STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO LONG-TERM PEACE

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The focus of this research is to define the role the military should assume in post conflict infrastructure reconstruction during peace operations. The paper examines the limitations under which the military currently operates, discusses the advantages and disadvantages that the military and the civil agencies bring to infrastructure reconstruction, and suggests a template to use during future peace operations maximizing each organization to its best effectiveness. Reviewing the case studies of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, there is a gap of about one year from the cessation of hostilities until the civil agencies can properly organize, deploy, and become effective in post conflict reconstruction. This gap results in continued instability for the host nation, a longer military deployment for peacekeeping forces, and greater outlays of resources for the troop contributing nations to the peace operation. By allowing and properly funding the military to engage in post conflict reconstruction during that critical first year, rather than limit the military to works that satisfy only the minimum military requirement, the host nation economy will be given a jumpstart, government legitimacy through the provision of basic needs will be established quicker, and overall security will be enhanced, thus shortening the required deployment for military peacekeepers.

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is about post conflict reconstruction, or more precisely how to execute post conflict reconstruction in the most optimum way to secure long-term peace. These are ideas formed during twenty-two years of military experience – experience gathered during security operations on the inter-German border during the Cold War; multiple peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans; no-notice defense missions in Kuwait; numerous exercises against notional forces in the swamps of Georgia, the deserts of California and Egypt, and the rolling hills of Germany; and almost constant military plan development to prepare for possible missions in places such as Korea, Iraq, Turkey, and Greece. Throughout all of these scenarios, there exists a common thread. After the fighting is done and hostilities have essentially ceased, viable physical infrastructure is essential for a region to develop economic strength, leading to government stability and security. The earlier that the infrastructure can return to normalcy, the better are the chances that the country will grow and that long-term peace will thrive.

Despite the inherent value of infrastructure reconstruction to the long-term peace process, I experienced significant frustration while deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo at the apparent gap between the limits of military infrastructure reconstruction and the beginning of post conflict infrastructure reconstruction by civilian agencies. This frustration later evolved into critical thinking on ways to better execute post conflict reconstruction, to maximize the reconstruction potential of both the military and civilian components, while also maximizing and growing the capabilities of the host country. I developed a comparative study of the experiences of three regions that had significant United States forces engaged throughout the three stages of peace operations – peace enforcement, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. The criteria for my case selection was straightforward:

(1) I considered only those peace operations that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, peace operations had the geo-political task to ensure that local conflicts did not sufficiently escalate to drag in larger regional neighbors or the two superpowers. The ending of the superpower conflict created a new set of circumstances to which the military and the civilian agencies have had to adjust. Any proposed template for post conflict infrastructure reconstruction must confine itself to the current standard of peace operations and not be sidetracked by Cold War guidelines.

(2) I limited my cases to those that had large infusions of United States military forces sent to conduct the continuum of military operations from high intensity conflict to peace operations. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has sent forces of at least a

battalion size or larger to ten conflicts around the world. The following table outlines the possible case pool:

Location	Dates (Calendar Year)	Peak Number of US Forces
Panama	1989-1990	14,000
Iraq and Kuwait	1991-present	35,000
Somalia	1992-1994	25,800
Macedonia	1993-1999	600
Rwanda	1994	3,600
Haiti	1994-present	21,000
Bosnia	1996-present	26,000
Kosovo	1999-present	7,100
East Timor	1999-present	1,300
Afghanistan	2001-present	7,100

Table 1: Major United States Peace Operations Since 1989

(3) I limited my case selection to operations that reached the peacebuilding stage and which lasted longer than 18 months in order to determine what effects the reconstruction gap had on country development. These two stipulations eliminated six cases:

- Panama – a short operation with no requirement for large infrastructure reconstruction as part of peacebuilding.
- Somalia – President Clinton terminated the operation when United States forces failed to accomplish countrywide peace enforcement. One of the prerequisites for peacebuilding is the establishment of a stabile and secure environment. This was never achieved throughout the country.
- Macedonia – United States forces were deployed as part of the UN Preventative Deployment Force. The mission ended on February 28, 1999, and later transitioned to be a part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). No infrastructure reconstruction was required in Macedonia and forces were there in a UN observer status only.
- Rwanda – United States forces were not deployed long enough to enter the peacebuilding stage.

- Haiti – United States forces were deployed in large numbers for less than one year, although there are still limited forces in theater.
- East Timor – short operation; not a sufficient United States presence to affect reconstruction.

(4) I limited my case selection to infrastructure efforts that required external funding. This eliminated Kuwait who had the required $14 billion to fully fund the United States efforts at reconstruction. Because the United States Army Corps of Engineers fully reconstructed the country on a reimbursable basis, paid for by the legitimate government of Kuwait, this operation is an aberration from the possible case pool.[1] Most peace operations do not have the luxury of having a fully functioning legitimate government, nor one with the wealth of the Kuwaitis.

Therefore, I chose to focus on the remaining cases - Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan - as the cases for comparison. All three operations meet the proposed criteria and constitute highly visible test opportunities for the international community to mobilize resources and design effective interventions for post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The findings of these three case studies suggest that even generous, well-intentioned external assistance is not readily available in the critical year after the cessation of hostilities. By demonstrating the problems encountered in each operation in respect to reconstruction, I fully develop a post conflict infrastructure reconstruction template in Chapter 5 to use as a planning guideline for United States peace operations in the future.

This book's focus on *external* resources may over emphasize the role of the military and the international donors in successful post conflict reconstruction. In the end, the critical determinants of successful peacebuilding and sustainable recovery must be *internal*. The efforts of the military, with a smooth transition to civil agencies supported by the donor community cannot substitute for the willingness of local actors to renounce violence and to devote domestic resources to reconstruction. The value of the post conflict reconstruction proposal in the final chapter is that it will help jumpstart the host nation and will give them a rapid start to recovery with a goal of self-sufficiency. A rise in self-sufficiency will subsequently advance the redeployment of the intervening military forces and civilian agencies.

I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance from persons who consented to be interviewed. They spoke with admirable directness and candor, and did not hesitate to give their remarks for attribution. I want to thank those who willingly gave their time to help me hone

my ideas and perfect my writing. At the risk of leaving somebody out, I must individually thank a few of my military colleagues such as Lieutenant Colonels Tim Touchette, Dave Carlton, and Ran Garver, and Major Eric Niksch, all of whom I served with in the Balkans; Major General Carl Strock who mentored me when I was a young major deployed to Kuwait and then helped me narrow my ideas during the actual writing task; Brigadier General Steve Hawkins, the premier engineer officer for peace operations; and Colonel John Durkin, who not only deserves thanks for help in crafting ideas, but also who ran invaluable interference for me in Heidelberg when I was deployed as the task force engineer and engineer battalion commander in Kosovo. I appreciate the advice of Colonel Mike Dooley and his fellow staff at the United States Army Peacekeeping Institute who helped guide my project to completion. And to the soldiers and families of the 16th Armored Engineer Battalion – I owe a debt of gratitude that I can never repay.

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CHAPTER ONE: CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Today's global security environment is complex and full of unknowns. Peace and stability are constantly threatened by traditional national and ethnic enmities, further retarding economic development and raising the cost of conflict, both in lives and in infrastructure. Ethnic divisions that were suppressed by the Cold War erupted with suddenness and ferocity, as the tragedies in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) and Kosovo vividly demonstrated. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, and ethnic cleansing grab our newspaper headlines and pose a serious danger to global stability.

Uneven economic development, whether between strict ethnic divisions or simply between the haves and have nots, will prolong poverty throughout the world, promoting terrorism, drug-based economies, and ever increasing instability. The gap between rich and poor societies has expanded dramatically, separating nations and continents into fundamentally different worlds. Transnational threats whose power, influence and interests cross international borders have transformed global instability from one of a state-on-state problem to one that encompasses intrastate divisions within a single geographical boundary. It has removed the management of conflict from the traditional governmental role, which may impart a sense of stability and rationale to the conflict, to one that involves leading actors from various sources.

It is increasingly difficult to determine who has the reins on the conflict and who can best be influenced to cease hostilities. Unlike professional armies who are likely to follow the standardized rules of engagement hammered out in various legal conventions, recent internal conflicts have involved paramilitary formations that typically do not adhere to the agreed-upon, legally binding rules governing behavior in times of war. These national and other identity groups typically define their actions as consistent with their own interpretation of legal conventions. Since the conflict is internal, they argue, their actions fall outside the realm of international law, and since they are challenging a constituted order, their actions fall outside the realm of domestic law.[2]

The current and projected security environment suggests many potential challenges from either states or individuals who comprise "transnational groups." Instability is far more likely to occur through asymmetrical responses and countermeasures, vastly different from the traditional force-on-force encounters that have dominated the past. Potential foes may devise unique weapons or strategies that strike at bases, diplomatic posts, economic interests,

telecommunications, computer networks, or even the American homeland, as was seen on September 11, 2001. Without warning, the United States may be forced to conduct simultaneous peace operations, working through the Armed Forces and the civilian agencies, with little to no reaction time. Why the end of the Cold War brought with it so many intrastate conflicts will likely be a matter of debate for years to come. These conflicts may have been the result of power grabs by ambitious politicians in the post-Cold War reshuffling of regimes and borders, or they may have happened because the very nature of the Cold War successfully kept these conflicts in check. Even if the answer points to resentments built up over the centuries and to long-seething ethnic hatreds unleashed by the end of colonial empires, the international community must determine successful methods to intervene if long-term peace is the desired result.

THE POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION GAP

The proliferation of intrastate conflicts during the post Cold War era has launched the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States, in particular, into a series of complicated peace operations amidst the devastation of sometimes protracted civil war. While the grim exposure of suffering and humanitarian crises through the international media often propels the urgency of superhuman emergency relief and humanitarian operations, during its aftermath the UN, international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and developmental organizations are left, often under withering resources, the difficult task of post conflict reconstruction.

Military forces are repeatedly sent into conflict areas to establish the peace, but are then retained in theater for an indeterminate amount of time without a clear exit strategy and without a clear mandate to execute peace operation tasks other than provide security and stability. There is no well-established strategy to quickly transition from the military's peacemaking and peacekeeping mission to the civilian agencies' longer-term mission of peacebuilding. There is no civilian agency that can make an immediate impact on the host country infrastructure and economy to jump start the nation and prevent a reemergence into conflict – they all need sufficient time to organize, acquire funding, and deploy. Furthermore, the United States military does not have the authority to execute post conflict reconstruction, even though they are already in theater providing security and stability. The result is a reconstruction gap that must be filled should the international community expect to achieve a final resolution to the conflict within a reasonable time frame and while significant international focus still remains on the

damaged country. There is a period of time from about one year to eighteen months after the cessation of hostilities when the host nation is in limbo – there is not enough infrastructure to facilitate a change to economic recovery, there are no internal assets in good enough shape to provide that infrastructure, and there is no external force that can legally provide the infrastructure help to promote the necessary economic growth. Under current guidance, all military actions in a peace operation must have a direct effect on the military mission. Any infrastructure reconstruction that has civilian only use is not covered under the current mandates and is viewed as mission creep and "nationbuilding".

Two empirical examples will aptly demonstrate the real-world impact of this strategy when operationalized on the ground. First, the NATO air campaign in Bosnia destroyed many bridges throughout the country, among which was a two-lane bridge that spanned the Drina River connecting the town of Foca to the main road network leading to Sarajevo. At the beginning of the peace operation, the Bosnian Implementation Force (IFOR) designated 2,500 kilometers of road as Theater Main Supply Routes (MSR), opening the NATO funding stream to repair these roads in order to support military operations. The road that was on the other side of the Drina River from Foca was designated as a MSR, but the bridge that connected Foca to the road network was not. Because the bridge was not directly located on the MSR (less than 100 meters away), NATO could not spend money to rebuild the bridge, which they initially had destroyed from the air. The limitation was so restrictive that employing a temporary bridge was even outside of the mandate. Because this policy effectively cut off the town from the Bosnia sector, Foca, although mostly inhabited by Bosnians, remained in Serbian hands, becoming an unstable town with high mafia activity.

Second, again in Bosnia, the United States used four Bailey Bridges (temporary, "erector set" type steel girder bridges of World War II era) deployed out of war stock reserves to span the gaps that remained when four small bridges were blown in the NATO air campaign. Unlike the Foca example, these bridges were properly located on a Multinational Brigade North (MNB-North) MSR and fit the criteria allowing the use of United States resources on MSRs directly supporting the military mission. However, when the United States military shifted its sector to better align with the military mission, it resulted in a redesignation of the MSRs, and these four bridges were no longer located on a designated MSR. In accordance with United States policy, the bridges had to be removed.

The Bailey bridges had been in place for almost a year and had endured numerous crossings by both military and civilian traffic. Some pieces of the bridges were bent beyond repair; however, replacement parts were unavailable because the company that built Bailey

Bridges had ceased to exist. NATO issued a formal request to the United States Department of State asking that the bridges remain in place, with crossing restrictions due to the bridges' wear and tear, as a gift to Bosnia so that the freedom of civilian movement that had progressed in the year since the cessation of hostilities could continue. The United States refused, first, because the Bailey Bridges were to be redeployed to replenish its depleted war stock (even though they were deemed unserviceable upon close inspection) and, second, leaving the bridges in place would have been considered a violation of their non-nationbuilding mandate.[3] The ultimate solution was to secure non-governmental funding in the summer of 1997 to replace these four older bridges with four new Mabey-Johnson bridges (basically an updated Bailey Bridge made of titanium steel).[4] The result was that additional aid money was spent unnecessarily on four new bridges; the four old bridges were removed, deemed unserviceable, and thus destroyed; and the outcome of maintaining freedom of movement was attained, but at a much higher cost – precious money that could have been used in other areas.

These are only two instances, but are representative examples of the limitations imposed by a policy of non-nationbuilding that otherwise could have greatly added to the stability and enhanced the security of the theater. This causes a significant delay in rebuilding the host country infrastructure and adds to an already considerable list of security concerns. This lack of nationbuilding authority for the military prolongs the period of instability, uncertainty, and unrest, further extending the military's requirement to remain in theater to provide a safe and secure environment. Is there a more optimum approach to handle the post conflict reconstruction mission that will not only jumpstart the economy and the local governing structures, but will also lead to an earlier redeployment of military and civilian interveners?

MODEL FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Boutros Boutros–Ghali's An Agenda for Peace formally recognizes the peace consolidation activities that take place after a conflict. However, he provides only the following generic definition: "Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."[5] This charge suggests a wide variety of actions that must be operationalized on the ground in order to promote a sustaining peace and facilitate the extraction of military forces. George Joulwan and Christopher Shoemaker, two former military officers with considerable peace operations experience, outline the idyllic phases that every peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation should pass through – transformation, stabilization, and normalization. In the transformation phase the terms of the written peace

agreement are initially translated to on-the-ground operations. There is the urgent task to rapidly introduce security forces to enforce the military aspects of the peace accord, quickly followed by several other steps: establish a legitimate government apparatus; install police, judicial, and penal systems; provide essential social services; and accelerate a return to productive economic activity. The primary thrust in the beginning of this transformation phase is for military or internal security forces to create a secure environment and ensure freedom of movement while longer-term civilian functions are set in motion. The emphasis is strategic and nationwide action. The message is that the war is over and that the peace process is irreversible.[6]

As compliance with the military aspects of the peace accord becomes routine and civilian recovery measures are initiated, the focus shifts from military to civilian implementation, and from nationwide strategies to localized implementation. The stabilization phase prepares the institutions of the legitimate government to assume their future roles. The legitimate government is charged to maintain internal stability, establish a minimum level of military capacity essential for the country's self-defense, reestablish the economic base, establish an internal police capacity, reestablish a viable education system, create legitimate political institutions, and establish a responsive public health system.[7]

During normalization, external forces and assistance are withdrawn and their responsibilities are turned over to evolving institutions within the country itself. The final transition from conflict to normalcy occurs, clearing the way for international assistance to be terminated. Self-sufficiency is the message. Internal security responsibilities are handled by the local police, the judicial system is competently operated by local judges, basic services are routinely provided by the local government, the economic base is stable, the host nation exercises self-governance, and finally, international military forces are withdrawn.[8]

Joulwan and Shoemaker's three phases call for different levels of effort by different governments, agencies, and organizations involved in civilian-military implementation. In the transformation phase, the focus is heavily weighted on peacekeeping operations and the military component is the preeminent responsibility. As this phase matures, the military situation stabilizes, the peace takes root, and the civilian agencies and organizations gradually become more active. This process transitions to the stabilization phase, when military activities decrease and diminish, and civilian implementation gathers momentum and organizational coherence, assuming the dominant role until normalization is completed. In this final phase, the military component decreases dramatically, civilian organization implementation continues, and the legitimate government assumes the full breadth and scope of its responsibilities. Self-

sufficiency is established and the preponderance of international support activities – civilian and military – disappears.

This approach presents an ideal scenario – a world in which civilian and military agencies are in perfect harmony with the path to achieve normalcy, in which there is a seamless transition from military to civilian implementation during peacebuilding. It also depicts a world where the extraction of military forces after a short period of time is considered a normal turn of events. However, a review of the peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan will quickly show that there are breakdowns and delays in the three-phase approach when local and tangible factors are put into the mix. There are externally imposed limitations under which military forces currently operate and there are recurring delays until the civil agencies can properly organize, deploy, and become effective in post conflict reconstruction. These delays result in continued instability for the host nation, a longer military deployment for peacekeeping forces, and greater outlays of resources for the troop contributing nations to the peace operation. However, should the mandate allow the military, with sufficient upfront funding, to immediately engage in post conflict reconstruction upon the cessation of hostilities, the host nation economy will be given a significant jumpstart, the reestablishment of basic needs will help secure government legitimacy, enhancing the overall security and shortening the required deployment for military peacekeepers. The goal is rapid normalization in the host country with quick military extraction – the problem is how to make that goal into a reality.

CONDITIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTION

There is no argument - peacebuilding must begin with the establishment of a secure environment, with a separation of warring – or potentially warring – parties by the implementation force in order to maintain peace and security. This remains the first and primary focus of a peacekeeping force upon entry into a conflict scenario. Without secure conditions, neither the military nor civilian agencies can effectively concentrate on reconstruction. If there remains an insecure or uncertain security environment the military must take the lead. The military will be involved not only in developing and maintaining a secure environment but will be active in the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the performance of emergency civilian police functions, such as the maintenance of law and order. Under current practice the military will repair emergency infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and limited mine clearing, but only to support military operations. The military will enforce arms embargoes and will disarm and

demobilize belligerents to enhance the security posture. Only until these basic security conditions are met can the process of reconstruction begin.

Once security is established and maintained, the operation moves into the late stages of transition, where countries emerging from conflict are in the netherworld between a complete state of war and a complete state of peace, and where the behavior of international actors, the parties to the conflict, and civil society directly impact the outcome of the peacebuilding efforts. Often in the wake of war the physical infrastructure of the host nation is in bad need of repair. Whether due to overt destruction from conflict or from destruction caused by a prolonged lack of maintenance, bridges, roads, ports and airfields are no longer able to provide the support to the economy that a fledgling government requires for self sustainment, and damaged water and electrical grids cannot handle the demand that the civilian populace requires. To compound the problem, a residual effect of war can be a significant mine threat that not only threatens civilians attempting to proceed with their normal daily lives, but impedes access to the very infrastructure the nation needs to survive.

Therefore, a rapid infrastructure reconstruction effort becomes the key to peacebuilding, significantly boosting the economy by providing access to markets, employment, and services that promote social economic development of the host nation. The host nation government will experience growing confidence as basic needs and services are provided on a regular basis. Admittedly, infrastructure reconstruction efforts, while striving to bring a sense of normality back to conflict-torn land, are not enough to achieve the prevention of violent conflict. The attainment of long-term peace depends on much more than just a successful short-term implementation of a settlement and the building of a few roads. But it is worth noting that the level of civil participation that individuals can have, even when democratic procedures are available, is greatly constrained by their economic security. This level of civil participation will have a direct effect upon the level of security that can be attained in peace operations.

> The level of responsibility and impact that the marginalized poor can have as citizens and as decision makers is minimal. We simply cannot hear the voice of individuals when poverty keeps them in a vacuum, nor can we easily learn about their preferences when they in fact do not have choices. Thus, hand in hand with establishing the mechanisms and institutions that allow participation in a society, poverty eradication is primal.[9]

A successful infrastructure reconstruction effort does not guarantee the prevention of deadly conflict, but without reliable infrastructure that connects the community, long-lasting peace cannot be sustained. Upon these building blocks, confidence-building measures can be

established, which through verifiable behavior demonstrate the willingness of the parties to sustain a long-lasting peace.

WHY IS THERE A RUSH TO EXTRACT THE MILITARY?

Why, though, should the international community be concerned about leaving the military in place in the world's peace operations? Is there a major ramification should peacekeepers remain deployed for longer periods of time? Is it not fair to say that the international community should consider longer military deployments as they have proven in many instances to solidly establish the security and stability that was lacking prior to deployment? Since 1948, the UN Security Council has authorized 54 peacekeeping operations, 41 of which have been authorized since 1990. The number of deployed international peacekeepers has changed dramatically over the last few years. In June 1993 there were 77,310 soldiers and civilian police deployed in UN operations alone. In January 2002, 47,095 were in UN operations,[10] but combine that with the NATO-led operations in Bosnia (20,000) and Kosovo (50,000), and the number of international peacekeepers reaches an all time high exceeding 100,000. These numbers show a growing willingness on the part of the international community to establish peace operations in order to handle the growing threat to international security.

However, after the unsuccessful UN missions in Croatia and Bosnia (UNPROFOR, 1992-1995) and Somalia (1992-1994), both humanitarian peacekeeping missions that reverted to peace enforcement, there was hesitation to use the UN in complex peace operations. The UN was relegated to observer and interpositional peacekeeping (1994-1998), and the number of deployed troops declined. In the late 1990's in order to meet the growing threat to international security, the numbers of international peacekeepers increased.[11] Overall, the increase in peacekeepers demonstrates an increased confidence in the UN's ability to plan and conduct missions, and a belief by the nations of the world that peace operations can succeed if sufficiently supported.

This apparent success, however, comes at a high cost in personnel, equipment, and money. United States military forces are deployed in over 120 countries everyday preserving peace around the world through operational engagement.

> Since the 1992 presidential election, the number of people serving in the U.S. military has been cut by over 700,000. The brunt of this cutback has fallen on the Army and Air Force, both of which have experienced personnel cuts of 45% since 1989. The Navy, through the elimination of vessels and undermanned ships, has been reduced by 36%. Over the same period, however, operational

commitments (such as deployments to Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq) have increased by 300%.[12]

In order to meet the military's mission to fight and win the Nation's wars, the military must have the opportunity to train to maintain their proficiency in high intensity conflict. Peacekeeping duties, however, do not afford many opportunities to maintain that proficiency. Units that are alerted for deployment to peacekeeping duties undergo several months of intensive training in peacekeeping tasks, depending on their service (Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marines), branch (Infantry or Engineers, for example) and component (Active Duty, Reserves, or National Guard) capped by an external validation prior to deployment. Active duty units concentrate on those peacekeeping tasks that are different from their normal warfighting tasks. Through the execution of various scenarios that the peacekeepers may face in theater, external evaluators will certify that a unit is trained for peacekeeping deployment. Reserve and National Guard units, on the other hand, not only have to train on unfamiliar peacekeeping tasks, but also must execute their normal post mobilization training in preparation for activation. A RAND study completed in 1998 proposed a brigade training model that would validate a reserve brigade on tactical missions in 92 days and ready to move in 102 days.[13] This study, however, did not consider additional time to train on the specific peacekeeping tasks that are required in peace operations. Units that return from a peacekeeping deployment undergo months of refit and retraining where the emphasis is to recover the equipment to the highest maintenance standards, allow personnel to take some needed rest, and then retrain the personnel in high intensity conflict. This training period is capped by a final training event where the unit is recertified by external evaluators as proficient in high intensity conflict. Evaluators recertify Active Army units at one of the maneuver training centers. Reserve units are recertified during their weekend training and subsequent annual training cycles.

At any given time, a peace operation can affect up to three times the number of troops that are actually deployed.[14] For each unit taking part in an operation, another unit will be preparing as a replacement unit, and a third unit (the unit that was previously deployed) will be recovering from its deployment. (The units that are available to deploy to an operation are referred to as the rotation base). Military and civilian leaders have voiced concern about the high operating tempo of military forces in peace operations. Some question that concern, noting that the average number of Army soldiers, for example, deployed during 1998 was about 28,000, which represents 6 percent of the total active Army, or 9 percent of the deployable Army.[15] However, the reason for the concern about operating tempo becomes clearer when deployments are analyzed by unit type. In the Army, large percentages of the high-demand

capabilities in the combat-support and combat-service-support areas are in the reserve component. Such "high-demand/low-density" units are subject to frequent deployments, causing deleterious effect on morale and retention. In the past, some of those units have repeatedly deployed, either to the same operation or to consecutive ones. In some cases, nearly all of the active units with a particular support capability have had to deploy to a specific operation. For example, 100 percent of the teams that control movement in and out of air terminals and 75 percent of the petroleum supply companies in the active Army deployed to Somalia.[16]

The Army's experiences in recent peace operations indicate that several units in the active Army have inadequate rotation bases to support extended or continuous peace operations – for example, quartermaster and transportation branches, such as general supply companies and water purification units. Because the Army considers deployments of more than 120 days a year to be a strain on soldiers and their families, the Army needs a rotation base with at least three times as many units as the number deployed.[17] For several types of support capabilities, however, the Army has four or fewer units in its active component, making repeated deployments a usual occurrence and supporting extended operations very difficult.[18] Unlike the Army, the Marine Corps has traditionally incorporated rotation-base requirements into its structure. That approach allows it to maintain both the regular Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments and the schedule that deploys Marines for six months and then gives them 18 months at home. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps has also faced personnel shortages in certain specialties because it does not have enough of those forces in its active component. Personnel that have been particularly taxed are experts in dealing with civilian populations - civil affairs units, which are entirely in the Marine Corps reserves. In addition, the Marines have faced personnel shortfalls for linguists and joint communications systems specialists.[19]

The current pace also places a high strain on vehicles and equipment. In a normal training year, the United States Army's M1A1 tank is routinely scheduled to drive 800 to 850 miles. During a year that has a peacekeeping event, tanks are being driven over twice that amount. Aircraft limitations on flying hours are being exceeded halfway through the fiscal year causing earlier groundings to conduct required phased maintenance. Original equipment life expectancies are being halved through overuse. This causes additional strain on the supply pipeline to provide, initially, replacement parts and then replacement vehicles for overused military equipment. In some cases, the United States is no longer producing replacement vehicles and must rely on equipment overhaul to keep the fleet operational. Because there are limited replacements, equipment that is being overhauled is not available to the unit for training

and for deployment, causing the unit to experience degradation in training and in equipment readiness. The Chairman of the House Committee on National Security argued in 1997 that the pressures of the drawdown and operations other than war "are having a significant impact on the readiness of U.S. military forces and are placing at risk the decisive military edge that this nation enjoyed at the end of the Cold War . . . the readiness of our armed forces is suffering."[20]

The strain also shows up in the Army's personnel framework. Repeated six-month deployments to the Balkans and Afghanistan cause severe anxiety to a force that is over 50% married. Soldiers who have recently exited the military cite Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) and time spent away from home on peacekeeping deployments as the most common reasons for pursuing another way of life. General Thomas Schwartz, former commander of the United States Army Forces Command, testified before Congress that, "Our soldiers . . . repeatedly tell us that they choose to leave the Army because they cannot raise their family and be constantly deployed."[21] Although the Army easily made its recruiting goal for 2002, critical shortages continue to exist in junior officers and non-commissioned officers who opt to leave military service once their initial obligation is completed. As the Commander of III Corps, then Lieutenant General Schwartz cited an example of extensive cross-leveling of one deploying unit which had a lower priority of fill strength in peacetime. That battalion task force of 760 soldiers had to cross-level 226 personnel from outside the battalion to meet the theater deployment criteria. A second example was from Operation Restore Hope (Somalia), where there was a deployment requirement for ten military police companies (1193 personnel). While the Time Phased Force Deployment Database indicated that ten military police companies went to Somalia, the fact was that these 1193 personnel actually came from more than 50 different units – 41 military police companies and ten military police battalion headquarters.[22] This strain is similarly felt in the Reserves and the National Guard; however, the strain lies more with time taken away from their civilian employer rather than from their family. Reserve and National Guard soldiers who are activated for up to two years are constantly pulled between their obligations to the military and to their civilian occupation.

WHAT SHOULD BE THE MILITARY ENDSTATE?

The personnel, equipment, and financial strains are further aggravated by the lack of a perceived endstate for military peace operations. There is no tidy sequence to which the military can point with assurance that will define the moment redeployment will occur. One can easily see that the major task confronting the Western powers that convened the Dayton

conference, for example, was to end the violence in Bosnia. This was the primary goal, and one of immense rhetorical power. The Bosnian war was a unique modern experience because a slow genocide was televised to a worldwide audience each night. Thus, ending the violence was significant not only for the civilians and combatants directly involved in the conflict, but also for a wider viewing public. The "CNN effect" clearly and correctly focused attention on ending armed conflict. However, the danger of this focus was that the ending of the violence in itself was the goal, while the roots of the conflict and the means to create long-term institutions that would prevent its reemergence were left unaddressed.

Getting the balance right in such situations is difficult for the actors facilitating the conflict's resolution. There is no possibility that the warring parties in the midst of ongoing destruction are interested in or able to create the required institutions from the bottom up. Indigenous solutions are impossible to conceive while genocide and expulsions continue. A heavier burden thus is instead placed on the interveners and peacekeepers - they come to the conflict with obligations. While a noble goal, facilitating the transition from armed conflict to mere coexistence cannot be the end in itself. The intervener must be judged on whether the transition to coexistence is a durable one and success is measured on how fast the host country can manage its own affairs in a peaceful manner without outside help.

Intervention is judged equally on the standards used by the facilitating states in creating the process and its outcome. Some argue, for example, that the Dayton Peace Accord was the best 'deal' that could be made under the circumstances surrounding its conception. The realities of an ongoing armed conflict, the political marginalization of a number of key negotiators, the limited patience of the contact states, and the fragile consensus among them compromised the final agreement. The operational result was that virtually all institutions required for a peaceful coexistence between the former warring parties had to be created on the ground by the interveners. The Dayton Agreement leaves unresolved wide disagreements that the international community has little choice but to constantly renegotiate, making detachment from Bosnia impossible in the short or medium term.[23]

EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS WITH NO DEFINED ENDSTATE

The deployment criteria for military forces to Bosnia was specific – all United States peacekeepers would remain in theater for one year as part of IFOR. Upon the completion of one year, all American peacekeepers were to redeploy back to their peacetime locations. Because of its leadership role in the international system as a whole and within NATO in particular, the United States position became the bellwether for the commitment of the entire

international community. From the beginning of the operation, the United States made it clear that its commitment was neither open-ended nor permanent, and the rest of the players in Bosnia took their lead from the United States position.

The plans articulated by the United States during IFOR's term of service were shaped by the United States presidential elections and by mounting public concern about the United States role in Bosnia. Domestic opposition to United States involvement may have been greater had United States forces sustained casualties due to hostile action. Even in the absence of casualties, it was clear that United States commitment was tenuous, and the international community and America's European allies watched very carefully for signs that United States resolve was eroding. This created major problems for the forces on the ground. Day-to-day interactions with the former warring parties were tempered with the possibility that the United States would not see the process through to its conclusion.

In Fall 1996, NATO confronted the reality that the conditions were not set that would allow military forces to be withdrawn, and that there was little prospect of these conditions being created in the foreseeable future. Nearing the conclusion of the year and the day immediately after the United States presidential election in 1996, President Bill Clinton extended the mandate for another year to allow additional time for the peace process to continue, committing American forces to the follow-on force or Stabilization Force (SFOR). This mandate has been extended seven times and still there is not a viable plan for full extraction of all American peacekeepers. To be sure, in the first months of implementation of the Dayton Accords, the presence of overwhelming military force was instrumental in keeping the peace. But the daunting challenges of building the kinds of institutions and processes that are required to support the Dayton Agreement and, indeed, that are at the heart of conflict prevention are far beyond the abilities of the military. The military can bring about the absence of war; the civilian agencies have the expertise to reconstruct the country's institutions for an enduring peace. But until the agencies can become operational in theater, there is a gap in capability and authority. So, where is the military endstate?

It is still early to determine which of the institutions discussed during negotiations at Rambouillet and Paris in February and March 1999 will be implemented in Kosovo under NATO control; however, Rambouillet provides a second example where the international community charted an agreement to end a conflict in the former Yugoslavia and provided a territory with a new institutional framework. In this case, the representatives of the state in which Kosovo lies – that is, Yugoslavia and Serbia – negotiated the agreements with the representatives of the ethnic group dominating the province – the Albanians. While the representatives of the state

easily achieved legitimacy because they were sent to the negotiations by the elected government of that country,[24] the representatives of the ethnic group were problematic, due to the absence of internationally and state-recognized elections within the Albanian community. Thus, the Albanian delegation included not only the "elected" Ibrahim Rugova and members of the LDK party which carried the most votes in the election, but also members of the Kosovo Liberation Party, and intellectuals, such as Veton Surroi, who had no formal political or military following.[25]

Within the framework of the agreement for Kosovo, the proposed constitution took a more prominent place than the constitution had in the case of Bosnia. In general, the proposed constitution is more detailed and elaborate than the six-page constitution for Bosnia. The document, however, falls short and does not define the people enacting the legal text, and in no way determines the composition of Kosovo. It refrains from clearly dividing institutions between Albanians and Serbians. As opposed to the main challenge at Dayton, which was to map out the relationship between the groups within their respective entity of predominance, the challenge of the negotiations at Rambouillet lay in codifying the relations between the province and the state, Serbia or Yugoslavia.[26] The Rambouillet proposals remain vague in contentious issues such as the degree of bilingualism of Kosovo, especially in education and other spheres of interaction with authorities. Most of the progress made at Rambouillet was more of a confirmation of the basic approach the international community takes to resolve conflicts rather than a clear delineation of institutions to facilitate a long lasting peace in Kosovo.

Recognizing that no two peace operations are alike and that each is distinct and unique, President Clinton introduced American peacekeepers into Kosovo under NATO command without a time-based endstate as in Bosnia, but rather with an endstate to be developed in character with the ongoing peace operations. The initial reaction was to deploy ground troops into Kosovo immediately after the aerial bombing campaign to put a halt to the ethnic cleansing. However, once this was accomplished, the military was faced with the same lack of defined criteria upon which to base redeployment as is found in Bosnia. The approach of an event-based deployment fits better into the military's operational scheme of maneuver; however, to date no criteria for extraction of United States forces from Kosovo have been fully developed.

Unlike conventional military operations such as Operation Desert Storm, peace operations come to the military with little strategic political-military clarity. There is no "unconditional surrender" that can be demanded, signaling the end of conflict and the end of American military engagement. Peace operations require a full analysis of the crisis situation in order to fully understand the totality of the problem and its symptoms. This understanding is the prerequisite

for the United States to define its limits of employment for its finite resources. There must be a thorough strategic examination of the crisis, calculation of a realistic time table (to include entry, transition, and exit strategy), and development of courses of action so that our senior leaders make informed strategic decisions. As can be seen in Bosnia and Kosovo, strategic ambiguity creates tactical uncertainty. Compressed time-tables, artificial exit dates, and general confusion as to the purpose of the mission places leaders in a reaction mode to unforeseen change as opposed to controlling the execution of a thorough, well developed plan.

When a peace accord contains strategic statements of a mission and its objectives, those statements must be translated subsequently into specific missions and objectives for those forces, institutions, and organizations that will implement the accord. They must include specific tasks to be assigned to the organizations and institutions undertaking the intervention, including the conditions under which these tasks are to be performed, and the standards by which progress can be measured. The list must be broad enough to cover the entire spectrum of relevant activities – military, political, social, economic, psychological, and informational. Once compiled, these tasks should be thoroughly examined to discern where they overlap, complement, or conflict with one another. The task list also helps crystallize the number of organizations required for the accomplishment of the peace mission. Diplomats, political leaders, NGO officials, and military commanders must all take part in determining what is required to accomplish the assigned missions. Once tasks and subtasks have been identified, it becomes far easier to judge if the participation of other organizations is necessary or desirable in the first place, or if the participation of a specific organization is no longer required.

In the last decade, political and economic wars have become less frequent, whereas cultural and ethnic wars have multiplied. The organized, technologically managed warfare of nation states has been replaced by primal violence. Violent conflicts among people fighting for the survival of their way of life are more personal and inhumane than wars for economic or political advantage traditionally fought by nation states. Because the enemy is seen as totally inhumane and maximally threatening, there are fewer rules and standards regarding the wounded, captured, and civilians in intra-cultural conflicts than there are in international wars. The probability of a ceasefire, truce, or armistice is small, and there are more attacks on noncombatants, including massacre, torture, rape, starvation, and incarceration. These are struggles that demand genocide, fights to the finish, and ethnic cleansing. They are especially cruel and have long-term repercussions.[27]

EVENT BASED EXIT CRITERIA

In light of this shift in the genesis of organized violence, there are certain tasks in proposed peace operations that only a military force can successfully accomplish. These required actions provides a skeletal outline of an event-based exit criteria for military forces. First, the "CNN effect" establishes a high priority to solve the immediate problem of insecurity and violence. Instant, up-to-the-minute news coverage through the lens of television brings the cruelty and intense violence of conflict into the home of the average American. Public opinion can quickly form with a call for America to "do something" to end the violence. But is the military the right answer? Why insert military forces rather than use other forms of intervention? Many argue that peacemaking can be successfully accomplished without involving the military. Peacemaking programs, for example, are specifically designed to bring potential and former combatants together to manage their differences through negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation. Lawyers, diplomats, and social scientists that are trained as mediators believe that with training and assistance people can work through their problems, reach compromises, and manage their conflicts more constructively.[28] But there is a cost incurred while negotiation and mediation are taking place – lives are being lost in violent conflict. In simple terms, when a hostile situation exists, only the military has the capability to forcefully separate warring parties at the beginning of a peace operation. If the government is sufficiently swayed to take action, there is only one option that can bring a quick end to the violence and immediately save lives. Military forces can be quickly inserted to separate warring factions and establish a forceful end to the inner violence that has plagued the host country. Military intervention allows the factions to gain a respite from fighting and allows the factions to focus on other problems rather than the immediate problem of waging war.

This task includes not only the separation of belligerent factions, but also includes the initial execution of routine police functions and the establishment of an interim court system and penal system to give clout to the internal police. Should the military leave without handing off this task, a return to conflict can occur without warning. Therefore, as part of the transition from stabilization to normalization, the host nation must be able to maintain all aspects of internal security allowing the former combatants time to reestablish bonds of trust across ethnic and cultural lines. For the military to exit the country, the security responsibilities, which the military assumed upon entry into the host country, must be gradually handed over to local police – whether it be an interim police task force established by a civilian agency, or directly to a police capability operated by the host country. Regardless, the function of internal security must be

established and continually exercised by a legitimate authority immediately from the cessation of hostilities through normalization.

Second, military intervention provides a minimum level of military capacity to defend the host nation from external attack while the host country reorganizes into a peaceful state. Upon the cessation of hostilities, belligerents are disarmed and demobilized to quickly establish peace between the separated combatants. Arms embargoes are enforced and peacekeepers supervise compliance with any imposed arms control measures. The successful completion of this task, however, produces an immediate power vacuum in the region that must be filled by the intervening military until the host country can reestablish legitimate capacity to defend itself from outside aggression. Otherwise, neighboring entities may feel compelled to take advantage of the opportunity to enlarge their influence and fill the existing power void with their own forces. Once the host country can train and establish a minimum level of military capacity essential for the country's self-defense, the military peacekeepers can withdraw from the host country while maintaining a residual capacity to keep the peace with rapid deployment forces located outside the country. If the survival of the host country is vital to the peace operation, this minimum level of self-defense must be maintained throughout the process from peace enforcement stabilization to normalization.

Finally, the violence associated with destructive cultural conflicts not only shatters bodies, homes, and cities, but it also decimates human relationships. The reestablishment of a civic culture after such conflicts requires new and innovative programs. Without having the specific capability to mend these type of fences, traditional international peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, as seen in past UN activities, have not been effective during or after primal violence and reestablishing civic culture is not usually designated as a military mission. The continued prominence of the primordial sentiments aroused during the violence makes relocation of refugees and communal activities prone to renewed conflict. If the military has little direct role in this arena, what can it do to foster renewed confidence and to tame energies that could be prone to violence?

It is more productive for combatants to work jointly on the more technical and economic problems of rebuilding, allowing the development of relationships and civil society to follow from these less direct and more impersonal problem-solving efforts. Such peacebuilding activities can contribute to the construction of civic institutions and identities. Focusing previous combatants on the issues of rebuilding the country's damaged infrastructure and rebuilding the country's economic base provide avenues in which confidence and security can grow. Once a combatant is no longer engaged in warfare, there must be something constructive to occupy his

time or the tendency will be to re-emerge into conflict or into illegal activities. Because the former combatant needs legitimate employment, economic reconstruction and recovery give hope and jobs.

Since domestic market and export capacities are limited, major sources of growth and employment generation in the initial stages of recovery will come from construction-related activities. It is critical that reconstruction projects employ local nationals and companies, and that any emergency food aid that comes from external sources does not hamper the recovery of agricultural production and the creation of jobs in the rural areas. Equally important in this initial stage of economic recovery is the early adoption by the authorities of a set of measures that can immediately facilitate economic restructuring. These include measures that promote internal trade as well as external trade and help reactivate functioning productive assets.

But there is a stumbling block that the military must help overcome until civilian agencies can deploy – there is significant infrastructure damage that physically impedes economic recovery. An important focus of the economic recovery program will be job creation and the reconstruction of transport, telecommunications, energy, and other infrastructure damaged by the war, without which it will be impossible to restart production and trade on any significant scale. In parallel, the program must repair water, sewage, and health facilities (without which there will be a continued threat to public health), rehabilitate farms to improve the supply of food and reconstruct housing to relieve acute shortages. Reintegrating demobilized soldiers and the unemployed in the economy is not only an economic necessity but is essential to maintaining a long-term peace, and certainly a strong reconstruction effort that quickly rebuilds the host country's economic capacities is critical for peace.

As the host nation has experienced an economic collapse, financing for these efforts will mostly have to come from abroad, and as the institutions of civil society have broken down, the organizational efforts to spearhead this effort must be externally driven. At the point that this effort must begin, immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, the military is the only viable entity deployed in the theater. Therefore, the military must become the executive agent for this reconstruction until the various international aid agencies can take over. Only economic progress that visibly improves peoples' lives will demonstrate that peace and reintegration bring more benefits than war, and not until normal infrastructure has been brought back can a switch in growth strategy be considered. Any delay drives up the possibility for a re-emergence of conflict; therefore, the military, as the only viable execution agent in theater, must tackle post conflict infrastructure reconstruction to facilitate economic recovery. Only until this function can

be handed over to civilian agencies, either international or local, can the military redeploy. To redeploy prior to handing over this responsibility would encourage the re-emergence of conflict.

The ultimate goal in peace operations is the establishment of a legitimate government entity through a process of self-determination that can provide the basic needs and services to facilitate a growing community in a peaceful environment. Whether it be rural agrarian or urban high technology, the community, to reach this goal, requires three functions as a foundation upon which to grow: internal security, minimal self defense from outside threats, and a sound economic base to survive and thrive. There are many governmental institutions that military forces are not designed to reconstruct – banking programs, social assist mechanisms, and educational systems to name a few - but the provision of the three basic functions will allow the government with civilian agency assistance to develop the other required institutions necessary for long-term peace. Until these basic functions are established and are turned over to civilian agencies, international or local, the military should not redeploy – they still have a job to do. The tasks that are associated with the provision of these basic functions should be the tenets upon which the declared military endstate should be designed. By mandating the military to focus their work in these three areas, the military mission is clarified and strengthened, the economy will receive a jumpstart leading to quicker economic revitalization and enhanced security, and confidence in the legitimate government will be strengthened. The accomplishment of all of these will facilitate a quicker military redeployment to home station.

COMPLEMENTARY CAPABILITIES

It is clear that the nature of international and intrastate conflict changed in the 1990s, producing such intense civil conflicts that the international community felt compelled to respond, either on its own initiative or at the request of the parties to the conflict. The peace operation that requires only military forces or civilian agencies is rare. Recent operations have become so complex and multifaceted that the capabilities each organization brings to the problem can become complementary to other organizations as long as they can be focused around a problem solution. The stage on which these organizations and forces must operate is typically crowded, not only with warring factions and hard-pressed local populations but also with a cast of external actors – other militaries, IOs, and NGOs; diplomats and aid workers from national governments; and private individuals and foundations. Despite similar objectives, however, cooperation between these third parties is by no means inevitable. Establishing cooperative

relations among the various external players remains one of the most challenging aspects of the international response to conflict and disaster.[29]

Exactly who, if anyone, is responsible for coordinating the work of various players varies from operation to operation. In UN missions, for example, the United Nations often appoints a special representative of the secretary general (SRSG) either to head the entire operation or to manage its political and administrative elements. His authority, however, is usually limited. In the first place, the SRSG is typically given little room for maneuver by UN Headquarters, which is itself constrained by the need to maintain the support of interested major powers. Second, while the SRSG generally has control over the components of the mandated mission, he or she does not control the aid agencies of various governments or the special envoy of other IOs. Nor does the SRSG exercise direct authority over the military component of an operation. Finally, the SRSG may well have very little control over international and local NGOs. NGOs, which may number more than one hundred and who may have been on the scene long before a mission is launched, may have already formed their own network to coordinate activities, and may not want to change their practices to accommodate the SRSG.

In short, most peace operations are complex activities in which no one is completely in charge, making it all the more important to ensure that all players function cohesively. The various players in an operation may regard one another warily, preferring where possible to be in charge or to function independently. Almost as if they were different countries, they speak different languages, sprinkling their documents and conversations with terms and acronyms that mean little or nothing to the others. Each has adopted its own philosophy, methods of operation, and organizational culture – and these may not merely differ but actually clash. Despite the differences or the complexity of the operation, it is important to remember that each player is involved because it has been mandated to act by some authority or because it wants to help.

If the layers are peeled back a little farther, one will find that the military and the civilian agencies are not really working at contrary purposes, but have complementary abilities that can be meshed together into a well-designed effort of post conflict reconstruction. Those aspects of the reconstruction effort that the military are not specifically trained to accomplish are well filled by the various civilian agencies. On the other hand, the military brings a level of responsiveness and organization that the agencies do not inherently have at the beginning of a peace operation. There are six criteria that help to define the complementary nature of the military and the civilian agencies – organization, deployability and logistics, security, planning,

training, and funding. The challenge lies in the ability to coordinate these criteria between the military, IOs, and NGOs for the benefit of the host nation.

THE MILITARY ARM

Upon receipt of the execution order to deploy into a hostile situation, the military brings certain characteristics to the theater of operations that cannot be replicated immediately by the civilian agencies. Just the visual appearance of a professional peacekeeper has an immediate and clear psychological impact. Professional and overt behavior based on an accepted code of conduct creates a positive atmosphere among the conflicting parties and contributes to a climate of trust. In peace missions, military forces are increasingly used in a variety of operations across the military continuum including observation, liaison, protection of relief convoys and refugees, infrastructure reconstruction for military purposes, support to civilian agencies, and humanitarian work. Above all, the military must be prepared to immediately transition to actual combat should the situation grossly deteriorate. The net result is that military forces are now used in ways and for purposes that their Cold War equivalents would never have thought likely, and for which much adaptation in force structure and training was necessary.

Characteristics of the Military

The overall advantage that military forces bring to a peace operation lie in their ability for quick response and decisive action. The common factor found in each of the grading criteria is that regardless of the operation, these positive traits already exist in a military organization. Although the United States uses a formal certification process for peace implementation forces, there is not a significant preparation phase which military forces must undergo to be able to bring peace enforcing and stabilization forces to bear in a conflict situation. To produce a rapid response, the government can choose to deploy its military and can have immediate effects. Long-term effects, however, must be realized through a variety of other methods as the military's focus is in the short term.

Organization. The military brings an in-place command and control structure and hierarchical organization to the peace operation. It is a highly structured organization that places value on chain of command, unit specialization, and teamwork built through habitual command relationships. Although at times complex, this chain of command runs from the highest elected official to the lowest ranking soldier. There is little question about who is in charge of the military in a peace operation, resulting in a single focused continuity of direction operationalized through the commander's stated vision and intent. To be clear, United States military forces work for its civilian leaders and the civilian leadership verbalizes the desired

strategic result of a peace operation; however, the operational details of how to realize the military endstate is developed and reinforced by the military commander and his staff. The commander has broad authority to accomplish the missions assigned – he can organize and employ forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.[30]

To support the commander, subordinate forces are organized into coherent units based on functionality. Through a flexible and adaptable force generation process, a commander's force for deployment is designed and tailored based on the specifically assigned mission in the peace operation. Units are organized to be able to provide all functions required of the mission – whether the requirement is for infantry and armor type units to work in a peace enforcement role, or for engineers and civil affairs units to work at reconstruction and recovery. The military has the ability to quickly tailor its force for the mission. Since the former warring parties in a peace operation have their own agendas to pursue, the military's emphasis on planning and predictability is heavily saturated with flexibility and adaptability to meet all contingencies. Without a doubt, the military is mission oriented, but that mission could change daily.

Additionally, the military establishes habitual relationships between subordinate units to foster teamwork and coordination. Through repetitive training exercises, teams are built that encourage and promote success immediately upon deployment to a conflict situation. Every unit regardless of its size is part of a team and depends on all the other elements of that team. To facilitate teamwork, the military develops shared standards, procedures, and experiences to create the cohesion that is extremely important to building trust among individuals. The result is a unit whose performance as a whole is greater than the sum of the individual efforts of its members, and who can deploy into a peace operation already formed as a cohesive organization, without devoting valuable time to developing successful relationships.

Deployability and Logistics. Should the United States government want to put something into a crisis situation that can have an immediate impact, the military has the inherent ability to rapidly deploy and place forces on the ground at the desired time through a variety of methods: Army and Marine War Stocks prepositioned around the globe, air and sea insertion on moderately prepared ports or air strips, forward staged air and sea deployment nodes that are well-designed and highly functional, and the ability to create debarkation and embarkation nodes in areas of the world where none previously existed. When General John M. Shalikashvili was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he stated the level of importance that he place on this capability: "We are more and more an expeditionary force; strategic air and sealift, complemented by our prepositioning initiatives, must be our number one priority."[31]

In light of General Shalikashvili's guidance, the United States military, following Operation Desert Storm, concentrated on the deployment of its ground forces and consolidated all Army war reserve stocks, including former theater reserves, into five regional material stockpiles; Continental United States (CONUS), Europe, Pacific, Southwest Asia, and Afloat. This consolidation in support of the military's Global Prepositioning Strategy takes advantage of the Strategic Mobility Triad of airlift, sealift, and global prepositioning. This effort significantly decreases the amount of time required to deploy and position ground troops into a conflict situation, reflecting a strategy designed to fit the changing international environment of the post Cold War era. Additionally, a Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review was conducted to study mobility requirements for the post-Cold War military. The study concluded that the military could increase its deployability through expanded sealift, airlift, and transportation infrastructure. As a result, in 1999 the Air Force established Air Expeditionary Units that deploy under a predictable rotation system in an attempt to enhance air responsiveness, reduce the stresses of deployment to enforce no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq, and meet other disaster and humanitarian assistance demands as they arise.[32] Logistically, the Air Force has securely pre-positioned logistics support packages to lighten the amount of logistics that an Air Expeditionary Force would be required to deploy. Using different flexbasing deployment categories (48-, 96-, and 144-hour deployment standards), the Air Force can build in flexibility to execute operations in any theater.[33]

The Marine Corps, as the smallest service, prepositions its heaviest equipment in locations around the world in order to minimize travel time during deployment. For example, a large portion of the Corps's heavy equipment is located in Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. In order to be responsive to impending crises, the Marine Corps has a Marine Expeditionary Unit on deployment at all times, using a normal 6-month rotation system, enabling a Marine force to be deployed to sea with its full complement of equipment. The Navy, using its 10 carrier battle groups, also uses a rotation system to insure that carrier battle groups are stationed in international waters in accordance with the perceived threat. Normally employing four carrier battle groups at one time, allowing the other groups to conduct periodic maintenance and stand down, Navy operations have the capability to expeditiously move battle groups around the globe based on world events.

As the service that provides the bulk of the forces in peace operations, the Army developed the Army Strategic Mobility Program in response to the Mobility Requirements Study, a military transportation capability that can provide a crisis response force of up to Corps size (5 and 1/3 divisions) from the United States and overseas forward presence locations.

It used the following mobility standards:

- A light or airborne brigade-size force in theater by C+4 ("C" is the day the execution order is issued and the subsequent number are measured in days), with the remainder of the division to close by C+12. The force would be largely transported by air.
- An afloat heavy combat brigade with support closes in theater and is ready to execute peace operations no later than C+15.
- Two heavy divisions sea lifted into theater by C+30
- The remaining two divisions and Corps support command to arrive in theater by C+75.[34]

Under the mobility program umbrella, the Army developed an equipment afloat prepositioning program to accommodate a combat brigade, but also common equipment and supplies that facilitate rapid deployment. Included in the afloat prepositioning package are transportation and port opening equipment that are critical to reception, staging, off-loading and onward movement of deploying units. The Army Prepositioned Afloat Program provides the combatant commander with deployment flexibility and increased capability to respond to a crisis or contingency with a credible force. The purpose of a prepositioned afloat operation is to project a heavy force early in the crisis capable of complementing other early arriving forces; to rapidly reinforce a lodgment established by Army early entry forces; to protect key objectives (ports and airfields); and to be prepared to conduct subsequent operations across the range of military operations.[35]

Supported by the United States Navy, afloat operations range from the employment of one ship in support of a humanitarian assistance mission to the employment of all afloat vessels to support the combatant commander's campaign plan. It carries critical weapons systems, equipment, and supplies common to all theaters, but is a force package that is mobile and can be quickly positioned in response to a crisis anywhere in the world. This program allows the early deployment of an Army heavy brigade force to support the needs of the combatant commander, minimizing the initial requirement for the strategic lift. In view of global operations, the prepositioning system provides the flexibility to conduct operations across the entire range of military operations. The Army's project will continue to expand, working toward a goal of two million square feet of prepositioning capacity called for in the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study.[36]

In an effort to deploy even faster, Army Chief of Staff Eric K. Shinseki announced in October 1999 a massive transformation of the United States Army. At the completion of the transformation, Shinseki claims:

> We will develop the capability to put combat force anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff – in brigade combat teams for both stability and support operations and for warfighting. We will build that capability into a momentum that generates a war-fighting division on the ground in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.[37]

Should prepared embarkation and debarkation points be unavailable, United States forces have the ability to create suitable airstrips in theater and to provide logistics-over-the-shore where port facilities are non-existent. The combination of all of these initiatives puts almost any scenario throughout the globe within fast reach of the United States military should the United States government need to respond quickly to a conflict situation.

Once deployed, the military is self sustaining – a great asset that is often overlooked when deciding which avenue to pursue in peace operations. The military is designed to provide its own logistics capability, when no other support is available, and can remain in theater for indefinite periods of time. Former Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer challenged the Army:

> Logistics is the lifeblood of armies, that is an indisputable constant in military history. This means putting our faith in concepts like velocity management and total asset visibility, giving up the comfort of stockpiling supplies on an iron mountain. We have to depend on systems that will deliver the right support, at the right place, at the right time. We have to build the systems that will give us the confidence and responsiveness we need. Revolutionizing logistical affairs and business practices is not only central to preparing for future military operations, it is also the fulcrum of our effort to balance readiness and modernization.[38]

Military focused logistics infuses information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations. In Bosnia the rules of engagement allowed the United States to enforce peace; however, at the same time the military was prepared logistically to go to war in a moment if required. The military can transition quickly from lethal to non-lethal means and can deploy those capabilities on the battlefield where each can be sufficiently applied as required. The United States has transformed its logistics structure to reflect the new post Cold War environment. Again, according to General Reimer:

> The brute force logistics of the past, where the military stockpiled massive amounts of supplies, is inadequate for the military operations of the future - we

> can no longer afford the large amount of equipment that we traditionally moved from one place to the other during the Cold War. We must be able to move quickly around the world and provide our troops with the supplies and repair parts they need in a timely manner.[39]

Security. The primary mission in peace operations is to create a climate of stability and security to achieve a durable and lasting political settlement preventing more bloodshed. The first of these objectives is strictly military in nature. According to Thomas Mockaitis, "Peace operations to end civil conflict are by their very nature enforcement operations requiring the deployment in a timely manner of a sufficiently large combat contingent adequately armed to stop the fighting with the use of force if necessary."[40] It is really that simple. Military forces have the ability to tailor their forces to the perceived threat in order to intervene in hostile situations, prevent additional conflict, and demonstrate enough potential firepower to thwart any reemergence into conflict. They are able to provide their own force protection without reliance on others and are able to mass fires in a combat role should the situation deteriorate into hostile conflict. Civilian agencies do not have this capability.

Military forces plan for the worst-case scenario. This allows the pitfalls of each situation to be factored into planning, enhancing not only the prospects for success of the mission, but also determining the level of protection required for the participating troops. Peace operations can change quickly, often with little or no warning. In situations where religious or political divisions are long-standing, hostility runs very deep and violence can erupt at a moment's notice. Warring parties may target their wrath in all directions, not confining their attacks against their traditional enemies, but may also target outsiders, regardless if they are civilians or soldiers. Peacekeepers may be required to demonstrate sufficient strength to counter any aggressive acts by either side. Fortunately, a show of strength can help defuse tense situations and contribute to a more peaceful and stable environment.

Should the operation reemerge into conflict, United States military forces have a joint arsenal of weapons that can be engaged to quickly reestablish security and stabilize the environment. Not only do the ground troops have their organic weaponry that can influence the situation at close range, but air support and naval gunfire support can be used as a stick to bring the belligerent parties back into a more peaceful tone. Overwhelming force, or more importantly the threat of using overwhelming force, can have a stabilizing effect to diffuse a hostile situation.

Planning. A key ingredient in conducting a peace mission is solid joint operations planning – a process that promotes the development of the best possible plans for potential crises across the full range of military contingencies. Joint operations planning is an integrated

process entailing similar policies and procedures during war and peace operations, providing for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decisionmaking. In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. In crisis, the process is shortened as necessary to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of planning. In all its applications, the basic process remains fundamentally unchanged, providing a consistent and logical approach for integrating the activities of the National Command Authority, Chairman and Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders into a coherent planning and execution process focused on the mission's strategic objectives.

The advantage of this approach is that it provides an orderly and systematic approach for using existing capabilities to achieve objectives defined in national strategy. The resultant plans are accurate measurements of the Nation's ability to successfully prosecute the national military strategy within the constraints of available forces and resources. This measurement provides a means of assessing the balance between strategy and capabilities, determining risks, and focusing the acquisition of additional resources and capabilities. Plans developed during deliberate planning provide a foundation for and ease the transition to crisis resolution. Work performed during the deliberate planning process allows the development of processes, procedures, and planning expertise that are critically needed during crisis action planning.

