

ACCEPTING THE CHALLENGE: EXAMINING INFANTRY AND MILITARY
POLICE EMPLOYMENT OF COMPETENCIES ON THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY BATTLEFIELD

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ACCEPTING THE CHALLENGE: EXAMINING INFANTRY AND MILITARY POLICE
EMPLOYMENT OF COMPETENCIES ON THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
BATTLEFIELD John P. DiGiambattista, 61 pages.

Mission, threat and capabilities adaptations in the twenty-first century continue to change the tasks assigned to U.S. Army Infantry units. Traditional infantry tactical training does not prepare U.S. infantry forces for many of the tasks required in continuing missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Examining the threat and U.S. Army doctrine for both infantry and military police forces in terms of U.S. Army leadership skill sets provides insights into how to train infantry forces in the future. The analysis of the threat in the future portends increased training focus upon conceptual and interpersonal skills. Infantry training does not focus on these skills. Military police do integrate these skills into both training and operations. It is possible for infantry forces to leverage training focus on conceptual and interpersonal skills. By accepting that missions in the twenty-first century will require skills different from traditional competency in tactical operations, infantry forces will be better able to understand the complex issues of the current and future battlefield. By reconceptualizing the relationship between apparently non-tactical skills and tactical skills, the infantry force will be able to achieve greater success in future missions.

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ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
COE	Capturing the Operating Environment
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FM	Field Manual
FYROM	Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
HTAR	How the Army Runs
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LEC	Law enforcement competencies
MP	Military Police
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MTP	Mission Training Plans
NLA	National Liberation Army (of Kosovo)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SASO	Support and Stability Operations
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the future they [Marines] will need the flexibility to address a wide variety of crises. In one city block, a marine will provide food, care, and comfort for an emaciated child. In the next block, you will see this Marine with outstretched arms, separating two warring tribes. Then in the third city block, this same Marine will engage in intense house-to-house fighting with hostile forces. (1997)

General Krulak, "The Three Block War: Fighting In Urban Areas"

While General Krulak is describing Marines in this quote, it is quite appropriate today for Army infantry forces. Army forces face a myriad of tasks, and while the mission of the Army is to fight and win the nation's wars (FM 7-0 2001, i), success is often achieved only if infantry forces are successful in each of these tasks simultaneously. In peacetime the Army's mission adapts only slightly, by adding the word "prepare" to the mission description. Yet, the Army has not always been prepared for war (Heller 1986, 329), and likewise it has not always been prepared for other missions short of war (Bolger 1995, 330). As an infantry company commander in Kosovo in 2001, I dealt with such an experience. Though the unit conducted a three-month preparation, during the deployment the company dealt with a myriad of events for which it was not prepared. This thesis will address some of these frustrations, seek to understand them in a new light, and examine possible solutions for how Army infantry units prepare for operations on the future battlefield.

In March 2001, my company was operating in Kosovo as part of Operation Joint Guardian. In U.S. Army doctrine this was a "stability" operation and was aimed at providing security and safety for the Serb and Albanian people of the country, so that

they could develop a viable government. As the unit deployed into the area, a violent insurgency developed in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which was supported by rebels operating in the unit's sector of Kosovo. On 8 March, 2001, the infantry company, as part of the NATO occupation force called KFOR, conducted a cordon and search operation in Mijak, a village sitting astride the boundary between Macedonia and Kosovo. In the initial stages of the operation, rebels, who had been actively fighting the internal Macedonia forces with mortars and heavy machine guns only days prior, engaged KFOR. During the firefight, one rebel was wounded and no KFOR forces were injured. The rebel elements evacuated the village within six hours. Upon entering the village, the company conducted a cursory search of the building the rebels had used as a barracks and established local security.

The barracks were a former schoolhouse, and were filled with school supplies as well as military equipment. The unit leaders did not have the investigative skills to correctly collect and analyze the information in the barracks area. Few if any of the troopers in the unit had ever been on an actual objective and their training had not prepared them for the massive amounts of possible information within the building. From weapons parts and manuals in foreign languages, to common items of uniform and clothing, to ledgers and rebel record books, the building was a trove of information. Once the area was secure, the battalion commander and staff turned their focus to the continuous stability operations in their sector of approximately 20,000 people. The company was left alone to analyze the contents of the building and sort through the debris to identify items of intelligence value.

