

A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: THE IMPACT OF POST 11 SEPTEMBER 2001  
UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA ON THE ISLAMIC  
MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
Strategist Program

by

TIMOTHY JAMES PARKER, MAJ, USA  
B.A., University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, 1991

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2003

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No.  
0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 06-06-2003	2. REPORT TYPE thesis	3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) 05-08-2002 to 06-06-2003
---	--------------------------	--

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY THE IMPACT OF POST 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA ON THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN Unclassified	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) Parker, Timothy, J	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Ave Fort Leavenworth, KS66027-1352	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER ATZL-SWD-GD
--	--

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
A1,Administrative or Operational Use  
06-06-2003  
US Army Command and General Staff College  
1 Reynolds Ave  
Fort Leavenworth, KS66027-2314

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT  
Prior to 11 September 2001, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) posed a serious threat to Central Asian stability. The IMU, a militant fundamentalist Islamic group, declared that its goal was to overthrow the Central Asian governments and establish an Islamic state. By 2001, the IMU, supported by Al Qaeda and the Taliban, was capable of destabilizing Central Asia. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States (US), the US fought against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In order to prosecute the conflict, the US gained the support of and deployed forces to some of the Central Asian states. This thesis question explores the effect that the post 11 September 2001 US involvement in Central Asia had on the IMU. The thesis concludes that the IMU was devastated by the US intervention while the Central Asian states were substantially strengthened. This created a window of opportunity for the Central Asian governments to resolve Islamic fundamentalist unrest in Central Asia. Should these governments support religious freedoms and political and economic reform, this would undercut the IMU popular support. If there is no change in government policies, the IMU will likely transform into an Al Qaeda-like organization and resume its efforts to destabilize Central Asia.

15. SUBJECT TERMS  
Uzbekistan; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); Al Qaeda; Taliban; Central Asia; Regional Stability; Islam; United States

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:	17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 83	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Buker, Kathy kathy.buker@us.army.mil
---------------------------------	--	---------------------------------	---

a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number 9137583138 DSN 5853138
---------------------------	-----------------------------	------------------------------	--

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Timothy James Parker

Thesis Title: A Window of Opportunity: The Impact of Post 11 September 2001 United States Involvement in Central Asia on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chairman  
Jacob W. Kipp, Ph.D.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Lester W. Grau, M.A.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Harold S. Orenstein, Ph.D.

Accepted this 6th day of June 2003 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: THE IMPACT OF POST 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA ON THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN, by Timothy James Parker, 61 pages.

Prior to 11 September 2001, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) posed a serious threat to Central Asian stability. The IMU, a militant fundamentalist Islamic group, declared that its goal was to overthrow the Central Asian governments and establish an Islamic state. By 2001, the IMU, supported by Al Qaeda and the Taliban, was capable of destabilizing Central Asia.

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States (US), the US fought against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In order to prosecute the conflict, the US gained the support of and deployed forces to some of the Central Asian states.

This thesis question explores the effect that the post 11 September 2001 US involvement in Central Asia had on the IMU. The thesis concludes that the IMU was devastated by the US intervention while the Central Asian states were substantially strengthened. This created a window of opportunity for the Central Asian governments to resolve Islamic fundamentalist unrest in Central Asia. Should these governments support religious freedoms and political and economic reform, this would undercut the IMU popular support. If there is no change in government policies, the IMU will likely transform into an Al Qaeda-like organization and resume its efforts to destabilize Central Asia.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank my chairman and committee for their assistance and professionalism, and most of all, patience. I also thank my wife, Mary, and daughter, Emily, for their patience and support, to include the early morning wake-ups. My son, Nathan, was a great help in keeping me alert and hard at work during the late nights. I could not have completed this without all their assistance.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	ii
ABSTRACT .....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	iv
CONTENT .....	v
ACRONYMS .....	vi
ILLUSTRATION .....	vii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	6
3. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS .....	11
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	53
APPENDIX	
A. IMU DECLARATION OF JIHAD, 1999.....	62
GLOSSARY.....	64
REFERENCE LIST .....	67
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	73
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT.....	74

## ACRONYMS

FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
HT	Hizb-al-Tahrir. A non-violent Islamic fundamentalist movement that supports the return of the caliphate and sharia law.
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. An Islamic extremist organization that is pursuing the overthrow of Central Asian governments and the imposition of sharia law through violence.
IRP	Islamic Renaissance Party
US	United States
UTO	United Tajik Opposition

ILLUSTRATION

Figure	Page
1. Map of Central Asia with Ferghana Valley detail.....	61



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The Mujahedeen of the Islamic Movement [of Uzbekistan], after their experience in warfare, have completed their training and are ready to establish the blessed Jihad. *An extract from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan declaration of jihad, August 1999* (Rashid 2002a, 247)

Even as the World Trade Center towers came crashing down due to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the effects of that attack began to ripple around the world. Among the first actions of the United States (US) was to strike back at the Al Qaeda network and its leader, Usama bin Laden, who were responsible for the attacks. Al Qaeda was harbored in Afghanistan by the Islamic Taliban regime. In order to overthrow the Taliban, the US needed access to Afghanistan, and the best access was via Central Asia. Central Asia, therefore, became the corner stone to the first phase of the US-led global war on terror.

The US involvement in Central Asia had a clear impact on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Less than three months after the World Trade Center attacks, the Taliban regime fell and Al Qaeda was on the run. Less evident was the effect of post 11 September 2001 US involvement on Central Asia's own militant group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

A comparison of IMU capabilities prior to 11 September 2001 and on 1 January 2003 demonstrates the effect of US engagement. A comparison of the level of US involvement prior is also important. Central to assessing the complex situation in Central Asia is an understanding of the history of the region.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asia has been a strategically important to the US. US foreign policy in Central Asia revolved around access to vast oil and natural gas reserves and the desire to limit Iranian and Chinese influence in the region. Since 11 September 2001, Central Asia has been central to US strategic interests supporting US operations in the region. Loss of stability in Central Asia would threaten the US successes in Afghanistan and harm the US-led global war on terror by creating additional “failed states” in which terrorism could grow.

Central Asian Islamic fundamentalist movements have existed for many years, and experienced an enormous resurgence after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1999 the IMU emerged as a substantial military, terrorist, and religious movement, successfully launching offensives from Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The security forces of these countries were proven ineffective against the IMU. The IMU, with the support of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, continued to grow, receiving arms, military training, and recruits from around the Muslim world. In the late summer of 2001, the US recognized the threat and began providing limited military support to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Still, the future looked dire for the governments of Central Asia. Economic weakness, political and religious repression, interethnic violence, and friction among Central Asian states concerning limited resources created an environment susceptible to Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. President Islam Karimov and the Uzbekistan government seemed unable to deal with the IMU. Uzbekistan and possibly Central Asia were headed to a collapse.

The 11 September 2001 attack significantly altered the situation in Central Asia. Usama bin Laden bore direct responsibility for the attack, bringing world attention to the

all-but-forgotten region of Afghanistan and Central Asia. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan allowed US forces to establish bases on their territory, which, in return, brought substantial US military and economic aid. The subsequent defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda eliminated a major source of IMU training, recruits, and supplies. The world remained focused on Al Qaeda, with little understanding of the danger the IMU posed to the region. Very few in the West wondered how much the US involvement in Central Asia had damaged the IMU, or encouraged more recruits to its ranks.

For Uzbekistan and Central Asia, the world has truly changed since 11 September 2001. The year began with the threat of civil and religious war, a failing economy, and very limited assistance from outside powers. In January 2003, the IMU and Taliban were evidently crippled or destroyed, and the US was investing militarily and economically in Central Asia, and understanding that Central Asia's states must not fail. But is the situation as positive as it seems? What change or influence has the US presence brought to the region, and, specifically, what capability does the once-feared IMU retain? Perhaps the IMU and Central Asian Islamic extremism can rise again. Or perhaps this is a window of opportunity for Central Asia, while the IMU is weakened and the world supports a Central Asian recovery.

For the purpose of this thesis, Central Asia is Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan, though considered part of Central Asia in some references, are not included for this thesis. Terrorism is defined by the US Department of State as, "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." (US Department of State, 2002a)

A major limitation to this study is the reliance on English language materials and translations. English language sources often do not have intimate knowledge of the culture and region, while translated material is subject to the translator's language competency and agenda. Restricting research to unclassified sources is a minor limitation that allows the widest possible dissemination of the thesis. Though classified US Government records would most likely provide additional details, it is unlikely that they would alter the final conclusions of the thesis.

The thesis focuses on the impact of US presence in Central Asia from 1 October 2001 to 1 January 2003; therefore, events that occur after 1 January 2003 are excluded from this study.

The thesis has relevance because the success of the US global war on terror relies on stability in Central Asia. With a stable Central Asian base, the US may continue operations in Afghanistan, reducing the capabilities of terrorist organizations to operate out of the region while building a secure state. The US, Russia, and China all have critical security interests in Central Asia. For the US, it is the prosecution of the global war on terror, for China it is the fear of the spread of Islamic militancy from the region into China's Muslim Xinjiang province, and for Russia it is the security of her southern border and suppression of regional support for the Islamic Chechen rebels. All three powers have economic interests in the Central Asian oil and gas reserves. Prior to the US-Afghan war, the IMU was the greatest threat to Central Asian stability. For Central Asia, the long road to stability and prosperity requires the elimination of the IMU. Perhaps there is a chance now.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Literature Review

Books and publications on Central Asia are plentiful, and fall in three categories. The first covers Central Asia before the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. The second, and most prolific, covers the period from 1991 through 10 September 2001, and generally addresses the challenges and opportunities of the newly independent region. The third addresses events following the 11 September 2001 attacks and the beginning of a larger US presence in the region.

The books written prior to the Soviet collapse provide insights into the history of Islam and the roots of current issues in Central Asia. *The Great Game*, written by Peter Hopkirk in 1990, provides insight on the original Russian conquest of the region in the late 1800s. Hopkirk's *Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin's Dream of Empire in Asia*, published in 1984, follows the events leading to the Soviet domination of Central Asia. Though sources written prior to the Soviet collapse provide a vital context, they do not address many of the issues of religion and ethnicity that were shrouded by the Soviet system.

Resources that address Central Asia from the fall of the Soviet Union up to 11 September 2001 are plentiful and provide historical background information, as well as observations on over ten years of independence. Research focused on recent books such as *Life After the Soviet Union* by Nozar Alaolmolki and *Central Asia*, edited by Alexei Vasseliev, both published in 2001. Alaolmolki, once a Fulbright instructor in Kyrgyzstan,

provides a solid background on Central Asia's problems, foreign interests, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the IMU. Vassiliev provides a distinctly Russian point of view on political and economic issues. *Central Asian Security*, edited by Roy Allison and Lena Jonson in 2001, brings the expertise of nine separate authors addressing key issues in Central Asia. Most applicable are the chapters on Islam in Central Asia and US interests in the region prior to 11 September 2001. *Calming the Ferghana Valley*, a book published by the non-profit Center for Preventive Action, addresses the unrest in Central Asia. Nancy Lubin, the principle author, focuses on the Ferghana Valley, a stronghold of Islamic fundamentalism and a microcosm of all the challenges faced by Central Asia. Published in 1999, this book also includes numerous Internet links for additional research.

Periodicals and newspapers, most notably *The Christian Science Monitor* and *The New York Times*, trace the development of the Central Asian republics. Their articles provide a chronology of the Tajik civil war and the rise of the IMU. There are sufficient research resources providing new and occasionally conflicting information, analysis and points of view covering the rise of the IMU and the entrance of the US into the region.

After 11 September 2001, there was an enormous increase in the number of periodicals, Internet sites, and articles devoted to Central Asia and Islamic fundamentalism. Though few books have been published on the subject since 11 September 2001, and fewer still address the changes that have shaken the region, some are worthy of note. An excellent overview of the region and its issues is *Afghanistan and Central Asia* by Martin McCauley, with a chapter addressing the US presence in the region after 11 September 2001. *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, by

Ahmed Rashid provides in-depth coverage of the Central Asian Islamic movements and their activities since 1991. Rashid, a respected Pakistani journalist, interviews key players and provides an in-depth knowledge of the land and culture, although he occasionally shows bias against the Uzbek government.

Magazines provide frequent coverage of Central Asia, while other news media, such as *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, provide less frequent coverage. The Internet is also a valuable research tool. Government sources, such as the US Department of State, the US embassies in Central Asia, and the Department of Defense websites provide much relevant information. Sites, such as *Central Asian Analyst* and *GazetaSNG.ru* provide focused reporting on the region. Johns Hopkins University supports a Central Asia site, as does Harvard. There are many additional sites offering the latest in Central Asian news, as well as in-depth analysis.

The Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College published several relevant monographs, to include, *Growing US Security Interests in Central Asia*, in October 2002. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, or FBIS, provides translated articles from foreign media, to include Central Asian countries. FBIS provided a wealth of details not reported in western media. FBIS translations include an assessment of the veracity of the media, and what the political leanings of that particular magazine or newspaper are.

There is no work that addresses the effect of US presence on Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, specifically the IMU in Uzbekistan. This thesis begins that work.

## Research Methodology

Research for this thesis was chronological and topical. Initially, research material was compiled chronologically within a framework of four historical phases. The first phase covers relevant Central Asian history up to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The second phase covers Central Asia from 1991 to 11 September 2001. Together, these two phases provide the required thesis background to chapter four. The third phase covers the US-led war against the Taliban government in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 attacks and ending with the fall of the Taliban's conventional forces in December 2001. The final phase covers from December 2001 to 1 January 2003. These two phases provide the comparative information required to determine the effect that US intervention had on the IMU, and are the basis for the analysis and conclusions in chapter five.

