could be stabilized and 43% were outright opposed to deploying any troops at all regardless of the security situation.⁷⁵ There is a serious divide in what roles and missions the JSDF should participate in as evidenced by the poll. The SDP argued for some time that the JSDF should not exist at all, although that stance has softened somewhat recently. Meanwhile, the DPJ argues that the JSDF should remain a self-defense force limiting its roles and missions to the geographical location of Japan for the purposes of defense only. The LDP argues that the natural evolution of the JSDF is to become a full-fledged military and a participant in operations alongside its security partner, the United States, and other allies wherever Japan's national interests may lay or if an ally is being threatened. Regardless of what Japan decides, its regional neighbors and the United States will be watching closely because the transformation of the JSDF into a full-fledged military will be an event truly worth watching and one that will affect the security situation in Northeast Asia as well as the rest of the world.

⁷⁴ "South Korea, Japan Sending Troops to Iraq." *Reuters*, 01 December 2003.

⁷⁵ "Japan confirms troop dispatch to help rebuild Iraq." *Agence France Press*, 12 November 2003.
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/60008/1/.html> [02 December 2003].

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IV. JAPAN'S NATIONAL INTERESTS AND ITS NEIGHBORS' POSSIBLE REACTIONS

Japan's history in Asia has been somewhat less than spectacular, although that perception has become more positive in recent years. Japan's history of aggression and occupation has affected almost all of the countries that will be discussed in this chapter. Japan's greatest perceived threat is from North Korea. The launching of a Taepodong missile over Japan, the spy boats incident, the mothership incident and most recently North Korea's adamant refusal to give up its nuclear program are all reasons for Japan transforming its SDF into a full-fledged military. But the physical threats of North Korea are not the only reasons for the transforming the JSDF.

A. JAPAN'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

Japan's national interests obviously lay in its security and continued prosperity while also engaging the world diplomatically, economically and "militarily." Japan's greatest ties to its neighbors are economically and historically. Japan's relations with its Northeast Asian neighbors go back centuries, thus it is difficult to view Japan as a singular nation without looking at the consequences of any actions taken by Japan on its neighbors. When the Cold War came to an end, Northeast Asia as well as the rest of the world expected that "the peace dividend" had finally arrived. Japan looked to increase its economic and security relations with the rest of the world. Japan once again embarked on a course to develop "comprehensive security" using its powerful economic engine. However, the post-Cold War era was not to be as generous as the Cold War era was. The world community was

not going to tolerate Japan's "free-riding" as evidenced by the world's reaction to its "checkbook diplomacy." Therefore, Japan has embarked on a careful course of engagement, taking incremental steps, as laid out in chapter 2, which will allow it to eventually become a "normal" nation. However, those steps must be tempered by the reactions of Japan's allies and neighbors.

B. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan celebrated the 30th anniversary of their normalization in 2002. The relations between China and Japan continue to grow stronger, especially economically. China has surpassed the United States as the number one exporter to Japan and Japan is China's largest trade partner.⁷⁶ As the economies of China and Japan become more interdependent, the importance of the security of the sea-lanes and keeping goods and services flowing will increase in Northeast Asia as well. Despite the growing economic relations, there are still issues from the past that affect present day economic relations. One of the more recent downturns in Japan - China economic relations was the loss of a bid by the Japanese to build a railroad in China. The project was to build a high-speed rail between Beijing and Shanghai, however, the bid will probably go to a French rival supposedly because of Prime Minister Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.⁷⁷ The Yasukuni Shrine is dedicated to the approximately 2.5 million people who have died in Japan's conflicts between 1853 and 1945, including

⁷⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Diplomatic Bluebook 2003. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap2-a.pdf>> [5 March 2004], 31.

⁷⁷ "Koizumi's shrine visits derail Japanese bid for China rail project." *Channel News Asia*, 18 February 2004. <<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/eastasia/>> [18 February 2004].

14 Class A war criminals from World War II. Critics of the Prime Minister's visits to the shrine say that the visits symbolize the government's approval of previous war criminals' acts.

While China is important to Japan as a trading partner, China also represents the greatest competition economically, militarily and potentially politically to Japan. While Japan remains the greatest economic power in Asia, China has had a larger percentage of Gross Domestic Product growth over the past several years and shows no signs of slowing down.⁷⁸ China has also become the world's top recipient of foreign direct investment, receiving over \$30 billion in the first six months of 2003.⁷⁹ Militarily, China has the largest standing army at just over two million troops and continues to modernize its military. China has recently announced that its military spending in 2004 would rise 11.6 percent over the 2003 budget of 185.3 billion yuan (22.37 billion dollars).⁸⁰

The success of China's economy is largely due to China's newest generation of leadership, spearheaded by PRC President Hu Jintao. The fourth generation leadership has been characterized as "the technocrats" because of their extensive backgrounds in engineering and economics.⁸¹ The

⁷⁸ Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. *Strategic Asia 2003-2004: Fragility and Crisis* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003) 488-489.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 7.

⁸⁰, "China to boost military strength, build high-tech weapons." *Channel News Asia*, 5 March 2004. <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/73984/1/.html> [5 March 2004].

⁸¹ Lyman Miller, "China's National Party Leadership" (March 1, 2003). <<http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/references/leaders2003.pdf>> [21 February 2004].

success of China's economy may suggest that there is a shift occurring in China from the previous Chinese Communist standard to some as yet to be determined form of capitalism. Such a shift in China's political system could spell trouble for Japan's prospects of remaining the lead goose in the flying geese model. The United States would also welcome a capitalist China that is sowing the seeds of democracy. The United States' previous objections to establishing relations with China had primarily been because of China's Communist nature and because of China's human rights violations⁸². However, because of the headway that China is making economically, with China being granted Permanent Normal Trade Relations by the United States in 2000 and gaining membership into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, it would appear that the United States' stance on China is shifting. China would therefore benefit from the United States turning away from Japan and recognizing an emerging "democratic" China as the new, regional, military and economic power.

As China continues to grow economically and modernize militarily, it has the potential to become the regional hegemon and potentially become the next superpower to compete with the United States. Thus, it would not bode well for China to have a fully "normalized" Japan in such close proximity to China. Japan would present greater competition as a "normalized" country with the ability to project power and not be restricted by its Constitution. Furthermore, it would be most beneficial for China if Japan stayed under the United States' security blanket, then

⁸² The most publicized and international display of China's human rights violations was the squashing of the pro-Democracy movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

China could focus on the United States as its major competitor knowing that Japan was "under the United States' thumb." Even though China advocates a "multipolar" world,⁸³ it would be difficult envisioning military relations between Japan and China. However, the United States could decide to support a full "normalization" of Japan in order for it to balance China in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, a normalized Japan could be used as a balance by China against the United States as well.

C. THE TWO KOREAS

The two Koreas both share a common history with Japan up until the end of World War II. Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910 and remained so until the end of World War II when Allied forces liberated it. However, at the conclusion of World War II the future of Korea was yet to be decided and the nation was separated at the 38th parallel, the North to be administered by the Soviet Union and the South by the United States. This particular division has impacted both of the Koreas' relationships with its neighbors and other countries in the Asia.

1. Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is probably Japan's closest bother-in-arms in the sense of a shared Mutual Defense Treaty between Japan and the United States and the Republic of Korea and the United States. This "virtual alliance" between the ROK, Japan and the United States creates an interesting dilemma for the ROK if Japan normalizes its defense establishment. The ROK lists its key

⁸³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China's Views on the Development of Multipolarization." 18 August 2003. <<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24880.htm>> [6 March 2004].

diplomatic tasks on its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's website as:

1. Peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.
2. Policies toward Iraq and the Middle East.
3. Strengthening of the ROK-US alliance.
4. Economic and trade foreign policies in response to increasing openness in the global economy.
5. Promotion of cooperation with the international community.
6. Fostering of a favorable environment for the establishment of a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
7. Laying the groundwork for the development of Korea into an economic hub in Northeast Asia.⁸⁴

Based on this list of interests it is fairly easy to see that Japan's involvement cannot be underestimated. One can see that all the tasks will somehow involve Japan in one way or another, whether it be politically, economically or in a worst case scenario "militarily" - that worst case being a North Korean nuclear scenario. Japan has become the ROK's number two trading partner directly behind China. As mentioned in the PRC section, with the economies of the ROK, PRC and Japan becoming more interdependent it will become increasingly important to protect the flow of goods and services within and to and from the Northeast Asian region. In all of Asia, Northeast Asia represents by far the largest volume of trade. The ROK and Japan are deeply interested in maintaining and improving their economic relations. "Militarily" speaking, Japan and the ROK have taken steps to improve their military-to-military relations. ROK naval ships visited Japan for the first time in 1994 and JMSDF ships made a port call to Pusan in 1995.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Foreign Policy. <http://www.mofat.go.kr/en/for/e_for_aim.mof> [5 March 2004].

⁸⁵ Sang-Woo Rhee and Tae-Hyo Kim, ed., *Korea-Japan Security Relations* (Seoul: Oruem, 2000), 104.

Additionally, in 1999 the JMSDF and the ROK Navy held their first combined exercises in Pusan.⁸⁶ Despite the headway that the two navies have made, there is some hesitation on Japan's part to have its GSDF participate in combined exercises with the ROK marines and army since the GSDF has no marines and because of Japan's history of military aggression on the Korean Peninsula.

The ROK is extremely sensitive to the military balance of power in Northeast Asia with the United States' intention to downsize its force posture in the ROK. While United States military forces are stationed in the ROK to serve as the catalyst to United States involvement in the event of an invasion from the North, the withdrawal of those forces would significantly decrease the United States' desire to get involved in a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, one could make the case that a "normalization" of the Japan Self-Defense Force could foster the creation of a Mutual Defense Treaty between the ROK and Japan that would be beneficial to both parties involved if the United States were to substantially reduce its forces in or withdraw its forces from the ROK.

2. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is probably Japan's greatest perceived threat. The DPRK continues to be a "wild card" in Northeast Asian security matters by being the most unpredictable of the Northeast Asian countries. The DPRK's national interest could probably be summed up as follows:

1. Survival of the Kim Jong Il regime
2. International legitimacy

⁸⁶ Shinobu Miyachi, "Korea-Japan military ties take the heat off US" *Asia Times Online*, 18 November 1999. <<http://www.atimes.com/japan-econ/AK18Dh02.html>> [15 March 2004].

3. Form lasting economic, diplomatic and security relations
4. Independence/Reunification

Based on this list of national interests, it is necessary to look at the history of relations between the DPRK and Japan. The relations between the DPRK and Japan over the last few years could be characterized a "two steps forward and then a tumble." Despite somewhat warming relations, a series of events have worked to upset any normalization talks. On August 31, 1998, the DPRK test launched a *Taepodong-1* medium range ballistic missile over Northern Japan that fell harmlessly into the Pacific Ocean. The missile is believed to have an effective range of 1,500 - 2,000km, putting most of Japan within its range. The DPRK claimed that the missile was actually carrying its first ever satellite, the Kwangmyongsong No.1 spacecraft, to be launched into orbit. Despite the DPRK's claim no information has ever been received from the satellite and Western tracking systems have not detected it in orbit.⁸⁷ As a direct result Japan suspended food aid to the hunger-stricken DPRK and said that aid would not resume until the DPRK had taken positive steps towards stemming its nuclear and missile development programs.⁸⁸

On March 22, 1999, two North Korean spy boats disguised as trawlers were detected in the Sea of Japan within the territorial waters of Japan. This incident, in addition to the *Taepodong* missile incident, proved to further inflame relations between North Korea and Japan.

87 "First Taepodong 1 Launch Carried A Satellite." *Jane's Missiles and Rockets*. 01-Oct-1998, EDITION: 1998, VOLUME/ISSUE: 002/010.

88 "No capitulation, no food: Komura to Pyongyang." *The Japan Times*, 13 August 1999. <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn19990813a4.htm>> [18 February 2004].

Despite being pursued by the Maritime Safety Agency and the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the two boats were able to escape back into the northern port of Chongchin in North Korea. This incident also had a further noteworthy aspect; it was the first time in the JMSDF's existence that they opened fire for reasons other than self-defense. The Cabinet had given the order to the JMSDF to stop and inspect the boats after which the JMSDF destroyers opened fire with their 5" guns and JMSDF P-3C aircraft dropped 150-kg warning bombs in an effort to stop the boats for an inspection.⁸⁹

December 22, 2001 signified a further deterioration in Japan - DPRK relations with the sinking of a suspicious vessel southwest of Kyushu. The vessel was first detected on December 21 and determined to be similar to the two boats that escaped in the March 1999 incident. The Defense Agency ordered the Japanese Coast Guard to pursue and detain the vessel for questioning. After ignoring queries to stop, the Japanese Coast Guard fired warning shots and was met with return fire from rifles and rocket launchers. The Japanese Coast Guard returned defensive fire resulting in the sinking of the vessel. There were no survivors and only two bodies were recovered (of a suspected crew of 15). The vessel was only recently salvaged by Japan with the help of China and all evidence seems to point to North Korea as being the origin of the vessel.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Keizo Nabeshima, "In the wake of the spy boats." *The Japan Times*, 7 April 1999. <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo19990407a2.htm>> [18 February 2004].

⁹⁰ The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, (Tokyo: 2002), 331.

In September 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Korea in a prelude to what looked like a new round of normalization talks. In a surprise move regarding the long standing issue of the Japanese abductees, the Dear Leader Kim Jong Il admitted and apologized face-to-face to Prime Minister Koizumi in an extremely rare, first-time meeting of both leaders in Pyongyang. "It is regretful and I want to frankly apologize," Kim said, adding that the culprits had been identified and punished.⁹¹ However, a month later the positive aspects of the momentous summit would be overshadowed by the revelation in October 2002 that the DPRK was again developing its nuclear weapons program. The abductee issue remains a top priority for Japan as evidenced by the separate talks concerning the abductees that have occurred in conjunction with the six party talks. "That is priority number one as far as we are concerned," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hatsuhisa Takashima at a press conference regarding the Japanese foreign ministry visit to North Korea.⁹²

The DPRK faces increasing difficulty in its relations with Japan. The loss of food aid, diminishing trade and diplomatic hardships all serve to hamper normal relations between the DPRK and Japan. The reaction to a normalization of Japan, from a North Korean perspective, is the most difficult to gauge given its history of unpredictability. However, it would be fair to say that to the DPRK, Japan is the United States' regional "deputy" and rightly so. Currently Japan pays:

⁹¹ Charles Scanlon, "N Korea confesses to kidnappings," *BBC News*, 17 September 2002. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2262074.stm>> [20 February 2003].

⁹² "Japan, N Korea discuss kidnapped," *BBC News*, 11 February 2004. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3478835.stm>> [15 March 2004].

1. The costs for the Facilities Improvement Program for areas to be used by United States Forces Japan (USFJ)
2. Labor costs for USFJ employees locally employed
3. Utility costs for public use by the USFJ
4. Costs for the relocation of training at the request of the Japanese side.⁹³

Consequently, these expenses could be seen as "payment" to the United States for aiding in Japan's defense, primarily from the threat posed by North Korea. Thus, while the United States' responsibility is for protecting Japan from its neighbors, Japan is responsible for supporting the United States in that responsibility.

The DPRK could view the normalization of Japan from two sides. First, a normal Japan would be out from under the "security blanket" of the United States and could look to strengthen its relations in Northeast Asia to include the DPRK. Additionally, it would bode well for the DPRK to have greater access to Japan's economy, markets, technology sector and allies. Second, the DPRK could be the target of a newly normalized Japan that sees the value of a pre-emptive military operation against a bellicose neighbor with a history of unpredictable and aggressive behavior and react with either the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the ties between the ROK and Japan as discussed earlier could become stronger presenting a less favorable environment for the long-term survival of North Korea. Conversely, Japan could choose to sever its ties with the ROK, although that is highly unlikely given the existing strong economic ties and the relationship with their mutual ally the United States.

⁹³ *Defense of Japan 2003*, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2003, 158-159.

Another avenue that the two Koreas could pursue is reunification. A reunified Korea could either turn to form its closest relations with Japan and the United States or with the PRC. If a reunified Korea turns to Japan and the United States, then the normalization of Japan would enhance the security and economic positions of all three nations. However, if it turns to the PRC, then the PRC and reunified Korea would want Japan to maintain its status quo relations with the United States in order to prevent a independent arms race between a unified Korea and Japan.

D. TAIWAN

Taiwan was ceded to Japan by China as a result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 that ended the Sino-Japanese War. Japanese imperial rule lasted for the next fifty years until the end of World War II. Taiwan presents an interesting situation for Japan. Economically, Taiwan is Japan's fourth largest trading partner. Politically, Japan maintains working relations on a non-governmental basis in accordance with the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué.

Taiwan's national interests are not unlike any other country. President Chen Shui Bian makes clear two goals for Taiwan, security and independence.

To safeguard national sovereignty and defend national security is my solemn duty, as is my commitment to allow the people of Taiwan to be masters of their own land.⁹⁴

In order to accomplish his goals of security and independence there are two major accomplishments that President Chen identifies, democracy and economics, as the cornerstone for international recognition and eventual

⁹⁴ President Chen's Press Conference, Presidential Statement, Press Conference, February 3, 2004. < http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/docset/showenews.php4?_section=5&_rid=1598 > [28 February 2004].

independence.⁹⁵ These major accomplishments are not too dissimilar from Japan's own accomplishments. Additionally, Taiwan's goals are not unlike what Japan has achieved.

Taiwan would probably welcome a "normalized" Japan in that Taiwan could work to improve relations with Japan and perhaps use those ties to gain independence from China. However, that would put Japan at risk by severing its ties with China. Also, a "normalized" Japan could detract the interest of China from Taiwan, allowing Taiwan to progress more steadily towards independence particularly if Japan and Taiwan were to sign a mutual security treaty. Japan's support as a normalized military against an aggressive PRC could be a welcome addition to Taiwan's security. However, this situation could also worsen China-Taiwan tensions if Beijing perceived Japan as a threat. Japan's view of the Taiwan-China issue is that while not outright pledging to aid Taiwan in a cross-straits crisis, Japan's ties to the United States would obligate Japan to support the United States in a military operation involving the defense of Taiwan. Ultimately, Japan would like to see the China-Taiwan situation resolved peacefully.⁹⁶

E. RUSSIA

Like the PRC and ROK, the ties between Russia and Japan are growing stronger. In January 2003 Japan and Russia announced the Russian-Japanese Plan of Action, a bilateral plan that

[E]nvisages, among other things, considerable strengthening of cooperation in the international arena, continued negotiations on the question of

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Diplomatic Bluebook 2003. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap2-a.pdf>> [5 March 2004], 37.

concluding a peace treaty, positive shifts in the field of trade-and-economic cooperation, the development of cultural ties, and the deepening of trust and understanding between the peoples of Russia and Japan.⁹⁷

Russia has received approximately \$6.59 billion from Japan in the form of loans, grants and trade insurance since November 1990.⁹⁸ Economically, Russia depends on the trade generated by Japan and foreign direct investment (Japan ranks sixth among foreign investors) while Japan looks to Russia for its future energy sources. On matters of security Russia and Japan see almost eye-to-eye on the DPRK.

Russia and Japan are active and keen participants in the negotiating process on the questions of resolving the Korean situation. We have common objectives - the necessity to ensure the nuclear-free status of this sub-region and to maintain the regime of security and nonproliferation there, as well as to achieve this by peaceful means.⁹⁹

Thus, economically and diplomatically, Russia and Japan share similar goals in Northeast Asia.

Although Russia and Japan share many economic, diplomatic and strategic goals there remain some issues that are unresolved. One of those issues is the rightful

⁹⁷ Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Losyukov's Interview with ITAR-TASS News Agency on the Questions of Russian-Japanese Relations. 13 February 2004. <<http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/31C7E29150FB4F38C3256E390051C54C?OpenDocument>> [6 March 2004].

⁹⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Diplomatic Bluebook 2003. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap2-a.pdf>> [5 March 2004], 90.

⁹⁹ Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Losyukov's Interview with ITAR-TASS News Agency on the Questions of Russian-Japanese Relations. 13 February 2004. <<http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/31C7E29150FB4F38C3256E390051C54C?OpenDocument>> [6 March 2004].

possession of the Kurile Islands. However, with the Ikurtsk Statement of 2001, reaffirming the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration and the 1983 Tokyo Declaration, both countries have agreed to settle the issue of the islands so that a peace treaty could be signed.¹⁰⁰ With the economies of both China and Japan recovering from the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, Russia has once again begun to engage both countries economically and diplomatically. Russia is focusing on restructuring its domestic economy, however it is keeping an eye on its regional neighbors.

F. SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan first established informal ties in 1973 and then formalized relations in 1977. Japan has been quite active in economic and development cooperation throughout Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia's greatest tie to Japan is economically. ASEAN and Japan have implemented the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in order to further develop economic ties between Japan and ASEAN seeking to increase the total amount of trade between the two to \$40 billion by 2020.¹⁰¹ Japan also has ongoing working group level discussions with all the members of ASEAN for developing an economic partnership with each respective member, however only Singapore and Japan have signed a Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement of a New Age Partnership (2002). Security-wise, in December 2003, Japan acceded to The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, a

¹⁰⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Diplomatic Bluebook 2003. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap2-a.pdf>> [5 March 2004], 88.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 39.

treaty that essentially commits the signatory states to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries.¹⁰²

Southeast Asia, while having economic dealings with Japan and only recently the beginnings of strategic cooperation, is more than likely to accept Japan's bid for normalization if only to provide a balance of power with regards to China. While ASEAN has deeper roots with China, the addition of Japan to its list of friends and trading partners would give ASEAN greater economic access to the United States through Japan and vice versa. Japan's history of aggression and occupation in Southeast Asia serves as constant reminder to Southeast Asia what a "militarized" Japan is capable of. However, a 1998 public opinion poll indicated,

An overwhelming majority of respondents saw Japan as a trustworthy partner that would not become a military threat.¹⁰³

Therefore, the possibility exists that a normal Japan would be welcomed by ASEAN.

G. FACTORS AFFECTING THE NORMALIZATION OF THE JSDF

There are several factors that could affect the full normalization of the JSDF. This section will examine those factors in a short and long term context.

1. North Korean Nuclear Issue

The North Korean nuclear issue continues to be the most critical issue with regard to the security of

¹⁰² Richard Hanson, "Japan, ASEAN celebrate 30-year relationship." *Asia Times Online*, 13 December 2003. <<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EL13Dh04.html>> [14 December 2003].

¹⁰³ Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. *Strategic Asia 2003-2004: Fragility and Crisis* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), 284.

Northeast Asia. The general consensus of all the Northeast Asian countries, excluding North Korea, is to maintain a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. However, if North Korea continues to develop its nuclear program and no progress can be made in the six-party talks, it is foreseeable that Japan will continue to take steps towards military "normalization" in order to preserve its own security. The pace of events on the Korean Peninsula will dictate the speed at which Japan decides to normalize. In the short term, if the situation on the Korean Peninsula is not resolvable and North Korea decides to employ or threaten to employ any of its nuclear weapons, it is highly probable that Japan will take steps to act on its previous legislation to strike preemptively and would do so "within the legal framework" of the Japanese Constitution, as advocated by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko.¹⁰⁴ This would be the most dangerous course, for Japan would need to enact emergency legislation in order to counter a threat from North Korea. Although most Japanese citizens would agree that defense of the nation would be a perfectly plausible reason to deploy the JSDF, a preemptive military operation may not be popular as seen in the meager support garnered when Prime Minister Koizumi backed Washington's bid for a preemptive attack against Iraq in March 2003.¹⁰⁵ The most likely situation, given North Korea's reputation for brinksmanship, is that the issue could drag on for some

¹⁰⁴ Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. *Strategic Asia 2003-2004: Fragility and Crisis* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), 150.

¹⁰⁵ "Koizumi pledges to back U.S. despite opposition to Iraq War." *Mainichi Daily News*, 5 March 2003.
<<http://www12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/search-news/899078/Koizumi20pledges20to20back20U2eS2e20despite20opposition20to20Iraq20war20-0-1.html>> [6 March 2004].

time, effectively giving Japan the time it would need to reinterpret its Constitution, gain the public's vote and build up its "military." A third scenario is that the North Korean regime implodes before it has the chance to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons and Japan will need to find an alternative Northeast Asian security threat in order to justify its revision of the Constitution.

2. Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi Reconstruction

Although JSDF personnel are only recently beginning to arrive in Iraq, the implications for Japan revising its Constitution based on events in Iraq can also be seen in a short and long-term context. In the short term, the most dangerous event that would raise the level of debate and hasten a decision on Constitutional revision would be the death of one or any number of JSDF personnel while deployed to Iraq. Given the opinion poll numbers for those opposed to the dispatch of JSDF personnel, there are two likely reactions to the deaths of JSDF personnel. The first could be one of utter shock and a feeling of resentment towards the government for ignoring the concerns of the public and dispatching the troops regardless. This reaction would probably be followed by the public's demand to withdraw the JSDF personnel and never allow them to be dispatched again. The second reaction would be the complete opposite, the public would be totally outraged at the death of its countrymen and unified in their demand that the government take immediate steps to allow JSDF personnel to take the necessary precautions and actions to protect themselves. Prime Minister Koizumi is hedging his bets against the first reaction. The JSDF personnel in Samawah are constructing a military camp on the outskirts of town that comes complete with a moat, barbed wire, only one entrance,

non-linear roads to deter suicide car bombers, high-tech sensing equipment as well as all the amenities of home including a gym, internet café, library, and of course a karaoke bar. All JSDF personnel will be confined to the camp unless performing their duties.¹⁰⁶

The long-term effects could be quite different. Depending on the actual duration of the reconstruction efforts, if JSDF personnel are routinely stationed in Iraq for an extended period, then the Japanese public could begin to experience a feeling similar to what Americans experienced as the Vietnam War became prolonged - one of uncertainty and a growing distrust of the government.

3. Global War on Terror

When Operation Iraqi Freedom began the world's focus shifted from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iraq. While, Japan pledged its support to the United States immediately following the September 11 terror attacks, the actual deployment of troops to Iraq took some time and urging by the United States. In the short term, unless there is a terrorist attack on Japanese soil or an attack solely directed at Japan or its national interests, such as the troops in Iraq, it is highly unlikely that the Global War on Terror will incite any meaningful dialog to change the Constitution. However, if the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks against Japan's allies increase, then it is possible that Japan could come under more pressure to provide support to those allies. Recall, it was the September 11 terror attacks that sparked the emergency legislation allowing JMSDF units to deploy to the Indian

¹⁰⁶ J Sean Curtin, "Japan's 'Fortress of Solitude' in Iraq-plus karaoke." *Asia Times Online*, 20 February 2004.
<<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FB19Dh05.html>> [20 February 2004].

Ocean. These types of incidents could spur the talks required for a revision of the Constitution.

The long-term effect of the Global War on Terror would be to encourage the buildup of Japan's own security posture while taking steps for the JSDF to reach further beyond its Constitutional limits. The Global War on Terror will not be won in the next few years, thus giving time to Japan to meter its steps towards normalization. As Japan's relations with other nations become stronger, they will begin to look to Japan as a rightful defender in both nations' interests. Thus, Japan will need to take steps to defend its interests and its allies' interests abroad. However, so long as terrorist attacks are not aimed at Japan or its allies, the need and desire to revise the Constitution will only be debated on the fringes until such time that a trigger brings the need for revision to the forefront.

4. Demographics

The "graying" of Japan over the next 20 years will begin to influence the ability of Japan to focus on Constitutional issues versus growing domestic concerns. According to the United Nations Population Division, the median age in Japan in 2025 will be over 41 years and the percentage of the population over 65 years will be almost 30%.¹⁰⁷ In addition, as a result of Japan's health care revolution, the life expectancy rate for Japan in 2002 is 82 and will continue to rise to 88.1 years by the years

¹⁰⁷ Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. *Strategic Asia 2003-2004: Fragility and Crisis* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), 461-462.

2045 - 2050.¹⁰⁸ This would represent an incredibly difficult situation for Japan's financial system. Assuming that the U.N.'s figures are correct, this would mean that for every one person of retirement age 65, there would only be two "working age" people.¹⁰⁹ This would present a competition for the government's finances - invest in the country's defense and security or take care of the burgeoning population of retired people. In addition, based on the U.N.'s figures, as the number of younger people decreases in the following years, it will be increasingly difficult for the JSDF to compete with open market jobs that offer better pay and benefits. The corollary to this is that while the job market, largely sponsored by the United States, in Japan was at its height during the Cold War, it has since bottomed out and the younger generation may seek to join the JSDF for job security and to avoid the stress of an uncertain job market.

The government will need to weigh the costs and benefits of investing in security and neglecting the people or vice versa. Preferably, the government will be able to find a balance. In March 2000, legislation was passed to reform pensions by cutting the pension benefits beginning

¹⁰⁸ United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "World Population Chart 2002" <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2002/POP-R2002-DATA_Web.xls> [6 March 2004]; "LONG-RANGE POPULATION PROJECTIONS" 21 August 2003. <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange/long-range_working-paper_final.PDF> [6 March 2004], 31; "World Population Prospect: The 2002 Revision Population Database" <<http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp>> [15 March 2004].

¹⁰⁹ Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. *Strategic Asia 2003-2004: Fragility and Crisis* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), 462.

in 2013 by about 20%, an increase in the age of eligibility from 60 to 65 and full indexation of pension increases.¹¹⁰

H. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

There are a number of reactions that Japan's neighbors could have and any number of courses of action that they could take. Those reactions and courses of action will all depend on the circumstances of the situation that motivates Japan to become a normal country. The North Korean nuclear issue, Japan's participation in Humanitarian Assistance and Iraqi Reconstruction, the Global War on Terror and Japan's demographics all have long and short term effects on the ability of Japan to become a normal country. The intensity and duration of these events will dictate the pace that Japan decides to reform or revise its Constitution.

¹¹⁰ Martin Mühleisen and Hamid Fauqee, "Japan: Population Aging and the Fiscal Challenge." *Finance & Development*, March 2001. <<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/muhleise.htm>> [6 March 2004], 5.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since its creation in 1950, the JSDF has taken incremental steps towards becoming a normal military. The United States can observe that Japan is making an effort to become "normal" and participate in additional roles and missions. There are several events that have occurred that could help in identifying to future indicators:

- The evolution of the roles and missions of the JSDF.
- The JSDF's efforts to acquire new technologies and capabilities.
- Shift in Japan's domestic politics from outright elimination of the JSDF to marginal acceptance.
- Recently passed legislation by the Diet to support JSDF operations in Iraq.
- The actual deployment of JSDF troops to participate in Iraqi reconstruction efforts.
- Japan's statement that it would be willing to conduct a pre-emptive strike against North Korea if the threat was imminent.

These events appear to show a trend that Japan is taking steps to normalize the JSDF. Future indicators that the JSDF is normalizing would be:

- Outright Constitutional revision.
- The JSDF's participation in full military operations in any part of the world.
- Japan becoming a member of any type of multilateral security agreement that includes collective self-defense.
- The LDP continuing to gain more seats while opposition parties continue to lose seats.
- JSDF buildup in response to the Global War on Terror and the North Korean nuclear issue as well as for events yet to happen.

In order for Japan to fully flex its power as a normal nation, it must have all the instruments of national power available to it - diplomatic, economic, informational and military. Although currently the necessity to use the

military as an instrument of national power is highly unlikely because of its strong relations in the other areas of national power, the potential need to use the military must not be overlooked. Japan's credibility in enforcing its foreign policy with its military is only as effective as its diplomatic, economic and informational arms can reach. Currently, if hostile action is taken against Japan's national interests, namely Japanese citizens and/or property, Japan cannot react with a strong, sustained military response to protect its interests abroad. Therefore the necessary step that Japan must take in the present security environment is to normalize the JSDF.

The factors that have been presented in this thesis indicate that the transformation of the JSDF has already begun and these indicators suggest that this process will continue. The rate of transformation will be shaped not only by world events but also by internal domestic issues. As long as Japan wants to be a player in the world economy, the United Nations Security Council, future multilateral security organizations and continue its favorable position with the United States, it is a necessity that Japan make itself a desirable partner with which to engage. Transforming the JSDF will be a historic and monumental step that will lead to Japan becoming a much more desirable trading partner, ally and friend.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

Japan needs to become a normal nation and take its place among the world powers. The United States should continue to maintain and strengthen its relations with Japan and encourage Japan to become a normal nation. In order to do this the United States should increase its

bilateral relations with all of Japan's neighbors to ensure their comfort with the idea of a normal Japan. The United States could also begin turning over some of its security duties in the Far East to Japan, thus endorsing Japan's bid to be the Asian "sheriff." The United States should use a "soft power" approach to its relations with the Far East and with Japan as a mutually cooperative ally. By economically, diplomatically and informatively preparing Japan's neighbors for the normalization of Japan, the United States will ensure that they maintain a strong role in future Far East policy planning, decision-making and policy implementation. The United States would do well to consider that a normalized Japan that does not wish to maintain its ties with the United States would present an even stronger Far East to compete and form relations with. Japan plays a crucial role in the security of Northeast Asia and the United States needs to consider the effects of a normalized Japan on future United States force structure in the Asia-Pacific region.

B. FURTHER RESEARCH AREAS

The following are some proposed areas of research that have arisen out of the research conducted for this thesis.

1. Offensive vs. defensive capabilities of the JSDF; are current capabilities sufficient for the JSDF's stated missions?
2. Political parties of Japan: What factors will affect the LDP remaining in power for the foreseeable future?
3. Future force structure levels in the Asia-Pacific region if Japan normalizes.
4. Potential security alliances between Japan and its neighbors as a result of its normalization.
5. Prospects for the United States remaining a key player in Far East when Japan normalizes.

Such research would be useful in the context of Japan normalizing in ways described in this thesis.

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