The end product is a detailed operations plan containing a full description of the concept of operations. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, deployment sequence, and resources required to execute the plan. Should there be no other communication between a theater commander and his subordinate commanders, the operation plan has sufficient detail the subordinate commanders can use to carry out the theater commander's intent. The benefits of this type of planning are readily apparent in peace operations when distances between units can be excessive and communications minimal. In light of these physical limitations, prior detailed planning allows peacekeepers to maintain a stable situation despite the absence of close supervision.

Training. The United States military forces train for peace operations as they would for any other mission that they may be assigned. As the number of peace operations involving United States forces has increased, so has the complexity of those operations. Today's peace missions are apt to involve such tasks as supervising elections, protecting specified safe areas, interacting with local people, guarding surrendered weapons, ensuring the safe delivery of food supplies, and helping rebuild government agencies or police forces. The amount and kinds of

training that a unit needs before deployment may vary not only by type of unit but also by the type of mission assigned. Many of those tasks are far removed from the ones United States forces normally expect to perform during conventional warfare. Fortunately, units usually have a substantial amount of time to prepare for peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions as most of those missions are long-standing operations with deployments planned far in advance. That gives assigned units enough time to train intensively for two to three months before deploying. Units assigned to peace enforcement missions, by contrast, typically get far less advance notice. They may have only enough time to prepare for deployment, with very little time for specialized training; however, most peace enforcement missions mirror tasks executed during conventional war.

The United States Army does not have a standardized training program that all units follow to prepare for peace operations. Instead, commanders choose the training for their unit on the basis of its stated purpose and expected missions. As a result, the amount of routine training that a unit receives in the skills needed for peace operations vary according to the commander's guidance.[41] A growing number of military and nonmilitary officials suggest that some training in skills particular to peace missions be incorporated into standard unit training for the forces likely to perform those missions. Two conferences that the Army's Peacekeeping Institute held to review participation in the Bosnia peace operation recommended that peace operations tasks in general – and planning and coordinating with civilian organizations in particular – be included in unit training. The Center for Army Lessons Learned concurred recommending that units assigned to peace operations train in a variety of specific tasks before deployment.[42]

In light of these suggestions, the Army developed a comprehensive peace operations model that includes certification of individual tasks at home station and unit certification by the observer controllers at one of the Combat Training Centers (CTC). Units execute a 3-week Maneuver Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) in which they are trained on peace operations tasks, and are then tested on these tasks using actors simulating local nationals and scenarios simulating those missions found in a peace operation. Upon completion of the MRE, the unit is certified for deployment. Additionally, unit commanders that foresee a possible deployment to a peace operation can add "peace and stability operations" to their Mission Essential Task List (METL) for year-round training. The METL is a list of tasks that the commander considers essential for a unit to succeed in its assigned mission and is reviewed annually in light of changed or altered mission projection. Experience has shown that Army units do train for some tasks essential for peace operations in the course of their regular training. As a consequence, some Army

commanders are comfortable about their basic preparation for the tasks required for peace operations. In a survey of 57 active-duty Army officers at the Army War College, 64 percent reported that "most" or "all" of the tasks required by peace operations were in their unit's METL.[43] Thirty seven percent of those surveyed believed at least one task that was "critical" for peace operations was outside the scope of the METL. Those "critical" tasks included crowd control, route clearing, negotiating skills, riot control, use of graduated force, civil affairs, law enforcement, coordination with NGOs, humanitarian assistance, and movement of small units.[44] These are the tasks that are emphasized during the training conducted at the MRE. According to General Reimer:

> Commanders in Bosnia are blazing new trails. They are dealing with the challenges of how you separate warring factions and build trust in an environment previously devoid of it. There are no school solutions about any of these problems and in fact the people on the ground are writing the book. The soldiers have been well trained. I talked to a number of them and they all told me that they had not experienced any surprises. Pre-deployment training had been tough but realistic. This is the proof of the pudding and Bosnia validates the need for tough, realistic training.[45]

The United States Marine Corps takes a different approach. Because the Corps wants its deployed forces to be ready for almost any contingency, each Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) trains for a standard set of 29 missions before deployment. Those missions include many tasks that might well be required during peace operations, such as evacuation of noncombatants; show-of-force, reinforcement, and security operations; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The training program culminates in a certification exercise designed to evaluate the MEU's warfighting and general purpose expeditionary skills, as well as its maritime special operations capabilities. A Congressional Budget Office survey of Marine Corps units indicates that most units did not alter their training programs to prepare specifically for peace operations. Because many of the tasks performed in peace operations are part of the 29 missions that MEUs train for, those tasks are seen as being a regular part of the Marines' area of expertise.[46]

Funding for Peace Operations. Funds to deploy United States military forces to a peace operation are immediately available should the need arise – although the source of funding for continued operations may take budgetary reprogramming or congressional supplemental appropriation. Unlike civilian agencies that fund their activities primarily through donors, the military can draw on budgetary accounts already in existence in order to rapidly enter a theater of operations. The costs that the Department of Defense incurs to provide troops for peace operations have increased dramatically in the past decade – from about $200 million in 1990 to more than $3.6 billion in 1998. Those costs soared in 1993 because of operations in Somalia

and because of higher costs for operations in Iraq and Kuwait. Costs jumped again in 1996 because the Department of Defense spent more than $2.6 billion that year to implement the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia.[47]

Although the total costs of peace operations are not relatively large compared with the Defense Department's overall budget, paying them can cause some difficulties in specific parts of the budget. Most of the additional costs associated with peace operations fall into areas funded by the operation and maintenance (O&M) account. That account primarily pays for training, fuel, and supplies for troops overseas. Between 1994 and 1998, O&M costs made up at least 80 percent of the annual incremental costs of peace operations.[48] Most of the other incremental costs were paid from the Defense Department's personnel accounts, for such things as imminent danger pay and pay for reservists called to active duty. Funds to cover those costs come from several outside sources, while transferring or reprogramming funds with the Defense Department budget pays some costs. Operations that the Defense Department can anticipate before it submits its annual budget can be paid from the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund. Should circumstances change (for example, if an unanticipated operation occurs or if costs exceed estimates), then the Defense Department may require supplemental appropriations.

The Defense Department's annual appropriation contains funds to pay for planned activities, but not unanticipated peace operations. If the additional O&M and personnel costs associated with such operations are small, the Defense Department may cover them by transferring funds between accounts in its budget or by reprogramming funds within an account.[49] If the costs are high, however, the Defense Department generally seeks additional funding through supplemental appropriations. Since 1993, the Defense Department has submitted several sizable requests for supplemental appropriations to cover peace operations, ranging from about $1 billion in 1993 to $1.8 billion in 1998.[50] Although the Congress has routinely approved those requests, the execution of that approval has taken several months in some instances. In fiscal year 1993, for example, supplemental funding to cover the costs of peace operations was not approved until July, the beginning of the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. To circumvent this delay, the Clinton Administration proposed creating a Readiness Preservation Authority in its 1996 budget request. That authority would have allowed the Defense Department to obligate funds (up to a certain limit) for essential readiness activities during the last half of the fiscal year without prior appropriation approval.[51] Many Members of Congress objected to the proposal, however, on the basis that it would have loosened what leverage the Congress has over peace operations through the appropriation process.

Instead, the Congress established the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund in the 1997 defense appropriation bill. By transferring assets to the services on the basis of actual events during the year in question, the fund was designed to meet the requirements of contingency operations without disrupting approved defense programs. The fund has fallen short of that goal, however. Although the Congress appropriated $1.1 billion for the fund in 1997, primarily to pay for ongoing operations in Bosnia and the Middle East, the costs of those operations exceeded the budget amount by $2 billion. Similarly, in 1998 the costs of peace operations were $1.7 billion higher than the $1.9 billion in the fund.[52]

To further illustrate, the incremental costs of peace operations to the Army in 1994 through 1998 represented a very small portion (from 1 percent to 3 percent) of the Army's total budget. But more than 80 percent of those costs were paid for out of the O&M account. Between 1994 and 1998, the share of total O&M spending accounted for by peace operations grew from 4 percent to 8 percent. Because the Army must pay for peace operations out of appropriated O&M funds until it receives supplemental funding or approval for transfers or reprogramming actions from the Congress, it often has to draw on funds earmarked to pay the operating costs of the Army's forces for the fourth quarter. Measured against such fourth quarter funds, peace operations accounted for a significant and rising share of spending: from roughly 30 percent in 1994 to 80 percent in 1998.[53] As money is moved across the Army to those units actively involved in ongoing operations, training and resources for units not involved in peace operations are curtailed and in some cases stopped toward the end of the fiscal year.

Funding is not an initial deterrent prohibiting the rapid deployment of military forces into a hostile operation. Money does not have to be secured from donors prior to deployment and cost overruns can be handled in a variety of ways in accordance with the wishes of the Congress. Being a government entity gives the military an advantage over its civilian counterparts; however, there continues to be arguments on how best to fund the military in order to pay for unbudgeted contingency operations. Regardless of the outcome of this debate, lack of funding will not stop a military deployment to a peace operation should the government decide upon that course of action, but it may alter the course of the ongoing operation once deployment into theater is complete.

THE CIVIL AGENCY ARM

Following the end of the Cold War, there was wide confusion concerning the roles and responsibilities between civilian and military agencies, significantly affecting peace operations in the 1990s. Institutions that had fairly distinct roles, identities, behavior, and expectations found

that all of that changed. Representatives of governments struggled with changes in the meaning and practice of sovereignty as both global and subnational forces challenged the status quo. In the United States and other countries, the State Department and foreign ministries still played a central part, but new developments such as the appointment of special envoys and special representatives by heads of state and the UN Secretary General brought a whole series of new actors into the official diplomatic process.[54] It follows then that capturing the characteristics of the key players becomes critical to develop strong military-civilian interface for effective post conflict reconstruction.

Characteristics of the Civilian Agencies

IOs have assumed a growing role not only in responding to crises but also in orchestrating efforts by other international actors – namely, the military and NGOs. The roles IOs assume have taken on new importance and more is expected from them to influence state actors that are engaged in conflict. This is readily evident by the great increase in UN sanctioned peace operations in the 1990s. By acting as a sounding board and a discussion table for states, they have immediate legitimacy should they determine crisis intervention is required. Inevitably, their higher profile and the greater responsibilities entrusted to them have made IOs the targets of substantial criticism. Furthermore, the peacemaking roles for non-official actors, NGOs, also opened up in the past decade, bringing many more individuals and institutions into the process, allowing private people and groups to intervene as third parties in troubled societies. After many years of being ignored by powerful states and impenetrable international organizations, NGOs were being hailed as magicians of sorts, targeting their efforts of reconciliation at the grassroots level of societies split by civil, ethnic, and religious strife. In their desire to help the vulnerable and powerless, NGOs have responded to conflict all over the world, sometimes as a function of their mission for humanitarian relief or human rights, and sometimes as a deliberate attempt to intervene in the conflict.[55]

Organization. An IO exists when two or more governments sign a multilateral treaty to form an institution that operates in more than one country, agreeing to finance its operations. Most IOs have more than two member states, although relatively few aspire to global membership such as the UN. Most IOs tend to make decisions by consensus rather than by majority or plurality votes – their rationale being that substantial dissent prevents effective action, discouraging the use of votes. Consensus is a double-edged sword, however. Decisions by consensus are more legitimate because they are backed by many countries, but at the same time may be somewhat watered down as they reflect lowest common denominators.

Not all decisions are binding, and member states of IOs can and do selectively ignore even those that are.

IOs have somewhat of a hierarchical structure with a fixed headquarters, but most maintain liaison offices in the member states, and member states, conversely, maintain a diplomatic presence in the city where the IO is located.[56] Most IOs have annual sessions at which important issues are debated and decisions are made, with provisions for emergency sessions if required. Once decisions are made, IOs depend on member states for implementation in peace operations. In the UN Security Council, for example, member states must provide the soldiers who will be deployed in the field once the decision to start peace enforcement operations is made.

Most NGOs, on the other hand, are quite decentralized and relatively flat in their authority structures. Employees work independently, still arriving at decisions through consensus, discarding the chain of command used by the military. NGOs are heavily dependent on the individual commitment and initiative of their staff. The managerial style is informal and works through personal engagement.[57] In a sense, the decentralized, independent approach to management can be a great asset in a tumultuous situation.

> The willingness of NGOs to act when speed is essential and detailed planning is impossible makes these organizations among the best equipped to respond to sudden humanitarian challenges. But this ability to turn on a dime – to change strategies, shift resources, quickly expand or shut down operations – can appear chaotic to organizations that have detailed planning and preparation. Field staff are likely to have the authority to design or commit to specific projects, at least at the level of providing seed money. If a new project seems to hold promise, staff will begin the task of designing proposals and seeking funds to permit its fuller implementation.[58]

Deployability and Logistics. Limited deployability and the lack of in-place logistics structures for international organizations that have the clout and resources to greatly impact the long-term peace process are grave issues. Simply put, the United Nations and regional organizations are poorly equipped to deal quickly with emerging crises. The problem is a technical one - it takes time to assemble an IO staff and prepare them for deployment. Most civilian organizations are loosely organized and generally lack sufficient, on-hand resources to respond quickly to complex and often dangerous situations. Additionally, there are few organizations that can coordinate large multiorganizational operations capable of providing long-term solutions to a conflict situation. The task of coordinating civilian organizations is far more complex than that of orchestrating military involvement because the range of potential civilian participants in conflict prevention is so much broader and the direction pursued by each of the

civilian organizations is varied. Therefore, IOs need a sufficient period of time to get organized, gather resources, and deploy before they can become effective at spearheading the peace operation. Unlike the military, they do not have on-hand logistical assets that would allow them to rapidly deploy to a conflict situation and require about a year to eighteen months to become firmly established in theater.

NGOs, on the other hand, are often already deployed in the theater of peace operations before it reaches the crisis stage, but their focus is primarily on humanitarian relief to solve the immediate crisis. Few NGOs are of sufficient size and strength to coordinate the entire peace effort and most are only working on a small segment of the overall problem, consistent with their donor interests. NGO field staff face numerous logistical frustrations and challenges.

> Transportation is particularly difficult, as NGOs lack access to aircraft, sophisticated communications equipment, satellite imagery, Land Rovers, armored vehicles, and Humvees that the peacekeeping troops and the larger UN agencies possess. In addition, access throughout the zone of conflict can be delayed by hours, days, and even months by damage to roads; by mines, bandits, and snipers; by unpredictable requirements for travel permits; by numerous checkpoints manned by undisciplined militaries; and by the imposition of duties and fees.[59]

NGOs do not have the organic capacity to overcome these problems. Their greatest effect lies at the grassroots level. Their ability to mobilize international resources and political will, to impose settlement, and to offer incentives and threats to opposing parties to change their behavior is marginal. They can prompt the principals from behind the scenes and on occasion can briefly be in the center of the mediation, but they are, for the most part, dependent on the individual states or international organizations to carry the bulk of the effort and bring the drama to some conclusion.

Security. Security is an enormous concern of IOs and NGOs, especially those engaged in relief, refugee, and human rights work in hostile situations. The increase in the total number of NGO workers – and more importantly in the number of local employees more likely than foreign workers to be caught in the local conflict – has compounded the problems raised by limited security and a lack of basic security training. Additionally, partnering with local groups can render an international NGO's impartiality suspect due to political affiliations or activities of the local staff.

Military forces cannot possibly be everywhere in a hostile theater; therefore, NGO staff working in a conflict zone are vulnerable and at times experience real danger. In the 1990s the changed nature of international conflict meant that relief workers increasingly found their lives at risk. A Canadian Defence Ministry official candidly noted that some NGO workers had more

battlefield experience than most Canadian Forces personnel.[60] Relief workers in Rwanda and Chechnya were deliberately killed in 1997. In Burundi and the Sudan NGOs were expelled and workers killed because they were witness to local atrocities. In other countries workers were victims of land mines, armed hijacking of vehicles, banditry, kidnapping, and bombings. As a result of these events and the deterioration of field situations, aid workers concluded that they needed weapons on their side in order to fulfill their mandates. In Somalia:

> The ICRC suspended its normally irrevocable principle of avoiding cooperation with military forces in its relief operation in order to protect its relief convoys. The chaos in Somalia became so bad and the negotiating position of humanitarian agencies so tenuous that military force became the only viable alternative.[61]

Security concerns have prompted international NGOs to consider a variety of approaches to ensure staff safety. InterAction, the American NGO association, has developed a training module to promote security for staff operating in high-risk zones. The training emphasizes personal conflict handling techniques rather than deterrence and physical protection. Recognizing that NGO staffs are vulnerable to assaults and other violence, it aims to heighten their sensitivity to potentially threatening situations and gives them tools to defuse or avoid confrontations. A Canadian study, undertaken by the University of Toronto and CARE Canada, suggests another approach to the security problem. This report recommends the establishment of a private security force, a "foreign legion" composed of trained professionals who would be paid by an NGO to provide protection for its own staff, just as private security firms provide protection for businesses and other institutions in many parts of the world. This idea, almost repugnant to NGOs a few years ago, is one measure of the changed circumstances intrastate conflict provides.[62]

Planning. One of the glaring weaknesses of the civilian aid community involves planning for peace operations. In a workshop held at the National Defense University in 1996, NGO workshop representatives complained that United States government or UN objectives are often unclear, which greatly hamper planning efforts. The UN Security Council does not always spell out its objectives, leading to confused responses by both governments and NGOs. Because of unique domestic political considerations, member states sometimes prefer that the UN not be too definitive when identifying its objectives, allowing each country to tailor its response to a situation. This lack of clarity, however, complicates the planning process for all involved, including NGOs.[63]

Generally, the United States Ambassador in-country is the focal point to start the civilian planning process. Either the government of the country where conflict occurs will request

assistance from the United States or a resolution from the UN will call for external action. For the United States, the Ambassador declares the situation a disaster and the embassy sends a cable to Washington requesting help. The lead agency in disaster response is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA will assess the situation and determine the most appropriate response from the United States government, which may include relief commodities, regional advisors, and NGO funding to conduct humanitarian relief. OFDA also works with the military in determining how forces can best support the effort if required. But concrete, effective planning among civilian and military agencies remains weak.

Many workshop participants raised questions about the process by which the United States government gets involved in peace operations. While some of the participants were exceptionally well versed in the bureaucratic trappings of crisis/disaster response, others were less well informed. Many participants stated that the process was often muddled and that the system did not always function smoothly. This results in a key disconnect where NGOs become principally concerned about planning for participation in humanitarian relief, and not with military planning. Until Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, the two planning processes were distinct and compartmented. Communication between the military and the NGOs continues to be stilted and the NGOs are not consulted about an operation until the decisions have already been made by the military. The government planning process remains closed and relevant NGOs cannot effectively get their foot in the door to participate. NGOs often are asked too late and too infrequently to participate in the planning process leaving greater ad hoc responsibility to those workers on the ground, once all parties are deployed.

Additionally, the lack of NGO participation in the government planning process may lead to a disruption of established in-country NGO relations by a new military presence, particularly by a force whose mission focuses primarily on stability and less on the other elements of the operation. Once the military becomes involved in the peace operation, the potential for disrupting informal - albeit effective - channels of communication among NGOs in-country is considerable. Given the independent nature of NGOs and the sheer size of the NGO community there are too many moving parts to gain much of a coordinated effort. As one NGO workshop participant recognized, the "commander's intent" is critical to any military planning. "If you can't identify the commander - and you can't on the NGO side - this will be a problem."[64]

Training. Research, training, and education are vital to any peacebuilding system as these efforts attempt to influence perceptions and attitudes, and build a culture of peace. Those that work in the civilian agencies need two distinct sets of skills. Facilitating meetings,

developing leaders, teaching entrepreneurial skills, and building businesses might be thought of as "organizational" skills. It is comparatively simple to apply them in peaceful communities, where trust and confidence in the future are virtually guaranteed. In war torn and divided societies, however, they must be accompanied by "therapeutic" skills if they are to be effective. These skills include reestablishing relationships across territorial or ethnic boundaries, managing the social service dynamics of residual conflict, and lending support to individuals and communities who lack deep confidence in their future. Both skill-sets are essential for long-term peacebuilding.[65]

In practice, there is a compartmented range of skills needed to support peacebuilding. Major international agencies tend to embody the required organizational skills, while therapeutic and social service skills often reside in smaller NGOs that may have the added difficulty to deploy and sustain themselves in mission areas.[66] NGOs and IOs tend to have greater expertise in the culture of the host nation than the military forces that are chosen to intervene and may have close contacts built from years of providing humanitarian relief in the region. It is common for NGO staff to remain within the NGO world throughout their careers. Many who have worked in the fields of relief, development, or human rights may translate their skills to UN agencies with similar missions, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Food Programme (WFP). Those engaged in conflict mediation and resolution may become teachers to further channel their work. A number of former NGO employees can be found on the staffs of funding agencies, such as USAID and the World Bank.

Additionally, the formal education level is high among NGO staff. Medical doctors work in the administration of health related organizations and engineers give their expertise to agencies that specialize in reconstruction. Among those active in conflict resolution are university professors of political science, sociology, or psychology. Lawyers are indispensable to human rights organizations and refugee organizations. Other degrees commonly found among NGO staff include business administration, public health administration, public affairs, and international affairs.[67]

The type and mandate of the NGO itself will determine the skills required. Everything from funding source to personnel policies will shape a NGO into the picture that its donors desire. During crisis, an international NGO will often deploy only a small number of its managing staff from its home office to the scene, requiring local inhabitants to fill other essential positions. Particular skills, local knowledge, command of the predominant languages, and the ability to provide coordination between the NGO staff and host country nationals are all criteria

used during the hiring process. At times even the ability to obtain a security clearance will play a large role in the hiring of local nationals, although this requirement considerably minimizes the available talent pool. During IFOR, local nationals that were hired primarily as translators often had advanced degrees in engineering that were useful in rebuilding the infrastructure and negotiating construction contracts. Some technical terms that an average native speaker would not understand in his own language, much less be able to translate them between languages, proved easier for those with a technical background. It was also found that local nationals with advanced degrees had a better command of English – the operating language for the peace operation. Notably, the professional caliber of such workers are usually high, because in a crisis zone there is a large pool of highly trained but unemployed professionals from which the NGO can select its staff.

Funding for Peace Operations. The biggest single challenge facing civilian agencies is money. The funding community is accustomed to looking for a tangible product as an outcome, but conflict resolution is a long-term process. Foundations want projects with clear objectives and measurable outcomes within specified time constraints, but conflict resolution is an open-ended process with impossible to measure results. Compounding these difficulties are the financial realities of the work itself. There are great travel expenses involved, and a long-term though perhaps sporadic time commitment is required.[68] Sometimes the call to work is immediate which necessitates immediate funding possibly pledged against a loosely defined deployment plan. Raising money within these parameters is extraordinarily difficult and requires an entirely different set of skills than that used in conflict resolution.

For IOs, lack of financing can have two possible effects. First, it can limit the activities of the force, requiring it to select certain tasks or concentrate on specific regions rather than pursue a comprehensive approach. As the peace process becomes delayed, this triggers a vicious cycle ultimately requiring more funds than originally anticipated. Second, a shortage of money can lead to the complete abandonment of an operation when sources of funding expire.[69] In actual practice, the lack of funding is far less dramatic for UN peacekeeping operations, regardless of budget deficits. Countries like the United States tend to find the money to deploy military forces under the regional organization banner in order to stop hostilities and provide a safe and secure environment. In contrast, the work of some of the UN specialized agencies, such as the UNHCR, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), or the WFP, has been severely impaired when appeals have not been met by contributions. Similarly, regional and subregional organizations have been hampered in their ability to initiate effective peace operations due to a lack of funds. Among all the restraining and

conditioning factors for peace support operations, cash flow remains the key issue. Given finite funds and resources and too many conflicts to manage, selection will have to take place.[70]

Boards of directors that reflect the particular mandates, culture, and history of the organization, on the other hand, govern NGOs. Since most NGOs raise money among members of a particular segment of the public, their constituency's interests dominate their mission performance and direction; otherwise, their financial survival will be tenuous. Furthermore, if the institutional constituency or fundraising base of an NGO has an ideological predisposition against one party or another in a conflict, the organization's usefulness as a neutral mediator may be compromised. Some NGOs have political, religious, and ideological agendas that limit the type of conflict resolution work they undertake.[71] The medical professionals who were its founders dominate the board of directors of the International Medical Corps, an American NGO that specializes in providing emergency medical care during conflicts. Catholic bishops, as another example, serve as the board of directors for Catholic Relief Services, giving specific ideological direction to the effort of Catholic Relief, a direction that may be different if managed by a board of a different makeup.

During the 1990s, the international donor community pledged more than $100 billion in aid to three dozen countries recovering from violent conflict.[72] From Cambodia to Bosnia, El Salvador to Rwanda, and Tajikistan to Lebanon, multilateral and bilateral donors have supported post conflict peacebuilding with generous packages of grants, concessional loans, debt forgiveness, and technical assistance. Providing a bridge between emergency humanitarian relief and long-term development, these financial and material resources are designed to persuade formerly warring parties to resolve conflicts peacefully and are intended to lay the foundations for a sustainable transition to economic growth and participatory governance. However, in many situations a significant proportion of the pledged resources has never materialized or has done so very slowly. Despite ostensible good intentions, too often aid promised has not been committed, aid committed has not been delivered, and aid delivered has arrived too late.

In the words of the World Bank:

> Pledges are made, but commitment takes longer, and there is a considerable lag before actual disbursement takes place. Sustainable transitions out of conflict take several years, yet there is a tendency for donors to disengage once the conflict has receded from public attention.[73]

ROADBLOCKS TO POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

If the goal is to rebuild the physical infrastructure in order to jumpstart the economy and strengthen security immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the military is the organization that is most suited to accomplish this mission within the first year. However, despite all of the advantages that the military brings to peace operations, there are roadblocks that have been erected that greatly limit the military's effectiveness in post conflict reconstruction. Most of these limitations derive from having no initial mandate that allows any military involvement in post conflict reconstruction in the civilian sector. This becomes a downward spiral leading to limited reconstruction funds, inappropriate troop strength, and absence of an organization for combined civil-military reconstruction planning. The result is a lack of military focus on the long-term benefits of immediate reconstruction in favor of a short-term focus on security and stability operations. This negative domino effect, however, can be prevented by an extension of the post conflict reconstruction mandate to the military.

Post Conflict Reconstruction Funding. An advantage of the United States military is that they have available funding to deploy forces to a peace operation to stop hostilities and provide security; however, that same funding stream is not immediately available for infrastructure reconstruction – for military or civilian uses. UN funding is severely limited simply by the sheer number of peace operations being conducted simultaneously and also by the number of countries who are in arrears in their payment of peace operations dues to the UN. Most of the available UN funding is targeted to humanitarian assistance – food distribution and public health concerns – and is the responsibility of the UN mission director of humanitarian affairs.[74] Infrastructure reconstruction, however, receives such little attention in the UN that no staff officer in the expanded Department of Peace Keeping Operations is assigned the task to develop approaches to infrastructure reconstruction.[75]

NATO infrastructure funding is regulated through the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Resources Committee, and its subcommittee, the NATO Infrastructure Committee in Mons, Belgium. Infrastructure expenditure is authorized through a process of individual project approval, limiting military construction to the "minimum military requirement", requiring a consensus vote of approval by the military members of NATO. As NATO has gained comfort and understanding in executing peace operations, the bureaucratic structure to gain approval has been streamlined through intra-military cooperation and standard operating procedures; however, the "minimum military requirement" mandate has not been relaxed. Therefore, no funding for civilian-only infrastructure repair during post conflict operations currently comes from NATO resources.

The only other immediate source of government humanitarian funds that the military can use for basic infrastructure repair lies in the hands of the regional United States Combatant Commander who happens to have the peace operation in his area of responsibility. Regional Combatant Commanders are annually given a limited amount of funds to be used throughout his area of responsibility for humanitarian purposes. However, the overall amount of this funding source is small and is to be spread over areas the size of some continents. Additionally, these funds are to be used for emergency humanitarian needs and are not intended to be used for long-term infrastructure reconstruction. Although the Combatant Commander does have discretion in how he targets the use of this account, convention is to use these funds to ward off impending humanitarian crises.

Forces Tailored for Post Conflict Reconstruction. Without a post conflict reconstruction mandate, military forces that deploy to peace operations do not have enough of the right kinds of forces in the necessary quantities in order to carry out reconstruction tasks. The ground units needed for peace operations under the current mandate are not necessarily the same types or quantities needed for major theater wars, but neither are they adequately configured to provide post conflict reconstruction. Military forces configure themselves in specific ways to perform particular missions. Certain kinds of combat-support and combat-service-support specialties – such as transportation, civil affairs, water purification, and construction engineers – are critical for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, while combat units – infantry and armor – are key for peace enforcing duties. Thus, some specialties may be in much heavier demand during peace operations than are other specialties. Post conflict reconstruction would require additional military engineers and augmentation by the civilians, for example, that work in the United States Army Corps of Engineers; however, without a requirement and the authority to execute post conflict reconstruction, these forces are not readily available in theater. Additionally, in the Army, a large percentage of the high-demand capabilities in the combat-support and combat-service-support areas are in the reserve component. The active-duty Army may contain very few of the required types of units, requiring a Presidential call-up. The dilemma continues - United States forces must have reconstruction authority in order to fill the gap from cessation of hostilities to civilian agency deployment, and they must have the authority early enough to properly configure the executing forces at the outset of the peace operation.

NATO forces are configured for operations through the use of a Contingency Establishment (CE) – a document that details the generic force required for a pending mission. Upon receipt of the mission, planning staffs determine the type and amount of forces that are

required to execute the various aspects of the assigned mission. A force generation conference is conferred where national representatives "bid" on the various slots to fill the CE. Often at the end of the force generation conference, key slots are left unfilled due to national guidelines or lack of specialties. Executing a post conflict reconstruction mandate would require the United States to recognize the long-term peace benefits of early reconstruction by military forces, would require massive troop concentrations early in the operation – primarily of combat-support type units, and would require a national will of commitment to execute a Presidential call-up of required reserve forces to complete the fill of the necessary CE.

Joint Planning Cell for Post Conflict Reconstruction. Military forces in a peace operation generally only function as a temporary solution to cool off a conflict and are not the long-term solution for peace operations. Civilian agencies have the long-term focus, and there are a number of arguments that unite, or at least ought to unite, civil and military operations in order to achieve a total focus. First, military and civil operations undoubtedly affect each other at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Without any overriding coordination there is a risk that they may counteract each other, resulting in a degradation of effort. At the strategic level, a decision about military intervention will have a large impact on the civil humanitarian operations already in the area. The aim of the civil operations, for instance, concerning refugee return, may affect the status of the military operation. Similar examples can be found at the operational and tactical levels. Second, successful civil operations of various kinds are a basic precondition for long-term stability and consequently a precondition for the military operation to reach a successful conclusion. Similarly, the civil operation may need protection and support from the military authorities. Finally, civil-military coordination is necessary to prevent local groups from playing off different parts of the international mission against each other. A party must not be able to block one operation in an area and simultaneously be rewarded with aid from another.

Post conflict reconstruction is a prime area that requires close civil-military cooperation to ensure that there is a seamless transition from the beginning of the deployment to the end of the deployment. Right now, however, there is no permanent coordination council developed that will adequately bring together civil agencies and military forces to ensure that planning for reconstruction is a coherent and inclusive action. General Joulwan argues for the creation of an overarching organization – a civilian-military implementation staff (CMIS) – at both the strategic and the operational level in order to effectively use the diverse organizations and resources, as well as to successfully conduct the day-to-day management of conflict prevention at all levels.[76] So far, however, this has only been used in an ad hoc manner, and not in an effective manner

during the first year following the cessation of hostilities. Should the mandate for post conflict reconstruction extend to the military, a civil-military working group must be created during the planning of the peace operation to ensure that plans for reconstruction are coordinated, resourced, and transitioned from military to civilian execution without a degradation or delay in reconstruction progress.

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES

[1]Janet A. McDonnell, After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1999), 5.

[2]J. Lewis Rasmussen, "Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century," in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, eds. I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 30.

[3] Brigadier General Claude DeWilde, Chief of Engineers, IFOR, "Request the Gift of Bailey Bridges to Bosnia," memorandum to the NATO Infrastructure Committee, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 19 July 1996. Garland H. Williams CHENG7@ifor.mil, "Request the Gift of Bailey Bridges to Bosnia," electronic mail message to Colonel Ernesto Maglia emaglia@nato.mil, 20 July 1996. In July 1996, there was a series of e-mail correspondence between the Chief IFOR Engineers in Sarajevo, Bosnia, (signed by Brigadier General Claude DeWilde (FR)) and the Engineering Section of the NATO Infrastructure Committee in Mons, Belgium (Colonel Ernesto Maglia (IT)), conveying the initial request to "gift" the bridges to Bosnia The request was favorably endorsed by General George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and then sent to the United States Department of State in Washington, D.C., in July 1996. The negative reply to IFOR was transmitted by telephone from Colonel Maglia to Captain Terry Tull, IFOR Deputy Chief of Engineers (US Navy) in September 1996 (exact date unknown). Note: NATO e-mail communications are classified under the CRONOS communications system and cannot be retrieved by non-NATO serving officers. All addresses under IFOR have been changed to reflect the changed staff organization. The original e-mail server in Sarajevo has been replaced and attempts have failed to recover all of the original e-mail correspondence. Additionally, the original document requesting the gift of the bridges was electronically destroyed during the staff transition between IFOR and SFOR and paper copies (due to limited space in Sarajevo) were not kept in IFOR Headquarters. Attempts to locate the original document at the IFOR parent headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe, also failed. The account of this incident is based on the author's notes as he was the staff officer that prepared and coordinated the correspondence.

[4] Brigadier General Steven Hawkins <steven.hawkins@us.army.mil>, "Bosnia Bailey Bridges," electronic mail message to Lieutenant Colonel Garland H. Williams <gwilliams@usip.org>, 25 November 2002. Brigadier General Hawkins confirms that the request was made; however, he redeployed from Bosnia before the issue was settled using NGO money during the first year of SFOR.

[5] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York, NY: United Nations, 1992), A/47/277-S/24111, 11.

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[7] Ibid., 14.

[8] Ibid., 14-15.

[9] Claudia Gonzalez-Vallejo and Giselda Garroso Sauveur, "Peace Through Economic and Social Development," in The Psychology of Peacekeeping, ed. Harvey J. Langholtz (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 26.

[10] The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997-2002 (Stockholm, Sweden: Elanders Gotab, 2002), 255.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Jason Morrow, "Greater Intervention and Military Cutbacks are a Deadly Combination," National Policy Analysis, No. 249 (June 1999): 1.

[13] Thomas F. Lippiott, James C. Crowley, and Jerry M. Sollinger, Time and Resources Required for Postmobilization Training of AC/ARNG Integrated Heavy Divisions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), 9.

[14] Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, February 1996), A-7.

[15] Army forces can be divided into three categories. Deployable forces, or operating forces, are those soldiers assigned to units that can deploy. Institutional forces do not deploy but support the operating forces in fields such as acquisition and training. The third category of soldiers are moving from one assignment to another, are in training, or are medically unavailable. All soldiers are assigned to one of those categories, but the actual numbers in each category change daily. For 1999, the Army assumed that operating forces constitute 63 percent of the active Army, institutional forces make up 24 percent, and trainees, transients, holdees, and students compose 13 percent.

[16] General Accounting Office, Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts, (Washington, D.C.: GAO, March 1995), 4.

[17] G.E. Willis, "Army Leaders Seek More Funds for '98," Army Times, 23 March 1998, p. 8.

[18] That rotation base would allow one-third of the units to be deployed while one-third prepared to deploy and one-third recovered from just having been deployed. For a more detailed treatment of the relationship between the size of the rotation base and the deployment cycle, see Ronald E. Sortor, Army Forces for Operations Other Than War, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997).

[19] Adam B. Siegel, Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations: Insights from Seven Case Studies, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1995), 88-89.

[20] Claire M. Levy, et al., Army PERSTEMPO in the Post Cold War Era, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 37.

[21]Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the House Services Committee, Hearing of the Military Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

"Statement by General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia," 106th Cong., 1st sess., 22 March 1999.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Fionnuala Ni Aolain, "The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis," in Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, eds. Dzemal Sokolovic and Florian Bieber (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001), 68.

[24] The delegation, however, also included members of each of the national groups in Kosovo (Roma, Egyptians, Gorani, "loyal" Albanians and Turks), whose legitimacy and degree of representation were doubtful.

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[26] The status of Kosovo is left ambiguous to the extent that it is not possible to determine clearly whether the province is autonomous with Serbia or Yugoslavia.

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[31] General John M. Shalikashvili, History of the U.S. Army War Reserve Support Command, n.d.; available from <http://www.osc.army.mil/fsc.History.asp>; Internet; accessed 19 August 2002.

[32] Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping: Issues of Military Involvement, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1 August 2002), 13.

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[34] United States Army Transportation School, Division Transportation Officer's Guide, Reference 01-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: United States Army, 7 June 2001), 3-1.

[35] Global Security.org, "Combat Prepositioning Ships Army Prepositioned Afloat," 16 September 2002; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/sealift-cps.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2003.

[36] Ibid.

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[39] Ibid., 126, 146.

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[41] Congressional Budget Office, Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, December 1999), 2-4.

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[43] Alan D. Landry, Informing the Debate: The Impact of Operations Other Than War on Combat Training Readiness, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 7 April 1997), 5.

[44] Ibid., C-1.

[45] Reimer, 22.

[46] Congressional Budget Office, 4-5.

[47] Ibid., 5-1.

[48] Ibid., 5-2.

[49] The Congress must approve any supplemental appropriations and agree with transfers and reprogramming actions of any significant amount. That amount is set by Congressional authorization and appropriation committees and can vary from year to year.

[50] Congressional Budget Office, 5-3.

[51] The amount obligated could be up to one-half of that year's appropriation for O&M Budget Activity 1, which provides funds for operating military forces.

[52] Congressional Budget Office, 5-3.

[53] Ibid., 5-4.

[54] Pamela Aall, "NGOs, Conflict Management and Peacekeeping," in Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, eds. Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (London, England: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2000), 123.

[55] Andrew S. Natsios, "An NGO Perspective," in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, eds. I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 337-341.

[56] Aall, Guide, 8-10.

[57] Aall, "NGOs, Conflict Management and Peacekeeping," 135.

[58] Aall, Guide, p. 98.

[59] Ibid., 108.

[60] Michael Williams, Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping, Adelphi Paper 321 (London, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), 41.

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[62] Michael Bryans, Bruce D. Jones, and Janice Gross Stein, Mean Times: Adapting the Humanitarian Imperative for the 21st Century (Toronto, Canada: Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, October 1998, unpublished version), 42.

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[66] Ibid.

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[69] Annika S. Hansen, Drawing Lines in the Sand: The Limits and Boundaries of Peace Support Operations. Monograph No. 44 (Pretoria, South Africa: The Institute for Security Studies; Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000), 6; available from <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/DrawingLines.html>; Internet; accessed 15 September 2002.

[70] S. J. Stedman, "UN Intervention in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and Strategy," in Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, eds. D. C. F. Daniel and B. C. Hayes (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 51.

[71] Natsios, 348.

[72] Members of the donor community include bilateral aid agencies of national governments, particularly the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the departments, programs, and specialized agencies of the United Nations; the international financial institutions (IFIs); and multiple nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Oxfam. According to data compiled from the OECD's Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1999, countries emerging from conflict received aid commitments of approximately $109 billion from multilateral institutions and DAC members between 1990 and 1997.

[73] The World Bank, Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, August 1998), 21.

[74] Mark R. Walsh, "Managing Peace Operations in the Field," Parameters 26, No. 2 (Summer 1996), 8.

[75] Michael A. Sheehan, Assistant Secretary-General United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, interview by author, 5 September 2002.

[76] Joulwan, 21-22.

CHAPTER TWO: BOSNIA

Tito's death in 1980 marked the end of a unique era in Yugoslavia. With the 1984 Winter Olympics on the near horizon and the country enjoying relative prosperity under communism, no one could even have imagined the dramatic changes that would be in store for the country in the next decade. Primarily external forces to the country would help undo Tito's fragile state. Some, like the dangers of mounting foreign debt, could be foreseen; others, such as the devastating effect of the worldwide rise in oil prices, could not. For a country like Yugoslavia, which was heavily dependent on imported fuel paid for in hard currency, the oil price crisis alone could have resulted in financial ruin. Feeble attempts to deal with Yugoslavia's economic woes in the 1980s produced "stagflation" and a substantial drop in the standard of living. Additionally, rising inflation rates charted the country's economic ill health. By 1987 the rate had reached 200 percent per year; by August 1989 it was nearly 200 percent per month.[1]

Yugoslavs dreamed of greater prosperity and of being part of the new Europe. They were the first to leave the Soviet bloc in 1948, but faltered badly in the 1980s. While the bloc countries were breaking with the Soviet Union and renouncing communism, the Yugoslavs were not so sure of their future and were divided over how the country should proceed. The issue of centralism versus federalism, so poisonous in the years between the world wars, reared its ugly head with a vengeance. With Tito gone, no one was strong enough to keep the federation together; meanwhile, the leaders of the individual republics pushed harder than ever to assert themselves.[2] This, in a capsule, is how nationalism reemerged in Yugoslavia and ultimately helped tear the country apart. In the end, the respective positions of the republics turned out to be irreconcilable.

The NATO-led operation in Bosnia's Operation Joint Endeavor was NATO's first-ever ground force operation, its first-ever deployment "out of area", and its first-ever joint operation with NATO's Partnership for Peace and other non-NATO countries. It was a demonstration that the Alliance had changed and adapted its forces and policies to the requirements of the post Cold War world, while continuing to provide collective security and defense for its Allies. But this "first" operation also brought some inconsistency and some "muddling through" as situations arose. NATO did not have policies and procedures that covered every aspect of the planned operation, nor did it have policies that could be used when unforeseen contingencies arose. Peacekeeping on such a grand scale was not a commonplace occurrence and the roadmap for post conflict reconstruction was not fully developed.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO NATO INTERVENTION

Following a decade of mounting internal tensions, the disintegration of Yugoslavia accelerated with the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. Both countries declared their independence on June 25, 1991, and were subsequently recognized by the international community as independent states. The immediate result was war in Slovenia. Prime Minister Markovic ordered the Yugoslav army to take control in Slovenia; however, the Slovene National Guard and police had prepared well for the confrontation. In ten days, the war was over; deaths and casualties were minimal. The European Commission (EC) and the Brioni Agreement of July 7, signed by EC representatives and the heads of Yugoslavia's republics, settled matters for Slovenia and brokered a truce. The truce in Slovenia held for the stipulated three months, in accordance with the agreement, the republic became independent, and Yugoslav forces evacuated by late October.

In Croatia, however, independence did not occur smoothly. Hostilities began in July 1991 and the war proceeded badly for the Croatian government. The Yugoslav authorities lost control of the Yugoslav army. The army, whose officer corps was 70 percent Serb, soon began supporting the Croatian Serbs in the war. Fighting raged in several areas until the end of the year. In the north and the west the fighting split Croatia in two, cutting off the main part of the republic from its lucrative coastal resort areas. The southern Adriatic Sea's tourist mecca, Dubrovnik, attacked in October, was bombed from the air and the sea, its resort hotels were destroyed, and many buildings in the older walled area of the town were indiscriminately set on fire.



Figure 2.1: Aerial View of Dubrovnik.[3]

The war between Serbs and Croats was reminiscent of World War II's bestial fratricidal killing, with civilians bearing the brunt of the conflict. Eastern Croatia, which had a mixed population and a border contiguous with Serbia, experienced some of the most vicious fighting. In Vukovar, only a fourth of its traumatized inhabitants who had not fled or who had not been driven out survived the eighty-seven day siege, mostly by living in underground cellars. At the end of the siege, there were 2,300 dead; the town itself was totally leveled.[4]

The EC tried to stop the war to no avail. Only when special envoy Cyrus Vance, representing the UN, entered the negotiations was any headway made toward peace. In late November 1991 there was a UN cease-fire that stopped most of the fighting. By then the Serbs controlled one-third of the Croatian republic. Ten thousand people were killed, 30,000 soldiers and civilians were wounded, and 730,000 people were refugees and lived in other Yugoslav republics or elsewhere in Europe. The UN, who would provide troops to monitor the truce, prepared terms of the settlement. The cease-fire agreement was signed in early January 1992. UN Resolution 743 established the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to supervise the cease-fire and the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces. By mid-February the number of UNPROFOR troops was set at 14,000 and in early March thirty nations began deploying forces to serve in four different areas of Croatia. Because it was important to keep the management of UN operations away from possible hostilities, UNPROFOR headquarters was set up in Sarajevo.[5] Clearly, the UN was ill informed and ill prepared for the imminent war in Bosnia, which began the very next month.

Discussions on the sovereignty of Bosnia between its three regionally based political parties – the Party for Democratic Action, the Croat Democratic Community, and the Serb Democratic party – began shortly after the first free elections in Yugoslavia in November 1990. Bosniac and Croat politicians supported the principle of Bosnian sovereignty; Serb leaders opposed it.[6] In November 1991, the European Union's (EU) Badinter Commission reported that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina satisfied the necessary and required conditions to be recognized as an independent republic by the EU, provided that the desire for independence was confirmed by a popular referendum. In a referendum held on March 1, 1992, two-thirds of the adult population voted and almost all favored independence. The nonvoting third of the population was largely comprised of Bosnian Serbs, many who had decided to boycott the referendum.

Bosnia was recognized as an independent state by the member countries of the EU and the United States and subsequently became a UN member under Security Council Resolution 755 on May 22, 1992. Immediately, local Serb militias and the Yugoslav National Army

challenged the country's independence and territorial integrity. Following its declaration of independence, Bosnia was thrust into a four-year-long war launched by the opponents of its independence. The war included segments of the Croat and Serb populations, remnants of the Yugoslav army, and Bosnia's two neighbors – Croatia on the north and west and Serbia on the east – who intervened to support the Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian-Serb armies in the country. More than one-half of the population of Bosnia lost their lives, were injured, were internally displaced, or took refuge abroad.

The confrontation lines in Bosnia did not change significantly in 1993 and 1994. The Serbs conducted a prolonged siege of Sarajevo, while successive peace plans were proposed and then tabled by international mediators, and ultimately rejected by the warring parties. The first major changes on the ground occurred in spring 1995. In April, just before the expiration of a four-month ceasefire, the Bosnian Army carried out its first successful offensives against Serb forces, taking high ground in central Bosnia. Croatia recaptured the Serb held region of Western Slavonia, and made advances in western Bosnia. In retaliation, the Serbs carried out their long predicted attack in July on the eastern Bosnian designated "safe area" of Srebrenica, where 40,000 people had relied for their safety upon a battalion of UN peacekeepers. The town was soon overrun, and in front of Dutch peacekeepers and the world's television cameras, the troops commanded by General Ratko Mladic segregated the local men and the older boys. Compelling evidence indicates that they were taken away to be slaughtered; between 3,000 and 8,000 are still missing.[7] The rest of the population – desperate women, children, and old people – were expelled from the town. The massacre at Srebrenica was the worst single war crime in Europe since 1945.

Later in July, as Mladic's men closed in upon Zepa, another designated "safe area" in eastern Bosnia, the Contact Group states and other interested parties convened in London.[8] The European states agreed to an American proposal for a "substantial and decisive response" in the event of further attacks on "safe areas," with special emphasis on Gorazde, a town located in eastern Bosnia along the Drina River. At the beginning of August 1995, NATO formally extended the new cover to Bihac, Sarajevo, and Tuzla, stating, "Any attacks will be met with the firm and rapid response of NATO airpower."[9] Throughout this period, Croat forces in Bosnia and the Croatian Army gained ground from the Serb forces in western Bosnia – approaching the heavily Serb-populated Krajina region of Croatia. The Croatian Army attacked on the Krajina on August 4, 1995 – three days after the United States Congress voted to lift for Bosnia the arms embargo imposed on the warring republics in 1992. There was scant resistance, and no support from Belgrade. Zagreb's successful military offensive was followed

by a Croat campaign of "ethnic cleansing" against the Krajina Serb population. Almost 200,000 people fled – possibly the largest movement of Serbs in history.[10]

NATO RESPONSE TO HOSTILITIES

NATO Air War

Perhaps lulled into complacency by three years of threats followed by inaction, the Bosnian Serbs crossed the line compelling NATO to act. On August 28, 1995, a shell landed in the Sarajevo market place, killing thirty-seven people. The Serbs attempted to blame the Muslims as they had in past incidents, but detailed crater analysis revealed that the round had, in all probability, come from Bosnian Serb army positions in the hills surrounding Sarajevo.[11] On the other hand, the fact that the Bosnian government had press releases ready within minutes of the incident suggests that the attack may have been staged.[12] Despite the uncertainty, this was the pretext for which the international community had been waiting. United States envoy Richard Holbrooke wrote, "The brutal stupidity of the Bosnian Serbs had given us an unexpected last chance to do what should have been done three years earlier."[13] On August 29, United States Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright met with UN Permanent Secretary for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan and received the latter's assurance that UN civilian and military personnel would relinquish all veto power over air strikes. This was a curious guarantee, given that the London Conference was supposed to have already relieved the UN of that veto power. NATO aircraft commenced bombing in the early hours of August 30, 1995, in a mission termed Operation Deliberate Force. Additionally, the guns of the Rapid Reaction Force established dominance around Sarajevo, fixing Serb artillery pieces and mortar tubes with radar.

The timing of the air campaign was way beyond the opportunity window to use limited air strikes to coerce the Serbs. In view of its well-earned credibility from the Gulf War, the Bush Administration may have caused the Serbs to rethink their entire strategy if confronted early on with even limited use of United States military power; but the risk of escalation to large-scale intervention was deemed too high. In contrast, President Clinton authorized selective air strikes after it was too late for such limited means to fundamentally change the results of the successful Serbian aggression. But in attempting to demonstrate the will to use force, the Clinton Administration demonstrated instead how sharply limited any use of force would be.[14]

The air campaign ran with few pauses until September 17. By then NATO warplanes had flown 3,515 sorties – this roughly compares to one good flying day in the Gulf War. The

operation to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 836 inflicted great damage on the Serb military infrastructure, creating an opportunity for the Croat and Bosnian government sides to capture territory. Alliance planners were determined to avoid targets where there might be a chance of "collateral damage" to nearby civilians – that goal was achieved. So were the larger objectives of the air campaign: the Bosnian Serbs agreed to pull back their heavy weapons. More importantly, they agreed to take part with the Bosnian Muslims and Croats in peace talks that, from the outset, were premised upon the condition that they would emerge with only 49 percent of Bosnian territory, not the 70 percent that only weeks before had been within their grasp.[15] By using massive force but without granting any side victory Operation Deliberate Force helped create the conditions upon which the foreign ministers of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia reached agreement on basic constitutional principles for Bosnia, signed in Geneva on September 8 and in New York on September 26. This agreement in turn led to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, known as the Dayton Peace Accords, initialed by the presidents of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia in Ohio on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.[16]

Dayton Agreement

The Dayton Agreement had two goals: to end the fighting and to rebuild a viable Bosnian state. To accomplish the first goal, the agreement detailed an elaborate calendar of commitments to separate and draw down the armed forces of the Bosnian Serbs on one side and the Bosniac-Croat alliance on the other. In a separate understanding, the United States committed itself to reinforcing Bosniac forces in order to create an internal balance of power to deter any future attacks by Bosnian Serbs.[17] To accomplish the second goal, the agreement outlined a wide range of provisions from a postwar constitution through elections to preservation of national monuments. Dayton also promised to restore all living members of the pre-war population to their original homes, thus reestablishing the original demographic base on which the postwar state could take root. To reach these ambitious objectives, the accords committed the international community to a specific and intricate set of roles throughout the process of implementation. These roles were highly decentralized, which made it hard to maintain any degree of policy coherence once implementation started.

As a text, the Dayton Agreement consisted of a short "General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)" in which the parties pledged to "welcome and endorse" the concrete provisions outlined in eleven substantive annexes.[18] The first annex covered the "military aspects" of the settlement; the rest covered what are usually referred to as the "civilian" provisions, though this

military-civilian dichotomy reflects less the inherently military or civilian content of each particular provision than it does the authorized roles of the third party implementers.

Military Responsibilities. Dayton's military annexes principally secured the cease-fire line between Serb forces and the Bosniac-Croat alliance, stabilizing the territorial allocation of the country between them. The details of the agreement brokered by United States envoy Richard Holbrooke divided Bosnia into two roughly equal parts: the Bosnian Federation, occupying 51% of Bosnian territory, and the Republik Srbska, receiving the remaining 49% of Bosnia. It transferred some territory between the Federation and the Serbs allowing Sarajevo to be reunited, under Muslim control. The two parts of Bosnia technically remain part of a single state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but only as a de jure stipulation. They agreed that forces were to be separated along either side of an "Inter-Entity Boundary Line" (IEBL) dividing the Republika Srbska from the Bosniac-Croat Federation and, furthermore, the parties accepted a detailed calendar of obligations governing the cessation of hostilities. The parties agreed to a modest package of regional arms control and confidence-building measures, pledging to cooperate completely with all international personnel, explicitly those working with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).[19] No provisions were made for the possibility of renewed hostilities between Bosniacs and Croats within the Federation.

The Dayton Accords outlined an extensive role for various international actors to help implement the peace (see Table 2.1), and compliance with the accords' military provisions was to be supervised by a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) led by NATO.[20] Authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, IFOR was commanded by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), was 60,000 strong at first deployment, and was expected to complete its mission by December 1996, or one year after Dayton's signing. Although its mandate encompassed all military provisions, IFOR's widely perceived primary role was that of a classic, if particularly well armed peacekeeping force: to separate armed forces, oversee the cantonment of troops and heavy weapons to agreed upon areas, and stabilize the cease-fire.

Importantly, IFOR's secondary support responsibilities ran the gamut of implementation activities. Furthermore, IFOR's tasks were linked to the parties' promise to ensure the safety of all civilians under their respective jurisdictions, to provide humane and nondiscriminatory law enforcement, and to cooperate with the international criminal proceedings at The Hague. IFOR was also asked to support other components of international implementation, with specific reference to the refugee return related responsibilities of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). IFOR was expressly directed "to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond

appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person."[21] Related only minimally to IFOR's overtly military tasks were Dayton's provisions for arms control and confidence building, which were to be undertaken by the OSCE, and for judgment over Brcko, which was to be decided by international arbitration.[22] Brcko commands the junction between the two halves of Bosnian Serb territory, and controls Bosnian Federation access to the Sava River. Three arbitrators, one from the Federation, one from the Serb Republic, and one selected jointly were to settle the dispute by December 14, 1996 – this part of the agreement failed miserably during the first year of implementation.

Civilian Responsibilities. In contrast to the agreement's military responsibilities, the tasks for civilian implementation were parceled out annex by annex to lead agencies, though some tasks – like human rights – had no one formal steward, and some agencies – like OSCE – had multiple responsibilities. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) monitored the preparation and conduct of elections. The UNHCR handled the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. UNPROFOR, who had been in Bosnia since 1992, transformed into the backbone of The International Police Task Force (IPTF) to monitor and help reform Bosnia's police. Oversight of human rights provisions was collectively executed by the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UN High Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, and provisions for missing persons was delegated to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Although not articulated in the text of the agreement, the World Bank took the lead on postwar reconstruction. Finally, the EU worked within the Federation to reconnect the divided city of Mostar, a responsibility that it had assumed before Dayton.[23]

With so many international bodies responsible for implementing the various components of the Dayton Accords, some means of coordinating their efforts was sorely needed. The model adopted at Dayton, however, was loose, particularly on the civilian side and did not provide any actor with a serious mandate to coordinate civilian efforts. Instead, to coordinate the panoply of the civilian organizations, Dayton authorized an international Office of the High Representative (OHR) to oversee civilian implementation.[24] The High Representative was to enjoy final interpretive "authority in theatre" of Dayton's civilian provisions, similar to the Commander of IFOR's (COMIFOR) authority to interpret military provisions. Although the representative's role was initially designed to be coequal to that of COMIFOR, it was widely recognized that the High Representative would have far less effective authority, particularly over other implementing agencies that reported separately to their respective governing bodies and had neither the habit nor the incentive to put their operational resources under the direction of a central authority.

With respect to fellow implementers, the High Representative had, at best, the leverage of the bully pulpit – "to consult, inform, cajole, liaise, even hector, but not to direct, allocate, or spend, let alone hold accountable."[25]

Annexes		Key International Implementers
1A	Military Aspects	IFOR
1B	Regional Stabilization	OSCE
2	Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and Related Issues	International Arbitrator
3	Elections	OSCE
4	Constitution	European Court for Human Rights, International Monetary Fund
5	Arbitration	
6	Human Rights	OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCHR, European Court of Human Rights
7	Refugees and Displaced Persons	UNHCR
8	Commission to Preserve National Monuments	UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
9	Bosnia Public Corporations	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
10	Civilian Implementation	OHR
11	International Police Task Force	UN

Table 2.1 The Dayton Agreement and Its Implementers

The Dayton Agreement stopped four and a half years of terrible violent conflict, but it did not mandate either of the ultimate options for Bosnia: reintegration or partition. It left all sides with much still to negotiate. The agreement, in theory, created a window of opportunity for external political forces to enter the political scene in Bosnia in support of reintegration. But it has been clear from the outset that this opportunity demands rigorous implementation – by IFOR/SFOR and the OSCE – of the integrative provisions of Dayton. The eventual outcome is still uncertain and may be the creation of a unified Bosnia, or the complete opposite – a final division of Bosnia into two or three parts; or it may be an uneasy, indefinite survival of a nominally unified Bosnia.

IFOR/SFOR

While adamantly refusing to contribute ground forces to UNPROFOR, the Clinton Administration maintained a commitment to provide forces to oversee implementation of an overall peace settlement. With the 1995 peace negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, Administration officials laid out their rationale and initial planning for United States participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force for Bosnia. Administration officials argued that United States participation with ground forces was necessary for two main reasons: 1) the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serb negotiators all made United States ground force participation a condition for their acceptance of any peace settlement, and 2) United States participation was necessary for the United States to maintain a leadership position in NATO. President Clinton subsequently emphasized a moral responsibility to end the savagery of the Bosnian conflict.

On the basis of the Dayton Peace Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1031 authorized a one year multilateral NATO-led IFOR under the UN Charter's Chapter VII. To enforce the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement, NATO sent approximately 54,000 ground troops into Bosnia proper. The UN Security Council endorsed the creation and emplacement of IFOR with a greater degree of delegation to NATO than had occurred in Bosnia before, but little different to the earlier delegations to member States to undertake potentially offensive military operations in Rwanda, Haiti, and Somalia.[26] The resolution directed IFOR "to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with" the agreement and, "stresses that the parties shall be held equally responsible for compliance . . . and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by IFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation . . . and takes note that the parties have consented IFOR's taking of such measures".[27] Although IFOR was consented to by the parties, it was not a traditional form of peacekeeping. IFOR performed a traditional peacekeeping role while the accords were being complied with, but would become an offensive operation should a faction violate the accord. Even while it was performing a basic peacekeeping function, the threat of enforcement action should the peace be broken, combined with the much greater military capacity of IFOR, made it a much more capable military operation than UNPROFOR, a traditional peacekeeping force, despite the Security Council's attempts at tinkering with its mandate.

In late 1996, the lack of progress in civilian reconstruction and continued friction between the ethnic factions, including within the Muslim-Croat Federation itself, led to the widespread belief that some NATO military force would be required beyond IFOR's December 20, 1996, mandated exit. These concerns led NATO's political leaders to authorize the follow-on

Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 1996, to last until June 1998. However, by the end of 1997, there was little optimism that Bosnia would have a viable national state or economy by June. Fragile government institutions and continued ethnic antagonisms led most observers to believe that an international military force of substantial size was necessary to remain in Bosnia for perhaps years, if further inter ethnic war was to be averted. Because he believed the region's conflict to be the single greatest threat to contemporary European security and hence a long-term NATO concern, Former High Representative Carl Bildt suggested the permanent stationing of NATO troops in Bosnia. Although not accepting this position, NATO foreign ministers reauthorized SFOR in March 1998, and tied the duration of its deployment to the achievement of specified benchmarks of success in implementing the Dayton Accords.[28]

NATO's decision to extend its presence in Bosnia without specifying a withdrawal date, and President Clinton's commitment of United States troops to this effort led to concerns over the potential length of Bosnia operations. For both IFOR and SFOR, political concern over a potentially limitless duration led to establishing so called "deadlines" for withdrawal. However, as each deadline approached, the lack of progress toward political stability in Bosnia raised fears that withdrawal would result in renewed warfare, and consequently NATO approved the continuation of operations. While establishing specific withdrawal dates may have allayed some concerns, it also permitted those opposed to the Dayton Accords to believe the NATO commitment to their enforcement to be limited, and the resumption of armed conflict need only be postponed rather than abandoned. NATO leaders hoped that tying withdrawal to demonstrable political and administrative progress would encourage more widespread cooperation in implementing the Accords. Those who endorse an extended SFOR believe that a return to ethnic warfare in Bosnia holds greater dangers for United States security interests than the prospect of continued United States deployment in the region. Bosnia is the type of mission for which NATO is supposedly shaping its forces after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the inability or unwillingness to bring a lasting peace to Bosnia would undoubtedly bring NATO's credibility into question.[29]

STATE OF BOSNIA AT THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

Although somewhat technical and detailed, it is important to examine the war torn state of disrepair that Bosnia found itself to fully understand the necessity of achieving post conflict reconstruction progress immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. Using six broad sectors for measure – the economy, transportation, water and waste systems, energy, telecommunications, and the residual mine threat – one can realize the impact that having no

viable infrastructure will have on the long-term security and stability of the region. When IFOR entered the theater, they found that the war in Bosnia had wrought extensive human and physical devastation. The direct toll of the war was enormous: 250,000 killed, more than 200,000 wounded, and 13,000 permanently disabled, with the young bearing a large share of the burden. In terms of human losses, Bosnia's pre-war total population in the 1991 census was 4.29 million people. Since then about one million left the country, while 200,000 – 300,000 immigrated into the State as refugees from other countries. This left a net population in Bosnia of about 3.4 million persons, 23 percent less than in 1991. The International Crisis Group summarized the situation of the displaced people and refugees from Bosnia: "836,500 people are still internally displaced within Bosnia-Herzegovina. . . . 223,000 Bosnian Serbs are still refugees in FRY. . . . 30,000 Croats, mainly from Bosnia, are still registered as refugees in Croatia. . . . 128,000 people from Bosnia-Herzegovina are still living as refugees in Western Europe."[30]

The war made 90 percent of the population in the federation at least partly dependent on humanitarian foreign aid, and there was extensive damage to the country's water supply, power generation, roads, and central telecommunications facilities. All parts of the transportation system were damaged, either directly, by heavy military and commercial traffic, or by a lack of adequate maintenance. Bridges throughout the sometimes Alpine-like region were damaged creating small population pockets without easy access to markets and urban centers. A government survey in July 1995 estimated that 63 percent of the country's housing units sustained at least some damage, and 18 percent of the units were destroyed (defined as more than 60 percent damaged).[31] Health hazards existed from deteriorating water and sewage systems; water supplies in many urban centers were grossly insufficient for the growing number of people requiring services, sewage collection systems and treatment plants did not operate, and solid waste collection and disposal practically collapsed. The number of hospital beds decreased by 35 percent, and infant mortality doubled in just five years. Education also suffered as a result of the war, with school enrollments falling by over 50 percent, and many schools damaged or destroyed. All sectors of the economy suffered from major losses in human resources as a result of migration, mobilization into the military, and war casualties. Population movements were considerable and unpredictable, making the size and location of populations and households very difficult to estimate, complicating the reconstruction effort. Increased population density in many urban areas placed heightened burdens on the facilities; in Tuzla, for example, the population increased by 50 percent.

The Economy

In the former Yugoslavia, the economy grew by an average of 5.5 percent a year from 1960-90. Though this rising prosperity was broadly shared in the 1980s, Bosnia, next to Macedonia, was the poorest republic in the old Yugoslav Federation. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached $8.3 billion, or around $1,900 per capita, in 1990 – considerably below the $6,500 of Slovenia but more than Macedonia's $1,400. The economy was much more open and market-oriented than other socialist economies; it had a highly educated labor force, and more than half of its export products were sold to Western markets for hard currency.[32] On the other hand, agriculture was in private hands, farms were small and inefficient, and food was traditionally a net import for the republic. The centrally planned economy created some legacies. Industry was greatly overstaffed, reflecting the rigidity of the planned economy. Under Tito, military industries were pushed in the republic; thus, Bosnia hosted a large share of Yugoslavia's defense plants.[33]

The economy was fairly well diversified, with a large industrial base and a highly capable entrepreneurial class that produced complex goods such as aircraft and machine tools. More than half of its output and employment was generated by the industrial sector, which concentrated in the energy and raw material producing sectors (especially electricity generation, wood production, coal and bauxite mining, and coke production), as well as textiles, leather, footwear, and machinery and electrical equipment. In the service sector, Bosnia developed a strong capacity in civil engineering. About 500 engineering and construction companies operated out of Bosnia before the war, generating roughly 7 percent of the GDP[34] - an important statistic defining local capacity available for post conflict reconstruction.

No macro estimates of the country's physical damages can capture the human suffering, the loss of irreplaceable works of art, and the destruction of cultural landmarks caused by the war. Nonetheless, these estimates illustrate the magnitude of the reconstruction and reconciliation task that was ahead. Simply put, Bosnia's economy must increase more than threefold just to regain the level of output that it once attained. No other country in Central and Eastern Europe experienced such a massive economic collapse since World War II. The most severely afflicted transition economies exhibited cumulative GDP declines on the order of 30 percent (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia) to 40 percent (Albania, Macedonia), and 50 percent (the USSR). Bosnia, on the other hand, experienced a 75 percent drop in GDP. Annual per capita income fell to about $500, and industrial output in 1994 was 5 percent of the 1990 output.[35]

Some progress has been made, however. Due to Bosnia's strict currency board regime, inflation has remained low in the Federation and in the Republik Srbska; however, growth has

been uneven, with the Federation outpacing Srbska. Bosnia's most immediate task remains economic revitalization. To do this fully, the environment must be conducive to a private sector, market-led economy. Additionally, Bosnia faces a dual challenge: not only must the nation recover from the war, but it also must complete the transition from socialism to capitalism. Movement has been slow in this area, but some progress has been made. A Central Bank was established in 1997, successful debt negotiations were held with the London Club in December 1997 and with the Paris Club in October 1998, and a new currency linked to the Deutschmark was introduced in mid-1998, remaining relatively stable.[36] With a strong human capital base and an appropriate set of forward-looking policies, Bosnia could reemerge from the ruins of war and become a successful economy, provided international assistance mobilizes for the initial reconstruction.

The Transportation Sector

In terms of physical losses, the government estimates the overall damages from the war at $50 - $70 billion. The economic replacement cost of the destroyed assets is huge; according to initial World Bank staff estimates it lies in the range of $15-$20 billion.[37] All parts of the transportation system were heavily damaged, by excessive military and humanitarian traffic, or by lack of maintenance for more than three years. Access to several important transportation corridors were blocked, transport organizations were divided along territorial lines limiting freedom of movement throughout the country, and companies were further weakened by the loss of personnel, funds, and equipment. In addition, the displacement of 2 million people, which is taking considerable time to resolve, greatly altered transport demand, as has the restructuring of the economy that was started before the war.

Prior to the war, Bosnia had a 123,000-kilometer road system, including 3,700 kilometers of main roads. After the war, about 2,500 kilometers of roads required urgent attention to avoid catastrophic failure, as well as an estimated 58 bridges which were damaged and considered a high priority to repair or replace.[38] It was not uncommon to spend hours on the road traversing the countryside weaving through potholes created by shelling or simple road failure and negotiating makeshift detours due to multiple bridge outages. Tunnel ceilings and walls quickly reached failure before their normal life expectancy, accelerated by the affects of freeze and thaw. During the winter, large icicles would form inside the tunnels, creating large knife-like daggers, endangering motorists when the icicles fell from the ceiling. During the summer, it was not unusual to encounter livestock in the tunnels as they provided the only source of shade from the heat. Motorists would have to enter the tunnels with care as there were no working lights to

either illuminate the animals seeking relief from the heat or illuminate horse drawn carts transporting agricultural products. Safety equipment on the roads and bridges was non-existent after the war.



Figure 2.2: Temporary Repairs to Bridges Destroyed During the Air War.

Before the war there was a 1,030 kilometer rail network, 75 percent of which was electrified, and was generally adequate in extent and condition to support Bosnia's economic and transportation needs. As no significant river system exists in Bosnia that is capable of commercial traffic, rail facilitated the country's exports and imports. However, the war caused extensive damage to the railways. When IFOR entered the theater, only about 300 kilometers were operational - the main line south of Mostar and the lines east and west of Mostar.[39] Bridges and track were systematically destroyed during the confrontation, electrical and signaling equipment was removed by opposing forces, and switching equipment was beyond repair. Additionally, the local public transport systems in Sarajevo and other urban areas ceased to function. Buses and trams were overturned and burned, track was uprooted and removed, and mines were placed in an attempt to prevent any personnel movement. These efforts greatly aided the Serbs during their siege of Sarajevo.

For air travel, Bosnia had two civil airports before the war, one in Sarajevo and one in Mostar, and three military airports in Tuzla, Bihac, and Banja Luka. Since the Sarajevo Airport was located on one of the major confrontation lines of the war, the facility was badly damaged and unusable. Large craters were found in the runway from Serb shelling, all lighting and landing assist systems were removed, and the terminal was heavily shelled.[40] A Russian IL-76 airplane remained on the western edge of the tarmac, the result of an inebriated pilot's attempted landing during the early phases of the war. This plane was recovered only after the war due to the danger of heavy shelling from Serb positions in the hills around the airport. Compounding the problem, the Bosnians built three tunnels underneath the tarmac in order to

transport emergency supplies into the city. These tunnels, two of which were concrete lined and one a simple dirt tunnel, were thought to compromise the integrity of the runway. Mostar, although not located on a confrontation line, was in similar condition and neither airport supported civilian airline traffic at the cessation of hostilities.

Finally, because Bosnia is virtually landlocked, with the exception of a small spit of land near Metkovic, the primary port in Ploce, in southern Croatia, was the only port available to the Bosnians in order to export goods by sea. However, Serb forces damaged the overhead lift capacity and sunk several ships in the port blocking the entrance to the facility. Without lift capacity the port was limited in its ability to handle container traffic. Therefore, the Bosnians were unable to transport their goods over land because of the poor roads and bridges, were unable to transport their goods by sea because the port was virtually closed to large, commercial traffic, and were unable to transport their goods by air because the civilian airports had ceased to function. The economy at the cessation of hostilities was at a standstill due to its devastated transportation sector, without a great prognosis for internal healing and improvement.

Water Supply, Sewage, and Solid Waste

In the urban areas other more basic human needs problems were exacerbated by the poor infrastructure state. The massive movements of population and the heavy concentration of people in parts of the country that were considered safe, resulted in major problems in the delivery of basic water and sanitation services to the people of Bosnia. While damage from the war was part of the reason for this state of affairs, a major contributing cause was the complete lack of maintenance over the previous few years, resulting in crumbling infrastructure. Losses from water leakage, already at 30 percent before the war, increased to 50 percent by war's end. Before the war, piped municipal water supply coverage in urban areas was 90 percent, and 24-hour service was the norm. Throughout the country, 56 percent of the population was supplied with piped water; the remainder in the agrarian areas was supplied with clean water by individually constructed wells. Bosnia's unique geological makeup of limestone provided an extremely pure source of drinking water, unequalled throughout Europe. Sewage collection systems covered 70 percent of the population in urban areas and about 35 percent of the overall population was connected to a municipal sewage system. Most municipalities had well-organized waste collection services that ensured periodic delivery to landfill sites or temporary disposal areas. Few sewage systems, however, had treatment plants; Sarajevo was the lone

exception. In 1976, the World Bank helped finance a project to rehabilitate and expand Sarajevo's water supply networks and install sewage treatment equipment.[41]

Immediately at the cessation of hostilities, massive population shifts caused water supplies in many urban centers to be grossly insufficient for the number of people requiring services. Waterborne diseases were common; people had to queue for extended periods of time in the cold of winter in order to obtain humanitarian relief, and water contamination from inadequately handled waste water was a constant hazard. Sewage collection systems clogged, while pumping stations and treatment plants failed. In addition, arrangements for the disposal of solid waste, which was highly efficient before the war, broke down, bringing new health hazards to citizens. Since many garbage trucks were destroyed or were inoperable due to lack of maintenance and spare parts, solid waste collection and disposal collapsed. As a result, riverbanks and forests became dumping sites – it was common throughout the country to see rusted cars, abandoned appliances, and garbage in the same streams used by the populace to obtain their untreated drinking water. Additionally, in divided communities such as Mostar, opposing sides compounded the problem by restricting each other's access to water sources and solid waste disposal sites.

As IFOR entered the theater, it was obvious that the long-term reconstruction program for water supply, sewage, and solid waste had to quickly restore services to pre-war levels or there would be a massive outbreak of disease. As a force protection measure, IFOR headquarters itself daily trucked in its drinking water from a local brewery that still had an operational well free from contamination. In addition to its social, environmental, and political benefits, a water system reconstruction program would enhance the operation of industries requiring an assured water supply, and allow people to turn to productive activities rather than haul water for domestic chores. Critical on-site repairs of water distribution and treatment plants, unblocking and replacement of sewer lines, and developing landfills for solid waste would be key elements of any post conflict reconstruction program.

Energy

Before the war, Bosnia operated its own electricity system and met the local demand. In 1990, generating plants located in its territory produced 13,090 Gigawatt hours (GWh) while electricity consumption was 11,181 GWh. Prior to 1992, the coalmines in Bosnia produced about 15 million tons of brown coal and lignite per year, of which 70 percent was used for electric power generation and the remaining 30 percent for industrial and household uses. Standards in most mines were high and maintenance conditions were good. Natural gas was

imported under a contract between Russia's Gazprom and Energopetrol, a state-owned oil and gas company. Consumption peaked in 1990 with 610 million cubic meters, constituting 8 percent of the total energy consumption in Bosnia. Within Bosnia, distribution and maintenance of the gas networks was the responsibility of Sarajevogas. In 1976, the World Bank made a $38 million loan to help build a 265-kilometer pipeline connecting Sarajevo to the country's natural gas network. In 1990, district heating systems served 120,000 customers, equivalent to 450,000 inhabitants or 10 percent of the total population. The Sarajevo system was the country's largest, serving 45 percent of the city's population.[42]

Upon the cessation of hostilities, about 70 percent of electrical generating capacity was found to be damaged or was out of operation due to destroyed transmission lines. About 60 percent of the transmission network was seriously damaged, including transmission facilities and interconnection lines as well as transformer stations, civil works, and maintenance equipment. The distribution network was largely destroyed. People to operate these facilities were scarce, since many of the staff were required for the war effort while others were refugees. Residential electricity, if operational, was limited to 2 hours per day in urban areas and house fires were common from overturned candles used in lieu of electric lights. Coal production dropped to 1.5 million tons in 1994, less than 10 percent of the pre-war level. The number of people employed by the mines decreased from 26,000 to about 7,000; most of the skilled personnel left the country.[43]

During the war, Sarajevo's district heating system was badly damaged by direct shelling and through the corrosion and cracking of boilers, substations, network pipes, and internal heating installations in buildings. Lack of maintenance due to war shortages compounded the problems. By early 1996, the number of flats served by district heating dropped from 45,000 to 16,000, while the number of household gas connections had increased from 15,000 to an estimated 89,000.[44] Most of the wood available in Sarajevo – trees, old furniture, and even wooden grave markers – was consumed during the war to provide heat. Many improvised and illegal gas connections were made, often leading to explosions and death. During 1996, gas consumption constituted 70 percent of all energy consumption in Sarajevo, constituting the basic heating and cooking fuel for the city's remaining 300,000 inhabitants. As a positive note, the coal-fired systems in Tuzla and Zenica were almost fully operational, as were those of smaller cities and towns in Central and Northern Bosnia. In all cities, lack of maintenance due to concentration on the war effort caused its share of damage, but generally, the damage to district heating systems in Bosnia was not overly severe.

Telecommunications

Bosnia's well-developed prewar telecommunications system suffered severe direct war damage. Before the war, Bosnia had about 696,000 lines in operation, or about 15.3 lines per 100 people, comparing favorably with other republics. The war damaged switching and transmission equipment, reducing the installed phone lines by more than 30 percent to 472,000 lines and international lines by 90 percent (down to 400 international lines).[45] Some lines that were not in service did not suffer direct physical damage, but were either disconnected or only locally connected. Destroyed facilities included transmission and switching equipment, buildings, microwave towers, and overhead cables; many underground cables were also damaged. Daytime call completion rates from abroad dropped from 35-38 percent to 1-2 percent and no commercial calls were being directly connected from Bosnia to Croatia, one of its nearest neighbors.[46] To communicate between Bosnia and Croatia, one had to use military communications or use a cumbersome process and route messages through a third country that had restored communications to Bosnia. The telecommunications company (which also handled postal service) was split into three separate and largely disconnected networks based in Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka. The telex and data networks no longer operated. Again, human resources were scarce for this, since many service sector staff left or became refugees. Furthermore, most of the equipment documentation was destroyed in the war.

This sector, in particular, required massive technical assistance. Not only did the country require a reconnection in terms of landline service, but also there was no mobile phone service available in the country. In an area where the geography prohibits most routine forms of communication, mobile service becomes vital to serve the needs of business and facilitate the reconstruction effort, including areas not previously served by the fixed network.

Mine Threat

Finally, a massive problem that continues to impact all sectors of Bosnian life is the residual mine threat. During the war, half a million mines were placed in over 17,000 minefields, largely around the lines of confrontation. Because the lines of confrontation constantly moved during the 4-year war, the exact location of all of the minefields was never known. Standardized minefield records were either improperly used, unavailable, missing or never filed at a responsible secure headquarters. Mine locations, for example, were recorded on the walls of houses, bunkers, pavements or other structures and were subsequently damaged or forgotten. According to Colonel Steve Hawkins, Engineer Brigade Commander, 1st Armored Division (US), (the first American unit to enter Bosnia):

> The Serb Army did the best job of minefield recording. The Croatians were second, the Bosnian Muslims were hit and miss on their minefields. They didn't have a lot mines. They used to go over and steal mines from the Serbs, take them out of the ground and put them over in different places for their minefields. And their reporting wasn't all that great. In addition, you could tell soldiers were rather intoxicated when they filled out some of the forms and put their minefields in, and sometimes they used dubious markers like the strawberry bush was the marker with which to find the minefields in the area.[47]

Mine pollution in Bosnia was a significant obstacle to the reestablishment of normal development activities. In addition to the direct consequences of mine accidents, mine pollution had far-reaching indirect effects, such as changes in patterns of social interaction and modes of subsistence.



Figure 2.3: Mine Marking on the Side of a Bridge (south of Sarajevo, Bosnia) and in a Railroad Yard (near Sisak, Croatia)

Moreover, landmine hazard was a factor affecting decisions on refugee return and the pace of reconciliation. Dr. Pramod K. Sethi, the inventor of the Jaipur Foot (prosthesis device), succinctly captures the true danger of the mines:

> A much more devastating cause for disabilities has now appeared on the global scene: the widespread and continuing use of landmines in countries where civil wars have become endemic. Even if a ban on the use of landmines could be imposed and implemented, we shall still be saddled for years to come by the "silent war" waged by these weapons that are meant to maim rather than kill, the victims often being the poor in the countryside where such mines are laid. Not surprisingly, they include many innocent women and children.[48]

At the point of IFOR's entry into Bosnia, minefield locations were virtually unknown. The British, who were in theater as part of UNPROFOR, only had a comprehensive mine database

for the British sector and not the entire country. Entering Bosnia in December 1995, Hawkins attempted to get any minefield data. During a historical interview, he stated:

> I said (to the British) I'm getting ready to bring about 20,000 soldiers down here. I'm the engineer; I'm supposed to know where the minefields are. I need your database. And I tell you, I was absolutely amazed. (They) did not have a (complete) database on mines. They had a database, and all it had was the British sector minefields that they knew about already, and they had big swatches that said be careful, that's the ZOS, because you might find a minefield in here. They had done nothing to obtain minefield data. Under the Dayton Peace Accord, the three formal factions were to identify and clear all minefields within the first 30 days of implementation. Having been out into the country and having talked to the UN, even though they didn't have records, they gave you a picture that was pretty scary on what the threat was. I knew that it would be impossible. Besides, it's winter. There is snow on the ground. Clearing mines is a tough business in good weather. It's not what you want to do if you don't have to in winter.[49]

MILITARY RESPONSE TO POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Minimum military requirement – that is the phrase that governed the military's commitment of resources to Bosnia's post conflict infrastructure reconstruction. If the project did not directly aid the military mission, monetary resources could not be used for the project. For small humanitarian projects funded from other sources, troop labor and military equipment could be used when not otherwise engaged in projects contributing to the military mission. Any project outside of these guidelines was considered "mission creep" and was not authorized for execution.

Additionally, the engineering structure in Bosnia was not the cleanest organization. Because there were two large military engineer staffs executing countrywide engineer operations without any engineer forces directly assigned to either of them for tasking, it was decided that the strategic level of operations would be assigned to the IFOR staff, made mostly of officers and military members from the staff of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). The operational level of the operation was assigned to the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), a multinational staff designed for quick deployment in order to conduct NATO operations. Another anomaly of the Bosnian peace operation, Operation Joint Endeavor, was that it was NATO's first "out-of-area" operation. Very little doctrine existed to govern this type of operation; therefore, most of the standard operating procedures were written as the operation progressed. The following wiring diagram depicts the command and control relationships that existed in the engineer structure in the first year of the peace operation.



Figure 2.4: IFOR Engineer Structure

There was much redundancy and overlap of missions between the IFOR engineer staff and the ARRC engineer staff. Furthermore, the Multinational Divisions (MND) received loose guidance and instruction from the ARRC, but also had to be responsive to national concerns as well. In light of most NATO decisions where the future is decided by a consensus vote, military "orders" in NATO's first deployment were usually issued only after first asking the nation if it had any objection to the *potential* draft order. Only after the MND agreed would the final "order" be published concerning a mission. This procedure greatly slowed decisions and operations. During IFOR there was constant concern over the command and control structure and the division of labor between staffs. The initial structure caused so many problems that when SFOR was created to replace IFOR, the IFOR staff and the ARRC staff were melded into one SFOR staff, thus eliminating the redundancy, creating a more streamlined staff capable of both strategic and operational levels of operations.

NATO Engineering Effort

When IFOR and the ARRC deployed into Bosnia, there was a constant tug-of-war between engineering staffs on who was to take the lead in developing the Theater Engineer Program for Operation Joint Endeavor. The French provided the IFOR engineer (IFOR-ENG) – Brigadier General Claude De Wilde - who was militarily competent, but who was not savvy as to the ways of NATO. The ARRC engineer (ARRC-ENG) was provided by the British – Brigadier General John Moore-Bick, a forward thinking individual who could easily recite engineer grand strategy and promote the theater engineer program. The difficulty was that he advocated policies that were not promulgated by IFOR. It was the responsibility of IFOR-ENG to develop an engineer vision that would provide guidance and control to the subordinate units of IFOR; however, the first IFOR engineer vision statement wasn't written until May 1996, about four months after the ARRC-ENG had published his version of the "Theater Engineer Programme".

The two visions did not mesh and it was seen as the "cart leading the horse" in theater engineer operations.

The IFOR engineer staff in Sarajevo that supported De Wilde was thinly manned. The most it could hope to accomplish with its eight officers was broken down into five broad areas: the creation of theater engineer policy for the reconstruction of roads, bridges, ports, and airfields; construction/rehabilitation management of the IFOR headquarters buildings; the procurement and subsequent management of NATO Infrastructure Committee funds; professional engineer advice to Civic Affairs personnel on humanitarian projects funded externally; and the coordination of the mine awareness training in theater. There was little hands on construction management, except for the creation of IFOR headquarters, as the staff was mostly consumed by the development of policy and NATO procedures. Outside of Sarajevo, IFOR-ENG created three Regional Engineering Offices (REOs) in each MND sector. The REOs task was to provide construction management and contract maintenance for civilian contracted road and bridge rehabilitation throughout the three MND sectors.

The ARRC staff, on the other hand, was much more robust. Moore-Bick was supported by a large staff of professional engineers whose expertise ranged from bridge and road design to airfield construction and port rehabilitation. The ARRC's capabilities included a terrain team able to make local maps when existing maps were grossly outdated; an intelligence section able to create minefield overlays to enhance force protection; and a project planning section able to make detailed project assessments that could be handed over to civilian firms for civilian infrastructure reconstruction. Moore-Bick's staff developed detailed plans on how to open up Bosnia's infrastructure to fully support the military's freedom of movement, including rapid deployment and redeployment of military forces. Additionally, his designers completed a comprehensive assessment of the Sarajevo airport, enabling an outside contractor with World Bank funding to complete enough rehabilitation to allow civilian air traffic by August 1996. This required comprehensive demining of the airport site to humanitarian standards with mechanical demining machines. But, again, all of the IFOR projects had to meet military missions. None of them were solely for civilian support and many projects that should have been completed in the first year to promote civilian freedom of movement were not accomplished because of the limitations imposed by NATO and the troop contributing nations.

A project summary produced by the ARRC in December 1996 titled "1996 – Year of the Sapper" best sums up the efforts of the IFOR engineers:

Project	Description	Cost
Roads	2,500 kilometers under stable maintenance; snow and ice removal through the winter; IFOR repaired/maintained only 3% to meet the minimum military requirement	$22 million
Bridges	62 bridges of varying types; military equipment, timber, and masonry reconstruction; 10 equipment bridges emplaced	$20 million
Bosnia – Herzegovina Access	8 routes from Croatia and Serbia into Bosnia	
Rail	480 kilometers of network rehabilitated; IFOR repaired/maintained only 5% of total to meet the minimum military requirement; none of the rehabilitation was electrified track; additional signaling and safety equipment is required for civilian use	$10 million
Gorazde Access Road	75 kilometers of single-track built in advance of the road to be completed by the Bosnians	$3 million
Headquarters Facilities	Renovations of existing buildings – heavily damaged by shelling during the war	$13 million
Airports	Opened airports at Sarajevo and Mostar to military and civilian traffic	$8 million
Other	Numerous hydrological, utilities, and construction in support of CIMIC and military operations	Unknown
Total: More than $80 million; over $22 million completed with troop labor; incalculable contribution to nationbuilding.[50]		

Table 2.2 – IFOR Engineer Project Summary

In December 1996, the IFOR engineer staff produced an update of the "CJ ENGR Strategic Vision," in an effort to determine the future direction for engineer operations during 1997. It anticipated a noticeable reduction in troop strength at the theater and divisional levels,

requiring a greater reliance upon contractor support, minimizing SFOR's ability to support civil agencies.



Figure 2.5: NATO Repairs to the Gorazde Road.

SFOR continued to maintain the existing corps and theater route networks and the corps redeployment routes; however, the total kilometers under SFOR contract were reduced, negatively expanding the number of kilometers of road not scheduled for routine maintenance, exasperating the already poor road network. SFOR bridging repairs were couched in terms to support military freedom of movement; however, the International Management Group's (IMG) Emergency Transport and Reconstruction Project (ETRP) subsequently proposed a bridge replacement program into which SFOR planned to integrate its limited efforts. The ETRP proposal was for the future - no permanent civilian bridge reconstruction had occurred in the critical first year. Rail reconstruction was projected to be even more dismal.

Figure 2.6: Repairs to a Railway Bridge Connecting Croatia and Bosnia.

"The theatre minimum military requirement (MMR) was achieved in 1996. Activities in 1997 are above and beyond MMR and will be executed based on funds and troops available."[51]

The emphasis here is on *civilian* funds available. The Italian Railway Company (military unit) had rehabilitated 480 kilometers of rail during the first year of IFOR using NATO Infrastructure Committee funds, but that constituted only 5% of the total network and was targeted at lines that would support IFOR's deployment and redeployment needs.

United States Engineering Effort

While IFOR's overall mission was constrained by minimum military requirements, the United States engineering effort in Bosnia was even more focused by President Clinton's National Strategy published in February 1996.

1. Sustaining a political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future for all its people.
2. Preventing the spread of the conflict into a broader Balkan War threatening the stability of the new democratic states in Europe.
3. Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the conflict.
4. Halting the slaughter of innocents.
5. Helping to support NATO's central role in Europe while maintaining its role in shaping Europe's security architecture.[52]

Table 2.3 – United States National Strategy for Bosnia

Nowhere in this strategy does it discuss the Bosnian aftermath of peace enforcement. Attaining these objectives was largely dependent on the effective use of the other economic, diplomatic, political, and informational instruments of power by the international community. This lack of post conflict direction to the military inferred that once the military provisions were in place, the area stabilized, and the threat reduced – IFOR would have completed the required prerequisites to allow the civil provisions to be implemented. Unfortunately, the civilian agencies that were mandated to do the remaining parts of the Dayton Agreement were not yet deployed.

United States post conflict engineering effort can be categorized into five tasks: maintain the mobility corridors for military freedom of movement; construct and maintain military base camps, observation points, and checkpoints; establish, clear, and destroy the Zone of Separation (ZOS) between the Former Warring Factions; collect and distribute minefield data and monitor demining operations; and resolve critical infrastructure shortfalls. The first four

tasks directly stem from the military mandate as outlined in Article I of the GFAP. The last sector was a point of mission creep – an effort by engineer leaders, recognizing the need to help the locals repair their infrastructure, yet having insufficient funding to make a significant long-term impact.

Freedom of Movement. The initial engineer task to facilitate military freedom of movement was to construct a float bridge over the Sava River to enable the initial peacekeepers to enter Bosnia in December 1995. This major undertaking completed in the most treacherous of weather circumstances was the signal of United States resolve to solve the Bosnian crisis. However, once the force was in Bosnia, the engineer mission to support the freedom of movement became a constantly evolving dictum. To clarify the mission somewhat, Major General William Nash, the United States commander of Task Force Eagle (MND-North), articulated his views of civilian freedom of movement in his initial commander's intent:

> Civilian freedom of movement is not within IFOR's mandate, but the responsibility of the parties. IFOR, in conjunction with the international police, will facilitate civilian freedom of movement by dismantling illegal checkpoints and assisting repatriation efforts.[53]

This guidance in a sense promoted negative construction, the dismantling of artificial barriers to movement, and did not enable the military engineer to construct positive infrastructure that would additionally facilitate civilian freedom of movement or repatriation for civilians. Consequently, the initial work pursued by IFOR rebuilt routes only to rough terrain, 4-wheel drive standards – the standards minimally required of the vehicles deployed by the military. Throughout the year, many roads were upgraded with IFOR graders and gravel to allow civilian cars, trucks and buses to easily transport both workers and economic products throughout the sector; however, this was not the justification for the upgrade, nor was it a permanent upgrade, requiring almost continual, daily maintenance. Instead, the justification for these upgrades on MND-N routes was to help stabilize the routes for military traffic and the gravel was added to save on maintenance costs to military vehicles. The benefit to civilian traffic was officially deemed to be a collateral benefit.

Likewise, military engineers applied their professional expertise to several civilian routes to assess the causes of route failure and used their methods of persuasion to link local governments, factional engineers, civilian deminers, civilian construction assets, and flood control agencies to a common goal of repairing the route. Lacking a direct funding link to resource these projects, United States soldiers were forced to solicit the aid of United States governmental relief agencies to pay for the reconstruction.

The result was that many of these road projects were completed long after the first year in theater, although the initial plans for construction, mine clearance, and execution timelines were adopted and completed within the initial critical year.[54] The ultimate endstate proved to be well worth the effort - renewed flow of refugees, economic goods, and freedom of movement between sectors of the ZOS, an event too hard for the Former Warring Factions to solve independently. But, the time lost because of skewed funding schemes caused delays in the projects' completion, delays to the great benefits the Former Warring Factions ultimately enjoyed because of these projects, and delays to the economic revitalization that these projects helped to facilitate.

Base Camps, Observation Posts, and Checkpoints. Entering Bosnia, the military engineers did not have the mission to create base camps for the deployed 20,000 United States soldiers. According to Hawkins:

> I was told 'hey, it's not going to be your mission to do base camps, Hawkins. They'll be there when you get there'. . . . (Instead) I actually started most of all this with combat engineer labor, and with Seabees and RED HORSE (Air Force engineer unit). We had to get the initial force in there and be able to provide security for Brown and Root (United States civilian contractor hired to construct base camps in Bosnia), and then Brown and Root had to have time to mobilize its operation in country.[55]

The initial base camp concept mandated three large base camps for a brigade combat team, which was the most efficient concept for an extended mission. However, applying this template to the existing ground conditions demonstrated that this was not feasible, both in terms of actual physical location and in terms to support the commander's scheme and intent for peace enforcement operations. The mostly agrarian infrastructure and poor soil conditions, combined with the existing harsh winter conditions, prevented the construction of massive base camps for 1,200 to 1,800 soldiers on Bosnian farmlands. Camp designs were created on vehicle hoods and construction was managed in portable notebooks. Engineers created common bed-down standards and construction phases were separated in three tiers of escalating force protection and comfort. The creation of efficient construction management systems, the assignment of 400 extra construction engineers, and the equitable distribution of over $10 million in initial contracts across all factions' economies allowed for the completion of the peace enforcement construction mandate. After the first 90 days, 15 major camps and six remote facilities had tier 1 (tents with wooden floors) and tier 2 (tents with wooden floors and walls) essential base camp and force protection construction completed.[56] Additionally, engineers constructed IFOR checkpoints throughout sector to randomly monitor and control the movement of the Former Warring Factions. During the initial opening of the ZOS, the

guaranteed presence of IFOR checkpoints was used as a diplomatic tool to encourage factions to remove their defensive positions. Although $10 million in local contracts helped to jumpstart the construction economy and the construction of the base camps was necessary for the force protection of the peacekeeping soldiers, the final product did not contribute to a revitalization of the local infrastructure. The checkpoints helped to enhance the security of the country, but, again, that was in direct support of Article I of the GFAP – not as part of a well conceived post conflict reconstruction plan encouraging civilian normalization.

The Zone of Separation. Since the conflict started in the spring of 1992, the confrontation lines grew into major defensive networks comprised of integrated fires, obstacles, and defensive structures. The creation of the ZOS became a permanent scar on the face of Bosnia, marking hundreds of kilometers on the now famous outline between Bosnian Serb and Federation forces. Aerial overflights clearly showed the exact position of the warring factions' front lines and the complexity and depth of the fortifications. Nothing was permitted to cross the ZOS - all communication and infrastructure was permanently cut; roads were cratered by demolitions preventing even 4-wheel drive traffic; high tension power lines, phone lines, and water systems were destroyed; rail lines were severely damaged with railroad ties uprooted and subsequently used for bunkers; and bridges ranging from 2-lane international to local farm traffic were destroyed beyond repair. Even the bobsled run that was prominently featured in the 1984 Winter Olympics was destroyed as the Serbs used the concrete track as a secondary fighting position and mined all approaches to the track. It appeared as if someone took a hammer and chisel and carefully separated the country along the Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL).

The faction defenses were built in depth with connecting trenches spaced 500 to 800 meters apart and large earthen bunkers built every 200 meters. The bunkers could house two men for a three-day rotation and included a wood stove, bed, and small kitchen. Enhancing the defense were the minefields. Nothing was emplaced to standard; there were no set doctrines, techniques, records or types of mines. Minefields were placed between the factions' front lines to prevent offensive actions, providing a force multiplier effect for the defense. Roads, trails, rail lines, and all avenues of approach were heavily mined with Anti-tank mines, supported by Anti-personnel mines to deter manual clearance by the opposing faction. Engineers placed minefields between the primary, secondary, and tertiary trenches to delay advancing forces, allowing the defensive force to reposition to a trenchline in the rear. Perpendicular access trenches were booby-trapped with trip wires curtailing the attacking forces ability to pursue the retreating force.

The mission to remove the ZOS naturally fell to the military engineer – again, a military mission to support the GFAP. In the United States sector alone, there were 69 miles of ZOS to control containing over 2,400 bunkers, 1,850 minefields, and 120 miles of trenchline.[57] At work coordination meetings, engineer company commanders met with the factional engineer to determine the weekly work schedule. To insure IFOR safety from mines and booby-traps, factional engineers would enter and proof the bunker to insure that there was no threat to IFOR soldiers, who would then rig the bunker for demolition.

Figure 2.7: ZOS Bunkers Prior to Destruction by NATO Forces.

After six months, all bunkers in the United States sector had been destroyed. A subsequent decision allowed the connecting trench lines to naturally collapse from the rains in the spring and summer. Finally, IFOR engineer vehicles brought in gravel, filled trenches, and compacted the road subgrades, restoring the traveled road surface to an acceptable 15-mph travel speed. Trees and shrubs that had grown over the road were cut back at the minefield edge and any berms, bunker debris or barriers (old buses, vehicles, and armored vehicles) were cleared to allow unimpeded movement of two-lane IFOR convoys. Again, a mission designed to promote military implementation of the GFAP, but one that also contributed greatly to the political objective to break down the barriers between factions.

Minefield Data. Upon entering Bosnia, the United States had to develop a database on mines. Under the Dayton Peace Accords, the three Former Warring Factions were to identify and clear all minefields within the first 30 days of implementation. Without the luxury of falling in on an established database or even an established system for gathering the data, Hawkins used his brigade intelligence section to collect and disseminate the minefield data. As the maneuver commanders deployed and started to implement the accords, volumes of minefield recording forms were submitted by the Former Warring Factions. Six interpreters and six soldiers worked 24-hours a day, first translating the available forms into English and then

translating the locations determined off of all the different local map systems onto the WGS-84 map system, the system used by NATO. According to Hawkins:

> They were on a different scale, and so if you look at the grid coordinates they had on their forms, it didn't quite match their overlays. We took the grid coordinates and overlays, and by terrain association off of their maps, not necessarily the records, we translated the location of the minefields one-by-one onto a WGS-84, 1:50,000 scale map. Over the course of the year, we recorded 4,439 mine belts, had about 12,000 records – minefield records that we had to deal with. We had minefields reported that didn't have records, but we knew about where they were. And we had about 5,000 minefields that we hadn't had recorded anywhere.[58]

There was unexploded ordnance (UXO) all over the sector, mostly a result of the NATO air campaign, which was just as deadly as the recorded minefields. Dual purpose improved conventional (DPIC) artillery rounds and mortars that failed to detonate littered the countryside as well. To add more confusion, the Serb army gave every soldier 20 anti-personnel mines to use. As infantry soldiers, the Serbs would use these mines as point minefields, emplacing the mines in front of the defensive position, but never properly recording the minefield as an engineer soldier was trained to do. There was an unknown quantity of these type of minefields and soldiers stumbled across these in almost every type of setting, but most especially in the confrontation lines.

The brigade attempted to centralize the minefield data reporting and recording in order to standardize the effort across all the maneuver brigades in the United States sector. They started by producing see-through minefield overlay maps that a soldier could lay on top of his map and determine where the minefields were located – but, the overlays tended to shift and move causing an inaccuracy that the soldiers could ill afford to have. In this endeavor, accuracy was paramount to protecting and saving lives from mine strikes. Therefore, the engineer brigade negotiated with a British topographic unit to produce "tacky" prints, tactical prints that depicted the geographic map along with the individual minefields by minefield number. This enabled the soldiers to look anywhere in the area, cross reference the geographic location with the minefield number on the tacky print, and further cross reference the minefield number with the paper copy of the minefield data sheet to obtain the details of the minefield. Should a soldier depart on a mission, he would determine his route by a map reconnaissance, pull the minefield data sheets out of the paper copy database for those minefields that he would possibly encounter, and have a translated copy in English of the minefield record on the ground should it be needed. Toward the end of the first year, the brigade was able to computerized the effort so that you could enter the computer database, bring up the map, bring up the data of the

minefield, and then bring up the actual mine field record right on disk. This was a timesaving and mission enhancing development. The final result was that there were 24 mine strikes in the first year in the United States sector alone – most were by multinational units from other countries crossing the sector, although the United States did suffer one death and one casualty from mines.

Resolve Critical Infrastructure Shortfalls. The most important post conflict reconstruction role that was performed by United States engineers was the identification of damaged facilities, the assessment of potential repair, funding alternatives and the interrelationship of the required project to the larger geopolitical and economic context of Bosnian peace and stability. Individual requests came from all directions - local mayors, NGO deminers, other multinational engineers, well-meaning maneuver brigade and battalion Civil Affairs officers, and tactical commanders. Requests included removing building rubble for the mayor of Brcko (a strategic center of gravity due to the town's evenly divided ethnicity), mine clearing cemeteries for cross-ZOS religious groups, and moving a Serb Catholic church bell located in Muslim controlled land. Without an engineer designed, brigade approved concept to focus engineer capabilities to achieve a regional endstate, it was apparent that the entire first year would be spent on localized, bilateral faction support. This would do little to achieve any effort toward uniting the factions into one interdependent country postured for long-term peaceful coexistence.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Todd Semonite, 23rd Engineer Battalion Commander:

> Working within the general maneuver concept for the "peacekeeping" phase, engineers concentrated on orchestrating the infrastructure repair plan. The focus was on IFOR sanctioned projects either built or funded by IFOR. NGO and IO assistance was welcome but at this time, they were not prepared to assume the lead in any functional sector. Bottom line – during "peacekeeping" operations, IFOR would take the lead on using limited IFOR engineer assets and funds to rebuild critical, politically important projects to carefully shape and set the conditions for the civil element to assume this mission when capable.[59]

The engineer staff designed an operational set of reconstruction and humanitarian assessment priorities that could create second and third order ramifications on strategic-level peace initiatives. All efforts focused on projects, programs, and initiatives that brought the factions together, creating a dialogue and interdependence between the sides. Projects that only supported one faction were avoided as these seldom created any strategic potential to substantially bring the sides closer together. However, only limited humanitarian funds were available through the Civil Affairs chain; all other funding had to be solicited from NGOs, IOs or other donors. The scope of the proposed reconstruction projects was usually the rebuilding of

an existing structure (limiting factional disagreement) to improve the quality of life for all sides. Most projects that were completed were localized and considered humanitarian rather than infrastructure reconstruction.

Priority 1: INTERNATIONAL PROJECTS – The completion of these projects support economic, resettlement, political, or diplomatic initiatives in Bosnia and adjacent countries.
Priority 2: NATIONAL PROJECTS – These projects involve at least two factions and create favorable political, economic or diplomatic ramifications outside the Posavina Corridor region.
Priority 3: REGIONAL PROJECTS (MULTIFACTIONAL) – Projects within the corridors but designed to generate relationships and agreements between factions as well as generating an economic or humanitarian improvement for both sides.
Priority 4: REGIONAL PROJECTS (ONE FACTION ONLY) – Creating economic or humanitarian improvements for only one faction. Used by IFOR to balance an unequal distribution of aid by external agencies to the opposing side. No significant multi-factional interaction, limited political potential.[60]

Table 2.4 – Operational Engineer Assessment Priorities

The few large infrastructure projects that were funded by IFOR, which also provided great physical relief to the factions, continued to meet the guidelines of "minimum military requirement." For example, the priority 1 project to conduct the Brcko Transportation Study and reconstruct the Brcko highway bridge between Bosnia and Croatia not only opened the Brcko hub to civilian transportation, but also enhanced the resupply route of United States troops in Bosnia. The priority 2 project to rebuild the Tuzla corridor rail line reestablished the rail traffic between Bosnia, Croatia, and the European central region, but also allowed IFOR to save $650,000 by bringing over 70% of the United States division's fuel by rail.[61] The priority 3 project to create the Arizona Market allowed the civilians to meet at a critical point in the IEBL in order to create an open market for trade, but also allowed IFOR to man a secure checkpoint so soldiers could inspect vehicles for illegal contraband. Finally, the priority 4 project to remove rubble from Brcko helped the locals regain access to critical sections of their town, but also allowed IFOR to better patrol the area to enhance security. None of the projects that were funded by IFOR were strictly for civilian use. All post conflict infrastructure projects that the United States engineers completed were either funded by IFOR to support the military mission, or were funded by third parties as part of their humanitarian mission.

Mine Awareness / Demining Effort

In addition to creating a minefield database, IFOR forces had to work at forming a demining program. There are two types of mine clearance processes: military and humanitarian. Military mine clearance is the process undertaken by soldiers to clear a safe path so they can advance during conflict. The military process of mine clearance specifically clears only those mines that block strategic pathways required in the advance or retreat of soldiers at war. The military term used for mine clearance is breaching, and accepts that limited casualties may occur. Humanitarian mine clearance is very different. It aims to clear land so that civilians can return to their homes and their everyday routines without the threat of landmines and UXO. This requires that all mines affecting the places where ordinary people live must be cleared, and their safety in areas that have been demined are guaranteed to be clear for humanitarian purposes. All mines are cleared and the areas are thoroughly verified by clearance teams so that they can say without a doubt that the land is now safe, and people can use it without worrying about possible injuries. The aim of humanitarian demining is to restore peace and security at the community level. In light of these definitions, the UN organizations involved in mine action do not carry out mine clearance directly. In most countries they advise and assist the national authorities, or a UN peacekeeping mission to carry out mine clearance. The UN typically establishes a Mine Action Authority or Coordination Center responsible for overseeing clearance activities. The actual clearance operations are then carried out by national civilian agencies, military units that agree to take part in humanitarian operations, national or international NGOs, or commercial contractors. Bosnia was no different, placing the military into a monitoring role and a mine awareness role.

According to the "CJ ENGR Strategic Vision":

> Demining is the responsibility of the Former Warring Factions. Our engineers are charged with monitoring the lifting and clearing of minefields by the Former Warring Factions with a priority to lifting known minefields. SFOR engineers will only lift mines in the interest of our own freedom of movement. . . . A key element of our strategy is the recognition that the UN Mine Action Centre (UN MAC) is the lead agency for the long-term demining strategy for the country. We will support the UN MAC with the transfer of information and will collocate our mine clearance center (MCC) with the UN MAC. The UN MAC will hold the definitive database for mine information.[62]

IFOR/SFOR required the Entity Armed Forces (EAF) to carry out their responsibilities for demining. Failure to carry out these demining activities required by the Dayton Agreement, resulted in unit training bans. Even with this threat, however, very little was done in the first year. Multiple training bans were imposed on the EAF for failure to cooperate and little more

was accomplished than stretching thousands of kilometers of mine tape across the country at places deemed likely to contain a minefield. The initial UN efforts to train and employ local deminers faltered in the first year as the Bosnian government imposed a 100% tax on the deminers income, thus, discouraging the UN from pursuing this approach. Only until this tax was overcome, did training commence a year later. IFOR engineers, however, scored success by developing a comprehensive mine awareness training plan. Targeting the local communities and schools, IFOR engineers produced training packets (using such training aids as "Superman" comic books specifically produced for mine awareness) that would educate the local nationals on what the mines and UXO looked like, where potential minefields would be located, and what to do should a person stumble across a mine. These efforts lead to a steady decrease in mine incidents reaching a monthly total of zero by August 1996.

With SFOR encouragement, the entities produced a detailed plan for demining operations in 1997, and more than 20,000 mines and 1,100 other unexploded objects were removed.[63] Since then Bosnian demining teams carried out demining operations as part of the National Demining Plan. The Bosnians had 43 nine-man demining teams operational in Bosnia, in accordance with SFOR's requirements. Three permanent demining schools were opened in Banja Luka, Mostar, and Travnik to enable the training of the Bosnian armed forces at different levels of demining and in the handling of UXOs. The Federation and the Republic of Srpska Mine Action Coordination Centers carried out quality assurance and general survey activity in the field. They identified outstanding mine clearance tasks and certified and registered areas as being cleared. In addition to the Bosnian forces, mine clearance is being carried out by a number of bodies including commercial demining companies contracted by the International Trust Fund for Mine Clearance and Victims Assistance, international and national NGOs, and Entity Departments for Civil Protection. The government is in its fifth year of implementing an initial five-year Mine Action Plan. This Plan aims to reduce the risk of death and injury of persons from landmine and UXO pollution. Future strategies will aim to make the country free from the impact of mines by 2010. As many as 18,000 known mined areas still infest the country and the total area requiring clearance is estimated to be in the order of 400 square kilometers. To date, only 7% of this area has been cleared and as much as 4,000 square kilometers still require further survey activity. A rapid clearance of affected areas will increase the pace at which displaced persons can return and will also provide a foundation for future growth.[64]

CJCIMIC Effort

While all provisions of the GFAP were broad in nature, the third provision – the promotion of a permanent reconciliation and the facilitation of political arrangements – presented the greatest amount of ambiguity. Given the inherently political and civil nature of the dispute, IFOR maintained a pivotal interest in the implementation of the civil and political aspects of the GFAP. Successful accomplishment of IFOR military responsibilities would constitute only one leg of a three-legged stool that included political and civil responsibilities – all of which were required to create a stable, solid structure. Recognizing this fact, the GFAP provided supporting tasks that IFOR could undertake within the limits of the identified principal tasks and available resources. These supporting tasks included:

- Create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace settlement;
- Assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions; and
- Assist the UN agencies and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions.[65]

For the most part, the responsibility for coordinating the vast array of implied supporting tasks fell to a small, often unnoticed staff section – CIMIC/Civil Affairs. CIMIC, the NATO acronym for Civil Military Cooperation, played an unprecedented role in achieving the objectives of the GFAP. The implementation of the civil aspects of the GFAP was essential to IFOR's exit strategy and the return to normalcy for the people of Bosnia, and CIMIC became the vital link between the military and the civilian organizations operating in theater. According to Admiral Leighton Smith, Commander of IFOR, "In November (1995), we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did . . . now we can't live without you."[66]

The primary and supporting military objectives outlined in the GFAP that had civil or political implications were translated into a comprehensive CIMIC Campaign Plan, which was to eventually guide civil-military activities during the IFOR deployment. This CIMIC Campaign Plan had five major portions, outlined in Table 2.5. Translated into a comprehensive set of tasks, CIMIC operations facilitated a wide variety of activities in support of the OHR and other organizations such as the OSCE, UNHCR, World Bank, European Union, Red Cross, and others who were responsible for implementing the majority of civil actions outlined in the GFAP. CIMIC personnel participated in Joint Civil Commissions (JCCs) set up by the OHR at the regional level to facilitate civil actions through Bosnia. It also set up CIMIC Centers at the

cantonal (local) level to implement civil reconstruction and improvement plans. These centers operated in each of the MNDs where there was demonstrated need and available resources.

1	Conduct civil military operations in support of the military implementation of the GFAP
2	Promote cooperation with the civilian populace, various agencies, and national governments
3	Leverage capabilities of NGOs, IOs, and national governments
4	Create a parallel, unified civilian effort in support of the GFAP implementation
5	Prepare to assist governmental, international, and non-governmental humanitarian, public safety, and health contingencies[67]

Table 2.5: CIMIC Campaign Plan

Early on in the IFOR deployment, however, it became clear that there was a major disconnect between the CJCIMIC at IFOR headquarters and the ARRC CIMIC. To highlight the point, it was observed that the CJCIMIC was heavily getting involved in infrastructure projects relating to Sarajevo, and the ARRC CIMIC assumed responsibility for political/military interface and the resolution of constitution development issues – a seeming reversal of roles. Because Sarajevo occupied a key strategic position, specifically with regard to the world media, a decision was made that a special CIMIC Center would be created just to deal with the implementation of civil projects in this city. CJCIMIC assumed this responsibility, but when it commenced operations in Sarajevo, it did so in the backyard of the ARRC CIMIC, causing jurisdictional friction. One hundred CIMIC personnel, or almost 30 percent of the total CIMIC personnel in Bosnia, ended up supporting those two headquarters alone.

The problems inherent in having two headquarters responsible for the same area of operations are obvious. Decisions were made to deviate from the Operations Plan (OPLAN) in order to adapt to unexpected situations on the ground. While addressing the needs of the immediate situation, the deviation resulted in the loss of the traditional command functions of the higher IFOR headquarters over the subordinate ARRC headquarters. To solve this situation, the Chiefs of Staff of IFOR and the ARRC published Terms of Reference for CIMIC operations and responsibilities in the IFOR Theater in order to help define and clarify the overall CIMIC command structure. Closely related to the IFOR-ARRC "turf battle," there was an overall failure to put in place a command structure capable of synchronizing the efforts of both the military and civilian components in what should be a tightly integrated operation. For example,

there were approximately 70 people at CJCIMIC; half of these were active with project management, and the other half involved in liaison. Despite this manpower, there was no active coordination or cooperation with CIMIC activities in the French-led division sector – the sector that included Sarajevo.[68] From the civil-military aspect, the CIMIC mission was to help create a parallel, unified civilian effort in support of NATO Peace Plan implementation. However, the formidable civil-military obstacles standing in the way of this objective were many and varied. In one civil-military example, an exemplary military performance in the reconstruction area prompted a strongly worded criticism from one of the UN civil agencies (which may have been embarrassed by its own conspicuous lack of success).

Shortfalls

The civil-military mission of the IFOR deployment had among its goals to promote cooperation with the civilian populace, various agencies, and national governments; leverage the capabilities of NGOs, IOs, and national governments; and create a parallel, unified civilian effort in support of the Dayton Accords. Quick implementation of the military aspects of the agreement provided the essential secure environment and freedom of movement for the commencement of the civil aspects of the agreement. What had not been fully anticipated, however, was the amount of lag time that the civil coordination structures required before they could become operational. In the absence of functioning civil implementation institutions, IFOR received intense public pressure to take a larger role in the implementation of the GFAP civilian tasks.

Overall responsibility for the implementation of the civil and military tasks agreed to at Dayton was divided between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command and the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board through the OHR. However, no formal mechanism existed to develop the unified political direction necessary to synchronize civil and military policy between these two bodies. Given the importance of an integrated civil-military effort in Bosnia, this was a significant shortfall that had long-term ramifications. Under the Dayton Accords, the OHR was to coordinate the activities of the civilian organization in Bosnia to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement, and to remain in close contact with the IFOR commander to facilitate the discharge of their respective responsibilities. But the civilian implementation institutions mandated at Dayton began the operation under considerable disadvantages. These organizations had to be created, funded, and staffed on the ground after the military deployment. This delay resulted in public pressure for IFOR to take on a larger role in

implementing civilian tasks. This public pressure resulted in a limited self-fulfilling prophecy. Once the OHR established itself in theater, the impression created was that where the OHR should have been taking the lead on projects such as providing gas, electricity, and water, it was expected that IFOR would take the lead. As a result, "mission creep" was a natural occurrence because of the competence and ability of the CIMIC organization and a lack of visible activity in these areas by civil agencies.

There were problems with this method of mission extension, however. As there was no visible OHR staff to tackle civilian infrastructure problems, and since CIMIC did not immediately assume this mission, there was considerable delay in assessing what exactly required reconstruction. It took until August 1996, a full eight months after the stand up of IFOR, that CJCIMIC completed a comprehensive assessment by obstina (county) and even longer to mobilize funding and resources to begin solving many of these problems. The locals continued to experience life without drinkable water, reliable electricity, or safe heat. Additionally, overall guidance for the reconstruction of Bosnia was not forthcoming. The High Representative was not a UN Special Representative with UN authority. His political guidance originated from the Steering Board of the PIC, which was not a standing internationally recognized political organization. As such, the absence of an organization with which the NAC (NATO's standing political body) could coordinate policy hampered synchronization of civil military implementation of the GFAP. Given the UN's reluctance to play a lead role, there was effectively no internationally recognized political organization providing overall direction. As a consequence, actors operated autonomously within a loose framework of cooperation, but without a formal structure for developing unified policy.

INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN RESPONSE

The civil cooperation situation in Bosnia was unique in that members of many NGOs and some IO humanitarian relief organizations were already actively engaged when the IFOR deployment commenced. In fact, there were an estimated 530 NGOs in theater at D+1. But this situation created its own set of problems. When IFOR entered the theater, the CIMIC deployment was modestly delayed. As UNPROFOR forces withdrew or transferred into IFOR, valuable CIMIC turnover opportunities were lost. Without advanced information, the NGOs assumed that IFOR would continue, if not increase, the same type of support that UNPROFOR had provided to them. The philosophy advanced by IFOR, however, was quite different than UNPROFOR's vision. IFOR refused to provide what it thought the NGO community could

provide for themselves because of a fear of causing a dependency on IFOR for essential aspects of support. The root of this philosophy was the promotion of self-sustaining activities in preparation for IFOR's eventual withdrawal. The ARRC sent personnel in early to educate the NGOs on what IFOR troops would be doing, but the briefing was only given in Sarajevo and not in the field where a majority of the NGOs were located. There was much confusion.

Authority to rebuild the Bosnian infrastructure and restore public services was derived from the GFAP. Specifically:

> Annex 9, Article 1: Bearing in mind that reconstruction of the infrastructure and the functioning of transportation and other facilities are important for the economic reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . . The Parties hereby establish a Commission on Public Corporations (the "Commission") to examine establishing Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations to operate joint public facilities, such as for the operation of utility, energy, postal, and communication facilities, for the benefit of both Entities. . . .[69]

> Annex 10, Article 1: The Parties agree that the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement will entail a wide range of activities including continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as necessary; reconstruction of infrastructure and economic reconstruction. . . .[70]

Restoration of public services occurred in three stages. As IFOR deployed, either military components or various NGOs and IOs provided emergency public services and humanitarian aid on an ad hoc basis as they followed the military into Bosnia. Simultaneously, the major international donors, led by the European Commission (EC), World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), met to assess the damage to the Bosnian economy and infrastructure and to develop a three-year plan to rebuild the vital elements of the Bosnian country. The second phase focused on the construction of power plants, roads, telephone lines, water services and sewage, initially near the major population centers and then spread throughout the region. Finally, the international community is in the process of transferring the operation and maintenance of public services to local officials, seeking methods to improve efficiency so that they better serve the needs of local communities and the international investors they hope to attract. The following sections examine each of these phases in better detail.