While these recovered items produced some valuable lists (such as locals who had supported the rebels with gifts of food or equipment) unfortunately, items of little to no value to the company's and battalion's immediate tactical operations were not identified and were not evacuated to higher levels for further analysis. For example, a map of Macedonia, with specific villages highlighted in yellow, was not identified as a critical piece of information. In the unit's view the villages marked were too deep within Macedonia to be linked to the insurgent activity. Only weeks later some of the villages highlighted on the map became the scene of insurgent fighting against the FYROM forces. The unit's training had focused upon tactical tasks, as a result they did not have the skills to correctly assess the intelligence value of the map. This failure allowed threat forces to continue operations in Kosovo and Macedonia. Also, it was clear that those who had used the building were still operating unidentified in Kosovo. The building likely held fingerprints and other simple-to-collect forms of information which would have helped them identify such people, yet the soldiers did not have the proper skills to capitalize upon them.

A few days before leaving the village, the unit identified a cache of weapons and equipment, including a computer. While, again their training had not focused upon intelligence gathering and sources of information, the company secured the computer first, based upon its possible information contents. The battalion intelligence section examined the files and programs stored in the computer's central processing unit (CPU) and nothing of value was identified. Once again, the company on the border was left to ponder what intelligence was lost on the machine, and how might they have more quickly identified and processed the important information?

Another similar example occurred in the company's sector only a week later. Most likely in response to the effective increase in U.S. KFOR activity within the sector, terrorists destroyed a Serb home with a bomb. The blast was unusual, for unlike all the previous bombings it was in a Serb village, and did not fit the pattern of the bombings in the battalion sector. As a result, the battalion intelligence section requested that the unit on the scene gather specific information about the circumstances of the bombing. The intelligence section sought to know if the owners lived in Kosovo or Serbia; if they had received an offer from an unknown agent to buy the home; how long they had owned the home, and other data.

At the bombing site, the dust settled and the drunk and unruly Serb villagers slowly went home, but the tension the mob created remained. The unit leaders stood in the dark street with the neighbors next to a pile of bricks and rubble which only hours before had been their friend's home. The Serbs were in no mood to answer any questions. Yet, the contract interpreters began to ask other, less direct questions, about the crops, the livestock and the weather. The neighbors, young and old men and distressed mothers, slowly began to answer questions. The tone of the situation changed, and after an hour and a half, when the intelligence group arrived the unit had answers to all of the desired questions and more. It became apparent to leaders on the ground that the method of questioning and proximity of the threat or danger of the bomb blast had a great impact on the witnesses. The soldiers had all been trained in negotiation techniques specifically for this mission, but they did not have the interpersonal and cross-cultural skills to employ these techniques properly and get answers to the important questions. They wondered if there was a method of questioning that might provide more information and help them

accomplish their mission to prevent the violence and promote the safe and secure environment. Might there be a unit, group, or skill that they could use to acquire the information they needed?

These examples serve to illustrate the challenges U.S. Army forces face on the current battlefield. Appropriately, Army leadership has identified many of these challenges and integrated their requirement into the Army's mission. In June 2001, shortly after the events described above, the Army published FM 1, *The Army*. This manual is the capstone doctrinal manual for the U.S. Army (FM 1 2001, iv). It describes the Army's mission.

The Army serves the Nation. We defend America's Constitution and our way of life. We protect America's security and our Nation's interest. We answer the Nation's call to serve whenever and wherever required. We must prepare for decisive action in all operations. But above all, we are ready to fight and win the Nation's wars. (FM 1 2001, 1)

In this passage importance is given to the "Nation's interest" in conjunction with fighting and winning wars. While being "ready to fight and win" wars is of primary importance, the idea of achieving the "Nation's interests" is also given great weight. FM 1 also relates, "The military must provide the National Command Authorities with flexible forces that can operate across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict to achieve national security objectives" (FM 1 2001, 20). These passages show that national security objectives are the Army's paramount objectives. The Army has recognized that warfighting may not always achieve the national security objectives and integrated this concept into its mission. As a result, the Army has incorporated non-warfighting mission requirements, such as operations other than war, called stability and support operations, into its doctrine.

Importantly, FM 1 introduces the notion that the challenges of operations other than war and actual warfighting will both occur on the battlefield. In the introduction to FM 1, General Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army writes, “transitioning from peacekeeping to warfighting and back again--sap operational momentum. Mastering transitions is key to setting conditions for winning decisively” (FM 1 2001, i). Understanding that the Army mission today and in the future involves transitions from peacekeeping to warfighting and back is critical, for it creates the requirement for forces to understand themselves, the environment, and their mission in order to transition at the appropriate time and do it efficiently and effectively. As a major component of the U.S. Army’s force, infantry forces must develop this capacity in order to achieve the success in the future.

Also, as General Krulak’s quote in the epigraph shows, the possibility exists that U.S. force will have to conduct operations other than war and warfighting simultaneously. Understanding that Army forces may have to both provide humanitarian aid and attack a strong-point concurrently adds even more importance to General Shinseki’s comment about strength sapping. It might be said that if mastering transitions is the key to setting the conditions for decisive victory in the future, then mastering peacekeeping and warfighting tasks concurrently maintains the conditions for decisive victory.

Recent experience in the Balkans and other theaters shows the Army, or the United States at large, may already have institutional expertise that would help infantry forces deal with these types of transitions, situations and missions. These are Military Police (MP) units and civilian law enforcement agencies, which routinely prepare forces

to both transition between and execute operations requiring combat skills and other skills. The connection between current infantry skills, current and future infantry missions and the skills law enforcement organizations employ has not been examined to date.

Proposed Research Question 1: In twenty-first century operations, is there a need for U.S. infantry units to be trained and educated in skills other than tactical?

Proposed Research Question 2: Can U.S. infantry forces more rapidly and effectively accomplish their assigned missions on the future battlefield if they approach institutional training and development in a manner more like MP?

Proposed Research Question 3: If other skills are needed, how might they be taught?

Significance and Examples. The United States has embarked upon the first war of the twenty-first century in the war on terror. The battlefield environment has changed dramatically from just ten years ago. All of these changes affect what the U.S. deems as mission success and consequently the methods U.S. forces use to achieve success. This paper will examine these factors in view of the role of the infantryman on the modern battlefield to determine if his missions may benefit from the addition of police techniques and capabilities to the infantryman's basic skill group.

The United States is changing the definitions of many of its missions. In current operations, Special Operations Forces conduct "strategic site exploitation" in support of the FBI to find evidence of weapons of mass destruction, identify corpses and recover DNA samples. Searching for evidence or investigating is a traditional skill of police forces. In 2001 in Kosovo, soldiers from the 101st Airborne division conducted "non-lethal ambushes" along the border to capture and deter arms smugglers supporting

insurgency in Macedonia. A police officer would probably term these ‘nonlethal ambushes’ as “surveillance and apprehension.” Not one of these missions is described in current U.S. Army infantry manuals.

Yet, accomplishment of these tasks fulfills national political objectives and will not likely disappear from the battlefield. For example, as units secure and clear Al-Qaeda positions, the Army and other military forces have found evidence of Al-Qaeda plots and terrorist links. The National Command Authority has deemed this information useful in the national information campaign and has published the information to the world at large. This is in effect, finding and using evidence. If, in the war on terror, evidence is important and necessary, it is likely it will be useful in future operations. For the infantry, this means that simple “POW and search teams” common to Ranger School-training raid task organization, are not enough. Future infantry-trained soldiers may not understand what evidence looks like, how to secure it, or how to preserve it. They will need the conceptual skills to help develop new understandings of the possible sources of information.

An adequate response to the frustration junior and senior leaders feel at adapting to these missions is to research the actual tasks infantry troops are being asked to execute and determine how the Army can institutionally prepare infantrymen to do them better. Also, by examining both how law enforcement agencies conduct their duties and the nature of future operations, it may be possible to formulate the requirements for infantry soldier skills in the future. Although this study is aimed at all future operations, it is possible that it will yield insights into the requirements for soldiers in conducting support and stability operations (SASO) or noncombat operations. It may help leaders better

understand the skills required for operations other than war and, more importantly, how these skills may be related to the battlefield or transitions on the battlefield. The relationship between combat skills and noncombat skills may be much closer than junior and senior Army leaders usually acknowledge today.

Assumptions. The critical assumption for this study is that the combat capability of the U.S. infantry is the primary reason for their employment in any operation. As described in FM 3-0, *Army Operations*, “The ability of Army forces to stabilize a crisis is directly related to their perceived ability to attack and defend as necessary” (FM 3-0 2001, 9-5). In fact, FM 3-0 lists the following issues as considerations for stability operations: act decisively to prevent escalation, and apply force selectively and discriminately (FM 3-0 2001, 9-14). It is clear that the Army has identified the capability to conduct combat operations as the factor that provides it legitimacy as a peace operations force. In terms of this thesis, these statements mean that the basic infantry skills involved in closing with and destroying the enemy remain paramount in training and execution. This study will focus on the possibility that the law enforcement doctrine approaches and develops skills in a manner which will augment the infantry forces’ current skills and improve its capability and flexibility.

Definitions. The following terms should be clarified prior to proceeding: competency, twenty-first century operations, and the traditional infantry mission.

The definition of competency begins with the root of the word, competence. The Oxford English Dictionary defines competence as, “sufficiency of qualifications; the capacity to deal adequately with a subject.” The term “capacity” here supports the idea that competency does not deal with simply a single function, but a variety of functions

which allow one to deal successfully with a subject. The term is also currently used in business leadership assessment tools. Business researchers define competency in much the same manner, “A competency is an underlying characteristic of an individual which is causally related to effective or superior performance of a job.” (Briscoe and Hall 1991, 1). In line with these definitions, this study will define competencies as broad groups of skills.

The Army’s leadership manual, Field Manual (FM) 22-100, defines four specific skill sets: conceptual skills, interpersonal skills, technical skills, and tactical skills. In FM 22-100, conceptual skill is skill with ideas and includes critical reasoning, creative thinking, and improvisation. Interpersonal skills are skills used in dealing with people and include coaching, teaching, earning trust and respect. This study will also add multicultural awareness to the skill group. Tactical skill is unique in that it is best understood as the employment of the other skills to achieve success in combat. It involves applying warfighting doctrine within the commander’s intent, professional knowledge and warfighting skill, and the ability to plan for and execute offensive, defensive, stability and support operations. Technical skills are skills with things and procedures and include knowing how to use and maintain equipment, basic soldier skills and the procedures for accomplishing unit tasks (FM 22-100 1999, B-12-15). These four skills sets will provide a system for assessing skill requirements.

In discussing required skill sets, there are two other competencies not specifically listed in FM 22-100, but important to the Army in the future. These competencies set the conditions for development and understanding of the other skills. They are self-awareness and adaptability. FM 1 provides a definition of both of these skill groups,

Self-aware leaders understand their operational environment, can assess their own capabilities, determine their own strengths and weaknesses, and actively work to overcome their own weaknesses. Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware--then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment. Self-awareness and adaptability are symbiotic. (FM 1 2001, 12)

These competencies are superordinate to the other four listed previously and they will serve to inform the discussion of skill sets in general. They may also provide insight into how the infantry forces might approach development of the conceptual, interpersonal, tactical and technical skills.

The next issue is twenty-first century operations. These are both current and likely operations. Thus, we must examine both the missions U.S. infantry face today and the likely missions they will face tomorrow. This requires a limited amount of extrapolation of the types of enemy and missions U.S. troops will face in the future. Much of this extrapolation has been done in Army manuals and doctrinal publications, and the Army White Paper, "Capturing the Operational Environment." The critical issue is that this study is not limited to SASO operations and the value of the various skill sets required for SASO only. Rather, it seeks to determine if development of all of these skills will support all types of operations in the future and makes the importance of such development, if required, much greater.

The final definition is the concept of the "traditional" infantry mission. As stated in the infantry field manuals for squad through brigade size units, the mission of infantry is: "to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver, in order to destroy or capture him or repel his assault by fire, close combat or counterattack." While there are slight variations in the major infantry manuals the concept remains the same. The infantry has

seen and continues to see its role on the battlefield in terms of close combat action, as opposed to surveillance, targeting, or controlling a threat or potential threat. This is important because it defines the manner in which infantry forces approach their mission.

Limitations. The scope of this study is all infantry soldiers in twenty-first century operations and it will be limited to open sources. It is likely that some classified data from current operations would be useful; however, classified information will not be used because enough open source information is available to satisfactorily examine the issue.

Another important factor in current operations is the U.S. Army methodology for deployment on SASO operations. Currently, the Army uses the alert, train, deploy methodology for deployment to SASO operations. This is an important consideration in the effectiveness of U.S. infantry units in current operations, but examination of this methodology is beyond the scope of this paper. The success of this training concept is debatable, and does bear on the overall applicability of training infantry skills; however, this paper will limit itself to the question of institutional training, not unit training.

This thesis will also be limited to employment of basic law enforcement skills and organization. There is no need to examine forensic investigations or the concepts of rights warnings, or search and seizure rules. These concepts may become important to the infantryman as the Homeland Security debate continues, but not for purposes of this study. This study will confine itself to the basic skills used by law enforcement agencies as they apply to possible infantry requirements in future conflict. Detailed scientific investigation is a specialty even within law enforcement agencies. Infantry battalions will also require specialists, such as military police investigators, to conduct detailed investigations.

The final limit for this study will be to focus only on tactical infantry units. The Army currently has organizations at corps level designed to deal with information exploitation. Since the Army has organizations trained to deal with these specific issues already there will be little value in a study that re-examines the issue.

Significance. This paper will attempt to help infantry leaders identify their mission requirements and broaden their range of options in future operations. This should provide infantry leaders with a new manner of understanding their role on the future battlefield. A new understanding of their role will help infantry forces to identify doctrinal approaches that will improve their overall performance in twenty-first century operations. Infantry leaders will always be faced with the paramount requirement to conduct successful combat operations. In the past this has determined their primary doctrinal approach to training. This study should help them in the future to understand that the police approach to integrating the various skill sets does not detract from combat infantry skills, and development of these skills will likely provide increased mission success. For conceptual, interpersonal and technical skills all combine to create greater tactical skill, and each also contribute to success in the uncertain environment of the future.

Finally, the infantry force provides the central focus of this paper as a means to understand how and the Army as a whole might adapt to the future environment and requirements. The Army is focused upon control of land and populations. For example, in the introduction to FM 1 as General Shinseki writes,

[L]and forces alone have the ability to place enough “boots on the ground” and interact with the populations directly and continuously. In this capacity for human

interaction, ground forces are unique. The army provides human interaction--the basis for our warfighting doctrine. (FM-1 2001, i)

By their nature infantry forces provide one of the Army's most important means for controlling ground or populations, and as such they are one of the operational centers of the U.S. Army. While armor, field artillery, and aviation and the others are important and relevant combat arms forces, only infantry brings the manpower required to secure terrain and deal with populations. Again, this makes infantry training for the twenty-first century battlefield central to how the Army will train, for infantry forces have a specific function that deals with terrain and population, and this study will show that the infantry may have to adjust its training approach to deal with these issues on the future battlefield.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Many of the topics that are important to this paper have a large body of work already devoted to them, such as twenty-first century operations and law enforcement skills. In discussing the threat, this study will use U.S. Army doctrine coupled with the works of futurist writers. U.S. Army doctrine will also provide the basis for discussion of both infantry and military police approach to skill sets. Unfortunately, one of the important topics is not well developed. The relationship between soldier's skill requirements and policemen's skill requirements is significantly not represented in professional military writing. We will examine both the issues not covered in professional literature and the reasons why it is not examined, and the significant works that will contribute to this study.

Describing the relationship between soldiers' and policemen's skills is difficult. The competencies of the respective organizations appear to be in opposition, for, in broad terms policemen protect and soldiers destroy. Due to this understanding, most military writing is predicated upon the belief that the soldier's duties exist concurrent with, yet distinct from, the military police officer's duties on the battlefield. So, while infantry forces might perform a raid, at the same time somewhere else on the battlefield, military police perform traffic control duty. While some of the actual missions these forces undertake overlap, such as area security, Army commanders do not consider employing MP forces for traditional infantry combat missions unless in extreme circumstances. Still, the two forces are related in that the infantry force will not be able to accomplish its

combat mission without MP forces controlling traffic. Both MP and infantry functions are required on the battlefield, but are distinct activities.

However, as introduced earlier, this may not be the case and the exigencies of twenty-first century operations will likely require infantry soldiers to assume many police-type duties. Much of the distinction military leaders make between infantry skills and law enforcement skills is based upon their apparently different approaches to the use of force.

The Use of Force by Infantry and Police Forces

American military leaders, and infantrymen in particular, generally view their primary function as fighting and winning the nation's wars, not conducting operations other than war and the resultant police-type tasks. As some have observed,

There is clearly an overlap between what an army needs for war and what it needs for "other than war," yet these are not the same thing and an army geared for one cannot effortlessly shift between the two. Rather, it confronts a series of compromises. (Matthews 2002, 157)

These "compromises" are the critical points in the argument for Army leaders because these are the issues where police skills and soldier skills do not overlap. While these compromises may be made up of a group of issues, the most central issue is differences in the application of force. Soldiers and police both have as the objective of their actions the protection of society. Yet, they act in different environments. Soldiers generally act outside their national boundaries while police generally act within their national boundaries. Soldiers, who normally operate outside their nation, are trained to apply maximum force upon non-citizens or "enemy" forces. Police, who normally operate within their nation, are trained to apply force upon citizens of the nation and thus use

force only as a last resort. As Major Charles Pfaff writes, “Soldiers, when acting as soldiers fight enemies; police, when acting as police protect citizens, they may have to harm certain citizens in order to do so, but this can never be a first resort” (Pfaff 2000, 7).

Thus, the critical difference in soldier’s and police application of force is the recipient of the force. Police must restrain their use of force because the recipient of the force will actually be the object they are attempting to protect, the citizens. As citizens they are innocent until proven guilty, and they receive the benefit of the doubt. Generally, society does not require soldiers to apply restraint because they act outside the bounds of the nation, and the recipient of soldier’s force is usually an easily identifiable enemy. So, due to the environment in which they operate, the police in an environment of citizens, and the soldier in an environment of enemy, the police are required to use force as a last resort, while soldiers use force first and decisively.

Given these factors, military leaders then extend differences between police and soldier application of force to human nature and the requirements for training. Generally, they argue that soldiers trained like police to apply force as a last resort will be at a disadvantage on the battlefield and must be retrained in order to achieve the “force-first” mentality. This argument is based upon the ideas of S. L. A. Marshall, who studied American forces in combat during World War II. Based upon Marshall’s interviews with troops in the Pacific and European theaters, he determined that American soldiers do not have a predisposition to kill. He described the American soldier as, “at some point a conscientious objector” (Marshall 1978, 79). He believed that the American soldier must be conditioned to kill through training. If a soldier must be conditioned to kill, then any

activity which acts against this conditioning is a compromise from his training preparation to kill.

This is the essential “compromise” discussed in the quote above. The police focus on protection, and the police concept of “force as a last resort” acts counter to soldier conditioning and its focus upon killing. Further it supports soldier’s “conscientious objector” nature, and puts soldiers on the battlefield at risk. So, the argument is that preparing a soldier for anything less than combat compromises the development of a skill, killing, which is integral to his function. However, the Army of the twenty-first century is not the Army of WWII, and some of the premises of this argument are not valid today.

Based upon Marshall’s ideas, the U.S. Army has changed many of its training procedures. As a result, soldiers today are much more willing to engage the enemy (Grossman 1995, 35). Due to this change it is possible that military leaders’ argument against the police “force as a last result” mentality is unfounded. The soldier’s individual capacity to engage the enemy, or to kill, has changed to such a great extent that U.S. Army tactical doctrine is now based upon the idea that soldiers will kill when required and even relies upon independent soldiers to determine when and where to do such killing. Current U.S. tactical doctrine supports this argument.

Army doctrine now expects infantrymen to make numerous decisions about when, where and how to engage the enemy. For example, FM 71-1, the current manual for the tank and mechanized infantry company, lists eighteen different fire control measures (FM 71-1 1998, 2-56) which are methods to organize direct fire weapons systems in engagements to make the application of fire most effective. Each of these is a complex

and discrete system of organizing fires based upon soldiers identifying one or a combination of enemy formations, weapons systems, various points on the ground, or threatening behavior, to name a few examples.

An example of one method of fire control is a restrictive fire line. This is a line, usually determined by the senior trooper present, beyond which troops cannot fire. The determination of a restrictive fire line is based upon the position of friendly forces, not on the likely approach of enemy forces. Thus, it is quite likely that soldiers given a restrictive fire line as a fire control measure, would observe enemy forces beyond the line or even be engaged by enemy forces beyond the line, and be expected to know that they could not fire or even return fire at the enemy. Coupled with this knowledge is the discipline to restrain their trained response to being fired upon. So, in current U.S. Army doctrine military leaders expect a great deal of restraint and discipline even in the heat of combat. Given the level of restraint and understanding required to employ a restrictive fire line, it is not a far reach for military leaders to employ a “force as last resort” control measure.

The intent of this discussion has been twofold: first, to explain the lack of professional literature on soldiers using police skills; second, to show that the core actions of soldiers and policemen in the application of force are not mutually exclusive. This lays the foundation for the study. From this point we can review the existing literature relating to the topic. These documents can be categorized into three different types of U.S. Army doctrine: training, infantry, and military police doctrine.

Doctrine

With the advent of the internet, proliferation of computers, and massive use of precision guided munitions, military professionals have heralded a change in how militaries operate, or a revolution in military affairs (RMA). This has caused numerous changes in Army doctrine. One of the most profound has been in how the Army views threats to the United States in the future. The Army has devoted an entire study of the threat in a white paper titled, "Capturing the Operational Environment" or "COE." Published in 1999, the COE incorporates the ideas of many futurist writers and extrapolates their work to outline the general operating principles which the Army expects threat forces to use in the future against the United States in twenty-first century operations. These principles have been further distilled in the Army's current operations manual, FM 3-0, *Operations*. The succinct discussion of the COE based-threat in FM 3-0 will provide the basis for this study's description of twenty-first century Operations.

The second doctrinal resource will be Army training and infantry manuals associated with such training. Army training is outlined in the Army's primary training document, FM 7-0, *Training*. The critical concept of this manual is that units focus on mission essential tasks, or specific tasks that commanders determine are required to fulfill their wartime mission. These tasks are specific to each branch of the Army and infantry tasks are specifically focused upon the infantry's traditional mission, as defined in the introduction. For the infantry the parameters of these missions are outlined in the mission training plan manuals, or MTPs. These plans outline the tasks, conditions and standards for each task of the infantry at each level of command from squad through brigade. These

documents will provide information on what tasks the infantry trains for, and the standards that are used to verify the training level of infantry units.

The third facet of doctrine is military police skill development and usage. Military police employment of the skill sets are not the focus of this study; however, military police doctrine provides a succinct, clear and complete discussion of the skills police employ which will foster understanding of all of the skills. The base military police manual is FM 3-19.1, *Military Police Operations*, dated 3 March 2001, and it provides a means to organize our discussion of how the MP approach the skill sets. This examination will be further augmented with the civilian police approach to the skill sets to determine if there are any other police methods which might be of use on the twenty-first century battlefield.

Finally, a discussion of skill sets and skill group development will provide alternative methods for teaching these skills. As discussed, competencies are made up of a broad set of skills. Each of these skills might be employed together or separately to perform a specific task. Success in a specific mission might be achieved by linking a group of such tasks into a mission. The Army's current training methodology uses task-based training to achieve success. In examining the infantry and police approaches to the skill sets we have already found that these sets are not mutually exclusive. A way of approaching the common factors in the two approaches to skill sets may be through non-task-based training.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Identifying future skill requirements for infantry forces will entail examining threat-imposed requirements, infantry and military police doctrine and applying skill set concepts to the intersection of these areas. In examining this issue, the study will identify the requirements of the current and future battlefield. The future battlefield is a large and complex area and must take into account a number of diverse factors, that will be examined in terms of U.S. Army leadership skill sets. U.S. Army doctrine for both infantry and police forces will then be analyzed in terms of these same leadership skill sets. This will take up the greater part of the analysis because it is within the two fields that we are searching for solutions. Then we will look at skill sets, and apply skill set training ideas to the intersection of the areas. This process is the critical step in the paper and will serve to prove the paper's validity. Each of these steps will be examined in detail.

The first step is to determine what skills will likely be needed on the future battlefield. These competencies will likely also be required in today's environment, but anticipating future requirements is critical to the Army in preparing for future war. Also, the environment may cause increased emphasis upon one or another group of skills. The primary U.S. Army doctrinal manual is FM 3-0, *Operations*. Using this document as a base will ensure that this study has a common background with U.S. Army doctrine and with the Army's expectations of the future battlefield.

Army doctrine in the form of FM 3.0 will identify a number of elements that we will expect to see on the twenty-first century battlefield. These elements will be the focus

for skill requirements in terms of current U.S. Army skill sets. They will be the testing criteria for current U.S. infantry and military police skill. The skill requirements derived from the future threat will be the testing criteria for the infantry and law enforcement skill approaches. Each branch will be examined to identify if it focuses upon skill sets identified as important in the twenty-first century.

The second factor is how the U.S. Army infantry currently identifies its skill requirements in terms of U.S. Army leadership skill sets. Three types of documents will be important for this: Army field manuals, infantry field manuals, and infantry mission training plans (MTP). While all of the documents listed are Army publications, the term “Army field manuals” refers to field manuals that have broad scope, specifically, *Operations*, FM 3-0. This manual is important because it outlines the Army’s doctrine. All other Army field manuals should conform to the concepts outlined in FM 3-0.

The second group of documents is the infantry field manuals for brigade to squad level. While they do not specifically discuss skill sets, they are important because they outline the framework within which infantry units execute their tasks and thus identify the skills required to succeed in their missions. As stated above the concepts within these manuals should conform to the ideas in FM 3-0. These manuals are: FM 3-90.1, *The Mounted Brigade Combat Team*; FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion*; FM 71-1, *The Mechanized Company Team*; FM 7-10, *The Light Infantry Company*; and FM 7-8, *The Infantry Platoon and Squad*.

The infantry doctrinal examination will conclude with an analysis of the various unit-level MTP. These documents further develop how the infantry defines its skill requirements because they record the procedures of each task the infantry expects to

undertake on the battlefield. These documents list the task, conditions, and standards for every infantry battlefield activity. Upon completion of this analysis, the study will have a list of what skills will be important on the future battlefield, and which skills the infantry currently emphasizes.

The next step will be to examine U.S. MP and general law enforcement doctrine and training documents to develop an understanding of the specific skills law enforcement organizations emphasize. MP are combat support units, and as such, many of their skill requirements are specifically focused upon support to combat operations. Clearly not all of these skills will support the infantry force in execution, because they happen concurrent to the infantry performing their tasks and are the reason military police exist on the battlefield. But, within the doctrine, it will be important to identify how the military police view their skill requirements to identify which are actually separate and distinct combat support missions and which might have a place on the battlefield. The results of these examinations should be an outline of which U.S. Army leadership skill sets law enforcement currently emphasizes.

In the overall methodology, the next step will be to analyze the intersection of infantry and MP skill requirements to determine which would be of value to the infantryman on the future battlefield. It will be critical to clearly identify the requirement, skill and level of knowledge required

The final portion of the analysis will examine if the law enforcement approach to the various skills provides insight to training methods. This is a critical step in the project. It is unlikely that infantry forces will be able to adopt all of the skills within the broad skill sets which police forces employ, but there are some which will be of value to

all infantry forces and others which might prove valuable at certain levels, and as possible options in the future.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The changing nature of war is today often described in terms of capabilities of friendly forces. Yet, this approach leaves a critical factor out of the analysis, which is the enemy. In order to avoid such a misstep, this study will start with competency requirements derived from threat actions. