EDUCATING THE POST-MODERN U.S. ARMY STRATEGIC PLANNER: IMPROVING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCT

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The prevailing U.S. Army professional military education (PME) system reflects the legacy of the twentieth-century, modern, mechanized age of warfare. The twenty-first century security environment presents a unique set of challenges for U.S. national security and military strategy. The rise of a new information-age of warfare exacerbates the perpetual dichotomy between strategic intent and tactical action in war policy. In this new age, perhaps more than ever before, the distinction between periods of peace and episodes of war has become an arbitrary distinction; war in this age is increasingly just a “continuation of politics and policy by other (all) means.” Yet, the persisting PME continues to separate the martial tactical expert (the warfighter) from the extra-martial operational and strategic expert (the war-thinker), even constructing the career development profile of the Army officer corps in this bifurcated manner. Effective war policy through the integration of the full spectrum of national and multinational (coalitional) capabilities is less effectively learned under such an education and career development system. What the information-age of warfare demands is the education, training, and experienced-based learning of uniformed ‘strategic planners’ – experts well versed in the planning, management, and leadership of full spectrum, holistic war policy.
Educating the Post-Modern U.S. Army Strategic Planner: Improving the Organizational Construct

A Monograph

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Abstract

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How the U.S. Army is designed to educate its officers in strategy and planning will determine success, or failure, in its efforts to produce and sustain strategic planners. The security challenges that will face the next generation of military leaders demands that action be taken now to reassess and redesign the ways in which the Army educates and develops uniformed professionals, expert in advice-giving on matters related to national policy, national strategy, and experienced in the operational planning and tactical execution of martial actions intended to translate strategic goals into tangible effects. This new information age of warfare reflects a uniquely complex and ambiguous strategic environment. It reveals a graying of the distinctions between the strategic and the tactical levels of war and a growing synchronicity between the martial and extra-martial aspects of war.

Perhaps at no other time in modern history has the notion of war as a continuation of politics and policy by other means been closer to reality. The professional officer education system needs to accurately and effectively reflect and affect the prevailing epoch of warfare. There are indications (empirical and anecdotal) that the current U.S. Army education system is antiquated; more an example of the past (‘modern’) strategic times than the present and future (‘post-modern’) strategic environment. The modern PME, a derivative of the mechanized age of warfare, is typified by: separate approaches to strategic level education, operational-level education, and tactical level education; differentiated (partitioned) career paths for officers trained in strategy versus operations and tactics; a seniority-based approach to the education and experiential learning of officers in national and grand strategy; a service-based centricity in its pedagogy; and a military-centric approach to war policymaking and the development of future roles, functions, and missions for military strategic planners.

The 2003 complex strategic environment calls for the synthesis of expertise in the three domains of war into one entity: the uniformed strategic planner. To meet this educational end, the current educational ways and means must be assessed, evaluated. Weak spots and points of failure must be identified – all on behalf of retooling the system in ways that facilitate the development of Army experts in national strategic planning.

This monograph offers specific structural and procedural treatments to what is seen to be an education system ‘flawed by design’ and therefore ill-equipped to consistently produce the quality and quantity of strategic planning experts demanded by the security challenges that face the Army, the military services in general, and the nation on the whole. The monograph proposes four key changes:

- Removal of arbitrary branch-qualification requirements for O-4/Major, particularly for those officers identified early as potential future strategists.
- Formalize an Advanced Military Studies education experience in the professional military education (PME) of all officers designated at future “strategic plans and policy officers.”
- Dual-track uniformed strategic planner education, incorporating civilian and interagency academic and experience-based education into the career pedagogy.
- Make the education of the uniformed strategic planner truly “joint” and infuse joint into the career development of designated strategist early on.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ iv

CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................................. 1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
Purpose of the Monograph ............................................................................................... 4
Relevancy of the Monograph ......................................................................................... 6
Summary of the Monograph ......................................................................................... 12

CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................... 14
The Strategy-Tactics Dialectic ....................................................................................... 14
The 'Strategic' Domain of War, as Policy ..................................................................... 20
The Operational Domain of War, as Policy ................................................................... 25
Towards a 'Post-Modern' Education System ................................................................. 35

CHAPTER THREE ......................................................................................................... 36
The Education of 'Army strategists' ............................................................................. 36
Case Study: Indications of an 'Education-Gap'? - Somalia & The Balkans ................. 36
Case Study: A Look at Functional Area 59 ................................................................. 41
Case Study: The Army Strategic Campaign Plan for the War on Terrorism ............... 48

CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................................ 53
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................. 53
Prescriptions .................................................................................................................. 55
Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 60

APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 61
Glossary of Terms ......................................................................................................... 61
Functional Area 59 ........................................................................................................ 63
USAF Strategic Planner PME ....................................................................................... 68
Policy Treatments, New Concepts .............................................................................. 71

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................. 84

FIGURES & TABLES

Figure 1 ......................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 2 .......................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 3 .......................................................................................................................... 11
Figure 4 .......................................................................................................................... 16
Figure 5 .......................................................................................................................... 28
Figure 6 .......................................................................................................................... 33
Figure 7 .......................................................................................................................... 55
Figure 8 .......................................................................................................................... 56
Table 1 ............................................................................................................................ 22
Table 2 ............................................................................................................................ 25
Table 3 ............................................................................................................................ 29
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Professional attainment, based upon prolonged study, and collective study at colleges, rank by rank, and age by age ... those are the title reeds of the commanders of the future armies, and the secret of future victories (Winston Churchill).¹

The secret of future victory in future warfare will, as Churchill cautioned, depend largely on how military leaders are educated in war. Reviewing the current status of the US Army's 'prolonged collective study' of war is an important contributor to an effective transformation to twenty-first century warfare - the dawn of an era that brings war closer to its Clausewitzian ideal, as a "continuation of politics by other means."² The challenge to military theorists, scholars, and decision makers - governors and their generals - has always been to rationalize the theory, the history, and the doctrinal practices of war, as policy, during any period or epoch of warfare, in order to effectively prosecute war policy and win in war, whenever and wherever war might come. As the purposes of war changes over time political leaders and their military lieutenants must relearn war. Success in the education of martial experts is a key ingredient to success in future war.

Theorist and scholars alike have recognized throughout history, occurrences of "profound, discontinuous changes in the conduct - sometimes even the nature - of warfare." Such "Revolutions in Military Affairs,"³ or RMAs, fundamentally alter the character and the conduct of military operations.⁴

³ The debate over how best to educate, train, and experience military professionals (generalists) for war is as old as war itself. The debate has taken different form and emphasis over time, reflective of changes in war and the ways of war. Practitioners and scholars alike, writing about revolutions in military affairs (RMAs) have identified at least three distinct epochs of 'modern' warfare - the dynastic age of warfare (c.1200 to c. mid-1800s), the industrial age of warfare (c. 1800s to 1920s), and the mechanized age of warfare (c. 1940s to 1990s). Evolutions from one epoch to the next reflected changes in all aspects of war. As Morris Janowitz, a renowned political-sociologist, has offered, each evolutionary period witnessed reforms in officer education and training. Janowitz identified three officer typologies essential - individually and in combination - in war: military technologists, heroic leaders, and military managers. See Morris Janowitz, "Civic Consciousness and Military Performance," in The Political Education of Soldiers, ed. Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Westbrook (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983, 76.
⁴
So state the theorists.\textsuperscript{5} Recent intellectual effort has focused on the potential emergence of a new, post-Cold War ("post-modern") RMA, heralded by, or at least most easily identified to date by, the rising importance of information-based systems and digitization – technological revolutions that, like the tank of its day, once operationalized into military and war policy doctrine, changed warfare itself. Experts on the subject see the potential for a new way of warfare – Full Spectrum Operations – deriving from this latest evolution in technological affairs. Indeed, the latest United States national security and military strategies,\textsuperscript{6} the most recently revised Joint Vision statements,\textsuperscript{7} and the most current service transformation initiatives\textsuperscript{8} all reference to and ground themselves in the idea that an information-age revolution in military affairs is at hand.

### Evaluating the Revolution in Educational Affairs

This monograph examines the current initiatives within the United States Army to transform the education, training, and experienced-based learning of officers it designates as “strategists.” The study\textsuperscript{9}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{4} The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net Assessment) defines ‘RMA’ as “a major change . . . brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.” See Andrew W. Marshall, director of net assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 23 August 1993.

\textsuperscript{5} Amid the plethora of literature written on the revolution in military affairs, or RMA, there is some consensus on a best definition – one offered by Andrew Krepinevich. He argues that: “(RMA) occurs when applications of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character of conflict. It does so by an order of magnitude or greater – in the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces.” Michael Howard provides a similar thinking on revolutions in military affairs; one that places an emphasis on the organizational and sociopolitical rather than technological factors of change: “The revolutionary changes associated with the French Revolution and Napoleon were mostly sociopolitical and organizational in nature” (Howard, in Addington 1984, 48). For other seminal works on the subject of RMA, see Knox and Murray (2001); O’Hanlon (2000); Rosen (1991); Rogers, et al. (1995).


\textsuperscript{7} See Joint Vision 2010 and 2020, located on the JCS Homepage.


\textsuperscript{9} What have the ‘experts’ – military and civilian – identified as the shortfalls in today’s professional military education (PME) system? How have they addressed those shortcomings so far? The current structural and procedural design of the Army professional military education (PME) system may be presenting unintended consequences in the effort to more effectively meet the national needs and security environment demands of post-modern warfare. The method of study incorporates review of the theoretical propositions undergirding the issue of educating for strategic mastery, comparative analysis through historical coverage of the evolution of warfare and the changing conceptions of the strategy, operations, tactics, and recognized core competencies that evolve with and define war at any particular time (chapter two). This monograph also presents an argument: that there are gaps in the current strategist education system; gaps that are empirically and anecdotally supported through assessments of US
evaluates the recent efforts taken toward the education of Army officers in strategic plans and policy, and
the operational science and art, of "strategic art." Integration of operational effects, that derive from
capabilities and capacities defining of a new informational-based age of warfare is the baseline of the
analysis.

The importance of educational transformation as a critical factor in the current US
evolution/revolution in military affairs has been recognized and taken to task by theorists, planners, and
decision makers. Questions of, studies of, and reviews of the factors and indices affecting the
transformation of military hardware and operational procedures are abundant; almost equally abundant
are the inquiries into the "brainware" aspects of transformation.\textsuperscript{10} As the war policy environment changes,
so too must the way in which martial experts conceive of, and think about war.\textsuperscript{11}

**As Warfare Changes, Education of the Militarist Must Change**

The growing lethality of warfare, brought about by technological advances and innovative
operational ways of employment has made the "effects" of a war policy instrument as important a factor
(perhaps more so) as the instrument (capability) or the threat wielding that capability.

The seeds of a genuine revolution in international politics already are germinating, promising changes on
the order of those seen following the French Revolution, in 1815 with the Concert of Europe, in 1870
after the unification of Germany, in 1919 with the end of World War I, and in 1945 with the end of World
War II and the creation of the United Nations. The common, vexing characteristics of all such
international politico-military transformation, including today's are uncertainty, vulnerability, ambiguity,
complexity, and change (Kenney 1996, 2).

As the world changes, the fundamental purposes of military organizations may change. Indeed,
US military experiences during the 1990s, with the partial exception of the Gulf War, have witnessed a
changed realization of warfare and war's nature. The professional military education (PME) debates of

\textsuperscript{10} Steven H. Kenney, "Professional Military Education and the Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs," \textit{Airpower Journal} (Fall 1996).

\textsuperscript{11} There are a multitude of works and treatments within the international relations and national security studies
literatures that speak to new emerging threats to national, regional and global security. For a useful, albeit
incomplete survey, see Donald M. Snow, \textit{The Shape of the Future: The Post-Cold War World} (Armonk: M.E.
Sharpe, 1995), and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., \textit{The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't
the late 1980s and 1990s took place amid this environment of "limited" wars of self-determination, ethnic cleansing, environmental degradation, forced population displacements, narco-terrorism, etc. In fact, the debates and the policy reforms that have commenced since the late 1980s found their genesis in the recognized shortcomings of the United States and its military services to effectively meet the security challenges of the times.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA’86) was the seminal legislative-led reform; largely the response to the lackluster performance of US armed forces during the Iran hostage rescue attempt (Desert One) and the Grenada invasion (Urgent Fury). On the heels of the GNA ‘86 came the Panel on Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee (1987) and its review of joint (multi-service) education at the command and general staff colleges of the four services. The lack of a multi-service, operational focus in the PME was found to be the clear and present shortfall to the effectiveness of US military forces in future wars.

Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

15 Today’s joint warfighting ‘scorecard’ still indicates a joint anemia afflicting the US military, with service-centric education still the dominate key to future career success, and therefore service centricity still dominating officer education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emphasis Level</th>
<th>Joint/Combined Now/Future</th>
<th>Service Now/Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 STAR</td>
<td>100% / 100%</td>
<td>0% / 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 STAR</td>
<td>10% / 60%</td>
<td>90% / 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 STAR</td>
<td>8% / 50%</td>
<td>92% / 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 STAR</td>
<td>5% / 40%</td>
<td>95% / 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4/O-6</td>
<td>2% / 20%</td>
<td>98% / 80%</td>
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<td>0-2/O-3</td>
<td>0% / 5%</td>
<td>100% / 85%</td>
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But the shortfall has been identified and actions are currently underway to rectify the problem. What is the current ‘scorecard’ regarding strategic planner education? Does it reveal an educational gap similar to the joint specialty officer shortfall? If so, what is missing in the current master strategist curriculum and education system?
Purpose of this Monograph

Where Congressman Ike Skelton, in a lead article for the May 1992 edition of Military Review, asked, “JPME . . . are we there yet?,” this monograph asks the question, “mastery in strategic art and planning . . . are we there yet?” More direct, this monograph ponders over whether or not the current (modern) JPME system, is joint enough, civilian-based enough, and operationally-focused enough to adequately meet the demands of information-age war policy and warfare. While anti-intellectualism still haunts the culture of the US military to a significant degree, the complexities of the post-modern international politico-military environment have awakened the US military to the broader context of warfighting, and has opened military minds to the notion that expending time, effort, money, and other resources to the education of officers in the widening domain of functions and fields of study that increasingly fall within the context of “war” is not only a worthwhile expenditure, but is a necessary area of competency that must be incorporated into the PME system if the US military hopes to dominate in future war.

The military services have achieved great success in their efforts toward joint effects-based operations, with those successes tested and largely proven through the experiments of real battle and campaign in the deserts of the Middle East (Operation Desert Storm), and in the jungles and urban terrain of Panama (Operation Just Cause). Yet, the US experience with war during the 1990s did not manifest the ‘decisive’ victories of the type that the Gulf and the Panamanian experiences did. There were successes...
during the 1990s, and failures; however, 'decision' on these post-modern 'battlefields' was political and strategic, coming about only as an indirect result of direct military actions on the battlefield. In Somalia (1993), the military served to destroy an enemy – its traditional mission and mandate – but in this instance, the enemy to initially be "destroyed" was less a physical threat than an ephemeral one: the idea of denying food to a starving people as a weapon of domination and coercion. Such alterations in the scope, scale, and perhaps even the nature of war, has raised the issue of the need for a new round of GNA-type defense reviews.

Relevancy of the Monograph – Why does it Matter?

Tracing America's experiences in "major war" since, and including, the Revolutionary War, the historical record leaves the nation with a foreboding reality: much of America's innovations in both its capacity to make war and its capacity to understand and accommodate the changing nature of war have come late in the day, after the "loss" of the 'first battle'. Armies generally fight along lines of how they were prepared. Therefore, it is important to examine how the US Army has developed its organizations, equipment, war planning, training, and rules for war – its battle doctrine. This monograph argues that transforming the educational system is the critical first-requirement among equals in affecting an effective revolution in military affairs.

19 The US military has had a difficult time coming to terms with these ideational and contextual changes in post-modern warfare. Senior military leaders of combat forces in both Somalia and the Balkan campaigns acknowledge the difficulties they faced in integrating military and non-military elements and organizations (capabilities) of power to intended effect. The military achieved "success" in these operations, but recent studies have concluded that those successes came at perhaps a higher cost than needed to be paid, and continue to mask lingering problems that will continue to plague military policy implementation if not soon rectified. The United States has not yet found the need for a new round of "Goldwater-Nichols"-type reviews and reforms, but the idea for a necessary new round has been circulating within defense and military policy circles for several years. The rising call for a new round of reviews centers, again, on the issue of force and power integration. Though today's integration questions still imply shortfalls in joint effects, concerns with the integration of martial and non-martial elements of national power, and the operationalization of this widening spectrum of national power into war policy dominates the current reform discussion. See, Dennis J. Quinn, The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press), 1999.
21 Ibid., xi.
From the Need for JSOs to the Call for ‘Uniformed Strategists’

In 1989, General (Ret.) John R. Galvin22 added a critical literary piece to a then growing body of literature that recognized and debated over an evident shortfall in the knowledge and understanding of strategic affairs within the armed services; a shortcoming somewhat similar to Congressman Skelton’s recognized gap in joint-specialized war experts. General (Ret.) Galvin wrote:

The strategist in uniform provides advice to political authority in the development of national policy (what is to be achieved) and national strategy (how to achieve it). He has a role in forming national strategy and policy by explaining capabilities, the limitations of armed force, and how military power can be used as an element of national power.23

The very title of General (Ret.) Galvin’s Parameters article, “What’s the matter with being a strategist?,“ spoke to the prevailing skepticism of anything “political” and therefore, “strategic” within the military culture of the 1970s and 1980s.24 General (Ret.) Galvin recognized the prevalence of a systemic gap between national strategic aims in war policy, the capacity of the military experts to effectively translate those often ambiguous ends into tangible military objectives, and the ability (and willingness) of senior military leaders to advise political authorities on the policy setting, planning, and execution of war policy.25 Earlier, in 1984, Thomas J. Crackel had alluded to where the gap between the capability to understand the national strategic aims of war and the capacity to translate strategy into tactics might reside:

American military education has at its heart two crucial processes – the making of lieutenants and the making of colonels. How we prepare young men [and women] to lead others into battle, and how we ensure that those who assume the highest commands are well-qualified, are issues that must be addressed with utmost seriousness, because failure here can have the gravest consequences.26

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The two processes – the making of lieutenants and the making of colonels – continue to define, albeit in broad terms, the current (modern) professional military education system of the US armed forces in general, and for sake of emphasis in this monograph, the US Army, more specifically.

Figure 1. The Modern PME Framework.

From an organizational perspective, the division of educational labor, authority, and responsibility within the US Army seems to affect the operationalization and integration of tactical, operational, and strategic education, and therefore, effects in war policy implementation. As the figure above depicts, there are considered to be three distinct levels of war, each overlapping the other and arrayed in a hierarchical manner. The primary responsibilities for education and training within the tactical band lies with the Army’s “basic” and “advanced courses.” This tactical band emphasizes platoon through division “battles and engagements.” At the higher end of the tactical band and overlapping with the operational level is the Command Arms Services Staff School. At this stage, Corps-level battles and “operations” are the primary educational and training focus. The seam between the operational and the lower-end strategic band falls within the educational and training responsibility of the Command and

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28 The same structural issues reside within the general PME design of the entire US armed forces. However, this monograph limits the majority of it analyses to the US Army.

General Staff College (CGSC). CGSC focuses on "subordinate campaign plans, and joint, services and combined operations." The US Army War College (AWC) is the primary institution for strategic level education (theater strategy and campaign plans).

One expert and faculty member at the AWC makes the point succinctly when he states that,

[T]he 'compartmentalization of skills' so typical of earlier training and education (civilian as well as military) is less and less adequate for the roles and responsibilities today's security practitioners and certainly senior military leaders must assume.

Experts seem to be coming to the same conclusions; that what is needed for success in the twenty-first century security environment are practitioners with the commensurate skills, knowledge, and capabilities that enable them to effectively practice the strategic art. Scholars and practitioners agree that to practice this "strategic art" successfully requires the integration of three related roles: strategic theorist, strategic leader, and strategic practitioner, or rather, the useful merging of leadership, management, and action.

The word strategy is one of the most ill defined and errantly used terms in the military lexicon. The term has had a different context during different time periods in military history; what was once termed "strategic" today refers to a whole other domain of warfare – the operational. Strategy is about both product and process.

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 22.
32 Ibid., 25.
34 Dorff (2001), 25.
35 That is, strategy is a policy, or specifically a plan or family of plans, what is referred to here as "S"trategy. But it is also a referent to an approach — a particular method, function, or "stratagem. This distinction is important in that now a distinction can be made between a National Strategy – singular, or rather, one particular policy – and agency-specific national strategies – plans or series of plans – that are part of a policy process that enables the parent Strategy. The United States National Security Strategy is an example of this multiple meaning, some might say schizophrenic notion of strategy. There is a resourcing aspect to strategy (again, small s) and an execution, or warfighting aspect to strategy (perhaps, big S). Within military circles, the resourcing functions relating to strategy fall within the domain of Title X functions – congressionally mandated roles and missions for each of the four military services of the United States relating to manning, arming, equipping, maintaining, sustaining, deploying, developing, and training of military forces. These "s"trategic functions are designed to serve the warfighting domain of "S"trategy – the execution of joint (multi-service), combined (i.e., multinational), and interagency/multi-agency strategic plans and policies. To simplify and clarify, big S refers to the "tooth" of strategy; small s refers to the "tail." The strategic planner education apparatus must educate, train, and experience the officer in all aspects of strategy: warfighting, war-providing, war-provisioning.
The experts are noticing that there is a need for strategic leaders who can coordinate ends, ways and means, strategic practitioners who can apply ends, ways, and means (and translate non- or extra-martial objectives into military objectives that are feasible, acceptable, and suitable), and strategic theorist that can formulate ways, ends, and means, all on behalf of fulfilling US national security interests. What is desired and demanded are "complete strategists,"

[...] officers, all up and down the line, because it takes a junior strategist to implement what the senior strategist wants done, and it (usually) takes the input of juniors to help a senior strategist arrive at his [or her] conclusions.

What is called for is a professional military education system designed to identify officers with a natural propensity for study and practice of the 'strategic art' early on in their careers (LTs and junior CPTs), and to provide those officers with a continual dose of martial and extra-martial knowledge, skill, and experience commensurate with twenty-first century strategic planning.

What the experts argue for is the production of the post-modern strategists (what this author terms the 'strategic planner'), yet, what persist is a 'modern' PME system that is possibly producing something less than what is called for (the Galvin et al. vision) and demanded by the new security environment.

Figure 3. The Educational Triad.

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36 Smith (2001), 2.

Morris Janowitz posited that military professionals had to be given "a candid and realistic education about political matters and follow career patterns that sensitize them to political and social consequences of military action." In his assessment, the US Army needed to foster the development of what he termed "warrior-scholars" at every chain-of-command level. This monograph joins these debates, and speaks to the educational impacts on the operational effectiveness of martial activities related to post-modern war policymaking.

**Summary. Winning the Next 'First Battle' Thru Improved Martial Education**

John Shy, in his retrospective on America’s “First Battles,” found that the peculiarity of this nation’s experiences in first battle lies mainly in “the lack of recent, relevant combat experience by forces engaged.” Testimony of senior military leaders regarding their first contact with post-modern warfare in the early 1990s spoke directly to a “lack of knowing” and understanding of the new ways and meanings of war. War as they once knew it, had changed; these leaders had to relearn war, or at least some aspects of it, “on the fly.” Shy also noted that political circumstances still appear to have two major effects on first battle experiences: politics limits the military possibilities to certain resources and locations, and pushes strategy in certain directions at certain times.” Understanding, appreciating and then learning to wield these “political limitations” as an effective war tool seems to be an important element of success in future war. This can be achieved through an officer education experience that emphasizes the civilian-political aspects of war policy.

As Shy notes, “when doctrine lacks clarity or credibility, soldiers at every level will fall back on other notions of warfare, whatever their source – prior experience, film images, even

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39 For Janowitz, the “warrior-scholar” is the collective of all three military typologies.
40 Janowitz, 428.
42 Shy, 327.
43 Ibid., 328.
44 Ibid., 327.
childish fantasies... [d]octrine, whether explicit or implicit, is never absent; defined simply, it is the general consensus among military leaders on how to wage war. The Army will “fight” based on the last rendering of doctrinal ways and means it has been educated to employ. That doctrinal baseline should reflect all aspects of post-modern warfare in an adequate fashion. The blending of the “domestic battlefield” with the foreign one – the broadening of the idea of national security to the point where it now encompasses any and all other policy contexts – compels the US Army to rethink its role and function in future war. Homeland security and defense redefines warfare, and the US Army’s role in it, in radical ways. Learning to be an effective “supporting component” in these new wars demands that the Army broaden its understandings of what war is, and its acceptance of what constitutes a capability of, or action in, post-modern war.

Lastly, Shy’s account teaches that throughout America’s historical experiences with war, the “chief human responses to changing military technology has been organizational and pedagogical: increasing specialization in the new technologies, more and more schooling to teach specialists the new tasks.” The key task of military leadership has become the management of a complex organization of technical specialists, and the standard professional path to leadership has come to mean spending much of a military career in school, as teacher or student. This monograph explores this last premise and evaluates the historical trends, contemporary realities, and futuristic theoretical musings that are indicating, more and more, that a more holistic approach to war study (specialization) is in order.

45 Ibid., 332.
46 Shy, 348.
CHAPTER TWO

THE DIALECTIC BETWEEN STRATEGY AND TACTICS

A Review of the Theory, the History, and the Literature

Edward Luttwak, arguably one of the preeminent experts of modern military strategic thought, found in his long years of study a paradox in the logic of strategy. As in 'normal' politics and policy, there is a horizontal and a vertical dimension to strategy making. In the horizontal dimension one finds war and strategy's true nature - policy and plans, the result of contention between adversaries "who seek to oppose, deflect, and reverse each other's moves" in war. Along the vertical, one sees the multi-dimensional nature of strategic policymaking - the vital interplay between the different levels of conflict - the tactical, technical, operational. Like in policy making, there is no natural harmony betwixt and between these aspects of strategy. The paradoxes that define the overall process of strategy are only rationalized as policy is rationalized - through the operationalization of strategic aims and vision into tangible and executable plans and policies. The operational domain facilitates the effective dialogue between strategy and tactics; it permits the dialectic to take place in a functional and effective way.

Of 'Prophets' and 'Leaders' of Military Strategy and War

In his study of strategy, operations, and tactics, B.H. Liddell Hart noted the following:

"History bears witness to the vital part that the 'prophets' have played in human progress - which is evidence of the ultimate practical value of expressing unreservedly the truth as one sees it. Yet it also becomes clear that the acceptance and spreading of their vision has always depended on another class of..."

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47 Shy, 349.
48 Ironically, the same non-linearity that one finds in the world of policy and policy making exist in the realm of strategy, strategic planning, and strategy making.
50 This is done within normal policy circles through the apparatuses of bureaucracy. In the world of strategy, the contrariness of strategic ends and resources available are rationalized through the use of operational art and science. It is the procedure - the functions and formulas - at the operational level of war policy that allows for a logical fitting together of strategy and tactics.
51 This monograph puts forward an argument. It contends that this natural paradox that always persist between grand and national strategic vision and the means and resources available to any national state or other sovereign entity can only be effectively brought into coherence through the processes of planning at the operational level of war policy. Moreover, this lashing together of the ends, ways, and means of war policy must be accomplished by individuals and small bodies of individuals educated, trained, and experienced in all three domains - both dimensions - of war policy.
men – 'leaders' who had to be philosophical strategists, striking a compromise between truth and men's reactivity to it.\textsuperscript{32}

What Liddell Hart reveals is the core elements to war itself – war as theory, war as history, and war as it is practiced at any given time and under any given conditions. He acknowledges the need for both prophets and leaders in war policy making – those able to understand war in the broad and the abstract; those capable of putting war's plans into action. The education of future uniformed 'prophet-leaders' – strategic planners – specialized in the full domain of war policy is of growing vital necessity in today's and tomorrow's strategic environment.\textsuperscript{33} Understanding the changing characteristics and lexicon of war is a useful starting point in this exploration toward a common understanding of both domains in relation to one another.

\textsuperscript{33} This chapter intends to build support for this latter proposition by first discussing the history of strategy, as theory and practice, from the late-eighteenth century until today. This short historiography of strategy, operations, and tactics will provide a review of the literature surrounding the issue of military strategy and operational art and science. It will also introduce some of the more prominent writings and musings on the subject of how to educate strategists, operational planners, and military tacticians. What is strategy? What is meant by 'operational art'? How do the two differ, relate, and inform each other? Answers to these questions are important in and of themselves, yet they take on a particular importance in the context of this study. What these domains of war policy are, separate from and in relation to one another and the tactical realm – execution) informs the alternative approaches to the education, training, and experiencing of specialist, expert in strategy, operational planning, and policy formulation and implementation. Whether or not (and how) the knowledge, skills, attributes of strategist differs from the core competencies of operational artists is the question that must form the baseline of any redesign of the strategist education system.
Figure 4. A shift in the lexicon of strategy and operations.

18th Century Lexicon
- Maurice
- Frederick the Great
- Gustavus Adolphus

19th Century Lexicon
- Napoleon
- U.S. Grant
- Clausewitz
- Bismarck
- Jomini

20th Century Lexicon
- B.H. Liddell Hart
- F.D.R.
- Hitler
- G.C. Marshall
- Churchill
- Stalin
- Eisenhower
- Svechin

Shift from the "art or skill of the [ruler-] general" to the "preparation of war [policy] on the map."

A separation of war policy between the leader (strategist) and the general (the grand tactician or operational artist)

Distributed operations and continuous logistics

Moltke the Elder

Strategy, as the "planning for, coordination of, and concerted use of the multiple means and resources available to an alliance, a nation, a political group, or a commander, for the purpose of gaining an advantage over a rival."

The rise and relevance of separate service-based "strategies" ( capabilities-based)
The layout of figure 4 is intentional and purposeful, albeit not fully explanatory of the evolutionary development of the strategy-operations-tactics lexicon. It’s intent is to emphasize four critical points:

- The evolution from eighteenth to twentieth century witnesses a shift from the agenda-setting, policy formulation, and execution of war policy being vested in one or a small body of ruler-generals (soldier-kings) to a growing separation of war and warfighting into separate entities – the setting of war policy into the hands of the ruler and the power of execution of war plans (tactics and techniques) into the hands of the general. By the turn of the twentieth century, the compartmentalization and separation of the domains of war expands even further, with theorizing over issues of strategy falling to the purview of academics, vice the policymaking falling to civilian leaders and the execution of war policy remaining with the uniformed experts.

- The emergence of a formally recognized ‘operational’ domain of war, first defined simply in terms of logistical lines of communication (supply), but eventually expanding to include the command and control of forces within particular geographic theaters of war/operation, and the array of forces in time, space, and purpose for realization of the higher war (grand strategic) aims.

- The shift from tactical (execution based) driven stratagems to capabilities-driven strategizing (planning). The rise of force development and modernization (research, and development; programming and budgeting; acquisition and procurement) of weapons systems and related technologies, normally specific to a particular military arm or service.

- The expansion of the lexicon, by the twentieth century, to include and distinguish between grand strategy (multi-national; extra-national and extra-governmental) and national strategy; from national strategy to the military strategy; toward theater-specific campaign strategies and the development and husbanding of service-specific, force-based stratagems advocating particular operational methodologies and tactical techniques and procedures.

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54 This point is an important one not only to the arguments put forward in this study, but more importantly, to the relationship between strategy and policy, how that relationship has changed over time (due to many factors, not the least of which was the effect of technological advancements on the growing scope and scale of military operations), and how the shift in the relationship can affect war policy itself. B.H. Liddell Hart makes the point more clearly: “to break down the distinction between strategy and policy would not matter much if the two functions were normally combined in the same person, as with a Frederick or a Napoleon. But as such autocratic soldier-rulers have been rare in modern times and became temporarily extinct in the nineteenth century, the effect was insidiously harmful. For it encouraged soldiers to make the preposterous claim that policy should be subservient to their conduct of operations, and, especially in democratic countries, it drew the statesman on to overstep the definite border of his sphere and interfere with his military employees in the actual uses of their tools. See B.H. Liddell Hart (1954, 319-320). This latter, Hartian notion underpins this monograph and will be addressed more directly later in the study. An effective and legitimate war policy, balanced between its policy and its strategy, is predicated on a balanced approach to how one educates, trains, and experiences its experts in the strategic, operational, and tactical science and art of war policy. Stovepiped and illogical education in these three domains can lead to an illogical (military policy determining war policy?) understanding of and approach to the making of war policy.
The evolution of the lexicon, particularly in western political-military society, and the
commensurate complication of the issue of strategy, operations, and tactics derived logically from
the growing complexity of war policy itself. What could once be studied, written about,
understood, taught, planned, put into practice . . . and more often than not won through a single
decisive battle or engagement by single individuals (soldier-rulers)\textsuperscript{55} evolved into a complex
policy issue that expanded well beyond the power and capacity of a single person – or nation –
and equally, could not be determined through single battle. By the mid-twentieth century, it had
become all too clear that war policy could rarely be determined even through a series of battles
and engagements (operations and campaigns).

Understanding this progression is important. The growing complexity of war policy
altered the civil-military relationship defining war making.\textsuperscript{56} The challenge of the twenty-first
century is to develop an educational system that can produce in one expert or small body of
experts, all those skills and attributes endemic to the planning and execution of war policy, while
maintaining the delicate civil-military balance vital to American republican, representative
democracy.

\textbf{Defining the three policy domains.}

For better or for worst (and beyond the subject of argument here), the philosophy and
works of Carl von Clausewitz provides the baseline of western military thought and United States
military practice. His treatise on war was, by his own definition, a continuation of politics and

\textsuperscript{55} Again, Liddell Hart (1954, 319).
\textsuperscript{56} Theorizing about war’s purposes (grand strategic and national strategic thinking and practice)
increasingly fell to civilian leaders, academic/policy experts, and sometimes military theorist (senior
military leadership). The practice of war remained the domain of the military officer corps. Operational
planning – the development of plans (operations and campaigns) that translate or “operationalize” strategic
level aims into tangible, resourcable, and executable military objectives – was, at best, left to the martial
experts; at worst, it was largely ignored, under-developed, and misunderstood. The growing complexity of
war demanded a professional and bureaucratic specialization in war policymaking, planning, and
implementation. Unfortunately, while specialization has been gained, it has come at the expense of
coherence and integration.
policy by other (military) means. For this reason, this author chooses to discuss and define what is more commonly considered in military circles as the three levels of war, in terms of three policy domains. With that explained, the relevant criteria that justify a distinction between these domains – over time – is absolutely necessary as a precondition to the propositions argued in this monograph.

The Tactical Domain

In the war vernacular, implementation or execution of policy falls within the context of tactics. According to Thomas E. Griess, tactics is “the planning, training, and control of the ordered arrangements (formations) used by military organizations when engagement between opposing forces is imminent or underway.” Taken from the Greek taktos, meaning ‘ordered or arranged’, tactics is the art of fighting battles. The nineteenth century saw the need to distinguish between two levels of tactics. The first level, grand tactics, spoke to the tactics of large organizations; the second – that of minor tactics—related to small organizations and/or organizations consisting entirely of one military arm (i.e., infantry, cavalry, or artillery). Being the most practical and identifiable domains of policy, implementation, or tactics, is left at this level of definition. Three important points must be made with regard to the implementation level of policy and war before moving on to the more complex (and for this study, the more relevant) domains:

• While war (policy) is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will (Clausewitz, On War, p. 75), it is vital that we remember that “essentially war [policy] is fighting, for fighting is the only principle in the manifold of activities generally designated as war.”
• That is to say, the de facto policy is the implemented policy.
• And to risk overstressing the point, execution is a key determinant in the prosecution of “good” policy.

This monograph also indirectly argues against this nineteenth century understanding of the “manifold of activities generally designated as war.”


Griess, 1985, pg. 5.

Ibid., 5.

This monograph also indirectly argues against this nineteenth century understanding of the “manifold of activities generally designated as war.”

Suffice it to say at this point, that a vital ingredient to all successful strategist and planners of the past (and arguably for the future) was an experience and training-based education in policy execution, or tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The Strategic Domain

While the term, 'strategy' derives from the Greek word, *strategos* (meaning “the art and skill of the general), modern definition of strategy transcends the military realm. Even within the military policy sub-field, military leaders generally work closely with civilian officials in the field of strategy. Contemporary understandings of ‘strategy’ and that which is ‘strategic’ prevail in this monograph for three main reasons. First, from a comparative study of eighteenth and nineteenth century conceptions of strategy, what was then regarded as strategy, today more describes the higher operational level of warfare. These nineteenth century definitions of strategy will be used to describe the contemporary operational domain of policy and war. Second, modern conceptions of strategy are the most relevant, in a practical sense, to this study’s purposes. It is the production of the strategic planner of today and tomorrow that is of concern here. Correspondingly, it is the contemporary political-military conception of strategy that is of importance. Third, modern understandings of strategy are most relevant due not only to the transcendence of the term beyond the purview of the military professional, but also because of the practical expansion of the military domain itself beyond that which has until recently been more comfortably defined as “purely military.” The notion of war and foreign policy as being a policy domain exercised “beyond the water’s edge” is outdated. It is no longer quite as useful (except perhaps in an academic sense) to distinguish between that which is domestic and that which is foreign; what is politics and what is war. This modern conception is the one that tomorrow’s strategic planners will be forced to face and contend with.

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Thomas E. Griess provides a useful and usable definition of strategy. Griess defines strategy as “the planning for, coordination of, and concerted use of the multiple means and resources available to an alliance, a nation, a political group, or a commander, for the purpose of gaining an advantage over a rival.” While some have defined strategy as “position” (Porter 1980:1985), others see strategy as “perspective” – an organization’s (in all senses of the term) way of doing things; its “concept of the business.” Strategy has become a multi-dimensional word, with multiple, often confusing and even contradictory meanings. The word is used variously for strategy as a fixed doctrine or merely a plan (what today, we would call ‘operations’) to describe actual practice or a body of theories. This author labeled this type of strategy small s strategy. Yet strategy is also descriptive of a particular way of war, encapsulating of a nation states’, corporate firm’s, organization’s, or non-governmental entity’s norms, principles, and purposes underpinning their actions, policies and processes – big s strategy.

The following chart summarizes some of the more prominent works in the fields of classical and modern thought on the subject of strategy.

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64 Griess, p. 5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1. Classical and Modern Conceptions of ‘Strategy.’</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLAUSEWITZ</strong>&lt;sup&gt;67&lt;/sup&gt; The use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. He will craft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it; he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements, ... the strategist, in short, must maintain control throughout. (p. 177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOMINI</strong>&lt;sup&gt;68&lt;/sup&gt; The art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. ... strategy decides where to act ... grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops. (pp. 69-71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUN TZU</strong>&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt; [offensive strategy] 1. in war the best policy is to take the state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this; 2. to capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it; 3. to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill; 4. what is supreme in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy (attack plans at their inception); 5. next best is to disrupt his alliances; 6. the next best is to attack his army; 7. the worst policy is to attack cities (attack cities only when there is no alternative); 9. if the general is unable to control his impatience and orders his troops to swarm up the wall like ants, one-third of them will be killed without taking the city. Such is the calamity of these attacks; 10. thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations (they conquer by strategy). (pp. 77-79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CORBETT</strong>&lt;sup&gt;70&lt;/sup&gt; By [maritime] strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces; for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIDDELL HART</strong>&lt;sup&gt;71&lt;/sup&gt; The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LUTTWAK</strong>&lt;sup&gt;72&lt;/sup&gt; [Clausewitz] the use of engagements for the object of the war (p. 128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCHNEIDER</strong> [Napoleon] the art of making use of time and space. Four Strategic Principles of the Campaign (Every campaign should have one clearly defined objective; the main enemy force should be that objective; the army must maneuver in such a way as to place itself on the flank and rear of the enemy; strike at the lines of communications of the enemy, while keeping own heavily protected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LUTTWAK</strong>&lt;sup&gt;73&lt;/sup&gt; [King: Lexicon of Military Terms] a science, an art, or a plan (subject to revision) governing the raising, arming, and utilization of the military forces of a nation (or coalition) to the end that its interests will be effectively promoted or secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed (1960, 135) [Webster’s Third New Int’ Dictionary] the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace and war [U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage] the art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat (1964, 135) [Marshall V.D. Skolovsky] a system of scientific knowledge dealing with the laws of war as an armed conflict in the name of definite class interests. On the basis of military experience, military and political conditions, economic and moral potential of the country, new means of combat, and the views and potential of the probable enemy – studies the conditions and the nature of future war, the methods for its preparation and conduct, the services of the armed forces and the foundations for their strategic utilization, as well as foundations for the material and technical support and leadership of the war and the armed forces. ... this is the area of the practical activity of the higher headquarters, that</td>
</tr>
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pertains to the art of preparing a country and the armed forces for war and conducting the war (Soviet Military Strategy 1975, 11)

[General Andre Beaufre] the art of the dialectics of wills that use force to resolve their conflict (1963, 16)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GADDIS&quot;74</td>
<td>The process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources (Strategies of Containment 1982, viii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAY&quot;75</td>
<td>The bridge that relates military power to political purpose; it is neither military power per se nor political purpose. By strategy, I mean the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy (Modern Strategy 1999, 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MURAY, KNOX, BERSTEIN&quot;76</td>
<td>The rational and reciprocal adjustment of ends and means by rulers and states in conflict with their adversaries (The Making of Strategy 1994, 614)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVECHIN77</td>
<td>The art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal set by the war for the armed forces; decides issues associated with the employment of the armed forces and all the resources of a country for achieving ultimate war aims (Strategy 1927, 69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHNEIDER&quot;78</td>
<td>&quot;Meta-Strategy&quot; or &quot;operational art (&quot;after-strategy&quot;) (Theoretical Paper #3, 1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 3.0</td>
<td>The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives (glossary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3.0</td>
<td>The art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives (para 2-4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDD 1</td>
<td>Defines how a job will be done to accomplish national political objectives. Strategy originates in policy and addresses broad objectives and the plans for achieving them (p. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDP 1-2</td>
<td>The process of interrelating ends and means. When applied to a specific set of ends and means, the product – the strategy – is a specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends. Strategy is thus, both process and product (p. 37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73 Here, Edward Luttwak provides a summary of several seminal definitions of strategy and the strategic realm, to include the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) definition. See Luttwak 2001.
75 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York, NY, 1999), 17.
78 Dr. James Schneider, Theoretical Paper #3 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1988).
The preceding summary of classical and modern thoughts on strategy reveals:

- The ever-present connection between policy aims and execution of (realization of) those aims at the level of tactical battles and engagements.

- A progression of the concept of strategy to a point where the art and the science both reach a complexity where command and control over both are rarely found in the genius of one individual ruler-general. As the distinction between the art and the science of strategy becomes more evident and clear, the need for specialization in strategy, versus operations, versus tactical implementation becomes more evident.

- An ever-present and growing relevance of geography in the conception and realization of strategy. As military operations expand geographically, the complexity of the conception of strategic aims, the formulation of strategic and operational plans, and the design and implementation of (military) objectives, operations, and missions takes a more formal shape; the importance of geography changes the command and control of war policy geometrically.

The emergence of a formal, operational level, domain of war policy is of particular importance, for it is the level of operational planning and processing where a nation or entity translates its often intangible and unquantifiable strategic aims, interests, and goals into actions; where resources are rationalized with strategic ends and purposes.
The Operational Domain

The following table summarizes what some of the seminal works in the fields of strategy and military operations have to say about operational art, science, and planning:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONAL ART / OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FM 3.0</strong> (June 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FM 3-90 TACTICS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JP 3.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MCDP 1-2 (USMC)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AFDD 1.0 (USAF)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NDP 1 (USN)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Luttwak (Strategy, 1987)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jacob W. Kipp (Svechin’s Strategy, 1992)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Schneider (Vulcan’s Amvil)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>British Definition(s) (DG&amp;D)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While this typology of operational art and the operational level of war begins with modern (twenty-first century) U.S. and NATO alliance definitions and understandings of the operational domain, as a reminder, the formal distinction of the operational domain begins to take shape in
the nineteenth century (perhaps with the rise and fall of the Napoleonic way of war) and develops from that period onward.

The above summary reveals the following about the operational domain of war policy. First, the operational domain is about planning and process, albeit to serve the purpose of the commander and/or the ruler (leader or leadership) in the making and execution of strategic decisions. It is focused on the operationalization of strategic endstates into realistic actions and obtainable (sustainable) objectives. Second, the operational level of war is about the relating of aims, capabilities, and resources available in particular time, space, and purpose configurations. War takes on a particular geometric, geographical, and temporal form at the operational (policy formulation and legitimization) realm. Third, the operational domain synchronizes and/or sequences individual or intermediate actions and objectives, systematically, into coherent operations, campaigns, theater strategies, and grand war plans. National, regional, coalitional, non-governmental assets are interrelated and synchronized through operational art and science. Fourth, the specific operational art and science of war policy has evolved (that is, moved forward and changed, albeit not always and necessarily in a ‘progressive’ manner which is typically thought of when the word “evolution” or “progression” is used) over time, with different periods of modern warfare typifying a particular formula of operational art and science. That is to say, the ways and means of working war aims into achievable military objectives have changed over time, largely the result of improvements in technological means available and the consequential development of organizational and operational processes, procedures, doctrines for commanding

79 Luttwak 1987, 88.
80 Current U.S. and western military doctrine conceives of the operational domain in very specific geographical ways. See Joint doctrine (JP 3.0 and JP 5.0); U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3.0, Operations; etc.
81 Dr. James Schneider provides a most useful definition of the operational art of nineteenth century, western (European), conventional force-based warfare. See Schneider 1988, 2.
and controlling these advances in technics in ways that are contributory to the realization of strategic aims through tactical actions.  

The Dialectic Between Strategic Purpose and Tactical Action

Two of the more modern and widely accepted definitions of strategy that capture the dialectic between strategy making and the realization of strategic aims through tactical action found in Harry Summers', *On Strategy*, and John Lewis Gaddis' *Strategies of Containment*. Summers tells us that strategy, in its simplest definition, is a balance of national ends, ways, and means. The most prominent and popular academic accounts tend to agree. For Gaddis, strategy is "the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources." Of all the modern conceptions and definitions of strategy, this Gaddis perspective most adequately captures the ironic, simple complexity of strategy that Carl Von

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82 Alexandr Svechin’s detailed description of the operational art still seems most relevant to and descriptive of the capabilities and limitations of modern, western conventional force military operations. His understandings of the nuances between a nation’s historical, geographical, cultural, economic, political, social, and military attributes and that nation’s strategic goals and availability of resources—and how these factors are or must be combined through a sequencing of intermediate operational goals and objectives—is still informative of logical, purpose-based operational artistry. See Svechin 1992, 69.

83 Colonel (Ret.) Harry G. Summers was an enlisted man and non-commissioned officer from June 1947-September 1957. He was a squad leader, Co. L, 21st Infantry Regiment, in Korea 1950-1. He returned to the U.S. Then from September 1963-February 1964 he was assistant J3 Operations at the NCO Academy, 7th Infantry Division, Korea. From February 1964 to October 1964 he was CO, 7th Administration company, 7th Division, Korea. He served in Vietnam February 1966-June 1966, as Assistant J3 Operations, 2nd Field Force. In June-December 1966 he was S3 1st Battalion 2nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, Vietnam. From January 1967-June 1967 he was Assistant J3 Operations 2nd Field Force, Vietnam. From July 1974-May 1975 he served as Chief of Negotiations, U.S. Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team, Vietnam. He retired as full colonel and by the time of his death was regarded widely as an expert in U.S. defense policy and strategy.


85 Lloyd (1997); Flournoy (2001); NDU (1999).

86 John Lewis Gaddis is Robert A. Lovett Professor of History at Yale University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution. Educated at the University of Texas in Austin, Professor Gaddis has also taught at Ohio University, the United States Naval War College, the University of Helsinki, Princeton University, and Oxford University. Professor Gaddis’s books include: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (1972, second edition 2000); Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History (1978, second edition 1990); Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (1982); The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (1987); The United States and the End of the Cold War: Reconsiderations, Implications, Provocations (1992); and We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (1997).

Clausewitz spoke to in the eighteenth century. In fact, this author proposes that Gaddis was quite successful in capturing much more than the simple complexities of strategy; he was successful in describing the dynamism that exist between strategy aims and the particulars of war policy implementation, through the mechanisms of the operational domain of warfare. Figure 4 attempts to graphically illustrate this point.

FIGURE 5. The Gaddis Paradigm.

The Gaddis conception of strategy is holistic of all three domains — and both dimensions — of war (policy). Strategy is both a product of ends, ways, and means, as well as the process through which ends are logically related to ways, and then translated into executable and resourcable plans. Strategy, to restate, is both product and process; ideas “operationalized” into effective and

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*Clausewitz: “everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy.” Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1976), 178.*
efficient plans. The dialectic between the strategic and the operational – between the strategists and the operational planner – is vital to the logical dynamism of this simple, but complex policy process. Ensuring that there is a functional and communicative linkage between the strategic idea, the formulated and legitimized plan, and the implemented plan (between the strategist, the operational planner, and the ‘tactician’) – through education, training, and experienced-based learning – is of particular importance in this monograph.

Educating Military Strategist and Military Planners

How one educates, trains, and experiences strategists, planners, and tacticians seems to reflect the conception and operationalization of strategy and plans of a given historical epoch.

Table 3. An [R]Evolution in Military-Educational Affairs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DYNASTIC AGE</th>
<th>THEORY OF WAR</th>
<th>PRACTICE OF WAR</th>
<th>EDUCATION FOR WAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRIAL AGE</td>
<td>War as ART</td>
<td>POLICY – determined by civilian rulers</td>
<td>SOLDIER-KINGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War as ART and SCIENCE, albeit science seems to dominate art</td>
<td>PRACTICE – conducted by military generals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHANIZED AGE</td>
<td>War as SCIENCE and ART, however, science is gradually controlled and subordinated to art</td>
<td>POLICY – by civilian leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy – determined by civilian leadership</td>
<td>PLANNING – conducted by specialized military staffs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning AND EXECUTION – conducted by military and civilian experts</td>
<td>PRACTICE – executed by military experts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORMATIONAL AGE</td>
<td>The ‘scientific artistry’ of war. The distinction between ART and SCIENCE less relevant; less distinguishable</td>
<td>POLICY – determined by civilian leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLANNING AND EXECUTION – conducted by military and civilian experts</td>
<td>POLICY, PLANNING, &amp; PRACTICE, understood by a small body of uniformed specialist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The need for experts educated, trained, and experienced in all domains and realms of war</td>
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</table>

The dynastic period of warfare saw the education of the soldier-king in strategy and the martial arts and sciences, by the rise of the industrial age of warfare, the complexities of warfare has already forced a division expertise between the ruler and the military expert. The complexities of war policy begin to demand a bureaucratization and professionalization of warfare – the specialization of some in the strategic arts and sciences, while others are versed in the martial
aspects of policy implementation, or warfighting). This growth in the complexity of war (as politics and policy) has continued through the mechanized age of war and now into the beginning decades of the informational age of war. The rise in complexity has contributed to a practical need to separate the strategic from the operational from the tactical. Unfortunately, this practical need to specifically specialize expertise and experts in one of these three domains (strategists, operational planners, or tacticians) has carried over to a false understanding and conception of the three domains of war as separable domains of war policy. Nations and their national militaries have structured themselves organizationally along these false divisions; nations and their militaries have designed their professional military education systems along these arbitrary jurisdictions. One of the primary arguments posited in this monograph is that such an arbitrary and divided approach to the education of military strategist, planners, and tactical experts can be harmful to national security strategy making. Civilian decision makers and strategists are typically educated and experienced in the extra-military aspects of war policy while the military experts, advisors, and decision makers are all too often limited in their education and experience to the martial realm of war policy.

Ebb and Flow in the ‘Education’ of Military Strategist, Planners, and Tacticians

Marshall Maurice de Saxe’s My Reveries Upon the Art of War, provides an early historical commentary on the education of martial experts in strategy and operations. It is Maurice de Saxe, in his discussions during the late eighteenth century on western warfare, where the importance of an “education” in both the methodical and the intellectual aspects of war is first formally noted. Marshall de Saxe notes that “one of the branches of the art of war, that is to say drill and the method of fighting, is methodical; the other is intellectual. For the conduct of the

latter [the intellectual] it is essential that ordinary men should not be chosen." It is the rigorous 
education in the martial arts that enables Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, to vanquish his 
enemies and preserve his vulnerable state against all probable odds; to win in his war policy 
against ruler-generals much older and more practically experienced in the practice of war. Jay 
Luvaass attributes Frederick’s success as a combination of an academic and practical education in 
the art and the science of eighteenth century warfare – a period of warfare where war policy 
seemed to encapsulate much more than simply the martial ways and procedures of war, and 
included an education in culture, literature, world history, languages, music . . . a liberal arts 
education.  

This latter point seems emblematic of the education of war during the dynastic age of 
warfare. Clausewitz’s corollary to his definition of war that states that, “war is a continuation of 
politics by other means” harkens back to this period of western warfare – where an education in 
the liberal arts and sciences was in fact a study in the art and science of war. Warfighting had not 
yet reached a complexity of its own; it had not yet demanded a particular science of its own that 
could more easily (albeit erroneously) be distinguished from other policy domains.  

By the zenith of Napoleonic warfare (1806-1809) war begins to take on its own 
distinctive operational forms, yet these forms are clearly linked to the functional processes of the 
nationalized state. The strategic, and now operational, and tactical aspects of war policy still 
remained vested in one man – the Emperor Napoleon. War, as a result, was still regulated 
predominately by the man and his ‘genius’ – a genius developed through a lifetime of self-study 
in the broad aspects of war. Yet, one already sees the scholarly and experienced based education 
of would-be marshals and general aides de camp under Napoleon’s tutelage. The basis of 

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90 Ibid., 294.  
91 Jay Luvaass, Frederick the Great: The Education of a Great Captain, in The John Biggs Cincinnati 
92 David D. Chandler gives an elaborate description of both the apprenticeship of a young Napoleon 
Bonaparte (Chandler 1966, 3-36) and of the ruler-general’s own use of apprenticeship and experience-
based teaching for the education of his marshalle. (Chandler 1966, 133-191).
eighteenth and nineteenth century education in warfare confirmed the importance of self-study, a liberal arts study, and a study regimen grounded in practical experience in war fighting.

Shifting to the American Civil War experience, education in warfare begins to distinguish itself from the education of war policy. The education of warriors and future generals begins to take a more particular, methodical track from the education pedagogy of the future political, war leader. The United States Military Academy curriculum of the nineteenth century (indeed since the Academy’s inception in 1802) takes on a particularly scientific and methodical (technocratic) approach to the study and practice of war policy. The education of the American Civil War military leaders (Grant, Lee, Sherman, and others) is the education of specialist in the material and martial aspects of war policy – somewhat more distinguished and disjointed already by this time from the political, social, and strategic aims underpinning the war’s purpose. Somewhat ironically, the influences on the West Point curriculum and approach to the education and training for war came from those Jominian heritages so emblematic of a time and age when the methodology and technocratization of warfare was only one part of a greater symbiotic whole of war policy in late-eighteenth century and early-nineteenth century European warfare.

The “cold rationalism” of the Jominian art of war transcended not only across the pond to America, but also across the European continent to Prussia during the early to mid-1800s. An aloofness from matters of the political as a vital and positive trait in the military expert seemed to take root as an important tenet of military professionalism in these early Prusso-German examples. This apolitical ethos amongst the Prussian officer corps somewhat permeated the

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93 It must be noted that this “hard science” approach to the education of junior officers, though still present, has undergone significant renewal. Today’s curriculum at the U.S. Military Academy, as well as the other national service academies, has adjusted to meet the demands and complexities of post-modern war; complexities that call a greater emphasis on the humanities. See, James M. Smith, et al., Robert Crowley and Thomas Guinzburg, eds., West Point: Two Centuries of Honor and Tradition (New York, NY, 2002).
95 Molke was noted for his general aloofness from politics, becoming best known perhaps in his reputation as a trustworthy, yet ambiguous confidant and advisor to King William I. This trait is indeed evident from
manner in which officers were to be formally educated, trained in those things martial and related to warfare, and experienced in war policy. The study of mathematics, literature, science, history and culture – all begin to take on the "military" prefix in the professional officer education systems of modern, western national militaries.\(^97\)

The 'Modern' Education System

The modern, United States military education system is emblematic and symptomatic of the American and western societal approach to war and war policy. The civil aspects of war policy are considered, even structured, separate from the martial aspects of war. The professional military education system reflects this separation in its design to a significant degree.

Figure 6. The 'Modern' PME.

Officer PME Career Progression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Code/Abbrev.</th>
<th>Professional/Intermediate</th>
<th>General/Flag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PME Programs and Schools</td>
<td>- Service</td>
<td>- MC CSSC</td>
<td>- MC Art of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- OCS</td>
<td>- MC School of Art/Military</td>
<td>- Air War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Army C&amp;G &amp; Staff</td>
<td>- CSB &amp; Combat Support</td>
<td>- Army War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- College of Naval Ops</td>
<td>- Equivalent Int/Leaf Pgm</td>
<td>- College of Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Nonresident Adv MIC</td>
<td>- Nonresident Command and Staff MIC</td>
<td>- JFOI/OIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- RDC Link</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Equivalent Int/Leaf Pgm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Staff College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Captain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Senior military leaders (the generals) are formally educated in the martial arts and sciences, in a bottom-up, and slow progressive manner. Education and training begins in the tactical and technical sciences of war. The art of command and leadership in war is fostered this point forward in the German military experience, and permeates the American civil-military experience as well. See Holborn, 286.

\(^97\) See Arden Bucholz's, Molke, Schlieffen: Prussian War Planning (Oxford, UK, 1993) for more on the rise of the German General Staff System, its style and approach to officer education and development, and
through further advanced military schooling through the company grades. Early field grade education comes in the form of more military schooling, and focuses on staff planning. It is typically that only near the end of the standard military career (between the fifteenth and twentieth year of service) that some officers are provided the opportunity to study those aspects of war that lie outside the martial realm and experience. It is rarer that these officers are afforded the opportunity to study the other-than-martial sides of war policy in institutions *outside the martial realm* (Advanced civilian education and internships/fellowships).

Exacerbating the education gap even further is the division within the military profession between senior ranks, field grade ranks, and company grade ranks, and how the education and experienced based learning process has been stovepiped along these rank based lines, to the detriment of the development of multidimensional uniformed experts in war policy. Company grade officers are typically relegated to tactics and techniques of warfighting. Field grade officers are nominally educated and experienced in operational level (and to a lesser degree, theater-strategic) planning. The study and practice of strategy (national and grand) falls to the purview of the senior leadership (colonels and generals).

This hierarchy of educational and experience opportunities is tied to the seniority-based promotion and assignments processes. Officers are typically not endorsed or resourced for the attainment of operational or strategic level education until a certain point in their careers. Even then, few are selected for such opportunities, and of these, few are able to remain competitive in the normal, progressive command track upon their return from these extra-ordinary education and experienced based learning opportunities.98

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98 In short, the modern military officer education system truncates the study and experiencing of war for its leaders largely to the tactical and operational domains. Those officers fortunate enough to study and fulfill assignments outside the normal system tend to do so at their own risk – foregoing operational and tactical level assignments deemed by the organization as “career enhancing” in order to study and experience the other-than-military factors of war policy. Those officers able to balance the tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of their education and assignment career are a rarity.
Toward a 'Post-Modern' Education System

President John F. Kennedy, in his words that follow, correctly captured the signs of the security times of his generation — a security environment that has only become more complex since his days, demanding even more that the military adjust its ways of educating its officers in the strategy, operations, and tactics of war:

You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the problems of our time have . . . been solved by military power alone.

A return to a time where the divide between politics and war — the foreign and the domestic — were less recognized seems to have returned. Ironically, it is at this very point in time, that the U.S. military (and the U.S. Army in particular) seems intent on compartmentalizing war into separate domains in the education of its future war experts. In these times of strategic ambiguity, the United States needs officers that are both prophets of strategy and the theorizing of war and practitioners (leaders) of war policy.99 The twenty-first century demands a return to a time when much of the policy, planning, and execution of war policy was vested in one or a small body of experts. Now is a time to educate and experience future uniformed strategic planners.

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CHAPTER THREE
THE EDUCATION OF STRATEGIC PLANNERS

Examining senior military leader experiences in “stability and support operations” (SASO) during the 1990s can help identify what shortcomings (if any) exist in the way the US Army educates its strategic leadership for post-modern warfare. Examining the US Army’s most recent attempt at formal, organizational and procedural change in the way it educates for expertise in strategy and high-level operations – Functional Area 59 – provides a practical source for evaluation of how the Army is “scoring” in regards to post-modern educational reform. Finally, a brief glance at the US Army planning of its campaign for the war on global terrorism provides some insights to the challenges that remain in strategic planning education – problems that the FA59 “experiment” may or may not resolve given its present organizational and procedural direction in strategist education and development.

Case Study. Senior Leader Experiences in the Balkans and Somalia

The RAND Arroyo Center conducted an exploratory study of senior military leader experiences in the Balkans and Somalia, assessing how well the Army prepares its senior leaders for future missions involving joint, coalition, and “full spectrum” operations. The increase in United States involvement in stability-and-support operations (SASO) since the end of the Cold War has raised several new areas of concern in how the Army educates its war experts. The RAND study revealed the following:

- Army leaders thrust into the SASO environment found that their ‘warfighting’ skills had to be complemented by other attributes, eg., political and diplomatic skills;
- Army leaders could not count on the presence of staff officers with joint and/or combined experience or training – such qualifications being not normally an assignment consideration for duty in Army units;

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101 Ibid., 8.
Army leaders discovered that their organizations had to be adapted to the operational and political realities of the situation to which they were deploying — too often on the fly. Army leaders found their units (Divisions and separate Brigades) tasked to assume missions for which they were not designed, equipped, or organized.

In 1995, elements of the US Army 1st Armored Division deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation Joint Endeavor to implement the Dayton Peace Accords. The 1st Armored Division, under the command of Major General William Nash, was part of a larger multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), charged with overseeing the military aspects of the Dayton agreement. IFOR's mission, albeit predicated on its warfighting competencies, did not end at the martial aspects of war policy; the mission also presented the Army with a multitude of non-doctrinal challenges, including: enforcement of ceasefire; supervision of boundaries and zones of separation; enforcement of the withdrawal of combatants to barracks areas; and the movement of heavy weapons to storage sites. The Army, and its warriors, found themselves in an environment that required them to "deal effectively with complex, politically dominated, multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational, and multicultural peace and stability operations."

On 3 December 1992, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a warning order to Central Command to execute Operation Restore Hope and within a week, elements of the 10th Mountain Division (under the command of Major General Steven Arnold) began their deployment to Somalia. From the beginning the Restore Hope operation illustrated problems of structure, design, and education that continue to haunt US war policy to this day. Acting as the joint task force (JTF) Army Force Command (ARFOR) was an innovative departure from prevailing Army doctrinal convention; an adaptation the 10th Mountain Division was ill structured and ill prepared to accommodate. The following doctrinal conventions in what a Division was arrayed to do (and what it was structured 'not' to do) presented MG Arnold with significant challenges:

102 Ibid., 11-13.
• Division staffs tended to focus on tactics, while ARFORs required operational focus and perspective;
• Divisions were not organized to deal with the type and level of relationships typical of an ARFOR;
• Divisions are not designed to be joint headquarters

General Arnold and his Division was faced with a mission demanding complex multidimensional and multilateral coordination and facilitation – activities that went well beyond the martial realm – but was ill-equipped to handle the tasks. General Arnold came to realize early on that “coordination would not be easy and cooperation would not be automatic, particularly with the non-governmental organizations, since each of these organizations had different views toward the use of military forces.”

Some Common Negative Trends.

First, both field commanders (Generals Nash and Arnold) saw their mission as the Army has traditionally taught all of its warriors to think about stability and support operations – as operations other than war. In the Clausewitzian sense of holistic war, this notion of war is not only erroneous, it is critically flawed and has the potential to lead the Army astray in its war policy mandate. This conception of war limits the relevancy of the Army to only “tip-of-the-spear” aspects of war; to only one area of warfare. General Nash presented the errant conception himself:

In Bosnia, US Army doctrines were largely inadequate in an environment that forced American commanders to wrestle with the political, diplomatic, and military demands of stability operations. Almost from the inception of the IFOR operations, US commanders found themselves in uncharted territory. Having trained for thirty years to read a battlefield, general officers were now asked to read a 'peace field.'

Seeing their education, training, and experiencing in this bifurcated way is the root of the problem.

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105 Howard Olsen and John Daves, Training US Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia
Second, both cases indicated that there was a problem of “mission creep” inherent in these stability and support operations. While both Nash and Arnold found operations at the company level and below as being “right out of the tactical field and drill manuals,” they found their more senior leaders caught in an environment for which they were largely untrained; battalion commanders and higher being ‘stretched’ a little beyond conventional operations due to the complexities and the many players involved in operations other than war.106

Our initial operation was to provide security. As the operation developed, we assisted in standing up councils and governments, rebuilt schools and orphanages, conducted disarmament of warring factions, taught English in schools, repaired and built roads and provided assistance in many other ways. Some of this mission creep was directed, some was self-initiated. We found that our soldiers needed to see the effects of what they were doing. Getting them to assist in orphanages, schools, feeding centers and in other projects was one way of helping them see the importance of their mission. Additionally, to have any credibility with local leaders, we needed the flexibility to address the problems of their respective communities.107

Again, a large part of the problem seems to be in how the Army itself has conceived of stability and support operations; in a manner that allows the warfighter to see any deviation from traditional warfighting roles and functions as a creep away from the “fighting America’s wars” mandate. By educating the military profession and professionals within it that there is “war” and a separate policy domain of “operations other than war,” and then by defining the professional ethos upon the first domain at the expense of the latter, the Army has truncated the profession’s understanding of what is war and what is not war. The mission creep that senior leaders find themselves dealing with may be a false reality; the result of politicians and their desire to cost-save in the resourcing of war operations.

Third, and lastly, both cases recognized an ad hoc character to post-modern (post-Cold War) warfare and war planning. While war has always been a “come-as-you-are” exercise, these two post-modern experiences seem to indicate that come-as-you are has replaced to a large degree prior emphasis on deliberate war planning. Like in Somalia, the Army’s results in the Balkans

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106 Special Report, United States Institutes for Peace, October 29, 1999, 2.
were mixed. There were systemic problems in the initial phases of both operations. One author has noted that both experiences indicated a propensity for "ad hoc problem solving" that resulted in "convoluted strategic planning and coordination." The after-action reports noted that this "ad hoc-ery,"

... was the result of a lack of institutionalized, hierarchical multi-national strategic planning and a disconnected sequence of plan development [that] caused a lack of synchronization and organizational confusion. ... Deployment planning processes were stove piped among services, other militaries, and agencies, and compartmentalized at various headquarters which stymied parallel planning and reduced unity of effort.  

Both cases are indicative of a flawed perception of self, self-relevance, and self-importance of Army officers and the Army. The lessons apparently learned from the Somalia and Balkan experiences has been that Army leaders were trained, equipped, and organized for warfighting, but were expected once on the ground to do something quite different. In hindsight, and with this notion in mind, the Army applauds itself for successfully adjusting to an "abnormal" experience. Ad hoc-ery is seen as a successful adjustment to the "unknown" rather than seen in its broader relevancy – as a stop-gap procedure in place of a lack of process and procedure for dealing with warfare in its fuller context, prior to having to do so on-the-fly for expediency sake. Notions of SASO's ad hoc, mission creep, and operations other than war character is a false reality; the result of a misperception of war and the result of the Army's failure to rightly structure its educational system to prepare post-modern warriors for post-modern warfare.

The two case studies indicate that shortcomings still prevail in the area of joint force integration. However, the operational cases also indicated a significant shortage amongst senior military leaders and their staffs in knowledge of the socio-political and cultural aspects of post-modern war. Also indicative in these cases, and a shortfall derivative of those already mentioned, was a lack of planning expertise in the integration of martial tactics, techniques, and procedures

109 Ibid.
("tactiques") with socio-political (et al.) factors for national/coalitional strategic purposes and effects.

Recent Organizational 'Fixes' to the MOOTW Educational Shortfall

The US Army has come to realize, through its intervention experiences during the 1990s, the importance of maintaining strategic experts within the force. The establishment of Functional Area 59, Strategic Plans and Policy, is the latest organizational solution to what the Army has recognized as a critical shortfall in its war policy preparation and expertise.\(^{110}\)

Strategic Policy and Plans is designed as a specialty that provides the capability for strategic analysis and policy development performed by departmental, joint, and multinational staffs as well as interagency working groups and task forces in support of the formulation and implementation of national security strategy and national military strategy.\(^{111}\) FA 59s are expected to be specialists in the development and implementation of national level strategic plans and policies; theater strategy and planning; and the development of concepts and doctrine for employing military forces at the operational and strategic levels of warfare.\(^{112}\) These 'Army strategist' directly support the Title 10 U.S. Code responsibilities of DA and the Secretary of Defense concerning the strategic direction of the Department of Defense. They are to formulate

\(^{110}\) The Institutional Support Career Field (ISCF) was one of the three “breakout” career specialty fields developed under OPMS XXI. FA 59 is one of seven functional areas that comprise the Institutional Support Career Field. FA 59, strategic plans and policy, derives from a functional predecessor in the Army Strategist Program, initiated in 1974 by then Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams, with the intent of developing a sufficient number of senior officers “uniquely qualified by experience, education, and aptitude for assignment to key strategic planning and operations positions on Army, Joint, and combined staffs and other agencies and activities as appropriate.” Prior to the new functional area, the primary means by which the US Army identified its “strategists” was through this Army Strategist Program by designation of the 6Z Additional Skill Identifier. The primary means by which Army still identifies what it calls “strategists” is through this program, as part of the officer study program at CGSC and the completion of the focused Strategist Advanced Application Program, attainment of the masters in military art and science (MMAS) degree, and completion of written and oral examinations. Though a worthy program, particularly for building a foundation of strategic level knowledge amongst the generalist population, the Army Strategist Program was not deemed a sufficient means for producing the quality of uniformed strategist desired and demanded by the US Army. See the Functional Area 59 Homepage [accessed online] at http://www.fa59/perscom.mil.


\(^{112}\) Ibid.
departmental, DOD, and US government positions on national security policy and national military strategy. These mature, seasoned specialists provide assessments and recommendations to senior military and civilian decision makers (e.g., unified commanders, Army leadership, senior DOD and governmental officials) related to national security. They prepare or contribute to key policy documents. They relate national security and national military strategies to Army, joint, and multinational force requirements and develop operational and strategic level Army and joint warfighting concepts and doctrine.\textsuperscript{113}

In short, Functional Area 59s are intended to be the embodiment of those ‘uniformed strategists’ envisioned by General Galvin. However, there is evidence that innovation in the development of Army ‘uniformed strategists’ is being stifled by some of the more negative legacies of the traditional, generalist PME and career development system.

\textbf{A Slow March to Expertise – Problems with the Seniority System}

The US Army Personnel System – the “assignments process” – has come under increased scrutiny over the last few years; the exodus of junior and middle grade officers during the mid-to-late 1990s was the original spark for the latest fire over the personnel system. Yet, this would not be the first time in modern history that the pathway to recognized failures in the education of martial experts led to problems embedded in the assignments process. If the last “interwar period” can be considered as a reliable point of measure, periods of interim peace seem to find the personnel apparatuses of the times lagging behind the changing times and changing needs of the services. Dwight D. Eisenhower railed against what seemed at various times throughout his long and illustrious career, one consistent hurdle in a sea of change throughout his careers: the prevailing seniority system of promotions, and consequently, career opportunities.\textsuperscript{114} General George C. Marshall not only railed against the arbitrary administrative strictures of the times, but instilled ad hoc methods around many of those structures, and instituted formal reforms

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} (Eisenhower 1948; Holt and Leyerzapf 1998)
to the grindingly slow seniority-based system that would, if left to its own devices, have denied
the Allies of many of its most valuable war policy minds of the era. Every era has its own
rendition of bureaucratic “noise” to deal with. The “noise” needing to be dealt with here –
eliminated – derived from some of the “fixes” of the Marshall era. Nevertheless, the signs of the
new times beckon for a new approach to how the Army experiences its officers in holistic war
policy.

Moves are underway within the current George W. Bush Administration and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to review and, if deemed necessary, revise the standing
military personnel system. Many reformist ideas have come into their own of late due in no
small part to a recent manuscript offered by one young military victim of the current system:
Major Donald Vandergriff. In his book, _The Path to Victory_, Major Vandergriff identifies the
‘industrial-age personnel system’ as the root to the problems now facing the army and the US
military more generally. In addition to finding the current system calibrated in its promotion
and career advancement processes on the wrong measures of success (what he would regard as
“peacetime administrivia” perhaps), Vandergriff faults the prevailing personnel management
system for its “ticket punching” versus “true readiness” promotion-based advancements, and its
consequential privileging of “management expertise” over “combat expertise.” His recognition
of a rigor mortis affecting the current career management system, similar to that which
constrained officer advancement during the times of Marshall and Eisenhower, are less
provocative and emotive, and more relevant to the case at hand.

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115 Pogue 1963
   Also, see “New System for field grade officers,” *Army Times* (16 December 2002).
118 Major Vandergriff’s examination misses a vital point: failure in the assignments system directly retards
   the education and training of officers in the martial aspects of war, not to mention the wider elements and
   context of war policy. If it is true, that education is the best teacher, then the Army must look at how it
   aligns and allows for its officers to become comfortable with and confident in there experiences with war.
   Experience needs to reinforce academic learning and training – an academic and training regimen that has
   already been identified as being too martial and too narrow in its focus. The following figure presents the
current assignments (‘development’) plan for FA 59 officers. The Army’s ‘schooling’ approach is
The Arbitrariness of Branch Qualification.

The branch qualification requirement poses a particular set of challenges. While most appropriate in some circumstances, prevailing branch qualification requirements are anachronisms in others. Considerations for how some of the otherwise-considered benign legacies of the traditional officer career development system may be unintentionally undermining positive efforts being made by branch managers and the Proponency to broaden the education of future master strategists have not been given ample attention. The contention made here is that the branch qualification measure of effectiveness employed in the traditional system as the accepted means of progressing officers from one rank to another – from one level of responsibility to another – may not be the appropriate measure of effectiveness or measure of progression (expertise) for FA 59 and its officer corps. Not only does the branch qualification legacy prevail in functional area 59 as the measure of progression, it centers so much on the specifics of this requirement to the point of missing learning opportunities that, though they do not conform to the prescribed BQ strictures, are by their nature, war policy-relevant learning experiences.

Donald Vandergriff’s critique of the officer personnel management system that emerged from the then recognized demands of the post-World War II security and US defense environment (and promoted, therefore, by then Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall) focused its contentions with the negative effects of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (OPA 47) on unit cohesion and the current readiness of combat units. This author’s criticism begins where Vandergriff’s ends: the negative and unintended effects OPA 47 and the present officer management system is levying on officer experienced-based learning. The legacy of OPA 47 negatively affecting how and when future Army ‘strategists’ are educated. The drawbacks of the old seniority system still haunt the US Army’s approach to experienced-based learning. Operational and strategic level assignment opportunities come too late in an officer’s career. Exacerbating the lateness problem, is the compartmentalized nature of the operational and strategic level experience to which these “late-bloomers” are subjected. Intermediate-level (O-4/O-5) assignments afford the fledgling strategist with joint and middle-management level parent service familiarization, but the fragmented and time-constrained assignments process lends the system itself to a default to familiarization at best, rather than the synergistic effects desired from such experienced-based learning opportunities.

continues to enforce the “competitive ethic” that derives from a centralized promotion system
that, by design and implementation, “defines success” upon a very small set of critical career-
 enhancing positions and experiences – command, aide-de-camp (to a general officer), and “key
and essential” staff officer positions, such as Battalion and Brigade operations officers (S-3s) and
executive officers (XOs). The argument is not that these are not the right “branch qualifying”
positions for many (if not most) of the tactical and even operational level functions – it will
always be vitally important that strategic planners (war policy experts) are well versed in the
commandership of small combat units. The argument is that a “one size must fit all” approach to
officer promotions, assignments, and experiencing is wrought with problems, many of which
directly affect (negatively) the Army’s ability to fulfill the Galvin vision.

Designing and defining the entire system by what many somewhat arbitrarily (and wholly
inaccurately) define as the “command track” measures of success limits officers in the career and
assignments choices they can afford to make along the seniority-based promotion path and still
remain “competitive” for “command.” Yet, as has already been discussed to detail, what is
regarded today as the traditional command track and the warfighting model is only the implement
of holistic war policy. Ensuring future war policy experts and senior military leaders are
proficient warrior in this traditionalist sense is of great importance; it is a necessary condition, but
not a sufficient one for the achievement of the Galvin vision in physical form.

Anecdotal and empirical evidence is available, indicating that the strictures of the current
branch qualification requirements are bleeding valuable experience and expertise out of the armed
services and throwing away experience-based learning opportunities that might prove of vital
import and significance to post-modern warfare.121 The current assignments process provides

121 For a quick glance at a broad and growing body of literature on the subject, see Masland and Radway’s
Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1957); Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military
Organizations,” in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.) Military Effectiveness (London: Allen &
very little opportunity to deviate from the traditionalist paradigm. Time spent away from “troop assignments” is still largely perceived as wasted time, or at least ‘less-relevant time’. The fact that all officers spend time (typically between their sixth and tenth years of service) “away from troops” in nominative assignments for three to four years makes the “relevancy” arguments against time spent in school or in other than the standard command track assignments illogical. It seems that some time spent away from troops are valued more relevant than others. However, when the question of how relevant an experienced-based learning opportunity might be to the education of war experts are asked and answered from a perception of how far removed that experience might be from traditional muddy boots templates rather than on the changing nature of war itself, then irrationalities in how we pick and choose what is and is not “relevant” education begins to erode the very effectiveness of the martial profession and its martial artists. As chapter two pointed out, the operational nexus of war policy, as essential as it is in the effective translation of war policy strategic aims into tactical, implementation actions, is equally as important in how the Army approaches the education of its war experts. Two elements of the operational issue bear particular importance here: how FA 59 educates its officers in operations (plans and planning) and the actual nut-and-bolt operationalization of the functional area itself.

**Academic ‘Learning’ in Operations.**

The US Army’s answer to the question of how, where, and at what point in the officer career development process to educate officers in the art and science of ‘operations’ is found in the Advanced Military Studies Program. Otherwise known as the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the AMSP is the Army’s post-graduate (post-CGSC) solution to the tactical and operational level planner gap recognized in the 1970s and early-1980s (SAMS was founded in 1982) and which to some extent prevail today. SAMS is a yearlong graduate level program at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for “specially selected

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volunteer field grade officers focused on producing leaders with the mental flexibility to solve complexity problems in peace, conflict and war.” Since its inception in 1982, SAMS has taken on the responsibility and task – formally and informally – of producing tactical and operational level planners for US Army Divisions and Corps. SAMS annually graduates between 50 to 80 specialists possessing a breadth of knowledge in military affairs, a common basis of tactical and operational concept understanding, and a common problem-solving outlook that makes these graduates premier battle staff leaders and planners. The US Air Force, US Marine Corps, and most recently the US Navy have similar established programs.

The current structural and procedural approach of Functional Area 59 finds the US Army unintentionally separating and narrow casting its efforts and its effects into at least two separate functions – strategy versus plans. Operationalization is educated principally in only one half of itself. The negative outcome might in fact be a design flaw within the specialty area, where one side of the branch is incapable of “speaking” to the other, much less the entire branch being capable of operationalizing national aims into executable orders for the Army and Nation on a whole. Recent experiences in the development of the US Army strategic concept for the war on global terrorism provides some interesting anecdotal evidence that this negative trend is alive and well and inhibiting the Galvin vision.

123 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Respectively, The School of Advanced Studies (SAS), The School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW). The Navy program – NOPSI – is the newest and still in development at the time of this writing. These four military programs, as best can be determined by research to date, are the only graduate-level programs focused on the operational elements of war policy.
127 This is a significant gap in not only the martial domains of war policy, but in the civilian domains as well. The consistent inconsistencies between national policy intent and realized policy at implementation (between the NSS and the NMS, not to mention the other instruments of power strategic documents and plans) – the gap between civilian direction and military interpretation in war policy – all can be attributed in some form or fashion to this scarcity in operational education.
The Army Strategic Campaign Plan for the War on Global Terrorism

Immediately following, and in partial response to, the 11 September 2001 surprise attack against the US homeland, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations ad Plans (DCSOPS) assembled US Army planners from throughout the continental United States and overseas to develop the Army’s Strategic Campaign Plan (ASCP) in support of what would become Operation Enduring Freedom (the war against global terrorism). DCSOPS formed the ad hoc team around a core of officers, predominantly FA59-designated officers, from the office of DAMO-SS. Additionally, operational planners – fellows from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) – were brought from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to participate as ASCP team members.

The lessons learned from the planning experience, from the perspective of both SAMS operational-level military planners and Army strategists directly involved in the process, provide valuable insights into the challenges of bridging the gap between strategic intentions and operational-tactical requirements in twenty-first century war planning.

One lesson learned by the planning team was that planners at the strategic level needed to be “comfortable with making assumptions about what higher level decision-makers might decide.” Assumption-based planning is a required skill for all planners, perhaps most for the strategic-level planner, since national level guidance (and higher), even when given in an explicit and timely manner, still remains largely ambiguous and amorphous. Assumption-making implies risk. Planners must be effective risk assessors and risk managers. The level and degree of

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129 The challenge facing this strategic planning team was daunting and near unprecedented. The team was tasked with conceiving of, and constructing what was to serve as the US Army’s strategic concept (campaign rubric) that would guide all further and future operations related to a national/global coalitional war against terrorism of a global reach; a war of ambiguous strategic aims and intentions, and undetermined duration. The final product was presented to the Army Chief of Staff six-weeks after the 9/11 attacks.
130 From author’s informal discussions with unnamed representatives from both DAMO-SS and the SAMS contingent working on the 2001 ASCP.
understanding, knowledge, and comfort with strategic level ambiguity (the political realities of
defense and security policy) that can come from “being there” – as a student, an intern, a
collaborator, etc. – can make assumption-based planning more rigorous, more reliable, and less
risky. Use of the military decision-making process (MDMP) demanded in this strategic
environment that planners construct courses of actions (COAs) for not only the pending
operations and tactical mission, but also for the national strategy, national military strategy
(NMS), and the homeland security strategy (HSS) that had invariably been radically affected by
the surprise assault.\(^{132}\) Having a confidence in this level of the political-warfare environment – a
confidence that comes from being adequately educated in its nuances – is essential to successful
strategic planning.

SAMS planners recognized a trend amongst the planning group to gloss over, or skip
outright, the first stage of the MDMP – mission analysis (MA) – and opt instead for an immediate
and aggressive COA development. Thinking of the potential factors that compelled officers to
default to the comfort zone of identifying courses of action prior to getting a comprehensive
picture of the mission situation itself is instructive. It is a natural tendency to fall back on one’s
comfort zone when faced with a new or ambiguous task; particularly under crisis conditions. The
temptation to default to course of action development in the planning process may be proof-
positive of this tendency. If military planners – be they strategic level experts or operational-
tactical level experts – are made more aware of the new socio-political and cultural (et al.) aspects
of post-modern warfare, then perhaps the cognitive dissonance against mission analysis can be
overcome.

The following three excepts from the SAMS planner contingent raise significant concerns
to the compatibility of officers educated and identified (organizationally-identified and self-
identified) as “planners” versus “strategists.”

\(^{131}\) ASCP 2001.
\(^{132}\) Ibid.
One of the biggest lessons learned for the SAMS Fellows was the effect that different political environments have on the planning process at the strategic level. Obviously the politics of the civilian level leadership and different administrative agencies have a huge impact and that is what most planners would expect. Political considerations related to beltway issues, interservice rivalry, procurement programs, and transformation issues came into light as some staff officers exhibited parochialism (either intentionally or inadvertently) in subtle ways through the process.\footnote{Ibid.}

The first comments speak to the SAMS planner’s recognition of the importance of the political factors affecting the ASCP process but at the same time, acknowledges their collective frustration with what they deemed as distracting parochialism.

Only days after the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon, there were pressures to pursue or exclude certain COAs for what appeared to be political reasons... \footnote{Ibid.} [T]he country was at war and the focus of some of the team members was political, advancing certain weapons systems, and pursuing peacetime agendas as if it was a normal POM cycle. Planners were often frustrated and had the perception that some were more concerned with peacetime agendas than wartime requirements.\footnote{Ibid.} 134

This observation on the part of the SAMS Fellows indicates a disharmony of interests and perspectives that relates to the systemic paradox between that which is typically regarded as strategic factors and those regarded as tactical factors of war policy. More worrisome, the observation is indicative of a “difference of opinion” between the ASCP “strategists” and “planners” over what was and what were not war-relevant factors. There seems to be varying ideas of what war is (and isn’t).

In the case of the ASCP, there was a small group that thought the plan should be more of a corporate vision instead of a campaign plan. The challenge as a planner was to bend those flawed ideas into a better product.\footnote{Ibid.} 135

Clearly, there was a difference of perspective within the planning team, between “planners” and “strategist” over how to proceed in the development of the strategic campaign plan. While the military planners viewed the beltway military strategist as overly corporate and management oriented in their planning outlook and perspective on the “new war,” the DAMO-SS Army strategists saw the SAMS planners as overly narrow and militaristic in their perspective and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.}\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.}\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.}

50
approach. The integration challenge rested somewhere between these two opposing perspectives, yet neither seemed capable of recognizing the relevancy of the other’s point of view.

Mustering long-term public and foreign-diplomatic support for what promised to be “a campaign of years, if not decades,” required more than only the influence of military force. The effective planning goal lied at the nexus of these opposing perspectives.

The ASCP team also noted lessons for future strategic planners to consider in regards to future roles and responsibilities of the strategic planner.

- A strategic planner is typically considered to be a doctrinal expert. Planners must be vigilant to ensure proper use of terminology and definitions.
- Strategic planners must be team-builders and team-maintainers.
- Strategic planners must be comfortable with ‘ambiguity’.

The fact that the SAMS-planners became, by-default, the planning leads is of interests only so far as it might be indicative of a fail-safe default of the overall US national security policy process to the “martial position.” A military-heavy approach was the appropriate approach in the short-term aftermath of the homeland attacks, but a military-heavy approach may not be the most effective or efficient instrument of power to deal with the longer term, subsequent operational phases of the campaign.136

**Strategic Plans AND Policy, not Strategic Plans OR Policy.**

As the US Army Strategic Campaign Plan case shows, the strategy-tactics dialectic persist and afflicts effective war policy and planning with a martial and tactical level bias. The DAMO-SS strategists seemed to defer to what they knew best – the management side of war planning – while the SAMS planners were focused on the tactical military imperatives. Neither group of officers was any less devoted to waging the war and winning. Both, however, were

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136 This years’ International Studies Association (ISA) annual convention (Portland, Oregon, 23-27 March 2003), focused its discussions and debates on evaluation of the initial military-led operations in the war on global terrorism and their potential effect on future stages in the long term campaign. Concerns were raised regarding the potential pending military operations in Iraq. Several scholars and defense and security experts in attendance alluded to the policy ambiguity now circulating around the issue of Iraq as a second-order result of a short-sided, military-heavy approach to the overall campaign design. See Michael Hirsh and Melinda Liu, “Imagining the Day After,” *Newsweek* (17 February 2003).
confined to their own perspectives due to their bifurcated educations as planners versus strategists.

The post-modern security environment, and the information-based age of warfare emerging in its wake, both demand greater specialization in expert knowledge to deal effectively with the complexities of post-modern warfare; specialization that crosses multiple jurisdictional boundaries between the military and the non-military domains of war policy. Operational integration across these various policy domains will prove the key to future victories in post-modern war; an integration that goes well beyond multi-service and multi-national cooperation. The future war experts will need to be made comfortably conversant in the civil-military nuances of the information age of warfare. The future educational construct designed to meet these challenges must be stretched beyond the traditional stovepiped and incremental designs that proved effective in the past, but may be out of date for post-modernity.
CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusions, Current Trends and Recommendations

The dominant trend within universities and the think tanks is toward ever-narrower specialization: a higher premium is placed on functioning deeply within a single field than broadly across several. And yet without some awareness of the whole — without some sense of how means converge to accomplish or frustrate ends — there can be no strategy. And without strategy, there is only drift.  

The gap between the strategic aspects of war and the tactical actions in war and war planning has been well documented. Reviews of the 1980s called for a reform of the existing PME to facilitate more joint expertise within the armed forces. One of the answers, then, was the mandating of JSO development within the PME. This latest period of reform, review, and transformation may be indicative of a similar shortcoming in the prevailing PME, this time indicating an anemia with regards to advanced civilian, graduate level study in international affairs and operational planning.

A Gap in Civilian-Based Education?

Changes in the security dynamics of the post-modern international environment should have a significant vote in the election to round-out the educational experience of Army strategists with more civilian-academic and operational planning expertise, or to remain focused on the martial, tactical-level of warfighting. New trends have already influenced the redirection of US foreign and security policy and the rules and practices governing the interaction of nations, businesses, individuals, and transnational groups and organizations.

“Academia” Has Started to Adapt and Innovate

The information revolution has clouded what was at one time a clearer divide between those issues domestic and those of a foreign policy nature; the digital era has grayed the

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138 The reform debates began, justifiably, with the GNA ’86 initiatives, and carry forward through the Skelton Panel recommendations, and the Richard B. Cheney studies, conducted by now Vice President Dick Cheney, when he served with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the mid-1990s
distinction between the military aspects of war and the non-military. Civilian graduate programs have adjusted accordingly.¹⁴⁰

At Georgetown University, the National Security Studies of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service has added courses on low-intensity conflict, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, transnational relations, and economic aspects of national security to the standard fare on defense and military policy. International communication and environmental policy are among the concentrations offered by the School of International Service at American University and the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Some programs, such as George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs and Johns Hopkins’ Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies offer executive versions of their programs for working and/or mid-career professionals.¹⁴¹

The military’s inextricable relationship with politics and policymaking is not a contemporary phenomenon; there have rarely if ever been military actions without political ramifications.¹⁴² Morris Janowitz parrots the positive and necessary requirements of an advance-civilianized conception of war policy for the future martial expert, noting that, “the contemporary officer must relate national policy to the military organization,

... [To assume international policing and peacekeeping (PK) responsibilities, the postwar officer needs an understanding of national policy and objectives, which demands a broader scope of ‘citizen attachment’ – that is, closer ties to society and state.”¹⁴³

Authors and national security experts John W. Masland and Lawrence I. Radway identified three categories of qualifications¹⁴⁴ that all officers should meet.¹⁴⁵

- Professional Military Qualifications, consisting of military competency, the representation of the national security viewpoint in a democratic society and knowing the problems of enlisted personnel;
- General Executive Qualifications, including the evaluation of people and information, effective communications and the efficient and economic conduct of affairs; the ability of officers to grasp large and complicated situations; the ability of the military officer to see

¹⁴² Ibid.
¹⁴⁵ The “new age” Masland and Radway spoke of was the mechanized age of warfare, circa 1950s. The shortfall in the civilian side of professional military education is seen by many to still persist; to hinder the military in its ability to more effectively contend with the realities of twenty-first century warfare.
the "big picture" — making cognitive connections among, and balancing, war's diverse components;

- Military Executive versus Combat Leader, being less distinguishable in this new age of warfare, calling for a good military education system, as well as an [assignments] rotation system designed to enhance military officer adaptability amongst the civil-military aspects of warfare.

How the Army develops (educates through experience-based learning) its war experts — its strategic planners — has promise of being one of the more effective treatments for curing the strategic planning anemia afflicting the service. Experiences seal and confirm (or deny) learning. If war is about more than just its warfighting veneer, then the Army must do better at aligning the experiences of its officers with the full domain of warfare.

Looking to the Future.

What post-modern warfare, and the threats that help to define it, demand in terms of competencies to deal effectively in the new environment, should determine the Army's next moves in transformation. That includes the next steps the Army takes toward the education of the officer corps in general, but specifically, in terms of how the Army will produce and husband its core body of strategic planning experts. The experts all allude to what collectively form a loose set of core competencies and measures of effectiveness:

Figure 7. Educating the Post-Modern Strategic Planner.
The need for a greater "international practitioner" competency in the generalist officer population, but particularly within the Army’s strategic experts is acknowledged and emphasized. A “beyond-the-martial” educational experience is explicit in the writings of theorists, scholars, and practitioners alike, and is implicit in the nature of the post-modern security environment. With the dwindling distinction between domestic and foreign security policy issues, the future Army strategists must be more than simply familiarized with both domains; they must be competent in both policy domains, a competency that can only be obtained and sustained through frequent and continued (periodic) academic study and experience-based learning in both domains.

A four-fold approach to an educational reform geared toward the creation and fostering of a small, manageable body of strategic planners in the US Army is one way of conceptualizing policy treatments and recommendations.

Figure 8. A Four-Fold Approach to Educational Reform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Four-Fold Approach to Reform</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advanced Civil Education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- More opportunity for designated future strategists to acquire advanced degrees earlier in their career timelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- More FA 59 (or equivalent) oversight and direction to ACS curriculum</td>
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<tr>
<td>- More emphasis on post-academic outreach/internship/fellowship experienced-based learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Stronger emphasis on international affairs and policy studies as the &quot;core&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Joint/Combined/International Education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Continual career lifecycle learning in multi-service functions, roles and missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Incorporation of MTT-concept for education and qualification of officers at JFM E lift level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consideration of a MEL-4 Joint/Combined Command &amp; Staff School Concept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Advanced Civilian Education.

Detection and designation of future strategic planners much earlier than the current system is admittedly difficult, if not impossible to achieve; particularly true if no significant trade-off in military tactical and technical learning is desirable. One way of overcoming the loss of an earlier civilian academic learning experience is through maximizing the opportunities, post-graduate school, to reinforce and add to that learning and knowledge through civilian and governmental (private, public, and international) experience-based and research-based outreach. Participation in Department of the Army (DA), DOD/OSD research is conceivably possible during normal assignment cycles - even during operational assignments. The challenge is to integrate such activities into the guiding mission essential tasks of the parent unit, so as not to detract from daily unit requirements.

Such opportunities can add relevancy to some traditional unit-based educational programs, such as unit professional reading programs and leader development programs that often receive scant emphasis. Infusing more first-hand experience with the extra-martial worlds of war policy into the traditional career lifecycle of the Army officer (future strategists), either through more formally supported and resourced academic learning and/or through post-grad outreach, internship, and fellowships could prove an effective innovation in the civilian-combined-interagency, joint professional military education (C²IPME) system of the twenty-first century.

Civilian-based academic institutions have outpaced the military in many respects in identifying the new challenges and nuances of the twenty-first century security environment, and have made significant movement toward improving their curricula and programs to accommodate the post-modern war environment. Part of these civilian-based institutional and philosophical reforms has been a reconceptualization of the value of having mid-career military officer as part of their student bodies. Civilian-military relations can be greatly enhanced through military officer attendance in in-residence ACS. Civilian educational institutions and the US Army (US
military) must work together and collaborate in order to make these educational experiences more affordable and benefiting to both domains of war policy development. Positive trends already abound. The national service academies as part of their processes and programs for acquiring high-quality company-grade officers from the fielded force for ACS and instructor/teaching assignments, have found ways, in coordination with civilian academic institutions, of offering officers high-cost, prestigious educations for the cost of a standard mid-to-low cost program. The seeds of greater civilian-military cooperation on the education issue have been laid for some time now. The Army needs to become more effective and efficient at reaping what has already been sown.

Joint/Combined Military Education.
Appendix four discusses the JSO/JPME transformation effort currently underway, and how these reforms relate to the subject of Army strategic planner education, in greater detail. Those initiatives emphasize the need for movement toward a more universal and accessible JPME I and II experience for JSOs specifically and the generalist population, in general. If career timelines and OPTEMPO rob officers of the time and opportunity to go to the resident courses, then perhaps bringing the course to the officer is the next best option. A combination of virtual (distance-learning based) and physical (Educational Management Teams concept, similar to the MMT design) remote learning alternatives could enhance the building of joint culture and joint capability within the Total Army Force. Reaching a higher level of joint cognition is one step

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147 This author supervised such an outreach program for the Department of Social Sciences, USMA, at West Point, from 1998 to 2001. Prestigious international relations, public policy, comparative politics programs (and the like) like Harvard’s JFK School, Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), and others have been quite accommodating in lowering their annual tuition cost – as well as their in-residency degree requirement timelines – to help facilitate military officer attendance. These programs have also adjusted some of their requirements relating to Ph.D. research and dissertation preparation, increasingly allowing student officers to complete these requirements, in-absentia, during their military follow-on utilization tours. The added “time” this provides to officers makes attainment of the masters and Ph.D. more affordable than ever before.

148 J-7 initiatives
closer to a more holistic strategic conception of war policy and the strategic planners future role in it.

Operational Integration.
Of the treatments offered in the figure above, the establishment of a joint-combined, and interagency advanced warfighting course (similar to SAMS, SASS, and SAW) and the move toward mobile strategic planner staff augmentee teams (MSPSAs) are two innovations that have some degree of empirical support through contemporary practical experimentation. Appendix three details the experiment within the JCS with a Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS). The mobile strategic planner team concept has some recent operational reinforcement, from experiences with the addition of ad hoc, modular staff augmentation to the 10th Mountain Division during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Officer Development (Assignments).
Experience is the best teacher. This popular statement does not consider enough, the fact that experience, if left to its own ends, can teach the wrong lessons as much as well-balanced experience can reinforce success. A purpose-based or "effects-based" approach to branch qualification should be considered as the new measure of educational and experienced-based learning success. Seniority, rank, and position may be adequate measures of success and effectiveness for some traditional branches, but should not be standard for all branches and specialties. New ideas on old negative notions of officer "homesteading" need to be reconceived. Longer tours at a particular station or post could add the degree of officer stability needed from which short-and-near term "with assignment at . . ." opportunities can blossom. The Secretary of Defense has been considering ways of stabilizing the force (particularly O-4/Majors) for efficiency and quality of life reasons. Officer Development (Assignments)

149 Army Times, 17 December 2002.
education can only progress as far as the assignments process will allow. Fixing the latter is a prerequisite to fixing the rest.

**In Conclusion**

The military experiences of US Army senior leaders during the 1990s revealed – by their own recollections and their own testimonies – that as good as Army education had been throughout their careers, the new warfare they faced found that education less effective than it need to have been; perhaps even irrelevant in certain respects. Future success will depend on educating future strategic planners adequately, appropriately, and holistically for the challenges of the twenty-first century.

US Army plans on manning a functional area of strategic plans and policy officers that will number no more than 200 “strategists” once the branch fully matures. Small numbers can have significant effects on policy. War policy is no different. In fact a digital, or informational age of warfare will increasingly find the tactical actions of direct level combat soldiers (war policy implementers) having a direct and near-real time strategic policy effect. Lieutenants and captains will be more than tactical warfighters in this new age; they will find themselves the de facto mayor, the “cop-on-the-beat”, the social worker, the city manager, etc.

Increasing numbers of challenges such as new warfare forms, combined with the technical environment, will mean that [leaders] will have to be ‘more comprehensively trained, less specialized’ and will have to cycle back through school often during their careers. They will need a broader range of skills in order to be more flexible.

Revising the PME for a small body of war policy ‘translators’ educated in the full spectrum of war policy could serve as the critical organic bridge across a persistent chasm between policy and practice; between civilian policymakers and military policy executors. Until more systemic structural solutions to the strategy-tactics dilemma are realized hope of spanning this gap may rest within the military genius of holistically educated cohort of strategic planners.

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150 RAND Study (2002).
APPENDIX ONE – GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ARCENT - U.S. Army Central Command

ARFOR - Army Forces

C^3W - command and control warfare

CA - civil affairs

CALL - Center for Army Lessons Learned

CAS - close air support

CCC - Course Captains Career Course

CGSOC - Command and General Staff Officer’s Course

CTCs - combat training centers

DoD - Department of Defense

FM – field manual

G2 - intelligence, general staff

G3 - operations (division); operations and plans (corps), general staff

G4 - logistics, general staff

G5 - civil-military operations, general staff

G6 - communications, general staff

G7 - information operations, general staff

IFOR - Implementation Force

IBCT - Initial Brigade Combat Team

IO - information operations

IOBS - information operations battle staff

IM - information management

ISR - intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

JFLCC - Joint Force Land Component Command
MDMP - military decision-making process

METT-TC - mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations

MI - military intelligence

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OPFOR - opposing force

OPSEC - operational security

PA - public affairs

PSYOP - psychological operations

RGFC - (Iraqi) Republican Guard Forces Command

R&S - reconnaissance and surveillance

S3 - operations and training, brigade and battalion staff

SJA - Staff Judge Advocate

TTP - tactics, techniques and procedures

TRADOC - Training and Doctrine Command

U.K - United Kingdom

U.SCENTCOM - United States Central Command
### Appendix Two

**Functional Area 59.** The following chart details the structure, attributes, and functions of FA 59.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duties &amp; Assignments</th>
<th>Strategic Plans &amp; Policy (FA 59)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service at multiple levels on Field, Army, departmental, joint, and multinational staffs, and on interagency working groups and task forces in support of the formulation and implementation of national security strategy and national military strategy. Future developmental concepts and doctrinal development at the operational and strategic levels</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes &amp; Skills</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly developed analytical and problem solving skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ability to conceptualize and develop creative solutions beyond that of the established operational paradigm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Action-oriented and decisive in nature; a warfighter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intellectually inquisitive and respectful of academic standards</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly adept at understanding other societies, their values, and national interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creative thinking and critical reasoning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectually honest with superiors and unafraid to state and defend convictions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically fit and possessing military bearing</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge Set</th>
<th>Specialized knowledge of Army and joint organization, structure, doctrine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization, structure and doctrine of the warfighting Army, the Department of the Army, DOD, Joint Staff, unified commands, military alliances, and the US government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of the branch capabilities to achieve combined arms warfare, as well as joint and multinational warfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the domestic political context in which the Army must fulfill its Title 10 USC and Title 32 USC responsibilities and the context in which the Department of Defense provides for national security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues related to the international geopolitical arena and their implications for developing the national security policy and the national military strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint warfighting and the integration of joint and service systems (planning, resourcing, and warfighting) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of formal and informal systems of the US government, the National Security Council, Joint Strategic Planning System (JSCP), and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accession &amp; Progression</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary route: Career Field Designation process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial identification between an officer’s 5th and 6th years of service. (Not considered for FA 59 assignment until branch qualified in basic branch)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No direct commissioning into FA 59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Field Designation Board (CFDB) between an officer’s 10th and 15th year of service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior officer “cross-over” option (select and limited)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Specialty Areas (Career Paths)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Policy; Concepts and Doctrinal Development; Operational Plans; Legislative Affairs</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Educating the FA 59 Officer.

Prior to formal accession of the designated officer into the functional area (after CFDB around the 10th and 15th year of service), there is limited formal institutional focus on the academic learning of identified FA 59 officers in those attributes and core competencies deemed defining of the expertise desired and demanded of these officers. Formal academic learning largely begins no earlier than the 10th year of service. This is in spite of the Proponent’s guidance for all junior officers identified as potential future Army strategist to look for opportunities to attain graduate degree experience in strategic plans and policy related disciplines as captains.152 Opportunities for advanced civilian academic study, other than self-directed and self-resourced study, prior to formal career field designation and attendance at (or completion of) CGSC, are limited to opportunities that exist in conjunction with assignments to the USMA or ROTC faculty, or through selection for the Army G3 Harvard Strategist Program.153

FA 59 majors are required to complete the OPMS XXI Intermediate Level Education (ILE) schooling prior to entering the primary zone for lieutenant colonel. This schooling program is still under development, but as of now will consist of officer completion of a common core course (in conjunction with the CGSC curriculum; currently the Army Strategist Program satisfies this requirement) and a FA 59 Qualification Course154. While in attendance at CGSC, officers are afforded an opportunity to attain a master of military art and science (MMAS) degree, with a focus on doctrine, operational art, or campaign planning. The Proponent also officially encourages FA 59 officers to consider attendance to the US Army Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP)155, a yearlong post-CGSC resident course focused on the education of officers

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153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
in the special skills of campaign and operational planning at the tactical and operational
echelons.\footnote{Ibid.}

Formal academic education in holistic war policy at the lieutenant and colonel levels is
typically limited to self-study, and/or schoolhouse academic instruction related directly to, or in
conjunction with standard MEL-1 Senior Service College (SSC) or MEL-1 civilian fellowship
equivalents.

The US Army formally recognizes several internship and fellowship programs that offer
FA 59 officers (majors, LTCs, and COLs) unique experienced-based learning in holistic war
policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training with Industry (TWI) Program</th>
<th>Year-long research affiliation with RAND or Institute for Defense Analysis. Majors (O-4s) participate in strategy and policy-related research deemed of importance to the US Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FA 59 Intern Program</td>
<td>Six-month to one-year internship with a US Government organization outside the Department of Defense, such as the National Security Council or Department of State. Pending program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Strategy Course</td>
<td>Distance Education (correspondence) program in support of FA 59 officer self-study program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff Intern Program</td>
<td>Interns serve in an action-officer capacity in assigned Joint Staff directorates. Typically reserved for junior officers (Captains) considering accession into FA 59.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Intern Program</td>
<td>Similar program to the Joint Staff Internship. Limited to branch qualified Captains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army G3 Harvard Strategist Program</td>
<td>Reserved for two to three junior officers per year. In-residence program at Harvard University. Attainment of a MPA in International Relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White House Fellows Program</td>
<td>A National competition. One-year fellowship followed by two-year utilization assignment. Prior graduate degree required. Branch qualification required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Congressional Fellowship Program</td>
<td>On e-year competitive program. Service as staff assistants to members of Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Senior Fellowship Program</td>
<td>Opportunity to study issues of national importance in association with individuals and agencies, in and out of government, actively involved in influencing the formulation and execution of US foreign and domestic policies. Reserved for senior FA 59 officers (minimum time in service of 19 years).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Military Fellowship**
One-year in residence at the CFR's headquarters in New York, or in special circumstances, in the Council's Washington, DC offices. Reserved for senior ranks.

**Harvard Center for International Affairs (CFIA) Fellowship**
A senior professional's program.

**Federal Executive Fellows Program**
The Brookings Institution. Grade O-6 fellowship.

**Department of State Senior Seminar**
Grade O-6 fellowship

**George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Fellowship**
15-week course. Officers take part in security-related research. Grade O-5 fellowship.

**Asia-Pacific Center (APC) for Security Studies Fellowship**
12-week program. Grade O-5 program.

**Department of State School of Professional and Area Studies Fellowship**
Fellows serve on the staff of the School of Professional and Area Studies office of the Foreign Service /institute. Grade O-5 fellowship.

**National Security Management Course**
Eight-week residency course at Syracuse University. Focus on the national security decision-making process. Open to Army Colonels.

**OSD Corporate Fellowship**
Placement of senior fellows with civilian corporations to gain understanding of how revolutionary changes in information and related technologies are influencing American society and business.

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**FA 59 Duty Assignments ('development')**

The recoding of existing duty positions throughout the Army and joint services, as well as the designation and creation of new duty roles and functions throughout the armed services communities is an ongoing process; a process for which both the Proponency and the desk officers at PERSCOM must be applauded. These efforts have created and are fostering a functional area that breadths a new and much needed air of flexibility and opportunity within the larger Army and within the FA 59 officers themselves. The branch recognizes the importance of
formal academic instruction as well as the importance of reinforcing that formal learning by way of self-directed study and experiences gained and learned from during FA 59 tours of duty.

Yet, problems still persist that are constraining these positive efforts being attempted currently, and that may compromise in the future. Three major shortcomings identified here bear detailed discussion: constraints inherent in the seniority-driven assignments process itself; limiters that derive from the branch qualification requirement ‘legacy’; and the poverty that is allowed to persist in the FA 59 program in the area of formalized operational planning education for all its designated officers.
Appendix Three

The US Air Force Approach to Strategic Planning Education

Learning from the Air Force Model – A Useful Approach?

While bifurcation in the approach to educating, training, and experiencing strategic planners in the US Army has been argued against in this monograph, the USAF has endeavored upon a trifurcated path commensurate with its own service ethos, its own service design and mandates, and service peculiarities. The technical and temporal aspects of the service alone justify more of a split approach to their PME. The following charts present the latest in the US Air Force approach:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0 YOS Intro Operational Specialization</th>
<th>POL-MIL STRATEGIST (J-5)</th>
<th>POL-MIL STRATEGIST APPLICATIONS (J-3/5)</th>
<th>JOINT EMPLOYMENT (J-3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% BA/BA degrees</td>
<td>100% BS/BA degrees</td>
<td>100% BS/BA degrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Take maximum advantage of national scholarship opportunities for early/initial graduate study</td>
<td>Take maximum advantage of national scholarship opportunities for early/initial graduate study</td>
<td>Take maximum advantage of national scholarship opportunities for early/initial graduate study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 YOS Core Specialist</td>
<td>35% of pool = MS/MA degrees</td>
<td>30% of pool = MS/MA degrees</td>
<td>25% of pool = MS/MA degrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Desired focus on policy-relevant fields (eg. Politics; international relations; international economics; public policy; area studies, military history; regional history; war studies, military strategic studies)</td>
<td>Prefer major or minor focus on policy-relevant fields (eg. Politics; international relations; international economics; public policy; area studies, military history; regional history; war studies, military strategic studies)</td>
<td>Major focus defined by operational core.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some (no more than 10%) educated in technical graduate degrees</td>
<td>No more than 10% = technical degrees</td>
<td>Some focus (no more than 5% minimum) highly desired in policy/strategy-relevant fields (eg. Politics; international relations; international economics; public policy; area studies, military history; regional history, war studies, military strategic studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some (no more than 5%) = degrees in management</td>
<td>No more than 10% = management degrees</td>
<td>Follow on faculty duty desirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Follow on faculty duty desirable</td>
<td>Language skills highly desirable – 10% target</td>
<td>Language skills highly desirable = 10% target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Language skills highly desirable (25% target)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10 YOS Entry Point for POL-MIL Strategist Core Occupation</th>
<th>Aerospace Specialist</th>
<th>Aerospace specialist</th>
<th>Entry floor for joint employment broadening</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75% of pool = MS/MA degrees</td>
<td>70% of pool = MS/MA degrees</td>
<td>60% of pool MS/MA degrees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desired focus on policy-relevant fields (same as above)</td>
<td>Prefer major or minor focus on policy-relevant fields (eg. Politics; international relations; international economics; public policy; area studies, military history; regional history, war studies, military strategic studies)</td>
<td>Some focus (no more than 20% minimum) highly desired in policy/strategy-relevant fields (eg. Politics; international relations; international economics; public policy; area studies, military history; regional history, war studies, military strategic studies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No more than 15% technical graduate degrees desirable</td>
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</table>
The Air Force trifurcated education model for its strategic planners is uniquely different from the Army’s current bifurcated approach. For one, the USAF approach sets quantitative and qualitative objectives (and measures of effectiveness) for its education progression; it also infuses academic, training, and experienced-based learning into all three of its functional models.

Graduate and post-graduate level, formal civilian-based academic learning is not only emphasized (at varying degrees) at all levels within all functional domains, it is resources accordingly and supervised (directed) by the USAF. Not only is academic education viewed as an important variable in the creation of war policy experts, academic education in top-notch, prestigious institutions, and in fields of study with a direct relevance to war policy is emphasized by and controlled. The Air Force has gone farther than the Army in its education of war experts, emphasizing the need for policy relevant advanced degree achievement by its officers. The relevance of Ph.D.-level education is embraced more so by the USAF. Same is true for the US Navy, as evidenced by the work of Norman E. Hoeller:

The line officer is the personification of the Navy’s ability to meet its national defense objectives. Does the line officer, then, need a Ph.D. degree to fulfill his role within the organization? The answer is no. Is the total organization more effective, however, as a result of the intellectual potential he represents? According to the study, yes.\textsuperscript{157}

The point here is not to compel the US Army to provision all its officers with doctoral degrees in war policy; though it is interesting to note that in all other fields of policy studies, the doctorate designation is the approved accolade for recognizing 'expertise'. The point, however, is that the provisioning of a high-quality civilian-based advanced degree academic experience, for at least those officers designated to become the Army’s premier experts in holistic war policy, does provide a much needed intellectualism to the institution and its approach and conception of what war policy is and how it needs to be approached in planning and in execution.

Yet as chapter introduced and chapter three expounded upon, despite the fact that the military as an institution recognizes the importance of civilian graduate education due to its positive impacts, the perception persist that advanced civilian education somehow diminishes military expertise and professionalism.158 This virulent reaction against ‘intellectual sophistication’ haunts the US Army as both an institution and a profession, and hamstrings all efforts to educate, train, and experience a better and more effective crop of war experts for the twenty-first century.

Appendix Four

Policy Treatments: New Conceptualizations of War Policy Education

What follows is an offering of some new ways of thinking about how the US Army educates for production of the complete strategist; the strategic planner. It is an offering of some new ways of structuring these new thoughts and pedagogical methods into the education system of Functional Area 59. While most of the programs and programmatic ways presented here are not new in and of themselves, where innovation can be found is in the manner of redesign proffered in the following pages.

Formal Academic Learning: The 'West Point Core' as the Baseline

Inculcating future strategic planners in the holistic nature of war policy needs to begin at the pre-commissioning and undergraduate education stages of officer development. One of the arguments made in this monograph is that while some familiarization with the various martial and non-martial aspects of war as policy is provided to the generalist population, the Army as an institution remains remise in developing and supervising a standard set of core competencies by which to guide future and continuing (career lifecycle) officer education. The United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point has traditionally maintained a core academic and experience-based curriculum derived from, and in support of the US Army vision and mission. The Academy is presently experimenting with a new curriculum, commensurate with the changed national security environment of the post-Cold War era, and coincident with the Army’s concept of Information-Age warfare and Full Spectrum Operations. The new proposed 'West Point Core' may serve as a useful template for all officer accession and undergraduate learning institutions.
The USMA has departed significantly, but not completely, from its engineer-heavy and physical sciences traditions in order to (in hopes of) better accommodating the peculiar needs of warfare and nation-based politics of the twenty-first century. Stronger emphasis is given throughout a cadet’s four-year experience, in this newly proposed curriculum, to issues of comparative politics, culture-based studies, information management and info-tech studies, history, and international relations. Of particular note, the new approach recognizes the importance of operational integration as a tool of success for future Army officers and future strategists. Referenced as the ‘Integrative Experience’, the curriculum change currently under consideration cordons off time, space and resources within the four-year program dedicated to teaching the cadets how to “integrate” all that they have learned and experienced together. This multidisciplinary, multifunctional operational planning experience could serve as the bedrock upon which an operational planning learning experience could be built, inculcating every stage of an officer’s broad education experience.
A Better Education for All Cadets

- Anticipates the intellectual requirements of officership for the Army.
- Increases opportunities to study culture & foreign languages.
- Integrates core/study-in-depth with multidisciplinary experiences that support the overarching Academic Program Goal.
- Increases study of Information Technology.
- Maintains acceptable level of engineering/technology.
- Strengthens the major/FOS.
- Increases flexibility, versatility, and cadet choice in the Curriculum.
- Can be accomplished within current load parameters, scheduling constraints, and resources (faculty and labs).

The formal curriculum is only part of what could be a universal pre-commissioning PME for all Army officers, regardless of whether they access from the USMA, ROTC, or OCS. Infusing experience-based learning into the undergraduate education experience is vitally important to the education of future holistic war policy experts. Having the opportunity to intern, as cadets, within the US interagency process, with non-governmental and private organizations – having the opportunity to learn about the joint service community – would contribute immensely to the familiarization of wars full and true nature to these young leaders, early on. Laying this seed of understanding early, can bud into an officer corps with a better appreciation for all aspects, functions, and elements of war as policy.

Formal Academic Learning: Advanced Civilian Schooling

Though the experts all seem to agree that, at least in theory or idealistically, it would be of some benefit to afford all officers earmarked early-on as future strategists with a prestigious advanced graduate learning experience, two issues continue to stymie making this theory a reality: cost in dollars, and cost in time available in the current career developmental lifecycle.

The dollar cost challenge will continue to inhibit the process of achieving the goal of better education for future war experts. In the pages that remain, no solution (no magic pill) can be offered. However, one thing is sure: if concerns with future effectiveness in war’s prosecution
demands that war's experts are better educated in war's multidimensional character and purposes, then the US Army will need to recalculate the benefits to cost in providing high-caliber academic study to its core war strategist. Again, the USMA has been experimenting with innovative public-private cooperative initiatives with prestigious academic institutions and civilian-based foundations to find cost-effective ways of making graduate-level study available and affordable to Army officers.

The time-available challenge is more an Army self-imposition. The 'arbitrariness of branch qualification' mentioned earlier greatly prohibits not so much the opportunities available to the officer in advanced civil studies, but rather prohibits the opportunity the officer has in taking advantage of these learning opportunities. If an Army officer wishes for a successful long-term career in the service, that officer cannot "afford" to deviate too far, nor too often, from the command track; a track that has been shown to provide few opportunities for civilian graduate study. Distanced-learning and co-op education programs may prove the only feasible, suitable, and acceptable means available for providing young company grade officers advanced civilian learning experiences. It would be difficult, and potentially damaging to the tactical and technical training of officers in their core warfighting and leadership roles and functions, to offer much less mandate in-resident civilian study any earlier than the Army does now. However, the Army does need to consider whether or not it is maximizing the potential of the company grade years of a typical officer. Many young officers, after completing the vital duty assignment of platoon leader or company executive officer move on to serve upwards of two years as assistant staff officers. Might some of that time, after platoon leadership training but before branch qualifying company command, be used to provide these young officers with an advanced civilian academic learning experience? Again, if the need is recognized, the time is now to find ways of accommodating the need.
Experience-Based Learning: The Post-Graduate Fellowship/Internship

The shortfalls identified in this evaluation regarding post-graduate academic and research ("outreach") opportunities are not that there are too few opportunities available. On the contrary, the opportunities abound in terms of military-based, civilian/governmental-based, civilian/corporate/private-based, and international-based internships and fellowships for US army officers, and particularly designated "strategists" to take advantage of. The shortfall is in time available in an already saturated 'normal' career progression. Not a whole lot of time can be allocated to such extra-tactical endeavors without taking valuable time away from the technical and tactical training for warfare. Time "away from troops" is also perceived as time that could be "better spent" within the dominant US Army culture. An officer can unintentionally take on the brand of "the intellectual" rather than be recognized as "the warrior" if too much time is spent thinking about war. Though uncomfortable to hear, these sorts of cultural biases, and the arbitrary administrative restrictions that largely derive from them, are well documented by senior military leaders, scholars, and practitioners.159

One possible way of rethinking of post-graduate outreach experience as an enhancing aspect of war preparation could start with a reconsideration of officer education as a non-stop continuum. There is absolutely no reason why an assignment to a TO&E duty assignment, or to a TRADOC course should mean the end to outreach opportunity. In fact, outreach – relevant research opportunities for DOD, the Services, et al. – should be integrated into the JPME, at a minimum, and even infused into the daily activities of "field forces."

While assigned as an assistant professor with the Department of Social Sciences, USMA, West Point, this author took part in numerous real-world, relevant DOD-directed research projects. Attendance at and participation in civilian-based international affairs conferences was encouraged during this particular duty assignment. These activities were all "extra" activities from a formal duty assignment perspective, yet they were a vitally rewarding and educational
experience both for the individual officer as well as the Department program and the US Army in
general. While in attendance in the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSC), this
author continued research-based outreach activities; once the administrative barriers were
breached (typically, issues relating to lack of funds), such opportunities were encouraged by the
staff, faculty, and command group. The Office of Homeland Security even “unofficially”
solicited a small group of CGSC officers for six months of out-of-the-beltway research and
analysis regarding the preparation of the nation for the new Homeland Security function.¹⁶⁰

Fellowship, internships, and training-with-industry opportunities – typically one-year
assignments – often interfere with the standard two-three-and four-year officer assignments. The
fact that such opportunities are recognized, all too narrowly, as “extra” relegate them to perceived
time away from more legitimate duties. Consideration of fellowship or internship-based
assignments as branch service enhancing, or even branch qualifying (particularly for FA 59
officers) could help to overcome the perceptual barriers. Currently, such assignments are still
seen as “great, but a threat to needed branch qualifying time.” Receipt of an “academic evaluation
report” (AER) rather than the “officer evaluation report” (OER) relegates such outreach
opportunities as less career enhancing, and therefore less career relevant. Giving branch-
qualifying credit to such assignments (granting the OER rather than the ‘letter of appreciation’ or
AER) should be determined based on the relevancy of the job itself, rather than on whether or not
the duty position is “owned and operated” by the US Army, or an officially recognized officer
development position (ODP) assignment. The complexities defining this new information-age of
warfare actually make some of these fellowship and internship-based opportunities “more”
relevant to future martial expertise than some of the traditional experiences that have long defined
career success in the US Army. If the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is to

¹⁵⁹ Chapters one and three specifically address these arguments.
¹⁶⁰ This author was part of a ten-officer informal working group solicited by the Chief of Staff, Office of
Homeland Security (OHS) in October of 2001 to develop organizational concepts for the development of a
future Department of Homeland Security. This working group planned in support of this effort from
assume the lead-agency role in most future homeland security operations, and the US Army is
going to service as a supporting command in such missions, then facilitating the education of US
Army strategists (at a minimum) in FEMA-based operations is an important core competency to
resource and recognize as “branch qualifying.”

Incorporating outreach opportunity for officers assigned to “fighting MACOMs” is a
tougher challenge to overcome; but the problem is not insurmountable. All divisional units and
below maintain “professional reading programs.” It would not be all that difficult to infuse some
real-world relevancy to such programs, by integrating them into some ongoing TRADOC and/or
DA/DOD research project. Integration of outreach opportunities into traditional intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (IPB) activities could greatly enhance the IPB process itself, again,
adding relevancy and adding a means of educating the force on the new way of warfare.

Time and resources available are the standard excuses given to such ideas, and
unfortunately, effective excuses at ending the discussions prematurely. Time is a relative thing;
and is as much of a constraint as planners and decision makers want it to be. Why does an officer
need to stabilize in a duty assignment for a minimum of two-years (with the exception of overseas
short tours) in order for the officer to get “credit” for the work done, much less to get credit for
the educational benefit of the experience? The requirement is arbitrary and is limiting the
educational opportunity of future Army strategic planners to attain the requisite experiences and
knowledge they will need to be effective and relevant as master strategist in the post-modern war
era.

**Experience-Based Learning: Post-Graduate Studies in ‘Operations’**

Learning how to operationalize strategic challenges into tactical, or implementation-level,
plans and actions is perhaps the most important factor to consider in redesigning the US Army
educational approach to strategists development. When one thinks of operations in its effects-

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October 2001 to April 2002, and provided OHS with three organizational variants.
Based context of “integration,” the importance of operations-based education becomes even more evident.

Despite accomplishments by the Army and the other armed services in this area over the years (and with the helpful nudge of congress in 1986), there remain problems in both how the Army conceives of “operations,” and how the Army therefore prepares its officers for integration.

There is a prevailing notion within the US Army that the “operational level of war,” and to some degree the notion of “operations” itself are martial constructs, and moreover, are relevant only to the martial domain of war policy. It is doubtful, though possible, that the former contention is a correct one; the latter contention is wholly inaccurate and limiting in its perspective, given the realities of post-modern policy in general, much less warfare. Chapter two detailed the various definitions and understandings of operations, the operational level of war, and operational art. The simple chart offered in chapter two reveals something most substantial: while the official US Army, US Marine Corps, and even the Joint doctrinal definitions of “operations, et al.” qualify the integration of force in “military” terms, all other renderings avoid the martial qualifier. While the operationalization of “operations” as a formal domain or level of war during the eighteenth century did in fact take on a unique characteristic to the martial science and art, that particular operationalization, martial as it was, was of a particular time period and strategic-environmental context. This in no way was to mean that “operations” was to forever to be defined in the linear, mass-oriented military tactics, techniques, and procedures of that time, nor did it relegate operational science and artistry to merely the martial realm.

Appreciating the larger than military context of force and power integration – operations – demands a larger than martial education for the martial expert. FEMA has its own integration process and artistry, as does NASA, and the FBI, and the INS. Foreign countries have their own unique ways and means for integrating strategic aims with resources available for operational effects. Tomorrow’s uniformed strategic planner must be familiar with, if not expert in, all these various operational methodologies; and more. Operational expertise must begin with formal
academic learning, and reinforced by training and experienced-based learning opportunities, throughout the career lifecycle.

### The Spectrum We Want the Joint Force to Dominate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>WAR</strong></th>
<th><strong>MOOTW Involving Use/Threat of Force</strong></th>
<th><strong>MOOTW Not Involving Use/Threat of Force</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUCLEAR WARFARE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONVENTIONAL WARFARE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FORCIBLE ENTRY; STRIKES; RAID S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>INFORMATION OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS; RECOVERY OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>COMBATING TERRORISM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HOMELAND SECURITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMELAND DEFENSE; NATIONAL LAND DEFENSE; NATIONAL MARITIME DEFENSE; NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE DEFENSE; CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVIL SUPPORT; CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT; MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITY; DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTER DRUG OPS</td>
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### Learning from the Lessons of the '86-'89 Joint Officer Reforms

The Skelton Panel was the first official governmental review of jointness in DOD; it was the first formal review to identify systemic shortfalls and the first statutory attempt to rectify some of those shortfalls. The current Joint Staff transformation initiatives in joint professional military education (JPME) continue to find shortcomings, and continue to strive toward possible solutions. One of the JCS's latest reviews find an educational (academic; training; experiential learning) gap between the captain and lieutenant colonel ranks in joint integration.
The junior grade—middle ranks gap in joint integration education has been substantiated in a recent Boos-Allen study, conducted under contract by the JCS. While the civilian-contracted study found an absence in joint integration education at the company grade levels, the reviewers acknowledged the continuing importance of focusing the majority of company grade training and academic study on service core-competencies—developing and reinforcing service expertise prior to joint education. However, the study did emphasize the need for improved joint education and familiarization earlier in the officer career development timeline. The solution mentioned is becoming a popular panacea for the education dilemma: distanced learning.

The pros and cons of distanced learning are beyond the scope of this monograph. However, self-study, no matter how enhanced through improved information technology and digitization, should not be considered as the cure-all for joint officer education. The same holds true for solving the strategist education gap. One remedy initiated in November of 2002 by the Department of the Army for Army strategist (FA59) education is the establishment of a distanced learning correspondence program, the Defense National Security Studies Program.\(^1\) So far still a voluntary self-study program, the DNSSP is a useful supplement to what should be a broad, wide-ranging curriculum for the education of Army strategic planners. Valuating the program as more

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\(^1\) This program began in November 2002, and can be accessed [online] at http://www.persom.gov.
than a supplement may be a programmatic misstep toward a better more holistic educational system.

**Advanced “War” Studies Programs: Infusing More Joint and Strategy**

Despite the best efforts and outputs of SAMS, SASS, and SAWS, there remains a crucial shortage in operational integration expertise – both within the military domain and within the civilian sectors. The merging of the domestic with the foreign aspects of security policy, and the commensurate rise of homeland security issues, makes the absence of a cross-cutting, civil-military operational integration education system all the more substantial and foreboding.

Attaining full joint integration between SAMS-SASS-SAWS remains a challenge; infusing full-combined (multinational) and full-interagency integration via some formalized educational system and/or institution remains an even more distant endeavor. The call for a joint advanced studies program is not a new one. Yet, there is a new initiative currently underway within the J-7 of the Joint Staff to realize a joint equivalent to SAMS and the other service-based advanced warfighting programs. Tentatively labeled the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, or JAWS, this proposed program would supplement (not replace) the one-year service-based advanced studies programs, focusing academic, training, and experiential learning on joint operational integration – the development of theater strategic plans.

The same thought and effort needs to be committed to the establishment of strategic integration education, though a programmatic similar to the proposed JAWS initiative. Or better still, the JAWS concept could be reconceived and redesigned even before its development and implementation (anticipated for Fall of 2003)\(^{162}\) to go beyond the joint integration competencies, incorporating full-spectrum integration education (civilian; interagency; corporate; multinational; etc.). A broadened conception of the Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) – one that incorporates martial and extra martial capabilities and competencies within the scenarios – could serve as the

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\(^{162}\) Discussions (electronic mail and telephonic) with the J-7 and staff, March 2003.
baseline for the course curriculum and androgogy. Piggybacking on the positive movements
toward better joint education may be the best means of bettering the educational opportunities of
future strategic planners.

Merging the Learning: ‘Flexible Assignments’

This is not the first study to pinpoint major faults and shortcomings in effective officer
development to the officer personnel management system. It will surely not be the last. Without
belaboring the point, ‘flexibility’ in officer assignments, promotion selection, branch qualification
crediting, and career development is an important factor in future educational success of war
policy experts. The “command track” pathway to officer success needs to be relooked,
reconceived, and redesigned, so that it accommodates the acquisition of core competencies and
expertise that are now redefining success in the post-modern age of warfare. The Army’s notion
of ‘command’ itself is perhaps ready for a review. This latter point remains more of a
philosophical discussion, but practical evidence is beginning to mount, supporting at least the
plausible idea that notions of command in the past no longer fits nicely with the command needs
of this new age of warfare. The US Army, though successfully evolving its tactics, techniques,
and procedures to post-modern warfare, is already experiencing cognitive dissidence in
transforming fully and confidently to the new emergent ways and purposes of war policy. Under
such transitory conditions, the need for a small but capable body of strategic planning experts to
serve as ‘translators’ and mediators between the traditional Army and the emergent one –
between the martial and the extra-martial halves of the war policy coin – is perhaps more
important than ever before.

The US Army must rethink what it values as “relevant assignments” versus less relevant.
Three-year assignments in staff and command positions are important for the achievement of
“mastery level” experience, confidence in operation integration and execution of plans and
orders. However, there is no reason that three years spent in a particular duty assignment – to a
particular unit of action – should relegate experience to the confines of the particular unit of assignment. Outreach opportunities should be incorporated into standard unit operations. Three-month, six-month and one-year internships/fellowship experiences should be infused in TDA and TO&E assignments, and seen for their staff and planning-relevancy. Perhaps longer stabilizing timelines are the solution, with the caveat that officers are parceled out to various outreach opportunities during perhaps a four to six year duty assignment, in a “with duty at” or “with duty with” status. This sort of recommendation would require innovations in the overall assignments philosophy and processes. Yet, if the nature of post-modern war calls for such innovation and adaptation, then innovation of existing educational and assignments-based processes must be given credence and consideration. One way to experiment, cost-effectively, with such ideas is to forego the majority of traditional regulatory guidelines and mandates of the officer career management system for FA 59 officers.
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