Phase One (1995 – early 1996)

The collapse of the Bosnian economy left the civilian population highly dependent on outside aid. In support of the IFOR mission, IFOR military engineers breached and cleared obstacles to enable ground troops to move into position. While the engineers' efforts were in support of the security tasks, the local civilian population took advantage of the newly

constructed roads and bridges, thereby increasing their freedom of movement. Moreover, numerous NGOs tended to closely follow the IFOR forces; after temporary bridges were established and mines cleared, the NGOs would re-enter the newly reconnected local communities and provide immediate relief (such as emergency health services and fuel). In some rare cases, the minimum military requirement governing construction equaled the civilian requirement, therefore serving as the initial reconstruction of the civilian infrastructure.

The vast share of multilateral assistance to support post conflict reconstruction and economic transition in Bosnia was organized by the World Bank through a series of periodic pledging conferences. Recognizing the need, Bank architects held their first planning meeting with Bosnian officials in Warsaw in January 1995, ten months before the Dayton negotiations. Meeting again in Warsaw in the spring of 1995 with the representatives of the government of Sarajevo, the architects of this project began to generate support and provided official recommendations for Bosnian reconstruction at an informal donor meeting in October 1995, using the opportunity of the annual World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) meeting in Washington. The pledging conferences started well, with the first two conferences exceeding pledging expectations; however, the momentum quickly slowed. The first formal pledging conference occurred in Brussels on December 21-22, 1995, when donors were asked to support a four-year, $5.1 billion Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (PRRP), prepared by the government of Bosnia with the aid of the World Bank, the EC, and the EBRD.[71] Fifty countries and twenty-seven IOs pledged $615 million, exceeding the conference's target by $97 million. Its key objectives were to initiate a broad-based rehabilitation process that would jump start economic recovery and growth, strengthen government institutions, and support the transition to a market economy. The framework divided reconstruction efforts into thirteen sectors[72] each of which was to be "chaired" (or coordinated) by one of the four major donors. The International Management Group (IMG), an IO falling under the umbrella of the UNHCR, provided technological advice and information on high priority needs, and was to loosely coordinate activities among the sectors. But little actual long-term reconstruction occurred. Basic needs in the form of humanitarian relief were being met; however, major reconstruction was conspicuously absent during this phase.

The Brussels meeting was succeeded by a Sectoral Technical meeting in Paris in January 1996 and a donor information conference in Sarajevo in March 1996. A second pledging conference took place in Brussels on April 12-13, 1996. Fifty-two countries and twenty IOs pledged another $1.23 billion, exceeding the conference's target by $30 million.[73] Of the approximately $5 billion pledged in humanitarian, peace implementation, and post conflict

reconstruction assistance to Bosnia, the overwhelming preponderance, an estimated $4.2 billion, was pledged at the four Brussels pledging conferences to support the PRRP. The United States alone had pledged some $30 million, but $15 million of this was blocked by the Lautenberg legislation, which prohibited aid to Republika Srpska.[74] Additionally, neither the $10 million pledged by the EU nor the $17 million for the UN Trust Fund were delivered. These shortfalls in aid significantly delayed reconstruction. According to Hertic, Sapcanin, and Woodward:

> Much of the pledge gap in Bosnia reflected delays in delivery and implementation, not nonfeasance or default. Causes of these delays could be found on both the donor side, where inexperience created heavy start-up costs, and the recipient side, where host-government procedures were woefully underdeveloped. Delay was exacerbated by the decision making procedures of the peace agreement itself, by the dominant role of political conditionality in the use of aid, and by the complex coordination problems of so large an operation as the "Dayton" mission.[75]

Given the size and complexity of the PRRP and the large number of donors helping to implement it, success required close aid coordination among the donors and with the government. Deliberations among the World Bank, the EC, the G-7 countries, and the Netherlands produced an elaborate and evolving structure to coordinate assistance to Bosnia, but little actual construction to improve the physical infrastructure was completed on the ground.

Phase Two (1996-1999)

By mid-1996 a combination of NGOs and IFOR forces provided most emergency public services (although at different levels of efficiency) and major international donors mobilized plans to begin reconstructing the critical infrastructure. While each of the major donors adopted different strategies to coordinate efforts in their assigned sectors, all of the donors attempted to coordinate the particular needs of each locality with the overall development plans,[76] contracted work to private corporations (either local or international corporations),[77] and coordinated their efforts with the local IFOR/SFOR commanders.[78] According to Carl Bildt, the High Representative:

> It was certainly important that so much money was pledged, but it is even more important that it should be spent wisely, in fairness both to the people of Bosnia and to the taxpayers in the donor countries. To that end, my office holds meetings at the strategic level both in Brussels and in Sarajevo, where we aim to prevent the agencies stepping on each other's toes and running complete programs. We also express our concerns where funding is inadequate in the key infrastructural areas like power, water supply, transport and communications. But it is important to understand that we are not an executive agency with

> programs and budget of our own. My job is to coordinate and advise, to monitor and persuade – often to cajole and to be the catalyst.[79]

A sample of various infrastructure challenges in coal production, the natural gas sector, and the rehabilitation of district heating illustrates the immediate problems that Bosnian post conflict reconstruction faced. The coal sector reconstruction efforts identified the lowest cost and most competitive mines in order to restore output to minimum acceptable levels to provide sufficient fuel for coal-dependent combined heat and power plants. A thorough review of the sector's future viability and its prospects was necessary for the government to determine which mines to close. Extensive war damage made rehabilitation of some mines prohibitively expensive; others were clearly not economical; and long-term demand was likely to decline as the country modernized from its socialistic norms to more efficient methods in the country's heat and power plants. Additionally, efforts were made to transfer low cost mines to private sector ownership. The immediate priority in the natural gas sector was to restore safe service to acceptable levels, to help fund consumption, and to manage excess demand by introducing tariffs that cover basic costs. Reconstruction programs helped to reconfigure the gas network and helped to train staff in modern gas utility management. Outside assistance helped the Bosnian government reach a settlement with Gazexport on debts for past consumption, an issue that was complicated by three consuming parties, including the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs.[80] To rehabilitate district heating throughout Bosnia, the highest priority was given to restore urban heating services to adequate levels as soon as possible. Repair made sense because there was no readily available and efficient alternative supply of heat and these services were essential to the health of the population. Destroyed, cracked and rusted heat exchangers, pipes, radiators and valves within buildings had to be reconditioned or replaced. A major network planning effort was launched to determine the optimal configuration of each city's future heating system. Sector institutions were strengthened through staff training in modern district heating management and operating techniques.

Initially, NGOs delivered supplies and constructed new components of the infrastructure under a high degree of threat from either mines or from locals. Further, political instability between the two Entities of the Bosnian State (Federation and Republika Srpska) and inside the Federation (between Croat and Muslim governments) persisted throughout much of the second phase. Conflicts among various Ministries over development priorities were symptomatic of the political instability. The military role in the reconstruction process tended to evolve with security conditions. Early in the phase, IFOR focused on providing protection (including demining and providing escorts) for the delivery of supplies, providing security at construction sites,

transporting construction crews through dangerous points in the region, and providing assets to deliver supplies. However, as security concerns eased, various IFOR and SFOR components devoted more manpower and equipment resources to the actual construction of infrastructure. For instance, in 1998 SFOR helped repair a waste management plant near Sarajevo, and the SFOR Engineering Branch assisted with snow removal in primarily civilian areas during the February 2000 blizzard. But, again, these military efforts were either equipment or manpower related – no funds were expended to promote civilian only endeavors.

Phase Three (1999 – present)

By 1999, the major international donors shifted their efforts from construction to the transfer of ownership and maintenance of the various public services to the Bosnian government and private companies. The remaining challenge was to train locals to properly run and maintain the facilities and transfer the management in such a manner to move Bosnia towards a successful private sector market-led economy. For example, in November 1999 USAID contracted Dresser and McKee, a Washington, D.C.-based wastewater engineering consulting firm, to conduct training sessions designed to make Bosnia's water utility companies self-sufficient.

Since the end of hostilities, the condition of the transport infrastructure has significantly improved, mainly through the implementation of the World Bank's Emergency Transport Reconstruction Project (ETRP) and SFOR activities to restore strategic infrastructure. Major transportation bottlenecks remain, however. More than half of the main network still needs to be rehabilitated in the road sector. Road maintenance needs to be urgently undertaken to avoid further deterioration of infrastructure and maintenance organizations need to be organized and equipped. In the railway sector, the economically important part of the network was restored to minimum military standards, but implementation of the operating agreements and further rehabilitation are needed before commercial trains can run regularly. Extensive work is still required on the Sarajevo Airport to accommodate regular civilian traffic. The bottom line is that the public transport systems will continue to require a considerable level of assistance in the years to come.

ASSESSMENT

The twentieth century began in Sarajevo, with war. At the end of the century, Sarajevo enjoyed peace, at least a short-term peace. The guns have remained silent in Bosnia for more than seven years, but the precarious truce concluded at Dayton has not yet made the transition

into a permanent state of stability. Large parts of the area were destroyed and depopulated and the task of post conflict reconstruction was compounded by the fact that the transition from communism to democracy and to free market economies has not been completed. But the way to long-term peace lies through reconstruction. Breaking the cycle of destitution and hopelessness is the only way to break the continuing cycle of violence.

In their final chapter, the authors of the first Carnegie Report on the Balkans, writing in 1913-14, observed that the future seemed "well nigh hopeless." Such pessimism was well warranted. Shortly after the publication of the Report, Europe was engulfed by World War I. In 2003, no comparable catastrophe looms on the European horizon, although Bosnia is now at a crossroads. IFOR was able to stabilize the security situation in Bosnia with impressive efficiency. IFOR deployed rapidly along the ceasefire lines, separated the three armies, and created a weapons exclusion zone at the IEBL. In accordance with precise requirements and timetables set out in the Dayton Agreement, heavy weapons were destroyed or moved into cantonment sites, and were subjected to regular inspection by international forces. The three armies were demobilized to peacetime levels, and their deployment and movement in the field was controlled by IFOR to reduce tensions.

Through these measures, the military mission successfully contained the risk of renewed armed conflict. It did little, however, to promote the creation of an effective state. In the Dayton Agreement, IFOR was given the authority, but not the obligation or the funding, to assist with the broader civilian goals of the peace process. In the first year of the peace process, it was resistant to deploy its forces to prevent inter-ethnic violence, apprehend indicted war criminals, or support the return of refugees and displaced persons through a comprehensive infrastructure reconstruction program. Additionally, the military objective to physically separate the armies tended to undermine the long-term prospects of unifying the territory. With no progress to date in merging the three armies, the division of territory into separate military zones continues to support illegal parallel structures.

On the civilian side of the mission, the greater part of available resources were directed into physical reconstruction, driven by urgent humanitarian considerations and the need to kick start the economy. Jointly coordinated by the World Bank and the EC, the priority reconstruction program attracted over $5 billion in international aid; however, much of it was delayed in its arrival or was tied strictly to humanitarian uses. At the time of the Dayton Agreement, more than 2,000 kilometers of roads, 70 bridges, half of the electricity network, and more than a third of the housing was destroyed. Despite the logistical difficulties, by 1999 the reconstruction program had repaired a third of the housing, and most urban infrastructure had

been restored to prewar levels, from telephone lines to electric power generation, from water services to the number of primary schools.[81]

Disbursing this volume of international aid in such a short period of time was an enormous operational challenge for the international agencies involved – a challenge that was not met with success in the critical first year. It required that the responsible organizations make the rapid disbursement of funds their principal objective; however, much of the funds were not available, nor the organization established to accomplish disbursement. In the first two years, aid was withheld from the Republika Srbska because of the influence of indicted war criminals on the government, and was only made available in large quantities in 1998 following the election of a new government. In the Federation, however, political and institutional considerations played little part in the reconstruction program. The World Bank entered Bosnia on the basis of a post-natural-disaster operational policy, which explicitly excludes institution building objectives – this policy would serve to have long-term negative effects.

In order to carry out urgent reconstruction in the post conflict environment, the international agencies tended to bypass the new constitutional structures and deal directly with the local authorities that had direct control over the physical infrastructure. Many times this meant dealing with those individuals who had the best command of the English language. Aid was disbursed at local levels by implementing agencies, or via municipal, cantonal or entity authorities. This enabled local warlords and separate ethnic power structures to greatly benefit from the reconstruction program – both materially, through the control of construction companies and the provision of goods and services to international reconstruction agencies, and politically, by being able to nominate the beneficiaries of international aid.

As long as the distribution of financial or material assistance was involved, the ethnic power structures were willing to cooperate with the international community. However, to reach certain political objectives such as minority return or implementing the new constitutional structures, international efforts met with strong resistance. As a result, international agencies focused on physical reconstruction, where results were achievable, at the expense of institution building or other political objectives. The lack of attention to long-term civilian institutions ultimately became an important limiting factor on the reconstruction program. For example, the failure to establish local authorities responsible for ongoing maintenance means that roads repaired with international funds now require a second round of repairs, but nobody in the local government is capable of managing the required on-going maintenance program. Although most of the rail track was repaired by 1999, the lack of central authorities to operate inter-entity transport means that the volume of rail traffic remains low.

Over the next two to three years Bosnia must begin to generate a sustainable growth momentum in order to survive. Postwar growth of the last four years has been strong – brought about by a slow, but successful reconstruction effort and sound macro performance – but it is not yet sustainable. While recovery has brought a generalized increase in incomes, many Bosnians remain worse off than before the war and unemployment is painfully high. Consensus is difficult due to a fragmented postwar governance and has been at the root of a slower than hoped for reform effort. Two external factors will also affect the development outlook in the next two to three years: with completion of the postwar PRRP (1996-1999), donors will now begin to phase down their programs of support. Therefore, fiscal and external adjustment as well as other less tangible adjustments will be required over this critical two to three year period. Finally, the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe presents an opportunity for closer integration with European institutions; however, accelerated structural and institutional reforms to bring the country closer to European standards will be required to take the most advantage of this opportunity.

Bosnia must begin to take ownership of its economic future by assuming increased responsibility for economic policies and outcomes. This will require strengthening governance at all levels and reducing dependence on the international community. It must also promote sustainable growth and employment in an inclusive way that provides increasing incomes and opportunities for all Bosnians. Reforms aimed at increasing private sector activity, and, in parallel, measures to ensure that growth is inclusive and safety nets are in place for those who cannot feel its full benefits are needed. Needs remain in housing, community services such as water and solid waste services, and demining. While the reconstruction effort produced remarkable achievements – returning most services to their prewar levels in four years – addressing the remaining physical impacts of war in selected sectors is likely to take many more years. There will be other conflicts in other parts of the world and the international community – both military and civilian – must learn from its mistakes made in Bosnia so as to be more responsive in the future. Bosnia was NATO's first deployment and served as a test bed for policies grounded in theory but little practice. There are better ways to conduct post conflict reconstruction – methods that can eradicate the delays in funding that can jumpstart the economy, and kickoff its formation of the required institutions to promote long-term peace. The international community must perfect these methods for peacekeeping and peacebuilding or the cost, not only in money but also in human lives, will continue to escalate.

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

[1] Carole Rogel, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1998), 17.

[2] Misha Glenny, "Yugoslavia: The Great Fall," New York Review of Books, 23 March 1995, 58. The Titoist vision continued to command strong support as late as May-June 1990, when a survey of more than 4,000 respondents asked whether their personal attachment was strongest to their immediate region, to the republic in which they lived, or to Yugoslavia. Large majorities of Muslims (84 percent), Montenegrins (80 percent), Serbs (71 percent), and Macedonians (68 percent) all said Yugoslavia; the proportion was lower for Croats (48 percent) and Albanians (49 percent). Only Slovenes strongly rejected the Yugoslav label (26 percent). These results were not surprising: those who voted in greater numbers for Yugoslavia were those who materially gained the most from the federation.

[3] All photographs included in this chapter were taken by the author from May to November 1996.

[4] Wayne Bert, The Reluctant Superpower: United States Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95 (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 50.

[5] Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1995), 32.

[6] Rogel, 30-31.

[7] Ibid., 33-34.

[8] Srebrenica fell on 12 July, six days after the Serb assault began. Zepa fell on 25 July. The assault on Srebrenica stands as one of the most atrocious events of the war. Beyond the obvious responsibility borne by Serb authorities for this bloodletting, many others have been accused of contributory culpability: the commander of local Bosnian forces who never arrived to help defend the town, the UN authorities who never managed to order close air support when it was desperately needed, and the United States authorities who are alleged to have known in advance but did nothing to prevent the assault on the town. On the UN role, see David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre Since World War II, (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997); and United Nations, Report on the Fall of Srebrenica, UN document A54/549, 15 November 1999). On what United States authorities may have known, see Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, "Bosnia: What the CIA Didn't Tell Us," New York Review of Books, 9 May 1996, 14.

[9] Richard Holbrooke, To End War (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1998), 72.

[10] Helsinki Human Rights Watch reported mass burials in shaft graves designed to conceal multiple burials and accounts of bodies found with single gunshot wounds to the back of the head; Croatian Committee for Human Rights, "Statement No. 29," Zagreb, Croatia, 2 November 1995.

[11] Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia, Death of a Nation (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1996), 361.

[12] Pearson Centre Archive, "Situation Report, Sarajevo Shelling," (Sarajevo, Bosnia, n.d.).

[13] Holbrooke, 93.

[14] David C. Gompert, "The United States and Yugoslavia's Wars," in The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, ed. Richard H. Ullman (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 139.

[15] For an excellent account of Operation Deliberate Force, see Rick Atkinson's two lengthy articles, "Air Assault Sets Stage for Broader Role" and "In Almost Losing Its Resolve, NATO Alliance Found Itself," in the Washington Post, November 15 and 16, 1995; both begin on p. A1. An official account, "Operation Sharp Guard," is available from NATO's Public Affairs Office and on-line from the NATO gopher.

[16] Leo Tindemans, et al., Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), 53-54.

[17] This program was called "train and equip" and has been run from its inception by the same private company, Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), that gave technical assistance to the Croatian Army during the war.

[18] For the full text of the accord, see General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Paris, France, 14 December 1995), (hereafter, GFAP); also available from <http://www.ohr.int/gfa/ga-home.htm>; Internet.

[19] Ibid., Annex 1-B and Annex 1-A, Article II, 1-4. Arms control measures set a ratio of forces among the parties and their regional guarantors based on their respective populations and ostensible defense needs. From a baseline determined by the military capacity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), armaments were to be reduced as follows: to 75 percent of the baseline for FRY, 30 percent for Croatia, and 30 percent for Bosnia. Bosnia's 30 percent would, in turn, be allocated between the entities in a ratio of 2:1 (Federation to Republik Srbska); Annex 1-b, Article IV.

[20] When IFOR's mandate was first renewed beyond December 1996, its name was changed to the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

[21] GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article VI, para 3(c-d).

[22] Ibid., Annex 2, Article V.

[23] An EU Administrator was established in 1994 for the city of Mostar, which was heavily damaged by Croat-Bosniac fighting in 1993 and is only marginally less divided today between its Croatian western section and Bosniac eastern section than it was during the war.

[24] From January 1996 to April 1997, the High Representative was former Swedish prime minister and EU mediator in Bosnia Carl Bildt; from April 1997 through August 1999, the office was held by Spanish diplomat Carlos Westendorf; assumed in August 1999, by Austrian diplomat Wolfgang Petritsch; and taken over by Paddy Ashdown in May 2002 until the present.

[25] The High Representative's authority even over his or her own office has been questionable. Most posts within OHR are seconded by member governments; particularly at high levels, these are allocated as much on the basis of political horse trading as of anything else.

[26] N. D. White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, second edition (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1997), 127.

[27] GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article I, para 1(b).

[28] Steven R. Bowman, Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 13 November 2001), 4.

[29] Ibid.

[30] International Crisis Group, The Balkan Refugee Crisis: Regional and Long-Term Perspectives (Brussels, Belgium: 1 June 1999), 4.

[31] The World Bank Group, Reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Priorities for Recovery and Growth (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1995), 1.

[32] The World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Toward Economic Recovery (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996), 3.

[33] Background Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, September 2001), 2.

[34] The World Bank Group, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Toward Economic Recovery, 3.

[35] Ibid., 10.

[36] Background Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2.

[37] The World Bank Group, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Toward Economic Recovery, 10. Bosnia had a GDP of about $8-9 billion before the war. Assuming a capital output ratio of four to five, total prewar capital stock was $30-40 billion. Since nearly half of the capital stock is estimated to have been destroyed, the damage is presumed in the range of $15-20 billion. The government's estimates of war damages include not only physical destruction, but also the capitalized value of (i) unpaid wage and pension arrears since the war began; and (ii) the capitalized value of claims on the State such as frozen foreign exchange deposits lost to citizens and enterprises during the war.

[38] Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, "ARRC Bridge Replacement Plan: Phases 1-3," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Sarajevo, Bosnia, ARRC Engineer Branch Brief, 30 December 1996, 3.

[39] Tindemans, 96.

[40] 62d Construction Royal Engineers, Sarajevo Airport Assessment (Sarajevo, Bosnia: 62d CRE, May 1996), 20-29. The 62d CRE, an English military unit that is similar in capability to a civilian engineering design firm, conducted a detailed assessment of the Sarajevo Airport soon after the shelling ceased. Their report outlines in minute detail the equipment that would be required to restore the Sarajevo Airport back to acceptable international guidelines for civilian air traffic safety. Landing lights, runway strength, and equipment to minimally facilitate visual flight rules (VFR) landings and takeoffs were highlighted. The French contingent operated the Sarajevo Airport for military purposes only and provided portable equipment to ensure safety to NATO aircraft. Civilian traffic did not operate out of Sarajevo until late summer 1996, and then only under VFR conditions.

[41] The World Bank Group, Reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina: World Bank Press Release (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group, 1995), 1.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] The European Commission and The World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996-1998 Lessons and Accomplishments: Review of the Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program and Looking Ahead Towards Sustainable Economic Development, Report prepared for the May 1999 Donors Conference, n.d., Annex 6-1.

[45] Ibid., Annex 4-1.

[46] David Woodward, The IMF, the World Bank, and Economic Policy in Bosnia (Oxford, England: Oxfam, 1998), 11.

[47] Colonel Steve Hawkins, Engineer Brigade Commander, 1st Armored Division (US), Oral History Interview Transcript, Bad Kreuznach, Germany, 6 March 1997, 51-52.

[48] Dr. Pramod K. Sethi, speaking at the Rotary International Conference in San Antonio, Texas, June 2001; available from <http://landmineconf.rotary5030.org/>; Internet; accessed 4 October 2002.

[49] Hawkins, 48-49.

[50] Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, 3.

[51] IFOR/SFOR Engineer Staff, "CJ ENGR Strategic Vision", internal vision statement (Sarajevo, Bosnia: IFOR/SFOR, December 1996), 4.

[52] William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996), 35.

[53] United States Army Task Force Eagle Headquarters, TFE Joint Military Commission Policies, Procedures, and Command Guidance Handbook (Rodelheim, Germany: United States Army Printing and Publications Center, 12 May 1996), 1.

[54] Lieutenant Colonel Todd T. Semonite, The Military Engineer as a Critical Peace Operations Multiplier, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 7 April 1999), 108.

[55] Hawkins, 26-27.

[56] Semonite, 68.

[57] Ibid., 37.

[58] Hawkins, 50-51.

[59] Semonite, 87.

[60] Ibid., 88.

[61] Ibid., 99.

[62] IFOR/SFOR Engineer Staff, 5.

[63] General Wesley K. Clark, "Building a Lasting Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," NATO Review, 46 – No. 1 (Spring 1998): 20.

[64] United Nations, "Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 2 May 2002; available from <http://www.mineaction.org/countries/countries_overview.cfm?country_id=252>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2002.

[65] GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article I, para 1(b).

[66] Colonel William R. Phillips, "Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in Bosnia," NATO Review, 46 – No. 1 (Spring 1998): 25.

[67] James J. Landon, "CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation," in Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1998), 121.

[68] Ibid., 131.

[69] GFAP, Annex 9, Article I.

[70] Ibid., Annex 10, Article I.

[71] Zlatko Hertic, Amela Sapcanin, and Susan L. Woodward, "Bosnia and Herzegovina" in Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery, eds. Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 319.

[72] Transport, Electric Power and Coal, Telecommunications, Housing, District Heating and Natural Gas, Water and Waste Management, Landmine Hazard Management, Education, Health, Industry and Finance, Employment and Labor, Agriculture, and Social Protection.

[73] The objectives of the PRRP included rehabilitation of key infrastructure and social sectors to jump-start production and ensure improved access to basic services and housing to facilitate the return of displaced persons and refugees; implementation of projects in support of employment generation and demobilization of soldiers; strengthening of key government institutions and establishment of basic economic institutions of the two entities and the state, including a new central bank, as called for under the Dayton-Paris peace agreement; continuation of efforts toward macroeconomic stabilization; and implementation of the demining project as an important prerequisite for physical implementation of other projects. "Chairman's Conclusions," Second Donor Conference on the Reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.

[74] Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) sponsored the War Crimes Prosecution Facilitation Act of 1997 (S804, May 23, 1997), which restricts United States bilateral assistance and instructs the United States executive director to the international financial institutions (specified as the IMF, IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA, and EBRD) to oppose and vote against any aid or grants to countries, entities, or cantons providing sanctuary to indicted war criminals who are sought for prosecution before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (available from <http://Thomas.LOC.gov>); it was incorporated into the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for 1998, Section 573 of HR 2159, and became law on 12 November 1997.

[75]Hertic, 359.

[76] For example, in January and February 1996 the EC identified "official counterparts" in the Bosnian local governments that assisted in the identification of sector priorities and assisted in the coordination between EC and local activities. However, the initial identification of sector priorities was wrapped up in the long-term struggle between entities and was not completed until late summer 1996.

[77] For example, USAID contracted Ralph M. Parsons Company to provide overall program management of the Municipal Infrastructure and Services Program (a $265 million initiative to rehabilitate basic infrastructure in facilitating the return of refugees).

[78] The degree to which donors coordinated with IFOR/SFOR varied significantly. For instance, USAID followed Congressional guidance that called for the "bulk" of reconstruction resources to be confined to the United States SFOR sector and Sarajevo, and therefore USAID linked their mission closely with NATO.

[79] Carl Bildt, "Implementing the Civilian Tasks of the Bosnian Peace Agreement," NATO Review 44 – No. 5 (Spring 1996): 5.

[80]The World Bank Group, Reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina: World Bank Press Release, 2.

[81] European Commission and World Bank, May 1999.

CHAPTER THREE: KOSOVO

The military intervention into Kosovo proved to be unlike any other experience. Unlike Bosnia where NATO entered the country supported by a UN mandate and on the heals of a UN protection force, the Kosovo intervention was conducted through the instrument of an international security organization without the benefit of an initial legitimizing UN mandate. Where Bosnia was a separate, autonomous republic of Yugoslavia and later a state in its own right, Kosovo was a province of a larger state – a state that did not want NATO intervention into its borders, but who was coerced by aerial bombing to accept NATO forces. While Bosnia was heavily industrialized with a fairly developed baseline infrastructure throughout the country with peaks of modernity in Sarajevo, Kosovo was agrarian, with few widespread infrastructure amenities. Even the largest town, Pristina, was somewhat backward in its infrastructure development.

The difference in governmental structures also plays a role to determine the infrastructure starting point for each mission. Although the Dayton Agreement established a Bosnian government consisting of three ethnicities, the sub-government, primarily the ministries that ran many of the day-to-day activities, existed in force before the war, and could be rebuilt after the war. There was a lack of infrastructure maintenance through four years of war and many skilled workers and managers fled the country; however, the entire ministerial structure did not have to be reinvented and could be revitalized with external help. Kosovo, in contrast, did not have that advantage. Extensive Serbian oppression caused the Albanian majority to establish a parallel government, concentrating on things like basic and higher education. The infrastructure, however, was untouched, either by the higher Serbian government or the Albanian parallel structure, for more than a decade. No money, the absence of a viable governmental structure, and little interest by the Serbian government in building Kosovo resulted in a province lacking many of the most basic infrastructure needs required for self-sustainment.

The Serbs consider Kosovo their historic heartland – the "cradle" of their nation. It was the historic place of origin for the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Serbian Patriarchate was at Pec until it was abolished in 1766, and several famous Orthodox monasteries still survive. Kosovo Polje, just outside Pristina, the Kosovo capital, was the site of the famous Battle of Kosovo in 1389, a defeat which caused the downfall of the Serbian medieval kingdom and helped consolidate Ottoman power in the western Balkans. The battle, celebrated and commemorated in folklore, remained a major trauma in national memory and defined their nationhood, Christianity against the infidel. Serbs assert that the Serbian stand at Kosovo

saved Europe from Turkish barbarism, a position somewhat difficult to reconcile since the Turks won the battle and ultimately reached the gates of Vienna. June 28 is a national holiday for Serbs, unique in that they celebrate what is considered a resounding defeat.[1]

Kosovo has for many years represented a dual minority problem. Albanians – who make up the majority in Kosovo – are a minority in Serbia, while Serbs are a minority in Kosovo. The Serb minority in Kosovo has dwindled over the years, due to increasing out-migration and a much higher Albanian birth rate. In 1961, the Serb minority was 27 percent of the population; now it is less than 10 percent.[2] Attempts to "re-colonize" the province, including the effort to resettle Krajina refugees from the Bosnian war, failed to change the demographic reality.

The Albanian conviction that time was on their side led most in Kosovo to support a policy of "time and patience" regarding the future independence of the province. Ibrahim Rugova, a writer turned politician, adopted this approach and as president of the Albanian 'parallel state' in Kosovo, formed governing institutions separate from the Serb established bodies. The parallel state, reflecting self-confidence among the Albanian population, was based on a cadre of officials, experts, and entrepreneurs who benefited from the province's early autonomy and were educated at the University of Pristina, the intellectual center of Albanian nationalism. In 1989 the situation drastically changed. The Belgrade government abrogated Tito's constitution of 1974, which had given the province a very large degree of autonomy. The government suppressed all provincial government bodies; dismissed thousands of Albanian officials, professional people, and workers; and declared martial law. Rugova's response was to continue his policy of non-violent waiting while trying to win support abroad for Kosovo's independence and perfecting the parallel state at home.

By 1993, 400,000 Albanians had left Kosovo in response to deteriorating socio-economic conditions. In 1995, Albanian Kosovars were bitterly disappointed in the Dayton Agreement, which, in their view, failed to recognize their long-standing and justified demand for independence. The Dayton Accords not only recognized Republika Srbska in Bosnia, but also shut the door to the Albanian Kosovar case by decreeing that no additional changes in borders within Yugoslavia would be sanctioned. The Serbs in Kosovo, meanwhile, were increasingly worried as they saw how the refugees from Krajina were poorly received and treated in Serbia. They felt isolated, abandoned by Belgrade, and increasingly felt they were being sold out to the Albanians. In March 1997, the civil government in Albania collapsed resulting in anarchy, replacing the passive Albanian resistance with violence, first by the underground "National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo" and then by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). As conditions worsened, Albania became a wide open market of military assets for the KLA. Using

external finances, some of which was alleged drug money, and Albanian arms from external sources, the KLA engaged the Serbian authorities in a full-fledged civil war for independence. Public opinion among Albanian Kosovars swung strongly against Rugova's non-violent approach and took sides with the radical KLA. The KLA started a campaign of terrorism by killing Serbs in the refugee camps, Serbian policemen, and border guards in order to radicalize the situation. In response, the Milosevic regime countered with increasingly violent and indiscriminate repression.[3]

EVENTS LEADING UP TO NATO INTERVENTION

In 1998, NATO's attention turned to the Kosovo region because of the increasing flow of refugees into Western Europe and Albania, and concerns about the conflict spilling over into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes. Of large concern was Milosevic's disregard for diplomatic efforts aimed at peacefully resolving the crisis and the destabilizing role of militant Kosovar Albanian forces. In March, United States Secretary of State Madeline Albright placed the blame for the violence in Kosovo squarely on Milosevic. She outlined terms for the end of the conflict which included the presence of international observers in Kosovo, "enhanced" status for Kosovo within Serbia, and no more violence. These terms were ignored and the war intensified. On May 28, 1998, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), meeting at the Foreign Minister level, established NATO's two major objectives in Kosovo:

- To help achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the response of the international community;
- To promote stability and security in neighboring countries with particular emphasis on Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.[4]

On October 12, following further deterioration of the situation, the NATO Council authorized air strikes, placing the necessary forces under NATO command. This overt move was designed to support ongoing diplomatic efforts to force the Milosevic regime to withdraw forces from Kosovo, end the violence, and facilitate the return of refugees. The next day, following diplomatic visits to Belgrade by NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana, United States Envoy Richard Holbrooke, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee General Klaus Naumann, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Wesley Clark, an agreement was negotiated that postponed the air strikes if the Serbian government 1) would

reduce its troops and security forces in Kosovo to pre-crisis levels; 2) permit unarmed NATO reconnaissance flights over Kosovo; 3) accede to an international force of 2,000 unarmed civilian monitors to oversee the ceasefire; and 4) begin meaningful negotiations towards Kosovar autonomy. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to observe compliance on the ground and NATO quickly established the aerial surveillance mission. The establishment of the two missions was further endorsed by UNSCR 1203.

To support the OSCE, NATO established a military task force to assist with the emergency evacuation of members of the KVM if renewed conflict should put them at risk. The task force was deployed to Kumanovo, FYROM, five kilometers from the Serbian border, under the overall direction of NATO's SACEUR. Given the recalcitrance on both sides, meaningful negotiations never took place and sporadic violence continued, with increasing reports of Serbian executions of Albanian citizens. The situation in Kosovo again flared at the beginning of 1999, following acts of provocation on both sides and the use of excessive and disproportionate force by the Serbian Army and Special Police. Without success, the United States and other Western countries used sanctions to try to persuade Milosevic to cease repression and restore autonomy to Kosovo. To renew international efforts, the six-nation Contact Group (United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) met on January 29, 1999, and agreed to convene urgent negotiations between the parties to the conflict, under international mediation. They invited the two sides to Rambouillet, near Paris, to start peace talks on February 6.[5]

To induce the parties to comply, the NAC authorized Secretary General Solana to launch NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia if the warring Serb and Albanian factions failed to reach a peace agreement by February 20. The draft peace plan taken to Rambouillet called for a 3-year interim settlement that would provide greater autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia, and the deployment of a NATO-led international military force to help implement the agreement.[6] The Contact Group did not wish to encourage continued fighting for Kosovar independence, but sought a settlement that would restore Kosovo's previous level of autonomy. These concerted initiatives culminated in initial negotiations in Rambouillet near Paris, from 6 to 23 February, co-chaired by representatives of France and the United Kingdom. The parties' goal was an Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Governance in Kosovo, known as the Rambouillet Accords. These accords would affirm the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but provide that an international meeting would be convened in three years to determine a mechanism for final settlement of the Kosovo problem. Yugoslavia would withdraw

its army forces from Kosovo, withdraw Ministry of Interior units from Kosovo not assigned there prior to February 1, 1998, and withdraw air defense forces beyond a 25-kilometer Mutual Safety Zone. NATO would lead a military force to ensure compliance.[7] Secretary General Solana reiterated NATO's willingness to use whatever means necessary to bring about a peaceful solution and avert a humanitarian crisis. The first round of talks, however, closed with no agreement.

A second round of talks was held in Paris, from 15 to 18 March. At the end of this round, the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace agreement, but the Serbian delegation refused to sign. In a news conference on March 19, President Clinton said, "If we do not act, the war will spread."[8] Immediately afterwards, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary troops deployed from their garrisons in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and with 20,000 additional Serb troops massed at the northern Kosovo border,[9] forcing tens of thousands of people to flee their homes in the face of a systematic offensive. On March 20, the OSCE verification mission was withdrawn from the region, having faced obstruction from Serbian forces to such extent that they could no longer continue to fulfill their task. In a final attempt to persuade Milosevic to stop attacks on the Kosovar Albanians or face imminent NATO air strikes, Holbrooke flew to Belgrade. Milosevic refused to comply, and on March 23 the execution order was given to commence air strikes. On March 24, NATO's Operation Allied Force began air strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo signaling the first military offensive action undertaken by NATO without specific UN endorsement. Russia and China, each with veto power on the UN Security Council, continued to oppose the use of force to resolve the Kosovo crisis; therefore, UN Security Council approval was not pursued. However, the September 23, 1998, UN Security Council resolution, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, did reference the UN Charter's Article VII and permitted military force to maintain international security.

NATO Air War – Operation Allied Force

Western expectations for a brief bombing effort and rapid capitulation were met instead with Belgrade's defiance. The regime severed diplomatic relations with Western powers and accelerated its "ethnic cleansing" of Kosovar Albanians; the test of political and military wills began. General Clark told Secretary Albright, "Despite our best efforts the civilians are going to be targeted by the Serbs. It will just be a race, our air strikes and the damage we cause them against what they can do on the ground. But in the short term, they can win the race."[10] Official NATO and United States statements announced the same goal in undertaking the air operation

against Yugoslavia: to stop the violence against Kosovar Albanians. NATO announced that its military action was "directed towards disrupting the violent attacks being committed by the Yugoslav army and Special Police Forces and weakening their ability to cause further humanitarian catastrophe."[11] The Secretary General added: "We must stop the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now taking place in Kosovo."[12] The United States Department of Defense announced: "The primary goal of air strikes, should Secretary General Solana make that decision, would be to arrest the ability of the Serbs to brutally attack the Kosovar Albanians."[13] In an initial public statement, President Clinton outlined similar objectives:

> Our strikes have three objectives: First to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression and its support for peace. Second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks. And third, if necessary, to damage Yugoslavia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military capabilities.[14]

At the start of the operation, only a small number of targets had been approved for strike. A myriad of authorities, including the highest national political levels, permanent representatives on the NAC, SACEUR, air planners in Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), and authorities in countries hosting NATO aircraft were involved in the target-approval process. Collateral damage was always an important consideration in deliberations over targets, and since the alliance's primary goal was to compel Yugoslav forces to end violence against the Kosovar Albanians, it could not afford to be seen as acting inhumanely, to either Kosovar Albanians or Serb civilians. The rules of engagement were therefore highly restrictive, reflecting NATO's goals and values. They required positive identification of targets before pilots were cleared to release ordnance. Moreover, forces were not allowed to attack military vehicles if they were intermingled with civilian vehicles. As one participant noted:

> At the Combined Air Operations Center during the conflict, because we were so concerned with collateral damage, General Short put out the guidance that if military vehicles were intermingled with civilian vehicles, they were not to be attacked due to collateral damage. At the same time, the Serbs had cover of weather. . . . Therefore, another ROE (rules of engagement) position would happen that unless you could clearly identify the target, you were not to drop.[15]

On March 28, after protracted discussions about the Serb acceleration of cleansing ethnic Albanians, the NAC authorized attacks against a broader range of fixed targets throughout Serbia proper and to escalate attacks on Yugoslav forces in Kosovo.[16] During this discussion, General Naumann argued that NATO should start "attacking both ends of the snake by hitting

the head and cutting off the tail."[17] Attacking the head of the snake implied hitting targets most closely associated with the regime's sources of authority throughout Serbia. On April 1, NATO began to strike infrastructure in Serbia, including a major bridge over the Danube River at Novi Sad, but restricted targets in the immediate Belgrade area. On April 12, NATO struck the oil refinery and oil storage facilities at Pancevo. As Belgrade continued its killing of Kosovars, NATO faced mounting pressure to halt the ethnic violence and to end the conflict on terms acceptable to NATO. In the face of continued defiance from Belgrade, the alliance had to put greater pressure on the Yugoslav leadership while preserving NATO's unity.

On April 23-24, NATO held a summit meeting in Washington, D.C., to commemorate the 50th anniversary of its founding. The NATO leaders devoted much attention to Kosovo – NATO's first and to-date only offensive combat operation - as Operation Allied Force appeared far from a success. At the close of the summit, NATO leaders unanimously agreed: "We will not lose. Whatever it takes, we will not lose."[18] According to the statement issued by the heads of state and government:

> The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence pursued by the Belgrade regime under the direction of President Milosevic. We will not allow this campaign of terror to succeed. NATO is determined to prevail.[19]

In the same statement, the NATO leaders made five demands on Milosevic: "Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo"; withdraw military, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; allow the stationing in Kosovo of "an international military presence," understood to imply NATO forces; allow the safe return of refugees; and work toward an agreement "based on the Rambouillet accords."[20]

At the time of the Washington summit, NATO started to attack electric power transformers and official radio and television stations. The United States advocated more extensive attacks on electrical power generation, but other NATO members, especially France, counseled restraint. To address the French concerns, the United States offered to use CBU-94, a then-secret cluster bomb that ejects large numbers of fine carbon-graphite threads. These threads short-circuit electrical lines, causing outage until they can be removed. Although these attacks were ostensibly aimed against the military use of electrical power, they actually had greater effect on the civilian economy. Military users had backup generators, especially to support the vital communication function.

When it became apparent that the Yugoslavs were not going to bow quickly to NATO's demands, NATO reconsidered the prospect of a forced-entry ground operation, a course of action that remained highly undesirable and politically charged. This was reflected in the approach taken toward military planning for a land invasion. The NAC did not authorize planning for such a possibility, and the United States continued to reject the notion of ground operations. Under these restrictive political conditions, United States and NATO military planners were not authorized to conduct traditional campaign planning. The documents emerged in its place were known as military "assessments." By this device, military planners could consider various ground options in the absence of a specified authority to do so. Although United States and British headquarters were conducting independent efforts to develop ground courses of action, "planning" was not complete at the time Operation Allied Force ended. By late May, media reports about the increased likelihood of a ground attack were becoming more frequent.[21]

Military-Technical Agreement

Beginning in late May 1999, United States Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (representing NATO), former Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin, and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari (representing the European Union) met several times to discuss conditions for ending the conflict. On May 27, while these negotiations were continuing, Chernomyrdin met with Milosevic. The Yugoslav leader insisted that countries that had participated in the air campaign should not deploy peacekeeping forces to Kosovo, thus excluding all of NATO's prominent members, and wanted Russia to occupy a northern sector where the Serb population was concentrated. The United States rejected this idea because it could lead to partition. During a dramatic final negotiating session in Bonn on June 1, the United States and Russia finally reached agreement on terms for ending the air operation. Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin delivered these terms, coinciding with those announced at the NATO summit conference, to Milosevic in Belgrade on June 2. They told Milosevic that they had not come to negotiate, only to present terms. Confronted with a solid front, which included the only major power that might have sided with Yugoslavia, Milosevic capitulated.[22] After 78 days of increasingly intense air strikes that inflicted damage on Yugoslavia's infrastructure and its armed forces, Milosevic agreed on June 3 to a peace plan based on NATO's demands and a proposal from the Group of Eight (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Russia, and Japan). On June 9, military officials signed the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) affirming the terms of the peace plan, providing specific details on its implementation. The agreement was signed by

Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, on behalf of NATO, and by Colonel General Svetozar Marjanovic of the Yugoslav Army and Lieutenant General Obrad Stevanovic of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[23]

On June 10, Secretary General Solana announced a temporary suspension of NATO's air operations against Yugoslavia stating that NATO was ready to undertake its new mission to bring the people back to their homes and to build a lasting and just peace in Kosovo.[24] Later that same day, the UN Security Council approved UN Security Council Resolution 1244 welcoming the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces. The resolution, adopted by a vote of 14 in favor and none against, with one abstention (China), announced the Security Council's decision to deploy an international civil and security presence in Kosovo, under UN auspices.[25] In part, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 demanded a political solution based on the general principles set forth by the G-8 Foreign Ministers on May 6, 1999, and further contained in the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin Agreement of June 2, 1999: the full cooperation of Yugoslavia in the rapid implementation of the principals of the MTA; an immediate end to violence and repression in Kosovo; and a complete phased withdrawal of all military, police, and paramilitary forces in Kosovo. The UN was designated to lead the interim civil authority, later termed the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK).[26]

KFOR – Operation Joint Guardian

Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Lieutenant General Jackson, serving as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) Commander and acting on the instructions of the NAC, prepared for the rapid deployment of the security force (Operation Joint Guardian) mandated by the UN Security Council. The resolution set forth very specific guidelines for KFOR, and Lieutenant General Jackson tailored his forces to reflect that guidance (outlined in Table 3.1). KFOR did not immediately deploy into Kosovo, instead waiting to synchronize its deployment with the withdrawal of Serb forces in order to avoid a co-mingling of forces. This delay, however, allowed time for a 200-man contingent of Russian troops to leave their SFOR station in Bosnia and occupy the airport in Pristina on June 10. Reportedly planned by the Russian General Staff and endorsed by President Boris Yeltsin to ensure a high profile role for Russia in KFOR, this action caught NATO by surprise and prompted high-level United States-Russian negotiations.

- Deter renewed hostilities, enforce the cease-fire, and both ensure the withdrawal and prevent the return of Yugoslav military, police, and paramilitary forces;
- Demilitarize the KLA and other armed Kosovar Albanian groups;
- Establish a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons could return home in safety, the international civil presence could operate, a transitional administration could be established, and humanitarian aid could be delivered;
- Ensure public safety and order and supervise the removal of mines until the international civil presence could take over;
- Support the work of the international civil presence and coordinate closely with it;
- Conduct border monitoring duties; and
- Ensure the protection of movement itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations.[27]

Table 3.1 – Responsibilities of KFOR

General Clark requested that Lieutenant General Jackson order the Russians to withdraw from the airport, but Jackson refused to act. He informed his home government, which agreed that KFOR should not confront the Russians. A subsequent agreement reached on June 18, 1999, provided for a shared control of Pristina airport operations, with Russian participation in airport ground operations and air operations under KFOR control.[28] However, the dramatic Russian gambit caused NATO to accelerate its deployment into Kosovo, entering the province on June 12, 1999 (D-Day), with a force of 20,000 troops divided into six brigades (France, Germany, Italy, the United States and two from the United Kingdom). Within six days, all lead elements had entered Kosovo in an operation that demanded considerable skill and professionalism from the staffs and soldiers of Headquarters KFOR and the multinational brigades. Serious challenges, however, faced KFOR upon arrival. Yugoslav military forces were still present in large numbers and the KLA was armed and highly visible. Fighting was still going on and nearly a million people were refugees outside of Kosovo. Those who remained lived in daily fear for their lives. There was little electricity or water, homes were destroyed, roads were mined, bridges were down, and schools and hospitals were out of action. Radio and television were off the air – ordinary life in Kosovo was suspended.

The immediate priority was to ensure that no security vacuum developed between the outgoing and incoming forces, one that could have been filled by the KLA or any other armed group. In 11 days, the operation achieved the stated aim: the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and their replacement by KFOR as the only legitimate military force under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. All this took place in a volatile and fast-moving environment where the eyes of the world's media were watching and recording every move.[29] On June 20 at 5:25 p.m., the full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was confirmed, over six hours ahead of schedule.[30] At confirmation, Secretary General Solana announced that, in accordance with the MTA, he had formally terminated the air campaign. Up to this point, NATO forces were at the forefront of the humanitarian efforts to relieve the suffering of many thousands of refugees forced to flee Kosovo by the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign. In FYROM, NATO troops built refugee camps, refugee reception centers, and emergency feeding stations, as well as moved many hundreds of tons of humanitarian aid to those in need. In Albania, NATO deployed substantial forces to provide similar forms of assistance. NATO assisted the UNHCR with coordination of humanitarian aid flights as well as supplementing these flights by using aircraft from member countries. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) established at NATO in May 1998 also played an important role in the coordination of support to UNHCR relief operations.[31]

Under the mandate to establish a safe and secure environment, KFOR efforts focused on monitoring and verifying the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and later the demilitarization and transformation of the KLA. The multinational brigades sought to establish order, provide humanitarian assistance, and support UNMIK and the other agencies. Each brigade adopted schools and facilitated spring planting through the delivery of seed, fertilizer, and fuel. The MNBs ran countless patrols to increase freedom of movement, enabling the citizens of Kosovo to return to their farms and businesses, further moving towards normalcy. The brigades and the UNMIK Police jointly investigated numerous reports of criminal activity and suspicious activities.

KFOR was actively involved in the demilitarization of Kosovo. With the arrival of KFOR, military and police forces from Yugoslavia completed their withdrawal and met the final timelines of the MTA. Also KLA forces were compliant with the terms of the "Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the KLA". This agreement, signed on June 20, provided for a "cease-fire by the KLA, their disengagement from the zones of conflict, subsequent demilitarization and reintegration into civil society."[32] This was scheduled to occur within 90 days. KFOR units immediately established weapons storage sites throughout the province to provide a collection and safeguard point for the storage of all weapons requiring turn-in in

accordance with the June 20 agreement. KFOR also monitored the wearing of KLA uniforms and insignia. Although the KLA was initially slow in turning in its weapons, the numbers increased significantly as the deadline approached. By September 20, Lieutenant General Jackson certified that the force had completed its process of demilitarization and had ceased to display the KLA insignia.[33]

Tons of weapons and ammunition were seized or handed to KFOR, including thousands of pistols and rifles, hand grenades, anti-personnel mines, rocket launchers, artillery pieces, mortar bombs, rifle bombs, anti-tank mines, fuses, explosives, and even anti-tank rockets and missiles. The transformation of the KLA occurred through resettlement programs, the creation of the Kosovo Police Service and the stand-up of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which was an unarmed civil relief organization dedicated to the rebuilding of Kosovo's infrastructure. The KPC was established on September 21, 1999. Under the direction of KFOR and UNMIK, the KPC was authorized to provide disaster response, conduct search and rescue, provide humanitarian assistance, assist in demining, and contribute to rebuilding the infrastructure and communities. It had no role, however, in defense, law enforcement, riot control, internal security, or any other task involved in the maintenance of law and order. The maximum strength of the KPC was established at 5,000 (3,000 active and 2,000 reserve).[34] The result is a country safer now than before, with less illegal activity, and a decrease in violent inter-ethnic crimes, allowing the opportunity to rebuild the infrastructure enhancing the economy's chances to improve. KFOR and UNMIK are partners in an international effort to restore Kosovo and help the local population transform the province into a free and democratic society open to all. Although KFOR's main responsibility is to create a secure environment, the multinational force provides resources, skills, and manpower to various organizations and agencies working under the UNMIK umbrella.

STATE OF KOSOVO AT THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

The war in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 and the NATO air campaign in 1999 caused immense physical destruction – of housing and electricity, water, sewage, transport and other infrastructure – and eliminated social, public safety, and other government services. In mid-1999 UNMIK assumed the administration of the province and found a daunting challenge. In the first six months following the war, emergency humanitarian assistance facilitated the return of refugees, and provided food and other immediate assistance to help people survive the

winter. Reconstruction and development efforts, however, may take many years, cost billions of dollars, and require support from multiple donors.

Although a number of estimates of post conflict reconstruction needs were developed while the war was still raging, all were conjecture; none were based on a comprehensive on-the-ground survey. NATO forces attempted to gain insight into the extent of damage using satellite imagery and refugee accounts; however, neither provided much credible information. Infrastructure conditions up to Kosovo's borders was well documented in the AFSOUTH Contingency Engineer section archives, but there was a significant void as to the post conflict condition of Kosovo itself. Therefore, there was little quality intelligence upon which to base a reconstruction plan. The first major assessment conducted by a European Commission Task Force in July 1999, focused on housing and local village infrastructure. It estimated that 58 percent of the houses in 1,300 villages had been damaged, most of them severely. The estimated cost to repair this housing was $1.2 billion, and for other village facilities – schools, clinics, local electricity, clean water, etc. - $43.9 million.

A second, more far-reaching round of assessments, covering energy, telecommunications, transport, commercial, and social infrastructure, was conducted prior to the second donor conference held in mid-November 1999. The European Commission (EC) and the World Bank, with the support and assistance of numerous donor organizations, prepared the final report. Laying out reconstruction and development objectives in Kosovo over the next four to five years, the EC-World Bank report estimated the cost of reaching those objectives at $2.3 billion in external financing, on highly concessional terms. According to the European Task Force, nearly half the funds were needed before early 2001. In addition, government operations during this period, taking into account local revenues, were expected to suffer a deficit that would have to be made up by external financing – estimated at $107 million in 2000. At the November 1999 donor conference, donors were asked to contribute to the operational budget as well as to undertake programs outlined in the reconstruction strategy. A brief look at the starting point for reconstruction will help to understand the huge reconstruction challenge that faced KFOR and the international community.

The Economy

Kosovo was traditionally the poorest and least developed part of Yugoslavia. Throughout the 1990s, the region suffered a severe economic crisis, with GDP contracting by 50 percent between 1990 and 1995, falling to less than $400 per capita by 1995, and unemployment rising as high as 70 percent. According to the International Monetary Fund, the underlying causes of

crisis (lack of competitiveness in a changing international environment and economic sanctions on Yugoslavia) were further compounded by the so-called "enforced measures". Facing hardship, Kosovars adjusted to the situation in three main ways: (1) emigration, mainly to Western Europe, building up a diaspora which may play an important role in the region's economic recovery; (2) return to rural areas, which resulted in more than a doubling of the active population in the agriculture sector between 1990 and 1997; and (3) development of a large "gray" economy (informal activities of a legal nature), and of some "black" activities (of an illegal nature).[35]

Before 1989, Kosovo was transforming from a predominately rural society to a more urban one – and the portion of active population engaged in agriculture had fallen to about 26 percent. But, throughout the 1990s, after a number of industrial workers and employees lost their jobs, the rural population increased substantially. In 1998, agricultural activities, together with forestry and agrobusiness, accounted for about 60 percent of employment, and played a key role in food security at household level. Agriculture was largely based on small family farms and productivity was low. Typically, farming provided about half of the family income, the other half coming from both remittances and off-farm incomes.

At the cessation of hostilities, agricultural production and related processing industries came to a standstill. In the view of the World Bank, the 1999 spring cropping season was largely forgone, 50 percent of the cattle and 85 percent of the poultry was lost or killed, 55 percent of the farm mechanization was damaged, many farm buildings were destroyed, agro-processing equipment was looted or made unusable (particularly privately-owned small and medium enterprises) and housing and rural infrastructure suffered severe damage.[36] Kosovo relied heavily on commercial imports and large-scale donor assistance to meet its immediate food demand. Additionally, the impact of the conflict was compounded by the legacy of the 1990s. Throughout the decade, formal services (veterinary or advisory services) were not available for the privately owned farms, access to farm fertilizers was severely limited, investments were curtailed, and major irrigation schemes that were developed in the 1970s collapsed. On the other hand, Kosovars developed informal parallel structures covering a wide range of agriculture services – fertilizer and mechanization supply, and processing facilities. These structures, which were marked by an impressive capacity for private initiatives, may be able to be replicated and could be key factors in driving rural recovery.

Rapidly restarting the rural economy is essential to provide employment, income, and food security to rural households. In the long run, growth and employment will be driven both by the development of non-agricultural activities, and by the reorientation of agriculture towards

activities in which Kosovo farmers may have an expressed comparative advantage, possibly competing internationally (i.e., labor-intensive cultivation of fruits and vegetables, and some livestock production, rather than grain and industrial crops). But such developments will require a considerable amount of time. In the meantime, and in the absence of any real alternative, agriculture will remain key to providing income and food security for the majority of the rural population, as well as raw materials to the agroprocessing industries. In this initial phase, growth in the sector will mainly come from widespread increases in farming production.

The Transportation Sector

The transport sector in 1999 was in poor condition, and substantial donor assistance, estimated to be $165 million by the European Commission, was needed for its rehabilitation. The 3,800-kilometer road network, including 623 kilometers of main roads, and 1,300 kilometers of regional roads, was generally poor, with a fairly low network density at 0.35 kilometers per square kilometer.[37] Conflict related damage was relatively limited (only about a dozen bridges were destroyed on the main highways), but the lack of maintenance throughout the 1990s produced deplorable effects. Damage was most severe on roads that were under the responsibility of municipalities, including parts of the main and regional roads going through the municipality. In a number of cities, some sections of the main network deteriorated to the point that vehicles actually drove on the sub-base. Much urgent work was done by KFOR, putting temporary bridges or bypasses into place wherever needed for military purposes. But large parts of the road network were unstable with a long backlog of maintenance. Services to clear roads during the winter were suspended causing stoppage along many of Kosovo's secondary roads. KFOR contracted with local companies for snow and ice clearance for its military designated routes; however, most roads throughout the region were not included as part of this network. Reconstruction priority for the road network include:

- Permanent reconstruction of all damaged bridges.
- Patching, overlays, reconstruction, and drainage works on about 450 kilometers of main and regional roads.
- Rehabilitation of 450 kilometers of gravel and dirt roads, using labor-intensive methods, to help rural employment.
- Constructing bypasses in key locations (border crossing points with FYROM).
- Provision of essential equipment to local companies (trucks, earth and overlay works equipment, spare parts for asphalt plants and crushing units) as payment for their work.

The pre-war railway network in Kosovo consisted of 330 kilometers of single track, non-electrified standard gauge route length. Much of this was in relatively mountainous terrain with steep slopes and sharp curves. The network consisted essentially of two lines, one north-south and one east-west which cross at Kosovo-Polje, and one branch line between Klina and Prizren. In the 1980s, the rail traffic was about 3 million tons of freight.[38] Most of this consisted of bulk commodities needed for or produced by the mining, metallurgical and chemical industry. As Kosovo was an agrarian economy, passenger traffic was limited to about 4 million passengers per year, mainly over short distances. Financial problems and the need for hefty subsidies were a permanent characteristic of the antiquated system.

Traffic on the lines to Peja and Prizren ceased in early 1998 because of security concerns, and the line to Podujeva was discontinued several years ago. Additionally, the section between Kosovo-Polje and the airport suffered heavy damage during the conflict. In June 1999, KFOR reestablished traffic between Pristina and Volkovo (at the border with FYROM) where it runs on the average of four trains daily for KFOR and humanitarian supply needs. The future of the railway network, however, is closely tied to the political situation in Kosovo. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development recommended that no long-term railway investment take place until the situation in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia is clarified – especially the opening of the line to Belgrade – and until the future of the mining, metallurgical, and heavy chemical industries in Kosovo is determined. Otherwise, money spent on an underused railway network could be spent in other more deserving sectors.

There is one airport in Kosovo, about 15 kilometers south of Pristina, and four landing strips (about 500 meters long). The Pristina airport was built in the mid-1960s as a regional airport able to handle mid-sized commercial aircraft, such as the B737. It was not designed to handle the heavier wide-body aircraft, which were using the Belgrade airport. The runway has a length of 2,500 meters, and the apron and terminal are small.[39] Despite its limited importance, there were serious damages to the airport during the conflict. The control tower and technical block were damaged beyond use, the luggage reclaim area in the passenger terminal building was destroyed, and the pavements of the runways and taxiways received some relatively minor damage. For military purposes, the British military reestablished daylight operations by repairing the runways and taxiways, and establishing temporary control tower radio communications and radar coverage; installing military navigational aids and emergency approach lighting; reconditioning the instrument landing system; and establishing rescue and fire fighting services, emergency power, refueling facilities, and ground handling operations. Civilian flight operations ceased during the conflict; however, civilian flights have recently

resumed with the present military control. The operations are under some restriction, mainly due to weather conditions, but otherwise do not represent any particular peculiarities. According to the European Commission, the financial benefits are considerable, with estimates ranging at over $100,000/month.

Water Supply, Sewage, and Solid Waste

Most of Kosovo's water supply systems were relatively small and covered the urban areas only. The six larger regional schemes supplied water to one or more cities and nearby villages, and served about 900,000 people. A dozen small systems served an additional 150,000 people. Rural water supply systems, however, were non-existent. Most rural dwellings operated private wells or drew water from artesian springs. Rural wells were generally in bad condition and water quality was poor - not always due to pollution of groundwater, but also to negligence of the users. Most urban areas had combined wastewater and storm water collection systems, but the systems were old and badly maintained. Drainage channels were filled with soil and debris and caused serious flooding during heavy rains. Sewer systems were of poor quality and frequently had broken pipes, allowing wastewater to infiltrate into the underground. Additionally, wastewater treatment plants did not exist throughout the country. Apart from some very simple and hardly maintained industrial wastewater pre-treatment facilities, there was no other wastewater treatment. In order to avoid immediate danger to health, wastewater outlets were often located a few kilometers downstream of the city limits. Many riverbeds did not, however, carry water during the summer, and hygienic conditions in rivers downstream of urban areas were subsequently very poor. During the 1980s, wastewater treatment plants for the few bigger urban areas like Pristina were designed, but construction was never started.

Physical damage to the water collection and treatment facilities as a direct result of shelling was limited to the urban supply systems. Only two pumping stations, a water treatment plant, and some civil structures at the water intake of a storage lake received direct hits. Damage to the plumbing in burnt houses, however, caused serious problems. Since water companies were short of tools and parts to repair the leaks, water continued to run unabated at many damaged locations. The situation in rural water supply was even worse. During the conflict, about half of the rural boreholes and wells were deliberately polluted, and returning refugees not only found their homes destroyed but also their access to clean water denied. Moreover, other wells, which were not polluted during the conflict, but which had not been used for some time, were subject to pollution from dust and dirt. The European Commission

estimated that 15,000 to 20,000 wells were subject to cleaning and/or rehabilitation.[40] Overall, adequate institutional frameworks for efficient operation and maintenance of the schemes were virtually nonexistent. There was hardly any company structure and no proficiency to collect revenue. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, a number of key staff left Kosovo. Among other things, service vehicles, tools, protective clothing, and remaining spare parts were lost. Vehicles and tools left behind were often out of order and certainly beyond cost-effective repair.

Finally, the solid waste situation was critical. The first impression upon entering Kosovo was one of piles of trash along the roadways. Refuse continued to pile up without any system for removal. Most of the trucks, which handled the trash containers, were lost or damaged allowing the trash to accumulate, particularly behind apartment buildings in the urban areas. As alternatives, people threw their solid waste into natural watercourses or drains. Many drains were full of refuse along with debris, raising the potential for major flooding. A serious consequence was that medical waste was commingled with municipal waste. Hospitals were disposing waste on-site, throwing it in with other waste or attempting to burn it in pits. This waste contained sharps, syringes, bandages, blood-saturated wastes and body parts. All posed grave threats in exposing the public to blood-borne pathogens.

Energy

Electricity, primarily from lignite-powered thermal power plants, was Kosovo's main source of energy. Additional sources of energy were four district heating systems and coal production for use by the province's industries and households. Electricity was widely used for all household purposes, including space heating where district heating was not available. In the pre-conflict period, industrial consumers, mainly Feroniki and Trepca, the two large metal-mining entities, used about 30 percent of the electricity. Kosovo used to be an important net energy exporter, feeding into the high voltage transmission ring of Yugoslavia. Reliable data on electricity generated, generation costs and consumption patterns is not available; however, the European Commission study revealed that Kosovo was to have produced 4,912 GWh of electricity, of which 2,907 GWh was for domestic consumption and the remainder for export outside the province.[41] As there was no direct conflict-related damage, the power plants suffered mainly from lack of maintenance and mismanagement. The plants were nearing the end of their lives and were subjected to prolonged negligent operational practices and lack of maintenance. Conflict related damage to the secondary distribution network, however, was extensive, estimated to affect 30 percent of the network. Damage was particularly extensive in the Gjakove, Gjilane, Mitrovica, Peja and Prizren areas. During recovery, demining operations

will have to be carried out in certain areas before reconstruction can begin. As in the water sector, the distribution companies also suffered from lack of tools, vehicles and equipment, all of which were essential for maintenance purposes.

Coal was extracted from two large mines, Mirage and Bardh. They were large surface mines, extracting low-grade lignite under favorable overburden/coal ratios. The mines were at an advanced state of development and all overburden was dumped into the pits. From 1989 onward, the production of the Kosovo mines dropped gradually to about 8 million tons per year – about 50 percent of its design capacity. A further drop, to about 6 million tons per year occurred in 1993 and 1994, during the Bosnian conflict.[42] There was no conflict-related physical damage to the mines; however, all mobile equipment was removed from the sites. The main mining equipment remained in operable condition, confirmed by testing of the equipment and on-site inspections, but the mines themselves were in very poor condition due to continued neglect. The amount of coal uncovered and readily available for extraction is limited to 1-2 months with a high buildup of overburden material. As a result mine operations are hampered by steep fronts ripe for dangerous landslides. Immediately at the cessation of hostilities (July 1999), the mines restarted production at a rate of about 200,000 tons per months. Despite the low level of production, there was a stock of 550,000 tons of coal available at the power plants. The high level of stocks enabled the mines to meet the reduced power plant demand, despite the lack of auxiliary and mobile equipment, despite the frequent power outages, and despite the inability to restart the mining equipment due to the low voltage supplied by the power plants.[43]

Pre-conflict Kosovo had district heating systems in only four cities. All systems were run by municipal-owned district heating enterprises, which ensured the supply and distribution of heat. Additionally, district heating prices were well below production costs. While consumption by public facilities such as hospitals, hotels, and administrative buildings were metered, households were invoiced based on an average charge per square meter of living space. In general, the district heating systems appear to have suffered only minor conflict damage. However, in all cities, damage due to lack of maintenance was significant. The district heating system in Pristina, for example, was over 25 years old and was recognized to be relatively inefficient.

Pollution resulting from power generation, district heating, and associated coal mining was prevalent in the area around Pristina. Estimates from the late 1980s for particulate emissions exceeded World Health Organization guidelines. For the district heating plant, pollution mainly resulted from the poor quality of heavy fuel oil – and it is likely that the only solution is to replace the plant in its entirety as well as major sections of the distribution systems. There is no

adequate institutional framework for the efficient operation of Kosovo's energy system. There is no company structure, no business culture, and no functioning billing service and collection service. Proper records and planning tools are missing and the previous higher-level managers have left leaving a vacuum at the top. Kosovar Albanians filled most of these positions, but many have insufficient experience.

Telecommunications

With only about 130,000 phone lines in service, Kosovo's telecommunications network had the second lowest telephone penetration rate in Europe, amounting to about 6 lines per 100 people (about a quarter of the Yugoslavia average of 22 per hundred people).[44] Since very little investment was made in the sector through the 1990s, the current network is little different from that of 1989. Only 34 percent of the network was digital, and the remainder was made up of obsolete technology. Party lines and tandem exchanges were common with all international routing through the exchange in Belgrade. At the cessation of hostilities, telecommunications infrastructure had suffered heavy damage to key installations during the conflict. Communications on the fixed network was limited to local calls, and international access was not available except for limited service on a few exchanges in Pristina. There was no mobile service in the province. Many facilities were destroyed including a local exchange in Pristina, a tandem exchange in Pristina allowing intercity service, and two secondary transmission stations in other parts of the country. While the local exchanges remained mostly in service, there were no spare parts and there was no test equipment, tools or vehicles for rehabilitation and maintenance. Most exchanges were likely to fail if power outages exceed their battery capacity. There are no firm estimates of the number of subscribers' lines that were destroyed during the conflict, but it is thought that some 110,000 lines remain in service.[45]

A rapid rehabilitation of the telecommunications network is key for successful recovery, since the current situation may hamper the restart of large-scale economic activity. In principle, telecommunications is an income-generating activity, and some part of the development program could be financed from private sources. It is expected that the private sector could and should play a leading role in the development of a functioning mobile service and the modernization effort. Still, in view of the urgency of the situation, the extent of damage, and the poor development of the network in the first place, as well as the current uncertainties concerning Kosovo's political status, some donor support will be needed for repair of the fixed network and to catalyze private sector activities. Such support should be heavily frontloaded, so as to allow for a rapid resumption of telecommunications in the region.

Mine Threat

Before the recent conflict erupted in Kosovo, the province was uncontaminated by landmines, booby-traps, and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Unlike other areas of Europe, no explosive materials had been laid during the two World Wars. The inhabitants of Kosovo were, therefore, unaware of the dangers of landmines and UXOs. In spite of the danger, and in defiance of the advice of the international community, 800,000 refugees spontaneously returned to the province in June 1999 as KFOR forces moved in. At the time, there was no data available regarding landmine and UXO contamination. However, during the refugee crisis, UNHCR coordinated a massive landmine awareness campaign in asylum countries and at the borders. The toll paid for the spontaneous and non-advised return was relatively limited with 232 casualties, of which 40 were fatal (from June 12 to August 31, 1999). Most of the refugees had returned to Kosovo by the end of August and were trying to resume productive activities; however, up to 25 percent of those activities were directly affected by the presence of landmines and UXOs.[46]

Generally, the danger which landmines and UXO posed can be characterized in three distinctive cases:

- The Yugoslav forces laid minefields both to defend the provincial borders and to protect their defensive positions. They also laid mines in and around some villages in order to limit the movements of the KLA forces;
- The KLA forces laid some mines, which, as part of the negotiated agreement, they were to remove. The KLA reported that they had completed this task, but did not provide records;
- NATO aircraft dropped Cluster Bomb Units (CBU), which was the major type of UXO contamination.

Initial data was lacking. Initial statistics as NATO entered the country showed that the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (VJ) recorded 616 minefields, and NATO identified 333 cluster bomb drop-sites on which a total of 1,400 bombs were dropped. As part of the peace settlement, the KLA quickly removed the mines they used during the conflict. All in all, 1,000 suspected mined areas were reported, but 30 percent of the casualties that were reported occurred in other locations that were not identified as contaminated. This indicated not only that it was critical for the existing database to expand by gathering additional information, but also

that nuisance mines placed in and around many villages were not reported and remained a hazard.[47]



Figure 3.1 : An unexploded BLU-97 cluster bomb found in Kosovo.[48]

MILITARY RESPONSE TO POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

The rules for military reconstruction in Kosovo reflected the rules that were in effect in Bosnia. The major difference between the two operations is that unlike Bosnia, NATO did not have advanced knowledge of the status of Kosovo's infrastructure before deployment. Trying to specifically determine the extent and scope of work required was an effort that went largely unfulfilled prior to NATO's entry into the province. Records of previous CIA reports from ongoing clandestine operations in Kosovo were scoured for bits of engineer information, but these reports were often dated (more than two years old), the source of the information could not be verified, or the data in the reports did not provide enough engineer specific information to adequately determine the future infrastructure effort. AFSOUTH, the NATO headquarters in Naples, Italy, employed CIA operatives in its intelligence section to help further refine the intelligence picture, but the raw data necessary to develop and paint the intelligence picture did not exist. To gather additional data, AFSOUTH, through the American Joint Intelligence Center in England, directed its satellite overflights over key portions of Kosovo, but because of intense cloud cover was unable to gather the type of specific engineer data required to refine the post conflict reconstruction mission that NATO was going face. Finally, AFSOUTH was unable to predict the damage that the NATO Air War was going to inflict in its attempt to stop Belgrade's campaign of violence.

Therefore, AFSOUTH military engineer planners assumed the worst. Having recently completed a thorough reconnaissance of Albania's infrastructure in 1998, having completed a

thorough reconnaissance of FYROM's infrastructure in 1999, and having extensive knowledge of Bosnia's infrastructure due to the ongoing IFOR/SFOR mission, engineering assumptions as to the state of Kosovo's infrastructure were made in order to complete the engineer plan. Against those assumptions, a generic engineer force structure was developed and subsequently proposed at various force generation conferences held at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium. Once again, however, nations were reluctant to offer up their limited engineer resources in light of the insufficient data foundation upon which the plan rested. A competing factor at the force generation conference was the ongoing commitment of NATO troops in Bosnia. Peacekeeping was taking a huge toll on NATO's military forces with the results of the first two force generation conferences being dismal at best – there were many engineer force requirements that went unfulfilled at the point of deployment.

NATO Engineering Effort

Building on the success of the engineer reorganization during the transition to SFOR, KFOR established its engineer command structure in a much similar manner. Just like IFOR and SFOR, unity of command was not achieved in the multinational KFOR operation – the NATO commander lacked the necessary leverage and control, and nations reserved the right to dictate how, where, and when their contributing forces would be employed and deployed. An attempt, however, was made to at least achieve unity of effort – agreement and common understanding of the objectives and the desired endstate of the operation. Mirroring this tactic, the KFOR Engineer developed a theater engineer campaign plan designed to rebuild Kosovo's roads, bridges, railroads and airports in support of military forces, and provide a comprehensive mine awareness campaign to enhance stability and security. The initial project approval process began in winter 1999 before NATO's Air War. Ten generic projects were submitted from the AFSOUTH Contingency Engineer Section to the NATO Infrastructure Committee using the project approval process developed in Bosnia, in order to secure early funding against such broad project headings as repair and maintain roads, repair and maintain bridges, repair airfields, and establish and maintain international military headquarters. Not able to conduct a thorough infrastructure reconnaissance, nor knowing what infrastructure the future air campaign was going to damage, NATO approved the submissions in very short time, allowing AFSOUTH flexibility to adjust the scope of work for each project once on-the-ground reconnaissance could be completed. Upon entry into the theater, MNB forces were funded to execute designated reconstruction on NATO main supply routes, or else civilian contractors were hired to perform the work.

Unlike Bosnia, local construction capacity in Kosovo was lacking; therefore, many projects were contracted to sources external to the country or were executed by military engineers with NATO funding. In the first year, KFOR built or repaired 260 kilometers of road and reconstructed or repaired 6 major bridges. A major Italian construction company was hired to completely repave NATO Route "HAWK" from Blace to Pristina during the summer of 2000, and other internationals were brought in to execute repairs to bridges that had been in place with little maintenance for over 50 years. The Italian Railway Company, the same military unit that executed the initial repairs to the rail network in Bosnia, repaired 300 kilometers of railroad and two bridges in the first year in order to facilitate military resupply. With Kosovo having such an immature road network, the rail significantly helped KFOR meet its resupply objectives not only in timeliness but also in required commodity quantities. British military engineers repaired the airport at Pristina - a temporary control tower was installed and new navigation aids, including a new Instrument Landing System are being brought into service, to facilitate the reinstatement of round-the-clock operations. Meanwhile, the airport was opened for traffic under Visual Flight Rules, primarily for military and humanitarian flights but with limited commercial services. Working with in-place NGOs, key infrastructure such as schools and utilities were repaired and brought back into service. Key to this effort was the restoration of the region's aging power plant near Pristina.

International Demining

When New Zealand Major John Flanagan arrived in Kosovo in June 1999 to open and head the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UN MACC), 100 people a month were getting blown up by landmines – a legacy of yet another stage of the long-running Balkans conflict. With a mandate from the UN to be the focal point for mine action, he gathered information from NATO and local villagers, and with his knowledge of former Serb-held areas took two months to build up a picture of the massive demining task ahead. Despite his UN position – he had just spent two years in the UN's mine action service group in New York – Flanagan ran into massive institutional resistance. His plan was to clear the country in less than three years, by setting an aggressive endstate and getting the resources to meet that target, rather than have the operation drag on for decades. This could not be done, he was told. According to Flanagan:

> People from (non-government agencies) and the UN scoffed at my proposal. They thought it was going to be a 20-to-30 year operation. I could see the same mistakes from Bosnia being made all over again. It's seen to be job creation. Mine clearing agencies are the biggest local employer – it creates a dependency, an end in itself. Organizations were setting up 10-year leases on buildings.[49]

Flanagan said that this attitude was symptomatic of a huge growth in civilian agencies' involvement with mine clearing, starting in Afghanistan in 1989. He was undeterred. Backed by specialist knowledge and mine clearing experience in countries including Cambodia and Bosnia, he was determined that his team would not end up prodding its way across the country. With a budget of $70 million, his plan involved hiring 1,400 mine clearers, six mechanical clearers (which work by flailing the ground), and 30 sniffer dogs blitzing through Kosovo. He had to convince the powers of the UN that it did not make sense to spend months in any one area, covering every blade of grass. Speed was the key – moving deminers off of minefields if they didn't find any mines in two weeks. In two and a half years, 350 square kilometers were cleared of 25,000 unexploded mines, 8,500 NATO cluster bombs, and 13,000 other types of explosives. "The number of people now getting their limbs blown off has dropped to about one a month, lower than the death rate from road accidents," Flanagan said in June 2002. "It's hugely satisfying."[50]

The UN MACC successfully completed its objectives and the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance in Kosovo have virtually been eliminated. While it may take some years to completely eradicate all items of explosive ordnance from Kosovo, as indeed it will in most other countries in Europe, the situation is such that the level of contamination no longer impedes social and economic development within the province. The closure of the existing UN MACC in December 2001 coincided with the overarching move towards provisional self government in Kosovo, as directed by Security Council Resolution 1244.

United States Engineering Effort

The United States Engineering Regiment concentrated their engineering operations on one main mission with five supporting tasks – base camp construction to house the American force was the central focus, with supporting tasks that included maintaining roads and bridges for military operations; clearing mines and unexploded ordnance for the basecamps and marking the remainder for humanitarian demining; closing routes into Serbia to prevent illegal smuggling; provide equipment and labor for small humanitarian projects; and provide a backup snow and ice clearance (SNIC) capability should there be a failure in the civilian capacity. As in Bosnia, no money was allocated to the Engineer Regiment to execute post conflict reconstruction for civilian facilities and only little money was provided to the Civil Affairs section to conduct limited humanitarian operations.

Base Camp Construction. Since the summer of 1999, United States engineer elements from across the Armed Services, uniformed and civilian, including the private sector, worked on one straightforward mission: house the American force and its allies in Kosovo. Knowing United States forces would be in Kosovo for an extended period allowed planners to build using temporary construction standards (3- to 5-year planning horizon) early during the deployment. According to LTC Jim Shumway, Chief of the Military Engineering and Topography Division in Europe:

> In Bosnia, construction was more incremental because of the political implications and changing operational requirements as the mission went from peace enforcement to peacekeeping. In Kosovo, we knew we were going to be there awhile, so the decision was made to build SEAhuts (South East Asia huts) in an effort to be good stewards with our resources. The decision to move directly from Tier II tents (tents with wooden floors) to SEAhuts avoided spending millions of dollars to stair-step construction of base facilities over several years. Additionally, construction materials used for Task Force Hawk in Albania were harvested and shipped for use in Kosovo.[51]

Fewer base camps were constructed in Kosovo due to geographic, economic and operational considerations. Working with the United States Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, the Engineer Regiment used lessons learned to develop contingency engineer doctrine into a long-term base operations strategy. With this framework, military engineers established base camp master plans so construction could begin on SEAhuts, force protection bunker emplacements, and other more durable facilities. With 1,700 Army, Navy, and Air Force engineers deployed, this became the largest base camp construction mission since Vietnam. It was also the first experience in using a civilian sustainment services contract (Brown and Root Services, Inc.) to build a military infrastructure of this magnitude.

In planning the contingency operation for Kosovo, the Army chose to establish two base camps and to commit the engineering resources needed to build adequate facilities quickly. The rationale was based on previous experience in the Balkans. In Bosnia, due to the projected short-term deployment, troops intended to stay in tents for the duration. When the mission continued through the first cold winter, living conditions deteriorated, and tents were poorly heated, often needing replacement as moisture took a toll on the fabric. "The decision for Kosovo was that we would do it right the first time," said Colonel Robert McClure, Commander of the 1st Infantry Division Engineer Brigade and the first Task Force Falcon Engineer. "From the time we were on the ground in June, the engineers' goals was to have soldiers inside before winter – and to only move everyone once."[52]

The two base camps were named Camp Bondsteel and Camp Monteith – both named after previous Medal of Honor recipients. With an order from the Corps Commander to have all soldiers in SEAhuts by October 1, 1999, construction began on July 1 with the arrival of the Navy Seabee Battalion overland from Albania where they had been a part of Task Force Hawk during the Air War. The Seabees occupied the sector's smaller camp, Camp Monteith, located on the edge of Gnjilane in what was Yugoslav army barracks before the war. The camp was largely untouched by the conflict, except for two precision bomb craters that destroyed the maintenance facilities. But retreating forces and the locals trashed and looted the buildings to the point that it took weeks to make them usable. The closeness of the city raised force protection concerns that led to the decision to abandon many of the buildings on the base. Instead, more than 75 SEAhuts and support structures were built in an adjoining field for a force of 2,000. The importance of Camp Monteith is its location – it is the locus of tactical activity in the American sector because of the mixed ethnicity of the surrounding population, and its proximity to the Russian battalion, which served alongside the American peacekeepers. Indeed, the first American fire support for Russian forces since World War II were fired from artillery positions built by Seabees at Camp Monteith.

The second and much larger camp, Camp Bondsteel, is the "Grande Dame" in Kosovo of what engineers do. Spread over almost 900 acres of rolling wheat field, it was picked early on to become what it is today, the major American base camp in theater. Within its fenced perimeter is a helicopter airport with over 50 parking pads, over 175 SEAhuts supporting 5,000 soldiers, a 30,000 square foot headquarters building, an ammunition holding area, motor pools and chapels, as well as recreation and dining facilities for soldiers. Water from several wells on camp is piped into each hut from huge holding bags and there is even a wastewater treatment plant for effluent – something not found in the rest of Kosovo.



Figure 3.2: Camp Bondsteel, Before (June 1999) and After (June 2000)

The numbers involved in the effort of building both camps are staggering. At its height, 1,000 expatriates hired by the contractor, plus more than 7,000 Albanian local nationals, joined 1,750 military engineers. From early July until well into October, construction at both camps ran 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with perhaps a half-day each week for soldiers to do personal and equipment maintenance. The final tally for this period was 10 million man hours and 500,000 equipment hours. More than 6 million board feet of lumber, 2 million square feet of plywood, 84,000 sheets of drywall, 200 tons of nails, and 100 miles of electrical cable were consumed in the first year. More than half a million cubic yards of earth were moved on Camp Bondsteel alone. The amount of gravel used at both camps would have covered a two-laned road from St. Louis to Kansas City. In the end, the Engineer Regiment built more than 700,000 square feet of living space – equal to a subdivision with 355 houses – in less than 90 days.[53]

Maintaining Roads and Bridges. There are only a few roads throughout Kosovo that can handle major commercial and military traffic and there are very few alternate routes should the major arteries be blocked. The Main Supply Routes (MSRs) that United States engineers were tasked by NATO to repair and maintain in the American sector were Route HAWK, which connected the border crossing point at Blace, Macedonia, to Pristina, and Route LION, which connected Urosevac (near Camp Bondsteel) to Gjilane (near Camp Monteith). Additionally, United States engineers constructed the Gjilane Ring Road bypass, a 15-kilometer road which moved military and civilian traffic out of downtown Gjilane to reduce congestion in this key inter ethnic town. Both of the MSRs were in treacherous shape having sustained only limited damage from the conflict, but considerable damage from overuse and no maintenance for a decade; the ring road was initial construction connecting several smaller existing one-lane gravel roads. Using minimum military requirement standards, the Engineer Task Force quickly assessed the task, giving priority to Route HAWK in the first year, allowing Route LION to temporarily remain in its dilapidated state, and the ring road to remain on the construction list of priorities until the Spring construction season. Between the Macedonian border and Camp Bondsteel, Route HAWK had six critical tunnels and bridges (designated as Targets 1-6 in the construction plan), all built at the end of World War II in the early Tito years; failure of any one would shut down the route indefinitely as no alternate roads existed to reroute traffic out of this steep, mountainous region. This route was key to the United States force's survival as all supplies were transported to Camp Bondsteel and Camp Monteith via this route. There was no airport available to handle United States resupply planes and the rail network was not functioning. To ensure the route remained open, United States engineers with NATO funding

constructed a one-lane gravel bypass around each "target" allowing military traffic to pass while repairs were being made should a "target" fail. These bypasses were completed in June 2000.

In August 2000, the 120-meter bridge at Target 2 began to fail. The northern bearing roller, an elongated reinforced concrete roller which allows flex and movement in the bridge to naturally absorb the shock of passing truck traffic, rotated 90 degrees, turned on its side in the bearing channel, and begin to crack. The northern side of the bridge dropped 18 inches and was in danger of total collapse. United States engineers, using a form of tele-engineering (a network of secure, sophisticated, high-frequency satellite communications systems), sent inspection photographs to the Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) in Vicksburg, Mississippi, for evaluation and engineer assessment. Immediately, ERDC recommended to close the bridge as catastrophic failure was imminent. As Route Hawk was a NATO designated route eligible for NATO funding, the NATO engineer (a British colonel) asserted his command authority and employed a British engineer and design unit to rappel off of the side of the bridge, conduct an inspection, and make a second evaluation. The NATO conclusion was that the bridge was not approaching catastrophic failure, but that it should be constantly surveyed for further deterioration and restricted to one-lane traffic going south, using the gravel bypass for all northern traffic. This lasted for two weeks until it was determined that the structure was continuing to fall. NATO immediately closed the bridge, hired a local contractor to asphalt the bypass, since it too was beginning to show severe wear from the large amounts of truck and military traffic, and hired a Macedonian construction firm to fix both ends of the bridge since the southern bearing roller was also showing signs of failure.



Figure 3.3: Repair of Target 2 (August-September 2000).

In less than six weeks, the civilian contractor constructed rudimentary scaffolding under each end of the bridge (about 75 meters high), hydraulically raised the bridge off of its bearing roller by 24 inches, removed the defective rollers, cleaned the channel, and installed new rollers. The bridge was quickly reopened so that the truck traffic, so vital to Kosovo's fledging economy, could resume in full force.[54]

During the 2000 construction season, attention was given to Route LION, a two-lane asphalt road connecting Camp Bondsteel to Camp Monteith. In many places, the asphalt had failed with cars traveling on the sub-base of the road – again, with no available alternate routes. It would often take military 4-wheel drive vehicles up to one and half hours to traverse this 30-kilometer route, while it would take civilian cars even longer, not to mention the damage caused to the vehicle frames and suspensions by the poor road conditions. United States engineers deployed Detachment 1 of the 277th Asphalt Company to repair the road. Additionally, in an effort to speed up the repair and employ the newly created Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), United States engineers transported 20 members of the local KPC engineer unit to the construction site each day where they would work side-by-side with the Asphalt Detachment fixing Kosovo's roads. This partnership effort had several positive post conflict ramifications. First, the road was completely repaired during the available construction season – something that could not have been accomplished without the additional KPC manpower.

Figure 3.4: Combined effort of KFOR and the KPC to repair Route LION.

This enhanced the freedom of movement, not only for the military, as the project was designed, but also for the Kosovars. Second, the effort created a partnership between the United States forces and the KPC leading to greater security and stability in the area. Although the KPC was forbidden to carry arms and engage in security efforts, they still had unofficial influence in the

region from their previous status as the KLA and used that influence to significantly lower the violence level of the area. Third, by having KPC members work alongside United States soldiers, it gave the KPC a sense of legitimacy in Kosovo. The local Kosovars were initially leery of the KPC and its motives. By seeing the KPC working hard for the reconstruction of Kosovo infrastructure, much of this trepidation was removed and the KPC was accepted into normal Kosovo society – vital for any public organization, especially one that previously was the source of great violence. Finally, as a humanitarian gesture, the 20 KPC members who worked daily with the asphalt platoon received an American prepared hot meal – something that they would not often have had if they were not working with United States forces.

The third major road mission was the construction of the Gjilane Ring Road. Initially started by the same Navy Seabee Battalion that was constructing Camp Monteith, the project also employed horizontal construction elements of the two National Guard/Reserve construction companies in the Engineer Task Force and used elements of the Swedish Excavation Platoon for some limited earthwork around embedded obstacles. The road, constructed through the countryside and suburbs of Gjilane, was designed to move the military traffic out of town in order to eliminate the traffic delays and minimize the chances for vehicle accidents in town. As the road progressed, more and more civilian traffic accumulated on the ring road, causing major delays with the ongoing construction; however, employing a military police unit to help control traffic allowed construction to continue. Once NATO conducted an onsite project inspection and realized the benefits of this extended bypass, they further authorized the road to be upgraded to asphalt and contracted the one bridge on the route to be rebuilt at NATO expense, hiring civilian companies to complete both of these tasks. The final product was a permanent two-lane asphalt road allowing both military and civilian traffic to escape the traffic congestion of downtown Gjilane.

Despite the limitation and mandate to repair the MSRs to minimum military requirement, there were several instances that United States engineers employed their equipment for civilian advantage. In the Gorni Kusce sector, Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Foy, commander of 1st Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment, received repeated complaints in his local town hall meetings of injured civilians dying enroute to a hospital because their cars could not physically travel certain dirt roads. He also heard complaints of roads so bad that local Serbs were physically cut off from Serbia requiring a mobility corridor that allowed more direct access to the ring road north of Gjilane. This road would not only provide a route that would bypass Kosovar Albanian enclaves, but would more than half the former travel time to Gate 5 (Russian traffic control point into Serbia near Kamenica) for hospital care in Serbia, which most Kosovo Serbs preferred over

the dual treatment hospital facility in Gjilane. More importantly for the peace effort, the creation of the route would set the conditions for a purely Serb/Albanian cooperative effort. Foy submitted a project to the 16th Engineer Battalion Commander to use organic horizontal equipment to grade the dirt roads so the cars could reach the hospital. Additionally, he convinced a local Albanian gravel quarry owner to provide free gravel that was then used by Serbs to build a road with equipment that they had stolen from the quarry at the beginning of the war. The stipulation was that the stolen equipment would be returned to the rightful owner after the project was completed. In these cases, the work completed by the horizontal section was for civilian purposes only. No military traffic would routinely travel these routes, but the impact of this work was a great quality of life improvement to the local nationals and created an opportunity to integrate the Albanian and Serb workforce at the quarry, increasing Serb employment in the region and raising the standard of living in the nearby Serb enclaves.[55] Because of the funding limitations, these roads, although built to western standards, were only made of gravel and would require constant maintenance to ensure that these roads remained open. These roads did not qualify for NATO or United States funding so only equipment and manpower could be used – artful military diplomacy with the locals secured the free material. When the beneficial aspects of these roads were realized, the routine maintenance of these civilian roads was added to the Engineer Task Force construction priority list.

The missions to maintain the task force main supply routes used "reach back technology", employing the high technology of the engineer laboratories in the United States to conduct in-depth assessments of the road network in Kosovo. ERDC's Topographic Engineering Center (TEC) in Alexandria, Virginia, applied their Engineering Route Studies program, a graphic product designed to provide country-scale terrain, climate, and natural disaster data in conjunction with current route conditions. The graphic highlighted such items as areas of potential flooding, steep grades, switchbacks, potential choke points, and areas of landslides. Road information included distances in kilometers, surface type, and road classification (such as expressway or single lane). The studies allowed military planners to assess the overall impact of terrain and climate for major routes throughout the Southern Balkans. This added capability allowed the United States Engineer Task Force to properly deploy its limited equipment and material to meet the mission standards.

Mines and Unexploded Ordnance. The United States engineer effort for demining Kosovo was strictly limited by national policy to a highly successful mine awareness campaign, identifying and marking the minefields and UXO fields for humanitarian clearance, and the establishment of a Minefield Quick Reaction Force in the event a person required rescue from a

minefield. Because young children were more likely than adults to find a mine or UXO while playing outside and exploring new places, the Mine Action Center at Camp Bondsteel established a program of instruction that targeted elementary through high school age children.

Figure 3.5: Mine Awareness Education.

Similar to Bosnia, some munitions that were painted bright colors for easy identification attracted children's attention because they appeared to be toys. Therefore, engineers placed a high priority on the local schools, supplementing their mine awareness teaching with posters and mine awareness Superman comic books provided free by various international organizations. Instructors brought disarmed examples of mines and UXO to help students learn recognition. Training included mine marking practices that flag unsafe areas as well as how to safely exit an accidentally entered minefield. In order to capture the children's short attention spans, soldiers would devise games and activities in which to teach their mine instruction, rather than rely on less exciting lectures that may not convey their message as well.

As the mission unfolded in Kosovo, United States engineers were successful in obtaining the Serbian records of minefields emplaced in the MNB(E) sector and also the bomb targeting grid references used during NATO's Air Campaign. Using this information, combat engineers marked each minefield and UXO field with standard NATO materials – barbed wire, pickets, and international mine signs. Because the locals would remove the marking material to use on their farms to corral their livestock, the engineers were forced to check each minefield every two weeks to ensure that the minefield marking materials were still in place, and, if not, would replace them until the minefield was cleared by the UN contracted civilian humanitarian demining firms. Starting with a database that had over 100 minefields in the eastern sector alone, MNB(E) was virtually cleared of mines by December 2000.[56]

Figure 3.6: EOD detonating a cache of mines in Kosovo.

Should somebody find themselves in a minefield, the Engineer Task Force established and maintained the Minefield Quick Reaction Force, designed to be able to clear a path through the minefield to the victim using mechanical means, extract the victim and the vehicle, provide any required medical aid on-site, and provide overall security for the operation. The engineers had two Panthers and three Mini-Flails to help them with their mechanical mine-clearing missions. The Israeli-developed Panther, a modified M60 tank, used 9-ton forward rollers to detonate mines, which typically do little or no damage to the vehicle. The Panther works by a remote control consisting of a personal computer with video simulation software and radio devices that trigger actuators on the tank. It can start and drive the Panther from as far away as 800 meters, yet fits in a suitcase. The Mini-Flail uses a small skip loader chassis without the operator cage. A forward-mounted drum rotates at high speed, flailing the ground with chains that strike with a force of about 300 pounds per square inch. The Mini-Flail controller is a small, hand-held device, no bigger than a field radio, with small joysticks that allow the user to maneuver the vehicle. Both systems are diesel-powered, and the Panther has controls that can be overridden to allow manual operation. During the first year, the Minefield Quick Reaction Force was employed only twice; however, the Panthers and Mini-flails were often used at construction sites with great results. Of all the areas, minefield awareness and clearing were the biggest lessons learned from Bosnia. This highly successful mission resulted in relatively few casualties once Task Force Falcon was established in Kosovo.

Smuggling Routes. The boundary between Kosovo and Serbia was porous with many logging trails crossing the border every one or two kilometers. As KFOR entered Kosovo, it

quickly discovered that there was a massive ongoing smuggling operation using these small trails. Illegal drugs and arms were taken across the eastern Kosovo boundary into the Presevo Valley in Serbia to support a rogue, but persistent, insurgency of the old KLA called the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedya, and Bujanovac (UCPMB). The UCPMB established its headquarters in Dobrosyn, 3 kilometers into Serbia proper, recruiting members and conducting a type of basic training in the immediate area of the boundary. This was a most destabilizing element in the region and was a source of concern for the KFOR leadership. In an effort to starve the KLA of these illicit materials, the engineers developed a plan to close 84 trails using explosives, downed trees, and artificial obstacles, attempting to force all boundary crossings to occur at Observation Point Sapper or Observation Point Terminator, the two authorized crossing points on the boundary into the Presevo Valley.[57] Planned and managed out of the Engineer Task Force operations office, platoon sized patrols of about 25 soldiers, would ensure that no people were in the immediate vicinity, detonate explosives to create a truck-sized crater into the trail, tying barbed wire and logs on the sides to prevent any bypass of the crater by local vehicles.



Figure 3.7: Engineer Platoon placing explosives to block smuggling route.

Although the obstacles were well emplaced, there is a saying in the Army that an obstacle not covered by observation or fire is not an obstacle. Unfortunately, the boundary was too extensive and the force levels too low to monitor each trail; most of the obstacles were filled in by hand by smugglers and loggers allowing vehicle passage. Although this was a strong, deliberate effort by the engineers, circumstances precluded this mission from having a great positive effect on the smuggling problem.

Humanitarian Projects. With the large basecamp mission, the minefield marking mission, and the border closing mission, United States engineers were hard pressed to find opportunities to execute humanitarian projects under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 task to "support the SRSG and international organizations and NGOs in Kosovo in their . . . infrastructure repair tasks." Outside of the horizontal construction equipment opportunities to improve local dirt and gravel roads, funding limitations precluded the engineers from attempting many projects that would directly improve the quality of life for the locals. Replacing the entire electrical grid or water system for a village, for example, was beyond the mandate and the funding allowances for the engineers. However, as many of the deployed soldiers were also parents, the depressing state of Kosovo's education sparked an initiative to adopt local schools and rebuild them using what free material and labor the soldiers could gather. Each engineer company adopted a local school, voluntarily using their one half-day of downtime each week to clean and execute minor repairs to schools that had been closed for about a decade. Depending on the individual school's needs, the engineers repaired dilapidated floors and ceilings, fixed chairs and desks, and completed basic ground leveling.

The inside of a schoolhouse was very basic – several small classrooms, battered tables and chairs, and wood stoves. There were no computers and most didn't have a blackboard. The walls in the school classrooms depicted a mixture of decoration – one had a picture of a KLA hero, others had cartoon murals painted on some walls, and still others simply had dull green, cream or gray walls in dire need of being repainted. The floors were wooden, with much of it in rotting decay. Most of the facilities needed extensive cleaning and painting, while others needed replacement windows and electrical rewiring for lights and power. Electricians checked wiring and lights, keeping a close tally on the number of light bulbs that needed replacing. It was ironic that many of the lights would be stamped "Made in USSR" in English; however, the soldiers would only replace two or three of the six lights in each fixture because the aging circuits could not handle the full electrical load. Other teams replaced broken windows with Plexiglas as a quick fix to keep out wind and snow – most classrooms were heated with a small, inefficient wood burning stove in the corner as central heating did not exist.

Outside, external latrines were refurbished as most were clogged, gates and perimeter fences were repaired, and children's sports fields were cleared of saplings and scrub brush that had grown up in the decade of disuse. Horizontal construction equipment was used to regrade the sports fields and combat engineers replaced soccer goal posts and volleyball nets. It was common that a soccer ball would magically appear and an impromptu game would start. It was

almost comical as the game would feature children of all ages, usually wearing tee-shirts donated by various humanitarian relief agencies, playing against United States Army soldiers





Figure 3.8: Destroyed Schools Near Urosevac, Kosovo.

wearing helmets and flak vests with unloaded weapons strapped to their sides. At the front gate of one school, tired of washing light covers, a small Kosovar child wanted to be photographed with Specialist Javier Varela, who had spent the afternoon on guard duty. Varela stated:

> From these kids' view, I don't know if it will matter that the school is clean and the walls are painted. I just remember growing up in Chicago that the important thing is to be in school. If we helped get them back here learning something, that's all that really matters.[58]

Most soldiers wrote to their communities and churches in the United States describing the school conditions and received an amazing response. The communities sent countless boxes of school supplies, clothes, and, in one case, new computers to help the schools get back on their feet. Through these soldiers' efforts, the Kosovar children restarted their education and began to regain some of the childhood that had been temporarily taken away – something that each soldier could point to as having made a tangible difference during his or her deployment.

Snow and Ice Clearance. Completing the primary SEAhut construction by early fall, Task Force Falcon engineers looked ahead to see what challenges winter storms would pose. A single winter storm historically may dump as much as 22 inches of snow in the area. For a task force that was heavily dependent on one single supply route that traverses through some of the highest terrain in southern Kosovo, it was imperative to develop a capability to maintain that route clear of snow and ice. During the Snow and Ice Clearance (SNIC) planning, KFOR

engineers tried to develop local contracts to help with snow removal; however, there wasn't a lot capability available.

To provide a backup capability to local contractors, the Army deployed civilian engineers from the United States Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory to field a snow and ice clearance/abatement package. The package included 5-ton truck snowblades, HMMWV snowblades, and both towed and mounted sand/salt spreaders. The SNIC plan focused on NATO's main supply routes ensuring that roads in the assigned regions were passable for operational and humanitarian missions. Snow and ice clearance within the villages and towns remained within the responsibility of the locals. In most cases, there was no local capacity and locals could only rely on rising temperatures to help dig them out.

Nearly every military activity in Kosovo depended on the Army's terrain and mapping capabilities, and SNIC was no exception. The Geographic Information Systems (GIS) allowed planners to model multiple variables and create maps reflecting their relationships. For example, a 100-year storm could be superimposed with maps showing damaged roads to predict if a particular route would be passable. During winter preparations, engineers used GIS for mapping main supply routes, alternate routes, and local roads to allocate plows and other equipment. According to the Engineer Brigade intelligence officer:

> We've been modeling terrain and weather factors that could potentially contribute to a 'state of siege' when people are isolated from food, water, and power. Elevation is the primary concern. We're also looking at terrain features – how landforms on slopes, called spurs and draws, will affect people's ability to move about after a storm.[59]

This assessment used historic weather data from the Pristina Weather Observation Center along with satellite data from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and other sources, including NATO reconnaissance. Terrain and weather data were combined with maps showing "hot spots" of violent activity. The information indicated from a tactical standpoint where snow removal equipment was needed to help quick reaction forces respond to emergencies. During the first year, there was one major snowstorm that closed Route Hawk. Over 20 inches fell and many civilian trucks slid and jackknifed on the road making the road impassable. United States engineers used their snowplows and wreckers to remove the snow and the vehicles from the road in order to reopen the route within 18 hours. Additionally, B Company of the 142nd Engineer Combat Battalion (North Dakota National Guard) used their organic equipment for snow removal as the local capacity was not capable to achieve the same results. According to SGT Todd Christie, a heavy equipment operator with B Company's Horizontal Platoon, "Some seemed to think a road grader would not be any good at clearing snow and were not sure how

to mix the sand and salt to melt the ice, but these were both issues we have dealt with previously."[60]

Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) Projects

In an attempt to involve former KLA personnel in positive activities, NATO and UN officials agreed to the creation of the KPC. NATO and the UN intended the 3,000-strong organization to be a uniformed civilian force to deal with emergency situations; however, some of the KLA leaders saw the KPC as the nucleus of a future Kosovo army, a view rejected by NATO and UN officials. The KPC officially came into being on September 21, 1999, with the promulgation of an UNMIK Regulation and Statement of Principles providing provisional legal status for the KPC within Kosovo. According to the Statement and Principles, the KPC would:

- Provide a disaster response capability, including major fires, and industrial accidents or spills.
- Conduct search and rescue.
- Provide humanitarian assistance in isolated areas.
- Assist in demining.
- Contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities.[61]

The KPC had no role in defense, law enforcement, riot control, internal security or any other task involved in the maintenance of law and order. Direction and advice was provided to the KPC to actively participate in the rebuilding of Kosovo infrastructure. The KPC consisted of six regional headquarters with a 66-man support detachment in each region responsible for engineer construction and demining. With the onset of winter, the immediate priority in the first year was housing reconstruction assistance to organizations providing basic life support. Much was accomplished with little equipment, and returning refugees had sufficient housing to survive the first winter. However, the KPC suffered from a chronic lack of international support. It was not included in the regional Kosovo budget and financing was dependent on contributions from a few interested nations. The hand-to-mouth approach did not help maintain the independence of the KPC, some of whose members were suspected of engaging in intimidation and corruption. If the international community wished to resolve the possible corruption problem then it needed to ensure that the KPC members would be given a decent wage and provided the training and equipment necessary to carry out their assigned mission. To help with the training, United States engineers developed and executed a training plan to provide the KPC with basic engineering and English skills. Adequate engineering equipment remained a problem as the United States engineers were prohibited from lending tools to the KPC. Despite

these roadblocks, the KPC concentrated on refurbishing the remaining schools in the region during the second year. Receiving large amounts of international funding, the KPC completely overhauled schools in the Urosevac and Gjilane areas, achieving high quality results with the most basic hand tools.

CJCIMIC Effort

There were many problems constraining the civil-military affairs effort in Kosovo, starting with the lack of overall organization in KFOR headquarters to the lack of a campaign plan in MNB(E); however, there were also success stories that contributed to the reconstruction of Kosovo. Violating the unity of effort principle of war, civil-military missions in headquarters KFOR were split among a number of directorates beyond the civil-military operations staff. While J9 (Civil-Military Operations) conducted most civil-military liaison and provided practically all of KFOR's civil-military expertise and assessments, there was a separate Civil Affairs directorate in charge of an independent group of French CIMIC officers largely dedicated to the support of economic development. J5 (Strategic Plans) provided operational planning and project management assistance to UNMIK, while J3 (Current Operations) conducted liaison with local police forces. Therefore, there wasn't a cohesive or coherent organization that coordinated all civil-military affairs efforts. Along with the lack of an established clearing mechanism for projects at the KFOR level, there was a CIMIC Campaign Plan that was never implemented. Many KFOR CIMIC officers, in fact, had no knowledge that a KFOR CIMIC Campaign Plan existed. This caused action officers to work redundantly, or even at cross purposes. According to the MNB(E) Civil-Military Affairs Officer in May 2000:

> KFOR has not provided a plan to coordinate and synchronize CMO activities between the MNBs. . . . KFOR provides broad CIMIC guidance and intent along several lines of operations: freedom of movement, humanitarian support, public safety, civil administration, infrastructure repair, economics and commerce, and democratization. Measures of effectiveness and endstates for the lines of operation are not specified. An overall CMO campaign for MNB(E) does not exist. This is due in part to the lack of guidance and direction from higher headquarters in Pristina. Even though our teams are engaged in CMO activities on a daily basis, there is no clear statement of what the priority/main effort actually is. This being said, many of the CMO activities are reactionary (based on the current situation) rather than deliberately planned and synchronized to attain an overall objective.[62]

In light of this, direct infrastructure reconstruction was minimal, although United States Civil Affairs teams provided a heavy facilitation role. MNB(E) used its nearly 60 United States Army Civil Affairs personnel, plus other CIMIC soldiers, to facilitate civilian agency success through programs such as the Village Employment Rehabilitation Program with the UN

Development Program. In addition to conducting over 500 village and school assessments and maintaining a significant database, civil affairs teams performed hearts-and-minds projects to promote overall military mission legitimacy in line with the target audiences determined by the current operations staff. They also assisted UNMIK and NGO-led capacity building projects such as business seminars for small and medium enterprise owners (the majority of Civil Affairs personnel are Reservists, many of whom have business experience of their own). As in all other MNB sectors, the United States, Polish, Russian, and Greek forces provided direct and indirect support of the myriad of humanitarian relief activities, many of which were funded by government agencies from their own countries or by like-language NGOs.[63]

Over $3.4 million of Department of Defense humanitarian assistance funds were provided to rebuild schools, public utilities, and health care facilities. Task Force Falcon Civil Affairs teams coordinated and facilitated the restoration of electrical power and telephone services, especially to the Serbian enclaves. As a mark of Civil Affairs persistence, when MNB(E) began to experience increased ethnic violence in its sector as well as hostilities along its border with Serbia, particularly in the Presevo valley, Task Force Falcon Civil Affairs continued to support UNMIK, NGOs, and other efforts of international organizations to restore fundamental public services and lay the groundwork for the eventual transfer of functions to the appropriate civil institutions.

INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN RESPONSE

The immediate priorities of the international community after the end of the Kosovo conflict were to establish order and security and avert a humanitarian catastrophe. Despite the short duration of the armed conflict between NATO and Yugoslav forces, which lasted 78 days, the Kosovo conflict caused significant human dislocation. At the peak of the conflict, nearly one million Kosovars – mainly ethnic Albanians – representing about 45 percent of the prewar population of the province fled their homes. Following the end of the conflict, 210,000 Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities were displaced and remain so to this day. After the end of the war, KFOR and UNMIK inherited a precarious domestic security situation: widespread possession of arms, human rights abuses, violence, and the risk of generalized conflict between armed Albanian groups. KFOR and UNMIK's first major tasks were thus to establish a secure environment and provide emergency assistance to the population. During the first four months after the conflict, relief agencies distributed food rations to about 1.5 million people in Kosovo, and 900,000 continued to receive food aid throughout the winter of 1999-2000. Construction

materials were provided for home reconstruction, and emergency repairs were carried out on damaged health facilities. The handling of the immediate post conflict humanitarian crisis by the international community was a success: by the early summer of 2000, the humanitarian emergency was over.[64]

In parallel, UNMIK used its authority under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 to establish a civilian administration in Kosovo. UNMIK established four sections or "pillars," each run by an international agency: humanitarian affairs (UNHCR); civil administration (UN); democracy building (OSCE); and reconstruction (EU). An international UNMIK staff managed the four pillars, as well as the 30 municipalities in Kosovo. In July 2000, after the humanitarian emergency was over, the humanitarian pillar ceased to exist as a formal component of UNMIK, and the number of pillars was reduced to three.

However, the lack of funding, as in Bosnia, was a major issue and deterrent to immediate post conflict reconstruction. Confronting the issue of Kosovo reconstruction, donors came to believe that a long-term solution for Kosovo must be regional. On July 30, 1999, donor nations met in Sarajevo to launch a Balkan Stability Pact that sought to promote political and economic reform, promote cooperation, and integrate the region into the rest of Europe. But it wasn't until March 29-30, 2000, that donors met in Brussels for a Regional Funding Conference to support the Balkan Stability Pact. They pledged roughly $2.3 billion to fund a package of "quick start" projects that could begin within a year in the areas of economic infrastructure, anti-corruption, regional security, and democracy and human rights, but it was also the first time that donors began to identify and set up the *process* to develop "near-term" and "medium-term" projects. At this point, KFOR and UNMIK had already been in theater for nine months and the stated regional approach was just beginning to identify the processes to develop and complete reconstruction projects in a country ravaged by war and plagued by unemployment.

For Kosovo specific, a number of estimates of post conflict reconstruction needs were proposed even while the war was still raging, although all were conjecture; none were based on a comprehensive on-the-ground survey. In July 1999, several international task forces began making assessments that would lead to a more realistic estimate of needs and costs. The first major assessment (July 28,1999) conducted by a European Commission Task Force, focused on housing and local village infrastructure. It estimated the cost to repair damaged housing was $1.2 billion, and for other village facilities – schools, clinics, local electricity, and clean water - $43.9 million. The EC and the World Bank took the lead in organizing international economic assistance efforts, through their joint chairing of a High-Level Steering Group, that included the United States and other major donors. A first donor conference, based on the EC's

assessment, was held in Brussels on July 28, 1999, and concentrated on short-term humanitarian needs arising from the return of refugees. For a subsequent donor conference, a second, more far-reaching, round of assessments, covering energy, telecommunications, transport, commercial, and social infrastructure, was conducted. Detailing the reconstruction and development objectives in Kosovo over the next four to five years, the EC-World Bank report estimated the cost of reaching those objectives at $2.3 billion in external financing.[65]

A second reconstruction-oriented donor conference, held on November 17, 1999, focused on reconstruction and development concerns and evoked slightly more than $1 billion in pledges (only $36.2 million was pledged for humanitarian programs). The total amount closely matched the $1.1 billion required through the end of 2000. However, funds pledged for the different categories of required assistance – civil administration budget, peacekeeping, and reconstruction – did not meet the specific monetary needs in each category. Additionally, actual received donor pledges only amounted to 75 percent of that pledged. The EU and its member states were the main providers of financial support; however, the lengthy approval processes of the EU apparatus severely inhibited the speedy allocation of urgently needed sums. Millions of Euros were committed but not disbursed. EU finance ministers objected to making budgetary contributions to an entity that could not in the ordinary sense be understood as a country.

To further compound the problem, EU leaders at the European Council meeting in Cologne, Germany, asked the European Commission on June 4, 1999, to set up an agency for the purpose of reconstructing Kosovo. On June 23, the European Commission proposed a draft regulation to establish the agency; however, it wasn't until December 15 that the EU formally established a European Agency for Reconstruction of Kosovo to administer its reconstruction program – a full six months after KFOR entered theater. Despite glowing reports from the European Court of Auditors, the established structure was exceedingly cumbersome.[66] Two administrative committees - one in Pristina and one in Brussels – created unnecessary duplication for every decision that controlled the Agency. They had to base their deliberations on 80 different EU regulations, and the various committees failed to meet more than once a month, causing additional delay. The Agency was additionally controlled by an Administrative Committee that consisted of representatives from all of the 15 member states. Thus, Brussels red tape impeded not only the reconstruction of Kosovo, but also the recovery of the wider Balkan region. The Stability Pact made some progress, but was far from meeting the expectations of the Balkan people.[67] As a bright spot, despite the political limitation that excluded Kosovo from receiving money from many international aid agencies, the World Bank provided $2 million from a Community Development Fund for infrastructure and services

projects and for budget support for the civil administration of the province. It also provided $60 million in grant assistance through a Trust Fund for Kosovo over an 18-month period.[68]

Although relief funding may have been sufficient to avert the humanitarian crisis, transitional administration start-up funding was not. In addition to compounding the typical planning shortfalls, this contributed to staffing shortages as high as 50 percent, hampered service support operations, and delayed key infrastructure repair and public service restoration projects. As an interim measure, the KFOR commander offered assistance. Reconstruction was key to the strategy of KFOR's second commander, Spanish General Juan Ortuno, who aimed to "provide a long-term economic perspective to the province" and to endow it with "a mechanism to facilitate the flow of international donor funding to regional and municipal levels."[69] KFOR conducted its own field assessment in March 2000 and identified that the international community lacked a Kosovo-wide capacity to assess specific reconstruction needs. In response, the planners at Supreme Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) set up the Kosovo Development Group, detached under the authority of the European Union's Kosovo reconstruction department. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain volunteered a staff of 18 trained officers, who worked in teams of three in the province's five sectors and in Pristina. Costs were shared among the parties involved with participating nations covering salaries, KFOR providing lodging and workspace, and the EU ensuring transport, as well as stationary and supplementary expenses. Starting in July 2000, Kosovo Development Group teams traveled throughout the province, identifying and prioritizing reconstruction projects in cooperation with the local authorities and the 120 NGOs operating in Kosovo. These projects, which covered all aspects of reconstruction, from repairing infrastructure to regenerating the economy, were all allocated EU funding. The Kosovo Development Group remained in effect until July 2001, at which point the EU civilian structure was able to take over the specific tasks of project identification and management.

By most accounts, Kosovo made much progress since the end of the war, although it has a long way to go before it is a self-sustaining, self-governing entity. Despite an almost two year delay for the EU to fully staff its reconstruction agency, basic infrastructure – roads, airport, communications, schools, housing – were repaired. Basic services – health, education, electricity, and water – are being provided. A basic framework of government is in place – with Kosovar nationals matched with international personnel in all departments of the UN administrative structure, and a judicial system, with police and courts, established. Elections at the local level were successfully held in October 2000, and Municipal Assemblies have begun to take responsibility for basic government functions. Small business and signs of civil society,

including independent media, are growing. But, until the various local ministries required to maintain Kosovo's infrastructure base are fully sourced, the province's physical infrastructure will either have to be maintained by international aid or will fall quickly back into its post conflict condition.

While the barest elements of government are in place, they function at minimal levels. Standards need to be improved across-the-board. Public utility infrastructure is antiquated and needs replacement. Teachers, police, and civil servants need training, and sporadic violence between ethnic Albanians and minority Serbs continues. While the UN estimates that donor support for the operating budget may end by 2003, it anticipates a need for donor activity in multiple sectors of Kosovar life for years to come.[70] Unfortunately, the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent Global War on Terrorism, are causing donors to move their money out of the region and into other venues. This doesn't bode well for Kosovo's future.

ASSESSMENT

Kosovo was a beautiful country that had been ravaged by war. The mountain villages were collections of tiny houses with red tiled roofs, which probably looked like they did centuries ago. Most homes had no indoor plumbing, requiring outhouses. Water was obtained from springs and wells, many of which were fouled by animal carcasses thrown into the water by departing Serbians. Villages that relied on streams suffered the pollution effects of rusting cars, dead animals, and general refuse. Compounding these basic needs challenges, driving in Kosovo was a nightmare. The roads were in terrible shape and people were more likely to be injured or killed on the road than by a sniper or by an act of violence. Drivers would swerve to avoid potholes without worrying about oncoming traffic. KFOR made extensive road repairs for military traffic but this had the unintended consequence of enabling drivers to travel at more dangerous speeds. There were no driving tests or licenses; most cars did not have license plates, many cars had been stolen from western Europe, and drivers ignored internationally accepted rules of the road. Many UNMIK, OSCE, KFOR and international aid workers adopted Kosovo driving habits as well, adding more chaos to the congested highways with tanks, trucks, buses, Humvees, Jeeps, and Land Cruisers.

Despite this ongoing chaos, Kosovo is a somewhat successful case study in economic institution building. The province's economy emerged from a decade of gross neglect, exacerbated by a short but destructive conflict with its human capital and physical capital severely diminished. Economic institutions were virtually nonexistent, and the vacuum was

filled by parallel structures of dubious legality. The financial system was obliterated, and the economy had reverted to cash-based transactions. Against this background, the work of the post conflict reconstruction and institution building undertaken by the international community since the end of the conflict is impressive, although too late to mitigate some of the violence. Today, Kosovo's economy has a recognizable face: private business is thriving, financial intermediation is restarting in a supervised manner, physical infrastructure is on par with its previous state of the 1980s, and there is a government providing public services partly financed through taxation. There are, of course, severe shortcomings and distortions in almost every part of this economy, but the basic building blocks are there for a solid foundation.

Within these accolades, however, is the reminder that the international aid community, again, could respond to the emergency humanitarian crisis but could not immediately respond for reconstruction once the fighting ceased. The simple fact is that international aid agencies must have ample time to organize, gather funding, and deploy. Recent history continues to show us, and Kosovo is just another example, that this process will consume most of a year. At the one-year mark, violence and instability increased in Kosovo. Young fighters had regained their strength and separatist factions raised their heads once again as alternate employment opportunities still did not exist. The emergence of the UCPMB in the Presevo Valley followed by violence on the Macedonian border was the unfortunate result. The international community will continue to have a key responsibility in Kosovo. Continued engagement is necessary at all levels if Kosovo is going to be a viable province, capable of self sustainment. First and foremost, under the current arrangements the initiative to resolve Kosovo's constitutional status cannot be taken by anyone but the international community which, through the UN, is collectively responsible for the administration of the province. Moreover, regardless of the shape of the final political settlement, Kosovo's political and economic institutions cannot continue to develop without significant assistance from the rest of the world. Last, considerable resources and technical expertise are required to employ the significant capital investment needed to lift Kosovo's economy from poverty and place it onto a sustainable growth path. These resources cannot materialize without donor support. The international community's "exit strategy" from Kosovo, therefore, must be a very gradual process if Kosovo is to have any chance at a stable, long-term peace.

However, the presence of the international community in Kosovo, while crucial, will not by itself be enough to achieve any of these goals. The ubiquitous presence of expatriates in Kosovo today, occupying virtually every position of authority, conveys a misleading impression. The fate of Kosovo is ultimately in the hands of the Kosovars themselves and the authority

positions must be gradually turned over to the locals. The new democratic institutions of self-government, however provisional, have already given Kosovars considerable influence in shaping events in Kosovo, and this influence is bound to increase with time. They now have to make the choice to build a peaceful, well-governed society and a strong market economy. They have a key piece – their physical reconstruction – well on the way. Now they need to develop the well-entrenched institutions in which to maintain, sustain, and promote all that they have accomplished in such a short time.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

[1] Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers (New York, NY, 1999), 12.

[2] Leo Tindemans, et al., Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), 114.

[3] Steven J. Woehrel and Julie Kim, Kosovo and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 3 July 2002), 2.

[4] Kosovo Force: Official Web Site of the Kosovo Force, "Background to the Conflict," n.d., available from <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/intro.htm>; Internet; accessed on 25 September 2002.

[5] Woehrel, 3.

[6] United States Department of State, "The Rambouillet Accords," n.d.; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet/text.html>; Internet; accessed 25 September 2002.

[7] United Nations Security Council, letter dated June 4, 1999, from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, enclosing the Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, S/1999/648, 7 June 1999.

[8] Bruce R. Nardulli, et al., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Arroyo Center, 2002), 18.

[9] Steve Bowman, Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 September 2002), 2.

[10] Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2001), 171. In his account, General Clark states that in a meeting with Secretary of State Albright a few weeks prior to Operation Allied Force, he explained that it was almost certain that Belgrade would attack civilian Kosovars and that there was little NATO could do about it.

[11] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Statement, (1999)040, untitled, 23 March 1999.

[12]North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Statement (1999)041, "Statement by Secretary General Dr. Javier Solana," 24 March 1999.

[13] Department of Defense, "Statement by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Kenneth Bacon" (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 23 March 1999).

[14] William Jefferson Clinton, "Statement" (White House Briefing Room, Washington, D.C., 24 March 1999.

[15] General Wesley K. Clark and Brigadier General John D. W. Corley, press briefing on the Kosovo strike assessment (Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Europe, Mons, Belgium, 16 September 1999).

[16] Clark, Waging Modern War, 211. General Clark reported that during the first few days of the air operation, "We were striking at the facilities of the Serb ground forces that were doing the ethnic cleansing, but we hadn't yet struck those forces."

[17] William Drozdiak, "NATO Leaders Struggle to Find a Winning Strategy," Washington Post, 1 April 1999, sec. A, p. 22.

[18] Doyle McManus, "Clinton's Massive Ground Invasion That Almost Was," Los Angeles Times, 9 June 2000, sec. A, p. 1.

[19] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Press Release S-1(99)62, "Statement on Kosovo," Washington, D.C., 23 April 1999.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 203. How much of a role a potential ground invasion played in Belgrade's final decision to capitulate to NATO's demands will most likely never be known. While arguing that a combination of factors was at work, Daalder and O'Hanlon state that the threat of a ground war was a critical factor in Milosevic's thinking, and it is doubtful that the war could have been won without it. Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1351-AF, 2001). Another assessment of Milosevic's reasons for settling acknowledges the contribution of a possible ground invasion, but argues that the dominant military factor influencing Belgrade's decision was the prospect of an intensifying air campaign against infrastructure targets. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO'S Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1365-AF, 2001). This third study gives more weight to the building evidence of a possible land invasion in the closing days of Operation Allied Force, but maintains that air power – and the prospects of its continued use and escalation – created many of the key conditions necessary for an eventual political settlement. There were, of course, changing political conditions, including growing political pressure from Russia on Belgrade to reach a settlement.

[22] Nardulli, 43.

[23] "Military-Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Serbia," 9 June 1999.

[24] Kosovo Force: Official Web Site, 4.

[25] Ibid.

[26] United Nations, UN Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244(1999), 10 June 1999.

[27] Ibid.

[28] A detailed account of the Pristina airfield episode and decision making is in Clark, Waging Modern War, 375-403.

[29] Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson, "KFOR: Providing Security for Building a Better Future for Kosovo," NATO Review 47-No. 3 (Autumn 1999): 17.

[30] Ibid., 18.

[31] Kosovo Force: Official Web Site, 5.

[32] "Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the Kosovo Liberation Army," 20 June 1999, available from <http://www.kforonline.com>; Internet; accessed 5 October 2002.

[33] Lieutenant General Agim Ceku, Chief of Staff, Kosovo Liberation Army, "Statement," 20 September 1999, available from <http://www.kforonline.com>; Internet; accessed 2 November 2002.

[34] The Kosovo Protection Corps, Commander, Kosovo Force's Statement of Principles; UNMIK/RE/1999/8, on the Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps, 20 September 1999, available from <http://www.kforonline.com>; Internet; accessed 5 November 2002.

[35] Dimitri G. Demeka, Johannes Herderschee, and Davina F. Jacobs, Kosovo: Institutions and Policies for Reconstruction and Growth (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2002), 5-7.

[36] World Bank/Food and Agriculture Organization survey of damage in the sector, as cited in European Commission and the World Bank in Support of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Toward Stability and Prosperity: A Program for Reconstruction and Recovery in Kosovo, n.p., 3 November 1999, 7.

[37] Ibid., 143.

[38] Ibid., 147.

[39] Ibid., 151.

[40] Ibid., 76.

[41] Ibid., 127.

[42] Ibid., 128.

[43] Ibid., 131.

[44] Teledensity in the region is typically at or around 30 percent, and in Western Europe over 40 percent.

[45] European Commission, 123-126.

[46] United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre, "Kosovo Demining," September 1999, available from <http://jacquesbure.free.fr/kosovo_demining.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 November 2002.

[47] Ibid.

[48] All photographs in this chapter were taken either by the author or by the Communications Section of the 16th Engineer Battalion between June and December 2000. All photographs have been placed in the public domain.

[49] John Flanagan, interview by author, 17 June 2000, Pristina, Kosovo.

[50] Richard Trow, "A Kiwi with a Mission to Clean Up Kosovo's Minefield," 12 June 2002, available from <http://www.mineaction.org/countries/_refdocs.cfm?doc_ID=648&from=misc/>; Internet; accessed 5 October 2002.

[51] United States Army Corps of Engineers – Europe District, Engineering In Europe, Special Edition, Kosovo: The Engineers' Story (Wiesbaden, Germany: United States Army Corps of Engineers, May 2000), 8.

[52] Colonel Robert McClure, Engineer Brigade Commander, 1st Infantry Division (US), interview by author, 3 June 2000, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo.

[53] Larry Wentz, "Peacekeeper Quality of Life," in Lessons From Kosovo: The KFOR Experience (Washington, D.C.: DoD Command and Control Research Program, July 2002), 383.

[54] 16th Engineer Battalion, "Operations Brief," Briefing slides with scripted commentary, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, 22 November 2000, 16-17.

[55] Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Foy, Commander of 1-37 Armor Battalion, interview by author, 12 August 2000, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Foy <Bryan.Foy@carlisle.army.mil>, "Winky looking for help," electronic mail message to Lieutenant Colonel Garland Williams <gwilliams@usip.org>, 25 November 2002.

[56] 16th Engineer Battalion, 8.

[57] Ibid., 7.

[58] United States Army Corps of Engineers – Europe District, 73.

[59] Ibid., 60.

[60] Ibid., 35-36.

[61] United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo, Regulation Number 1999/8 On the Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK, 20 September 1999).

[62] Christopher Holshek, "The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations: Promoting Unity of Effort," in Lessons From Kosovo: The KFOR Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (Washington, D.C.: DoD Command and Control Research Program, July 2002), 284-285.

[63] Ibid., 287.

[64] For a general discussion, see United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (New York, NY: United Nations, 2000); International Crisis Group, Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report No. 100 (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2000); and United Nations, Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, A Year and a Half in Kosovo (Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK, 2000).

[65] European Commission, 4.

[66] European Agency for Reconstruction. Report concerning the financial accounts of the European Agency for Reconstruction and the implementation of aid for Kosovo for the year 2000, untitled, 12 November 2001 (ECA/01/32), 1.

[67] The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2000), 124.

[68] Curt Tarnoff, Kosovo: Reconstruction and Development Assistance, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 16 January 2001), 6.

[69] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "CIMIC Reconstruction," NATO Review 49-No. 1 (Spring 2001): 21.

[70] United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Department of Reconstruction, Kosovo 2001-2003: From Reconstruction to Growth (Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK, December 2000), 2.

CHAPTER FOUR: AFGHANISTAN

It is difficult to draw exact parallels between the military interventions that NATO conducted in Bosnia and Kosovo with the intervention that the United States led in Afghanistan. In fact, the only major similarity is that post conflict reconstruction of the physical infrastructure did not immediately occur in all three operations to provide basic needs and services and jumpstart the economy. There are three main differences between the Balkans' operations and the operation in Afghanistan that are striking and obvious. Whereas the Balkans interventions were executed under a NATO blanket authority, the military operation in Afghanistan was a military coalition coordinated by the United States, excluding formal NATO authority, with Americans holding every key command position. The intervention was designed with a small force in mind; therefore, unlike the Balkans, security and stability throughout the countryside were not established immediately upon entry into the theater. While NATO forces in Bosnia and Kosovo immediately began the process of disarming and demobilizing the former warring factions under the auspices of a brokered agreement, the United States forces that deployed to Afghanistan arrived, not as peacekeepers, but as combatants with the mission to hunt down and destroy the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorist network.

As the initial force entered Afghanistan, it quickly determined that there was little to no infrastructure that could be used. If the force required infrastructure to support their operations, it had to be built. Unlike the Balkans where the infrastructure was somewhat damaged from neglect and war, but still repairable in most areas, Afghanistan's infrastructure had been decimated by a combination of 23 years of war, neglect, oppressive rule, and extended drought. Massive humanitarian relief was the initial order as Afghanis struggled to obtain even the barest of necessities; however, infrastructure to move the relief supplies to the outlying areas did not exist. Many Afghan villagers were forced to stock food stores for the cold weather as the lack of infrastructure precluded any resupply reaching the village during the winter. Roads initially built in the 1960s by the United States and the Soviet Union were worn and damaged through to the sub-base. Elevations in excess of 6,000 feet inhibited even the sturdiest of vehicles from traveling during snowy conditions.

The third main difference that set it apart from the Balkans was the governmental structure established in Afghanistan. While the governmental leaders in the Balkans and the regions that they controlled were readily identifiable, it was much more difficult to define the friendly and enemy organizations in Afghanistan. First was the Taliban, the Afghan rogue government. After Soviet forces departed Afghanistan in 1989 and the Moscow installed

government collapsed three years later, a coalition of tribal-based *muhahidin* assumed control of the country. The coalition quickly fell apart and its factions engaged in a civil war that ravaged the land. Into this chaos stepped the Taliban, consisting largely of young students from the religious schools in neighboring Pakistan, led by Islamic teachers headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar. Rooted in the southern Pashtun tribe (about 40 percent of the population), the Taliban in 1994 moved northward, determined to bring order to Afghanistan and create a pure Islamic state based on an extremely strict reading of the Koran. Capturing Kabul on September 26, 1996, the regime initially had a measure of acceptability and support among the Afghanistan populace; however, the regime's repression, particularly against women, their abysmal human rights record, cultural excesses (destruction of Afghanistan's historical assets), coercive imposition of radical Islam, and finally their provision of a safe haven for terrorists, global arms dealers, and drug peddlers quickly made the Taliban an international pariah.[1]

The second group was the non-Pashtun force that quickly re-allied as the Northern Alliance, organized loosely under ousted ethnic Tajik president Burhanuddin Rabanni. The alliance was composed of commander Ahmed Shah Massoud's Islamic Society of largely Tajik forces and General Addul Rashid Dostum's ethnic Uzbek National Islamic Movement. The forces of the Shi'a Hazara tribe, which maintains close relations with Iran, and those of the Turkmen tribe also joined the Northern Alliance. The third governing authority that was in Afghanistan consisted of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization based in more than 60 countries around the world.[2] Although deferential to the Taliban – some United States counter-terrorism officials even saw it as a partner of the Taliban – al Qaeda consisted almost exclusively of Arabs. Prior to October 2001, Afghanistan formed the nerve center of their activities and also served as the main base for their ideological and terrorist training. The result was a country with three functioning "governments," far from being an integrated unit. It was a country at war with itself.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION

If it is believed that the United States deployed military forces to Afghanistan only in a direct response to the September 11th terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, then many of the events leading up to the Afghanistan military intervention were summarily dismissed into irrelevant history. In order to understand the nature and justification of the United States military intervention, three previous terrorist attacks on various United States targets throughout the Middle East need to be quickly reviewed to demonstrate why the United

States response was aimed at the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb exploded outside of the Khobar Towers housing complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Americans and injuring more than 500 Americans and Saudis. Although not attributed to al Qaeda, this was the first international terrorist attack upon Americans since the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. Unable to accurately pinpoint the organization responsible, the United States response was to increase security on its military posts and increase its terrorism awareness – no overt retaliatory measures were taken.[3]



Figure 4.1: Bombing at Khobar Towers.[4]

On August 7, 1998, twin bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania crumpled buildings and blew apart nearby buses, trapping people under piles of concrete and twisted steel that rescuers cleared with backhoes, torches, and their bare hands. At least 81 were killed and more than 1,700 injured. The blasts occurred 450 miles apart from each other but just minutes apart, turning busy streets in the two African capitals into bloody zones of terror. According to National Security Council spokesman P.J. Crowley, "This appears to have been a very well-coordinated, very well-planned attack – clearly not the work of amateurs."[5] Although no one immediately claimed responsibility, intelligence quickly pointed to the al Qaeda network as the instigators of the attack. In response, United States military forces simultaneously launched attacks on August 20, 1998, against terrorist training camps at Khowst, Afghanistan, and the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant in Sudan, suspected of manufacturing chemical weapons. This was the first time the United States unreservedly acknowledged a preemptive military strike against a terrorist organization or network. At the time, this led to speculation that faced with a growing number of major attacks on United States persons and

property and mounting casualties, United States policymakers were setting a new direction in counterterrorism – a more proactive and global policy, less constrained when targeting terrorists, their bases, or infrastructure.[6] According to President Bill Clinton:

> I ordered our armed forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the threat they present to our national security. I have said many times that terrorism is one of the greatest dangers we face in this new global era. We saw its twisted mentality at work last week in the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which took the lives of innocent Americans and Africans and injured thousands more. Today, we have struck back. The attack was launched against one of the most active terrorist bases in the world. It is located in Afghanistan and operated by groups affiliated with Osama bin Laden, a network not sponsored by any state but as dangerous as any we face.[7]

Subsequently, on June 7, 1999, the Federal Bureau of Investigation put Osama bin Laden on its list of "Ten Most Wanted Fugitives." Intelligence led the Department of Justice to charge bin Laden with the embassy bombings and the Department of State's Diplomatic Security Service offered $5 million for information leading to his apprehension – the largest amount ever offered for a fugitive wanted by the United States government.[8]



Figure 4.2: Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.[9]

On October 12, 2000, in the port of Aden, Yemen, a sea-borne suicide attack against the USS Cole, a 505-foot United States Navy destroyer, blasted a 40-foot by 40-foot hole in the

ship's hull, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39. According to Richard Clarke, the National Security Council advisor who headed the government's counterterrorism efforts:

> There are some similarities that we see with East Africa. They [the embassy bombings] were very large and did extensive damage. This one appears to have been very large and shaped so that the blast went into the ship. There are similarities in the sophistication of the attack, the pre-planning of the attack. This is something that began long before the recent violence in the Middle East. This took months to plan, and there are indications of safe houses, and planning, and moving of personnel in. That's a sophisticated attack.[10]

On October 16, the Taliban government dismissed speculation that bin Laden was involved in the bombing of the USS Cole. On October 17, bin Laden warned the United States not to attack his home in Afghanistan, where locals feared a retaliatory strike. Saying that an attack would not kill him, he vowed to continue his battle against the "enemies of Islam;" however, he made no direct reference to the Yemen attack.[11] The United States response was to increase security at its overseas locations and increase terrorism awareness.



Figure 4.3: Attack on the USS Cole.[12]

At 8:45 a.m. on Tuesday, September 11, 2001, a commercial airliner crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. At that time, the severity of the incident, the numbers of people involved, and the reason for the crash were unknown. Shortly after 9:00 a.m., a second plane hit the south tower of the World Trade Center. At 9:38, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., was hit and a short time later a fourth commercial plane was downed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, about 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh. Shortly after 10 a.m., the south tower of the World Trade Center collapsed. Within the next half-hour, the north tower fell and the Pentagon crash site, between corridors four and five, melted and finally collapsed to the ground after a 45-minute fight. At 5:30 p.m. a third tower of the World

Trade Center complex, Building #7, succumbed to collateral damage, and a fourth building in the complex collapsed the next day.

The loss in human life was staggering:

- More than 3,000 people died or remain missing following the attacks.
- 343 firefighters and paramedics, 27 police officers, and 37 Port Authority police officers perished at the World Trade Center.
- 2,000 children lost a parent on September 11, including 146 children who lost a parent in the Pentagon attack.
- One business alone lost more than 700 employees, leaving at least 50 pregnant widows.[13]

According to subsequent videotapes of bin Laden, these strikes were rigorously planned and executed, but the effects were more deadly than calculated. On tape he stated:

> We calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy, who would be killed based on the position of the tower. We calculated that the floors that would be hit would be three or four floors. I was the most optimistic of them all...due to my experience in this field, I was thinking that the fire from the gas in the plane would melt the iron structure of the building and collapse the area where the plane hit and all the floors above it only. This is all that we had hoped for.[14]



Figure 4.4: Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.[15]

Immediately after the attack, it seemed that America had more questions than answers. What was going to be the appropriate response? What action could the nation, or the world for that matter, mount against a stateless enemy whose purpose was to end the way of life in the

United States? Where and in what direction should the United States direct its wrath? Is this going to happen again? Within hours of the tragedy, coalitions involving many nations assembled to fight terrorism – literally hundreds of countries contributing in a variety of ways – some militarily, others diplomatically, economically, and financially. In Washington, D.C., the Administration reestablished the Command Center in the White House, and President George W. Bush began to cobble together what would soon become a comprehensive response that included disruption of financial assets to terrorist organizations and the creation of a world wide coalition for the conduct of The Global War On Terrorism, in preparation of a military option to attack the terrorists at their source in Afghanistan and surrounding areas. According to President Bush:

> On September 11 the terrorists committed an act of war against the innocent. The terrorists killed not only to end lives -- they killed to end our way of life. Recently the terrorists said that we should forget the attacks of September 11. The terrorists would like nothing more than to silence the world's vocal opposition to their frightening vision they hope to export to every corner of the world. The world will never forget the innocent victims and the brave heroes who died attempting to save them. The world will never forget the survivors, the devastated families and the grieving friends they left behind.[16]

Since September 11, President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell created a worldwide coalition for the war against terrorism. The President met with leaders from at least 51 different countries to build support; 136 countries offered a range of military assistance and the United States received 46 multilateral declarations of support from International Organizations. Additionally, on September 12, the UN General Assembly and Security Council condemned the attacks, while NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS) and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) rapidly invoked their treaty obligations to support the United States effort. NATO allies assisted directly in the defense of American territory, and, notably, this was the first time that NATO invoked the Chapter V provisions of its founding charter.

In support of the United States, 89 countries granted over-flight authority for American military aircraft, while 76 countries granted landing rights. Additionally, twenty-three countries agreed to host United States forces involved in offensive operations. Through intelligence cooperation with many nations, the United States was able to acquire evidence against those responsible for the attacks of September 11 and was better able to prevent future terrorist attacks. Specifically in Afghanistan, with American leadership and international support, Afghans put aside long-standing ethnic and political differences to form a new interim government, naming a president and 29 ministers with portfolio, which included women who

were severely oppressed by the Taliban regime. As a vote of confidence, the United States and several other allies reopened their embassies in Kabul.

The Coalition Military Response

> I said to the Taliban, turn them over, destroy the camps, free people you're unjustly holding. I said, you've got time to do it. But they didn't listen. They didn't respond, and now they're paying a price. They are learning that anyone who strikes America will hear from our military, and they're not going to like what they hear. In choosing their enemy, the evildoers and those who harbor them have chosen their fate.
>
> - *President George W. Bush, October 17, 2001*[17]

Operation Enduring Freedom, the military phase, started October 7, 2001. This is a different kind of war against a different kind of enemy. The enemy is not a nation or an ethnic group - the enemy is a variety of terrorist networks that threaten the way of life of all peaceful people. Furthermore, the war against terrorism is the first war of the 21st Century, requiring a 21st Century military strategy. In that light, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld worked with coalition allies and the United States military to craft a cutting-edge military strategy that minimized civilian casualties, partnered with local forces, and brought quick destruction to the Taliban who supported the al Qaeda terrorist network. The coalition achieved broad military success while putting fewer than 3,000 American troops on the ground in Afghanistan. The United States military and Coalition forces demonstrated an ability to adapt to a distant, harsh and ever-changing battlefield. In some cases, soldiers conquered terrorists by welding together 21st Century technology with 19th Century tactics. Special Operations Forces (SOF) troops chased terrorists on horseback while using mobile phones and global positioning systems (GPS) to pinpoint targets for the Air Force. Bombers used 21st Century targeting technology - laser and GPS guided smart bombs to destroy specific targets, including centuries-old caves used as terrorist headquarters. It is an ongoing conflict, a global war on terrorism that may last for decades, but the Table 4.1 indicates a few of the key military successes thus far.

The military action in Afghanistan represented a global coalition effort. In addition to the United States, military assets were deployed from many other nations, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Russia and Turkey.[18]

- In just weeks the military essentially destroyed al Qaeda's grip on Afghanistan by driving the Taliban from power. Taliban leaders surrendered major cities to opposition forces, including Kandahar, Kabul, Kunduz, and Mazar-E Sharif. Senior al-Qaeda and Taliban officials were either captured or killed.

- The military destroyed 11 terrorist training camps and 39 Taliban command and control sites. This alone had huge impact. The Wall Street Journal reported on December 13, 2001, that as many as 50,000 terrorists from more than 50 countries had received training in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in recent years.[19]

- About 2.5 million humanitarian rations were dropped to aid the people of Afghanistan. Friendship Bridge between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan was reopened to transport humanitarian aid by land. The United States military rescued two American Christian aid workers who were being held as prisoners by the Taliban.

- Routes were blocked to try to prevent the escape of al Qaeda and Taliban members. Minefields and roads were cleared to ensure delivery of aid and freedom of movement.

- Leaflets were dropped and radio messages were broadcast to convey Coalition determination, provide truthful information, and encourage the capture of Osama bin Laden.

Table 4.1: Key Military Coalition Success in the Global War on Terrorism

United States Military Response

On September 11, 2001, General Tommy Franks, Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) was enroute to Pakistan to meet with President Musharraf to discuss a number of issues, among them security cooperation and terrorism. Upon notification of the attacks, he returned immediately to his headquarters in Tampa, Florida, where his staff, along with Defense and other government agencies, ensured "command and control survivability" while continuing to develop "situational awareness."[20]

On September 12, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the preparation of "credible military options" to respond to international terrorism. For CENTCOM, that directive guided the preparation of the plan that continues to unfold in Afghanistan. As in normal military operations, CENTCOM planning involved not only an evaluation of the enemy situation, but also the history of previous military operations in Afghanistan and the political and military situation across the region. The mission analysis and operational concept, which General Franks briefed to

President Bush on September 21, proposed that "US Central Command, as part of America's Global War on Terrorism . . . would destroy the al Qaeda network inside Afghanistan along with the illegitimate Taliban regime which was harboring and protecting the terrorists."[21] CENTCOM's mission analysis directed General Franks' recommended military course of action that was subsequently approved by Secretary Rumsfeld on October 1. General Franks briefed the final concept to President Bush on October 2, and was told to start combat operations on October 7 – twenty-six days after the attacks on New York and the Pentagon.[22] Planned operations involved all of the components of America's military power, and included significant contributions from the international community. The Coalition, which grew to 68 nations, sent military liaison teams to CENTCOM headquarters to develop an executable strategy of attacking simultaneously on several fronts. According to General Franks:

> Our intention from the outset was to seize the initiative and reinforce success, while keeping in mind the lessons of the previous campaigns in Afghanistan – avoid "invading," and work with (rather than against) the people. Among the lines of operation which characterize the campaign have been "Direct Attack of the Leadership of al Qaeda and the Taliban," and the provision of "Humanitarian Aid" to the Afghan people. Another line has focused on "Destroying the Taliban Military," using unconventional warfare forces alongside Afghan opposition groups whose goals were consistent with our own. "Operational Fires" directed by horse-mounted Special Forces troopers have also proven to be unique and successful. Additionally, we have employed Special Operations Forces in "Reconnaissance and Direct Action" roles while maintaining the capability to introduce "Operational Maneuver" (conventional forces) if required.[23]

On October 7, the Taliban controlled more than 80% of Afghanistan, and anti-Taliban forces were on the defensive. Al Qaeda was entrenched in camps and safe houses throughout the country. Afghanistan was, in fact, a terrorist sponsored state. By October 20 United States and Coalition forces had effectively destroyed all Taliban air defenses and had conducted a highly successful direct action mission on the residence of Mullah Omar in the middle of the Taliban capital, Kandahar. Simultaneously, SOF detachments linked up with anti-Taliban leaders and coordinated operational fires and logistics support on multiple fronts. Twenty days later, the provincial capital of Mazar-E Sharif fell. In rapid succession, Herat, Kabul, and Jalalabad followed. By mid-December, United States Marines had secured Kandahar Airport and the former Taliban capital was in the hands of anti-Taliban forces. Within weeks the Taliban and al Qaeda were reduced to isolated pockets of fighters; on December 22, General Franks traveled to Kabul to attend a moving ceremony marking the inauguration of the Afghan interim government – 78 days after the beginning of combat operations.[24]

United States Air War. Just like Bosnia and Kosovo, the military campaign in Afghanistan was divided into two basic phases – the air campaign and the ground campaign. However, unlike the campaign in the Balkans, which principally used strategic attack as a lever of coercive diplomacy, Operation Enduring Freedom had regime removal as one of its key objectives. To accomplish this goal, Taliban leaders and cadre were specifically targeted – not just military facilities, equipment, and front line troops. Given the relatively informal nature of leadership in Afghanistan and the militia character of the Taliban armed forces, residences and residential areas appeared on the target list.[25] Al Qaeda residences – as best as they could be identified – were also considered fair targets. Indeed, the elimination of suspected al Qaeda members – wherever they were and whatever they might be doing – was a prime campaign objective. Unfortunately, targeting Taliban and al Qaeda leaders and cadre "at home" increased the likelihood of collateral damage to their families. Additionally, targeting residential areas meant a reduced margin for error in attack.

The first phase began with massive air strikes that lasted the first few weeks of combat operations. Operationally, the United States prepared target lists and controlled the movement of all warplanes in Afghan airspace from the sophisticated operations center 1,000 miles away at Prince Sultan Air Base near Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Navy jets flew 500 miles each way from carriers in the Arabian Sea. Air Force bombers completed six-hour round trip missions from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Air Force fighter bombers originated from bases in the Persian Gulf, missions that took eight or nine hours. Land-based bombers and carrier-based strike aircraft raided Taliban operation facilities including radar, command-and-control centers and aircraft, as well as al Qaeda camps and headquarters, with support from Tomahawk cruise missiles launched by American and British warships and submarines. The intense air campaign succeeded in destroying all major fixed targets by late October, but by and large enemy forces were only scattered, not eradicated.[26]

Running low on large enemy infrastructure targets, United States military commanders turned their focus in early November to striking al Qaeda and Taliban operatives in the field with increased emphasis on digitally coordinated attacks. Using Afghan opposition forces to identify enemy targets, small SOF teams pinpointed target positions using GPS and called in air strikes to precise coordinates. Allied aircraft then destroyed enemy targets using precision-guided weapons, less than 20 minutes after receiving the target details. "Smart bombs" such as Tomahawk cruise missiles were used in conjunction with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) – conventional bombs equipped with GPS satellite-guidance kits and navigational fins, capable of hitting within a few yards of a designated target. JDAMs are cheaper than Tomahawk cruise

missiles ($18,000 to $1 million apiece, respectively), can navigate better in bad weather, can vary their trajectory patterns, and can be carried by long-range B-2 and B-52 bombers. Further, targets must be programmed into Tomahawks prior to launch, while air-launched munitions can be directed as needed, providing greater flexibility on the battlefield. More than 70 percent of ordnance delivered during the Afghan bombing campaign was precision-guided, as opposed to 30 percent in Kosovo and 10 percent in the Gulf War, resulting in more effective sorties and less collateral damage. The United States Air Force reported 90 percent accuracy in the bombing campaign, the highest in history. Military planners at CENTCOM initially calculated that it would take five months before conditions would be ripe for an offensive against Kabul. However, after only twenty days of air strikes, Northern Alliance forces were able to march on the capital, capturing it 24 hours later.[27]

United States Ground War. The ground war is more difficult to characterize as the intent and location of enemy forces were less clear. With allied SOF and air support, opposition forces were able to take the initiative when matched against enemy forces and appeal to other Afghans to join the effort to shake off Taliban rule. Many opposition fighters felt they were waging war against the Taliban for themselves and not for the sake of a foreign occupation force, while others joined to profit from being on what increasingly appeared to be the winning side. In early November, Mazar-E Sharif surrendered. Northern Alliance forces, backed by allied SOF and air support, advanced 90 kilometers from their positions south of Kisindeh and Aq-Kopuk to the outskirts of the city in just a few days. Taliban defenses retreated without much resistance to Northern Alliance advances, with numerous Taliban defections. As the attack continued, the Northern Alliance accrued momentum and gained new recruits while the confidence of the Taliban forces in the north waned.[28]

A domino effect ensued. Taloqan, the former headquarters of the Northern Alliance, surrendered with almost no resistance soon after the fall of Mazar-E Sharif, scoring an important psychological victory for opposition forces. Herat and Shindand quickly followed. Next, Kabul surrendered to proxy forces, and then Jalalabad. According to Brookings Institute scholar Michael O'Hanlon, "By November 16, Pentagon officials were estimating that the Taliban controlled less than one-third of the country, in contrast to the 85 percent just a week before."[29] In December, the first United States Army units deployed into Mazar-E Sharif, and Kandahar, the last Taliban stronghold in the country, fell to allied forces. By mid-month, many of the enemy were reduced to "pockets" and "pools" of resistance; some hiding in caves, others on the run. Osama bin Laden and more than 1,000 al Qaeda operatives were tracked to the mountains of Tora Bora on the Pakistan border, with allied forces scrambling to apprehend them

and seal off escape routes. During operations at Tora Bora, just over 200 SOFs and cooperating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives were in Afghanistan; too few to effectively monitor the entire Pakistani border without substantial help from Afghan and Pakistani forces.

On January 29, 2002, elements of the United States Army's 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), known as Task Force Rakkasan, relieved the Marine unit at Kandahar airbase. Four weeks later, the first UN humanitarian assistance cargo flights into Afghanistan offloaded 16 metric tons of humanitarian assistance material to UN vehicles.[30] Since that first humanitarian air delivery, United States forces participated in three ground operations during the first year in an effort to rid the country of all remaining Taliban and al Qaeda remnant forces – quite a daunting task considering the unforgiving Afghan terrain. On March 1, Operation Anaconda, the most visible and deadliest ground operation of the war, was launched in southeastern Afghanistan to root out hundreds of suspected Taliban and al Qaeda holdouts in the Khost and Patika provinces. Rough terrain, an altitude of 8,000 to 12,000 feet, and a temperature in the evenings between 15 and 20 degrees Fahrenheit, made for a tough operating environment. Although an increased number of conventional forces participated in this operation, proxy forces were once again relied upon to seal off important escape routes, and as with Tora Bora, many enemy forces escaped.[31]

Operation Mountain Lion, initiated on April 15, 2002, was designed to find enemy fighters in the Gardez and Khost regions, destroy those that were discovered, deny them control of the area, and deny them an opportunity to reorganize their forces. It was a 12-day running battle with United States troops and coalition allies searching caves and tunnels once used by al Qaeda and Taliban forces. While little was found, CENTCOM officials said the searches were necessary. According to CENTCOM command spokesman Lieutenant Commander Matthew Klee, "We don't want al Qaeda reoccupying these caves. We're doing this for deterrence purposes and also to make sure we didn't miss anything."[32] On May 31, Combined Joint Task Force 180 assumed control of operations in Afghanistan. Army Lieutenant General Dan McNeill assumed command, reporting directly to General Franks. The task force commanded United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan and supporting troops in Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its headquarters was established at Baghram Air Base, near Kabul.

July 27, 2002, marked an important change in the military situation on the ground. A guerrilla-like attack on a joint United States-Afghan reconnaissance patrol near Khost wounded five American soldiers. Since the rather inconclusive end of Anaconda, al Qaeda and Taliban forces seemed to have melted away into neighboring countries and local villages, and few

enemy targets were left to identify and destroy, causing a lull in the fighting. The July 27 attack, however, was followed by increased attacks on United States military and interim Afghan government targets, suggesting the possible reorganization of al Qaeda and Taliban elements into small, decentralized fighting units employing guerrilla tactics. In response the Coalition shifted more toward conventional forces and tactics.

Beginning on August 18, 2002, Task Force 180 and the 82nd Airborne Division kicked off Operation Mountain Sweep, their first operation since arriving in Afghanistan earlier in the year. Using combat engineers, aviation assets, and civil affairs detachments, Mountain Sweep continued Operation Mountain Lion in searching out al Qaeda and Taliban forces and information about the terrorist organizations. The six-day operation centered on the villages of Dormat and Narizah – south of the cities of Khost and Gardez. CENTCOM officials claim that Mountain Sweep was a great success with more than a dozen suspected Taliban affiliates taken into custody for questioning. By the beginning of October, about 2,000 soldiers from the 82nd were involved in similar operations along the Pakistani border.[33] The goal of stability and security was not fully realized throughout Afghanistan during the first year, although the situation is much better than it was prior to October 2001. Once again, this is a unique type of war and an unqualified victory will be difficult to determine. The major goals of the ground war, to overthrow the Taliban and to reduce the influence of al Qaeda were achieved. But enough remnants of Taliban and al Qaeda forces remain in the country to adversely affect the long-term peace and stability of the region.

STATE OF AFGHANISTAN AT THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

United States Secretary of State Colin Powell told Hamid Karzai, the interim Afghan leader, that the United States would make substantial financial commitments at the international donor's conferences and that United States forces would be relentless in pursuing the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban. Secretary Powell said on NBC's "Today" show:

> This country needs everything. It needs a banking system. It needs a sanitation system. It needs a phone system. It needs road construction. Everything you can imagine. We don't want to leave any contamination behind. That is in the interests of the Afghan people and certainly the mission we came here to perform."[34]

President Karzai responded:

> The Afghan people have been asking for a staying commitment, a staying partnership, from the United States to Afghanistan in order to make the region

> safe, in order to make Afghanistan stand back on its own feet and continue to fight against terrorism or the return of terrorism in any form to this country.[35]

The nature of this long-term commitment is evolving. The military situation remains tenuous and the long-term commitment of United States forces will continue to be debated. However, the concrete, indisputable facts concern the state of the Afghan infrastructure. Secretary Powell made the correct assessment – the Afghans have nothing - and it is to that problem that the United States must turn if the government plans to have an eventual military endstate in Afghanistan.

More than two decades of conflict and four years of drought led to widespread human suffering and massive displacement of people. Many parts of the country remain vulnerable to famine, the infrastructure base was destroyed or severely degraded, and human resources were depleted. State institutions were largely nonfunctional and the economy increasingly fragmented. The social fabric weakened considerably, and human rights undermined, with women and minorities as the principal sufferers. UN humanitarian agencies did much to alleviate the situation, wrestling with the Taliban who attempted to block foreign aid from flowing into the country. On September 12, 2001, however, the UN World Food Program (WFP), as well as a score of NGOs, all of which served as the principle lifeline for millions of Afghans, withdrew from the country in light of anticipated United States retaliation, leaving 5.5 million hungry people. According to the WFP, about 15,000 tons of stockpiled food remained in the country at the time of the group's departure, enough to last only two weeks.

The mass exodus of Afghans from Afghanistan after September 11 alarmed Afghanistan's neighbors. Pakistan and Iran, expecting over one million people to flood into their territories, promptly sealed their borders with barbed wire in the days following the attack. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans who reached the borders were forced to turn back. Those with visas could enter Pakistan, but Pakistani officials soon stopped issuing visas to Afghans altogether. Though neighboring states have standing obligations under international law to allow refugees into their territories,[36] neither the UN nor the international community pressed Afghanistan's neighbors to reopen their borders. Afghanistan's humanitarian, reconstruction and development needs are immense. Its economy is in a state of collapse, its infrastructure is destroyed, its formal state institutions severely undermined or non-existent, and its social indicators the worst in the world. While the agreement reached in Bonn, Germany, establishing the Afghan interim government, was historic and encouraging, the political environment remains fragile and the challenges ahead are immense. Combined, these circumstances presage a humanitarian disaster.

Afghanistan will undoubtedly need major reinvestment in all sectors. Significant resources will be needed not only to rebuild the human and physical capital destroyed over the last two decades, but also to move Afghanistan onto a higher trajectory of growth and human development for the medium term. In the short term, there remains a pressing need to meet the humanitarian needs of a war-weary population and to help ensure that the transition to peace is as smooth as possible. The Bonn Agreement provides clear political markers that the country needs to meet in order to sustain international support. It is essential that early assistance provide a stake in the peace process for ordinary Afghans in addition to those who might otherwise engage in conflict or illicit activities. Prior to 1979, Afghanistan was among the poorest and least developed countries in the world. Since then, its economic and social indicators have only deteriorated further. The majority of the Afghani people have nothing. The international community must determine what level of reconstruction will constitute mission success in a country with very limited pre-conflict infrastructure and resources.

The Economy

Afghanistan is a landlocked, mountainous, geographically remote, sparsely populated, ethnically diverse, yet geopolitically important country. According to the World Bank, it has long been one of the poorest countries in the world, falling near the bottom in terms of average per-capita income and UN Human Development Index (169th out of 174 countries in 1996). Afghanistan's pre-war economy was mainly based on agriculture and animal husbandry. The country had a low population density due to difficult topographical and climatic conditions (high mountains covering most of the country, extremes of temperatures, and arid to semi-arid climate). In 1978 – the last year of peace – Afghanistan was largely self-sufficient in food and was a significant exporter of agricultural products. Agriculture, however, was largely concentrated in the narrow river valleys and plains where irrigation water from snowmelt was available. The manufacturing industry was largely undeveloped, with only a few plants established in the areas of textiles, medicines, and cement. Nevertheless, macroeconomic policy was surprisingly balanced, with budget surpluses, a market-based competitive exchange rate and modest foreign and domestic debt.[37]

Economic considerations played second fiddle to political and military upheavals during two decades of war, including the nearly 10-year Soviet military occupation. During that conflict, one-third of the population fled the country, with Pakistan and Iran sheltering a combined peak of more than 6 million refugees. The drought, the long drawn out war of Soviet occupation, and the subsequent internecine conflict severely damaged Afghanistan's economy. By the mid-

1990s, the state and civil society had broken down over time and there was a progressive erosion of institutions – both modern and traditional – which had governed the pre-war society. Given the breakdown of the state and civil society, and consequent inability to respond adequately, a four-year drought led to famine. Crop production was halved and livestock herds heavily depleted, more than erasing the modest gains of the early mid-1990s. Increasing numbers of people lost their means of livelihood and were displaced, either internally or to neighboring countries. Malnutrition significantly worsened, with starvation occurring with increasing frequency. The Taliban, in a positive move, banned opium poppy cultivation; however, this sharply reduced the incomes of those small farmers and rural wage laborers who were dependent on poppy cultivation and related work. Government-provided social services, which never had a strong outreach into the rural areas, atrophied and to a large extent stopped functioning. NGOs and UN agencies took up the task of providing essential social services to parts of the population, building on community-based efforts in various parts of the country. Inflation wiped out the value of the Afghan currency in the 1990s, currency that was printed by the Northern Alliance without any monetary control. Agricultural output came down sharply, livestock herds were depleted, and large-scale industries almost ceased functioning.[38] In early 2000, 2 million Afghan refugees remained in Pakistan and about 1.4 million in Iran, while the post Soviet conflict Afghanistan economy was in a state of collapse.

The Transportation Sector

More than two decades of war not only devastated Afghanistan's infrastructure, but also deprived the country of new investment that would have raised services above prewar levels. As a result, most Afghans have little or no access to decent basic services, and must either go without or rely on costly alternatives. Among the most serious costs, particularly for women and children, are the costs in terms of health (from unsafe water and sanitation, and indoor air pollution from burning traditional biomass fuels) and time (required for fetching water and fuel). It is difficult to overemphasize the low base from which reconstruction will begin. The national road network is in poor condition, with significant numbers of bridges and causeways damaged or destroyed. According to the Asian Development Bank's Preliminary Needs Assessment, 128 kilometers of the 227 kilometer Torkham-Jalalabad-Kabul road (crucial both for trade and for relief shipments) is so seriously damaged that it takes 4 days for a truck to make a return trip between Peshawar and Kabul, a journey that used to take less than a day. Twenty-five years ago it took 3 hours to travel from Kabul to Kandahar, in December 2002 it took 14. Few rural villages have all-weather road access, and it is estimated that much of the primary road network

of 2,500 kilometers needs rebuilding. In addition to destruction and underdeveloped physical infrastructure, public institutions (national and municipal) nominally responsible for service delivery were severely weakened through loss of experienced staff and lack of funding for even routine maintenance.[39]

For a mountainous, landlocked country like Afghanistan, roads and airports are vital for transport, for international trade, to facilitate national integration, and to avoid supply bottlenecks that create inflation. In light of this, 41 airports augmented the poor road network; however, only one can adequately handle the wide body jet aircraft prevalent in today's commercial air structure. The largest and most important airport was Kabul International Airport, where traffic doubled to over 100,000 passengers annually between 1969 and 1976. Topographical conditions, however, limited the airport's capacity to handle wide-bodied jets, resulting in several expansion projects by both the Soviets and the United States to fix the problem. The Soviets lengthened the Kabul airstrip for use by larger aircraft, with new terminals and hangars, pushing up passenger movement to 127,000 in 1982.

There is an almost non-existent rail network. The total length is 24.6 kilometers of mixed gauges connecting Turkmenistan to Towraghondi and Uzbekistan to Kheyrabad – not sufficiently developed to aid significantly in Afghanistan's redevelopment.[40] Road rehabilitation and upgrading should focus on the core highway network comprising the national Ring Road and border links - most of which was originally built by the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. Fast track projects throughout the country are required to remove all bottlenecks such as collapsed bridges, disintegrated pavements, and damaged tunnels. Subcontracting can be used to generate employment through extensive labor-intensive methods in projects such as extensive drainage, erosion protection, and routine maintenance works.

Water Supply, Sewage, and Solid Waste

Access to adequate and safe water and sanitation facilities is limited, although in some areas NGOs and communities have improved conditions. Piped water and sewage networks are few in number and in poor shape due to a lack of maintenance and war damage. There is heavy reliance on on-site water and local sewage solutions. These solutions, together with severely diminished water resources caused by four years of drought, have led to high levels of groundwater pollution. Currently an estimated 23 percent of the population has access to safe water, although this masks wide differences among provinces and districts, and less than 20 percent of urban households have access to piped water. Rampant water borne diseases are a

major cause of the prevailing high infant and child mortality rates, with approximately 85,000 children under age five dying annually from diarrhoeal diseases. Few residential or public buildings in Afghan cities have sewage systems, and those that do have systems discharge wastewater directly into rivers without treatment – downstream users suffer the consequences. In 1997, the World Bank estimated that sanitation coverage was 23 percent of the urban population and 8 percent of the rural population. Hygiene education accompanying water supply installation has been introduced by some NGOs, but coverage remains extremely limited.[41]



Figure 4.5: Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births).[42]

Energy

What energy production existed before the conflict has since ceased. War has resulted in a shift back to traditional biomass fuels (firewood, crop residues, animal waste) for cooking and heating, likely to be a major contributor to respiratory diseases, especially among women and children. Prewar electricity was available only in the cities – about 6 percent of the population had access to electricity supply; because of severe damage to electrical facilities and a lack of any routine maintenance, this supply is limited to a few hours a day. The electricity production in 1999, for example, was limited to 420 million kWh with fossil fuel producing 35 percent of the available electricity. Despite having little or unreliable data, the output now is only a small percentage of the 1999 level. Additionally, petroleum storage facilities around major urban centers were destroyed and transport costs of imported fuels were inflated by the high costs of road transport. Natural gas used to be a major export, but gas fields ceased to operate and the wells were capped.[43] The final tally is that there is little energy production for a country that has 23 million inhabitants. The combined effects of the war, the drought, hyperinflation, and population displacement result in a country that now exists on scavenging for items to burn for residential uses.

Telecommunications

Communications facilities are seriously underdeveloped with limited telephone and telegraph service. Access to telecommunications is one of the lowest in the world with only 2 telephones per 1,000 people. In 1997, limited domestic telecommunications links were established between Mazar-E Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Kabul through satellite and microwave systems. Additionally, there are two international links, 1 Intelsat linked only to Iran and 1 Intersputnik link for the Atlantic Ocean region with a commercial satellite telephone center in Ghazni.[44] There is no mobile service or Internet service in the country. Because Afghanistan's telecommunications sector was so underdeveloped even before the conflict, reconstructing the telecommunications sector will require a determination of what constitutes success and mission completion. Although communications reconstruction was seen in Bosnia and Kosovo as a key to stimulating the economy and establishing normalcy, Afghanistan's prewar telecommunications state may lend itself to a different approach by the international community.

Mine Threat

Afghanistan, a country slightly smaller than Texas, is the most mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affected country in the world, a situation that has been exacerbated by the increase in open conflict and Coalition military operations since September 2001. Villagers attempting to disarm and recycle land mines continue to be maimed and killed, even though 7 million of the approximately 26 million inhabitants have received some form of mine awareness education. According to Donald "Pat" Patierno, head of the United States Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Humanitarian Demining Assistance Program, "Desperation causes some folks to engage in amateur demining even though they know the danger and may have received mine awareness training. This behavior is not unique to Afghanistan."[45] Land mines were first introduced to Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (1979 to 1989) and were widely sown by Soviet troops, their Afghan cohorts, and Mujahadeen freedom fighters. When the Soviets withdrew, the mines remained and the warring factions continued to plant more. Additionally, unknown quantities of UXO litter the country. These contaminants infest agricultural and grazing fields, irrigations canals, urban areas, homes, roads, power stations, airfields, and other facilities. UN estimates place the number of mines in the country at between 5 million and 10 million. The shear number of land mines throughout the country is even more staggering in light of the fact that only 11 percent of the total land area is contaminated with mines, and over half the country's terrain doesn't even lend itself to effective mining.[46]

Prior to these recent hostilities, the total economic loss to the country over the past 12 years as a result of mines and UXO was estimated by the UN at over $550 million; the limited data available suggest a casualty rate of 150 to 300 per month, with 200,000 remaining survivors of mine and UXO accidents. Pre September 2001 assessments indicate 732 square kilometers of known mined area, of which an estimated 100 square kilometers are mined in former frontline areas, and 500 square kilometers of UXO in contaminated battle areas. Recent events exacerbated the problem in Afghanistan with new areas being contaminated by coalition UXOs. Similar to Bosnia, the significant shifts in frontline military positions created new areas impacted by UXO from ground fighting, and ammunition depots in major towns, when hit, spread UXOs over as much as a 5-kilometer radius. Additionally, mine and UXO injuries escalated due to new contaminations and to increased population displacement, often in unfamiliar areas.[47]

In addition to the human toll and the loss of valuable livestock, mines and UXOs are obstacles to internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugee return. They deny people access to farm and grazing land, shelter and water, and prevent the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure such as roads, bridges, irrigation systems, schools, and other public buildings. At least 60 percent of the mine and UXO contaminated areas are in such locations, resulting in major losses to both the Afghan economy and society. Prewar mine action in Afghanistan, however, was extremely cost-effective based on experienced UN and NGO mine clearance teams and large scale use of mine detection dogs. The UN estimated that each dollar spent yielded $4.60 in economic returns. The annual yield for one square kilometer of clearance was as much as $2,000 for grazing land and from $13,500 - 520,000 for farmland. Cleared roads provided $250,000 in economic benefits per 50 kilometers. Additionally, prewar mine action resulted in an estimated 50 percent reduction in civilian mine victims, and facilitated the return or resettlement of approximately 1.53 million refugees and IDPs.[48]

MILITARY RESPONSE TO POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Post conflict reconstruction in this war torn country takes on a different meaning than it did in the Balkans. Unlike the Balkans, military forces in Afghanistan, except for civil affairs teams and SOF forces, are more centralized in the cities and do not venture far from their established safe havens unless actively engaged in ground operations. Roads are in some cases non-existent and the roads that do exist are replete with banditry, theft, and are essentially avoided by the military. The military "footprint" in Afghanistan is not all encompassing; in fact, in some

circles, the Bush Administration was accused of trying to reconstruct Afghanistan on the cheap by deploying the bare minimum number of forces in the country. United States and coalition forces are not present on every street corner and there is no well-established confrontation lines or zones of separation for coalition forces to monitor. Because the physical infrastructure is so lacking, most resupply for coalition forces arrives daily by air. There has not been a designation of an off-base Main Supply Route (MSR) network as there was in both Balkans operations, so engineer-funding streams were couched in force protection and force beddown, rather than in reconstruction. Given this scenario, is there a military piece in Afghanistan's reconstruction?

United States Engineering Effort

> Deploy rapidly to multiple locations in a contingency area of operations and conduct base camp construction. On order conduct airfield repair, sustainment, survivability, and general engineering as needed in support of theater combat operations.
>
> - *United States Engineer Mission Statement*[49]

The engineer mission statement was clear – there was to be no post conflict infrastructure reconstruction executed by military engineers in Afghanistan. All missions would be to support the deployed combat force and would adhere, again, to minimum military requirement standards. However, there were sufficient military tasks the engineer task force was required to complete in order to fully carry out their assigned mission. On September 11, CENTCOM Engineering Division, and its equivalent engineer staffs within its component commands, proceeded to direct military engineer efforts for a war unlike any this nation ever faced. Specified tasks that required engineer support included contingency planning, engineer unit deployment, airfield repair and upgrade, mine and UXO clearing, and base camp construction. In the immediate wake of the terrorist attacks, engineers immediately immersed themselves in contingency planning. Evaluating the condition of available infrastructure in the area of responsibility, they compared this information with available engineer assets and capabilities. The initial deployment of SOF units into the theater did not include supporting engineers – an omission that became obvious when the demand for engineers quickly escalated. In immediate response, some engineer forces already in the area revised their deployments to support early Enduring Freedom requirements. An Air Force RED HORSE unit, for example, diverted from a programmed project in one country to a contingency tasking in another.

As Operation Enduring Freedom progressed past the initial SOF stage, the flow of forces into the area significantly increased. Air Force RED HORSE and PRIME BEEF units (airfield construction units), Army engineer and prime power units, and Navy Seabee units deployed to

contingency installations to repair and upgrade airfields, construct base camps, and provide electrical power. Subsequent Army engineer units relieved Air Force and Navy Seabee units to continue base construction, maintenance, and repair, and Coalition partner engineers deployed into the area to support runway repair, well-drilling, and mine-clearing. Dividing the engineer mission into five categories – mobility, countermobility, survivability, general engineering, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Mine Action Center – it becomes readily apparent that engineer support to the deployed forces was an all-encompassing job considering the limited amount of military engineers (a few battalions of various engineer specialties) deployed into theater.

Mobility. Mobility operations are designed to facilitate the ease of movement for the military force and to enable rapid response and rapid resupply for combat forces whether in enemy contact or in day-to-day operations. The three mobility tasks that the engineer force accomplished in the first year of operations were route and airfield reconnaissance, airfield repair, and MSR maintenance and upgrades. Because there were no robust ground lines of communications in the area of operation, maintaining the air line of communications became a high priority. To adequately support the deployed forces in Afghanistan, war fighters needed airfields in several surrounding Central Asian countries and eventually within Afghanistan itself; the airfields would support fighter operations, logistical hubs, and force bed down. Because United States and Coalition forces had conducted only limited operations in the region before September 11, the only airfields and bases available quickly enough to support Operation Enduring Freedom were several fighter air bases built by the former Soviet Union. The Soviets hastily constructed or expanded these airfields during their 1980s Afghanistan campaign, using precast concrete slabs without reinforcing bar, emplacing them over roughly graded ground without a sub base – a recipe for airfield failure and disaster. Years of neglect and conflict, as well as Enduring Freedom air strikes, damaged and deteriorated the airfields, supporting utilities, and ground transportation infrastructure.[50]

Initially, rapid runway repair was the high priority mission for engineers. To get forces and logistics in theater quickly, they patched numerous bomb craters, repaired spalled and cracked pavement, and laid steel airfield matting. A more innovative approach was the Navy Seabee's use of acrylic copolymer soil stabilizers to suppress dust and stabilize soil for a desert airstrip. But there was a problem. Traditional concrete repair techniques necessitated closing sections of runways for days, waiting for freshly placed concrete caps and patches to cure to full strength. As fast as the situation was developing, the engineers did not have this kind of time and needed to seek other repair methods. As a faster alternative, engineers harvested the remaining undamaged slabs from unused areas of the airfields to replace the unserviceable

slabs. Small patches of damaged runway were cut out, the sub base was replaced and compacted, and the area was capped with the harvested slabs. By replacing these slabs during consecutive nights, airfields remained operational with minimal disruption while undergoing pavement repair.

Additionally, a team from the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency completed pavement evaluation studies at Kandahar and Baghram. These studies provided analyses on airfield characteristics such as pavement strength, the number of passes a runway could endure before failing, and recommendations on runway, taxiway, and parking apron usage. The teams generally overestimated the capacity of the airfields. For example, the assessment of the Kandahar airfield stated that it could support 50,000 passes by C-17s and 50,000 C-130 passes after several craters were repaired and that the Baghram airfield could support 15,000 passes by C-17s and more than 50,000 C-130 passes. Engineer planners relied on these assessments and were relieved that the airfields could support this amount of heavy traffic. For various reasons, however, these assessments were inaccurate. Once the initial repairs were completed in accordance with the assessments, the runways started again to deteriorate requiring daily maintenance. The premature failure of the Baghram airfield was attributed in part to several passes made by Russian IL-76 and AN-124 aircraft – the first being about the size of a C-17 and the second being the among the largest airframes in the world. The assessments did not project the use of these large airframes on the airfields, but there was no way to limit the use of large aircraft until the airfield failed and the Kabul airfield opened. As a result, friendly forces expanded their operations and used airfields built by the Soviet Union – the United States Cold War adversary.[51]

Concentrating on Kandahar and Baghram, engineers conducted initial rapid runway repair assessments to determine the requirements to make the airfields operational for military aircraft. Upon completion of the assessments, the 200/201st Expeditionary RED HORSE Squadron (United States Air Force), with help from the Italian and Slovakian Air Forces and the Polish engineers, completed concrete repairs to the runway, rewired the air traffic control towers, and constructed aircraft clamshell maintenance hangars.[52] Additionally, members of the 92nd Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy) and the 326th Engineer Battalion (Air Assault) completed over 60 other concrete repairs to the airfields at Kandahar, Baghram, and Mazar-E Sharif. These repairs totaled over 110,000 cubic yards of reinforced concrete and hundreds of cold patch asphalt repairs. In an effort to streamline resupply operations to the deployed force, additional assessments were executed at various ports and airfields in surrounding countries throughout Central Asia. All MSRs in the base camps in Central Asia, Baghram Airfield, and



Figure 4.6: Repairs to the Airfield.[53]

Kandahar Airfield were upgraded and maintained for military traffic; however, it is notable that no MSRs were repaired external to the base camps. To lessen construction times, United States engineers attempted to obtain materials from local quarries or else contract the delivery of suitable material from the limited local capacity. Materials were difficult to obtain early on in the operation because of the austere infrastructure and limited suppliers available, but this situation gradually improved. For example, Type 1 cement was the only kind available in Afghanistan, so all Type III cement (needed for proper repair of the runway) and all cold patch (needed to repair the asphalt at the Kandahar runway) had to be flown in. Keeping an adequate supply of these repair materials on hand was a constant challenge.[54]

Countermobility. The intent of all countermobility operations was to provide force protection to the deployed force while in the base camps and deter unwanted enemy movement upon a friendly force. This was a tough mission to execute because the enemy doesn't necessarily wear uniforms, nor operate as a traditional military force. Upon entry into theater, combat engineers constructed 8,000 meters of concertina wire fencing around Kandahar Air Base to keep local nationals and stray animals from conducting unauthorized entries onto the airfield. Six log cribs (an obstacle created from two parallel walls of railroad ties filled with dirt) were constructed at the base camp entry control points to facilitate vehicle movement, with two high blast walls made of 25,000 cubic yards of soil constructed for vehicle inspection. To secure the entry control point and provide cover for those soldiers conducting the vehicle inspections, two concrete bunkers were constructed and installed. To adequately guard the base camp perimeter, soldiers needed to be in a position higher than the ground that they were defending. In response, engineers constructed sixteen guard towers to help provide perimeter security. Finally, 800 meters of anti-tank ditch (a bulldozer wide ditch designed to stop vehicle movement) were built on both the northeast and south side of Kandahar Airfield in order to

adequately secure the coalition aviation assets. With force protection always remaining a high priority, the determination to what extent countermobility measures would be employed was always a judgment call based on the perceived threat.

Survivability. Survivability operations were designed and built to provide both vehicle and personnel covered fighting positions from which to conduct combat operations. To enhance and protect the Coalition force intelligence gathering ability, engineer forces first built hull-defilade positions (deep enough so that only the vehicle turret is exposed above the ground) around the Kandahar perimeter for the Canadian Coyotes (intelligence vehicle), and vehicle fighting positions for American Humvees equipped with TOW (Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided) missiles for perimeter defense. The engineers then used their Small Emplacement Excavators (small tractor with a small scoop blade on one end and an excavator arm on the other) to dig bunker positions for the dismounted infantry, vehicle positions for the mortars, and 2,000 feet of force protection trenches for personnel throughout the Kandahar life support areas. Logistics assets, because of their immobility and soft skin vulnerability, required protection from direct and indirect enemy fire; therefore, engineer forces constructed 12-foot earthen berms around the Ammunition Supply Point and the Bulk Fuel Point. These berms not only protected these logistics services from enemy fire, but also protected the rest of the base camp should an explosion occur during refueling or rearming operations. Additionally, it is common practice in a combat zone for Apache helicopters to rearm and refuel with the engines and blades turning in order to decrease the aircraft turn around time and limit the amount of time spent exposed to enemy fire on the ground. To support that mission, engineer forces constructed berms for hot rearming/refueling points throughout Central Asia and Kandahar. Again, these berms not only protected the Apaches from external gunfire, but also served as protection for others in the base camp should an aircraft explode while undergoing this somewhat dangerous logistics operation.[55]

These survivability missions were labor, material, and equipment intensive and required robust quantities of lumber, plywood, and sandbags for overhead bunkers and covers. Additionally, the austere environment and rocky soil conditions necessitated heavy dig assets requiring extensive maintenance support. Because engineer parts are not readily available in the Army inventory due to the low density of the equipment, engineer units, as a normal course, usually establish contracts at local commercial dealers (i.e.-Caterpillar or John Deere) in order to procure parts. This scheme was executed both in Pale, Bosnia, and in Pristina, Kosovo, in order to ensure ongoing maintenance support for engineer parts. In Afghanistan, however, the lack of a local vendor base led to difficulties in contracting for spare parts for commercial

engineer equipment. Once the airfield was established for military aircraft, engineer parts were, instead, procured through vendors in the Middle East and Europe and then flown in to Afghanistan on available military aircraft.

