

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
AFTER THE COLD WAR

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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The United States of America played a significant role in the Middle East during the second part of the Twentieth century. The United States has used its power to safeguard its national interests in the Middle East. The results of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East have varied, and created new friends and foes. This is inherent in the contradictory interest the United States pursuing in the region. This thesis will address the period in the wake of the Cold War. In this period United States faced a changing strategic reality; a Middle East without the vanishing Soviet Union's influence. United States has pursued a number of national interests during the last decade of the Twentieth century, some more vital than others. The purpose of this thesis is to examine if post Cold War United States foreign policy efforts in the Middle East has served the United States national interests. This examination will be done by analyzing the United States foreign policy activities to secure its national interests, defined by the National Security Strategy, in the region.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE COLD WAR by MAJ Ronny Modigs, 92 pages.

The United States of America played a significant role in the Middle East during the second part of the Twentieth century. The United States has used its power to safeguard its national interests in the Middle East. The results of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East have varied, and created new friends and foes. This is inherent in the contradictory interest the United States pursuing in the region.

This thesis will address the period in the wake of the Cold War. In this period United States faced a changing strategic reality; a Middle East without the vanishing Soviet Union's influence. United States has pursued a number of national interests during the last decade of the Twentieth century, some more vital than others.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine if post Cold War United States foreign policy efforts in the Middle East has served the United States national interests. This examination will be done by analyzing the United States foreign policy activities to secure its national interests, defined by the National Security Strategy, in the region.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The United States of America played a significant role in the Middle East during the second part of the Twentieth century. The United States used its power to safeguard all its national interests in the region. Some national interests are in some ways contradictory to each other. For example the security of Israel and the need for oil from the Arab states in the region. The results of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East varied during the Twentieth century. The varied results and impact of United States foreign policy have created adversaries and enemies, some of whom hate America so much they conduct terrorist attacks within America. The issue of whether the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East has created the terrorism threats that the United States faces today is too big to address adequately in this thesis, but is fundamental to it. This thesis will address the period from the end of the Cold War to 2001, when President Clinton left office, and focuses on the national interests of the United States in the Middle East. The purpose of this thesis is to examine if post-Cold War United States' foreign policy in the Middle East has served the United States' national interests.

#### Background

By the mid 1850s United States' trade in the Middle East had become substantial enough for the U.S. to attempt to get a commercial treaty with the Persian Empire.<sup>1</sup> Trade with the region did not increase during the next four decades since the local population was not greatly impressed with American commercial, political, and religious ideas. In 1892 British Lord Curzon<sup>2</sup> wrote:

It is against the impregnable rock wall of Islam, as a system embracing every sphere and duty, and act of life, that the waves of missionary effort beat and buffet in vain.<sup>3</sup>

The naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan when describing the region of strategic importance between Europe and the Orient coined the term Middle East. In the 1930s the United States assessed the importance of the Middle East as a land bridge among three continents. At this time the increasing importance of the region's contribution to the world supply of oil was becoming apparent as well as the Middle East's proximity to the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup> U.S. interests in the Middle East were minimal before World War II since it was considered a region dominated by Britain and that U.S. did not have much to gain from the region.<sup>5</sup> Some private individuals and groups, such as protestant missionary bodies, had clearly defined interests in the region, as did the Zionists who were working for the creation of a Jewish homeland.

During World War II (WW II) the United States and its European allies recognized the long-term strategic value of the region's oil resources. They found out how critically important petroleum was to fighting a modern conflict. At the same time they realized that Middle East oil could serve European postwar recovery. World War II definitely was the turning point for the United States regarding its interests in the Middle East. Three main issues were to influence American foreign policy in the Middle East for the rest of the Twentieth century. The fundamental issues were the Arab-Israeli conflict, the importance of Middle East oil, and the Soviet Union's threat to the United States and its allies. This thesis will now address the important background of these three issues.

## The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Hitler's extermination of European Jews became the turnaround for the Zionist movement. When effects of the holocaust became clear to American Jews any doubts about support for the Zionists disappeared among the American people and American Jews intensified lobbying in political circles.<sup>6</sup> Evidence of the success of the lobbying effort is demonstrated by President Roosevelt's 1944 campaign pledge:

I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give them their support to this aim. If re-elected I shall help to bring about its earliest realization.<sup>7</sup>

After World War II the Allies were facing a huge refugee problem with the holocaust survivors assembled in camps in Europe, which drove the question of a Jewish state. In 1947, the United Nations took over the question of Palestine, which was under a British mandate, and proposed that Palestine should consist of two states, one Jewish and one Arabic. This proposal came after extensive pressure on the British government from the Truman administration. The British were opposed to an independent Israel but were forced to comply because of economic pressure from the U.S. However, even in the U.S. administration there was strong opposition against the creation of Israel, for example, from Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Secretary of State George Marshall.<sup>8</sup>

On May 14 the establishment of Israel was declared and British troops withdrew. Immediately the Jews captured Jewish western Jerusalem, driving out all Palestinian inhabitants. The fighting between Arabs and Jews turned Jerusalem into a war zone and destroyed the United Nations' ability to work in the city. The swift action by the Jews created a huge Arab refugee problem by displacing 780,000 Palestinians.<sup>9</sup> The Arab states were not willing to handle the refugee problem partly because they were afraid it



would leave Palestine without Arabs forever and partly because of the economic burden it would put on their limited economies.<sup>10</sup>

From the creation of Israel the administrations of all American presidents from Truman to Clinton thought the Zionist dream of a Jewish homeland worthy of American support.<sup>11</sup> Another significant event in the history of Arab-Israeli conflict was the Suez crisis of 1956. Israel, having a deal with U.K. and France, attacked Egypt to seize the Suez Canal and an Anglo-French military intervention to protect the Suez Canal was condemned by the United States and the UN. The Anglo-French forces withdrew under a threat of war from the Soviet Union and UN troops occupied the Suez Canal zone. One of the consequences was that the Soviet Union's influence in the Middle East increased significantly and British and French influence waned.<sup>12</sup> During the Six-Day War in 1967 Israel attacked Syria, Egypt, and Jordan after Egypt's President Nasser, through military alliances, had tried to surround and cut off Israel. The war ended with a total Israeli victory as Israel seized the Sinai, Golan Heights, the old parts of Jerusalem, and the West Bank and Gaza areas of the Palestine mandate. The Soviet Union in turn helped the Arab states to rearm their armies'.<sup>13</sup>

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt and Syria surprisingly attacked Israel during its celebration of Yom Kippur. Israel suffered at the beginning of the war, but with extensive help from the U.S. in airlifting ammunition and supplies, managed to turn the situation around and surround the Egyptian army.<sup>14</sup> At the same time the United States and the Soviet Union acted through the United Nations' Security Council and enforced a truce which was supervised by UN troops. The important consequences of that war were that the United States became the leading western supporter of Israel and

that the Arab oil states started to use oil as a strategic weapon. They started to raise oil prices and sent an emissary to Washington to deliver a clear message:

Unless Israel returned to the 1967 lines and the United States stopped its arms supply to Israel, an embargo would be placed on all oil shipments to the United States.<sup>15</sup>

This was the first explicit connection between United States' two principal national interests in the Middle East, access to oil and the support of Israel. Partially as the result of the oil embargo, the United States began to participate more actively in the peace process and publicly admitted the need for a Palestinian homeland.<sup>16</sup> Other important issues have and will continue to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict. Religion, which historically has played a significant role in Arab and Jewish societies, especially in Jerusalem, is a unique problem because of religious differences of Islam and Judaism. Jews believe that God gave the land of Israel to them and them alone. Muslims also claim Jerusalem and believe that the concept of a Jewish state is against the philosophy of Islam.<sup>17</sup> The Palestinian refugee problem, created by the 1948 war and the 1967 Six Day War, also contributed to Arab nationalism and added impetus to the Palestinian resistance movement. These issues are clearly interrelated and show the complexity of the quest for a Palestine homeland.<sup>18</sup>

#### The Importance of Middle East Oil

Before World War II the United States did not have much interest in Middle East oil. The American oil companies in the region represented purely commercial concerns since the United States remained the world's largest oil producer and exporter.<sup>19</sup> At the end of the WW II Middle East oil became very important and a strategic necessity to American and European war efforts for fueling planes, ships, tanks, and trucks. The

increased American diplomatic, economic, and military involvement in the Middle East during the war ensured that American oil companies came to play a leading role in the region after World War II. In fact, American oil companies played a major role in carrying out United States' foreign policy with Arab states until 1973. In 1945 Truman stated:

Thus the world oil center of gravity is shifting to the Middle East where American enterprise has been entrusted with the exploitation of one of the greatest oil fields. It is in our national interest to see that this vital resource remains in American hands, where it is most likely to be developed on a scale, which will cause a considerable lessening of the drain upon Western Hemisphere reserves.<sup>20</sup>

In the late 1940s Middle East oil became strategically important to the U.S. since America saw its share of world oil production fall from seventy percent to fifty-one percent while the Middle East share rose from seven to sixteen percent.<sup>21</sup> The United States, which so far had been the world's greatest oil exporter, could not maintain this position after World War II. The United States needed Middle East oil in peacetime as well as in wartime to keep the industrial advantage it already possessed, plus the fact that the American military had become heavily dependent on oil. However, until the oil crisis in 1973, following the Yom Kippur War, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East did not devote much attention to Arab demands. The Arabs used oil as a political weapon against the United States' support of Israel and the quadrupled oil price intensified the energy crisis in the Western world.<sup>22</sup> At this time the United States realized that its foreign policy in the Middle East had to become more balanced, away from a singular focus on support of Israel.

### The Soviet Union's Threat to United States and Its Allies

After World War II the Soviet Union's influence the Middle East also increased for several reasons. The strategic importance for its national defense with the Middle East as a buffer zone against Europe and United States is one reason. The Soviet Union was more or less defenseless against a nuclear attack launched by submarines located either in the Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet Union also lacked warm water seaports near its industrial centers, which made it strive for seaports in the Middle East to enhance both its commercial and military capabilities.<sup>23</sup> This led to the establishment of a significant Soviet naval presence in the region.

In its "ideological" struggle against the West, the Soviet Union needed to balance the Western powers. Both sides had global ambitions at the time and struggled for increased power and a widened sphere of influence. The Soviet Union tried to deny Western states influence, and to expand trade with the Middle East. The Soviet Union was self-sufficient in oil production but wanted to undermine Western influence and access to Middle East oil. The Soviet Union gained political influence in the region principally by exploitation of the Arab-Israeli conflict through arms deliveries to a number of Arab countries such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and South Yemen.<sup>24</sup>

The Soviet Union, acting with the Warsaw Pact, began to increase its influence in the Middle East in 1955. This was when the West denied arms sale to Egypt. Egypt instead turned to Czechoslovakia, which agreed to provide Egypt with all weapon systems that Israel was acquiring from a secret arms sale with France. The Western monopoly on arms supply was broken. This action from Egypt brought the Soviet Union into the region and gave the regional actors more room to maneuver.<sup>25</sup> This situation led

to the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 in which the Soviet Union played a role, which significantly increased its influence in the region. The Soviet Union was an important actor in the Middle East throughout the Cold War.

### Conclusion

This chapter outlined the background and the most important factors and issues that influenced United States' foreign policy in the Middle East until the end of the Cold War. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, one of the most important national interests of the United States in the Middle East--denial of Soviet influence--disappeared, and the Soviet Union's threat to the United States and its allies ended. This thesis begins, at the end of the Cold War, when the two most historically important national interests of the United States in the Middle East remained valid. Access to Middle East oil and support of Israel are still national interests, although they contradict each other in many ways. At the end of the Cold War other national interests also arose for the U.S. in the region. It soon became clear that the need for stability in the region was important. Additional national interests of the United States during this period consisted of the security of friendly Arab allies, the spread of democracy, and the promotion of human rights for the people in the region.<sup>26</sup>

The purpose of this thesis is to examine if the United States' post-Cold War foreign policy in the Middle East has served the United States' national interests in the region and the world.

### Definitions

One of the key terms to define is, "the Middle East region." Originally the Middle East was a British colonial term, which in the middle of the nineteenth century

included Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Beyond the Middle East was the Far East and between the Middle East and Europe was the Near East (the eastern coastlines of the Mediterranean and its hinterland). The Middle East location has gradually moved west to include the Near East although both terms are still used. Today the term Middle East is used for the countries on the Arabic peninsula and Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran. Sometimes, and in this thesis, the term includes Libya, Sudan, Cyprus and Afghanistan.<sup>27</sup>

Another key term to define is “the end of the Cold War,” which in this thesis means the time after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989.<sup>28</sup>

Another important term to define is, “terrorism.” In this thesis the United States’ Department of Defense definition will be used: “The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”<sup>29</sup>

In this thesis the term terrorism also means the terrorism from the Middle East region, which basically means the terrorist threat the United States faces today.

#### Assumptions

The United States has no “hidden” agenda that influences its national interests and foreign policy in the Middle East.

Nation states act rationally according to their own perceived national interests.

#### Limitations

This thesis will not be able to link or analyze the U.S. domestic politics influence on the foreign policy in any depth.

This thesis will not be able to analyze the influence of Arab domestic politics, social, and religious issues in any depth and will therefore more or less handle these issues from a holistic perspective, although an admitted simplification of the complexity of these issues in this region.

### Delimitations

This thesis examines the United States' foreign policies in the Middle East as a whole and does not therefore examine the impact in a particular country if that policy or impact towards or from a particular country is not believed to influence the results or the conditions examined. This thesis examines a subjective choice of important activities in the United States' policies in the Middle East and their outcomes and does not examine every single activity or policy across the range of diplomatic, economic, informational and military instruments of power.

The significant change of the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East that occurred after the tragic terrorist attack on the eleventh of September 2001 is beyond the scope of this thesis and will not therefore be examined.

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<sup>1</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 23.

<sup>2</sup>Lord Curzon was one of the most important viceroys that were sent from England to rule India. He was a seasoned politician and before coming to India he had been an active parliamentarian and had been a minister twice. He was hardly forth when he was appointed as the viceroy of India. Before becoming the viceroy he had been to India three or four times and had also visited Ceylon, Afghanistan, Persia, Turkistan, China, Japan and Korea. In this way, his understanding of the Asian affairs was better than that of any other British statesman of the time quoted in <http://www.investindia.com/india50/history.htm>

<sup>3</sup>Ibid. Curzon, George N., *Persia and the Persia question* (London and New York: Longman and Green, vol. 1, 1892), 509.

<sup>4</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 17.

<sup>5</sup>T. G. Fraser, *The USA and the Middle East since World War 2* (Hong Kong: Macmillan Press LTD, 1989), x-xii.

<sup>6</sup>T. G. Fraser, *The USA and the Middle East since World War 2* (Hong Kong: Macmillan Press LTD, 1989), x-xii.

<sup>7</sup>T. G. Fraser, *The USA and the Middle East since World War 2* (Hong Kong: Macmillan Press LTD, 1989), x-xii. See also; Roosevelt to Wagner, 15 October 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. V, 615-16.

<sup>8</sup>T. G. Fraser, *The USA and the Middle East since World War 2* (Hong Kong: Macmillan Press LTD, 1989), 4-12.

<sup>9</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 39.

<sup>10</sup>Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, 1979), 163.

<sup>11</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 17.

<sup>12</sup>Tidens Världshistoria, *Från franska revolutionen till våra dagar* (Sweden: Tidens Förlag, 1987), 257.

<sup>13</sup>Forum, *När hände vad?, Världshistorisk uppslagsbok 1500-1992*, (Sweden: Bokförlaget Forum, 1993), 378.

<sup>14</sup>Following an Egyptian refusal to accept a cease-fire and a Soviet military airlift to the Arab states, the Nixon Administration sent a United States airlift of weapons and supplies to Israel enabling her to recover from earlier setbacks. Starting on October 14, 1973 U.S. Air Force "Operation Nickel Grass" flew resupply missions to Israel for a full month, until November 14. See [http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf\\_1967to1991\\_ykwar\\_course.php](http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_ykwar_course.php) .

<sup>15</sup>Kelly, J. B., *Arabia, the Gulf and the West* (New York: Basic Books, A division of HarperCollins, 1980), 397 ff., quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 103; and in Kelly, J.B., *Arabia, the Gulf and the West* (New York: Basic Books, A division of HarperCollins, 1980), 397 ff.

<sup>16</sup>Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, 1979), 166.



<sup>17</sup>Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, 1979), 162-163.

<sup>18</sup>Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, 1979), 107.

<sup>19</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 27.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 29, *Report of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee's (SWNCC) Near and Middle East Subcommittee*, September 20, 1945, quoted in Palmer, Michael A., *Guardians of the Gulf. A history of America's expanding role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992* (New York: the Free Press, 1992).

<sup>21</sup>Statistical Office of the United Nations (1950). *Statistical yearbook, 1949-1950*. Second issue, Table 43. New York: U.N. Publications, 146-147, Statistical Office of the United Nations (1950). *Statistical yearbook, 1949-1950*. Second issue, Table 43. New York: U.N. Publications, 146-147; quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 32.

<sup>22</sup>Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, 1979), 137.

<sup>23</sup>Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, 1979), 166.

<sup>24</sup>Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, 1979), 167.

<sup>25</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 61.

<sup>26</sup>William Clinton, *National Security Strategy of the United States: A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington D.C.: The White House, July 1994), 5.

<sup>27</sup>*Nationalencyklopedin*, NE Nationalencyklopedin AB, Malmö, Sweden, 2000.

<sup>28</sup>See for example historical article from Berlin Wall online;  
<http://www.dailysoft.com/berlinwall/history/fall-of-berlinwall.htm>

<sup>29</sup>See for example Terrorism Research Center;  
<http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/bpart1.html> for the DoD definition of Terrorism.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review evaluates the literature, which analyses United States' foreign policies in the Middle East. This evaluation classifies the different sources that have been used in this thesis according to their affiliation.

Efforts have been made to find sources that represent a wide range of opinions to give the thesis an objective perspective. To accomplish this effort sources were used from a variety of countries as well as religious affiliations to give this thesis as objective a bias as possible. This was difficult due to the inherent fact of the topic, "United States foreign policy," which has made the sources overwhelmingly American or written for the American market. No effort was made to classify sources from journals and magazines, in another way than as described below.

#### Classification of sources

The sources used in this thesis were of different types. The first type is the one that provided the historical information to put the thesis in its context. For this purpose sources like "The USA and the Middle East since World War 2" by T. G. Fraser,<sup>1</sup> which analyzes the United States' policy and especially diplomacy in the Middle East from WW II until the Cold War ended. This thesis has also used some theses written at different military colleges in America. One is by Conlin and Luce (1979),<sup>2</sup> "A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States foreign policy in the Middle East," a master's thesis, which was useful to outline the background although it is somewhat out of date. The second type of literature is governmental publications like the National Security Strategy, the public papers of the President, DoD Annual Report to the

Congress, other congressional records and foreign policy in the Middle East stated by the different administrations.

When it comes to the results of the United States foreign policy, a third type of sources can be defined. These sources, used to analyze the United States' foreign policy efforts after the Cold War, can be separated by their perspective or purpose. This spectrum can be divided into the categories of: authors with affiliation to either the Jewish or the Arab side of the conflict, U.S. domestic critics, U.S. theses, other governmental publications, and other sources.

In the category "authors with affiliation to either the Jewish or the Arab side of the conflict" authors like Yossef Bodansky<sup>3</sup> and his book "The High Cost of Peace" or Barry Rubin and his "The Tragedy of the Middle East" can be found. These two are examples of authors who have a pro-Israeli affiliation. Bodansky works for a Jewish lobby organization and Rubin is a former professor at a Hebrew University and is a frequent published in the Jerusalem post. Bodansky put the blame on Washington's policies but does not consider Israel to have done much wrong. Rubin put more or less all the blame on the Arab states and thinks that the U.S. could have done more to gain power. In this category authors with pro-Arab affiliation (or a negative attitude toward the U.S.) can also be found. This is rarer due to the overwhelming pro-Israeli literature to be found in the U.S., which is inherent in the position the U.S. has in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Stephen Pellitieré and his "Iraq and the international oil system--why America went to war in the Gulf" is one example in this category that has a U.S. negative tone to it.

In the category “U.S. domestic critics”, a more critical and pacifistic perspective is found. This category consists of authors like Noam Chomsky and Stephen Zunes. Chomsky’s “Rouge States” is one example of his opportunism against political hypocrisy and the way superpowers like the U.S. use their power. Another author is Stephen Zunes and his interesting analysis of U.S. Middle East policy titled “Tinderbox, U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism.”<sup>4</sup> Dr. Zunes analyzes United States’ Middle East policies both with a regional and a functional/historical approach.

In the category “U.S. theses and governmental publications”, the National Security Strategy, different masters’ theses from the U.S. War College or Air Command and Staff College and other research institutes in some way associated with governmental organizations like the Strategic Studies Institute are used. These publications give a good base for this thesis analysis as well as good insights and analyses of United States’ foreign policy and its effect.

In the category “other sources” this thesis defines sources, which do not belong to one of the other categories. This means sources from other parts of the world such as Lorenza Rossi’s “Who Shall Guard the Guardians Themselves,”<sup>5</sup> an analysis of the United States’ strategy in the Middle East since 1945. This study was made in 1998 and gives a very good background and analysis of the time until 1997 to the Middle East dilemma.

### Conclusion

This thesis literature review covers a wide spectrum of opinions and biases. This is natural since it is a very important issue, not only for millions of people in the Middle East but also for most of the Western World. The literature does have an inherent

western bias and is to a certain degree written for a Western or U.S. public. There is also the inherent assumption that if you agree with U.S. policy your book would never be published.

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<sup>1</sup>T. G. Fraser, *The USA and the Middle East since World War 2* (Hong Kong: Macmillan Press LTD, 1989).

<sup>2</sup>Conlin and Luce (1979), *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, 1979).

<sup>3</sup>Yossef Bodansky (2002), *The High Cost of Peace* (U.S.A.: Forum, 2002).

<sup>4</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003).

<sup>5</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998).

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this thesis is a qualitative literature-assessing survey of analyses made of the United States' foreign policies in the Middle East after the Cold War. This chapter describes the research tools, the research design, and the methodology used in this thesis.

#### Research tools

Since this thesis methodology is a qualitative literature-assessing survey, literature of different kinds is the main and only source used to collect data. The data in this thesis was found in different types of literature. Books were the main source of information and data. Articles and journals were other sources that were used to collect data. Another useful research tool was the Internet and other databases where different analyses were found, to be used as data.

#### Research Design

The first phase of research was to collect data that will set the stage or create the historical background needed to take the thesis to the time after the Cold War. This was done by studying analyses made of the United States' foreign policies in the Middle East from the early Twentieth century until 1989. This phase also determines what the national interests are that the United States had in the Middle East until the end of the Cold War.

The second phase of research was to collect data that was used to analyze the United States' national security strategy for the Middle East from 1989 until 2001 and the September 11 terrorist attacks. The data was collected mainly from the United States'

national security strategy. In this phase the data collection also focused on establishing a timeline of major foreign policy activities conducted by United States administrations after the Cold War. This data was collected from governmental papers and strategic overviews of the Middle East region found in different strategic research institutes' magazines and journals.

The third phase of research focused on collecting data from some major analyses made of the United States' foreign policies in the Middle East and its results. In this phase magazines and journals were used to collect data, mainly from shorter articles of analyses made in order to fill a potential gap of larger analyzes published in books in the last years.

#### Thesis Methodology

This thesis first analyzes the national security strategy the United States had in the Middle East as a stage setter to an analysis of its foreign policies. The analysis of the national security strategy in the Middle East starts when the Cold War ended. This analysis did not analyze the national security strategy of the first year of every administration, since the first national security strategy probably is more of a heritage from the earlier administration than the new administration's opinion. In this research the analysis focuses on continuity or discontinuity in the foreign policies of the United States in the Middle East since the Cold War ended.

Secondly this thesis analyzes if the post-Cold War United States foreign policy efforts in the Middle East have served the United States' national interests. The methodology this thesis uses was to analyse a number of analyses of United States foreign policies in the Middle East, and analyse them by national interests.

## Conclusion

This thesis uses a qualitative literature-assessing survey to analyse if U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy efforts in the Middle East have served U.S. national interests. The data was collected from literature of different types, but mainly from books. This thesis analysis methodology was to analyse U.S. foreign policy efforts by the national interests in the national security strategy.



## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

This chapter analyzes the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East by national interests as they are stated in the National Security Strategy. A number of separate analyses will be conducted of:

- U.S. national interests presented by President George H.W. Bush and President Clinton in their national security strategy (NSS) to determine if there were any significant changes in U.S. strategy in the Middle East since the Cold War ended
- U.S. national interest of the security of Israel,
- U.S. national interest of freedom of commerce and especially the need for free access to Middle East oil at reasonable prices will be analyzed,
- U.S. national interest of the security of friendly Arab states, and
- U.S. national interest of the spread of democracy and promotion of human rights, as well as an analysis of the perception of the U.S. among the Islamic people of the Middle East.

#### United States National Security Strategy towards the Middle East

President George H. W. Bush (1988-1992)

President George Bush's NSS of 1988 describes four principal U.S. national interests: First, the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, which means fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. Second, a healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad. Third, a stable and secure world,

fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions. Fourth, healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.<sup>1</sup>

In the Middle East U.S. interests include promoting stability and the security of its friends, maintaining the free flow of oil, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, discouraging destabilizing conventional arms sales, countering terrorism, and encouraging a peace process that brings about a reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states as well as between Israel and the Palestinians in a manner consonant with the U.S.'s enduring commitment to Israel's security. He emphasized that U.S. oil imports are likely to increase and that stability in the Gulf region is of fundamental concern to the U.S., and that military and political turbulence in the region have a direct impact on the U.S. economy through higher oil prices and potential supply disruptions. He further said that U.S. will help states in the Middle East to fashion regional security arrangements in the aftermath of the Gulf War, which will need a continuing U.S. presence in the region consistent with the desires and needs of its friends.<sup>2</sup>

President Bush's security strategy changed between 1990 and 1991 due to two different issues. The NSS of 1991 marked the first time the U.S. recognized the fall of the Soviet Union and announced the "new world order." The President also stated that the world was entering a new era. The other factor that influenced his 1991 NSS was the Gulf War. In the aftermath of the Gulf War he stated that the Middle East presents new challenges and opportunities. The NSS also supports more military presence in the region with naval presence and propositioning of heavy equipment, but not a permanent ground presence. This NSS was written right after the Gulf War, so it fell to the next

president to find a more comprehensive National Security Strategy for the “new world order” in the Middle East.

#### President William Clinton (1992-2000)

President Clinton’s National Security Strategies between 1994 and 1996 were subtitled “engagement and enlargement” after that the Clinton NSS began to focus on the new millennium, calling them strategies “for a new century.” His last NSS (December 2000) was named “for a global age.”<sup>3</sup> Even though President Clinton’s strategies changed names during the years of his presidency, the main theme or strategy seems to have been “engagement.” His national interests and national objectives were consistently three: enhancing security home and abroad, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights.<sup>4</sup> President Clinton’s security strategy did not change much during the years. For the Middle East he divided the interests in the region under the three overall objectives. To enhance security in the Middle East, the U.S. has enduring interests in pursuing a lasting and comprehensive Middle East peace, ensuring the security and well-being of Israel, helping its Arab friends provide for their security, and maintaining the free flow of oil.<sup>5</sup> To do this Clinton continued to promote an Israeli-Palestinian peace based on partnership and cooperation. He maintained a military presence in the Gulf region to enhance regional stability and supported the efforts to bring Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions. He encouraged members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to work closely on collective defense and security arrangements, help individual GCC states with their defense, and maintain bilateral defense agreements. As to promoting prosperity U.S. had the following economic objectives in the region: to promote regional economic cooperation and development,

and to ensure an unrestricted flow of oil from the region, to promote regional trade and cooperation, and to start programs for regional business arrangements, especially with Israel.<sup>6</sup>

The U.S. dependence on oil is described as more than 40 percent of the U.S. primary energy needs. Beginning in 1990 over 50 percent of that need for oil has been met by imports, and a large share of that comes from the Persian Gulf area.<sup>7</sup> While U.S. imports only about 15 percent of the oil exported from the Persian Gulf, the region will remain of vital strategic importance to U.S. national security due to the global nature of the international oil market. The U.S. interest in promoting democracy is described more vaguely in the NSS. The U.S. will encourage the spread of democracy and democratic values throughout the Middle East by constructive dialogue and hope that the region's leaders (for example Iran) will carry out the peoples' mandate for a government that respects and protects the rule of law, both in internal and external affairs. Promoting democracy includes increasing political participation, enhancing the quality of governance, and challenging governments to improve their human rights records. Clinton also stated that his policies were guided by a profound respect for Islam.<sup>8</sup>

### Conclusion

In the Middle East, U.S. national security strategies have basically had the same core national interests since 1989. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, one of the most important U.S. interests--containment of the Soviet Union--disappeared. Instead, the importance of regional stability was raised and with that other interests were emphasized to achieve this regional stability, primarily by securing Israel and the free flow of oil at

reasonable prices. These objectives remained the most important national interests of the U.S. in the region from 1989 to 2001.

### The Security of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

A successful peace process lubricates other U.S. relationships in the Middle East and Persian Gulf; a failing process pours sand into the gears.<sup>9</sup>

United States' national interest of the preservation of the state of Israel, as shown in the introduction, has been consistent since the creation of the Israeli state. But the rationale for this interest, except for the historical ties, shifted after the Cold War and especially after the Gulf War. This part will analyze the United States' actions in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict to determine how this has influenced the United States' national interests in the Middle East and demonstrate that a successful peace process would be the best way to secure U.S. national interests in the Middle East.

The conflict between Israel and Palestine has different names, depending on who looks at it. In this thesis it will be referred to as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict instead of the Arab-Israeli conflict, even if the latter's wider context certainly influences both belligerents' actions. In this conflict it is particularly difficult to get rid of the anchor of history, which is why everything cannot be determined by actions after the Cold War. This examination will begin with the U.S. interests Israel has served in the past and will help explain why Israel is such an important ally for the U.S. now and in the future.

#### Israel Serving U.S. Interests

The U.S. has used Israel as a player to secure its national interest in the Middle East for many years. From its creation Israel was important as an outpost of Western democracy in an increasingly important strategic region in the world. Israel has been

used as a player in the strategy the U.S. inherited from the British, *Divide et impera* (divide it in order to rule). Israel became important as a key component in projecting U.S. military and economic interests in the region and as a counterweight to the Arab nations.<sup>10</sup> Israel, as a client of U.S., has served U.S. national interests by successfully preventing victories by radical nationalistic movements in Lebanon and in Jordan, has kept Syrian ambitions of expansion in check and Israel's Air Force is predominant throughout the region which has allowed the U.S. to stay of the region for a long time. Israel has been a testing ground for American arms, and has been a conduit for U.S. arms and advisors to regimes and movements too unpopular for the U.S. to support openly, such as the Iran-Contras example.<sup>11</sup> Israel has worked covertly with the CIA and other U.S. agencies to support U.S. interests in the region and the world.

Some analysts view a militant Israel as a means to advance U.S. interests. Israel at war needs support from the U.S. Israel dependent on the U.S. is more willing to perform tasks, unacceptable to other allies, than would be an Israel at peace with its neighbors.<sup>12</sup> It could therefore be seen as in the U.S. interests to keep Israel dependent, especially in its ability to wage war, making it easier for Washington to control and serving U.S. future interests in the region. This could be one reason why the U.S. not has put more effort into forcing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process to a conclusion.

#### The Israel-Palestine Peace Process

In 1988, the PLO, without Israeli reciprocation, accepted the three conditions the U.S. had demanded for PLO participation in the peace process: Israel's right to exist, UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of the peace talks, and formal renunciation of terrorism.<sup>13</sup> The U.S. did not insist that Israel reciprocate and did not

demand that the PLO (actually Arafat at this time) be directly represented in the peace process. As late as 1991, at the Madrid Conference, the U.S. did the opposite. At the Madrid Conference the U.S. bowed to Israeli demands that the PLO not be a participant in the peace talks, although PLO members openly served as members of the Jordanian delegation. The Madrid conference did not lead to any long lasting achievement. Progress was achieved only when the Israelis and the Palestinians did an end-run around the restrictive Madrid formula dictated by U.S. and met with PLO in direct talks secretly in Oslo, Norway in 1993,<sup>14</sup> at the same time as more public negotiations were taking place in Washington.<sup>15</sup>

The Declaration of Principles signed by the U.S., Israel and the PLO in Washington in September included agreements from the Oslo accord, which were in the end more favorable for the Palestinians than the U.S. sponsored Madrid process had achieved.<sup>16</sup> In September 1993 a few days before the Declaration of Principles was signed, Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition. The PLO recognised Israel's right to exist and Israel recognised PLO as the legitimate representative for the Palestinian people.<sup>17</sup> In December the peace negotiations stalled again. The so called Oslo II Agreement signed in Washington on the 28 of September 1995 between Arafat and Rabin broke this impasse. This agreement negotiated in Taba, Egypt ten days earlier determined the seize of the Palestinian legislative council, and called for Israel's withdrawal from Palestinian population centers within one hundred days, Palestinian elections twenty-two days after Israeli withdrawal, the release of 5000 Palestinian prisoners, and terms for distributing water.<sup>18</sup> This agreement was followed by protests

from Jewish settlers in the occupied territories and influenced the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November of the same year.

In 1997, a majority of the UN SC voted three times demand Israel stop its construction of apartment buildings in the Har Homa suburb of Jerusalem. U.S. vetoed these resolutions despite President Clinton's criticism in December 1996 of Israel's settlements policy as an "obstacle to peace." In October 1998 the Wye River Memorandum was signed after nine days of U.S.-brokered negotiations at the Wye Plantation in Maryland. The agreement included an Israeli withdrawal from 13 percent of the West Bank, and the release of 750 Palestinian prisoners, and the opening of the Gaza Airport. In return the Palestinians agreed to revoke twenty-six anti-Israel clauses from the PLO Charter, arrest a number of suspects wanted by Israel, provide intelligence information to Israel security, and reduce the number of police to comply with force limits.

Both Israel (with some conditions) and Palestinian National Authority (PNA) ratified the accord. Israel complied with parts of the accord and withdrew from some areas in the West Bank, followed by the PNA's nullification of articles in the PLO charter that called for the destruction of Israel. In December the Israeli cabinet voted to suspend the Wye Accord until the PNA collected unlicensed weapons, abandoned plans to declare statehood in May 1999, and curbed incitement against Israel.<sup>19</sup>

In early 1999 the Israeli cabinet reiterated its claim to Jerusalem and Sharon later stated that the UN General Assembly resolution 181, which declared Jerusalem as an "international city" is "null and void."<sup>20</sup> In September 1999 Israel and the Palestinians signed an agreement in Sharm-el-Sheik, Egypt, to implement the Wye Accord. The



agreement allowed Israel to remain in control of the occupied territories' resources, sovereignty, ports, and airspace. The Palestinians fully controlled less than ten percent of the West Bank and Gaza, and even that was subject to Israeli authority.<sup>21</sup> During the years between the Oslo accords in 1993 and 2000 the U.S. brokered a number of agreements that led to withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, giving the Palestinians a degree of self-governance for the first time. During these years the Israeli government limited the mobility of Palestinians inside the territories and between Gaza and the West Bank. Israel also dramatically expanded its expropriation of land in the occupied territories for use by Jewish settlers and did not complete all withdrawals called for in the agreements brokered by U.S.

At the same time a more corrupt, inept and autocratic PNA under Arafat had aggravated a significant percentage of the Palestinian population. Arafat also showed himself unable to suppress the radical Islamic groups, which between 1994 and 2000 conducted more than two dozen of terrorist attacks against civilians inside Israel.<sup>22</sup> In the spring of 2000 a series of meetings in Sweden and Jerusalem between the two sides made some progress but a leak compromised the meetings and the talks stalled. These could have produced a good base for the Camp David summit if they had continued. President Clinton pushed both sides to Maryland, since Barak wanted it and had a good chance of success in his parliament at the time, even if the Palestinians was not ready and needed more time. Clinton afterwards blamed Arafat for the collapse of the peace talks. President Clinton tried hard at the end of his Presidency to get an agreement, but the belligerents were unable to agree to a formula for a stable peace.

## United States Role in the Peace process

The United States has declared as a national interest the security of Israel. It is therefore not strange in any way that U.S. has a bias in favour of this interest. This bias becomes clear in examining the U.S. role in the peace process. The U.S. has not played the role of a disinterested mediator in the peace process. It has long been U.S. official position that a peace agreement must be based on the UN Security Council (UN SC) resolutions, 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which call for Israel's withdrawal from "territories occupied" in 1967 in return for security guaranties from its neighbors.<sup>23</sup> When the Palestinians agreed on these resolutions as a basis for peace negotiations in 1988, the U.S. seems to have changed its mind. Settlement activity increased intensively towards the end of 1989 in the waning days of the Cold War. Statements like this one from Secretary of State James Baker in 1989 show the official policy, when he warned Israel:

For Israel it is time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic dream of a greater Israel. Israeli interest in the West Bank and Gaza, security and otherwise can be accommodated on a settlement based on resolution 242. Forswear annexation. Stop settlement activity.<sup>24</sup>

Despite this warning Washington considered a loan guarantee for funds to build settlements for Jewish immigrants from the USSR if they were not used in the occupied territories. Baker withheld these funds and they were not released until 1991, but Premier Minister Shamir still refused to stop building settlements.<sup>25</sup> Another example is the statement from President H.W. Bush, saying: "My position is that the foreign policy of the United States says we do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem."<sup>26</sup> Bush later approved Israel's request for a \$10 billion loan

guarantees when Rabin promised to halt political settlements, but Israel continued to build strategic settlements as well as settlements in Arab East Jerusalem.<sup>27</sup>

The U.S. initially supported two UN Security Council resolutions, 446 (1979) and 465 (1980) which require Israel to withdraw from the settlements in the occupied territories in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Under the fourth Geneva Convention it is illegal for any country to relocate its civilian population onto land seized by military forces.<sup>28</sup> Apart from above mentioned support of UN Security Council resolutions, the United States, between 1972 and 2000, has used its veto in the Security Council thirty-nine times to block resolutions critical of Israel's policies.<sup>29</sup> These actions and others, has followed the U.S. path to make sure that the UN no longer has a leading role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by, for example, arguing that UN resolutions have been superseded by the Oslo Accords. U.S. Secretary of State

Madeleine Albright stated that:

Resolution language referring to "final status" issues should be dropped, since these issues are now under negotiations by the parties themselves. These include refugees, settlements, territorial sovereignty and the status of Israel.<sup>30</sup>

In a 1997 "Letter of Assurance" from Secretary of State Christopher to Prime Minister Netanyahu demonstrates U.S. policy to avoid the language of UN resolution by implying that the West Bank and Gaza were "disputed" instead of "occupied" territories.<sup>31</sup> This U.S. position was taken despite that two-thirds of the population think that UN should take the lead in resolving the conflict and decide the territorial boundaries between Israel and a Palestinian state.<sup>32</sup> This cornerstone of U.S. policy follows a 1991 Memorandum of Understanding between U.S. and Israel explicitly stating that UN would not have meaningful role.<sup>33</sup>

These policy actions show that United States is defending its national interest in the security of Israel. U.S. policy objective is accomplished in part by keeping the UN and the international community out of a meaningful role in the peace process and by frequently using its influence in favor of one of the antagonists, while still trying to be the honest broker. This was obviously not a successful strategy in creating a peace or in convincing the world of the unbiased position U.S. had to play if it was supposed to give this peace process the legitimacy it needed and to negotiate a peace. This was hard to do when the official policy is one and the unofficial is another. This raises the question: what the “security of Israel” means as a U.S. objective in a post-Cold War and post-Gulf War Middle East? In other words, what is it U.S. taxpayers have spent more than double the amount of money spent to rebuild the devastated Europe after World War II to achieve?<sup>34</sup>

#### Israel’s post-Cold War and post Gulf War Security Problems

In the Six Day War in 1967 Israel showed the world that it was militarily stronger than all its neighbors. After that war U.S. aid to Israel increased significantly, increasing even more after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. After the Cold War, with the Soviet Unions’ fall, that threat disappeared from the Middle East as a rationale for U.S. military support to Israel. After the Gulf War the threat of Iraq to Israel’s security was reduced when Saddam Hussein’s offensive capabilities were crushed by a U.S.-led coalition under a UN mandate. The U.S. military presence and activities in the region since the Gulf War further diminished the military threat to Israel. Abba Eban, chairman of the Knesset Foreign Relations and Defense Committee stated in 1997: “Israel has

never been more secure against external menace than it is today, or more vulnerable to domestic folly.”<sup>35</sup>

Israel has formally been at peace with Egypt since the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, and with Jordan since 1994. Many Arab nations have recognized Israel’s right to exist and many have opened up commercial ties with Israel in the 1990s.<sup>36</sup> Israel’s GDP is higher than the combined GDP of its immediate neighbors Egypt, Syria, and Jordan (including the West Bank the Gaza Strip), and it possesses the world’s sixteenth highest per capita income. Israel is an advanced, industrialized, technologically sophisticated country, as well as a major arms exporter, yet it still receives \$3 billion a year in military and economic aid from U.S.<sup>37</sup> This aid has in recent years been justified as necessary to maintain a viable peace process. Some observers believe Israel has had all the advantages needed since at least mid-90s to create a secure environment but still views the occupied Palestinian territories as a necessary “buffer zone” against external threats.

#### Post-Cold War and post Gulf War Threats to Israeli Security

What is the perceived threat to Israeli security at the beginning of the Twenty first century? Terrorism from radical Islamic organizations is often cited as the only security threat that is left. U.S. policy has adjusted to that reality, as reflected in its expanded interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Originally, these resolutions’ security guarantees were generally interpreted to mean a promise of non-aggression by neighboring states enforced through arms control, demilitarized zones, early warning systems, and international peacekeeping forces.

In the late 90s the U.S. and Israel began to interpret the resolution as requiring that the physical safety of every Israeli citizen be guaranteed; if not, Israel is not required to withdraw from the territories occupied.<sup>38</sup> Many views this reinterpretation, as imposing unrealistic requirements on the Palestinians, since a weak PNA cannot completely control the actions radical Palestinians--including Islamic groups--just as the U.S. was not able to stop the 9-11 terrorist attacks in New York.

What is the solution? The solution is an enduring and stable peace agreement between Israel and a sovereign Palestine. As former CIA official Graham Fuller puts it:

Only when the Palestinians have a genuine stake in the new state and its sovereign freedom--something to lose--will the atmosphere of society change. Only then will radicals be perceived as damaging to their state, society and future. Only then can a Palestinian government start its crackdown internally on the remaining radicals, as the value of violence fades under new conditions.<sup>39</sup>

Why is Peace a Good Alternative for U.S. and Israel in the Middle East?

Peace is a good alternative for Israel as well for the U.S., whose major long-term challenge in the Middle East is the sentiment that its perceived policy, favoring Israel in the conflict creates among Muslims all over the world. A durable peace would definitely stabilize the region, by diminishing this sentiment and U.S. interests would benefit from it. It would increase U.S. and Israeli trade in the region, which consists of about 200 million people. It would greatly enhance Israel's security by removing Palestinians incentives for terrorism and Israeli counter-measures. A Palestine with clearly defined borders could become a buffer state against other potential Arab adversaries, and Palestine would have a vested interest in the peace and in opposing Arab rejectionism. Finally, Israel would certainly gain international support and thereby improve its international relations and commerce.<sup>40</sup>

For the U.S., a peace endorsed by the Muslim population in the region would certainly reduce the discontent directed toward the U.S. among the Arab and Muslim countries, thereby decreasing the reasons for people to turn to radical Islamic organizations, which constitutes the key terrorist threat to the U.S. in the region. A sustainable peace certainly would stabilize the region and enhance the security of its oil resources and the stability of oil prices.

#### Threats to an Israel-Palestine Peace

A bad peace forced upon an already discredited and weak Arafat could cause him to lose face in the Arab world and rather reject the conditions in a peace agreement and continue with the Intifada as the only means to an end. Another issue that is hard to determine is to what extent the PLO leader Yassir Arafat is influenced and used by the other regimes in the region to serve their purposes. Other threats to a negotiated peace are of course the belligerents' ideological differences, and a prejudice that is inherent in this conflict. The equitable and fair exploitation of natural resources, especially water, but also oil and some other issues are also interests that become more important in the region.

#### Conclusion

Especially since 1990 has the U.S. increased its role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, obstructing the attempts of other states and organizations to become involved. The inherent contradiction in the fact that a peace negotiator at the same time has the security of one of the belligerents as one of its most important national interests is obvious. That this contradiction has been apparent in U.S. actions in the peace process

after the Cold War is clear and not surprising, even if the American public have been told otherwise.

Many if not most observers of the Middle East recognize that a peace and self-determination for the Palestinian people is the most important issue to resolve to bring about long-term stability in the region. Until this is accomplished this issue will continue to be used by regimes and radicals to justify violence and extremism among Islamists and Arabs against the U.S. and its citizens in the region. A continuation of a policy perceived as unilateral support of Israel decreases rather than increases U.S. security objectives.

#### Regional Stability to Secure Freedom of Commerce, Especially Access to Oil

Europe in the next ten years may shift from coal to an oil economy, and therefore whoever sits on the valve of Middle East oil may control the destiny of Europe.<sup>41</sup>

The United States' national interest in access to oil at reasonable prices is clearly among the most important and continuing U.S. national interests in the Middle East. To secure this national interest the United States has used a number of strategies throughout history. Middle East history testifies to the encroachment of Western civilization and was divided after WW I according to British and French interests. The borders and leadership installed by the French and British facilitated their interests, and the results of these decisions are still visible today. The United States entered the scene during World War II as the new world power and inherited the colonial situation produced by British imperialism. The United States continues to balance power in the region by actions, similar to British strategy of *divide et impera*, favoring the leader that best suits its interests at the moment.<sup>42</sup> The purpose is to prevent a rival hegemon from dominating the region and threatening the United States' and its allies' strategically important access to



Middle East oil. George Kennan formulated this strategy in a lecture at the National War College in 1948:

Our safety depends on our ability to establish a balance among the hostile or undependable forces of the world: To put them where necessary one against the other; to see that they spend in conflict with each other, if they must spend it at all, the intolerance and violence and fanaticism which might otherwise be directed against U.S., that they are compelled to cancel each other out and exhaust themselves in internecine conflict in order that the constructive forces, working for world stability, may continue to have the possibility of life.<sup>43</sup>

The execution of this strategy has many examples in the region, e.g. U.S. support for the Shah of Iran, its overt support of Saddam Hussein in the war against Iran, the covert support of Iran in the same war, and the use of Israel as a counterweight, and dividing force in the region. The post-Cold War period by contrast, has been dominated by the strategy of dual containment (of Iran and Iraq).

This part of the thesis will analyze the importance of the Middle East to U.S. vital interests, including freedom of commerce and free market access to oil at reasonable prices. This part will also analyze U.S. foreign policy efforts in order to secure these vital interests, and the long-term effect of these policies on United States national interests in the region.

#### United States' Dependence on the Middle East

American participation in the development of Middle Eastern petroleum is equitable because American interests hold large percentages of proven reserves in that area and participate only to minor extent in current production. Such participation is desirable because there will be greater assurance that the tempo of exploitation will be adequate in relation to the desired conservation of Western Hemisphere oil reserves. Furthermore, and of greater importance, United States' policy should, in general, aim to assure to this country, in the interest of security, a substantial and geographically diversified holding of foreign petroleum resources in the hands of United States nationals. This would involve the preservation for the absolute position presently obtaining, and therefore vigilant protection of existing concessions in United States' hands coupled with insistence

upon Open Door principle of equal opportunity for United States' companies in new areas.<sup>44</sup>

U.S. Dependence on Middle East Oil. According to Stephen Pelletieré, U.S. society is more sensitive to change in oil prices than countries that do not have their own oil, since the protection of its own industry has created a situation without real incentives to reduce the use of oil (this is not strange, all countries does the same to protect their domestic industry). Cheap oil is already part of the strategy of the industry whose maintenance and profitability depends in large part on oil prices remaining low.<sup>45</sup>

The oil from Middle East is desirable for many reasons. First, the cost of production is very low for example only about twelve percent of what the cost is, to produce oil in Alaska. Second, Middle East resources have not been fully explored and developmental drilling continues to find new oil reserves. Third, the proven reserves of the Middle East are high in relation to the rate of production, roughly ten times as high as in the U.S., which gives significant influence and power in the world oil market.

United States' dependence on imported oil has increased since the middle of the 1970's and U.S. oil imports after the Cold War have accounted for between 45 and 52 percent of U.S. total oil consumption.<sup>46</sup> Of all the U.S. oil imports about 23 percent is imported from the Persian Gulf, nearly two-thirds (63 percent) from Saudi Arabia.<sup>47</sup> Exports to the U.S. represent about 15 percent of the oil exported from the Persian Gulf. The importance of Middle East oil for United States lies not only in its direct import, but also important for U.S. indirectly by the fact that the prosperity of its major trading partners in the world, Europe (40 percent of world market)<sup>48</sup> and also depend on imported Middle East oil. Europe imports about 38 percent of its oil imports from the Middle East and Japan more than 75 percent.<sup>49</sup>

### U.S. Dependence on the Middle East from an Economic and Commercial

Perspective. This assessment will be done mainly from a perspective based on the GCC countries since they possess most of the oil resources in the region, the fact that until 2000 Iran and Iraq were under the dual containment strategy of the U.S. Therefore, U.S. commerce and economic interests in the region incline towards the GCC countries. U.S. commercial interests in the Middle East have steadily increased since the mid-1970s, in part to pay for increasing U.S. imports of oil and petrochemicals from these producers. The U.S. is among the top five trading partners with every single GCC country, a situation that has created a trade surplus for the U.S. and helped U.S. to reduce the overall trade deficit in the mid-1990s. Exports from the U.S. to the GCC countries supported more than 650,000 U.S. jobs and were the primarily source of livelihood for nearly 2.4 million Americans.<sup>50</sup> At the same time, more than 700 U.S.-affiliated companies operate in the region and employ more than 16,000 Americans. Commerce is also the direct means of support to 50,000 U.S. dependents in the GCC countries.

Private sector investments by U.S. companies in these countries represent half the value of half the total world investments in the region. The GCC is becoming one market, for foreign investments, instead of six and more people and corporate leaders realize that the GCC region is becoming a hub for trade, services and investment opportunities at a crossroads between Europe, Asia and Africa, with a potential mega market that embraces one billion people.<sup>51</sup> From an economic perspective the GCC countries have provided substantial investment capital to both the private and the public sectors of the U.S. and other industrial economies for almost twenty years. The GCC has also been a key factor in continued support of the dollar and have invested \$ billions in

U.S. treasury securities, facilitating a low and stable U.S. interest rate, which has in turn given strength to the U.S. financial system worldwide.

One of the more concrete economic contributions of the GCC has been to share the financial burden and defray U.S. and allied costs during Desert Shield, Desert Storm and during the October 1994 renewal of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.<sup>52</sup> The contribution of GCC countries in stabilizing oil production policies as well as burden sharing demonstrates the importance of the financial component in supporting U.S. interests the Middle East.

The Importance of Middle East for U.S. Arms Industry. The U.S. and its Western allies have for many decades sold weapons to the Middle East, just as Soviet Union did before its decline and fall. Arms sales have always been a profitable industry with a much higher increase in consumer price index than for normal goods. In the 80s, U.S. companies, and other western countries,' with government backing, supported Saddam Hussein with raw material for his chemical and biological programs as well as components for development of missiles and nuclear weapons worth \$1 billion. One decade earlier, they had supported the Shah of Iran with weapons deliveries. In the wake of the Cold War and the Gulf War most Western states downsized their military with the result of a declining market for Arms sales in that part of the world.

In the Middle East the situation developments turned in the opposite direction. It turned out to be an opportunity for the arms industry to compensate for the diminishing demands for their products in the Western world. In the mid-1990s U.S. arms exports to the Middle East countries was 77 percent of total U.S. Arms export to developing countries.<sup>53</sup> During the 1980s and 1990s more than 70 percent of annual U.S. foreign aid

(\$3.8 billion on average) to the Middle East was military, opposed to only 28 percent for economic aid. At the same time, arms purchases totaled \$6.1 billion per year, more than half of the world's total. The U.S. is the biggest arms exporter to the Middle East, with exports totaling more than \$90 billion since the Gulf War. Arms sale have become number one U.S. source of export to the region, constituting almost one third of all U.S. exports to the Middle East. As a result, arms sales to the Middle East are a major interest for private individuals as well as companies and U.S. politicians as one director of a Middle East center observed:

If the billions have not been useful to the Saudis, they were a gold mine for Congresspersons compelled to cast pro-Saudi votes, along with cabinet officials and party leaders worried about the economy of key states and electoral districts. To the extent that the regime faces politically destabilizing cutbacks in social spending, a proximate cause is the strong bipartisan push for arms exports to the Gulf as a means to bolster the sagging fortunes for key constituents and regions--the "gun belt"--that represents the domestic face of internationalism.<sup>54</sup>

There is little doubt that the U.S. government and its domestic arms industry have a great interest in arms sales to the Middle East when defense sales constituted billions of dollars in income and were the source of primary, high paying jobs for tens of thousands of Americans.<sup>55</sup>

The arms sales importance is also apparent by how much money different lobbies used in the latest U.S. elections (1999-2000 election cycle). Organizations affiliated with the arms industry spent close to \$5 million. In comparison, another group with vested interests in the region, pro-Israeli organizations, spent \$2 million. This shows that U.S. domestic actors, public and private, have vested interests in the Middle East region not only because of oil, but also because of other interests that makes this region important to the U.S.

Pre Gulf War Strategies. President George H.W. Bush followed Reagan's foreign policies and the 1980 Carter doctrine, held that U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf were vital. This doctrine stated that external threats to the Middle East would be met by military force if necessary, even if the U.S. did not have that capability at the time.<sup>56</sup> Reagan's strategy during the 1980's maintained strong support of Israel while playing the other two potential regional powers, Iran and Iraq, against each other, in order not to allow one state to become a hegemon and thus a threat to the stability in the region. Bush's early years, until the Gulf War, were mostly occupied with the Arab-Israeli conflict, primarily focused on American hostages in Lebanon and the Palestinian Intifada, which began in December 1987.

President Bush, despite his two terms as Vice President under Reagan, pushed Israel hard to negotiate a peace with PLO, as shown by Secretary of Defense Baker's 1989 statement: "For Israel now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a greater Israel."<sup>57</sup> Following the solution of the hostage case in Lebanon, U.S. and Iranian relations became slightly better when Bush officially thanked Iran and Syria for their efforts in resolving the problem. President Bush's policies generally supported Iraq's Saddam Hussein until he invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. This event followed a misunderstanding between the U.S. and Iraq where U.S. ambassador April Glaspie told Saddam Hussein that the U.S. was neutral regarding his border dispute with Kuwait. Together with years of U.S. support, this statement probably gave Saddam Hussein the impression that he could get away with an invasion.

The Gulf War. The Iraqi invasion, successfully countered and defeated by a U.S. led coalition acting under UN Security Council resolution 678, was a decisive victory for

the coalition. Kuwait was liberated and the legitimate government was restored to power; coalition powers had very few casualties; Iraq's offensive military potential and nuclear weapons research facilities suffered serious setbacks; and the international community had demonstrated that it could respond to aggression.<sup>58</sup> The threat of having one power, in this case Saddam Hussein's Iraq, controlling roughly twenty percent of the world's oil resources made this war inevitable to secure the interests of the Western world. Saddam Hussein's control of these oil resources would have had significant consequences for the unfolding new economic order and the Gulf War thus shows the importance of Middle East oil to the economic interests of the world and of the U.S.<sup>59</sup>

The Gulf War was the second time the Carter doctrine was invoked to rationalize the use of military force to secure U.S. national interests in the Middle East (Operation Ernest Will, the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers was the first). The Gulf War reestablished the U.S. as a key power in the region and with the Soviet Union's dissolution made the grand strategy of containment (of Communism) obsolete.<sup>60</sup> In one stroke, justified and sanctioned by the international law of the UN, the deployment of U.S. and coalition troops in the Gulf brought under direct U.S. influence territories that have 40 percent of the world's oil reserves and 45 percent of the world's net oil exports. This foreign policy action, using primarily military means to secure a U.S. vital national interest--the free flow of oil at reasonable prices--was critical at a time when U.S. dependence on oil imports had never been greater.

The Aftermath Of the Gulf War. Iraq agreed in March 1991 to comply with UN Security Council resolution 687 which included identification and destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This resolution came to be enforced by the UN

Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors to ensure that Iraq disarmed to the degree required under that resolution. After Saddam Hussein's refusal to comply with these UN resolutions the U.S., United Kingdom and France unilaterally initiated "no fly zones" in 1992. In the south Operation SOUTHERN WATCH monitored Iraq compliance south of the 32nd parallel with Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (later Operation Northern Watch) in the north protected the Kurdish population.<sup>61</sup> These operations, in one form or another were ongoing 2000, have been on going since 1992 through the 1990's and forces been have used randomly during this period. At the same time UN SC resolutions consisted of heavy sanctions and embargos on Iraq, which for example prevented them from importing necessities and from selling its oil. The result of these resolutions was that:

Measures that affected the well being of the civilian population were combined with those which resemble "the process of disarming a conquered country generally imposed by contemporary peace treaties." This was also the first time such a draconian UN embargo had been imposed on a state which had just suffered severe infrastructure damage in the course of war.<sup>62</sup>

For the U.S. and UK the sanctions also had other purposes, especially as a way to promote regime change in Iraq; until that happened they fulfilled a purpose to contain Iraq.<sup>63</sup>

Opinions of the results of the economic embargo vary. Iraq's repressive rule under Saddam Hussein is well documented but Iraq was also one of the nations in the Middle East where people in general had a good life due to comprehensive and generous welfare with hospitals, sanitation facilities, and access to fresh water. Iraq had a strong economy with the highest per capita income in this region in the 1980's. The Gulf War, the sanctions, and the economic embargo changed that situation radically. The sanctions'



restrictions on the import of spare parts to power stations, water purifying facilities, and sewer systems that were destroyed during the war as well as their impact on medical supplies and nutrition, has influenced the death of between a quarter million to a million Iraqis, most of them children.<sup>64</sup>

The UN acknowledged these problems, and in 1996 the “oil for food” program started which allowed Iraq to sell a limited amount of oil under UN control to reduce the humanitarian crisis. But this program did not completely meet the most basic needs of the Iraqi people and did not allow them to rebuild the country.<sup>65</sup> Richard Butler, the chief UNSCOM inspector, said that the sanctions “simply aren’t working other than to harm the ordinary Iraqi people.”<sup>66</sup> It is important to remember that Saddam Hussein’s regime is one of the most totalitarian in the world and that one of the reasons the sanctions do not work is because his regime and the elite in Iraq support themselves instead of giving the people what they need.<sup>67</sup> So what has the U.S. to do with this and why is it important?

The U.S. purpose to achieve a regime change in Iraq has made the U.S. stick to these policies of hard sanctions and it has used its power against any changes in these resolutions. This has led to the view that sanctions being counterproductive to the goal of bringing Saddam Hussein down. The forces able to challenge Saddam Hussein’s regime have now instead been reduced to a fight for their own survival. This suffering of the Iraqi people has also been counterproductive from the perspective that it has become a propaganda tool to stir up anti-American sentiment inside Iraq and also widespread anger throughout the Islamic world, particularly at the street level.<sup>68</sup>

The results of the unilateral enforcement of the “no fly zones” are also disputed. None of the GCC countries the U.S. is supposed to defend has requested air strikes since they started in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Many hold the view that military action is not needed since they don’t feel threatened after loss of Iraq’s offensive capability in the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia has, for example, since the September 1996 air strikes, refused to allow the U.S. to use its territory to participate in the air strikes against Iraq, although “support” missions are still flown from Saudi bases. This has forced U.S. to use aircraft carriers, airbases in other GCC countries, or facilities in Turkey instead.

The air strikes in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and NORTHERN WATCH and other strikes e.g., bombing attacks in the 1998 Operation DESERT FOX, have negative influences on U.S. security interests. First, they create widespread resentment throughout the Arab and Islamic world for creating Iraqi casualties, both civilian and military, seemingly without justification. As such, they become an easy tool for Iraqi propaganda. Second, the unilateral air strikes--without the clear support of UN Security Council resolutions--have undermined the authority of United Nations. The perceived U.S. contempt for international law, while still pushing Iraq’s compliance UN resolutions, has resulted in anger among Arabs and other Muslims against the U.S.<sup>69</sup>

Dual Containment. President Clinton took office in 1992 and chose to handle the aftermath of the Gulf War with sanctions, air strikes, a reinvigorated Israel-Palestinian peace process, while facing a Saddam Hussein who refused to comply with the will of the U.S.. In 1994 Saddam Hussein showed that he still had ambitions to be a player in the region when he deployed his Republican Guard to the Kuwaiti border in an attempt to pressure the UN to lift sanctions. This attempt was met with an immediate response from

Clinton who deployed 36,000 U.S. troops to the Gulf region. This action by Saddam Hussein weakened the support for lifting sanctions in the international community.<sup>70</sup>

President Clinton also introduced the strategy of “dual containment” to create regional stability and secure U.S. national interests in the Middle East.

Integral to that effort (pursuing a comprehensive Middle East peace, assuring the security of Israel and U.S. principal partners, and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices) is the Administration’s strategy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran for as long as those states possess a threat to U.S. interests, to other states in the region and to their own citizen.<sup>71</sup>

Clinton made clear that the 1980’s policy of power balancing no longer was valid; the U.S. military presence in the Middle East had come to stay and was now the primary counterweight to potential regional hegemony:

As long as we are able to maintain our military presence in the region, as long as we succeed in restricting the military ambitions of both Iraq and Iran, and as long as we can rely on our allies--Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the other GCC countries, and Turkey-to preserve a balance of power in our favor in the wider Middle East region, we will no longer depend on one to counter the other.<sup>72</sup>

According to Martin Indyk, one of its principal architects, dual containment seeks Iraq’s full compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions, ending its repression of the Iraqi people, so that the regime of Saddam never again poses a threat to Iraq’s neighbors, and to establish clearly and unequivocally that the current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime, beyond the pale of international society.<sup>73</sup> U.S. actions, however sometimes revealed less public motives:

While officials will never say so publicly, it has always been American policy that the iron-fisted Mr. Hussein plays a useful role in holding Iraq together. In cold-hearted terms, officials say, the United States is better off with a unified Iraq than with seeing it broken into Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni Muslim states, which could destabilize Turkey and Saudi Arabia and invite a landgrab by Iran.<sup>74</sup>

Critics of U.S. policy interpret U.S. actions as demonstrating that it is not in the interest of the U.S. to replace Saddam Hussein in the 1990s, since he serve the purpose, so important to U.S. policy in the Middle East, of being the figure of a regional enemy, as long as the U.S. can keep him as a weak, demonized and castigated force.<sup>75</sup>

Containment of Iran is less criticized. Many see it as a justified policy because Iran challenges U.S. interests and the international community by sponsoring terrorism, opposes the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its attempts to acquire WMD.<sup>76</sup> It ferments instability by actively seeking to subvert friendly governments in the Arab world. In containing Iran the U.S. had to work unilaterally or with allies because of the absence of UN imposed sanctions. The U.S. is not, according to Indyk, opposed to the Islamic government, rather its behavior and the abuse of the human rights of the Iranian people. The U.S. approach to contain Iran had to be a different one from the Iraqi solution since it is a distinctly different situation. Initially Clinton used diplomatic pressure to isolate Iran, but when a U.S. oil company agreed to a lucrative contract with Iran, Congress passed the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which terminated all U.S. commerce with Iran. The result was that American companies were excluded from the Iranian market, a gap soon filled by companies from other countries.

A new try to isolate Iran came in 1996 with the so called D'Amato Act, designed to prevent companies from doing business with governments the U.S. defines as supporting terrorism.<sup>77</sup> This act had some serious international law issues, which led to complications with other nations. Iran's revolutionary ideals have appeared to soften since the 1980s. The regime, elected in 1997 and reelected by landslide in 2001, has taken uneven steps towards liberalization and seems to be going in a direction favorable

to Western interest. In 1998 Iran was on the edge of war against the Afghanistan Taliban government and provided military and other support to the Taliban's key opponent, the Northern Alliance. Iran has also, after two decades of internal problems and a war against Iraq, started to increase its international relations.<sup>78</sup>

The containment strategy through economic sanctions appears to be an appropriate, cost-effective means of containing regimes while awaiting their eventual collapse.<sup>79</sup> It could, however, as critics of this approach argue, lead to instability in the region because the containment policy does not respect the principle of power balancing, and does not take into account the nature of the societies, or the context in which the policy operates.

The dual containment policy is shot through with logical flaws and practical inconsistencies and is based on faulty geopolitical premises . . . American allies in the region and elsewhere have shown no enthusiasm for dual containment, making its implementation highly problematic . . . it ties American policy to an inherently unstable regional status quo . . . the policy could end the very results-- regional conflict and increased Iranian power--that the United States seeks to prevent.<sup>80</sup>

The aim of dual containment in the mid 1990s was, according to Lorenza Rossi, to denigrate not only Iraq but also the Iran regime and other insubordinate forces and groups, while simultaneously trying to drive more deeply the wedge between Iran and the remaining states in the region.

Jerry L. Mraz summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of dual containment in his research paper in 1997.<sup>81</sup> The advantages are that it demonstrates commitment and dedication to international affairs; it is a low cost policy; it ensures those U.S. vital interests in the region remain unchallenged (due to military presence); and, it has domestic support both from the Congress and the people. The disadvantages are no

international support for sanctions against Iran; American firms miss opportunities to do business with Iran and Iraq; the potential of a break up of Iraq with a removal of Saddam from power; a large military presence in the region might have the political cost of being a destabilizing force for GCC nations; and dual containment is too passive to force a change in behavior from either regime.

#### Conclusion

The free access to oil at reasonable prices is the most vital of the U.S. interests in the Middle East. It became so after WW II and is important both directly (U.S. need for cheap oil) and indirectly (the need to have a strong Europe and Japan as trading partners). The U.S. has used different doctrines to secure this interest. The Gulf War implemented the Carter doctrine and the aftermath of this war called for a new doctrine by Clinton--dual containment. After the Cold War and the Gulf War the increasing economic interdependence of the West with the oil producing countries in the region has made the Middle East important for other reasons than just oil. The market in the Middle East became important for other products, especially arms sales, in the wake of the Cold War and the downsizing of Western armed forces.

The Middle East is a potential huge market for Western countries but Clinton's dual containment policy has reduced U.S. companies' market advantages especially in Iran. The U.S. needs long-term stability in the region to secure its interests. Dual containment has been appropriate to achieve relative stability during the last decade of the Twentieth century. The key question is whether long-term stability in the region can be achieved by containment or if this strategy has only created a transitional short-term status quo.

## The Security of Friendly Arab states

A “friendly” person is as favorably disposed, serviceable, convenient, opportune and not hostile, and serving a beneficial and helpful purpose.<sup>82</sup> In the Middle East, a friendly state has traditionally been a state that has been pro-West and adopted the U.S. economic model. For example Saudi Arabia, favored foreign investors by minimising their taxes and accepted the inflow of foreign capital, both private and multilateral, which did not correspond with the larger amount of capital that left the country. This combination of nationalism and monetarism did not bring the miracle people expected, e.g. foreign debts of countries like Egypt led to new loans to pay the interest of previous loans.<sup>83</sup> One of the main challenges for the U.S. in maintaining a favourable status quo and a stable Middle East has been to stop the force of nationalism. One method of handle nationalism has been to fight it or to bind it to the ideas of a free market system, which frequently has resulted in a dependency on the West.

In the wake of the Gulf War U.S. military presence accelerated in the Middle East, leading to a more visible commitment to the collective and individual security of friendly Arab states. This was achieved through a number of defense cooperative agreements that the U.S. negotiated with different Middle Eastern governments.<sup>84</sup> After the Cold War, the U.S., together with other Western nations, shared not only the geopolitical interests of states in the region but also a strong economic interest in arms and technology sales to friendly states in the Middle East. These interests are likely to intensify with the shrinking of defense budgets in NATO and former Warsaw pact countries. This part of the thesis will examine U.S. foreign policy efforts to create security for its friendly Arab allies and the effects of these policies.

## Gulf War Alliances, Post Gulf War Agreements and Theatre Strategy.

During the Gulf War it was essential for the U.S.-led coalition to manage both the internal divisions among its Arab members and the possibility that Israel would be attacked and driven into the war. If that happened the coalition, probably would not have survived. The U.S. led the diplomatic efforts to ensure that Israel would not retaliate if Iraq launched Scud missiles against Israel, prompting Israeli involvement in the war.<sup>85</sup>

After the Gulf War Saddam Hussein continued to be a threat to security and stability in the region, leading to continued U.S. military presence under different defense cooperative agreements. The friendly Arab allies became protected by the terms of these agreements. The specific terms of these agreements are classified at the request of the countries concerned.<sup>86</sup> Defense agreements (sometimes, including access agreements) were signed with Oman (1990), Bahrain (1990), Kuwait (1991), Qatar (1992), and the UAE (1994). In general, agreements defined under what conditions the U.S. was granted access to facilities, their cost and maintenance, the legal status of U.S. personnel in these countries, etc. These agreements cemented security relationships and provided a base for long term military-to-military relationships, joint exercises, and training and provision of defense equipment between the U.S. and the signatory state.<sup>87</sup> The agreement responded to conditions General Schwarzkopf noted in his statement to the U.S. Senate, six months prior to the Gulf War:

The greatest threat to U.S. interests in the area is the spillover of regional conflict which could endanger American lives, threaten U.S. interests in the area or interrupt the flow of oil, thereby requiring the commitment of U.S. combat forces.<sup>88</sup>

Schwarzkopf's CENTCOM strategy relied on three pillars: presence, security assistance, and combined exercises, with the propositioning program as a key element of



the forward presence strategy. This theater strategy was later expanded by his successor General Hoar with the two pillars of “power projection” and “readiness to fight”, which were designed to achieve a “near continuous presence” in the region that could better deter conflict, promote stability and facilitate a seamless transition to war if required.<sup>89</sup>

When General Zinni was CENTCOM commander he declared that,

We will consider ourselves successful if we can help build and maintain a coalition that is organized to maintain collective security and is composed of professional militaries responsive to lawful authorities.<sup>90</sup>

These strategies, by the late 1990's, had led to a U.S. military presence in the region on any given day at between 18000 and 25000 soldiers, with a trend towards a long term or permanent U.S. presence in the region, especially in Kuwait and Qatar. The irony is that while U.S. presence appears sufficient to secure U.S. interests from any potential threat in the area, it has also increased the odds of other types of attacks on U.S. personnel and interests.<sup>91</sup>

#### Different Allies Different Approaches

GCC. The GCC has since its creation worked for economic cooperation to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers between its members, even if its primary purpose is to enhance its members' security. The GCC created a joint military command to command and control its defense activities and sponsored combined exercises to test coordination of its Western equipment and command systems. Although the GCC countries are among the top arms importers in the world, holding one third of the sales of U.S. arms manufacturers,<sup>92</sup> and are expanding their capabilities as an alliance, they are still dependent on U.S. presence in the region to defend themselves. The GCC still plays a

very important role in the region since they in the Gulf War succeeded in bringing other Arab and Islamic countries into that alliance, Egypt and Syria, and in broadening the alliance to give it a greater legitimacy in the international community and in the Middle East. Among the U.S. first priorities when it comes to friendly Arab allies in the region is maintaining its ties with GCC countries. The reasons are their possession of the majority of the oil resources in the region, their strategic position in the containment of Iraq and Iran, and their role as a trading partner, especially oil and arms, with the U.S. The GCC countries are viewed as essential to the U.S. ability to defend itself and its interests abroad against any and all would be adversaries.<sup>93</sup>

Egypt. Egypt serves U.S. interests in the region from many perspectives. Egypt is the country that gets most U.S. military aid, not included Israel, with an average of about \$1.2 billion annually since the Camp David agreement in 1978.<sup>94</sup> Egypt continues to be an important interest for the U.S. because of its commitment to peace with Israel, its position as a counterweight to Iraq, Iran and other regional powers, its shared views toward the Gulf States, its military bases, and its control of the Suez Canal. In the wake of the Gulf War U.S. strategic ties with Egypt have grown due to the U.S.-Egypt cooperation in the Gulf War, a cooperation that, prompted the U.S. to remove \$ billions of Egyptian debt.<sup>95</sup>

#### The Other Side of the Coin

To justify this vast expense (of its security posture in the region), the Clinton administration must be able to demonstrate that the United States is indeed threatened by potent foreign enemies. Hence the periodic alarms in Washington over the military power and aggressive designs of Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Only when Congress and the American people can be shown an authentic--and sufficiently menacing--threat on the horizon will they be prepared to subsidize indefinitely a cold war level military establishment.<sup>96</sup>

The critics of the militarization of the Middle East during the 1990's ask whether the large scale arms transfers and ongoing U.S. military presence in the region really enhance U.S. security interests. They hold that U.S. policies seem to create enemies rather than protecting the U.S. from its enemies. Israel announced in 1991 its acceptance of a proposal, by arms control advocates, to freeze arms exports to the Middle East. This made sense for Israel with its own weapons production capacity and clear superiority over its belligerents. The U.S. blocked this proposal.<sup>97</sup>

In a letter to President Clinton in 1993, 78 senators insisted that military aid to Israel must continue despite significant advances in the peace process because of the massive procurement of arms by the Arab states, neglecting to say that 80 percent of those arms transfers also came from the U.S.<sup>98</sup> The militarization also serves other interests in the region common to Israel, friendly Arab states and the U.S. They all share an interest in curbing radical nationalist and Islamic movements to preserve the regional status quo. For Israel, Arab militarism serves as an excuse for it to have a buffer zone in the occupied territories. For autocratic Arab leaders, the perceived threat from Israeli militarism serves as an excuse for their lack of democracy and their countries need for social and economic reforms. For the U.S., it creates stability, in addition to the direct economical benefits from being the regions major arms supplier.

If one arms race has been the one between Israel and the Arab states, the other has been between the friendly Arab states and Iraq and Iran. Even if U.S. officials claim that the Saudis are alone responsible for their purchases, in practice from the 1940s on it has the U.S. Defense Department that defines the Kingdoms' security needs. This practice leads conveniently to purchases of specific U.S. weapon systems.<sup>99</sup> This

tendency to define security in military hardware is not unique for U.S. but also other Western states that have interests in the arms industry and the Middle East. Where does this militarization lead in the wake of the Gulf War, with an Iraq without offensive capacity, and an Iran contained for more than twenty years? It is quite possible that the stronger the U.S. military presence and the stronger U.S. ties are to the GCC countries, the more likely that Iraq and Iran will feel threatened, thereby reducing the chance for mutual security agreements and de-escalation of tensions.<sup>100</sup> The paradox is that the more the U.S. has militarized the Middle East, the less secure the U.S. and its allies have become. The threat of violence, terrorism and war--even involving WMD--will paradoxically but almost certainly get worse.<sup>101</sup>

#### The Impact of U.S. Support to Friendly Arab Regimes

Franklin D. Roosevelt formed an enduring alliance in 1945 with Saudi King Saud. In return for free access to oil, the U.S. would protect the royal family from its enemies, external and internal. The alliances between the U.S. and the other autocratic regimes of the GCC have, during the 1990s, developed in to a dependency both militarily and economically.<sup>102</sup> While the elite get most of the wealth normal peoples' real income has decreased 40 percent since the 1980s. The U.S. military presence in the region is a very sensitive matter due to cultural and political considerations. The majority of conservative Muslim population is fundamentally opposed to U.S. policies in the region and regards them as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim.<sup>103</sup> The fact that the holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, are located in Saudi Arabia makes presence of the U.S. military, which has waged war against other Muslims from Muslim territories, look offensive to many Muslims in Saudi Arabia.

Another primary objection of the U.S. military presence in the region stems from the painful reminder of the region's monarchies' neo-colonial ties with Western interests as well as the concerns over the way this direct military support strengthens the regimes' authoritarian control.<sup>104</sup> This creates a situation where people without democratic rights and under autocratic regimes that suppress them, with the perceived support of the U.S., feel they have no other means to make their voices heard other than to turn to extreme means such as terrorism.

### Conclusion

U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy efforts in the Middle East have increased the security of its Arab allies, at least in response to the perceived threat of Iran and Iraq or Israel. The Gulf War and its following enforced sanctions ensured that Iraq's offensive capabilities were eliminated for a foreseeable future. Alliance building between the U.S. and GCC countries, military training that has promoted GCC defensive capabilities, and a robust U.S. presence have all combined to improve responsiveness to new threats in the region. This alliance building has created a mutual economic interdependency, with assured access to oil in exchange for trade (especially arms). This policy has also secured friendly Arab allies' loyalty to the U.S. and created stability in the region. This stability is needed on a long-term basis to exploit fully the potential huge market of the Middle East and to secure the free flow of oil at reasonable prices from the GCC countries who possess 91 percent of the world's excess oil production capacity.<sup>105</sup>

In order to achieve stability to secure markets and resources the U.S. has tacitly encouraged stable but authoritarian regimes during the last fifty years in the Middle East. Many of the countries regarded as friendly to the U.S. have often lacked popular

legitimacy. For supporting these regimes, during the 1990s, the U.S. has followed a long established pattern to block the rise of indigenous nationalist forces, whose interests might conflict with U.S. interests. Among the consequences of these policies are a U.S. general opposition to social reform and the ruling elites' hostility to democracy.<sup>106</sup>

The long-term consequences of this policy might be a broad revolution in the region. Until this revolution takes place many perceive they have few options except to turn to radical Muslims and potentially become martyrs in a fight for freedom from U.S.-supported autocratic regimes. This policy of supporting and preserving the pro-Western regimes also contradicts the national interest of the U.S. to promote democratic reforms in the Middle East, an interest clearly subordinated to the more vital interests of access to oil and a free market. This leads U.S. into the last part of this thesis: the examination of the U.S. national interest of promoting democracy and adherence to human rights.

#### The Commitment to the Spread of Democracy and to Promote Human Rights

For the United States, the attractions and advantages of supporting democracy abroad must be balanced against other strategic interests--and against the difficulty of sponsoring transitions that will inevitably entail a degree of disruption, if not instability.<sup>107</sup>

In the aftermath of the Gulf War and the fall of Soviet Union, U.S. policy towards the Middle East has changed. One of the causes of this change is the need for stability in the Middle East to secure the long-term vital interest of access to oil. Long term stability in the region depends in turn on the development of democratic processes in a region historically governed by tribal monarchies and military despots, based on the rationale that terrorism rarely rises out of democratic societies.<sup>108</sup> This part of the thesis will analyze the U.S. national interest to spread democracy and to promote human rights

in the Middle East. It will also analyze the syndrome of anti-Americanism and Middle East perceptions of the West and especially U.S. foreign policy in the region. These national interests of U.S. has not been and are still not among the most vital U.S. interests, especially not in this region, despite the words of the National Security Strategy:

we must be prepared to take strong measures against human rights violators. These include economic sanctions as have been maintained against Nigeria, Iraq, Burma, and Cuba; . . . and restrictions on the sale of arms that we believe may be used to perpetrate human rights abuses.<sup>109</sup>

#### U.S. Policy and Its Actions towards Democracy and Human Rights

As discussed in the previous chapter, U.S. support of the repressive regimes in the Middle East had had negative effects on human rights and the democratization of the region. U.S. policy in this area is inversely proportional to the perceived strategic importance of the country in question: the more important an allied regime is strategically, the less attention is given to human rights. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the Saudi National Guard (SANG), almost exclusively armed, trained and managed by the U.S. plays a key role in the regime's grip on power. The SANG has been accused of widespread human rights abuses against suspected opponents.<sup>110</sup> In other Arabic countries the U.S. has for example: increased aid to Morocco when its repression in Western Sahara and in Morocco itself continued unabated.<sup>111</sup> The U.S. welcomed the military coup in Algeria that nullified that country's first democratic elections.<sup>112</sup> In the early 1990s, when Jordan opened its democratic processes the U.S. suspended its foreign aid after a long period of large scale aid under a repressive regime.<sup>113</sup>

This follows what appears to be a recurring U.S. foreign policy path in the region demonstrated by Ronald Reagan's statement after SANG forces crushed a Saudi uprising

in 1981: “I will not permit (Saudi Arabia) to be an Iran,” referring to the successful uprising that led to the overthrow of the Shah of Iran.<sup>114</sup> The logic for this policy is that it is easier for the U.S. to have stability with a few ruling families than with their potential replacements as explained by F. Gregory Gause III: “the truth is that the more democratic the Saudis become, the less cooperative they will be with U.S. So why would we want that?”<sup>115</sup>

U.S. aid toward Israel has also generally increased when the governments’ activities in the occupied territories became more repressive.<sup>116</sup> The U.S. support for Israel is a major source of anti Americanism in the Arab and Islamic world. Especially when it comes to human rights violations by Israel, which are believed to be disproportionate even to human rights violations by Islamic governments. This depends in large part on the fact that many Muslims see Israel as a colonial settler state created in the interests of Western imperialism. Jerusalem’s status as the third holiest city in Islam is also a reason for this contempt, especially since Jerusalem, in their perspective, is under foreign occupation. Muslim governments, particularly in the Arab world, also use the Palestinians’ plight as a means to distract their populations from domestic concerns.

Some observers do not believe that Israel should be considered a modern democracy. Israel, for example, does not have a written constitution and can be described as a theocracy where all Jews are ultimately under the authority of rabbinical courts. Non-Jews are “second class” citizens and must live under Jewish laws.<sup>117</sup> Israel is also probably the only democratic country that occupies another sovereign nation, uses torture and practising genocide, according to another view.<sup>118</sup> With its support from the U.S. (as discussed earlier in this chapter), Israel has broken a number of UN Security Council



resolutions, while the U.S. has vetoed a number of attempts aimed at reducing violence the atrocities and terrorism in Israel and Palestine. For example, when calls grew from Palestinians, Islamic countries, and Europeans to send an international peace keeping force to the occupied territories to end the violence, a majority of Israelis supported that idea.<sup>119</sup>

Human Rights Watch, with support from Amnesty International, the UN Human Rights Commission, and other human rights groups called on the UN Security Council to immediately establish a permanent unarmed international presence in the West Bank and Gaza. Their mission would have been to report the compliance by all parties with international human rights and humanitarian standards. The U.S. made clear that it would veto such effort and cast the lone dissenting vote in vetoing that action.<sup>120</sup>

#### Democracy in Arab States in the Aftermath of the Gulf War

Is there no hope for democracy and human rights in the Middle East? Of course it is, just take a look at how long the Western countries needed to establish the democracies of today. The Gulf War definitely had an impact on the process of democratizing the Middle East. One of the most significant outcomes was:

that the “wall of fear” separating citizens from autocratic rulers has been broken through, and while the great powers applaud participation and exalt democracy, they loathe instability; . . . the achievement of greater participation and democratization without accompanying instability is difficult to imagine.<sup>121</sup>

A change has started towards more democratic societies, even if the different countries have different approaches. In some of the GCC countries the ruling families holding on to power by giving more of it away. Kuwait, Oman and Qatar have introduced aspects of democracy and plan to expand it to include females; Qatar held

elections in which women could vote in 1999.<sup>122</sup> In the aftermath of the Gulf War and with U.S. influence, Kuwait is probably one of the GCC countries that is most democratized today. The countries in the Middle East have during the 1990's made small incremental steps towards institutionalizing democratic processes and expanding civil liberties.

Despite signs of change these countries still have restrictive political systems that deny many rights to women and foreign workers. The region is known for religious discrimination, suppression of free speech and the denial of the right of peaceful change of government.<sup>123</sup> The slow progress towards democracy faces the risk of a backlash, especially if it gives leverage to radical Islamic movements. The result may be resurgence in government repression of human rights.

#### The Risk of the Middle East Turning to Radical Islamic Movement and Anti-Americanism

Politics is prohibited in this society in general, but the government can't close the mosque<sup>124</sup>

In the 1990s the U.S. rationalized its support for autocratic regimes in the Middle East as a regrettable but necessary means of suppressing the Islamic opposition. These regimes has created a situation were the lack of open political expression only encourages large segments of the oppressed populations to go underground to ally themselves with Islamic extremists. That radical Islamic fundamentalism is a force to be reckoned with in the current and future Middle East is undeniable. These groups will attempt to undercut any Arab government that tries to balance Islamic religious beliefs with democratic practice even if Islam has its own authentically democratic traditions.<sup>125</sup>

U.S. policy makers during the 1990s were aware of this risk and therefore executed a more cautious policy with countries such as Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately their actions to pressure Arab governments can also be used by radical Islamists as proof that the democratization process is yet another example of royal families' acquiescing to U.S. desires. Such a development could jeopardize U.S. interests by facilitating further instability.<sup>126</sup>

Another perspective of Islamism and anti-Americanism is that this hatred of America can be used to justify a great deal that is bad in the Arab world. Therefore this anti-Americanism is used by all levels of leaders to help keep these states politically dominated by dictatorships, socially restricted, and economically underdeveloped. This perspective means that the Arabs and Muslims blame their shortcomings on America instead of dealing with its internal problems and weaknesses that are the real cause of these countries' problems, and that anti-Americanism offers something to everyone to a low cost.<sup>127</sup> The question is key for the people in the region, since "actions speak louder than words." If "truth is in the eyes of the beholder" it is about their perception, a perception reinforced and delivered through the mosques. The challenge for U.S. policy is how to win back their hearts and minds.

#### Islamist Perceptions of U.S. Policy in the Middle East

There are a number of perceptions of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East that directly contradict its intent. A general perception of both Islamists and secularists in the Middle East is that U.S. foreign policy has favored Israel since the Six-Day War in 1967. Islamism is partly a reaction to the lack of self-determination and democratic institutions.

It is also a reaction to the absence of governments that operate legitimately for the well being of the people in the region.

The disempowerment and the irrelevance of nation-states artificially created by the British and the French in the end of WW I feeds dissent. Islamists also sees Arabs and Muslims as victims of the Western Christianity including the European crusades, the reconquista in Spain with a ruthless de-Islamization policy, the colonialist movements of the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries including the activities of Christian missionaries, and the denial of practice of their faith in Soviet Union. Islamists also includes the notion that for five decades Zionism has been another element supported by the Christians to eradicate Islam from the holy places.<sup>128</sup>

Islamism is also a reaction to what is perceived to be a double standard in the Western foreign policy in the Middle East. One example is the demonizing of the Islamists, where Westerners claim that there is no room for religion in the modern nation state. Islamists consider this to be hypocritical because of Western support of Israel and Pakistan, and think that the West is against Islam and not religion per se.<sup>129</sup> Another issue that intrigues Muslims is the statement by Israel (and its supporters) that it is the only democracy in the area, since they perceive it as a democracy for Jews while denying minorities like Christians and Muslims equal access to water,<sup>130</sup> housing,<sup>131</sup> health, education,<sup>132</sup> jobs, and the ability to purchase land. Islamists also perceive that there is a discrepancy between professed U.S. values and U.S. actions; that justice, self determination and human rights are victims of national interests; that “might makes right” is what matters; and that Muslims are rendered weak by the empowerment of Israel.<sup>133</sup>

When it comes to the Gulf War and the U.S. policy, the perception is that the objective was to “control the oil resources, protect Israel and achieve U.S. hegemony over the West (Europe) itself.”<sup>134</sup> Even if Islamists initially condemned the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, when the U.S. assumed leadership of the coalition the majority saw U.S. intervention as a continuation of colonial policies to maintain the division of the Islamic community into nation-states, destroy Arab power, and to maintain Israel’s supremacy in the region. They see U.S. policy as a double standard with these examples: Why was Iraq’s aggression immediately redressed when Israel’s had been going on for thirty years? Why did Saddam have to implement UN resolutions when Israel has been allowed to circumvent all UN resolutions except the one recognizing it as a state? Why did the Bush administration accuse Saddam of not respecting international boundaries when Israel has, for nearly half a century, of occupied territories designated for Palestinians as well as parts of Syria and Lebanon?<sup>135</sup> Why was Bush’s justification for military operations against Iraq the self determination of Kuwait when the U.S. refuses to recognize the Palestinians right to self-determination?

In denying that Iraq occupied Kuwait to liberate Palestine, Secretary Baker said, “no one should enslave a people in order to liberate another.” Islamists agree but fail to understand why U.S. policymakers permit Israel to “enslave” the Christians and Muslims of Palestine in order to liberate the Jews.

Finally, for Muslims Palestine is a cause. It represents the demand for the right of a people to self-determination, democracy, and freedom. The demand is that Palestine be recognized as equal to a European country, or, that a European Jew has no more or fewer

rights than a Palestinian Christian or Muslim. The Palestine cause is the demand for the end of a colonial era, an end of “Christian arrogance”<sup>136</sup> and “Jewish insolence”.<sup>137</sup> In addition, U.S. policy in the 1990s under Clinton--with Martin Indyk, a former Zionist lobbyist, in charge of U.S. policy in the region--only reinforced the impression that the Zionist lobby’s influence was unprecedented in history. The Islamists think that action speaks louder than words and remain unconvinced that U.S. policy has changed despite Clinton’s statements to the contrary.

### Conclusion

It is clear that the Middle East is in need of revolutionary economic and political reforms. These fundamental changes might also demand a better distribution of national resources, which inevitably would increase oil prices. The Middle Easterners want to see economic change, they want to see more responsible and accountable governments, and they are tired of the corruption of their leaders. The U.S. has well protected its national interests in the region during the past fifty years, and it has often done so by supporting illegitimate regimes, a situation that still exists today. The U.S. has during the 1990s created quite good relations with almost every government in the region except Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Libya. However, at the more popular level, among both Islamists and nationalists, there is a deep antipathy for U.S. policies. U.S. policies to date have not really emphasized spreading democracy and promoting human rights in the region. There are of course reasons for this reluctance, like the risk of making the region more radical if one pushes to hard.

The main reason, though, seems to be that it is easier to control a friendly autocratic regime instead of facing the obvious risk of instability with a Western style

democracy. The perception of the people in the region of the U.S. as a hypocritical power with double standards that does not “walk the talk” makes it hard to see how a democracy created from such perceptions could be U.S. friendly. In this light, is it easy to see why the U.S. national interests of spreading democracy and promoting human rights are not among the most vital national interests of the U.S. in the Middle East. The real commitment to these interests will therefore naturally only take place in regions where “maintaining stability” does not oppose a vital interest of the U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington D.C.: The White House, January 1988), 3.

<sup>2</sup> George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington D.C.: The White House, January 1988), 29.

<sup>3</sup> William Clinton, *National Security Strategy of the United States: A National Security Strategy for a Global Age* (Washington D.C.: The White House, December 2000).

<sup>4</sup> William Clinton, *National Security Strategy of the United States: A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington D.C.: The White House, July 1994), 5.

<sup>5</sup> William Clinton, *National Security Strategy of the United States: A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington D.C.: The White House, February 1996), 42-43.

<sup>6</sup> William Clinton, *National Security Strategy of the United States: A National Security for a New Century* (Washington D.C.: The White House, October 1998), 53-54.

<sup>7</sup> William Clinton, *National Security Strategy of the United States: A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington D.C.: The White House, July 1994), 17.

<sup>8</sup> William Clinton, *National Security Strategy of the United States: A National Security for a New Century* (Washington D.C.: The White House, December 1999), 47.

<sup>9</sup> Michael A Phillips, LTC, *Strategy for a Middle East Peace-- is the U.S. acting in its own best interest?* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 8.

<sup>10</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 300, Arguments in this part ‘*Israel serving U.S. interests*’ is essentially the same as the one from Stephen Zunes (below).

<sup>11</sup> The Iran-Contras scandal in the 1980s, when CIA sold arms secretly to Iran to free hostages, then sent the profits to Contra rebels fighting the elected Nicaraguan government, see <http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2001/10/22/story15356.asp> and <http://webcom.com/pinknoiz/covert/icsummary.html>.

<sup>12</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 162.

<sup>13</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 112.

<sup>14</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 113.

<sup>15</sup>Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington DC: 2000, ninth edition), 483.

<sup>16</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 114.

<sup>17</sup>Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (2000, ninth edition), 483.

<sup>18</sup>Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 489.

<sup>19</sup>Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 494-508.

<sup>20</sup>Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 509.

<sup>21</sup>Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 74.

<sup>22</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 114-115.

<sup>23</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 111.

<sup>24</sup>Jody Boudreault, Emma and Salaam Naughton, Yasser (Eds.)(1992). *U.S. Official Statements: Israeli Settlements and the fourth Geneva Convention* (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies), 48, quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 174.

<sup>25</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 174-175.



<sup>26</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 183; The President's remarks in Palm Springs is quoted in the New York Times, March 3, 1990, A5.

<sup>27</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 188.

<sup>28</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 128-129.

<sup>29</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 116.

<sup>30</sup>U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, letter to the United Nations General Assembly, August 8, 1994; quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox*, (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 116.

<sup>31</sup>Michael A Phillips, LTC, *Strategy for a Middle East Peace-- is the U.S. acting in its own best interest?* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 10.

<sup>32</sup>Jim Lobe, *U.S. and Israeli Governments Out of Step with Public According to New Polls* (Foreign Policy in Focus, May 13), 2002; quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 116-117.

<sup>33</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 117.

<sup>34</sup>David G Curdy, LTC, *Security and Peace in the Middle East* (Maxwell: Air War College Maxwell Paper No. 4, 1996), 18.

<sup>35</sup>Amos Elon, *A Blood-Dimmed Tide, Dispatches from the Middle East* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1997), p 121; quoted in Michael A Phillips, LTC, *Strategy for a Middle East Peace-- is the U.S. acting in its own best interest?* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 10.

<sup>36</sup>Michael A Phillips, LTC, *Strategy for a Middle East Peace-- is the U.S. acting in its own best interest?* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 12.

<sup>37</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 109-111.

<sup>38</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 118.

<sup>39</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 152-153; Fuller, op. cit.

<sup>40</sup>Slater, *Netanyahu, A Palestinian state, and Israeli Security Reassessed*, 681-689; quoted in Michael A Phillips, LTC, *Strategy for a Middle East Peace-- is the U.S. acting in its own best interest?* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 16.

<sup>41</sup>Walter Millis, (Ed.)(1952). *The Forestal Diaries. The Inner History of the Cold War*. With the collaboration of E.S. Duffield. With an introductory note by Alexander of Hillsborough. London: Cassel and CO., 266; quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 33.

<sup>42</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 281.

<sup>43</sup>National War College Lecture, December 21, 1948, *Kennan Papers*, Box 17, quoted in Gaddis, John L. (1982) *Strategies of containment. A critical Appraisal of Post war American National Security Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 29; quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 281.

<sup>44</sup>Memorandum by the inter-divisional Petroleum Committee of the Department of State. Foreign Petroleum Policy of the United States, April 11, 1944, in U.S. Department of State (1965). *FRUS 1944. Vol V: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa. The Far East*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, pp 30; quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 289.

<sup>45</sup>Stephen Pelletieré, *Iraq and the International Oil System – Why the Americans Went to War In the Gulf* (Praeger, 2001), 220-221.

<sup>46</sup>Table 1. Source: Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 166.

<sup>47</sup>Energy Information Administration; *Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Export Fact Sheet*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html>.

<sup>48</sup>WTO, International Trade.

<sup>49</sup>Energy Information Administration; *Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Export Fact Sheet*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html>.

<sup>50</sup>John Duke Anthony, *Ch 24: The U.S.-GCC relationship: Is It a Glass Leaking or a Glass Filling?* in David W Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States-- a historical and political reassessment* (Westview Press, Second edition, 1999), 419.

<sup>51</sup>John Duke Anthony, *Ch 24: The U.S.-GCC relationship: Is It a Glass Leaking or a Glass Filling?* David W Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States – a historical and political reassessment*, (Westview Press, Second edition, 1999), 420, 424.

<sup>52</sup>John Duke Anthony, *Ch 24: The U.S.-GCC relationship: Is It a Glass Leaking or a Glass Filling?* David W Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States – a historical and political reassessment*, (Westview Press, Second edition, 1999), 414-415.

<sup>53</sup>CSIS, *U.S. Global Arms Transfer*, 1998, [http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/usarms4\\_7\\_98.pdf](http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/usarms4_7_98.pdf) .

<sup>54</sup>Arms Sales Monitor, *Saudis Go for Broke on U.S. Arms* (Washington: Federation of American Scientists), No 30, July 20, 1995; quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 42.

<sup>55</sup>Anthony, John Duke, *Ch 24: The U.S.-GCC relationship: Is It a Glass Leaking or a Glass Filling?* David W Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States--a historical and political reassessment* (Westview Press, Second edition, 1999), 419.

<sup>56</sup><http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19810201faessay8169/j-c-hurewitz/the-middle-east-a-year-of-turmoil.html>.

<sup>57</sup>Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 108.

<sup>58</sup>Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 113.

<sup>59</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 291.

<sup>60</sup>Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 8.

<sup>61</sup>Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 19-20.

<sup>62</sup>Sarah Graham-Brown, *Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq* (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), xi; quoted in Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects*(Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 15.

<sup>63</sup>Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 15.

<sup>64</sup>The higher estimates have been extrapolated from a 1995 report from researchers for the Food and Agriculture organisation and various reports from UNICEF. The lower estimates are from reputedly more scientific studies, including the 1999 report *Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children* by Columbia University's Richard Garfield, and *Sanctions and Childhood Mortality in Iraq*, a May 2000 article by Mohammad Ali and Iqbal Shah in *The Lancet*, the journal of the British Medical Society; quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 91.

<sup>65</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 91-96.

<sup>66</sup>United Press International, August 2, 2002, quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 96.

<sup>67</sup>Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh referring to a report made by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Sweden;  
[http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/Inrikes/did\\_4943948.asp](http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/Inrikes/did_4943948.asp).

<sup>68</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 96.

<sup>69</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 86-90.

<sup>70</sup>Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 120.

<sup>71</sup>See the statement delivered by Martin Indyk, President Clinton's former policy adviser on the Middle East, to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on May 19, 1993; quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 283.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup>Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 10.

<sup>74</sup>Tomas Friedman, *the Missiles' Message*, *The New York Times*, June 28, 1993 ppA1, A6; quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 284.

<sup>75</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 284.

<sup>76</sup>Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 10.

<sup>77</sup> Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 197.

<sup>78</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 69-75.

<sup>79</sup>Patrick Clawson, *the Continuing Logic of Dual Containment*, *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 1, Spring 1998, 33; quoted in Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 15.

<sup>80</sup>F. Gregory Gause III, *the Illogic of Dual Containment*, *Foreign Affairs*, vol 73, No. 2, March/April 1994, 56-57; quoted in Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the*

*Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 16.

<sup>81</sup>Jerry L. Mraz, *Dual Containment: U.S. Policy In the Persian Gulf and Recommendations For the Future* (Research Paper: Air Command and Staff College, March 1997), 26-27.

<sup>82</sup>Merriam-Websters Inc., publishers, *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (Springfield Massachusetts, U.S.A., 1981), 911.

<sup>83</sup>See for example Alnasrawi, Abbas (1991). *Arab nationalism, Oil, and the Political Economy of Dependency*. (New York: Greenwood Press); quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 299.

<sup>84</sup>Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 19.

<sup>85</sup>Michael R Gordon, and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals War* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 193-195.

<sup>86</sup>Because they were not willing to show the agreements to opposition in their countries and not to show the details to other countries in the region see Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 20.

<sup>87</sup>Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 20.

<sup>88</sup>Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 21.

<sup>89</sup>See U.S. Central Command, Posture Statement, 1995, 39 and U.S. Central Command, *Shaping U.S. Central Command For The Twenty First Century*, Strategic Plan II, 1997-1999, 5; quoted in Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 20.

<sup>90</sup>Statement of General Anthony C. Zinni, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, before the house Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, February 10, 1999, 16; quoted in Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 22-23.

<sup>91</sup>Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 29.

<sup>92</sup>Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East*, (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 154.

<sup>93</sup>John Duke Anthony, *Ch 24: The U.S.-GCC relationship: Is It a Glass Leaking or a Glass Filling?*, David W Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States--a historical and political reassessment* (Westview Press, Second edition, 1999), 422.

<sup>94</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 38.

<sup>95</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 302-303.

<sup>96</sup>Michael Klare, *Making Enemies for the '90s: The new 'Rouge States' Doctrine*, *The Nation*, May 8, 1995, 625; quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 44.

<sup>97</sup>Interview, May 12, 1992, Seattle Washington, quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 40.

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<sup>99</sup>*Saudis Go for Broke on U.S. Arms*, *Arms Sales Monitor*, (Washington: Federation of American Scientists), No. 30, July 20 1995; quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 42.

<sup>100</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 45.

<sup>101</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 47, 63.

<sup>102</sup>Pol De Vos, *Oljehungern drivkraften bakom konflikten i mellan östern*, (*Internationales* No. 21, 2002), 14-15.

<sup>103</sup>Sami G. Hajjar, *U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 51.

<sup>104</sup>Observation from interviews with Gulf Arab Scholars at international academic meetings between 1992 and 2000; quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 65.

<sup>105</sup>Energy Information Administration; *Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Export Fact Sheet*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html>, 2.

<sup>106</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 300.

<sup>107</sup>Talbott, Strobe, *Democracy and the National Interests*, *Foreign Affairs* 75, 6, 52; quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 304.

<sup>108</sup>Curdy, David G, *Security and Peace in the Middle East: experiments with democracy in an Islamic World*, Air War College Maxwell paper No 4, 1996, 1.

<sup>109</sup>The White House, *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 20; quoted in Michael A Phillips, LTC, *Strategy for a Middle East Peace-- is the U.S. acting in its own best interest?* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 10.

<sup>110</sup>Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 6-7.

<sup>111</sup>Stephen Zunes, *The United States in the Sahara War. A Case of Low-Intensity Intervention*, in Daniel Volman and Yahia Zoubir, eds., *International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), 1993; quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 13.

<sup>112</sup>*Democracy Denied in Algeria*, *New York Times*, July 24, 1992, A24; quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 13.

<sup>113</sup>Congressional Research Service, *Jordan-U.S. Relations and Bilateral issues*, June 13, 2001, quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 14.

<sup>114</sup>Michael Klare, *Asking Why?* (Global Affairs Commentary, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, September 2001); quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 14.

<sup>115</sup>F. Gregory Gause III noted in Sennott, Charles M., *Doubts are Cast on the Viability Of Saudi Monarchy for Long Term* (*Boston Globe*, March 5, 2002); quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 16.

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<sup>118</sup>Michael A Phillips, LTC, *Strategy for a Middle East Peace-- is the U.S. acting in its own best interest?* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 44.

<sup>119</sup>A Dahaf poll taken May 5-6, 2002 showed 56% of the public said that such an international force would raise their hopes, a much higher percentage than those who said that their hopes would be raised by IDF responsibility for security in Palestinian cities; quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 26.

<sup>120</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Independent Inquiry Needed in Israeli-Palestinian Bloodshed*, October 7, 2000, quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 26.

<sup>121</sup> Norton, Augustus R., *Breaking through the Wall of Fear in the Arab World*. (Current History, January 1992), 37; quoted in Curdy, David G, *Security and Peace in the Middle East: experiments with democracy in an Islamic World* (Air War College Maxwell paper No 4, 1996), 16.

<sup>122</sup> Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 152.

<sup>123</sup> Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East* (Washington D.C.: 2000, ninth edition), 153

<sup>124</sup> Abu Saada, Hafez, Secretary General for the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, cited in Vick, op. cit; Quoted in Stephen Zunes, *Tinderbox* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2003), 26.

<sup>125</sup> Curdy, David G, *Security and Peace in the Middle East: experiments with democracy in an Islamic World* (Air War College Maxwell paper No 4, 1996), 16, 19.

<sup>126</sup> Katzman, Kenneth, *Arabia and Kuwait?* (Middle East Quarterly, September 1994), 21; quoted in Curdy, David G, *Security and Peace in the Middle East: experiments with democracy in an Islamic World* (Air War College Maxwell paper No 4, 1996), 16.

<sup>127</sup> Rubin, Barry; *The Tragedy of The Middle East* (Cambridge, U.K.: the Cambridge University Press, 2002), 240-250.

<sup>128</sup> Catovic, Saffet; *Europe's Islamic Heritage in Jeopardy* (Inquiry 1(6) (January 1993), 28; quoted in Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne, *Ch 26: Islamist perceptions of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*, David W Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States--a historical and political reassessment* (Westview Press, Second edition, 1999), 433-436.

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<sup>131</sup>Ibid

<sup>132</sup>Farah, Munir; *Impact on Education*, in Nasser A. Aruri, ed., *Occupation: Israel Over Palestine* (Belmont, Mass.: AAUG, 1983), 295-318; and Nasser Aururi, *Universities Under Occupation*, in the same volume, 319-336; quoted in Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne, *Ch 26: Islamist perceptions of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*, David W Lesch, *The Middle East and the United State-- a historical and political reassessment* (Westview Press, Second edition, 1999), 433-436.

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<sup>134</sup>Ghannouchi, Rachid, *Islam and the West: Realities and Prospects*, Inquiry 2 (7) (March/April 1993), 45; quoted in Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne, *Ch 26: Islamist perceptions of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*, David W Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States – a historical and political reassessment* (Westview Press, Second edition, 1999), 440.

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<sup>136</sup>Bakhkhush, Fathi; *Daqqat Sa'at al- Jihad: al-Umma fi Khatar* (The Hour of Jihad has struck: The Nation Is in Danger), Risalat al-Jihad 9 (93) (November 1990); quoted in Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne, *Ch 26: Islamist perceptions of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*, David W Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States-- a historical and political reassessment* (Westview Press, Second edition, 1999), 448.

<sup>137</sup>See *Kalla al-Sihyuniyya Haraka 'Unsurriyya* (No, Zionism Is a Rascist Movement) Risat al-Jihad 10 (103) (October 1991), 6; Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne, *Ch 26: Islamist perceptions of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*, David W Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States--a historical and political reassessment* (Westview Press, Second edition, 1999), 433-436.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS

Since the beginning of the Eleventh century, when the Crusades began and when Richard the Lionheart of England and Philip II of France were fighting Saladin in the third Crusade (late Twelfth century), there has been a continuous struggle by the Arabic people in the Middle East against invaders.<sup>1</sup> The Ottoman Empire ruled in the region more or less from the Fourteenth century until the end of WW I.<sup>2</sup> In the aftermath of WWI the British and the French divided the area into countries with their own interests in mind, a division into oil rich and oil poor countries. In the interwar years the Arabic people period faced British and French domination of the region.

The awareness of the long-term strategic importance of oil in the Middle East became apparent during WWII. The need for oil can be traced from the rise of petroleum as naval fuel prior to WWI, the interwar period with intense speculation on access to resources, the oil-related campaigns during WWII to secure this important commodity, the containment of Soviet Union, to the current regional threats to the free flow of oil.<sup>3</sup> Oil supply considerations, especially after WWII, have become the most important consideration as a base for United States strategy. In the wake of WWII and the U.S.-backed creation of Israel and the power struggle with the Soviet Union the U.S. took over the role as the protector of the West's interests in the Middle East after the British withdrawal from "East of Suez" in the late 1960s.

The Cold War period followed a path dominated by three important national interests of the U.S.: the free access to oil; the security of Israel; and the containment of the Soviet Union. The Suez crisis of 1956 deepened U.S. involvement and inaugurated

the military aspect of U.S. regional policy to fill a gap left by the collapse of British power. The resulting Eisenhower doctrine allowed deployment of U.S. troops in the region.<sup>4</sup> Following the Six Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the U.S. became closer to Israel, with deepening involvement in the Middle East. U.S. took responsibility as Israel's protector, leading to a perception among Arabs of unequal treatment.

The Arab states used oil as a strategic weapon in 1973 furthering U.S. involvement in the region. In 1978 the Camp David accords effectively removed Egypt from the equations but the Iranian revolution with the removal of the Shah of Iran in 1979 pushed again for military involvement. The consequence was the creation of the Carter Doctrine in 1980, with a Rapid Deployment Force ready to intervene from Pakistan to Egypt.<sup>5</sup> In the war between Iraq and Iran during the 1980s, oil shipments to the West became threatened and U.S. sided indirectly with Iraq, a policy that best protected U.S. interests at the time. This reaction included the employment of naval forces to secure the shipments of oil from the region, fulfilling the promise of the Carter Doctrine.

The decline of the Soviet Union in 1989, followed by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War, was the second time the Carter Doctrine was used to restore regional stability and Status Quo. The regional "adversary" has changed several times during the years, beginning with OPEC in the wake of 1973 embargo, to the Soviet Union after Afghanistan, ending with the regional threats of Iraq and Iran after the Cold War.

The U.S. National Security Strategy did not change much during the 1990s. The free flow of commerce, especially oil at reasonable prices, and the security of Israel remained the most vital of all U.S. interests in the Middle East. The key to achieve both these interests simultaneously is stability, a term that one analyst in this context defines as a “code word, referring to favorable orientation of the political elite--favorable not to their populations but to foreign investors and global managers.”<sup>6</sup>

To create long-term stability in the Middle East the most important issue to solve is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. U.S. unilateral support of Israel before and after the Cold War ended, shutting all other international organizations out, has created a lot of resentment in the Arab world and increasing support for the Palestinians in the rest of the western world. The U.S. has not always been perceived as the honest broker in this conflict, rather, it has supported Israel despite the latter’s obvious violations of international law, UN resolutions, suppression of democratic rights, and human rights abuses. To be able to create long term stability in the Middle East, the U.S. must solve this conflict and show that the U.S. can “walk the talk,” a conclusion not obvious to most countries in the region.

That the Gulf War and the fall of the Soviet Union created opportunities for the U.S. in the Middle East is clear. During the 1990s U.S. economic interests became more than just the free flow of oil. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s fall and the downsizing of western European armies, the Middle East has become the most important region for U.S. arms sales and an important destination for other export commodities. Free market access to oil still remains the most important national interest

of the U.S. in the Middle East, both for U.S. direct energy needs and to keep major U.S. trading partners--e.g. Japan and Europe--economically stable.

U.S. commitment to the security of friendly Arab allies in the aftermath of the Gulf War also increased significantly and provided the U.S. an opportunity to preposition weapons and equipment in the region in order to be responsive to meet new emerging threats to stability. But its presence also created resentment among the Islamic population of the region, who saw only infidels on holy soil.

Another consequence of this more visible U.S. presence was the U.S. support of autocratic and repressive regimes in countries where people do not have basic human rights, for example, a peaceful way of changing government. There is no doubt that U.S. presence and support of these regimes during the 1990s has become an increasing problem in the region, and a threat to future stability. Further is there any doubt that even if U.S. pursues its interests in the region, the interests of human rights and democracy will never be viewed as "vital" as free access to oil and the security of Israel. For this reason, the U.S. does not emphasize the promotion of democracy in the Middle East, since democracy would carry the inherent risk of overthrowing regimes friendly to the U.S., threatening stability, the key to achieving vital U.S. interests.

Has the U.S. foreign policy served its national interests after the Cold War? Yes, U.S. policy served its national interest based on what the administration in the White House perceived as important at the time, based on domestic politics and especially economic interests. However, the methods have become to be more like a firefighter fighting the symptoms instead of fighting the causes of the problems--fighting the most

visual threat instead of fighting the roots. It seems that the U.S. has pursued one short-term foreign policy after the other rather than a single, long-term policy.

The U.S. inherited the legacy of thousands of years of Western imperialism in the Middle East, the Crusades, the Ottoman Empire and the British. This imperialism and legacy together with U.S. support of illegitimate regimes, and U.S. unilateral support of Israel, denying any major involvement of other legitimate international organizations, have combined to create a deep antipathy and distrust among the region's people and their leaders. The U.S. has pursued its interests on a short-term basis, even if this policy is logical and justified from a Western perspective, the question remains: if this perspective is valid or just one version of the truth. Perhaps it is valid, perhaps not, but truth is not what is important, perception is.

The challenge for the U.S. in the Middle East, have been and will continue to be to balance its policies to secure its two most important interests; the free access to oil and its commitment to Israel's security. This act of balance, to secure these two vital interests that frequently contradict each other, without adding to the resentment that already exists against the U.S. in the region, is one of the greatest policy challenges for the U.S. in the future.

The long-term stability needed for the U.S. to secure its national interests in the Middle East requires winning the hearts and the minds of the people to the U.S. side. Minimizing the prevailing distrust towards the U.S. may, in the short-term, increase the risk to the U.S. and its people. But, winning these hearts and minds is the only possible way for the U.S. to serve its long-term national interests in the region.

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<sup>1</sup>Robert Cowley, Geoffrey Parker, *The Readers Companion to Military History* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), 118.

<sup>2</sup>Tidens Världshistoria, *Från franska revolutionen till våra dagar* (Sweden: Tidens Förlag, 1987), 208-209.

<sup>3</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 309.

<sup>4</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 307.

<sup>5</sup>Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1998), 309.

<sup>6</sup>Noam Chomsky, *Rouge States* (Cambridge: South End Press, 2000), 55.

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