Within this chronology specific topics are developed. Specifically, the strength, capabilities, and roots of the IMU and the US policies and interests are explored in applicable chronological phases. The diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of power model is used to assess the capabilities of the IMU before US military intervention, during the war in Afghanistan, and following the war in Afghanistan.

Initial research was conducted at the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), on Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This included relevant on-hand books, magazines, and periodicals, as well as library databases. In order to ensure that the latest analysis and developments in the region were incorporated, the Open Source Information System



(OSIS), open Internet searches, and relevant websites (State Department, Central Command, Harvard Central Asia site, Central Asia Times, etc) were all utilized

## CHAPTER 3

### BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

A geographic and historic context is necessary in order to understand the issues surrounding the IMU and US interests in Central Asia. The geography of the region, its terrain, and political borders have had a substantial impact on regional actors, including the IMU. The history of Central Asia provides insight into IMU actions and Central Asian government reactions and identifies continuing trends that influence current and future events. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are the three Central Asian republics in which the IMU conducted its operations and are the focus of this study.

Central Asia stands at the critical crossroads of the Asian continent. China lies to the east, Russia to the north and northwest, Pakistan and India to the south and southeast, and Iran (ancient Persia) to the southwest. Because of this position at the intersection of empires Central Asia grew rich from the trade on the Silk Road, was open to invasion from all directions, and on occasion, launched invasions of its own. The many ethnicities, cultures, and the primacy of Islam are all products of these invasions.

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan collectively cover an area of 788,600 square kilometers (Curtis 1996, 101, 197, 377), which is larger than the state of Texas (Geobop.com 2003). The three countries have a combined population of about 32.6 million, with Uzbekistan contributing 23 million to the total (Curtis 1996, 101, 197, 377). Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are primarily mountainous countries, while Uzbekistan stretches from the red deserts and the dying Aral Sea in the west, across open grassland, and ends in the Ferghana Valley in the east. The Ferghana Valley, of which both

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also control small portions, is the traditional breadbasket of Central Asia. It is home to ten million people, almost a quarter of Central Asia's total population, and historically is the regional cradle of Islamic activism. The "heart of Central Asia has always been the Ferghana Valley" (Rashid 2002a, 18).

#### Central Asia Before the Russians

Central Asia is first documented as part of the Persian Empire in 500 BC (Rashid 2002a, 18). Alexander the Great defeated the Persians and subsequently the Sogdians around 330 BC, seizing the Sogdian Empire capital of Maracanda, now Samarkand in Uzbekistan, and established the city of Alexandria-the-Furthest, now Khojend in Tajikistan (Tanner 2002, 42). Alexander left behind the Bactrian Empire, ethnically Greco-Sogdian, which lasted until 140 BC. The Parthians, a group of horse-tribes from the north Caucasus region, dominated western Central Asia until 226AD, when the Persian Sassanids gained control of the region. The Persian influence continues in Central Asia today, with ethnic Tajiks speaking a Persian dialect. Central Asia is the fault-line for Persian and Turkic culture and continues to spark Iranian and Turkish competition in the area in modern times.

The Hsiung-nu, predecessors of the Mongols and commonly known as the Huns, began expanding into Central Asia around 10 B.C., pushing many other tribes before them. By 400 AD, the Huns expanded their control all the way to the Volga River, and were poised to invade Europe. One of the Hun tribes pushed into Central Asia from A.D. 100 to 200 to establish the Kushan Empire. The Kushan Empire incorporated most of Central Asia, northern India, Iran, and the present-day Xinjiang province of China. Its

Buddhist emperor displayed religious tolerance, permitting the practice of Zoroastrianism and Hinduism in his empire. This tolerance became an accepted practice in Central Asia,

Around 650 AD, Arabs, inspired by the new Islamic religion, conquered Central Asia. The Arabs established Islam in Central Asia over the next one hundred years, while defeating numerous armies and ending Chinese expansion in the region. The Arabs, however, did not establish any permanent government and were forced out.

Independent Muslim khanates grew around key cities and oases. One of these khanates, based in Bukhara, became the Persian Samanid Empire from A.D. 874 to 999. The well-organized Samanids continued to spread the Persian language and culture through trade along the Silk Road and by the expansion of their empire. Several Turkic tribes attacked the Samanids, ultimately allowing the Seljuk Turks to gain dominance across Central Asia and eventually all the way to Turkey. In 1218 A.D. the Seljuks enraged a little-known Mongol warlord, Ghengis Khan, by killing his envoy along with hundreds of his Silk Road merchants.

Ghengis Khan set out to destroy the Seljuk Turks, devastating the city of Bukhara and killing 30,000 inhabitants in 1220 (Rashid 2002, 22). The Mongols, under the Great Khan, extended their empire all the way to Europe and re-established the Silk Road across Central Asia from Constantinople to Beijing. After his death, Genghis' descendants divided Central Asia into two regions: Transoxiana in the west and Turkistan in the east. This is the first reference to a country of Turkistan, a concept that remained up to Soviet domination.

Around 1369, Tamerlane, a native of Samarkand in present day Uzbekistan, established his empire throughout Central Asia, and eventually conquered India, Persia,

Arabia, and part of Russia. The majority of Tamerlane's warriors were ethnically Uzbek (Tanner 2002, 102). Persian culture, under attack throughout 400 years of Turkic dominance in Central Asia, was reduced further when Tamerlane replaced the Persian language with a Turkic dialect as the court language. The Shaybani Uzbeks, descendants of Ghengis Khan, defeated the Timurids, the descendants of Tamerlane, in 1500, and made Bukhara their capital. The Shaybani Uzbeks created the first Turkic script, replacing Persian.

During the time of the Shaybani Uzbeks, three critical developments reduced the importance of Central Asia and her peoples. First, the opening of the sea lanes from Europe to the east reduced the importance of the Silk Road, which had created much wealth for Central Asia. Second, the advent of gunpowder ended the dominance of the Steppe warrior (Tanner 2002, 103). Third, centuries of invasions and constant fighting weakened the Central Asia infrastructure, leaving roads and irrigation works in disrepair. In the 1600s and 1700s, the Shaybani Empire collapsed leaving three weak khanates: Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara (Rashid 2002a, 23). As Central Asia disintegrated the power of Russia was on the rise.

#### Russian Era

The Russian conquest of Central Asia was a slow encroachment of almost 200 years. The separate clans and khanates fell one by one under the hegemony of the Russian Empire. The tsars began this expansion by annexing Siberia in 1650. In 1715, Peter the Great invaded the Kazakh steppe, and by 1750 all the Kazakh leaders were tied to Russia by treaties. The US first influenced Central Asia, quite unknowingly, as the US Civil War cut off the supply of cotton to the Russian textile industry in 1861. Russia

began a program of conquest, irrigation projects, and resettlement of ethnic Russian farmers into Central Asia in order to produce the required cotton. Cotton continues to be a critical Central Asian crop to this day. The regional hub of Tashkent fell to the Russians in 1865 (Alaolmolki 2001, 19). By 1876, almost all of Central Asia was under Russian hegemony, and the province was named Turkestan, with Tashkent as the administrative capital. The separate Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva were allowed to remain, but were dependant on Russia.

In 1885 there was a revolt in the Ferghana Valley against the Russians. This is but one instance of the valley serving as a center for resistance against oppressors, and the involvement of Islam in that resistance. The Russians crushed this uprising, which was led by a Sufi Dervish (Rashid 2002a, 24-45). Sufism, a form of Islamic mysticism, developed within Central Asia to meet the needs of a nomadic people. Sufism promotes direct contact with God, tolerance of other religions, Sufi brotherhoods, and Sufi saints (Rashid 2002a, 26-27).

The Russian conquest of Central Asia brought the Russian Empire very close to the British Empire, which was expanding north from India. The competition for territory between the two states led to the “Great Game” in which both empires vied for influence in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The Great Game ended in the late 1800’s when the two empires established Afghanistan as a buffer state (Rashid 2002, 24). The arbitrary border agreed to by the empires discounted tribal and ethnic boundaries, thus leaving large Tajik and Uzbek minorities in Afghanistan, ensuring vigorous interaction and ethnic support across the border. The cross-border ethnic ties play key roles in the Afghan civil wars and the actions of the IMU.

The collapse of the Russia Empire was extremely harsh on Central Asia. As World War I bled Russia of her strength, she began to lose control over Central Asia, and became more and more desperate. Chaos and bloodshed preceded the final collapse of the empire. In 1916, tsarist troops brutally put down a revolt against World War I conscription and high taxes, all in the midst of a severe Central Asian famine. Tens of thousands were killed in the fighting and subsequent tsarist reprisals. Up to one-quarter of the Kyrgyz population was displaced or killed during this time (Rashid 2002a, 25). When the Russian Empire finally collapsed in 1917, Central Asia had no desire to be a part of the new Soviet Union. Lenin had other plans.

#### Soviet Era

Shortly after the collapse of the Russian Empire, Tashkent, with its large Russian minority, declared Turkestan an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) but governed little beyond the city (Alaolmolki 2001, 21). Many regional governments, independent from the Soviets, came to power. The Jadids, an indigenous Islamic movement created by Ismail bey Gasparali (1815-1914), promoted an Islamic-based unified Turkestan, but with modern, progressive political and social programs (Dannreuther 1994, 12). Some mullahs, fearing a Bolshevik repression of Islam, and loss of their powers, called for the establishment of Islamic sharia law (Rashid 2002a, 33). Sharia law is the strict application of the laws emplaced in the days of Mohammed. Though not considered extreme at the time, sharia law is considered harsh by modern standards. While the Bolsheviks fought for survival against the White Russian counterrevolutionary armies, Lenin appeased and bargained with many of the leaders of

Central Asia, temporarily permitting self-determination and supporting the practice of Islam (Rashid 2002a, 32).

The basmachi were the primary opponents of Lenin's Bolsheviks in Central Asia. The term "basmachi" comes from Turkish word "baskini" meaning "attacker," which first described bands of outlaws (Alaolmolki 2001, 20). The basmachi were loosely organized bands of fighters. Their popular support was based on strong anti-Russian and pro-Islamic fervor. The basmachi would later serve as an example to the mujahadeen of Afghanistan, as well as the IMU.

In 1918 the Ferghana Valley was once again the center of resistance with a reported 20,000 basmachi fighters securing the valley against the Bolsheviks (Hopkirk 1984, 64). In 1921, Lenin sent Enver Pasha, the ousted World War I ruler of Turkey, to convince the basmachi to lay down their arms. Instead, Enver took command of the basmachi in an attempt to create a pan-Turkic state from Central Asia to Turkey. When Enver Pasha perished in battle in 1922, his pan-Turkic goals died with him (Hopkirk 1984, 170).

The White Russian armies were defeated by 1920, allowing the Bolsheviks to repress religious and political freedoms and reconquer Central Asia. The basmachi fought on until 1929 in most of Central Asia (Rashid 2002a, 26) and continued fighting until 1936 in Turkmenistan (Alaolmolki 2001, 21). Many basmachi and their families, fearing retribution from the Soviets, fled Central Asia to other Muslim countries. The majority fled to northern Afghanistan, adding to the resident Tajik and Uzbek minorities (Rashid, 2002a, 34-35). The rugged north Afghan border and ethnic ties to Afghanistan later assisted the IMU in their operations.



Once Central Asia was subjugated, the Soviet Union, now led by Josef Stalin, needed to prevent further uprisings in the region. Stalin's goal was to destroy pan-Turkism and pan-Islamic movements by redrawing the Central Asian borders, purging local leadership and repressing Islam (Dannreuther 1994, 13). Stalin established the five republics of Soviet Central Asia to prevent any united opposition by ethnic groups, nationalities or religious groups. He did this by splitting vital resources, ethnic groups and clans among the republics. The Ferghana Valley, a single economic entity, was divided among three republics (Rashid 2002a, 36). Stalin included large minority ethnic groups in each republic. For example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have large Uzbek minorities, thirteen and twenty-three percent respectively (Curtis 1996, 101,197). Samarkand and Bukhara, traditional Tajik cities, were made a part of Soviet Uzbekistan. This division of separate republics, a first for Central Asia, created ethnic tension where once they lived together peacefully (Dannreuther 1994, 12).

By 1928, the Soviet anti-Islamic campaign was underway (Alaolmolki 2001, 22). Stalin worked to eliminate Islam completely, banning mosques and madrassahs, the wearing of the veil, and study of the Koran. The number of openly active mosques dropped from 20,000 in 1917 to only eighty-four in 1935 (Rashid 2002a, 38). In the 1930's, the Soviets launched massive purges of intellectuals and religious leaders, instituted a forced collectivization policy that destroyed traditional nomadic herding and killed millions, and implemented a program of Russification, which imported thousands of Slavs and suppressed the indigenous cultures. Islam was forced underground and became a quiet form of nationalistic and religious resistance to the Soviets. The underground observance of Islam nurtured a strong secretive society that instinctively

protected Muslims from the Communist Party. This ingrained attitude continues to assist the IMU in its growth and activities.

With the outbreak of World War II, Stalin's policies became more liberal since he needed the support of Central Asia in his desperate fight against Hitler. Stalin established Islamic directorates to oversee official Islamic activities, moved factories to Central Asia to escape German bombers, and exiled numerous ethnic Chechens, Germans and Ukrainians, (all potential German sympathizers), to Central Asia (Rashid 2002a, 38). The idea of state-sponsored and controlled Islamic institutions, begun in Central Asia at this time, continues in Uzbekistan today.

After the war, repression returned until the 1960's, when the Soviets were courting other Islamic nations, such as Syria and Egypt, and wanted to show that Islam was compatible with socialism. A few madrassahs opened and select individuals were permitted to go on the Haj pilgrimage in Mecca, but Islam in the USSR remained under state control. Native Central Asians were permitted into the upper echelons of the Central Asian Communist Party apparatus. Ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and others could now become senior party members, and even lead the Communist party in their republics. Central Asians became firmly embedded and co-opted into the Soviet system. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, these Central Asian Communists retained control of their republics.

The Islamic underground, however, was growing. The Ferghana Valley remained the Central Asian center of Islamic activity, as "children from all over Central Asia came to Ferghana to study [Islam]" and itinerant mullahs and underground madrassahs thrived

(Rashid 2002a, 41-43). In 1960, over 6000 unregistered mullahs were in Tajikistan alone (Rashid 2002a, 41-43).

The Soviet war in Afghanistan, lasting from 1979 to 1989, exposed Central Asian Muslims to more radical Islamic thought. Initially the Soviets sent many Central Asian Muslim soldiers into Afghanistan, where they were impressed with the religious fervor and faith of the mujahadeen (Rashid 2002a, 43). Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khjaev was a Soviet paratrooper in Afghanistan from 1987 through 1989 (Ruchala 2002). His experiences in Afghanistan helped transform him into Juma Namangani, the legendary military leader of the IMU.

The US supported the Afghan mujahadeen fighters in their war against the Soviets as part of the greater US-Soviet global competition. Pakistani and Saudi Arabian intelligence, with support from the US, recruited, trained and armed radical Muslims from around the world to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Over 35,000 Muslim radicals from forty-three countries fought with the mujahadeen between 1982 and 1992. By the end of the war, over 100,000 Muslims were exposed to Islamic radicalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Among those trained in the Pakistani madrassahs were hundreds of Uzbeks and Tajiks (Rashid 2002a, 44). The mujahadeen even carried out attacks from Afghanistan into Soviet Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 1987 against Soviet supply bases (Rashid 2002a, 44). At this point, US policy focused on punishing the Soviets in Afghanistan without considering any long-term effects on Central Asia.

Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and announced his reform program of perestroika. Although perestroika did not officially relax restrictions on religion, there was a subsequent resurgence of Islam in Central Asia. Much of the Islamic underground

came to the surface, and significantly, Islamic publications from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan entered into Central Asia. Thus the more radical external Islamic influence on Central Asian Islam, which tsarist and Soviet restrictions had prevented for over a century, began to take hold.

The Deoband sect of Islam was taught to Islamic recruits, to include Central Asians, in the Pakistani madrassahs. Deobandism, established in the small town of Deoband in northern India, developed in response to the failed Indian Mutiny against the British in 1857 (Rashid 2002b). The Pakistani madrassahs teaching of Deobandism emphasized the need to purify Islam and return to the original practices of Mohammed and his followers when Islam was founded (McCauley 2002, 87). Deobandism is intolerant of other religions, to include Shia Muslims, and emphasizes the concept of militant religious jihad. With Pakistani government funding and tacit US support, Deobandi madrassahs and influence spread from Pakistan throughout Afghanistan and into Central Asia. Scholarships with living allowances were reserved for Central Asian students to attend the Pakistani madrassahs. Ahmed Rashid writes, “Uzbek and Tajik radicals whom I met in 1989 were convinced that an Afghan victory would lead to Islamic Revolutions throughout Central Asia” (2002a, 44). The political and ideological roots of the IMU developed in the Pakistani Deobandi madrassahs (Rashid 2002a, 45).

Wahhabism is another fundamentalist sect of Islam imported from Saudi Arabia to Central Asia in the 1980s. In 1700, an Arab named Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), began a movement to purify Sunni Islam by expunging all changes to the religion since around 950 AD. This included eliminating luxurious living, extravagant worship, and the Sufi practice of saint veneration (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia 2000). Al-Wahhab

specifically desired to eliminate Central Asian Sufism among the Arab Bedouins (Rashid 2002a, 45). Al-Wahhab was able to convert the Saud tribe, which then waged a jihad against all other forms of Islam. The Saudis controlled and lost Arabia twice. In 1932 the House of Saud again rose to prominence in Arabia and established the current regime (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia 2000). The Saudi leadership established Wahhabism as the state religion, and has aggressively exported it since the oil boom in the 1970s. Wahhabism first came to Central Asia, specifically to the Ferghana Valley in 1912, but with little impact. In the 1980's, under the relaxed Soviet policy of perestroika, Saudi Arabia funded successful efforts to spread Wahhabism into Central Asia (Rashid 2002a, 45).

In the late 1980s, unrepressed violence and protests in Central Asia indicated a weakening of the Soviet system. Ethnic Uzbeks clashed with ethnic Kyrgyz in the Kyrgyz town of Osh over control of land in the Ferghana Valley. Over 320 persons were killed in three days of brutal fighting that followed. This violence sparked widespread protests against the government in the Kyrgyz capital (Curtis 1996, 113). In 1990, housing riots occurred in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe. Soviet troops suppressed the riots, inflicting numerous casualties. The Tajik government responded by declaring a state of emergency and repressing all political dissent (Curtis 1996, 267). Change was unstoppable and in August 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and the Central Asian Soviet republics declared their independence for the first time in history.

#### An Independent Central Asia

According to Bahadir Abdurazakhov, a former Central Asian diplomat, "With Communist Ideology abandoned but with the Communist elite still in power across the

entire region, a new political battle is being fought between Islamic fundamentalists on one hand and secular nationalists on the other. Liberal democrats occupy a weak position in the middle.” (Alaolmolki 2001, 24). This is an appropriate summary of the political conditions that followed independence.

In all five nascent republics, the Communist elites maintained their grip on power, which was not surprising since the activities of opposition groups were historically repressed. The elites and middle class hoped that retaining the incumbent leaders would prevent border disputes, ethnic tensions, or economic difficulties from destabilizing the region. Part of Central Asian independence included a rediscovery of its rich cultural and religious heritage, both as an anti-Russian protest and as an indicator of rising nationalism. Ethnic Russians in Central Asia, constituting much of the professional and skilled labor, felt threatened and alienated by this nationalism. In the initial turmoil of independence, many moved to the security of Russia.

In Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, who was elected President of the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet in 1990, was elected president of independent Kyrgyzstan in an unopposed direct national election. Islam Karimov was appointed first Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party in 1989, following a purge of the Uzbek Communist Party leadership for involvement in a massive cotton production scandal. Karimov was chosen by an elected parliament to lead the new Uzbekistan. In Tajikistan the transition to independence was not as smooth. The former communist party chief, Rahmon Nabyev, became president in a corrupt direct election, which immediately sparked a struggle with a coalition of opposition movements (Curtis 1996, 114, 400, 267). Another communist, Emomali Rahmonov, replaced Nabyev following the collapse of a power sharing arrangement in

December of 1992. The subsequent power-struggle between ex-Communists and a coalition of Islamists, nationalists, democrats and ethnic and religious groups led to over five years of bloody civil war, and the evolution of the IMU.

### The Tajik Civil War

The Tajik civil war, which lasted from 1992 until 1997, was a complex and harsh struggle leaving over 100,000 dead (some estimates are as high as 300,000) and over 1.5 million displaced during the war. In addition, the economic damage, estimated at over seven billion US dollars, crippled Tajikistan for years to come (Vassiliev 2001, 191).

The civil war was a religious, political, regional, and socio-economic war. On the surface it was a simple power struggle between the ex-Communist apparatus and an opposition coalition. However, individuals from the northern Tajikistan and the Khojund areas had long dominated key government and Communist Party positions and these incumbents wanted to retain power. The north contained most of Tajikistan's industry and business, which created a different social class from the farmers and herders of the south. Southern Tajikistan, containing the religious Garm region and the Shia Ismaili religious group living in the Pamir region, became the backbone for the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of Tajikistan. The Ismailis were the historical successors to the basmachi. The IRP later organized and then dominated the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which incorporated many smaller factions such as the nationalists and democrats. Said Abdullo Nuri, an IRP Islamist, was the nominal leader of the UTO. Southern Tajikistan was also influenced by the Afghan war. The UTO received some support from the Tajik warlord Ahmed Shah Masood, who served as Defense Minister in Kabul until 1996 (Rashid 2002a, 103). The Uzbek minority of Tajikistan, living mostly in the

southwest region, supported the government. Despite this, there were allegations that Uzbekistan provided a haven for UTO factions, causing further distrust between these countries (Vassiliev 2001, 179, 215). Russian soldiers, still guarding the Tajik-Afghan border, frequently were attacked and suffered hundreds of casualties during the course of the war (Vassiliev 2001, 206).

In 1994, the UN and the international community sent a small observer contingent in hopes of promoting a peaceful settlement. In 1997, a compromise agreement provided that the UTO and government would share power (Vassiliev 2001,207). This brought the Islamists who were willing to work within a democratic system into the Tajik government, but left the hard-line Islamists dissatisfied. The UTO militia, estimated at over 8,000 combatants, was incorporated into the Tajik military and security forces (Vassiliev 2001, 203). Foreign combatants were not incorporated, however, some of these remained in Tajikistan. The complex nature of the Tajik civil war, and its regional implications, is exemplified by the countries that signed the peace agreement in Moscow. These included Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

The Tajik civil war impacted the IMU in three ways. First, it provided a highly visible example of the success a civil war could have in a Central Asian country. The Tajik military proved generally ineffective and the rebels did achieve some degree of popular support. Rebel success increased fear of Islamists and led to subsequent repression of Islamic activities by Central Asian governments. This repression encouraged devout Muslims to support the IMU cause.



Second, it increased distrust among Central Asian governments, specifically between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Tajikistan distrusted Uzbekistan because of the Uzbekistan government's manipulation of the ethnic Uzbek minority in Tajikistan and possible collusion with an ethnic Uzbek renegade colonel fighting the Tajik government (Rashid 2002a, 105). The Uzbek government distrusted the Islamists, now in positions of power in the Tajik government, who, in turn, had ties to Uzbek fundamentalists. This distrust undermined any coordinated response to the rise of the IMU.

Third, the Tajik civil war created a group of battle-hardened, armed, and dissatisfied Central Asian Islamic militants. These militants rejected the compromise among Islamists, former Communists, and democrats, which ended the Tajik civil war. They became the core of IMU combatants. One of these disgruntled Islamists was a UTO commander and ethnic Uzbek, Jumaboi Khjaev, later known as Juma Namangani.

#### The Evolution of the IMU

Uzbekistan experienced a strong Islamic resurgence in the years prior to independence, and by 1991 Islam was entrenched. Islam Karimov, the president of the new republic, recognized this and swore his oath of office on the Koran. His initial acceptance of a revitalized Islamic society died quickly. Tohir Yuldeshev, a 24-year-old local mullah, had built a mosque and a madrassah in Namangan, a city of over 300,000 in the Ferghana Valley (Curtis 1996, 406). Saudi money funded Yuldeshev's movement. By 1991, he had gathered about 5,000 followers, established elements of sharia law in the city, and demanded that Karimov impose sharia law in the rest of the country. Karimov came to Namangan to talk with Yuldeshev, but left angrily after Yuldeshev refused to compromise his demands for sharia law. At Yuldeshev's right hand was Jumaboi Khjaev,

the charismatic ex-Soviet paratrooper. Yuldechev and Khjaev, later known as Juma Namangani, were to become the religious and military leaders of the IMU.

A critical event occurred when Yuldeshev led his followers out of the Uzbek Islamic Renaissance Party, declaring that he could not waste time working within the parliamentary system. Instead Yuldechev established the party “Adolat” [justice], which quickly established mosques and madrassahs across the Ferghana Valley. In 1992, Abdul Ahad, one of Yuldechev’s followers, stated, “We will ensure that first Ferghana, then Uzbekistan, then the whole of Central Asia will become an Islamic state” (Rashid 2002a, 139). Karimov’s government, after months of indecision, cracked down on Adolat, banning the party and arresting members. Yuldeshev and Namangani fled to Tajikistan, where they joined the Tajik IRP as they prepared for the coming Tajik civil war.

During the Tajik civil war, Namangani built a strong reputation as a military leader, while Yuldeshev built a support network for his cause. Living in Pakistan from 1995 to 1998, Yuldeshev built strong ties with Pakistani intelligence and numerous Islamic radicals who passed through the madrassahs. Yuldeshev ensured that Central Asian militants continued to receive Deobandist Islamic schooling. Reports indicate Yuldeshev received support from Iranian, Turkish, and Saudi Arabian intelligence services, as well as support from the numerous Saudi Uzbeks, heirs of the basmachi who had fled Central Asia in the 1920s (Rashid 2002a, 141). The Adolat party, now underground in Uzbekistan, remained a viable organization to support Yuldeshev and Namangani when called upon.

The end of the Tajik civil war in 1997 changed the situation for Juma Namangani. He opposed the negotiated peace, but was coerced by his IRP friends, now part of the

government of Tajikistan, to lay down his arms and disband his fighters. Namangani left his stronghold in the Tavildara Valley and moved to a farm in nearby Garm with his family and a group of Uzbek and Arab combatants. During this time Namangani became heavily involved in the drug trade to the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, in order to finance his growing movement (Rashid 2002a, 145).