General Engineering. Realizing that there was not much in Afghanistan to exploit for the coalition force facilities, the engineer task force, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, spent a considerable amount of its energy constructing the base camps for the 6,000 man deployed force. However, unlike the Balkans operations, the planning time available to develop the scheme for base camp operations was greatly curtailed and had to be developed quickly. CENTCOM engineers developed criteria for standardized base camp guidance and promulgated them in the "USCENTCOM Contingency and Long-Term Base Camp Facilities Standards." These standards allowed components to better forecast resource requirements, providing tenet units with a common expectation for base camp construction. Initial beddown facilities for the first units arriving in Baghram consisted of a mix of old Russian barracks, standard general-purpose, medium tents, and Force Provider tents (contained in U.S. Army pre-positioned logistics sustainment packages). Instead of designing and building SEAhuts as was done initially in Kosovo and ultimately in Bosnia, troops in Operation Enduring Freedom deployed to Tier II tents (canvas tents with wooden floors and wooden frame walls). The engineer task force employed horizontal assets to prepare the gravel site layout for 350 Tier II tents, followed by vertical construction with electrical lighting and outlets. As the camp expanded, more Force Provider facilities were added, and several buildings were renovated for use as offices and limited sleeping quarters. Elements of the United States Army's 249th Prime Power battalion – the same unit that was able to repair and provide power to the New York Stock Exchange six days after September 11 - provided 2.5 megawatts of power in Central Asia and an additional 3 megawatts of power at Kandahar. Initially, units depended on their organic tactical generators for their power needs; however, because the existing power distribution systems at both camps were deemed to be unsafe, the utility detachment and other engineer personnel installed underground power lines.

Providing an adequate supply of potable water at Baghram was also challenging during its rapid expansion. Initially, bottled water was flown in – an acceptable solution when the camp consisted of fewer than 300 people. It was soon apparent, however, that as the population expanded, bottled water would not be adequate to meet dining, laundry, and hygiene requirements. As a solution, on-site wells were established both at Baghram and at Kandahar to provide 80,000-100,000 gallons per day; 6,500 feet of pressurized service lines for showers, laundry/bath units, and dining facilities were emplaced; and 3,000 feet of a gravity flow sewer

line was constructed in order to transport both the gray and black waste water to a local leach bed within the camps perimeter – the only sewage treatment system operating in Afghanistan.[56]

Because the local jails were no longer functional, the engineer task force had to create a short-term holding facility at Kandahar in order to handle all prisoners or detainees. This facility consisted of four guard towers, a small shower facility, 3,000 feet of 8-foot high chain link fence with razor wire, floors and lighting for 30 cells/tents, and 30 custom latrines for the detainees. In some cases, these were better conditions than where the detainees had been living before their capture. Additionally, engineer forces built several wooden frame headquarters buildings – one for the brigade headquarters, one for the Joint Special Operations Task Force, and three others for support elements. For all construction, the engineers developed an adequate drainage plan, despite the ongoing drought, and adequate concrete pads for vital tent facilities and aircraft parking. Again, the lack of available local sources to contract for material considerably slowed the construction times at Kandahar and Baghram; all material had to come from external sources outside of Afghanistan.[57]

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Mine Action Center. Because of the pervasive mine and UXO situation in Afghanistan, there was a heavy requirement to support the deployed forces with EOD. Engineer units were tasked to clear thousands of mines and UXO from thousands of square kilometers of ground to make the immediate area safe for occupation and use by Coalition forces. The Soviets operationally used antipersonnel minefields to protect the airfields and then left them in place when they departed. These minefields were fenced and generally well-marked. Subsequently, however, like Bosnia the locals lifted many of the mines and placed them in areas outside of marked minefields. Both the Taliban and Northern Alliance forces, for example, were suspected of lifting mines and planting them in unmarked fields during their battles in and around the Baghram airfield. Coalition engineer and EOD units conducted clearance operations to make designated areas safe for use by Coalition forces. It is important to again highlight that Title X, United States Code, prohibits United States soldiers from conducting humanitarian demining operations. However, demining, that operation executed by civilian deminers, and area clearance, operations conducted by military engineers for the Coalition forces, significantly differ in that area-clearance operations render an area only reasonably safe for operational use, while demining operations give a very high level of assurance that all mines and UXO have been removed from a designated area.

The procedures chosen to clear areas in Afghanistan were based on several factors, such as the estimated threat, the purpose of clearing, the type of terrain to be cleared, the type of clearing resources available, and the time available. Generally, there were three methods of

neutralizing mines in Afghanistan: manual, explosive, and mechanical. The least preferred method, manual clearing involves manually moving or lifting mines or UXO out of the way. United States soldiers do not manually lift mines by doctrine, and, as this method involves the greatest amount of risk, it is not the preferred method of many Coalition force engineer units either. Clearing mines and UXO with explosives involves placing additional explosives in close proximity to the mines or UXO without disturbing them and destroying them in place. United States Army EOD units and the Norwegian engineer unit coupled this technique with a method of shooting the mines with a sniper rifle. The intent was to separate the fuse from the explosive material before the fuse became activated; however, the munition often exploded during this uncertain process. The final method and that which was most used in Afghanistan was the mechanical method using the Mine-Clearing Armor-Protected (MCAP) Bulldozer. The MCAP dozers were effective at clearing mines to a depth of about 6 to 18 inches and could withstand blasts from antipersonnel mines with little or no damage. However, the enclosed cab intensified the blast effects from the detonation, and if operators detonated several mines in rapid succession, they were relieved because of the concussion effects they experienced. The area clearing results were impressive. In the immediate vicinity of Kandahar Airfield alone, EOD cache-clearing operations found more than 80 weapons caches. In the first year, EOD personnel destroyed over 120,000 munitions, totaling more than 350,000 pounds of explosives. EOD provided support to conventional and SOF forces for all operations and provided an emergency response for minestrikes and UXOs. Using the MCAP bulldozer, Norwegian Hydrema mine flails, and Jordanian Aardvark mine flails, Coalition engineer forces cleared over 3 million square meters in Baghram, Kandahar, and Mazar-E Sharif. The MCAP dozer alone detonated over 70 mines and uncovered in excess of 700 UXOs. Additionally, eight teams of dogs and their handlers were brought in from Bosnia and used successfully to proof Baghram and Kandahar for UXOs. A drawback of using dogs for mine detection, however, is that the method is significantly slower than mechanical methods and the dogs are greatly affected by environmental conditions – hot weather, dust, and the residual odor from recent detonations.[58]

As in the Balkans, the military Mine Action Center provided mine products to the task force for the Kandahar area of responsibility. Upon entry into theater, there was little information on specific minefield locations. As an initial guide, engineer task force soldiers relied heavily on old Soviet maps for minefield locations; however, upon establishing a link with the UN Mine Action Center, which had been operating in Afghanistan for several years before Operation Enduring Freedom, engineer forces in each task force were able to track UN clearance operations, reports of areas that had been completely cleared and deemed safe, and

reports where mines and UXOs were newly discovered. In some circumstances, unfortunately, military area clearance procedures were not tracked in enough detail to allow the areas to be turned over to a humanitarian demining center upon conclusion of military clearance operations – something that the UN humanitarian deminers needed to determine if further demining actions were required in order to certify that the area is cleared to Tier III UN demining standards. Despite some initial problems, the engineer forces were able to establish an adequate database in an effort to protect coalition soldiers during combat operations. As of July 2002, the task force had endured 10 mine and UXO incidents in Afghanistan, which resulted in several deaths and severe injuries – although one incident is too many, this is a relatively low number when placed against the pervasive threat.

Figure 4.7: EOD Operations and Mine Awareness Education.[59]

Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) Effort

If Coalition engineers were not organized nor tasked other than to support the deployed force in military specific operations, was there any military effort that concentrated on the Afghan population? The answer is that on a low, grass roots level, there was a military effort, but lying mainly in the humanitarian assistance realm and not solely in post conflict reconstruction. Campaigns for hearts and minds have been conducted in other operations, but there was a two-pillared approach in Afghanistan that was truly unique. During the mission analysis, General Franks emphasized that simultaneous with combat operations, the Coalition had to demonstrate that the war against terrorism was never directed specifically against the Afghan people. It was important to the establishment of a safe and secure environment that

soldiers were seen to be doing beneficial things to help the locals overcome their present adverse situation. This military presence was key in spreading the security umbrella out of the large cities and into the villages, and was not an attempt by the military to usurp the traditional NGO role of humanitarian assistance. Immediate military assistance was required for a civilian population that was in dire need of all types of humanitarian assistance. In other operations, task forces were stood up to conduct primarily civil-military operations, but there never was the overt designation of a Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). There were some possible disadvantages: lack of synchronization between the joint force and CJCMOTF commanders; duplication of effort; and increased force requirements. But in the case of Afghanistan, the advantages of a CJCMOTF – consolidation and coordination of civil-military operations, unity of command and effort for civil-military operations, and free the combatant commander from civil-military tasks - significantly outweighed the disadvantages. With Coalition forces remaining for the most part in the large towns, no other organization would be in a position to demonstrate to a good portion of the Afghan people that the war was not a war against them.[60]

The first issue that the CJCMOTF had to contend with was the definition of its mission. In early October 2001, CENTCOM ordered the creation of the CJCMOTF; however, they did not specify its mission nor give it specific tasks upon which to develop the mission statement, as would normally happen for a subordinate element. The initial guidance covered a broad range of possibilities in the humanitarian assistance and support to Coalition commander's arenas, but the overriding stipulation was that the CJCMOTF was to take its lead from the UN and other civilian relief agencies. There was one problem - IOs and NGOs refused to plan or speculate on future requirements without the definition of a specific need. This forced the CJCMOTF staff to organize and plan against an unknown requirement. The first elements of the CJCMOTF deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait, in November and Brigadier General David Kratzer of the 377th Theater Support Command assumed command in early December. In absence of CENTCOM guidance, Brigadier General Kratzer and his staff developed the following mission statement upon arrival:

> CJCMOTF facilitates continued good relations with local authorities and populations, identifies and coordinates civil-military projects, continues support to Coalition commanders and facilitates emergency humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan. On order, CJCMOTF transfers responsibility of projects and missions, as appropriate, to IO/NGOs, Department of State (DOS), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the Office of Military Cooperation – Afghanistan (OMC-A) and redeploys from Afghanistan.[61]

This was a good start for a mission statement, but this was not enough guidance for Brigadier General Kratzer's subordinate commanders to fully carry out their jobs. With the establishment of a broad mission statement, the commander needed to establish his mission intent so that his subordinates would have adequate direction – an intent that subordinates could refer to for guidance when unforeseen events occurred. Again, with a country that needed everything like Afghanistan, some priorities had to be established in order to better focus the limited civil-military assets in theater. After much discussion, the CJCMOTF Commander published the following intent:

- Establish Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) where the UN has humanitarian centers to enable IO/NGO-led humanitarian assistance (HA) operations
- Establish CHLCs where specific SOF teams are operating to augment their humanitarian assistance and situational awareness capabilities
- Provide civil-military operations support to local Coalition commanders to facilitate military operations
- Synchronize civil-military operations occurring in Afghanistan as conducted by all actors in order to avoid confusion and/or duplicative efforts among all parties
- Establish links to embassy, USAID, UN offices, ISAF, OMC-A and other relevant actors in Kabul to provide situational awareness and recommendations for future US action
- On order, CJCMOTF transfers projects and missions to IO/NGOs, DOS, and ISAF in order to set conditions for redeployment of CJCMOTF from Afghanistan[62]

Table 4.2 - CJCMOTF Commander's Intent – Key Tasks

Operationally, the CJCMOTF made some progress although funding was consistently an issue. Damage caused by the Taliban's reign could be seen on almost every street corner, on the face of every man, woman, and child, on nearly every building in Afghanistan, and even on the streets themselves. Under its self designed mandate, the CJCMOTF attempted to identify, coordinate, and conduct quick-fix humanitarian projects throughout the country that were not being accomplished by the greater humanitarian assistance community. The task force was careful to coordinate its efforts with Afghan agencies and the IO/NGO community. "We seek out the projects that will have the greatest impact on the Afghan people, such as the National

Impact Projects," said United States Army Major Jeff Coggin, chief of the Task Force's Public Health Department.[63]

Once a National Impact Project was identified, CJCMOTF had to establish that the project met certain criteria. First, the project had to comply with Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Civil Aid (OHDCA) guidelines – not a simple task since OHDCA guidelines are quite extensive. Also, CJCMOTF ensured that the project supported the Afghan Transitional Authority. Lastly, the CJCMOTF coordinated its efforts with the various government ministries to ensure that the project was good for the task force and good for Afghanistan; one of the most important parts of the Task Force's mission was to support the transitional government and the choices the government made for the rebuilding of Afghanistan. After the approval process was complete, the project was offered to local contractors for bidding. Upon acceptance of a bid, Afghan labor was hired and local materials were used to maximize the benefit to the local economy.[64] During the construction phase, Coalition engineers, public health professionals, and local contractors met periodically to ensure that the projects were completed to an exacting standard and to answer any ongoing questions about the current project or any future projects.

All of the National Impact Projects were in Kabul. They ranged from a power and water complex decimated by decades of war, to pharmaceutical companies that provide medication to the multitudes of the sick and injured. There were ten National Impact Projects in progress throughout Kabul, including a Teachers Training College, an Artificial Insemination Farm, the restoration of the Kabul Dental Hospital, and the repair of 266 kilometers of irrigation canals. According to Coggin:

> Whatever we do here will affect the rest of the country. A good example of that would be the Teachers College. If fixing a school for children helps one community, then fixing a school that instructs teachers will help an entire nation. The Afghan workers take a great deal of pride in their work. They realize that what they're doing is for everyone.[65]

Funding for CJCMOTF projects came from a variety of sources and caused some consternation in its execution. Primarily the task force received funds from OHDCA – Title X funding that is fenced annually by Congress. OHDCA funds were previously used in peace operations for quick impact, high profile projects jumpstart humanitarian civic action. However, until Operation Enduring Freedom there was never such an organizational focus from as high as the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the spending of these funds. Given the peacetime archaic rules that governed their use, this became somewhat problematic. The rules demanded intense involvement of much of the CJCMOTF and CHLC staffs – something the organization was not task organized to do. The CJCMOTF slowly turned into a monetarily poor military

NGO, and sacrificed its core competencies of traditional community assessment, information coordination, and military civil action activities. Coalition engineer assets were too few in number to spread across Afghanistan and CENTCOM was never going to use operational funds for civilian infrastructure reconstruction. The initial $2 million of OHDCA funds was the only funding that the military had for humanitarian assistance, requiring interagency approval before the money was released - it didn't arrive in theater until February 2002. Despite the funding problems, the CJCMOTF estimated that considering the Afghanistan economy, its cost of living, exchange rate, daily labor, and material costs, the management of these projects and funds would be similar to managing a project of $20-30 million.[66]



Figure 4.8: A Rebuilt School in Afghanistan.[67]

However, such projects have always been secondary to the Coalition's main objective, fighting remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda. As the United States reached the one-year anniversary of deploying forces into Afghanistan, three quarters of Afghanistan was considered relatively secure leading to a slight shift in emphasis away from combat operations and toward reconstruction efforts. General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, debated in the Pentagon that the United States should change its priorities in Afghanistan and de-emphasize military operations in favor of more support for reconstruction efforts. General Myers suggested that it may be time for the military to "flip" its priorities from combat operations aimed at hunting down al Qaeda and Taliban fighters to "the reconstruction piece in Afghanistan," a notable shift in priorities for a Pentagon that has eschewed nation-building exercises.[68] These remarks were quickly reflected in CJCMOTF operations on the ground. Colonel Phil Maughan, the commander of the CJCMOTF in Kabul, said that the new focus of Coalition activities was designed to help Afghanistan's new government establish its authority, make it easier for aid

organizations to carry out their work, and eventually, to allow Coalition forces to go home. According to Colonel Maughan:

> Eventually, what we envision with these regional teams, is getting the central government out to the regions, giving them the legitimacy they need to support Kabul. But, we are also trying to get the NGOs and the UN to start working together. Once they start doing that, there will no longer be a need for the US military and we can go home.[69]

Until the Fall of 2002, civil military operations in Afghanistan were modest with a budget of $6 million supporting scattered teams of six reservists each. Working from United States bases in half a dozen Afghan cities, the teams contracted local workers to rebuild war damaged schools, clinics, wells, and other public structures. Under the new program, the budget doubled and large, professional civil affairs teams, including engineers and veterinarians, were deployed and stationed at regional bases in the cities of Herat, Mazar-E Sharif, Kunduz, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Gardez and Bamian.[70] A coalition of private agencies operating in Afghanistan criticized the expansion of the military civic action program calling it "risky and premature" and suggested that uniformed troops taking a major role in providing aid might undermine their efforts to bring about stability and development. But as word of the Americans' plan spread, local officials and residents welcomed the news, partly because the added foreign troops mean greater security and partly because the projects will provide work for hundreds of people in areas flooded with returning refugees and idle former combatants.

Shortfalls

The security situation in Afghanistan has changed remarkably since September 11; however, the state of the physical infrastructure has only gotten worse. The military reconstruction approach taken thus far in Afghanistan falls short of what was required in the first year. Military engineers did not have the mandate to execute any post conflict reconstruction. Although their list of accomplishments is laudable, their efforts, by design, were solely in support of the deployed military force, and it still takes 14 hours to travel from Kabul to Kandahar, a trip that used to take 3 hours. Military engineers have simply not worked "outside of the wire" on projects that specifically benefit the Afghan people. The CJCMOTF worked hard to initiate and complete several humanitarian projects – projects that were both job creating and beneficial to a specific local need – but there were problems. These projects did not address the large scale reconstruction of the physical infrastructure, the creation of the first ever CJCMOTF was rife with organizational problems, and the jungle of archaic rules and procedures that the CJCMOTF had to wade through in order to accomplish any projects, regardless of the size, greatly limited

the number and types of projects that they were fortunate enough to complete. The CJCMOTF served essentially as a military NGO, trying to fill humanitarian aid gaps that seemed to exist between the civilian NGOs that were deployed on the ground; however, even that was problematic. The CJCMOTF was charged to work with the civilian NGO community to determine the existing gaps, but met with little cooperation or sharing of information, resulting oftentimes in duplicative efforts.

A year after the formation of an interim government, Afghanistan in many ways has been transformed. The Taliban's harsh Islamist regime has been swept away. Schools, especially for girls, have reopened across the country. A large vote took place in June, electing an administration that is charged to prepare a democratic constitution. In Kabul, violence has diminished so much that the murder rate is half that of Washington, D.C. But basic needs are not being met, even in Kabul. According to Lieutenant Colonel Michael Stout, Deputy Commander of the CJCMOTF, power cuts by the city's feeble stations are frequent. Many middle class Afghans, who last winter had electricity most of the night, find that in fall 2002 they can get power only a few hours a day. There are only a few organizations that have nonstop power – the presidential palace, government ministries and ministers, peacekeepers (self supplied with generators), hospitals, and places like the airport, radio stations, and ambassadors' homes. The rest must accept it in limited quantities. According to Fariduddin Wafik, the director of power for Kabul:

> The biggest problem is the lack of water. The dams are empty – one in three doesn't have even a drop of water in it – and most of the country's energy is hydroelectric. Our machinery is so old. The winter will be even worse. Everyone comes here asking for [electricity], but it's impossible. We simply can't provide it to everyone 24 hours a day. Personally, when there's a light on in a house, I feel happy.[71]

To compound the problem, the international aid agencies still haven't arrived in force – similar to Bosnia and Kosovo. According to the Afghanistan Minister of Reconstruction, Dr. Amin Farhang, the reconstruction process at the one-year mark is not satisfactory. Promises made in accordance to the Tokyo reconstruction conference held in January 2002 have yet to be fulfilled. In total, the donor countries promised $4.5 billion for the next five years for Afghanistan, including $1.8 billion for 2002; however, of this $1.8 billion, $600 million was given to the UN, $600 million for the NGOs, and only $90 million was given to the government of Afghanistan. In terms of the projects that the government was working on, progress has been slow.

As a measure of comparison, if the countries that have recently received the most aid per head by the international community were listed from the most to the least, the order would be Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Rwanda, and then Afghanistan. Afghanistan is at the bottom of the pile, receiving just $75 per person per year, against an average of $250 for the other four countries. Additionally, only 40 percent of the aid that arrived was going to long-term development; the rest was for short-term feeding programs. In demanding reconstruction funds at the Tokyo conference in January 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan requested that the new money should be "separate from and additional to" short-term humanitarian assistance.[72] Afghanistan's Foreign Minister, Abdullah Abdullah, visited many western countries, including the United States, making his case for additional money. While the world already pledged billions in aid, the war-ravaged country's needs are still enormous. Afghanistan says that it needs up to $20 billion over the next five years to rebuild a country devastated by decades of conflict and that, without more aid, extremists will take opportunities to destabilize the nation. According to Abdullah:

> The issue is that, in the Tokyo conference, neither Afghanistan nor the international community had an assessment close to the scale of the problem. The needs of Afghanistan are enormous and reconstruction is a large part of security. The only real guarantee will only come if we can deliver on promises made to the people. If you can change the lives of people, for example in poverty, electricity, etc., you will have a great impact on the security situation. Tokyo pledged $4.5 billion over 2 1/2 to 4 years, but we have three problems. First, considering the situation, this is a small number and is not in the scale of the problem. Second, the composition of the money is not known – some, about 70%, went to the humanitarian situation. And, third, countries have not defined the money. Some of it is listed as credits and some are slow in disbursements. People expect us to deliver – otherwise, the situation will turn negative. We can't afford to fail as failure is a wasted opportunity.[73]

As far as the government is concerned, their main priority is road reconstruction. Because Afghanistan is landlocked, they are dependent on the roads for the transport of goods throughout the country. But the government has no money and is dependent on the international community for help. According to Farhang:

> We have prepared and offered a list of our projects and their priorities for the international community. However, as of yet, we haven't undertaken any real large-scale projects for the Afghan people – projects that give the people confidence in what the government is doing. We have done some visible projects to demonstrate to the people that we are doing something, but these have been small in nature. Such projects might include road reconstruction and the erecting of streetlights, but we need to undertake larger projects. While the international community knows and understands our efforts, at the same time they have strong reservations and concerns, particularly in the area of security. They want a 100 percent secure Afghanistan, which is not possible. No place in

> the world today can offer such a thing, including Europe and America. Keep in mind, Afghanistan has been at war for 23 years. It's simply not possible to ensure that [security] at this point.[74]

The shortfalls in Afghanistan at the one-year mark are great and there has been no viable effort, except for pledges and promises, from either the military or the international civilian community to address the large-scale physical infrastructure reconstruction so vital to Afghanistan's prosperity. This lack of effort at physical infrastructure reconstruction has exacerbated the security problem, thus, affecting the overall economy. Standards in some of the cities are slowly improving, but the situation outside of the cities remains tenuous at best.

INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN RESPONSE

Prewar Efforts

Afghanistan received international assistance for many years. Total international assistance to prewar Afghanistan (in the range of $200-300 million annually in recent years) overwhelmingly went to humanitarian relief purposes, much of it in the form of food aid and other in-kind assistance. A major program was demining, funded mainly through a UN-managed trust fund. Key development sectors like education and infrastructure accounted for only a small proportion of total prewar assistance, resulting in the poor state of infrastructure found in Afghanistan today. The dominance of humanitarian assistance to a large extent reflected donor restrictions against the provision of funding for explicit development purposes to a country without a legitimate and recognized government. The distinction between humanitarian and development activities is very much blurred, however, in the context of a country that has been facing conflict and a "complex emergency" situation for many years. Regardless, the Loya Jirga should have taken care of that specific bureaucratic anomaly.

Funding of assistance for Afghanistan was spread across a large number of bilateral donors, of which by far the largest has been the United States, followed by the European Union. Most international assistance to Afghanistan continues to be delivered by about 40 sizable NGOs (i.e. annual spending of $1 million or more each), along with numerous small and tiny entities. Much humanitarian assistance passes through the UN agencies to the implementing NGOs, although the larger and more reputable NGOs (mostly international NGOs) attract substantial direct donor funding for specific sectors in Afghanistan. In the absence of effectively functioning government service delivery or leadership, NGOs are the main actors in many

areas, such as primary education (especially for girls), rural water supply, basic health units, demining, and others.[75]

Before the recent conflict there were some improvements in NGO coordination in the field, and promising steps toward what could be called sector strategizing and programming among some NGOs (for example in the case of rural water supply). However, aid delivery remained highly fragmented and uncoordinated. There were cases of duplication, working at cross-purposes, and "crowding" on the part of both UN agencies and NGOs in response to donor demands. The logistics of getting assistance to Afghanistan was a difficult, high-cost endeavor. Rugged terrain and poor transport resulted in high transport and delivery costs; large parts of the country were inaccessible during winter, with NGOs stockpiling food stuffs to avert a crisis. Additionally, aid management occurred at four different levels – the field, regional hubs in Afghanistan, Pakistan where most agency country offices are located, and New York and other UN agency headquarters and donor capitals. This greatly complicated the decision making and raised overhead costs. The UN system's regular air transport operations (using chartered aircraft) comprised, together with the International Red Cross's plane, the only safe and reliable air transport in the country, but they were very expensive. The difficult and volatile security situation further added to costs and aid delivery bottlenecks.

International Demining

There has been a bright spot, however. The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) has operated under the coordination of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) since 1989, and was comprised of the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA), the UN Regional Mine Action Centres (RMACs) and 15 NGOs working as implementation partners. The RMACs were responsible for the field-level management, coordination and oversight of mine action activities in their respective regions. The 15 NGOs implemented most of the physical activities associated with mine action, including awareness, technical training, survey, and clearance, under the coordination of the MACA. In the absence of an indigenous national coordinating body, the MACA planned, managed and supervised all mine action activities for Afghanistan. It also provided technical support, ensuring the proper integration of mine action into wider humanitarian assistance programs. In total, MAPA employed over 4,700 Afghan personnel. MAPA operations were disturbed by the military operations in late 2001, with damage from air strikes, widespread looting, and the threat to the safety of mine action personnel forcing it to significantly curtail its operations. In the face of this new situation, it was still required to develop and implement a

comprehensive response to the emergency. One of the new aspects of this response was the retraining of deminers to deal with the threat from new types of Coalition UXO.

In order to support the aid community's efforts to alleviate suffering experienced by the people of Afghanistan, priority went to:

- Recover equipment and material losses suffered due to air strikes, looting and other damage.
- Retrain and redeploy personnel and equipment.
- Survey and verify activities.
- Respond to the overall emergency situation throughout the country.[76]

Prior to the recent conflict, MAPA managed one of the most effective demining programs in the world. Mine awareness briefings to more than seven million people contributed significantly to lowering the landmine casualty rate by an estimated 50 percent. By the end of 2001, Afghani deminers had cleared over 224 square kilometers of high priority, mine-infested land and 321 square kilometers of former battlefield areas, while destroying approximately 210,000 landmines and 985,000 pieces of UXO. In spite of the current military situation, MAPA reported that clearance operations have returned to 100 percent of previous capacity, although on-going security constraints limit operations in some areas. MAPA is expanding its mine clearance capacities. In 2001 there were a total of 113 clearance teams; MAPA increased this number to 201 by the end of 2002. In the first quarter of calendar year 2002, mine clearance organizations coordinated by MAPA cleared 23,825,611 square meters of high priority mine and UXO contaminated area. In addition, another 32,091,000 square meters were returned to various communities for productive use. This turnover was due to successful survey work conducted under MAPA auspices. In the same period, MAPA reported that 751 anti-tank, 16,196 anti-personnel, and 251,169 UXO devices were cleared. MAPA reported that the clearance of cluster munitions continued at a rate faster than anticipated. All known cluster munition strike sites were surveyed where access was possible and are in the process of being cleared. MAPA estimated that an additional 75 million square meters were be cleared by the end of 2002 and a further 60 million square meters were turned over as a result of survey work. The long-term objective of MAPA is to create a situation in Afghanistan where people can go freely about their lives without the threat of mines and UXO. In the short to medium term, MAPA is working to allow reconstruction and development activities to be carried out in a safe environment.[77] Effective implementation will lead to increased repatriation, reduced casualties

Figure 4.9: International Demining.[78]

and fatalities, increased food production, increased employment opportunities – including ex-combatants, increased micro and macro-economic capacity, increased individual and national self reliance, and enhanced access for emergency, rehabilitative and development projects and programs. Overall, the MAPA strategy has been a great success story, although much work remains.

Post Conflict Efforts

Post conflict efforts must key on placing the direction and management of reconstruction in the hands of the Afghan government; therefore, the Working Draft of the Development Plan and Budget and the proposed Six National Projects represent the next logical step in a process that was started at Tokyo. At the donor's conference a broad vision was outlined in (then) Chairman Karzai's presentation – a vision of a prosperous and secure Afghanistan that would also bring prosperity to its trading partners and stability to the region.[79] Following extensive consultation among Ministers and senior officials, the National Development Framework was produced. The framework articulated a strategy to develop this vision and was presented to donors at the Implementation Group Meeting in April 2002. The National Development Budget was the elaboration of the framework into a series of detailed programs and specific projects

within each program. It was not possible to complete a full development budget until more information on resources, particularly resource constraints faced globally and by each sector, was known. A full budget, integrated with an operating budget to cover the recurrent expenditure, was to be prepared and presented to donors for consideration at the first full Consultative Group meeting in late February/early March 2003.

Three pillars of the framework were identified:

- Human Capital and Social Protection – 45%
- Physical Infrastructure – 35%
- Trade and Investment and Rule of Law/Security – 20%

The decision on expenditure shares highlights a number of issues. First, at one level it is clear that there is a trade-off between spending on humanitarian assistance and spending on physical infrastructure. If the budget is to be the central tool of policy-making it is critical that these issues are considered together in the budget, and through this decision the government has indicated its broad disposition between spending in the two areas. Second, it highlights that synergies must be exploited between different categories of spending. For example, infrastructure spending through labor-intensive programs addresses humanitarian needs, while effective spending on infrastructure, such as on roads, can reduce the operating costs of providing humanitarian assistance allowing more assistance to be provided at a lower cost.

As an interim measure, pending the finalization of the National Development Budget, six priority projects were extracted from the working draft and agreed upon by the Cabinet as representing the government's highest priorities for donor funding. The Cabinet recognized that the needs were too urgent and the aspirations of the community too high to allow a delay of an additional five months before implementation commenced. Rather, national projects were immediately needed to increase the delivery of tangible results to the ordinary Afghan men and women. Further delays would reduce the people's faith in both the government and the international community, and undermine the legitimacy of the government – all of which could lead to a slide back into conflict. The approved six national projects were:

- National Solidarity and Emergency Public Works Projects: to rebuild local governance structures and nationwide community projects.
- National Education Infrastructure Project: to rapidly rehabilitate or construct primary schools in every district across the country.
- Urban Infrastructure Project: to bring together the management of water and sanitation facilities, power delivery, and road rehabilitation.

- Water Resource Investment Project: to invest in medium-sized multipurpose dams to increase the water resources of the country.
- National Infrastructure of Governance: to restore the presence and capacity of central government throughout the country so that it can deliver services in an accountable and efficient manner.
- Transport Project: to build a ring highway linking the major urban centers, highways from the ring highway to the major border points, and a highway across the center of the country from Kabul to Herat. [80]

Other problems existed, however. Despite the interim government's attempt to prioritize work, there were concerns from some donors, such as the Asian Development Bank, that Afghanistan did not have a national engineering agency governing institution to manage the work. The Asian Development Bank can provide the money for roads and other infrastructure but questioned who would do the overall master planning, operations and maintenance, national standards, quality assurance, fiscal programming and accounting. There is a small pool of engineers in the country; they are eager to contribute, but there is no central national agency to help train and pool engineering resources. This is a significant void in a country with the reconstruction program that faces Afghanistan. There is an Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Committee, consisting of the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, that will attempt to sort out the reconstruction efforts, and marry them with the efforts of the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, UN Development Programs, the Islamic Development Bank and various donor countries; however, the key-missing ingredient is an institution with experienced senior managers that can execute/integrate these various programs.[81]

ASSESSMENT

Although it would be premature at this point to put a precise price tag on Afghanistan's reconstruction, the financial cost will be high, reflecting the toll taken by two decades of conflict on the country's infrastructure, human capital, state institutions, environment, and, increasingly, social capital. Rehabilitation of infrastructure, capacity building and institution-building; agricultural and water conservancy investments to promote food security; an expanded demining program; restoration of basic services where they were operating before the war (mainly in the cities); bringing back, settling, and ensuring sustainable livelihoods for the large numbers of refugees and more recently IDPs; and other reconstruction activities will carry high costs. The overall cost of reconstruction in Afghanistan would be built from a needs

assessment and costing of programs in different sectors. In some areas of activity such as demining, food security, and to a lesser extent education, previous work by the World Bank and other agencies provides a sound basis for making preliminary assessments of the likely cost of reconstruction. For example, in the case of demining, clearance of identified high priority minefields can be roughly estimated to cost around $200 million (compared with a total of about $150 million spent on the mine action program during 1991-1999). However, with peace, large numbers of refugees would be returning and more marginal lands would be exploited, so it is likely that minefields previously identified as "low-priority" would become higher priority and also would need to be cleared. It would cost close to $300 million to clear all identified low priority minefields, implying a total price tag of around $500 million for mine clearance. Previously undiscovered minefields are still being identified and surveyed, which would further raise the cost of mine clearance.

Moreover, reconstruction in Afghanistan cannot be separated from longer-term economic and social development. Merely restoring the pre-1978 economic situation in Afghanistan (even if that were possible) would leave the country as one of the poorest in the world in terms of both incomes and social indicators. This would make the task of maintaining political stability and promoting national integration very difficult and would leave Afghanistan vulnerable to a resurgence of conflict. Population growth since the 1970s means that the pre-existing economic base and infrastructure could not in any case support the current population if most refugees return to Afghanistan. Therefore, reconstruction will need to be combined with a major development effort. For example, basic education and health, which in the past covered only a small portion of the Afghan population even in peacetime, will need to be greatly expanded to cover the bulk of the population. In addition to being rehabilitated, the agricultural production base will need to be expanded and improved so that it can support and provide food security to substantially larger numbers of people. The combination of reconstruction with urgent development needs will further raise the cost of reconstruction in Afghanistan.

International experience also suggests that the cost of infrastructure reconstruction will be high. For example, in the West Bank and Gaza, a total of $3 billion of reconstruction assistance was proposed in the first two years, for an area with a population of less than two million and with at least some functioning basic infrastructure and services. In the case of Lebanon, external assistance for reconstruction was in the range of $400 million per year over a period of 10 years, for a population of 4 million. In the Balkans, reconstruction costs also have been high – in the case of Bosnia, with a population of about 5 million people, total pledges (including humanitarian as well as reconstruction assistance) were $5.4 billion during 1995-1999. And

East Timor, with a population of less than half a million, is receiving $350 million of reconstruction aid over a three-year period. These comparisons indicate that for Afghanistan, a country of 25 million people (including refugees currently in other countries) – more than ten times the combined population of Kosovo and East Timor – the cost of reconstruction will be quite high, even taking into account the much lower level of per-capita income in Afghanistan.

In practice, what will constrain the level and cost of reconstruction assistance are domestic absorption capacity and the need to avoid excessive domination by foreign firms and staff of the reconstruction implementation process. However, Afghan private sector capacity in neighboring and nearby countries is substantial and can and should be brought into the reconstruction effort, which will increase domestic absorption capacity. The high cost of reconstruction and likely constraints on the availability of external funding mean that a private sector-oriented approach is called for. At first glance Afghanistan would not appear to be a prime candidate for private investment. Nevertheless, prewar Afghanistan was known for its entrepreneurs in trade, currency exchange, and other activities. A sizable group of Afghan business people has developed in neighboring countries, particularly in Pakistan, with considerable financial resources. The reconstruction strategy should try to attract back to Afghanistan the large groups of Afghan businesses, entrepreneurs, and skilled and unskilled workers currently in Pakistan and Iran. Moreover, Afghanistan has a positive prewar history of cost recovery for key infrastructure services like electric power, telecommunications, energy, and oil/gas pipelines. It is extremely important that such services start out on the right track during reconstruction. Options for private investment in infrastructure should be actively pursued.

It is abundantly clear, however, that very little post conflict reconstruction in the physical infrastructure arena for Afghanistan occurred in the first year after the cessation of hostilities. Some blame it on the tenuous security situation, others blame it on the poor record thus far of receiving the promised pledges from the Tokyo Conference, and still others blame it on a barely functioning Afghanistan Interim Administration with little capacity to handle and process those donations that have been offered. Regardless, until these types of problems are discovered and solved, there needs to be an external interim ability available and capable to start the country's reconstruction until such time that the international civilian community can sort out funding and organization. Afghanistan is once again an example of a war ravaged country where little progress was made in the first year, except for the quick overthrow of the Taliban regime and the creation, through a Loya Jirga, of an Afghan interim government. These are small steps forward to be sure, maybe even large steps forward in an institution building sense,

but much more could have been reconstructed to help jump start the economy and give the interim government additional legitimacy, while the long-term interveners and government took the time required to become properly established.

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER FIVE: POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION TEMPLATE

Before September 11, 2001, and the international response in Afghanistan, it was obvious that peace support operations were beginning to consume increasingly greater numbers of military forces from the international community. Despite comments that military peace operations would degrade the armed forces' ability to fight and win the Nation's wars, United States peacekeeping operations increased significantly in the last half of the 1990s. It was clear that:

> Whether they like it or not, the U.S. and European militaries have an important role to play and will be requested to participate in future peace support operations. The military is much better than civilian agencies at coordination and logistics, as well as their traditional tasks of enforcement and security. Significantly, there is a clear chain of command in the military, which is conspicuously lacking in many international organizations, and these are fundamental components for the smooth running of an operation.[1]

Despite the individual particularities concerning the military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, there are several threads that form the foundation upon which to build a post conflict reconstruction template. The case similarities under the broad headings of planning, culture, and infrastructure provide a stage upon which the solution template can emerge. The task is straightforward – develop a system that captures that which is good from these recent interventions, yet, change the current system to respond to that, which is currently dysfunctional.

CASE REVIEW

Planning.

For all three cases, there was a general lack of planning for post conflict reconstruction. It should be possible to find some post conflict guidance in the Political-Military (POL-MIL) Plan that is normally developed, written, and promulgated by the United States Department of State. But for these cases, only one POL-MIL plan was approved. There wasn't a POL-MIL plan written for Bosnia, and general guidance for stability operations was issued as the operation progressed. Civil Affairs planning and organization was immature at the IFOR level at the time of deployment and did not fully exist in any other country other than the United States. There was no established mechanism at NATO to execute contingency engineering missions – this capability had to be developed while IFOR was deployed in theater. Additionally, it was believed that all tasks, both military and civilian, were sufficiently outlined in the Dayton

Agreement, negating the requirement for additional coordination – IFOR, therefore, relegated its efforts to executing the military designated tasks, while the other tasks were delegated across several civilian agencies. Since the Dayton Agreement did not foresee or seemingly encourage a mixing of the two, the military mission was executed quickly and efficiently; however, with little initial civilian organization, the civilian tasks lingered. On the military side, civilian post conflict reconstruction was not envisioned or thoroughly developed. Military engineers were limited by the minimum military requirement imposed by NATO and could not plan beyond the one-year mandate that was given to IFOR. As late as 1 November 1996, the IFOR plans staff was not allowed to develop plans to hand over the military operation to a follow-on force. They were only allowed to plan for a complete withdrawal and redeployment that was to occur in December 1996. Only when the United States presidential election was completed, was the SFOR concept proposed. This gave IFOR planners a little more than 3 weeks to plan, rehearse, and execute a turnover to a modified SFOR staff, commanded by a completely different military organization. Thus, little thought was given to the military development of a post conflict reconstruction plan – the planners adhered to the delineation of tasks provided in the Dayton Agreement, which left that task to civilian organizations.

In Kosovo, NATO tried to learn from its mistakes in Bosnia. Early project design was completed before the Air War, using the same contingency engineering approval methods developed in Bosnia. There was an early approval of NATO money placed against those "type" of projects that AFSOUTH engineer planners believed would be necessary to support the military mission in theater. Without the benefits of a solid infrastructure baseline, planners developed generic projects in order to establish some kind of method for immediate execution of projects. But, again, the engineers were limited by the minimum military requirement. Their plans could not extend beyond those tasks that would support the military mission. The State Department drafted and approved a POL-MIL plan; however, that plan was never fully operationalized in the United States brigade at Camp Bondsteel. At a higher level, the European Union attempted to learn from mistakes made in Bosnia and initially formed the European Commission Task Force for the Reconstruction of Kosovo, quickly followed by the European Agency for Reconstruction, whose focus was the rehabilitation and repair of key infrastructure and public utilities –one of the four pillars promulgated by the UN Administration in Kosovo. These agencies, however, were not formed until the summer of 1999 and February 2000 respectively. This late formation with no prior planning resulted in little reconstruction progress during the first year after hostilities ceased. The initial program wasn't announced until

March 2002, and basic needs throughout the rural parts of Kosovo were still not met by the end of 2002.

Afghanistan provided an even bigger challenge. Without a UN mandate or a combined international headquarters like NATO sponsoring the intervention, coalition planning with a United States lead was essential. The State Department developed a POL-MIL plan for Afghanistan, but the plan was never approved. Draft copies were furnished to the CJCMOTF so that the civil affairs soldiers in theater would have the benefits of the planning that had occurred; however, without approval, the POL-MIL plan had no authority to task other agencies for support. The engineer plan evolved as the mission unfolded. Because the initial intent was to try to execute the operation with Special Operations Forces and airpower, little advanced planning for post conflict infrastructure was conducted. As the force grew in Afghanistan, CENTCOM engineers scrambled to find forces sufficient to complete the military support mission on base and at the airfields, but did not extend the engineer reconstruction mission beyond the limits of the military base. Main Supply Routes were never designated, with the command encouraging military personnel to stay off of the Afghanistan roads because of extensive damage and mines. Civil Affairs soldiers, who were more dispersed throughout parts of the country, executed several quick impact, high profile projects with funds provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, but this funding source was limited and its effects to the overall state of infrastructure in Afghanistan were minimal.

State Department officials appear wary to develop plans for potential contingencies for fear that their planning would inadvertently commit the United States to an inadequately vetted foreign policy. But, because the world is a most uncertain place and that all needs cannot be adequately forecasted, policy makers should accept this uncertainty as a given and, instead, devise an alternate method to accommodate the uncertainty and the start up time required for civilian intervention, yet still provide a mechanism to start the post conflict reconstruction phase of an operation immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. The first priority of the template, therefore, must be the development of an enhanced planning mechanism to plan for post conflict reconstruction. Planning must begin during the pre-conflict phase of an operation in order to sufficiently coordinate the military and civilian resources necessary to execute the challenging mission. A high level coordination group that can establish necessary working relationships between the military and the civilian agencies is essential so that reconstruction can begin quickly and maintain through to transition to local authorities.

Cultural Differences.

Responses by the United States to recent crises demonstrate an important but false dichotomy between civilian and military roles in post conflict reconstruction. In contingencies like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, uniformed services have created a safe and secure environment, and have also set the conditions for the reconstruction of war-torn societies through their expertise in logistics, engineering, policing, and support for humanitarian needs – but only to a point. Artificial limitations have been placed upon the military to avoid the image of "nationbuilding" and have limited the military's response to that which is truly a humanitarian emergency or that which is only in military support. Many civilian policy makers and agencies continue to think of peace operations in a linear fashion, insisting that a determination of specific civilian and military tasks in the post conflict phase provides them with a bright line delineating specific roles and responsibilities in different stages of conflict. Maybe the intent is to be able to assign credit or blame for progress in the various areas. However, this linear thinking falls short in a place like Afghanistan where some areas of the country are ripe for recovery while other areas remain in Afghan-on-Afghan conflict. The record of the last decade's crises bears further proof. Post conflict reconstruction requires integrated security and social, economic, and political development efforts, not separate tracks that diverge.

The three cases highlight the cultural differences and inherent capabilities found between the military and the international civilian community. In all three cases, the international civilian community held early donor conferences. The conferences verified the need to fund post conflict reconstruction, resulting in large amounts of money pledged by interested governments and international agencies. The conferences were highlighted by passionate pleas by the Secretary-General of the UN encouraging nations to pledge money for reconstruction, in addition to the money already pledged and spent for humanitarian assistance. However, the donations were slow to materialize. Some money that was initially pledged for reconstruction was later tied to specific projects hampering the local government's ability to apply the money to its highest priorities for reconstruction. Other pledges were never actually received, impacting on the IOs ability to organize and deploy to execute the reconstruction mission. This highlights a cultural reality that must be recognized at the beginning of the planning process – most international organizations do not have an established staff ready to deploy into a country with little notice. The organizations require time to develop a staff, organize their deployment, gather funding, and deploy. Because of a continuing uncertainty for funding, this intense effort will not begin until there is an established requirement to deploy. This causes an immediate gap in the reconstruction effort once the conflict has ceased.

Many of the reasons for this rapid response gap go beyond a simple lack of capability and involve a lack of clarity about the time frame for such post conflict assistance. Civilians in the diplomatic and development communities do not plan for short-term contingencies, something in which the military specializes, and often lack significant experience working with military counterparts. Military planners, uncertain about missions that exceed traditional security functions, debate whether the involvement of soldiers for such long periods of time dilutes the warfighting capacity of the armed forces – something that military officers will continue to debate in their respective war colleges for many decades. Finally, the providers of development assistance are still unclear how to integrate humanitarian emergency response with immediate post conflict reconstruction, later transitioning into the broader strategic vision of long-term reconstruction. Unless the international community develops sufficient rapid civilian response capacity, the military will continue to be the force available to accomplish "civilian" tasks, greatly reducing its ability to redeploy, potentially degrading the ability to engage in high intensity conflict and the ongoing campaign against terrorism.

The military culture is on the other end of the civil-military continuum. Because of its overall mission to "fight and win our nation's wars," the military has the capability to rapidly deploy to various regions around the world, and has the inherent logistics capability to sustain itself once it is deployed in a theater. Organizationally, the military has the in-place chain of command and organization to implement immediate action. The military missions in the three cases were somewhat different, but all had the overall priority to establish security and stability throughout the region. The primary differences in the security mission concerned the directed object of the security mission. In the Balkans, the military had two agreements upon which to base its security mission. As peacekeepers, the military was to separate and disarm the former warring parties, discouraging the rise of mafia related control, and encouraging the pursuit of legitimate alternative employment. Using routine patrols and military checkpoints, the goal was to establish a safe and secure environment so that the civilian agencies and local nationals could reestablish the economy and local forms of governance. The military part of the mission was hugely successful.

In Afghanistan, however, the military was a combatant force instead of a peacekeeping force. The goal was to search and destroy the Taliban and the al Qaeda wherever they may be found in order to limit their abilities to conduct terrorism throughout the world. The impetus was that by destroying these organizations, a legitimate government would be able to rise in Afghanistan through self-determination, increasingly providing the basic needs for its citizens as it became established. This mission was also rapidly accomplished with few Taliban and al

Qaeda remnants still remaining in Afghanistan; however, the endstate of the security mission was not to establish patrols across the breadth of the country as in the Balkans, but to target specific Taliban and al Qaeda cells for destruction. Afghanistan has never been effectively ruled from a central location. It doesn't have a sufficiently developed infrastructure to allow a central government to effectively rule across the entire country. Therefore, the Bush Administration proposed a limited force without the same massive patrolling found in the Balkans. Nor did the mission target the reconstruction of Afghanistan's infrastructure. However, realizing that the development of viable infrastructure is a key to establishing and maintaining security in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense shifted its priority at the end of 2002 from the establishment of a secure environment to that of reconstruction using the Civil Affairs Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Once the PRTs conduct the initial damage assessment, it will still be up to the international civilian community and the local government to execute the projects, as there is no residual, military engineer capability in theater to execute post conflict reconstruction. Comprehensive and joint civil-military planning during the pre-conflict stage may have spurred this change in military priority at an earlier, more sequential moment after the initial deployment.

The post conflict reconstruction template must address the cultural differences and logistical capabilities that are found in the military and civilian communities. Neither side can successfully execute a post conflict reconstruction plan by itself. Since the mission requires the military for the short-term rapid response capability, and the civilian long-term development capability, a mechanism is required that will successfully mesh the advantages and mitigate the disadvantages of each organization. Clearly, the slow civilian rapid response capacity does not apply to humanitarian assistance, which is currently well handled by the international community; however, the key civilian response gaps are in the area of the immediate post conflict assistance that allows for reconstruction to begin. Because the future is always cloudy, all operations are contingencies in one form or another, which prevents the international civilian community having the proper start up time and funding to rapidly respond. Anything less than a rapid response may lead to further violence and loss of life. Suppression of renewed conflict demands, at its most basic level, imaginative coordination and execution of all aspects of the peace accords; therefore, post conflict reconstruction must be an activity that engages both military and civilian actors, demanding careful thought and exercise.

State of Infrastructure.

The greatest similarity between the three cases is their state of infrastructure. Despite the differences in government – province, republic, or independent country – the future for each region is heavily dependent on having a viable infrastructure. Each case required a viable physical infrastructure to enhance the freedom of movement. Freedom of movement leads to increased trade and commerce, greater interaction between former warring parties leading to the development of common goals and ideas, and enhanced governmental development allowing for the provision of basic needs throughout their span of control. At the cessation of hostilities in each case, there was no viable infrastructure that could support freedom of movement or even support the ability to get farm goods to market in a reasonable time. Restricted infrastructure provided little connection to neighboring countries, seriously impacting the region's ability to conduct external trade – this is key to jumpstart an economy that has stagnated during a conflict. Each country had considerable war damage to its infrastructure, but was compounded by numerous years of degraded maintenance. In some instances, the physical infrastructure could be repaired, while in others the infrastructure had degraded sufficiently that complete reconstruction rather than repair was the order. Regardless of the extent of damage, each region did not have the ability to begin its reconstruction internally. The stimulus must come externally until the local capacity can be built and assume the task.

The last priority that the post conflict reconstruction template must address is a mechanism to provide immediate recovery of basic needs, followed by detailed project management, with an ultimate transition to local authority control and execution. The template must establish a flow of assistance, commensurate both with external agency capability and the extent of damage, that can jumpstart a region's redevelopment. The mechanics of how to do this well is what the remainder of this chapter concerns itself.

PRINCIPLES ON WHICH TO BUILD THE RECONSTRUCTION TEMPLATE

For future operations, if the post conflict reconstruction gap is to be closed in order to take full advantage of the relative calm that exists immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the international community must develop a more holistic approach, integrating not only the international civilian community in its overall plan for reconstruction, but also the military community which has the capability to mobilize and quickly establish reconstruction centers of excellence. There must be a way to successfully integrate the quick start abilities of the military without compromising the neutrality ideals of the IO and NGO community. The post Cold War

world has continued to emphasize the capacity gap between the military and civilian organizations by creating events that force the military to remain in theater performing non-military missions simply because no civilian agencies can rapidly deploy. Ongoing missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan reflect the changing demands being placed on United States military forces in post conflict environments and serve as a reminder that civilian agencies still lack the basic capacity to provide immediate, rapid support to supplement, and ultimately replace, a military ground presence once fighting has stopped. Former Central Command Commander General Anthony Zinni has stated that the United States military has become the "stuckee," the force that gets stuck with all the clean up because no other alternative exists to fill the emergency gaps. Similarly, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice warned that the United States should not be using military forces to do what civilian institutions should be doing. These serve as noble pronouncements, but fall short of an operational solution for the recurring problem.

General George Joulwan, using his hindsight from Bosnia, outlined four principles as a foundation for civil military implementation across the three phases of conflict: clarity of mission, unity of authority and integration of effort, timely political decisions and international commitment, and robust and realistic rules of engagement.[2] Although the rules of engagement principle is strictly a military principle to determine when appropriate force may be employed, the other three clearly call for a civil-military solution to solve the post conflict reconstruction gap.

Clarity of Mission. Efforts to suppress renewed conflict can only succeed if there is a clearly stated mission for the post conflict reconstruction program as a whole and specific, intermediate objectives that are attainable for each organization and institution. As the primary source, this mission and these intermediate objectives should derive from a thorough understanding of the agreement that serves as the foundation for the entire military intervention. These missions and objectives are further supplemented by specific tasks for each participant – tasks that point to the completion of the overall objective and tasks by which progress can be measured. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, there was an absence of a mechanism to effect successful integration of civilian and military implementation programs at any level – strategic, operational, or tactical. In all cases, the implementation of the military requirements and the Coalition structures were relatively straightforward; however, the implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreements was far more problematic.

Clearly, the international community should not expect all peace treaties to contain detailed guidance on all, or even most, of the key issues. Although it is within the realm of the

possible for a peace accord to be sufficiently shaped by its signatories to facilitate its successful implementation, peace accords are usually constructed to achieve political consensus, the terms of which are almost always subject to variable interpretations. Under such obtuse circumstances, those responsible to implement the terms of the accords must be aware of the implementing roles and responsibilities envisioned by the drafters. A way to create this awareness is to invite the implementers to the ongoing peace negotiations to get a sense of meaning that may not be found in the final document. The importance of leadership is evident from the very beginning to shape and interpret missions and objectives. One nation or organization must step up and take the lead to help ensure coherence and maintain forward momentum in the reconstruction mission. In those cases where the UN fills this leadership role, it is important that the Security Council achieve an early consensus to provide the opportunity for adequate planning and coordination. Additionally, missions and objectives must not only be clear, but they must also be achievable. In practice, this may mean accepting solutions that are incremental in nature, allowing for sufficient flexibility to facilitate required modifications as the operation proceeds. Leaders must build in periodic reviews or assessments to develop adjustments and new missions to be conducted if necessary. Part of the reconstruction template must include a military-civilian reconstruction working group to provide immediate planning and support for impending crises. This will significantly help to clarify the post conflict reconstruction mission and develop an execution plan that all parties can agree to, accept, and implement.[3]

Unity of Authority and Integration of Effort. Conflict suppression is a multi-disciplined operation, requiring a thorough integration of complex functions, executed by diverse organizations. Therefore, the establishment of an overarching integrating structure is a key step in carrying out the practical, day-to-day management of post conflict reconstruction operations as well as establishing local capacity and management. Yet, the creation of an integrating structure is the most daunting challenge the international community confronts, as autonomous organizations must surrender a measure of independence to achieve cooperation. Civilian and military leaders must overcome the hostilities and suspicions that often separate them to work toward the common goal of recovery. In Bosnia and Kosovo, and even less so in Afghanistan, there was no formal integrating structure established at any level, and no means by which the military and civilian implementation plans and activities were reconciled and coordinated. The integration that did occur was primarily at the operational level and occurred as a result of ad hoc arrangements developed between the military commander and the civilian authority.

The establishment of a common mandate of authority is fraught with suspicion – posed not only by the states and IOs involved but also by members of the military community. Most of the organizations that participate in conflict prevention operations – particularly NGOs and elements of the private sector – have no obligation to respond to any national or international authority, including the UN. NGOs, in competition for scarce resources, balk at the sharing of information and are reluctant to cooperate. Moreover, civilian agencies strongly resist any requirement that they subordinate themselves to – or even cooperate with – a military chain of command for fear of compromising their neutrality. At the same time, military leaders are reluctant to place themselves under the direction of a civilian organization, particularly one that has an international membership, and bristle at what they may consider to be ill-informed and ill-advised civilian guidance. Different organizations have radically different organizational skills and structures. The military, with its well-defined hierarchical structure, can respond on relatively short notice to fulfill a wide variety of missions. Civilian organizations, by contrast, are more loosely organized than the military and generally lack the resources for a rapid response to complex and often dangerous situations. Thus, the military often becomes the default option to deal with an impending conflict or crisis, even in those situations where civilian organizations have the primary responsibility to take the lead.[4] It simply takes too long to put together an ad hoc civilian structure to deal with the immediacy of the conflict prevention requirement. Recognizing this fact, the post conflict reconstruction template must adequately address the obstacles to civil-military cooperation and the problem of how to respond immediately to primarily civilian reconstruction tasks when civilian reconstruction agencies do not have the standby capacity.

Timely Political Decisions and International Commitment. Post conflict reconstruction operations generally occur in a fluid environment, requiring rapid decisions framed in the context of the overall objective. Such operations demand that an often-cumbersome decisional process be shortened, streamlined, and responsive. Moreover, each participating organization must have a complete understanding of what political and resource commitments will be required to meet its intermediate objectives. This understanding provides the foundation for the commitment and the conditions under which the commitment may terminate. Arbitrary deadlines for the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces or other international organizations are counterproductive; commitments must be made to the satisfaction of predetermined objectives, not to dates on a calendar. According to General Joulwan, any system that induces or permits excessive delays in reaching political decisions will condemn itself to irrelevance, no matter how

clear the mission objectives may be, how unified and effective the civil-military working group may be, or how committed the actors may be.[5]

In successful post conflict operations there is a long-term commitment, which every organization and institution involved must understand to ensure a constant source of funding during project execution. The willingness of donor nations in particular to maintain their support is of fundamental importance. The fact that peacekeepers and peace builders must be able to react quickly to the changing post conflict environment puts a premium on systems that streamline the process of political decision making. Therefore, an integrated and coordinated approach to post conflict reconstruction produces a web of activities, each of which supports a subsequent range of other activities. If one activity on the critical path to recovery disappears, the entire pattern is in danger of losing its coherence, its effectiveness, and could be significantly delayed.

THE POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION TEMPLATE

Methodology

To create a viable and, even more importantly, an executable post conflict reconstruction template, there are many models and methods to use. There are methods promoted by various civilian consultants that create corporate strategies based on team performance and strategic visioning; there are methods that weight the effect that normal group dynamics and group think has upon a process; and there are military decision making strategies that employ the use of progressive, step-by-step, course of action methodologies that are to be applied for every operation and in every context. However, to rely on only one model to create the template will produce a result that will fall short in meeting the goal of solving the post conflict reconstruction gap. Therefore, the following template was developed using a combination of several models. It first attempts to recognize the effects that natural group dynamics will play upon the template. It attempts to prod the emergence of a an effective military civilian working group, allowing the group dynamic cycle of forming, storming, norming, and performing to run its course during the group's initial formation. But this method alone may produce groupthink if some members become more dominant than others. To prevent this deficiency, other models must be consulted.

It next attempts to integrate the value of creating a central corporate strategy. Strategies link the learning from the past with a diplomatic vision articulating a high level path forward. In a sense, the corporate strategy brings the diplomatic vision back down to the ground to an

operational context. Strategies should tell a powerful story of where to focus actions; however, too many strategies undermine their impact – this harkens back to General Joulwan's unity of effort. Corporate strategy explores the connections between the vision and the organization's purpose; works to understand the strategic intent at the heart of the task; updates the currency of the mission and makes it operational; and develops until it represents everyone's deep commitment. Part of the development of corporate strategy is to commemorate all agreements, historical successes, core competencies, core values, critical business issues, upcoming challenges, central strategies, and desired organizational forms in a BIG picture everyone can use to remember their agreements and engage others in evolving the strategy.[6] The drawback to using this approach to the exclusion of other models is that this takes a significant amount of time – time that in most cases isn't a luxury for developing a post conflict reconstruction strategy.

Therefore, using the premise of group dynamics and the development of corporate strategy based on diplomatic vision, the template incorporates the military process for course of action development to provide a logical, step-by-step mechanism for plan development. The model examines all facts bearing on the problem, determines the mission for post conflict reconstruction, determines the available capability and capacity for execution, determines the executable strategy in which all actors can readily agree and can identify their roles and responsibilities, and finally determines the phasing of control. The intermediate goal is to quickly return the primary civilian tasks back to civilian implementation at the earliest feasible opportunity, with the ultimate goal of building local capacity, local management, and local control. Using this objective, the result is a post conflict reconstruction template developed into four phases:

- Phase 1: Pre-Conflict Planning and Strategy
- Phase 2: Emergency Response
- Phase 3: Subsequent Recovery and Project Management
- Phase 4: Transition to Local Capacity.

Phase 1: Pre-Conflict Planning and Strategy

What distinguishes rapid response from humanitarian aid is that it begins at the cessation of hostilities, and goes beyond saving lives to provide the foundation for post conflict reconstruction of a war torn region. A key assumption of any rapid response capacity is that humanitarian activities will continue during the initial infrastructure recovery. It has become

more difficult, however, to define where humanitarian assistance ends and who is ultimately responsible for moving the transition forward. While it is certain that immediate response activities often require international actors to hand programs over to local non-government authorities or other international actors, such transitions can be difficult. Most problematic is the absence of a clear timeline and planning process that bridges rapid response initiatives and developmental initiatives. The cultural divide between short and long-term efforts is exacerbated by archaic rules that allow for flexible assistance on the front end of a crisis, but do not enable it as the crisis matures. Similarly, some tasks that are performed at the cessation of hostilities may not be needed after the crisis, such as demobilizing and disarming soldiers or UXO removal. Follow-on programming to support long-term reconstruction may not be considered or may be set aside for a later discussion – a discussion that may never occur once the immediate crisis is resolved. It is evident that no clear interagency process currently exists to ensure a seamless transition from short-term rapid response to long-term reconstruction in order to meet the future needs of a given country.

At USAID, for example, a rapid response capacity to complex emergencies was formed in 1992, when USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) consolidated interagency personnel, grant mechanisms, and contracts to work with NGOs and other specialized organizations, ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid and short-term quick relief at the community level. Furthermore, in 1994, USAID established an Office of Transition Initiatives to provide immediate programming in the area of political development in countries emerging from conflict. This initiative has grown to a larger, more established effort to address the reemergence of violence as well as post conflict reconstruction efforts, but funding and staffing remain inadequate. This relatively small response to an ever growing requirement to provide immediate, on-the-ground programs in war torn societies is severely limited by resources, staff, and capacity to address the complex situations that currently affect the national interest. Moreover, this program functions outside of the traditional development culture and is funded from a separate appropriations account. These factors, however mundane, complicate the goal of moving from short-term assistance to longer-term reconstruction.[7]

In light of the recent terrorism events, there exists a window of opportunity to revisit the inherent lack of rapid civilian response so that government agencies, civilian and military, can realize the complexities of this type of effort and develop operational capacities to fill the post conflict reconstruction gap. After more than a decade of United States involvement in multinational peace operations and complex emergencies, it is readily apparent that the civilian capacity to respond rapidly is uneven, lacks specific legislative authorities, and is resource

starved. Additionally, the lack of an integrated interagency strategy and planning guidance contributes to the squandering of comparative advantages, the clouding of priorities, and the inefficient use of resources. Moving away from the current ad hoc nature of reconstruction response, an integrated civil-military framework would provide clear direction for the broad range of agencies involved both in the emergency response phase, as well as in the subsequent recovery and project management phase, to ensure seamless support for the transition from war to peace. Furthermore, any strategy or planning for rapid response must realize the importance of preventing the reemergence of conflict as a central tenet.

Documentation and Mandate. First, Phase 1 requires official documentation, a National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) on Post Conflict Reconstruction. Different from the current NSPD on strategic planning, the reconstruction NSPD would identify key gaps and clarify roles and responsibilities of different agencies at the operational level, not only to fill the long-term reconstruction needs of a war-torn country, but also to fill the emergency response gap that currently exists. There have been few attempts in the past to resolve this issue. In May 1997, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 56 on Managing Complex Contingency Operations (PDD-56), which attempted to institutionalize the lessons learned and best practices from past experiences. PDD-56 called for:

- The Deputies Committee to establish an interagency Executive Committee to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency operations;
- The development of a political-military implementation plan as an integrated planning tool for coordinating United States government actions;
- An interagency rehearsal or review of the plan's main elements prior to execution;
- An after-action review of each operation;
- Interagency training to support this process.[8]

PDD-56, despite its good intentions, was never fully implemented. There were pockets of resistance to interagency political-military planning for crises, reflecting both an anti-planning bias on the part of some agencies and a miscalculation of the time and resources needed to execute full-time planning. President Clinton's model was centered around the National Security Council (NSC), but had a serious, crippling byproduct: it offered no direction for sustained leadership below the President, who often is distracted by a host of competing concerns on a daily basis. There were no levels below the Deputies Committee to further advance the planning and cooperation for impending crises. The National Security Advisor or his representative may have provided leadership, but risked losing his status as an honest

broker. Even the most conscientious and candid official has difficulty balancing the roles of an honest broker, who encourages all views to be heard, and a leader, who must promote the policy he advocates. Yet personal leadership has proven to be essential, both inside of and outside of Washington. To ensure this leadership, the United States government turned in practice to a different model.

In practice, the United States government delegates exceptional powers to one individual, either informally or formally, as a Special Representative of the President within a particular domain. Two examples of such individuals are Richard Holbrooke, who facilitated an end to the Bosnian War and brokered the Dayton Agreement, and Robert S. Gelbard, who oversaw the implementation of the agreement and served as a special envoy abroad. Both were from the Department of State, the agency that would normally produce individuals delegated with such powers. There would be little reason to complain about the practice of appointing Special Representatives if the normal interagency process simultaneously performed well, but it doesn't. The motive for appointing a Special Representative is the recognition that the interagency process doesn't work, is tediously slow, and mostly uncooperative - perhaps detrimental enough to be a hindrance to developing long-term peace. In such circumstances, the Special Representative has little interest to promote the normal interagency process, anticipating that it would only make his difficult mission even harder to execute. He may increase his leadership power by encouraging the interagency process to atrophy, paving the way to coordinate directly with relevant agencies through his department and personal staff. Interagency working groups may approach irrelevance while the Special Representative assumes the central role in making and implementing policy. There may be little harm in this arrangement if the Special Representative is an extraordinary person, but a system that depends on finding such people is unsound.

The Tower Commission supports the view that the organization most capable of managing the interagency process is the National Security Advisor, provided that the National Security Council is empowered by the Administration to fully exercise this management:

> It is the National Security Advisor who has the greatest interest in making the national security process work. Our review of the present system and that of other administrations where committee chairman came from the departments has led us to the conclusion that the present system operates better when the committees are chaired by the individual with the greatest stake in making the NSC system work.[9]

Once entering office, the Bush Administration developed NSPD-XX that builds upon PDD-56 but expands its scope, providing guidance on advanced warning, planning, prevention, and

response options for complex emergency operations. NSPD-XX establishes a National Security Council chaired Contingency Planning Policy Coordination Committee at the Assistant Secretary level to develop the interagency contingency plans for emerging crises, focusing on United States objectives, endstate, policy options, interagency responsibilities, resource issues, and strategies for all aspects of the operation. There are two problems with this proposal. First, the National Security Council must be empowered by the President to fully coordinate and manage the interagency process. The NSC must be able to speak for the President and must be able to serve as a task manager in the interagency deliberations. Different administrations use their NSC in various ways – President Clinton's NSC enjoyed adequate power to serve the lead role; President Bush's NSC is a shadow of its former self and doesn't have the interagency power required to head the coordination committee. Second, the President never signed NSPD-XX, and in the case of Afghanistan there was no person or entity in charge of interagency planning and coordination below the Deputies Committee – the specific disadvantage of the PDD-56 model.[10]

Using the representative levels of effort available outlined in Table 5.1, a new NSPD should codify the roles and control mechanisms for each phase of reconstruction.

Phase 2: ***Emergency Response***	**MILITARY**		**CIVILIAN**	**LOCAL**
Phase 3: ***Subsequent Recovery***	**MILITARY**	**CIVILIAN**		**LOCAL**
Phase 4: ***Local Transition***	**MILITARY**	**CIVILIAN**	**LOCAL**	

Table 5.1: Phases and Levels of Effort of Local, Civilian, and Military Operations. Aggregate levels of activity will grow as governmental functions approach normalcy.

To solve the condition of unfamiliarity between civil and military components and to enhance the strengths that each brings to the peacebuilding process, the NSPD would create at the strategic level a standing Civil-Military Reconstruction Working Group (CMRWG) to provide immediate support for impending crises. Ideally headed by a strong NSC Director, or delegated to the State Department, the Working Group would coordinate planning, identify resources, refine government policy, and expedite logistical support. With more than 24 countries facing long-term, intractable conflicts, such standing and ongoing planning efforts would yield better interagency coordination and a clear understanding of standing capacities that each type of situation requires. Additional language in the NSPD, focused more specifically on how the

government should organize its participation in post conflict reconstruction operations, would further enable the unity of effort. Fundamental to any interagency process is to elicit well-considered advice. Each agency in the process has its own expertise and its own outlook on the situation and, preferably at an early stage, the relevant agencies should articulate their positions in a frank and open manner. Usually these broad positions will be at least compatible and a broad consensus will develop, with disagreements emerging during the discussions on specific implementation. Serious disagreements should illuminate important policy issues requiring resolution at the highest level. A sound interagency process should promote resolution and minimize the opportunities to defer or circumvent issues that need to be resolved. During the planning and the execution of post conflict reconstruction, the interagency process should help integrate a combined effort by providing channels of communication among relevant agencies from the working level to the highest level. In addition, it should harmonize United States efforts with non United States agencies, including IOs and NGOs.

The strongest solution would be to combine the NSC centered model and the Special Representative model – pairing a robust, NSC managed interagency process with a person wielding the extraordinary powers of a Special Representative. Carefully applied, the elements of this combined approach would complement, not thwart, each other. A Special Representative would benefit, as the President does, from an interagency process that encourages differences of opinion until a decision is reached and then expects agencies to close ranks. The NSC would benefit from a Special Representative who has the power to implement the policy choices reached and supported through a rigorous interagency process. There remain some obstacles, however. Institutional cultures that undervalue planning are a fundamental and persistent obstacle that must be overcome if the United States is to succeed in post conflict reconstruction operations. Doing so will primarily require sustained leadership on the part of the National Security Advisor to ensure that strategy development and planning are conducted according to the President's guidance, and also will require specific steps in some agencies to change their anti-planning culture.

Using a simple criteria matrix to evaluate the various models, it is clear that a combined model will better provide the coordination and execution required by post conflict reconstruction.

Criteria	NSC-Centered Model	Special Representative Model	Combined Model
Inform US officials across agencies about threats	High	Medium	High
Familiarize US officials with agency capabilities	High	Medium	High
Elicit well-considered advice from US agencies	High	Low	High
Raise policy issues that require consideration	High	Medium	High
Spur resolution of policy issues at appropriate levels	Medium	High	High
Integrate US efforts during planning and execution	High	Medium	High
Harmonize US efforts with non-US efforts	Medium	High	High
Promote strong leadership of US response	Low	High	High

Table 5.2: Criteria to Evaluate Models[11]

Working Group Dynamics. The success of the CMRWG and a successful strategy development and planning process requires a high degree of capacity – particularly trained and available personnel – in all participating agencies. In the past, such efforts have been hampered by the fact that each agency representative in the process was essentially a one-person show, and most had additional responsibilities completely unrelated to planning, with planning constituting their secondary responsibility. In contrast, this working group must be a standing organization with individuals dedicated full-time to contingency planning and immediate crisis response. Thorough planning requires devoting quality personnel to the process on a full-time basis. In agencies where planning is not a routine or a valued endeavor, and other priority areas may already be understaffed, building the internal capacity necessary for success will require leadership and culture change initiated at the highest levels.

Developing planning expertise and capacity in key offices likely to play important roles in post conflict reconstruction operations is critical to improve the response time at conflict termination. Currently, there is little strategic planning expertise outside of the United States military and little training is conducted on the civilian side. President Clinton's PDD-56 established interagency training programs to develop a cadre of professionals capable of planning complex contingency operations; however, these training programs have not been fully implemented. There are valuable planning skills that can be perfected in advance and a planner should have the opportunity to make mistakes and learn lessons in a training environment, without the pressures and high stakes of real world operations. Training also

builds familiarity with and acceptance of shared frames of reference, but will require additional funding. Personnel selected for training should be assigned to positions coded as planners where their training will have the most beneficial impact on the planning process. Additionally, this training should be opened to NGOs to develop a common planning standard across all of the applicable agencies. In times of relative peace, these personnel would be used to support deliberate planning, promoting interagency coordination and training efforts; while in times of crisis these planners will be sufficiently trained and familiar with each other in order to produce a coherent post conflict reconstruction plan that can be executed by the immediate responders, taken over by the long-term agencies, and transitioned to local control once local capacity is developed.

It is paramount that all key players, including those outside of the government, be involved in the ongoing planning for post conflict reconstruction. The government must be able to determine what others central to the post conflict reconstruction effort plan on doing, as their actions may directly affect the United States' ability to achieve its objectives in an operation. NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance lie specifically outside of the reconstruction planning parameter, as their mandate is concentrated on providing emergency humanitarian relief; however, the government must have a concept of NGO action in order to avoid duplication of effort. One method is to organize the most senior NGOs (those with an operating budget of more than $1 million) into a coordinating committee to work out a sub-plan, in coordination with the NSC. This idea addresses the need for NGOs to develop their own plans, as opposed to having the military or government agencies impose a plan on them, while at the same time cutting through the problem of dealing with hundreds of independent NGOs. As one participant at a National Defense University workshop stated, "You cannot regulate or enforce the NGOs to follow a plan. They must see the clear-cut advantage to following it."[12] By having the NGOs create the plan themselves, the assumption is that the process would be closer to achieving conception. Another approach may be to create the coordinating committee solely out of the donor organizations. Because there are far fewer donor agencies than NGOs, it may be simpler to get donors involved in a standing planning committee for humanitarian assistance. Should the donor agencies concentrate on post conflict reconstruction rather than on humanitarian relief, it is imperative that they are integrated into the CMRWG. These are the agencies to which the military will hand over the control of the post conflict reconstruction efforts; therefore, their views and capabilities must be inherent in the agreed plan. It may also be in the government's interest to invite key non-United States and international participants to a review of the United States plan. Additionally, the United States should consider including its closest

allies as partners in the United States planning process. While there could be legitimate operational security concerns with all of the actors, these can be managed, as they currently are in the United States interagency process. Figure 5.1 graphically depicts the CMRWG.



Figure 5.1: Civil-Military Reconstruction Working Group (CMRWG).

While the CMRWG accomplishes out of theater planning, the creation of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), at the operational and tactical levels, is the key to the effective use

of diverse organizations and resources in theater as well as to the conduct of the day-to-day management of conflict prevention. The CMOC is an implementing and integrating body – designed to operationalize the terms of a peace accord or other international agreement. It establishes policies for and coordinates the management of implementation, not only for post conflict reconstruction but for all post conflict operations. Clearly mandated authority for the CMOC must be promulgated by an organization with the standing and clout to make such a mandate legitimate. The UN is an obvious source, but for certain operations an appropriate regional organization, such as NATO, can also provide the necessary authority. Whatever its origin, the mandate must identify the basis for the action, the locus of authority, and the objectives that the operation is designed to achieve. If endowed with such authority by the UN or other appropriate organization, the CMOC can then develop its structure, membership, operational procedures, and management system. According to Ambassador Robert Oakley:

> The center (civil-military operations center) was an effective innovative mechanism, not only for operational coordination, but to bridge the inevitable gaps between military and civilian perceptions. By developing good personal relationships, the staffs were able to alleviate the concerns and anxieties of the relief community.[13]

Through the CMOC, each participant becomes aware of the objectives and activities of other participants. But the CMOC has no authority to direct action by any organization. It will be successful largely because the basic objectives of each of the participants have been negotiated and agreed to by their more senior members in the CMRWG. Ideally, a CMOC would integrate all post conflict recovery activities in theater; in practice, however, this is difficult to achieve. Thus, a CMOC may only be able to focus on integrating functions related to a series of specific events. These events, which should themselves be integrated into the overall scope of the operation, may be widely diverse and include elections, the return of refugees, major economic initiatives, visits by major figures in the international community, the withdrawal of peacekeepers, and, for the purposes of post conflict reconstruction, the repair of key infrastructure assets.

The authority of the CMOC would derive from the parent organization that is commanding the overall mission. For example, the authority of the CMOC in Bosnia would derive from the North Atlantic Council; however, each participant would coordinate directly with its parent organization within the strategic level working group. This parallel reporting chain would ensure that coordination occurs both vertically – along formal organizational lines – and horizontally – along functional lines. Active participation by the former warring parties is highly desired. The leadership of the CMOC would depend upon the phase of the operation. During transformation

and in the first stages of stabilization, the senior military commander is the head of the CMOC. When conditions allow for the primary focus to shift to civilian implementation, and only when the civilian staff is firmly in place, the leadership would pass to the High Representative if it is a UN operation, or to a State Department representative if it is a unilateral operation. During normalization, leadership would remain with the civilian representative until such time as the local government can assume the full range of its responsibilities. Then, during the final stages of normalization, the local government would assume full responsibility and the military and civilian international organizations would be reduced and withdrawn.

Clearly there are issues of subordination that must be addressed proactively and decisively; the need for integration, coordination, and unity of effort is too important to be left to ad hoc arrangements. Ad hoc arrangements did not work well in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan, and thus should be firmly established prior to any future contingency. The civilian representatives must be prepared to subordinate themselves to the military during implementation and stabilization, and the military must be ready to subordinate its activities to the civilian representative in the last stages of stabilization and normalization. As a solution, the deputy chairman of the CMOC should always be a civilian if the chairman is a military officer, and vice versa – this will help mitigate the tendency for one agency or the other to assume total primacy in the post conflict operation. Essential to the success of the CMOC would be a completely integrated staff – a combined joint task force that includes civilian and military representatives at all levels, with key civilian and military staff officers within each staff section. Each participant would be assigned to a section depending upon individual and organizational expertise. At the tactical level, coordination teams should be formed under the aegis of the CMOC and placed in appropriate locations for the necessary duration.

There is one sector, however, that is not represented in either the CMRWG or the CMOC. Unlike participating nations, IOs, and many NGOs, the business sector has no overarching, integrating structure and is motivated by goals and objectives that may or may not be consistent with those articulated by the UN and endorsed by the relevant players – profit, for example. Especially challenging is the coordination of the activities of private industry as it seeks investment opportunities. While investment should be encouraged and supported, the CMOC would have to coordinate such private sector activity early in the operation – and ensure that it contributes to the overall promotion of peace – until the national government is fully in place. For this reason, the CMOC's economic development staff and Infrastructure Recovery Office (outlined in Phase 2) will be pivotal. A proposed CMOC is presented in Figure 5.2.



Figure 5.2: Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC).

Formed under one chairman, the CMOC would encourage the cooperation and discourage conflicts between competing organizations. Because all organizations would have a voice at the CMOC, individual agendas could still be pursued wrapped up under the broad umbrella of the overall mission. Duplication of effort would also be avoided.

Planning Template. Once the working group is established, a planning template for reconstruction is required to guide the CMRWG – a process that the working group uses to comprehensively analyze the post conflict reconstruction mission in advance and develop an executable plan, thus narrowing the time required for planning while embroiled in crisis. Several mechanisms can be used to get participants working off of the same plan, including a comprehensive interagency assessment of the crisis situation. This begins, and should begin, well before a crisis takes shape in the minds of policy makers. Such an assessment can focus the strategy and planning effort from the outset by aiding the development of a common appraisal of what needs to be done on the ground to achieve the desired policy objectives. It can establish avenues to share information during the planning process. While any such assessment is a living document that will certainly be revised over time, it provides an invaluable foundation for developing a common view of policy aims, strategy, and plans.

Additionally, if at all possible, this process should include the "reality check" of perspectives from personnel already in the field.

The establishment of a common template or generic plan will enhance the strategy development and planning process. Equally important is that the CMRWG must identify a set of standing interagency arrangements for government post conflict reconstruction efforts (similar to arrangements agreed to in the Federal Response Plan used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency for domestic disasters). Such a template will be tailored by the particulars of each operation and will depend on factors such as the complexity of the operation and the level of United States involvement. However, its benefit is that it focuses analysis and debate on key issues that must be resolved at the strategic level, giving those at the operational level the overall guidance required to achieve rapid success on the ground. It provides a shared foundation on which individual agencies can build their own operational responses.

The template to follow during post conflict reconstruction planning is relatively straightforward and can loosely follow the Operation Plan development process developed and taught by the United States Army, but with a few modifications. Once the standing working group is formed, the operational plan is written under the direction of the NSC Director, using the following eight-step process:

- Step 1: Develop available facts
- Step 2: Develop specified tasks
- Step 3: Develop unspecified tasks
- Step 4: Determine any constraints on the operation
- Step 5: Develop the mission statement
- Step 6: Develop the plan of execution
- Step 7: Promulgate the execution plan through individual agencies
- Step 8: Execute the plan

Step 1: Develop available facts. Determine all available facts bearing on the problem. Determine what infrastructure damage is present in the country and document it for further action. Depending on the contingency, these facts may be difficult to obtain. Some applicable information may include items as simple as a list of the key towns and villages, a list of counties or regions upon which to organize a response, the extent of local engineering capacity or engineering materials, or the stability of the local ministries. This first step can and should begin well before conflict erupts in a region, taking advantage of all available time before the contingency proceeds to the crisis stage. As this is a standing working group, planners should

develop the ability to anticipate hot spots and trouble regions in the world. In this anticipation, planners should begin to develop a basic information database of each area, updating as necessary when new information becomes available. It is a continuing process that doesn't stop even upon the receipt of an execution order. Because of the interagency nature of the working group, members should be able to provide specific expertise in certain areas and collectively should be able to comprehensively analyze and determine the initial facts on the operation. Sharing of information between agencies is key. Artificial firewalls established to protect areas of information must be breached to gain a full and complete appreciation of the possible mission requirements.

Step 2: Develop Specified Tasks. Determine the specified reconstruction tasks that were given to the working group by higher agencies. These tasks will define the reconstruction problem and allow the working group to better focus its effort. Many of these tasks may come from a peace agreement that was negotiated, and many tasks will come from specific goals that the higher agency requires for post conflict reconstruction. The delineation of specified tasks may establish limits upon reconstruction that the higher agency wants to impose; however, many times the higher agency is unable to identify an endstate and may rely on the working group to "figure it out." Although not an ideal situation, this is realistic in today's fast paced international environment.

Step 3: Develop Unspecified Tasks. Determine any unspecified reconstruction tasks that must be accomplished or planning parameters that must be established in order to execute the specified tasks. Often, specified tasks will require the completion of a preliminary subtask in order to be successful. It is plausible that the higher agency simply didn't spell out all the tasks for brevity and speed, or omitted a required task in their contingency planning. The reconstruction working group must comprehensively flesh out these "hidden" tasks so that the logistics, materials, manpower, and funding can best be allocated with priority. The result of failing to define parameters, is that there is no established point that determines mission success – it goes hand-in-hand with establishing an appropriate exit strategy. It is also during this step that the working group comes to an agreement on what sectors the group will concentrate for reconstruction. Basic needs such as electricity, water, heat, road and bridge infrastructure, and telecommunications may be a way to organize the plan. But rather than simply state that the country's electricity will be restored to 24-hour service, when pre-war conditions do not suggest that level of development, the working group must consciously determine what level of reconstruction is appropriate based on the country's past history. Did the country have 24-hour electrical power before the conflict, was central heat available in the

cities before the conflict or did the inhabitants heat themselves with biomass fuels, was there a central water system or did the country subsist on well water, and did the country have an established sewage system or were local methods used and were they appropriate?

The working group must take into consideration the likelihood that the local government can continue to promote its country's growth once the basic level of reconstruction is accomplished. If the answer is no, then a higher level or standard for reconstruction must be considered, giving the country a higher starting point to promote continued human growth and potential. If the working group had been established for Afghanistan, for example, it would have quickly determined that reconstructing Afghanistan to its pre-war state would not have brought the country into any condition for future growth, thus limiting its chances for long-term peace. Because of the neglect of over 23 years of warfare since the initial Soviet invasion, Afghanistan's infrastructure was reduced to rubble and would require much more than a reestablishment of the conditions that the Americans found in December 2001. Additionally, the country must now support a much larger population than in 1978 and requires an infrastructure expansion commensurate with its 21st century requirements. If little information is available on the working infrastructure, such as in the case of Kosovo, the working group should establish the basic reconstruction criteria and allow the CMOC, working through the Theater Emergency Recovery Office (outlined in Phase 2) to determine through area assessment what areas require certain reconstruction tasks and what areas already meet the standard established by the working group. Obviously, accurate information is desirable, but in the absence of accurate information, establishing a cut-off line for reconstruction standards will go far toward establishing the reconstruction endstate for the international community.

Step 4: Determine Any Constraints on the Operation. During this step, the working group determines and applies any constraints that will curtail the scope of the operation or prevent the operation from occurring at all. Constraints could include a lack of funding, lack of or over committed manpower, or even the absence of political will. If the constraints are surmountable or can be successfully mitigated, the working group continues to develop a mission. If the constraints are determined to be insurmountable, discussion with the higher authority must occur to redefine the reconstruction task into something feasible, acceptable, and suitable.

Step 5: Develop the Mission Statement. Having analyzed the tasks, restate the post conflict reconstruction mission. Discussion must narrow the scope of the mission to that which is necessary to jumpstart the country in conflict. Although very short, this mission statement will serve as the principle that will guide all reconstruction efforts. It is the mission statement that

gives the member organizations power to procure material and logistics in support of the mission. Instead of pouring money into a situation without a fully developed plan on how to use the funds, the mission statement gives the working group a foundation upon which to request resources from donor agencies and governments. The agreed mission statement provides the working group an authorized mandate upon which to pursue successful execution.

Step 6: Develop the Plan of Execution. During this step, the working group determines the realistic sequencing of organizations into theater. If the pace of the contingency operation denies the NGOs and IOs the ability to rapidly deploy, an initial executive agent that can rapidly deploy must be chosen and agreed upon by the working group. Because of the inherent logistical advantages that the military has, there is a strong case for establishing the military as the executive agent in Phase 2. The plan should reflect the organizing structure and should also establish levels of reconstruction in order to establish first priorities. For example, the military under Phase 2, may concentrate during Reconstruction Level One on the rapid establishment of basic electricity, water, roads and initial demining in order to forestall a humanitarian disaster and allow freedom of movement to promote peace. Reconstruction Level Two may concentrate on the refurbishment of electricity and water to make these systems more efficient for the future and safer for the environment, may concentrate on the resurfacing of roadways in order to promote the market economy, and may focus on a mine awareness program to limit the number of casualties to landmines. Regardless of the reconstruction levels, it is in the strategic working group that these decisions must be made, reconstruction levels defined, and an execution plan with an initial executive agent established.

Step 7: Promulgate the Execution Plan Through Individual Agencies. Using the guidance and direction of the Congressional Liaison and the power and influence of both the NSC Director and the Special Representative, the individual members promulgate the agreed plan within their own agencies. The members of the working group should be able to come to the working group with the ability to speak with authority for their agency. Once the reconstruction plan is completed, the members take the execution plan back to their agencies so the individual agency can further develop its course of action in line with the overall coordinated plan. Ideally, individual agencies should be developing a parallel plan with the working group, so that it will not require much effort for the agency to establish its execution plan once the working group publishes its document.

Step 8: Execute the Plan. The executive agent receives an execution order to deploy and establishes the Theater Emergency Recovery Office (TERO) in country, under the auspices and coordination of the CMOC. The CMOC connection is important. Because the CMOC

coordinates all activities for post conflict reconstruction, the emergency response office, which handles the infrastructure specific aspects of the reconstruction plan, must be well integrated into the CMOC to avoid duplication of effort and to enhance on-the-ground execution. Until this order is received or the region is no longer considered a possible contingency, planners continue to refine the plan based on the most recent information available. As in Afghanistan, time may be a precious commodity in later stages of plan development and execution, so planners must take advantage of all time available during any slow periods to continue plan refinement. While strategy obviously drives planning, in practice planning also helps to refine strategy by framing and assessing alternative approaches, identifying negotiated tradeoffs, and highlighting interagency policy conflicts for decision makers. The result of this is more than just a set of documents; it encourages key players to build working relationships, resolve differences, identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize their actions, and better understand their roles and responsibilities. Smoothing out such wrinkles is much less costly in terms of blood and resources before an operation begins than during its execution.

Phase 2: Emergency Response

Once the reconstruction plan is successfully promulgated throughout the governmental agencies, the IOs, and the NGOs, an execution order to deploy into theater and establish a TERO is the trigger for the post conflict reconstruction template to enter Phase 2. In the immediate aftermath of hostilities, an external body, possibly a body proffered by the UN will take the lead to establish a viable government in theater. However, the newly established government will not be able to provide for all, if any, of its own recovery needs. With that assumption, external countries will play a crucial role in the immediate restoration of the physical infrastructure that will be vital to the development of the local government, economy, and security. Due to the short response time involved, the military takes the initial lead as the execution agent for Phase 2. According to Ambassador Robert Oakley:

> There are growing doubts by some influential members of Congress and by individuals in senior defense positions on the advisability of military involvement in such situations. This is especially true as the number of operations and size, duration, and cost of military participation have all increased. They would rather equip, plan and train for the big ones and avoid what they perceive as essentially civilian ops. U.S. military capabilities such as logistics, strategic lift, intelligence, engineering, and organizational planning mean that we are the only nation with the capacity to deploy rapidly enough to respond to major emergencies. These capabilities, coupled with the military prowess to deal with high intensity conflict, are why the U.S. has been called upon in the past and why it will continue to be called upon in the future. Even when there is a lack of enthusiasm, there may be no alternative other than inaction. The military is called upon too frequently

because it is too easy, and because not enough has been done to develop greater civilian capabilities.[14]

For Phase 2, the Emergency Response phase, there must be two organizations to effect rapid emergency reconstruction – the National Capacity Building Coordination Office and the Theater Emergency Recovery Office.

National Capacity Building Coordination Office. The first organization required for Phase 2 is the Department of Defense (DOD) led National Capacity Building Coordination Office. This office would be responsible to coordinate all capacity building, DOD reconstruction/construction assistance activities, and provide command and control for the operation and interface with United States agencies, Foreign Governments and International Aid Organizations. It may seem redundant to establish an office separate from the executing reconstruction office; however, previous reconstruction efforts, such as post Desert Storm, show that there are many aspects of reconstruction that must occur that do not necessarily happen on the construction site and for which there may not be the appropriate facilities in most areas of the theater. This DOD office would initiate agreements, process letters of assistance, assist in international legal process reviews, coordinate explosive ordnance removals in accordance with international law, coordinate DOD humanitarian activities, assist in funding transfers and processing, and coordinate overall program management.

The National Capacity Building Coordination Office would require personnel with specific international programs skill sets. These skills would include:

- Program Managers familiar with regulations and requirements relative to the development of international programs, such as Foreign Military Sales, Section 607(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act for Technical Assistance, Agreements with International Aid Organizations, and the UN.
- Lawyers familiar with regulatory requirements associated with International Agreements and contracting.
- Resource Management and Budget Officers familiar with the acceptance of various classifications of money, Foreign Military Sales, 607 Technical Assistance, Burden sharing, and Letters of Credit.

The initial staffing level needed for this type of office would be in the range of 35 to 38 United States members and about 15 host nation employees to act as expeditors and partners to learn and help execute the program. A National Capacity Building Reconstruction Office is outlined at Figure 5.3.



Figure 5.3: National Capacity Building Reconstruction Office

Theater Emergency Recovery Office. The second office required to effect rapid emergency reconstruction is the Theater Emergency Recovery Office (TERO). TERO has four specified tasks. First, to fully determine the scope of the reconstruction effort, comprehensive damage assessments of the critical infrastructure must be rapidly completed. This includes the determination of building structural safety and pavement evaluations; completion of environmental baseline studies to document hazardous sites (other than minefields) to be used in the eventual turnover of modified infrastructure to local authorities; thorough evaluation of damages to power generation and distribution systems, water and sewage treatment facilities, airfield facilities, and water resources infrastructure; and determination of the reconstruction efforts for heat, communications, medical facilities, and schools – the minimal facilities to return life to some sense of normalcy. Local nationals will integrate into the Damage Assessment Groups (DAG) as team members to assist with the surveys, solutions, and execution of the reconstruction work. Commercial contractors, under contract to the United States government through delivery type contracts, would also be members of the DAGs. The DAGs would assess the damage, design a remedial solution/fix, negotiate with the contractor and award the contract, usually the same day, to execute the repairs. This would expedite the return to normalcy with basic life support services.

DAGs can be formed in two ways. First, the teams can be rapidly formed using uniformed members of the United States Army Facility Engineer Group, an organization of 410 officers and non-commissioned officers who are mostly degreed and registered professional engineers. The full organization, which can be tailored to meet any contingency, is organized during peacetime into:

- 30 Facility Engineer Teams (FETs) with seven members each
- 4 Facility Engineer Centers providing staff assistance to the FETs
- 6 fifteen member detachments
- A Mobilization Planning Support Cell
- A Group Headquarters to provide expertise, guidance and policy review to support all activities.

The expertise within the Facility Engineer Group is extensive and allows the organization to leverage assets across the nation and to render high-quality, professional results in various engineering disciplines including architectural, civil/structural, electrical, environmental, and construction management.[15]

However, because of political realities, there may be military force ceilings imposed on a peace operation, precluding the deployment of additional uniformed personnel into theater for reconstruction. Force ceilings were stringent in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, for example, and uniformed members that wanted to come into theater for short periods were thoroughly reviewed before they were given clearance to enter the theater in order to maximize the work potential of every uniformed slot available. Additionally, there may be perception problems with the local nationals that would preclude the use of uniformed military personnel in reconstruction. The local government's acceptance of any "foreign", especially Western, assistance will be difficult. This sensitivity could be eased somewhat by creating a predominately civilian organization. Therefore, the second way DAGs can be formed is by using civilian engineers from the United States Army Corps of Engineers or from the United States Navy's Civil Engineer Corps, to preclude the appearance of a United States military organization. The project management, contracting, and logistical infrastructure could be all civilian positions, without experiencing degradation in the ability to rapidly deploy.

The second TERO task is to expedite construction and repairs in order to promote rapid recovery of the local economy. The response would identify national and regional engineering and construction capabilities and material resources that could contribute to rapid emergency recovery. The initial priority is to contract for repair and emergency construction of national infrastructure using local and regional capabilities. This would spur rapid development and

recovery of the local engineer capacity, provide jobs for unemployed locals, and inject much needed revenue into the fledgling economy. If this capability is not immediately available, the second, less desirable option would be to bring in contractors from neighboring countries that have experience working within the environment and constraints of the region. The last option is to bring in international contractors from already developed countries. Although this course of action would most likely provide quality engineering, the program costs would be greater because of the requirement to pay international consultant prices, and the long-term development of the local engineering capacity would be minimized. Sources for local material would follow the same course – efforts to use local vendors to provide material of acceptable quality would be maximized. Resources would be applied to meet the priority national needs and technical assistance would be provided to local officials in their repair and reconstruction efforts.

For three major reasons, the third task is to develop a system to track the reconstruction effort. The primary reason is that during this effort a critical infrastructure data base would be developed, providing the basis to facilitate the organization of further political, cultural, and economic development. This goes far in helping the newly formed government establish legitimacy and to help the new government completely frame the reconstruction problem in order to develop long-term construction solutions. Second, TERO must be able to show to donor governments and agencies that the vast amount of money infused into the post conflict reconstruction program is being used with prudence and maximum long-term impact. As seen in Bosnia and Kosovo, funding audits do not stop simply because the implementing organization is deeply involved in a contingency operation. The third reason, although with less direct impact, affects the political will of the governments that have agreed to provide resources in manpower, money, and equipment. If reconstruction progress is well documented, the ability to sustain the external political will in the post conflict reconstruction phase will be enhanced, even if other world events attempt to deflect attention away from the reconstruction efforts occurring in theater.

The final specified task is to train local technical personnel in maintaining and improving infrastructure. Using local nationals as part of the recovery process not only puts the population back to work rebuilding their own infrastructure, but leverages their knowledge and experience of the environment. Figure 5.4 attempts to depict a TERO upon initial establishment in theater. This organization would evolve into Phase 3 - a more typical planning, design, construction management and contracting organization (similar to a typical forward deployed engineer district type organization found in peacetime overseas locations).



Figure 5.4: Theater Emergency Recovery Office

Authorization and Funding. Any national capacity building/reconstruction effort will take from five to ten years or longer depending on the specific needs of the country and the funding stream. Capacity building and reconstruction projects should be prioritized based on the desires of the local government and those projects having the greatest benefit to the widest range of the population. The minimum level of funding required to create a noticeable benefit would be dependent on the infrastructure conditions, but would potentially require funding in the range of $200 to $300 million for the first year with subsequent years, four to five minimum, funded at the $350 to $500 million level. This level of funding would not complete the capacity building but would make a noticeable improvement in the general population's quality of life. Money alone, however, will not necessarily make a noticeable change; the funding must be utilized for its intended purpose and not be diverted to other purposes, with an honest broker in charge of disbursements and program/infrastructure construction quality oversight.[16]

The Department of Defense (DOD) can generally respond under the legal authorities of other agencies in providing infrastructure assistance in response to overseas disasters. Initially, Section 607(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195, as amended, 10 U.S.C. 2357) would be used to provide for the restoration of civil infrastructure. This provision of law permits any United States government agency to provide commodities and services to friendly countries and non-government and private volunteer organizations on an advance-of-funds or reimbursement basis. Section 607 agreements are typically executed between the Department of State and the host government or IOs, so that DOD is not the actual signatory. In the case of post conflict reconstruction, IOs would be the major source of money under Section 607 authority.

Normally DOD components may participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after a determination is made by the Department of State. However, under 10 U.S.C. 404, "Foreign Disaster Assistance," and DOD Directive 5100.46, "Responsibilities for Foreign Disaster Relief," the military commander at the scene of a disaster may undertake disaster relief operations without prior approval of the Ambassador/Chief of Mission when the emergency is so acute that immediate action is required to save life and property. Although primarily targeted toward humanitarian relief, there may be circumstances when the repair of physical infrastructure would be considered vital to the saving of lives. Additionally, under the Army Technical Assistance Program (authorized by Title 33, U.S.C. 2314(a)), DOD can provide technical assistance to United States private firms that bid or execute overseas projects, including disaster response and recovery work.[17] This Act could come into play when the DAGs complete the damage assessment and require external United States firms to complete the emergency repairs due to lack of local engineering capacity.

Several authorities are available for DOD to support other Federal agencies. These include the Economy in Government Act (31 U.S.C. 1535), the Chief's Economy Act (10 U.S.C., 3036(d), and specifically section 234 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1996 (33 U.S.C., 2323a, "Interagency and International Support Authority") which authorizes the United States Army Corps of Engineers to accomplish work directly for Federal agencies and IOs. It is under these authorities that DOD can provide technical assistance to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).[18] Finally, a last authority provides limited funding for troop unit construction. The DOD receives an annual appropriation under Title 10 U.S.C., 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (H/CA) to promote United States and host nation security interests. It is intended that the deployed United States military personnel will exercise their operational and readiness skills while

improving the condition of the host nation. The Joint Staff administers the program and the Secretary of State must approve the application of H/CA in any given country. Conceivably, H/CA could be used in support of a recovery project; however, the use of these funds in the past has been quite limited and of small value.

Phase 3: Subsequent Recovery and Project Management

Although the post conflict template is split into four phases, some of these phases are not always neatly separated. Although the emergency response phase is developed for a 90-day anticipated duration, the distinction between the emergency response phase and the subsequent recovery and project management phase become blurred. There may be cases where emergency repairs occur in one area, while more substantial, long-term repairs can begin in other areas. The emergency response organization developed in Phase 2 closely resembles an emergency management structure that could be used in responding to natural disasters. The response organization consists predominately of structural engineers who can rapidly conduct damage surveys and provide detailed estimates for repairs, rather than contract management and quality assurance specialists. The goal of emergency response is to restore facilities and services to their pre-war condition, not to make massive improvements. However, during the subsequent recovery phase, emergency management using the rapid assessment Damage Assessment Groups (DAGs) shifts to a more traditional project management structure using a commodity centered structure based on region analysis. This revised structure, the Theater Project Management Office (TPMO), can administer large contracts and complete projects to established quality standards; however, the structural design of the TPMO is based on the ability of the international aid agencies to deploy and assume the reconstruction mission. As the footprint of the aid agencies grows, the importance of the TPMO diminishes and the local national involvement in the TPMO can switch to assuming key roles in the internal ministries of the local government.

The recovery and project management phase includes additional repairs to the electrical and water supply systems, government and public buildings, and transportation networks. As the various local government ministries resume operations, the requirement for additional work by the TPMO is expected to temporarily increase. The ministries will identify additional requirements, but will begin to take on some of the responsibility that the TERO had initially held. Although the TERO base structure provides a skeleton on which to easily transition to project management under the TPMO structure, primary responsibility for the operation is transferred from emergency services to the project management division. The project

managers serve as the primary link with individual local ministries and each project manager handles the full range of projects associated with a particular ministry, in a specific region, across all functional areas. The project managers are assigned to each regional sector to coordinate with the appropriate local official responsible for that sector, establishing solid rapport, trust and confidence between the manager and the local entity. Each manager develops a program to administer all projects for that sector, from early in design conception through to project completion when the TPMO turns the finished product over to the ministry. The project managers establish priorities, develop budgets, and determine project features and quality standards. They monitor and report progress through the design, contracting, and construction phases and supervise turnover of the project to the local nationals. Their staff is determined by the amount of work required in each region; the assessments by the DAGs drive this staff organization as it determines the required scope of work. For example, in region A, the project manager may require resources to complete projects in all areas – public and state buildings, roads, sanitary, electricity and water, defense, airports, waterways, and communications; however, region B may be landlocked and may not need resources to support waterway reconstruction, but may have a greater role in the reconstruction of the roads due to the region's landlocked dependence. The staffing is all situation-dependent and is driven by the result of the initial damage assessments. Because of the lead-time to fill engineering positions, it is critical that the damage assessments are conducted quickly and accurately so that there will be a seamless transition between emergency response and project management.

As the role of the project management division expands, the role of the emergency management section, complete with the DAGs, decreases. Eventually, the emergency management division is dismantled, placing their few remaining functions within the project management division. As prudence dictates, the military staff members are replaced initially by ex patriot civilians and subsequently by local nationals as the local situation stabilizes and matures. The model in Figure 5.5 depicts the final structure that represents a gradual decline in contractor representation and an increase of local nationals on the TPMO staff, assuming that external contractors will decrease their presence as local nationals become stabilized and assume the reconstruction role for their own country.



Figure 5.5: Theater Project Management Office

Phase 4: Transition to Local Capacity

The ultimate goal of the post conflict reconstruction strategy is to reach Phase 4 and transition all reconstruction functions to the local capacity for construction and to the local ministers for management. The outside agencies must never lose sight of the fact that the purpose of external nation assistance during post conflict reconstruction is to help the host nation develop its own capabilities and its own public and private institutions. According to Lieutenant General Henry J. Hatch, Chief of Engineers during the Persian Gulf War, "You don't do that by going in and just building projects; it is a training, imparting of information, a building of a capability in the country."[19] Thus, integrating local nationals is a key element of this concept of post conflict reconstruction. By incorporating local engineers into the organization

from TERO through TMPO and giving them hands-on experience, the recovery effort will encourage the development of improved facilities, expanded engineering expertise, and stronger personal relationships.

A second key to the success of the post conflict reconstruction effort is the ability to bridge the cultural gap between the interveners and the host country. A lack of understanding, when eastern culture meets western values for example, can cause strains initially until the emergency responders and the locals learn to understand each other's methods and mores. Cultural awareness on the part of the interveners is essential to establish and maintain a tangible bond focused on the rebuilding of a war-ravaged country. Additionally, the interveners must withdraw before the host government loses enthusiasm for their presence. From the beginning, United States policymakers must recognize the need to hand over responsibility for the recovery of the local infrastructure to the local government as expeditiously as possible. Recovery efforts must visibly take into account the wishes of the local government and rebuild the country within the managerial auspices of the newly formed local government. Initially, as demonstrated in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, the local government may require significant help to decide what the priorities should be for reconstruction, but as the capacity builds and proves to be competent, the external assistance must fade into the background and redeploy. The ability for the interveners to successfully accomplish this handover will significantly affect how war-torn countries will view the benefits of outside help. There may always be the perceived danger that the goal of the interveners is to completely assume control of the local government and its affairs. There have been accusations to that effect in both Bosnia and Kosovo as to when the interveners will redeploy; however, there was no post conflict reconstruction plan to successfully guide the intervener's actions and duration, leading to a learning-by-doing situation. Therefore, planning for the handover during pre-conflict operations and demonstrating a strong resolve to hand over operations at the earliest point possible during reconstruction will significantly affect the willingness and ability of governments to accept future help.

Although the reconstruction of Kuwait after Operation Desert Storm was an anomaly since the local government was able to pay for its own reconstruction and the locals had a fully functioning government almost immediately at the cessation of hostilities, there are some valuable insights to be garnered from that recovery operation. The result of the operation was that the Kuwaiti government and people appreciated the efforts of the United States Army to repair the civil infrastructure; without the work of the post conflict reconstruction force, the Army

would not have been able to transfer responsibility to the Kuwaiti government nearly as fast. According to Janet McDonnell, an historian with the United States Army Corps of Engineers:

> The civil affairs soldiers, and the Corps of Engineers members not only played a critical role in planning and executing the recovery operations but also left behind an enduring spirit of goodwill. In large part through the efforts of the United States Army, not a single Kuwaiti died from lack of food, water, or medical care. Within 30 days, primary power in Kuwait was restored and roads were cleared. Within 45 days, the water supplies were replenished. Within 90 days, the airport was reopened. The country's civil infrastructure was restored within nine months. The United States Army was able to make a rapid transition from offensive ground force to nation assistance, successfully translating its victory on the battlefield into an environment of political and social stability and economic recovery.[20]

By the end of the recovery period, the prewar status quo had been restored in Kuwait – both politically and economically. Additionally, the bond between the two nations was solidified enough that the Kuwaiti government asked the United States to station a small force temporarily in Kuwait and agreed to periodic joint military exercises, something that would have been unheard of a year earlier. Again, Kuwait was an anomaly, but serves as an example of what can be quickly accomplished during reconstruction when the funding, organization, and political will coincide.

Phase 4 does not suggest an organization chart for the Transition to Local Capacity as each country's government and internal ministries are developed in accordance with their culture and traditions. The new government must develop the resulting organization with a close eye on the methods that will give the country the greatest possible chance at continued growth and prosperity.

FINAL THOUGHTS

If the United States government plans to militarily intervene into a region as peace enforcers and then peacekeepers, such as the ongoing military role in the Balkans, or if the plan calls for military operations as a combatant in response to a perceived threat, such as the military role in Afghanistan, the planning process must take into account not only the conduct of military combat operations, but must also succinctly plan the rebuilding of the country into an entity which can competently manage its internal affairs and develop its economy without perpetual external aid – otherwise, the intervention will have a high probability of failure. An approved State Department POL-MIL Plan that outlines the operation through the recovery and reconstruction phase is essential to provide guidance to the interagency community; however, it

is also essential to develop and execute a Post Conflict Reconstruction Plan, carefully unifying the government agencies with the IOs and NGOs so essential to completing the recovery of a war-torn country. Although at times there is much animosity between the aid agencies and the military, there is a concrete way in which to build relationships and accommodate all interests into a coherent plan that will provide maximum benefit to the local country and people.

History is on the side of those advocating post conflict reconstruction. The most well-known and widely successful reconstruction venture was the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II. Much of Europe was in a shambles, characterized in many instances by physical devastation and political instability, making the continent vulnerable to the expansive goals of the Soviet Union. As a result, in 1947 Congress approved Secretary of State George C. Marshall's plan to provide financial support for reconstruction programs developed by participating European countries. However, the advantages of having a rapidly deployable civil-military engineer organization were better demonstrated when the United States decided to help Greece recover from the devastation of war. Soon after the end of World War II, Greece was torn by a civil war between Communist guerrillas and government troops. President Harry S. Truman and the United States Congress believed it to be in the national interest to prevent a Communist takeover. To strengthen the anti-Communist forces, a program of economic aid was developed under the auspices of the State Department, with the underlying view that a Greece on the road to economic recovery would be less likely to fall to Communism. President Truman appointed Dwight P. Griswold, a former governor of Nebraska, as the administrator of the recovery program – an early example of a Special Representative appointed by the President for recovery and reconstruction. Upon receiving Griswold's report on the extensive damage, the State Department decided that the reconstruction and rehabilitation of roads, railroads, bridges, ports, and the Corinth Canal, one of the main Greek waterways, were the primary concerns. The prevalent view was that once the country's transportation system was restored and the ports were in operable condition, economic recovery would be more rapid.[21]

The State Department received over 100 letters from construction firms interested in doing the work. The department, unfamiliar with executing construction and letting contracts and having no organization to manage the job, sent representatives to the Office of the Chief of Engineers to gather information regarding the selection of contractors, the types of contracts that could be used, and the amount of fees to be paid. The State Department, concluding that it was unsuited to manage the reconstruction effort, asked the engineers, who had a far-flung civil works construction organization, to do the work. Formally, the Secretary of State requested the

Secretary of War to assume responsibility for the job; assigned to the Corps of Engineers in late July 1947, it was to be completed within a year.

Organizing in a fashion similar to a TPMO, the Corps reconstructed about 900 miles of highway, rebuilt three major ports, restored railroad bridges and tunnels totaling two miles, and upgraded 10 airfields. After about 1 million cubic yards of earth and debris had been removed, the Corinth Canal was reopened. Construction exceeded the one-year schedule by half a year, mainly due to guerrilla attacks, unusually severe winter weather, and chronic resupply delays; however, the engineer civil-military organization enabled the efficient accomplishment of the post conflict reconstruction mission and established several major precedents. First was the creation of an engineer organization to administer and supervise large-scale infrastructure reconstruction in a foreign country. Second was the provision of technical assistance in conjunction with economic aid. Third, the practice of training local contractors to perform as much of the actual work as possible began in Greece. And, fourth, the commitment to help a friendly nation to help itself was manifested in projects aimed at restoring the Greek economy.[22]

Since the end of the Cold War, the spread of Communism is no longer the key tenet that drives United States policy; instead, the prevention of inter and intra ethnic conflict and rapid conflict resolution should war emerge have become central to United States foreign response. No longer can the United States pick and choose its reactions to conflicts based solely on national interest, or its desire to not get involved. With the advent of enhanced global information technology, the opinions of Americans who earlier did not have a loud voice and of internationals urging American intervention have become equally strong in affecting the direction of American foreign policy. Therefore, the prevention of human suffering and aid to help a people recover from war have become equal in importance to the actual conduct of military operations and requires the same effort in its planning and execution. Also, because the number of military operations has grown exponentially since the end of the Cold War, exit strategies and pre-conflict developed endstates must be integral to every military intervention. As the military reduces its size and as the requirement for military forces for peace operations increases, developing methods that will enable the military to rapidly redeploy upon completion of the emergency response and recovery missions are imperative. The United States has seen the effects of not having a post conflict reconstruction plan in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. If there is no vetted plan, there is no real measure to determine if the intervention is successful, nor determine the point when the interveners can redeploy. Only when a host country has the four qualities outlined in the opening chapter – internal security, external security, a viable economy, and a working infrastructure – can intervening forces declare mission success and

endstate. But until the initial planning is accomplished to determine the endstate, the United States will either be required to apply more money and resources over a longer period of time than is necessary to pursue a stable situation in a peace operation, or else will risk losing significant allies and influence built through years of engagement and diplomacy.

The post conflict reconstruction template is a guide. It outlines one way to accomplish the planning and execution for post conflict reconstruction. There may be other ways to accomplish the same endstate; however, other proposals must include four basic principles to be successful:

- **Pre-conflict planning to determine endstate, to achieve approval and acceptance by both governmental and non-governmental agencies, and to determine the structure required for immediate response.** Planning facilitates rapid response. If the civilian aid agencies cannot provide a rapid response, the government must decide to provide a rapid response through its own resources, to be handed over at the earliest moment. If the post conflict response mirrors that used in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, there is a high probability of inter and intra ethnic rivalries reemerging into conflict during the first year after the cessation of hostilities. In the first year, the local government does not yet have the resources to rebuild; these must come from external sources in order to help build the economy, to give the locals work that is productive and not destructive, and to establish local government legitimacy early in the reconstruction process.
- **An organizational structure to accomplish immediate damage and infrastructure assessment.** One of the downfalls in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan is the inability to quickly ascertain the reconstruction mission. Assessments were late in development, driving a reconstruction gap that could not be overcome. Whether it is organized as a Theater Emergency Recovery Office or as a Civil Affairs Provincial Reconstruction Team, as was eventually created in Afghanistan, the effect must be to have accurate damage assessments and quick turn-around contracts to restore the basic needs of life as quickly as possible.
- **An organizational structure to effect long-term infrastructure reconstruction.** Until the local capacity is developed, there must be an agency that can competently manage the external assistance required to jumpstart a conflict-ridden country into economic viability. If the aid agencies cannot respond because of organizational and funding delays, the civil-military model is an approach that would adequately jumpstart the reconstruction effort until the major aid organizations can deploy.

- **The overarching goal is to transition to local capacity and management at the earliest possible moment.** It must be the goal of every reconstruction intervention to build capacity and support local control. A reconstruction mission's success will be largely dependent on the ability of the host country to continue with the reconstruction effort in the absence of external help. Whether it is through the development of Ministries of Transportation and Infrastructure or through the development of Regional Administrators that manage all aspects of governance in their province, local control is the desired endstate so that external interveners, military and civilian alike, can return to their countries of origin.

The focus on external resources may risk overemphasizing the role of the military and the donors in the successful recovery from violent conflict. It is vital for all concerned to understand that the critical determinants of successful peacebuilding and sustainable recovery will always be ***internal***. The good intentions of the military with a seamless transition to civil agencies supported by the donor community cannot serve as a substitute for the willingness of local actors to renounce violence and to devote domestic resources to reconstruction. But the value of this approach is that it will jumpstart the economy of the host nation, giving them a rapid start to recovery with a goal of self-sufficiency. A corresponding rise in self-sufficiency will thus advance the redeployment of the intervening military forces and civilian agencies and lead to possible long-term peace. The reconstruction of a country's physical infrastructure will not guarantee long-term peace; however, the absence of a viable infrastructure places a burden upon a fledgling government and people that cannot be internally overcome, and will prevent any chance of long-term peace from developing to its full potential.

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

-A-

AFSOUTH – Allied Forces Southern Europe
ANZUS – Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
ARRC – Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps

-B-

-C-

CBU – Cluster Bomb Unit
CE – Contingency Establishment
CENTCOM – Central Command
CHLC – Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CIVPOL – Civil Police
CJCIMIC – Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation
CJCMOTF – Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
CMIS – Civilian Military Implementation Staff
CMOC – Civil Military Operations Center
CMRWG – Civil-Military Reconstruction Working Group
COMIFOR – Commander of the Implementation Force
CONUS – Continental United States
CTC – Combat Training Centers

-D-

DAG – Damage Assessment Group
DOD – Department of Defense
DOS – Department of State
DPIC – Dual Purpose Improved Conventional

-E-

EADRCC – Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center
EAF – Entity Armed Forces
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC – European Commission
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERDC – Engineer Research and Development Center
ETRP - Emergency Transport and Reconstruction Project
EU – European Union

-F-

FET – Facility Engineer Team
FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

-G-

GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GFAP – General Framework Agreement for Peace
GIS – Geographic Information Systems
GPS – Global Positioning System

-H-

HA – Humanitarian Assistance
H/CA – Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

-I-

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
IDP – Internally Displaced Person
IEBL – Inter Entity Boundary Line
IFOR – Implementation Force for Bosnia
IFOR-ENG – Implementation Force Engineer
IMG – International Management Group
IO – International Organization
IPTF – International Police Task Force
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

-J-

JCC – Joint Civil Commission
JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition

-K-

KFOR – Kosovo Force
KLA- Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC – Kosovo Protection Corps
KVM – Kosovo Verification Mission

-L-

LDK – Democratic League of Kosovo

-M-

MACA – Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
MAPA – Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan
MCAP – Mine-Clearing Armor-Protected Bulldozer
MCC – Mine Clearance Center
METL – Mission Essential Task List
MEU – Marine Expeditionary Unit
MMR – Minimum Military Requirement
MNB – Multi-National Brigade
MND – Multi-National Division
MSR – Main Supply Route
MTA – Military Technical Agreement

-N-

NAC – North Atlantic Council
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NSC – National Security Council
NSPD – National Security Policy Directive

-O-

OAS – Organization of American States
OFDA – Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHDCA – Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Civil Aid
OHR – Office of the High Representative
OPLAN – Operation Plan
OPTEMPO – Operational Tempo
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

-P-

PDD – Presidential Decision Directive
PEC – Provisional Election Commission
PIC – Peace Implementation Council
POL-MIL – Political-Military
PRRP – Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program
PRT – Provisional Reconstruction Team

-Q-

-R-

REO – Regional Engineering Office
RMAC – Regional Mine Action Centre

-S-

SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFOR – Stabilization Force for Bosnia
SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SNIC – Snow and Ice Clearance
SOF – Special Operations Forces
SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary General

-T-

TEC – Topographic Engineering Center
TERO – Theater Emergency Recovery Office
TOW – Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided Missile
TPMO – Theater Project Management Office

-U-

UCPMB – Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedya, and Bujanovac
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAC – United Nations Mine Action Centre
UNMACC – United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre
UNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan
UNPROFOR – United Nations Protective Force
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
UXO – Unexploded Ordnance

-V-

VJ – Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

-W-

WFP – World Food Programme

-X-

-Y-

-Z-

ZOS – Zone of Separation

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