For two years after the end of the Tajik Civil War, Namangani, his family, and a core group of followers remained in the Garm valley of Tajikistan. He operated a small trucking company, which was heavily involved in transporting opium and heroin from Afghanistan to Dushanbe. Namangani's residence became a collection point for disaffected Islamic fundamentalists from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

While Namangani amassed volunteers and illicit drug money in Tajikistan, Yuldeshev spent this time strengthening his ties with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. They provided him with support and houses in Kabul and Kandahar (Rashid 2002a, NY). In Namangan, Uzbekistan, the brutal beheading of an Uzbek policeman, followed by similar beheadings of a collective farm chairman and his wife, led to further crackdowns against Islamic fundamentalists by the Karimov government (Washington Post 2001). Backed by increased funds and personnel, and strengthened by the backlash from increased repression of Muslims in Uzbekistan, Namangani and Yuldeshev created the IMU in the summer of 1998 (Rashid 2002b).

On 16 February 1999, six car bombs exploded in Tashkent outside the cabinet ministry in an apparent attempt to assassinate President Karimov. Though Karimov, who was enroute to the building at the time, narrowly escaped harm, sixteen people were killed and over one hundred wounded (Rashid 2002b, 38). President Karimov was

furious. Though some proposed that rival political factions, disaffected clans, or organized crime may have been responsible, Karimov placed the blame squarely on Islamic militants and renewed his crackdown, arresting thousands of suspected Islamists. He also began to pressure Tajikistan to expel the nascent IMU from the Garm valley, a task that Tajik authorities either seemed unwilling or unable to do.

In August 1999, the IMU published a declaration of jihad against the government of Uzbekistan (see appendix A). It stated that the IMU's primary objective was to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan based on sharia law. The message also claimed agreement and support from the major Ulema, or body of Islamic clerics, warned tourists not to come or they could be "struck down," and stated that jihad would first start in Kyrgyzstan because of repressive measures taken by Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev (Rahsid 2002a, 247).

As the statement of jihad was published, the IMU began its first military campaign. That same month, a twenty-one-man IMU band crossed from Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan, kidnapping a district officer and three Kyrgyz officials. Kyrgyzstan was not prepared to deal with such an attack and ended the standoff by giving safe passage to the IMU band back to Tajikistan in exchange for the release of the hostages. Kyrgyz officials later denied rumors that they also paid a \$50,000 US ransom. Karimov, furious with Kyrgyz and Tajik inaction against the IMU, used Uzbek bombers to strike the Garm and Jirgatal regions of Tajikistan. The dissention among Central Asian governments as evidenced by the Uzbek bombing seemed to be exactly the type of chaos Namangani hoped to promote (Rashid 2002b, 39).

Immediately following this incident, additional IMU combatants entered three villages in Kyrgyzstan and captured a Kyrgyz Major General, four Japanese geologists and approximately fifteen other people. Uzbek bombers struck again, this time at the villages held by the IMU, killing four civilians. The Kyrgyz Army also attacked the IMU, eventually driving them out and pursuing them and their hostages towards Tajikistan. The fighting forced over 4000 Kyrgyz to flee their homes into the mountains. Japanese diplomats arrived and assisted in negotiating the release of the Japanese geologists in October of 1999. Japanese and Kyrgyz officials denied rumors that they paid between two and six million dollars in ransom. The IMU escaped back to the Tavildara Valley in Tajikistan before winter closed the mountain passes. Uzbek pressure on the Tajik government to expel the IMU grew. Tajik IRP members, once civil war compatriots of Namangani, arranged for the airlift of 300 IMU militants and their families from Tajikistan to Afghanistan by the Russian military.

The IMU found a warm reception in Afghanistan, as Yuldeshev had done all the preparatory work the year prior. The IMU moved into a former United Nations refugee camp in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. While based in Afghanistan, Namangani and his IMU combatants had a safe haven within striking distance of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The Taliban and Al Qaeda provided monetary and equipment support and a seasoned training cadre. By hosting the IMU, the Taliban gained another force to fight against the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. More importantly the IMU would act as a counterweight to Uzbek support for the ethnic Uzbek warlord, General Dostum. Al Qaeda gained access to Central Asia through the IMU, an area in which it previously had no connections or influence (Rashid 2002b, 39).

During the winter of 1999 and 2000 the IMU were not idle. Yuldeshev and Namangani met repeatedly with the Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, and with Usama bin Laden. Reportedly bin Laden provided him with twenty million US dollars and three MI-8 helicopters. In addition, Saudi backers reportedly provided another fifteen million US dollars (Rashid 2002b, 39). A Kyrgyz press article places the total dollar amount sixteen million higher, and includes donations of anti-tank weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, mortars, night vision equipment, sniper rifles, and ammunition (Abdyldayev 2001).

Yuldechev used this time to try to unite all of the Uzbek opposition, to include the banned democratic and nationalist parties of Birlik and Erk, as well as the Islamic fundamentalist Hizbr-Tahrir, with the IMU. The Hizbr-Tahrir is an Islamic fundamentalist movement, founded by a Palestinian in 1953, that seeks to re-establish the caliphate that ruled all Islamic lands centuries ago, and to install sharia law in the Muslim world through nonviolent means (Rashid 2002a, 264). Yuldeshev's goal was to create the United Uzbek Opposition, modeled after the successful United Tajik Opposition, which, with the IRP at its core, was now sharing power in Tajikistan (Bishkek Kabar News Agency 2000).

It seems that the Yuldechev's United Uzbek Opposition never came into being. The IMU disagreed with the Hizbr-Tahrir on use of violence, and the democratic groups knew they were not compatible with the IMU goal of sharia law. A closer relationship with Hizbr-Tahrir did form at this time as the Hizbr-Tahrir bore the brunt of Karimov's crackdown. Over 7,000 Hizbr-Tahrir activists were reported in Uzbek prisons in 2001. (M. Ismail Khan 2001).

During the winter and spring of 2000 the IMU expanded its role to include international Islamic militants. The Taliban sent politically embarrassing recruits to the IMU training camp to become part of the IMU fighting force. The primary purpose was to establish plausible deniability. Therefore, when the Russians demanded that the Taliban stop training or hiding Chechen rebels, or the Chinese made the same demand regarding Uighur militants, the Taliban could plausibly deny having those foreign fighters in their ranks. The IMU reportedly trained militants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uighurs from the Xin-jiang Province of China (M. Ilyas Khan 2000). One source claims that the IMU trained up to 600 Chechens and 250 Uighurs from Xin-jiang province in addition to the 2,500 to 3,000 fighters the IMU already had trained (M. Ismail Khan 2001).

In July 2000, the IMU launched their second campaign into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz and Uzbek militaries had prepared for the IMU by mining portions of the border and conducting training, to include a Partnership for Peace border security exercise called Southern Shield 2000 (Bakeyev 2000). Their militaries were trained by Russian and US special forces, and received military equipment from Russia, China, and the US. The IMU, however, was able to infiltrate approximately 170 combatants into Uzbekistan and built fortified areas in the mountains along a major road into the Ferghana Valley. Uzbek special forces, fresh from Russian and US training, finally forced the IMU from their positions after a month of hard fighting (Rashid 2002b, 40). Five nearby villages were evacuated, and approximately 2000 ethnic Tajiks accused of assisting the IMU were held in detention camps and reportedly mistreated (Rashid 2002b 40).

In August 2000, the IMU struck again in Kyrgyzstan, kidnapping ten mountain climbers, four of whom were American. Kyrgyz Special Forces vigorously pursued the kidnappers, killing six IMU militants, capturing two more, and forcing the release of the hostages (Rashid 2002b, 40). The Americans were able to escape during the pursuit, although a Kyrgyz soldier who had been protecting them until captured was executed. In October 2000, Namangani pulled his forces back across the border to Afghanistan and Tajikistan, once again before winter closed the mountain passes.

Uzbekistan responded ruthlessly to this second IMU campaign. First, death sentences were declared for Yuldeshev and Namangani in absentia. Second, the Uzbek military laid additional mines on the indistinct Uzbek border, regardless of clan boundaries, herding areas, or normal crossing points. According to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe officials, the mines caused over thirty deaths in six months, further alienating the population (Rashid 2001b). In order to strike back at the governments of Tajikistan (for harboring the IMU), and Kyrgyzstan (for not preventing the IMU from crossing Kyrgyzstan into Uzbekistan), Karimov cut off their fuel supplies which traversed Uzbekistan through the Soviet-built pipelines. In addition, Karimov expelled thousands of Tajik refugees who were living in Uzbekistan, even though they were ethnic Uzbeks. This caused a small humanitarian crisis for Tajikistan (Rashid 2002b, 40).

Under pressure from Uzbekistan, the Tajik government again brokered a deal for the Russians to fly Namangani and 300 combatants out of the Tavildara Valley and into Afghanistan. With the Russian 201<sup>st</sup> Division guarding the Tajik-Afghan border, many assumed that the Russians must have allowed the IMU to return to Tajikistan each year.



Accusations and rumors abounded that the Russians were using the IMU to force Uzbekistan to accept Russian forces in Uzbekistan to assist in maintaining stability (Rashid 2002b, 40).

During the winter of 2000-2001, both the IMU and Central Asian governments prepared for the anticipated summer IMU offensive. The IMU continued to expand as a fighting force. From their bases in Afghanistan at the cities of Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz, the IMU continued training and incorporating more international Islamic militants, gaining combat experience against the Northern Alliance, and becoming a strong combat force for their Taliban hosts.

The Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments were also preparing. In September 2000, prompted by the kidnapping of the US mountain climbers, the US declared the IMU is terrorist organization. With this official acknowledgement, additional US aid became available. Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, promised ten million dollars in US aid to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and increased US Special Forces training programs (Peterson 2000). China, Russia, France, Israel and Turkey also provided assistance. China sent three planeloads of counter-terrorism equipment to Kyrgyzstan in January of 2001, and Russia sent thirty million dollars worth of military equipment (Rashid 2002a, 172).

Despite preparations, the situation was far from hopeful in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. According to Tursunbay Bakir Uula, a Kyrgyz parliament member, Kyrgyzstan tried to negotiate a nonviolence pact with IMU, which collapsed after the two IMU fighters captured in 2000 were sentenced to death. The IMU warned of retaliation if death sentences were carried out (Koichiev 2001). With eighty percent unemployment in

the Ferghana Valley, young men were reportedly leaving home to join the IMU. As one schoolteacher stated, “At least he [Namangani] pays them” (Rashid 2001b).

The IMU reportedly has thousands of “sleeper” cells in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, ready to support the IMU with safe houses and cached supplies when called upon (Rashid 2001b). After the IMU campaign of 2000, Terrence Taylor, from the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, summed up the darkening mood. “A year ago people were saying [of an Islamic state], ‘No, impossible.’ While I don’t foresee it in the near future, one just can’t rule it out now” (Peterson 2000).

In late July 2001, the IMU struck, signaling the beginning of its third campaign in as many years. They attacked two army posts on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border and a Kyrgyz TV transmitter. Accounts differ; some say the attacks were conducted by IMU sleeper cells (Rashid 2002b), while others report the clashes occurred when alert Kyrgyz soldiers caught IMU militants attempting to infiltrate (Koichiev 2001). In either case, it looked to be another bloody summer in Central Asia.

A bright spot came when, under pressure from the US and international community, Karimov announced he would release 25,000 prisoners out of the total prison population of 64,000 in honor of the tenth anniversary of Uzbekistan’s independence on 1 September 2001. In addition, he reduced the sentences for another 25,000 prisoners (Rashid 2002b 40).

At this juncture, Central Asia was set for an impending struggle that had the potential to consume the southern three republics. The IMU was continuing to grow in strength, bolstered by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Central Asian republics struggled to match the threat but seemed only to be able to respond in a disjointed and weak manner.

Central Asian political and religious repression, combined with economic depression, increased support for alternatives, such as the IMU. The international community, led by Russia, the US, and China had recognized the danger, and had just begun to aid the Central Asia governments. A broader war in Central Asia seemed inevitable. But on 11 September 2001, the world truly did change, and nowhere did it change more than in Central Asia.

#### US Policy in Central Asia: 1991 to 11 September 2001

US engagement in Central Asia did not start with 11 September 2001, nor did it start with the IMU offensives and kidnapping of Americans. Instead, the US had engaged Central Asia upon its independence, slowly building ties that would prove critical in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. As stated in Joint Forces Quarterly “The deployment to Central Asia during this latest crisis was the culmination of years of preparation” (Goldstein 2002).

The US engaged the Central Asian republics upon their independence, and built progressively stronger relationships. The pillars of the Clinton Administration policy towards Central Asia were democratization, market-oriented reform, greater integration with Western political and military institutions, and responsible security policies on nonproliferation, antiterrorism, and drug trafficking (Wishnick 2002). The US also hoped to reduce the influence of Russia and Iran and, to a degree, China and Pakistan in the region. This policy manifested itself in wrangling over possible oil pipelines out of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, with the US determined to not let a pipeline go through Russia or Iran, but instead take much longer path across the Caspian, through Azerbaijan

to Turkey. The US also wanted to ensure fair access for US energy companies in the Caspian Sea and Central Asian oil and gas fields.

With the Freedom Support Act, signed on 24 October 1992, the US began to assist the Central Asian states in democratization and free market reforms (Wishnick 2002). In 1993, a Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement was signed between the US and Kazakhstan, which pledged US assistance in destroying or dismantling the Kazak nuclear arsenal (Wishnick 2002). By 1995, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were members of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, with Tajikistan participating in Partnership for Peace exercises, though not a member (Wishnick 2002). The goal of the Partnership for Peace program was to increase Central Asian security cooperation and reduce regional instability. In late 1995, the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT) was established as part of Partnership for Peace and included soldiers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. CENTRASBAT was a peacekeeping battalion, which conducted numerous exercises and training with NATO and US forces. In 1998, CENTCOM Commander, General Zinni, supervised CENTRASBAT '98, which included US 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division troops along with Russians and Turks in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The increased US military interest in Central Asia was due to the Tajik civil war and the Taliban gains in Afghanistan, which now placed Taliban forces directly on Central Asian borders (Goldstein 2002).

In 1998 the US formed a joint commission with Uzbekistan as part of the US efforts against Al Qaeda, and signed a Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement in 1999 to dismantle a biological weapons research facility. The US-Uzbek threat reduction efforts paid off in March 2000, when US-provided detection equipment prevented

radioactive material from being transported from Kazakhstan to Afghanistan (Wishnick 2002).

In March 1999, prior to any IMU attacks, the US passed the Silk Road Strategy Act, which provided border control assistance, humanitarian assistance to victims of regional conflicts, and transition and infrastructure assistance for a free market economy (Wishnick 2002). In April 2000, the US provided three million dollars of additional security assistance money to each of the Central Asian republics as part of the new Central Asian Border Security Initiative. Following the August 2000 IMU offensive and subsequent kidnapping of four US mountaineers, the State Department added the IMU to its list of terrorist organizations (Wishnick 2002). The CIA also was hard at work building ties in Central Asia, though more covertly. One overt event was the visit by the Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, to the region in 2000 (Olcott 2001). When George W. Bush became president in January 2001 he maintained the Clinton policy in Central Asia (Wishnick 2002).

The IMU offensives brought a major change to geopolitics in the region. Throughout the 1990s the US worked to prevent Central Asia from falling back under Russia's control, and Russia struggled to limit US influence in the region. However, after the IMU attacks, Russia and the US found a common interest in maintaining regional stability and began to cooperate on countering the Islamic extremists. Instead of strategic competitors in the region they were, at least temporarily, strategic partners (Rashid 2002a). In spite of engagement and investment in Central Asia, the US was very disappointed that democratization and human rights did not improve in the republics, indicating a failure to achieve one of the pillars of US policy in the region.

### IMU Capabilities Prior to 11 September 2001

The IMU, prior to 11 September 2001, was a very capable combat and insurgent organization. In order to measure IMU capabilities before and after 11 September 2001 a consistent standard must be used. The D.I.M.E model, comprising diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of power will be used to assess IMU capabilities.

Diplomatically, with Yuldeshev as a de facto ambassador-at-large, the IMU developed a strong network of international support. Beginning in 1992, Yuldeshev, who reportedly speaks Arabic, Persian, Pashto, and Uzbek, traveled extensively in the Muslim world to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey (Conant and Caryl 2002). In each country, he made contacts with different Islamic movements, Islamic political parties, and friendly intelligence services (Rashid 2002a, 140). Yuldeshev also met with Chechen leaders during the 1994 to 1996 war with Russian forces, and returned to Uzbekistan to reorganize the Adolat party, his banned Islamic political movement, into underground support cells (Rashid 2002a, 141). The Pakistan Interservices Intelligence, then supporting the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, provided Yuldeshev funds and sanctuary from 1995 to 1998 (Rashid 2002a, 140).

In 1998, Yuldeshev met with the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and Usama bin Laden, securing safe houses in Kabul and Kandahar and preparing the way for the IMU to relocate to Afghanistan when encouraged to leave Tajikistan in the winter of 1999 (Rashid 2002b). The Taliban provided the IMU with a physical and diplomatic sanctuary. Unlike Tajikistan, where diplomatic pressure resulted in Tajik authorities

asking the IMU to leave, in Afghanistan the Taliban, though also under pressure, continued to shelter the IMU despite Russian and Uzbek protests.

By the summer of 2001, the IMU had established a very strong diplomatic support base in the Muslim world, with particularly close relationships to the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Pakistan. Just as these relationships were deepening, so was the diplomatic opposition to the IMU and its Taliban host. After successful campaigns in 1999 and 2000, Russian, China, and the United States began to provide diplomatic support for the Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek governments. The United States dealt a heavy diplomatic blow to the IMU by listing them as a terrorist group in September of 2000. In January 2001, US and Russian sponsored UN sanctions came into effect against the Taliban, which included an arms embargo. Diplomatically, the IMU had strong relations with ideologically compatible groups, but had alienated most others.

The IMU was limited in how it could disseminate information. There were two public pronouncements. The first was the IMU declaration of jihad published in August 1999, and later translated into English and posted on the World Wide Web. The second was an interview conducted by Voice of America with Yuldeshev on 6 October 2000. The IMU mostly utilized a less formal network to spread its message. To reach the international Muslim community the IMU utilized all of Yuldeshev's diplomatic channels. Yuldeshev, while working in Pakistan from 1995 to 1998, had contact with thousands of fundamentalist Muslims that were in the madrassahs. Once the IMU was ensconced in Afghanistan in 1999, the message could be spread through contact with the Afghan and foreign combatants supporting the Taliban. Within Central Asia, where the authoritarian governments maintained a stranglehold on the media, the IMU relied on

Adolat members and IMU sympathizers to garner support for the cause and contradict the government's messages. This became easier as Namangani's reputation as a heroic Robin Hood-like figure grew and exaggerated stories of his exploits became popular. In Uzbekistan, President Karimov's widespread anti-IMU campaign incited fear of the IMU "Wahhabists," which minimized the IMU information efforts. Overall, prior to 11 September 2001, the IMU had established a moderate grass-roots information campaign in Central Asia, and had a very successful information campaign throughout the Muslim world.

Militarily, by the summer of 2001, the IMU assembled a well led, adequately trained, and combat-experienced fighting force of approximately 3,000 fighters. The military strength of the IMU was centered on Juma Namangani, who was an experienced and charismatic leader. He was trained as a Soviet paratrooper, seeing action in Afghanistan in 1988. He then gained experience fighting in the Tajik Civil War from 1992 to 1997. From 1999 to 2001 he orchestrated and led some of the IMU incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as participating in Taliban operations against the Northern Alliance. Namangani's experienced leadership and battlefield successes strengthened his reputation across Central Asia, drawing recruits and earning the trust and support of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The international group of militants that Namangani commanded in 2001 were trained in basic combat skills at the IMU camps outside of Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz. Many had previous combat experience from the Tajik Civil War and in the IMU incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In Afghanistan the remainder of the IMU gained combat experience fighting for the Taliban. In August 2000, over 600 IMU



militants supported the Taliban attack on a Northern Alliance headquarters of Ahmed Shah Masood in Taloquan. The battle, which was successful after a month-long siege, gave the IMU experience in working with armor and artillery (Rashid 2002a, 174).

Though estimates of the number of IMU fighters varies drastically, the majority of sources place the IMU generally between 2,000 (Rashid 2002a, 174) and 3,000 (M. Ismail Khan 2001), with the highest number, 8,000, coming from a Russian source (Litvinovch 2001). The IMU are known to have the latest in night vision equipment, sniper rifles, and communications gear (Rashid 2002a, 166). A Kyrgyz press article indicated the IMU purchased anti-tank weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, mortars, night vision equipment, sniper rifles and ammunition (Abdyldayev 2001). A Russian press article adds, “several armored vehicles and Grad (hail) missile launchers” to the IMU inventory (Litvinovch 2001). Usama bin Laden reportedly provided the IMU with two or three MI-8 helicopters (Rashid 2002a, 166). Essentially, the IMU can be compared to a motorized infantry brigade, with a robust special operations or unconventional warfare capability.

A less quantifiable military capability the IMU may have developed is the creation of combat sleeper cells within Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. A sleeper describes an individual who is fully integrated into the local society; he may have lived there all his life. When needed, he supports or conducts operations for the IMU. Ahmad Rashid, the respected journalist from Pakistan, believes the 2001 IMU attacks in Central Asia came from sleeper cells, commanded remotely by Namangani. If this were the case then the IMU clearly demonstrated a new and dangerous capability. However, detailed reporting of the clashes contradicts the “sleeper cell” theory. The clashes occurring on 25 and 26

July 2001 were reported as Kyrgyz soldiers intercepting IMU fighters attempting to infiltrate the border. Other sources claimed these were not even IMU, but drug traffickers (Koichiev 2001). Even though it cannot be determined what the case is, potential sleeper cells of IMU militants cannot be ignored.

By the summer of 2001, the IMU was economically well resourced. From 1992 to 1998, Yuldeshev's trips gathered financial support from Pakistani Intelligence, Pakistan's Jamiat-I-Ulema Islami, an Islamic fundamentalist group, and Turkish Islamic fundamentalists. Russian and Uzbek sources alleged that Yuldeshev also received funds from the intelligence agencies of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey (Rashid 2002a, 140-141). Namangani, while living in Tajikistan after the civil war, reportedly became involved in drug trafficking. The IMU link to drug trafficking grew as Namangani used his network of militants and connections in Chechnya. A report from Interpol's Criminal Intelligence Directorate to the US Congress in 2000 stated that sixty percent of Afghanistan's opium exports moved through Central Asia, and the IMU may have been responsible for seventy percent of that trade (Rashid 2002a, 165). The ban on opium production by the Taliban in 2000 had little effect on the IMU drug trade, as the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention believed the IMU and other smugglers had stockpiled up to 240 tons of opium (Rashid 2002a, 165). The IMU may also have received as much as six million dollars as ransom for hostages, primarily the Japanese geologists in 2000, though Japanese and Kyrgyz officials flatly denied paying any ransom.

The greatest source of funding, however, appears to be from Usama Bin Laden and other individual Saudi contributors. In 2000, the Commonwealth of Independent

States Antiterrorism Center reported that Usama bin Laden provided twenty-six million dollars to the IMU. In addition, Saudi backers reportedly provided another fifteen million dollars (Rashid 2002a, 166). A Kyrgyz press article placed the total dollar amount ten million dollars higher (Abdyldayev 2001). Many of the Saudi contributors are believed to be ethnic Uzbeks, ancestors of the basmachi who had fled to Saudi Arabia after their defeat by the communists in the 1920s and 1930s. Regardless, when the lucrative drug trade is combined with monetary donations, it is clear that the IMU had robust economic backing.

#### IMU Activity After 11 September 2001

The successful 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks destroyed the World Trade Center in New York and damaged the Pentagon, killing over 3,000 people combined. The attacks were clearly and rapidly linked to Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, whose terrorist training camps and leadership were harbored by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Afghanistan and Central Asia, therefore, became the front line for the United States and its new global war on terror.

The IMU, now an integral part of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, would play a role in the coming fight. Namangani and his IMU militants were stationed in the north of Afghanistan, opposite the rejuvenated Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance, a collection of anti-Taliban forces consisting of mainly of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara were reinforced by an influx of Russian equipment, US Special Forces and US air power.

Namangani was designated the Taliban Northern Front commander (Litvinovich 19 Nov 2001). In November 2001, the IMU and Namangani defended the city of Kunduz

during a Northern Alliance siege. Namangani reportedly commanded a conglomeration of IMU forces, thousands of Taliban soldiers, and 600 fighters from 055 Brigade. The 055 Brigade was an Al Qaeda brigade composed of mostly Arab fighters and considered an elite force (Porzio 2002).

On 24 November, Kunduz fell and 300 defenders surrendered to the ethnic-Uzbek Northern Alliance commander, General Rashid Dostum. Many of these prisoners were non-Afghans, indicating that they most likely were IMU or from the 055 Brigade. General Dostum trucked these prisoners to Qala-i-Jang fortress, outside of the recently captured city of Mazar-i-Sharif. In this fortress the new prisoners joined another 300 prisoners, who had been captured defending Mazar-i-Sharif (Perry 2001). The 600 prisoners were mostly foreigners since General Dostum had begun to release the conscripted Afghan Taliban fighters as a sign of reconciliation. It is very likely that the majority of the 600 prisoners were IMU.

On 25 November, the prisoners overpowered their Northern Alliance guards, killed an American CIA agent, and seized control of the fortress. After three days of fighting involving Northern Alliance troops and tanks, US Special Forces, British SAS, and US air strikes, the uprising was crushed. Of the 600 prisoners being held in the fort, only 86 survived. One of the eighty-six was the infamous American traitor, John Walker Lindh, reportedly assigned to the 055 Brigade (Perry 1 Dec 2001).

The defeat of the IMU and Taliban at Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz, and the subsequent battle at Qala-i-Jang fortress inflicted heavy casualties on the IMU. However, there are persistent rumors of a massive airlift conducted prior to the fall of Kunduz that rescued thousands of Taliban-aligned fighters. The allegation is that the US allowed

Pakistan to airlift thousands of Pakistani military, intelligence, and volunteer fighters out of Kunduz. Indian intelligence, which was reported to have agents in the Northern Alliance at Kunduz, placed its estimate at 4,000 to 5,000 fighters airlifted out. The proposed reason for the airlift was to prevent the embarrassing capture of Pakistanis by the Northern Alliance, which would have precipitated a backlash against Pakistani President Musharif, possibly causing his regime to collapse (Negri 2002).

The airlift, denied by both the US and Pakistan, would not have saved the IMU if, indeed, it had ever taken place. The IMU, except for Pakistani members and possibly key leaders with ties to Pakistani intelligence, would have been excluded in such an airlift. It is unlikely Pakistan would risk the international backlash from the US, Russia, and China to save the IMU.

#### The Death of Namangani?

In what is believed to be the greatest blow to the IMU, General Dostum reported that Namangani was killed near the town of Kunduz in mid-November 2001 during the battle for Kunduz (Litvinovch 2001). Northern Alliance soldiers and civilians from Kunduz stated Namangani's convoy was bombed by US warplanes as it fled the city. He was taken to a hospital where he later died of abdominal and leg wounds. The reported location of his death varies, depending on the source. Predominantly the reports are he died in a hospital in Kabul, though some reports say it was Jalalabad or Mazar-i-Sharif (Chivers 2001). Pakistani intelligence unofficially confirmed Namangani's death in a Kabul hospital and burial in Logar province, to the east of Kabul (Levine 2001). The most compelling evidence, however, is a report from Sheraly Akbotoev, a former IMU member, who was called to Logar province to attend Namangani's funeral.

Unfortunately, Akbotoev was not able to visually confirm that the body was indeed Namangani's, as the body was wrapped for burial (Conant and Caryl 2002).

Rumors and reports still claim that Namangani is alive and well. Russian and Tajik intelligence have picked up a radio frequency linked to Namangani, but do not claim to have heard Namangani himself (Porzio 2002). The Kazakh newspaper, Megopolis, made the claim that he was alive, but offered no evidence in support of the claim (2002). Based on strong and consistent reports of Namangani's death, and absolutely no evidence to the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence leads to the conclusion that Juma Namangani, military leader of the IMU, is indeed dead.

#### US Policy and Presence in Central Asia After 11 September 2001

With the Bush administration's decision to attack Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Central Asia became critical by providing airbases and staging areas. The US reinvigorated contacts that had been established and nurtured since 1991 in order to gain access to and support from the Central Asian states. A serious concern of each of these states was the effect that cooperation with the US would have on internal and external Islamic opinion. Fear of inflaming Islamic radicals, such as the IMU, created some reluctance. The US was able to offset these fears by providing security assistance to reduce the added risk.

The US achieved the desired cooperation with Central Asia. All five Central Asian states agreed to share intelligence with the US and grant access to airspace. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan gave permission for emergency landings of coalition aircraft. Kazakhstan later approved use of an airfield, but it was not needed by the coalition at that time (Goldstein 2002). On 5 December 2001, Kyrgyzstan granted

permission for the US to use Manas Airbase, initially for one year, but then extended for as long as operations continued in Afghanistan. Manas Airbase held about 3,000 coalition forces (Wishnick 2002). Despite initial Russian opposition, Tajikistan allowed coalition use of Dushanbe Airport on a contingency basis. In addition, thirty-five coalition aircraft were stationed at Kulyab Airfield in southern Tajikistan and played a critical role in the anti-Taliban offensive. The US provided much-needed military equipment to Tajikistan in April 2002 (Wishnick 2002).

The US actively courted Uzbek cooperation. On 25 September 2001, US State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher reaffirmed the IMU as a terrorist organization, and locked in this designation for two more years (US Department of State 2002c). The US increased aid to Uzbekistan by one hundred million US dollars, bringing the total to 160 million US dollars (Rasizade Oct 02). US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld flew to Uzbekistan on 5 October 2001 and arranged permission for up to 1,500 US military personnel to operate out of Khanabad Airbase. In return, the US made a commitment to target known IMU training camps and strongholds in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan placed five military representatives in CENTCOM headquarters, located at MacDill AFB in Florida, to coordinate the cooperative US-Uzbek efforts (Wishnick 2002). Displaying how previously established contacts facilitated cooperation, the Uzbek officer who coordinated Uzbek support for the US was a graduate of the US Air Command and Staff College (Goldstein 2002).

Not only did the US quickly deploy military forces into Central Asia to meet its immediate goals, it continued to strengthen long-term cooperation. On 12 March 2002, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan visited President Bush in the White House.

Together they signed the “Declaration of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework,” in which the US promised to continue to assist Uzbekistan, while Karimov pledged to implement democratic reforms (Rasizade Oct 02). Although General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM Commander, stated during his visit to the region in late January 2002 that the US does not intend to have permanent bases in Central Asia (Stratfor.com 2002), President Karimov stated in his visit in March 2002 that “The US may remain in Uzbekistan as long as they think it is necessary; in other words, as long as it takes to finish disrupting the terrorist networks” (Wishnick 2002).

The United States also increased its intelligence and law enforcement presence in Central Asia with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel. The Tavildara Valley in Tajikistan, once Namangani’s impregnable stronghold is firmly in the control of the Tajik government forces working with CIA operatives hunting down IMU stragglers (Conanat and Caryl 2002). The FBI currently is planning on opening a permanent office in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan in support of counterterrorism operations, pending congressional approval of funding (Anderson 2003).

Two critical strategic changes took place in Central Asia after 11 September 2001. First, the myth that Central Asia remained in Russia’s sphere of influence was shattered. This opened the door for the United States to become a permanent player in Central Asia. Russia may attempt to close this door in the future, but this will prove difficult, if not impossible. Second, the US firmly committed to a strengthened long-term relationship with all of the Central Asian states in varying degrees. Part of this greater commitment can be seen in US policy documents. The 2002 National Security Strategy



describes a proactive strategy intended to "...disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by...identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders" (US President 2002, 6). The National Strategy for Combating Terror expounds on the 2002 National Security Strategy by laying out the US policy of working with "willing and able states" against terror and "enabling weak states" in their fight against terror (US Dep of State 2003a, 20). The US Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review, released in October 2001 after a quick post 11 September 2001 revision, includes Central Asia as part of an "arc of instability" which stretches from the Middle East to North East Asia (US Dep of Defense 2001, 4). The Quadrennial Defense Review sets forth the "Paradigm Shift in Force Planning" policy of "Deter Forward," reflecting the 2001 National Security Strategy policy of proactively meeting threats around the world (US Dep of Defense 2001, 20). These changes in US policy support the further commitment of US power to Central Asia in order to "disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations." The IMU, though not specifically named in the above documents, remains on the State Department list of terrorist organizations, with Tohir Yuldeshev added to the 2001 State Department second tier list of "most wanted" terrorists (US Dep of State 2002b, 147).

In the 2001 National Security Strategy, the United States still maintains strong language supporting democracy and free markets. This is also reflected in US policies toward the Central Asian states, all of which have questionable civil rights records, restrict political freedom, and remain tied to corrupt government-controlled economies.

Even before 11 September 2001 the US pressured Central Asian states toward political and economical reform. US State Department pressure was credited with freeing some prisoners and obtained Red Cross access to Uzbek jails (Bivens 2001). Many feared

that the US would now ignore human rights and reforms while the Central Asian governments support was needed for the war on terror. Though reforms are slow and sporadic, the US is committed to seeking and supporting Central Asian reform.

US pressure continues for Central Asian reform. The “Declaration of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework” between US and Uzbekistan was contingent upon Uzbek democratic reforms. Uzbekistan recognized its first human rights group, partly due to ties with the US, according to the Uzbek Deputy Foreign Minister (Hoagland 2002). Evidence of some reform in Uzbekistan comes from the 2002 International Religious Freedom Report, which chastises Uzbekistan for religious repression, but finds a bright spot in the fact that “The number arrested declined sharply from 1,500 persons in any 7-month period from 1999 to 2001, to 300 persons in the first 7 months of 2002 (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2002).

When Kyrgyz President Akayev visited the US in September 2002 he was thanked for his support for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and in the war on terror. Along with the thanks, however, Secretary of State Colin Powell gave him another message. “The Secretary [Powell] also stressed to President Akayev the importance of implementing political and economic reforms, especially democratic reforms and the protection of human rights, as a basis for development, for stability, and also for cooperation with the United States,” (US Dep of State 2002d). As the US increases ties to Central Asia, American ability to influence and promote reform in Central Asia grows.

With the immediacy of the war in Afghanistan over, the Bush administration was able to revise its Central Asia policy and objectives. The most recent statement of US

policy objectives in Central Asia are remarkably similar to those set by the Clinton administration and maintained by the Bush administration up to 11 September 2001. State Department official April Palmerlee clearly articulated these goals in February of 2003, stating, “The United States is committed to helping Central Asia become a stable, peaceful, prosperous region. US interests in the region are threefold: preventing the spread of terrorism, providing tools for political and economic reform and institution of the rule of law, and ensuring the security and transparent development of Caspian energy reserves.” (US Dep of State 2003b) The big difference from the old policy of “democratization, market-oriented reform, greater integration with western political and military institutions, and responsible security policies on non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and drug trafficking” (Wishnick 2002) is that counterterrorism has become the number one priority, and oil reserve development, a previously unstated but understood goal is now included.

## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### IMU Capabilities a Year After US Intervention

Undoubtedly the IMU's overall capabilities are greatly reduced following America's post 11 September 2001 involvement in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Just as important as a decline in IMU power, governments of Central Asia, which have served as the primary opponents of the IMU, have grown stronger in all aspects of the DIME with US assistance.

Diplomatically the IMU is further isolated, having lost the diplomatic shield provided by the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The US State Department has extended the inclusion of the IMU on the list of terrorist organizations, therefore, no country can openly support or assist the IMU without risk of repercussions from the US and its allies.

The IMU still does retain limited diplomatic power. Al Qaeda, the remnants of the Taliban, and the international network of Islamic extremists will continue to support and work with the IMU. In addition, there is evidence that Tahir Yuldeshev, the political and religious leader of the IMU, has taken refuge in Pakistan and is attempting to rebuild the IMU (Conant and Caryl 2002). Based on this and Yuldechev's previous ties to the Pakistani Interservices Intelligence, covert support from Pakistani intelligence may be continuing, and cannot be totally discounted.

The governments of Central Asia have increased diplomatic power. First, they have earned the support of the US, which includes diplomatic support, by assisting in the

fight against the Taliban and in the war on terror. Secondly, China and Russia want to counterbalance US presence, while defeating terrorism and Islamic extremism. This increases Central Asia's diplomatic power. Russia and China have increased support to the regional security organizations that had previously been established. In 1996 Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan formed the Shanghai Five organization. Uzbekistan joined in June 2001, changing the name to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Prior to 11 September 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was ineffective and took no substantial security measures. In June 2002, the organization established a permanent antiterror unit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, a solid commitment to defeat future terrorist threats (Wishnick 2002).

The information instrument of power changed the least between pre and post 11 September 2001 US involvement in Central Asia. Before 11 September 2001 the IMU relied upon Adolat party members and supporters to disseminate the IMU message via printed literature and by word of mouth. This has not changed. Other information methods used prior to 11 September 2001 were the World Wide Web, to post their jihad message, and Yuldeshev's one interview with Voice of America. Though the IMU could continue using these channels to disseminate information, the fear of capture or arrest deterred them, especially with US intelligence and law enforcement in Pakistan and Central Asia.

In the information war, the governments of Central Asia strengthened their control over all official media outlets in Central Asia using the global war on terror as an excuse for additional restrictions. Spreading fear of Islamic "Wahhabists," such as the IMU, has become an even stronger tool for governments after 11 September 2001.

Militarily the IMU was shattered by the US campaign against the Taliban. The IMU, operating as a military unit of the Taliban, was defeated by US and Northern Alliance forces at Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and crushed in the Qala-i-Jang prison uprising. IMU forces participated in the battles of Tora Bora and Shahi-kot, taking further losses, before crossing into Pakistan. Out of a potential 3,000 IMU fighters prior to 11 September 2001, only an estimated 200 to 300 remain, and most of those are thought to be dispersed in Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Iran (Conant and Caryl 2002). It is unlikely that any of the heavy weapons, such as the three MI-8 helicopters, artillery pieces or armored vehicles remain in IMU control. The IMU has potentially retained all small arms, night vision, shoulder-fired antiarmor, and possibly even shoulder-fired antiaircraft capabilities. Those IMU that remain are certainly battle-hardened loyalists.

The IMU lost military sanctuary in Afghanistan, where they could train and plan previously without fear of harassment or attack. In Tajikistan, the CIA and government forces are hunting IMU remnants (Conant and Caryl 2002). In the Pakistani border areas, where it appears the bulk of the remaining IMU is located, there have been reports of clashes between IMU fighters and Pakistani armed forces (Conant and Caryl 2002).

The loss of Juma Namangani, a charismatic and proven combat leader, severely damaged the IMU. Yuldeshev, now the undisputed IMU leader, is a political and religious leader without extensive military experience. There is no obvious replacement for Namangani in the IMU. Without the legendary Juma, attracting new recruits from Central Asia is much more difficult. Taking into account the loss of manpower, sanctuary, leadership, and equipment, the IMU is currently not capable of carrying out offensive military campaigns on the scale of 1999, 2000, and 2001.

The IMU most likely retains the “sleeper cells” made up of sympathizers and Adolat party loyalists. Very little is known about the strength or capability of these sleeper cells, though there are repeated claims of their existence. An IMU expert from the University of Glamorgan in Wales, Tamara Makarenko, claims “He [Yuldeshev] still has sleepers in all the Central Asian countries” (Conant and Caryl 2002). Ahmed Rashid proposed the 2001 IMU attacks in Kyrgyzstan were carried out by IMU sleepers, and suggested that the surviving IMU will regroup amongst these sleepers for future activities (Rashid 2002b). Though no direct evidence supports the existence or activities of sleeper cells, this capability cannot be ignored.

The Central Asian governments, especially Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, have improved their counterterror capabilities. Through specialized training and equipment from the US, China, and Russia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are better prepared to deal militarily with a threat similar to the IMU offensives of 1999, 2000, and 2001. The creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization counterterrorism battalion in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, adds an additional regional capability supported by Russia and China.

The economic instrument of power for the IMU is difficult to assess, but clearly is not as strong as before 11 September 2001. The IMU control over drug trafficking in Central Asia is most likely fractured, but can be expected to recover. Roberto Arbitrio, head of UN antinarcotics in Tajikistan stated that the drug trade has “started again on a grand scale” (Porzio 2002). With the reduction of the IMU’s personnel and military power, however, the IMU may not be controlling much of this new drug trade.

Ransom payments, an alleged lucrative IMU moneymaker in the past, is an unlikely source of income due to IMU weakness and the risk involved. Usama bin Laden

and Al Qaeda financing, which was believed to have provided the majority of IMU funds, is still available to the IMU, though probably in much reduced amounts. Al Qaeda is facing financial restrictions itself from the international community, and the IMU, with reduced military capability, may no longer be deemed worthy of large investments. Another previous source of income for the IMU was donations from wealthy individuals, often from the Uzbek diaspora in Saudi Arabia. Although the source is still available, the donations most likely have a more difficult time reaching the IMU and the political risks for Saudi Arabia to allow such support have increased. In summary, the IMU is most likely sufficiently financed to meet current needs with reduced personnel and reduced operations, but is no longer awash in millions of dollars permitting aggressive recruiting and offensive operations.

The Central Asian governments, on the other hand, are receiving much more assistance than ever before. In fiscal year 2001, the US provided 244.2 million dollars to Central Asia. In 2002 the amount increased sharply to 408 million dollars (US Dep of State 2002a). China and Russia are also supplying the governments with millions in security assistance equipment, training, and money. China promised 600 million dollars to Uzbekistan following the 11 September 2001 attacks (Rasizade 2002).

#### The Effect Of Post 11 September 2001 US Policy And Intervention On The IMU

From Alexander the Great through Persian, Arab, Mongol, and Russian conquests, each empire has left its mark on Central Asia. As Central Asia struggles with the Soviet legacy, one realizes not all legacies are good. The United States, an empire in influence only, now has a chance to leave its mark in Central Asia.



The US did not destroy the IMU, not with its military campaign in Afghanistan nor with its policies in Central Asia. The US instead has forced the IMU to abandon the conventional force that was successful in the Tajik Civil War and in Afghanistan, and transform into a force that can compete against a superpower like the US, or regional powers like Uzbekistan. The most likely model for the IMU is Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda has proven its effectiveness against the US in the past with attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Nairobi, the USS Cole in Yemen, and finally against the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. Tohir Yuldeshev, as the sole leader of the IMU, is heavily influenced by Usama bin Laden and has the potential to reconstruct the IMU in the image of Al Qaeda. The sleeper cells and Adolat members could be the building blocks for the network, assisted by the drug trafficking network already established. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, in the face of continued harsh repression, could be convinced to abandon nonviolence and support the renewed IMU, swelling the IMU ranks with supporters. The renewed IMU could then use terror, first to attempt to remove the US from Central Asia by attacking US targets such as bases, embassies and personnel. The second objective will be to overthrow the current Central Asian regimes. The most likely location for an Islamic uprising in Central Asia is in the birthplace of the IMU, the Ferghana Valley.

Already the Central Asian and Russian media highlight rumors of upcoming IMU attacks. Some articles claim there is “evidence that it [the IMU] was continuing to plan new attacks” (Central Asia Media Behavior 2002) and the Kyrgyz defense minister warned the press that 300 IMU guerillas were looking for an opportunity to attack (Moscow Interfax 2002). The US State Department assesses that “although the IMU

suffered significant losses during this [Afghanistan] campaign, there is information that the IMU may still maintain a capability to infiltrate into Uzbekistan for possible attacks' (US Dep of State 2002b). Clearly the threat remains and such indicators suggest that a transformed IMU will return to Central Asia in the near future.

The US did have an enormous effect on the IMU with its post 11 September 2001 actions and policies, but it is the continued actions and policies of the US that are most crucial now. America's next steps will determine if America's mark on Central Asia will be positive or negative.

#### Window of Opportunity for US Policy in Central Asia

Currently Central Asia has an opportunity to change. The internal threat from the IMU is diminished due to US actions in Afghanistan and counter-terrorism efforts around the world. The Afghan sanctuary and launching point for Central Asian Islamic extremists is gone. The Central Asian governments have suppressed any current Islamic threats. In addition, the Central Asian governments are now better prepared to counter future terror threats with newly equipped units, special counterterrorism training, and a Central Asian counterterror battalion located in Bishkek.

Central Asia is also enjoying a rare period of international support, including long-term commitments from the US in bilateral agreements, and Russian and Chinese security commitments in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The current cooperation of the US, China and Russia, three powerful countries, cannot be overvalued, nor can it last forever. All three countries share the same goal of a stable Central Asia free of Islamic extremist terror. The Great Game, for a change, has everyone on the same side, providing financial and military assistance for Central Asia.

This window provides an opportunity for Central Asia to take great strides in permanently dealing with the Islamic fundamentalist problem, but action must be taken quickly. Some form of the IMU will return to threaten stability in Central Asia if the overall situation does not improve. Economic depression, human rights abuses, and political and religious repression leave parts of the population without any real hope for a better future. Those who are not satisfied have no outlet or recourse for change. Add the external influences from Islamic extremists from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Afghanistan, which provide direction and resources, and young men join the only movement that has a chance of creating change, Islamic extremists like the IMU.

In order to prevent the likely future wave of terror in Central Asia, the US must encourage Central Asian reform to undercut Islamic extremist support. First, the US should, in conjunction with the willing Central Asian governments, construct a roadmap for reform and improvement, with set targets for economic, political and human rights reforms. The roadmap must be fit a timeline fast enough to undercut further Islamic resurgence or unrest. Over one year has passed since the IMU was fractured in Afghanistan and time is running out. Effective political parties, religious expression, and economic improvement will serve as a release for current frustrations. It is critical that moderate Muslims, the vast majority of Central Asians, be permitted to practice their faith, while keeping external extremist influence to a minimum. Turkmenistan, led by the reclusive and paranoid Saparmurad Niyazov, would be the only Central Asian republic likely not to participate in such a plan.

Second, in the roadmap, the US should link future aid and support to political, economic, religious, and human rights reforms. Each republic should be able to achieve

these goals individually. In this manner, Kyrgyzstan, which has shown a greater willingness for reform, would receive all planned aid and has the opportunity to set the example in the region, while Uzbekistan, which has resisted almost all reforms since 1991, would see portions of the aid restricted. Using aid as an incentive for reform can motivate reluctant regimes; however, at no time can one of the republics be allowed to become a failed state.

Third, the US should establish a parallel cooperative plan with Russia and China based on a set of common interests, the desire for stability in the region, and the need to bring an end to Central Asian Islamic extremist terrorism. The combined effort of the US, Russia, and China in executing a coordinated plan would focus resources on critical areas, push for cooperation among republics, and have a greater chance of success in building true security in the region.

Fourth, the Ferghana Valley should be the initial focus of improvements. From the time of the Persians, the Ferghana Valley has been the heart of Central Asia. The majority of Central Asia's population, farms, and the intersection of three republic borders make it the center of gravity in Central Asia. If the Ferghana Valley can be turned around, the rest of Central Asia will follow.

Despite all policy changes by the US or Central Asian governments, many Islamic extremists will never be satisfied. A professional and well-prepared security force must defeat these remaining extremists.




Figure 1. Map of Central Asia with Ferghana Valley Detail. *Source:* Nancy Lubin, *Calming the Ferghana Valley* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 1999), 2.



## APPENDIX A

### DECLARATION OF JIHAD BY THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN

As printed in Ahmed Rashid's book, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, 2002, page 247

*The following document was issued in August 1999 by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a declaration of jihad against the government of Uzbekistan. Originally written in Uzbek, it has appeared on the Internet in English.*

In the Name of Allah the most Compassionate and the Most Merciful

A message from the General Command of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

“And fight then until there is no more fitnah and the religion is all for Allah”

Al Anfaal: 39

The Amir (commander) of the Harakataul Islamiyyah (Islamic Movement) of Uzbekistan, Muhammad Tariq Farooq, has announced the start of the Jihad against the tyrannical government of Uzbekistan and the puppet Islam Karimov and his henchmen. The leadership of the Islamic Movement confirms the following points in the declaration:

This declaration comes after agreement by the major ulema and the leadership of the Islamic Movement.

This agreement comes based on the clear evidence on the obligation of Jihad against the tawagheet as well as to liberate the land and the people.

The primary objective for this declaration of Jihad is the establishment of an Islamic state and the application of the Sharia, founded upon the Koran and the Noble Prophetic sunnah.

Also from amongst the goals of the declaration of Jihad is:

The defense of our religion of Islam in our land against those who oppose Islam.

The defense of our religion of Islam in our land against those who oppose Islam.

The defense of the Muslims in our land from those who humiliate them and spill their blood.

The defense of the scholars and Muslim youth who are being assassinated, imprisoned and tortured in extreme manners – with no rights given to them at all.

And the Almighty says:

**“And they had no fault except that they believed in Allah, the All Mighty, Worthy of all Praise!”** Al Buruj: 8

Also to secure the release of the weak and oppressed who number some 5,000 in prison, held by the transgressors.

The Almighty says:

**“And what is the matter with you that you do not fight in the way of Allah and the weak and oppressed amongst men, women and children” An Nisaa: 75**

And to reopen the thousands of mosques and Islamic schools that have been closed by the evil government.

The Mujahadeen of the Islamic Movement, after their experience in warfare, have completed their training and are ready to establish the blessed Jihad.

The Islamic Movement warns the Uzbek government in Tashkent from propping up or supporting the fight against the Muslims.

The Islamic Movement warns tourists coming to this land that they should keep away, lest they be struck down by the Mujahadeen.

The reason for the start of the Jihad in Kyrgyzstan is due to the stance of the ruler Askar Akayev Bishkek, in arresting thousands of Muslim Uzbeks who had migrated as refugees to Kyrgyzstan and were handed over to Karimov’s henchmen (i.e. Uzbek regime).

The Most High says:

**“ Verily the oppressors are friends and protectors to one another.”**

The Islamic Movement shall, by the will of Allah, make Jihad in the cause of Allah to reach its aims and objectives.

It is with regret that Foreign Mujahadeen (Al Ansaar) as of yet have not entered our ranks.

The Islamic Movement invites the ruling government and Karimov leadership in Tashkent to remove itself from office-unconditionally, before the country enters into a state of war and destruction of the land and the people. The responsibility for this will lie totally on the shoulders of the government, for which it shall be punished.

Allah is Great and the Honor is for Islam.

*Head of the Religious Leadership of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*

*Az Zubayr Ibn ‘Abdur Raheem*

*4<sup>th</sup> Jumadi Al Awwal (ah)*

*25 August 1999*



## GLOSSARY

- Adolat. Translates to “justice”. It is the name of Tohir Yuldeshev’s political party in Uzbekistan, from which the core members of the IMU originated. Though banned, Adolat continues to function in Uzbekistan
- Al Qaeda. Translates to “the base”. International Islamic extremist terrorist organization led by Usama bin Laden. Al Qaeda has declared a jihad against the West and seeks to impose sharia law. Believed to be responsible for the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, the USS Cole bombing, and the bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
- Akayev, Askar. President of Kyrgyzstan since 1991.
- Basmachi. A Turkic term meaning “bandit” used by the Soviets to describe both the revolt and Islamic Mujahadeen who opposed the Communist system in Central Asia after 1917 (Rashid 2002, 263).
- Birlik. Translates to “unity”. Opposition party in Uzbekistan. Founded in 1988 and banned in 1992.
- Dostum, General Rashid. Ethnic Uzbek leader in the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.
- Deobandism. Extremist Islamic sect that originated from the town of Deoband in northern India. Predominates the madrassahs of western Pakistan.
- Erk. Translates to “freedom”. Opposition party in Uzbekistan. Founded in 1990 and banned in 1992.
- Hadith. The body of traditions about the sayings and acts of the Prophet Muhammad that delineate proper Muslim behavior and form along with the Koran, the basis for sharia law. (Rahsid 2002, 264)
- Hisb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami. Translates to “Party of Islamic Liberation. Abbreviated HT. A non-violent Islamic fundamentalist movement that supports the return of the caliphate and sharia law.
- Interservices Intelligence. Abbreviated ISI. Pakistani national intelligence organization.
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Abbreviated IMU. Militant Islamic group founded in 1999 that seeks to overthrow the current governments of Central Asia and install sharia law. Leaders are Tohir Yuldeshev and Juma Namagani.
- Islamic Renaissance Party. Abbreviated IRP. Islamic political organization founded in the Soviet Union in 1990, with independent branches in the Central Asian republics. The IRP is legal only in Tajikistan. (Rahsid 2002, 265)

Karimov, Islam. President of Uzbekistan since 1991.

Caliphate. Means “successor to the Prophet. The Islamic state established after the death of Mohammed, which united all Muslim lands. (Rashid 2002, 265)

Khjaev, Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch. Given name for Juma Namangani

Madrassah. School for the study of Islam. Madrassahs often teach specific forms of Islam and have been accused of radicalizing students in Pakistani and Afghani madrassahs.

Mujahadeen. Name for a fighter that has taken up the call of jihad to fight for Islam. Associated with those who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Nabiev, Rakmon. President of Tajikistan, 1991 to 1992. Now part of the Tajik coalition government.

Namangani, Juma. One of the founders of the IMU and a charismatic and renown military leader.

Nazarbayev, Nursultan. President of Kazakhstan since 1991.

Niyazov, Saparmurad. President of Turkmenistan since 1991. Also called Turkmenbashi.

Nuri, Sayed Abdullah. Founding member and leader of the Tajik IRP. Now a member of the Tajikistan coalition government.

Rahmanov, Emomali. President of Tajikistan since 1992.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Abbreviated SCO. Was the Shanghai Five, consisting of China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Became SCO when Uzbekistan was officially added in 2001. Discusses security and economic issues in the region.

Sharia. The Islamic legal code based on the Koran and the hadith of the Prophet Mohammed (Rashid 2002, 267).

Shia Islam. A minority sect of Islam found mainly in Iran, but with minorities throughout the Islamic world.

Sufi Islam. An Islamic mystical sect originating in Central Asia.

Sunni Islam. The majority sect of Islam.

Taliban. Translates to “students”. The Taliban were the group of fundamentalist Islamists that controlled the majority of Afghanistan from 1996 until overthrown by a combination of Afghan opposition forces and US forces in December of 2001.

Ulema. The scholars of Islamic theology.

Umma. The Islamic world community.

United Tajik Opposition. Abbreviated UTO. Coalition of the IRP and other opposition parties during the Tajik civil war.

United Uzbek Opposition. Abbreviated UZO. An attempt to unite the IMU and other opposition parties in Uzbekistan. Does not appear to have been successfully created.

Wahhabi. Extremist sect of Islam that originated in Saudi Arabia and has been aggressively exported throughout the Islamic world.

Yuldeshev, Tohir Abdouhalilovitch. Founding member of Adolat and the IMU. Religious leader of the IMU.

## REFERENCE LIST

- Abdyldayev, Syrgak. 2001. Batken: A small episode in a big game *Bishkek Infocenter*, 13 March. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).
- Alaolmolki, Nozar. 2001. *Life After the Soviet Union: The Newly Independent Republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia*. Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press.
- Allison, Roy, and Lena Johnson, eds. 2001. *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*. Virginia: R. R. Donnelly and Sons Co.
- Almaty Megopolis*. 2002. Wanted Uzbek leader may still be alive. 14 February. FBIS.
- Anderson, Curt. 2003. FBI seeking to expand presence overseas, *Associated Press International*, 29 March; available from [http://quickstart.clari.net/qs\\_se/webnews/wed/be/Afbi-terror-war.RX\\_a\\_DMS.html](http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/be/Afbi-terror-war.RX_a_DMS.html); Internet; accessed 6 May 2003.
- Bakeyev, Anvar. 2000. Ferghana Valley receives attack in sore spot. *Moscow Vremya*, 11 August. FBIS.
- Baumann, Dr. Robert F. 1993. *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan*. Washington D. C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History.
- Bishkeke Kabar News Agency*. 2000. Banned Uzbek opposition unites in Afghanistan, 15 February. FBIS.
- Bivens, Matt. 2001. Rights groups fear price of US-Uzbek alliance *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 October, 13.
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2002. International Religious Freedom Report 2002. *US Department of State*; available from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13990pf.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 May 2003.
- Caryl, Christian. 2001. In the hot zone; a small but fierce band of Central Asian Islamic guerrillas could pose a threat to US troops. *Newsweek*, 8 October, 30.
- Campbell, Kurt M., and Michelle A Flournoy. 2001. *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism*. Washington DC: CSIS Press.
- Central Asia Media Behavior*. 2002. Central Asia media roundup 2-3 Oct, 3 October. FBIS.

- Chivers, C.J. 2001. Alliance says it found school run by a titan of terrorism. *New York Times*, 1 December, B.1.
- \_\_\_\_\_. and David Rohde. 2002. A nation challenged. *Late Edition*, 18 March, A.15.
- Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia*. 2000. Wahhabi; available from [www.infoplease.com/ce6/society/A0851259.html](http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/society/A0851259.html); Internet; accessed 02 March 2003.
- Conant, Eve, and Christian Caryl. 2002. Radicals in retreat: An armed Central Asian offshoot of Al Qaeda has been splintered but may continue to pose a threat. *Newsweek*, 16 September, 27.
- Curtis, Glenn E., ed. 1996. *Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan Country Studies*. Washington D. C.: Federal Research Division Library of Congress.
- Dannreuther, Roland. 1994. *Creating New States in Central Asia: The Strategic Implications of the Collapse of Soviet Power in Central Asia*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, March.
- Dao, James. 2002. Kyrgyzstan seeks reward for helping fight terror. *New York Times*, 25 September.
- Fairbanks, Charles, and Andrew Bacevich. 2002. Bases of debate: America in Central Asia. *The National Interest* 68 (Summer)
- Gross, Terri. 2003. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid. *National Public Radio*. Aired 12 February; available from <http://discover.npr.org/features/features.jhtml?wfId=9999442>; Internet; accessed 15 February.
- Franks, Tommy R., Gen. 2002. Speech in Kazakhstan; available from <http://www.centcom.mil/News/Transcripts/20020821.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 August 2002.
- Gazetasng*. 2001. Kyrgyz soldiers reportedly clash with IMU fighters. 27 July; available from <http://eng.gazetasng.ru/print.php?id=4723>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2003.
- Geobop.com*. 2003. World Fact Book; available from <http://www.geobop.com/World/NA/>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2002.
- Goldstein, Lyle J. 2002. Making the most of Central Asian partnerships. *Joint Forces Quarterly* 30 (Summer): 82-90.

- Hoagland, Jim. 2002. Human Rights and our Allies. *The Washington Post*, 10 March, B.09.
- Hopkirk, Peter. 1994. *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*. New York: Kodansha America, Inc.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1995. *Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin's Dream of an Empire in Asia*. London: Kodansha America, Inc.
- Hunter, Shireen T. 1996. *Central Asia Since Independence*. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.
- Karatnycky, Adrian. 2002. Bush's Uzbekistan Test. *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 March, 9.
- Khamidov, Alisher. 2002. Warnings of Islamic militant incursions prompt anxiety in Kyrgyzstan, *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst*, 31 July; available from [www.cacianalyst.org/2002-07-31/20020731threats\\_of\\_new\\_incursions.htm](http://www.cacianalyst.org/2002-07-31/20020731threats_of_new_incursions.htm); Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.
- Khan, M. Ilyas. 2000. The road to holy terror. *Karachi Monthly Herald*. January, 121-127. FBIS.
- Khan, M. Ismail. 2001. Militancy threatens stability in Central Asia. *GazetaSNG.ru*, 27 August; available from <http://eng.gazetasng.ru/print.php?id=5091>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.
- Koichiev, Arslan. 2001. Kyrgyz soldiers reportedly clash with IMU fighters. *Eurasianet.org*. 26 July; available from <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav072601.shtml>; Internet; accessed 6 May 2003.
- LeVine, Steve. 2001. Key Uzbek rebel dies in bombing. *Wall Street Journal*, 5 December, A.17.
- Lewis, David. 2002. Crisis in Kyrgyzstan, *The Guardian Unlimited Observer*. 1 September.
- Litvinovich, Dmitri. 2001. Chieftains neutralized one at a time. *Pravda*, 19 November.
- Lubin, Nancy, ed. 1999. *Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia*. New York: The Century Foundation Press.
- Martynov, Pavel. 2001. Tajikistan may get caught up in its own game. *GazetaSNG.ru*. 31 January. FBIS.

- McCauley, Martin. 2002. *Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Modern History*. London: Longman Press.
- Moscow Interfax*. 2002. Kyrgyzstan: Defense Minister warns of infiltration threat by “guerillas”, 28 July.
- Murray, John. 2002. US abetting unsavory new client state in Uzbekistan. *Dublin Irish Times*, 16 February.
- Negri, Alberto. 2002. Al-Qaida’s great escape. *Milan Il Sole*, 10 February, 2. FBIS.
- Olcott, Martha Brill. 2001. The new geopolitics of Central Asia. *East European Constitution Review* Fall 2001. Vol 10. No. 4; available from <http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol10num4/features/olcott.html>; Internet: accessed 6 May 2003.
- Perry, Alex. 2001. Inside the battle at Qala-I-Jangi. *Time*. 1 December; available from [www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,186592,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,186592,00.html); Internet; accessed 3 March 2003.
- Peterson, Scott. 2000. Central Asia’s Islamist crucible as Muslims began observing Ramadan this week, and insurgency simmered in an impoverished region *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 November, 6.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2002. Amid reforms, Muslims still under fire in Ferghana Valley; Critics say that Uzbek government policies are pushing even moderates toward radicalism. *The Christian Science Monitor*, 19 July.
- Porzio, Giovanni. 2002. Asian connection. *Milan Panorama*, 31 October, 160-166. FBIS.
- Rashid, Ahmed. 2000. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. USA: Yale University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2001a. Juma Namangani returns to Tajikistan for fresh offensive. *Central Asia Analyst*. 17 January; available from [www.cacianalyst.org/jan\\_17\\_2001/juma\\_namangani.htm](http://www.cacianalyst.org/jan_17_2001/juma_namangani.htm); Internet; accessed 3 March 2003.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2001b. CA fears renewed insurgency. *The Nation: Islamabad*, 5 April. FBIS.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2002a. *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*. USA: R. R. Donnelly and Sons Co.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2002b. They’re only sleeping: Why militant Islamists in Central Asia aren’t going away. *The New Yorker*, 14 January, 34-41.

- Rasizade, Alex. 2002. Washington and the 'Great Game' in Central Asia. *Contemporary Review* 280, no. 1636, (May): 257-270.
- Ruchala, Cali. 2002. Namangani, Djuma. *Sobaka*. 22 July; available from [www.diacritica.com/sobabka/dossier/namangani.html](http://www.diacritica.com/sobabka/dossier/namangani.html); Internet; accessed 3 March 2003.
- Schonauer, Scott. 2001. Uzbekistan's cooperation with the US may result in economic dividends. *European Stars and Stripes*, 31 October.
- Smith, Dianne L. 1996. *Central Asia: A New Great Game?* USA: Strategic Studies Institute, 17 June.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1998a. *Breaking Away From the Bear*. USA: Strategic Studies Institute, 3 August.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1998b. *Opening Pandora's Box: Ethnicity and Central Asian Militaries*. USA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1 October.
- Stratfor.com*. 2002. US presence in Central Asia brings political leverage. 28 January; available from [www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis\\_print.php?id=2002953](http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_print.php?id=2002953); Internet; accessed 15 November 2003.
- Struck, Doug. 2001. Uzbek Taliban chief feared in homeland: Mazar fighting is blamed for attacks. *The Washington Post*, 10 November, A.17.
- Tanner, Stephen. 2002. *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*. Cambridge: Da Capo Press.
- Tenet, George J. 2001. Statement by director of Central Intelligence before the Senate select committee on intelligence on the "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World". 7 February; available from [www.maxwell.ssf.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/worldwidethreatbriefing.htm](http://www.maxwell.ssf.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/worldwidethreatbriefing.htm); Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.
- US Agency for the International Development Press Office. 2002. *USAID Awards \$22.2 Million for New Community Action Investment Program in Central Asia*. US Department of State. 11 July; available from [www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/11816pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/11816pf.htm); Internet; accessed 3 March 2003.
- US Department of Defense. 2001. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington D. C.: Defense Department, 30 September.
- US Department of State, 2002a, Press release by Beth Jones, Assistance to the Countries of Central Asia. 11 February; available from [www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/7951pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/7951pf.htm); Internet; accessed 3 March 2003.



- US Department of State. 2002b. *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001*. May; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10239.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2003.
- US Department of State. 2002c. Press Conference with Richard Boucher, *Redesignation of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a Foreign Terrorist Organization*. 25 September; available from [www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/13708pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/13708pf.htm); Internet; accessed 6 May 2003.
- US Department of State. 2002d. Daily Press Briefing with Richard Boucher, 23 September; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/13621.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 May 2003.
- US Department of State. 2003a. *National Security Policy for Combating Terrorism*. February; available from [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov); Internet; accessed 3 March 2003.
- US Department of State. 2003b. Remarks at University of Georgia by April W. Palmerlee. *Globalization and change in Central Asia*. 19 February; available from [www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/17817.htm](http://www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/17817.htm); Internet; accessed 3 March 2003.
- US President. 2000. *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*. Washington D.C.: White House, December.
- US President. 2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington D.C.: White House, September.
- US Trade and Development Agency. 2002. *TDA Commits \$3.5 Million for Projects in Uzbekistan*. US Department of State. 12 July; available from [www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/11870pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/11870pf.htm); Internet; accessed 3 March 2003.
- Vassiliev, Alexei, ed. 2001. *Central Asia*. London: Saqi Books.
- Wishnick, Elizabeth. 2002. *Growing US Security Interests in Central Asia*. USA: Strategic Studies Institute, October.

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
250 Gibbon Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA  
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr Jacob W. Kipp  
Foreign Military Studies Office  
101 Meade Ave  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Mr. Lester W. Grau  
Foreign Military Studies Office  
101 Meade Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Dr Harold S. Orenstein  
US Army Combined Arms Center  
ATTN: ATZL FD-CD  
1 Reynolds Ave, BLDG 111  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 6 June 2003
2. Thesis Author: Timothy James Parker
3. Thesis Title: A Window of Opportunity: The Impact of Post 11 September 2001 United States Involvement in Central Asia on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

4. Thesis Committee Members: \_\_\_\_\_  
Signatures: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

(A) B C D E F X                      SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

EXAMPLE

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
Direct Military Support (10)	/	Chapter 3	/	12
Critical Technology (3)	/	Section 4	/	31
Administrative Operational Use (7)	/	Chapter 2	/	13-32

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.
2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.
3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.
4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.
5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.
6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.
7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.
8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.
9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.
10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).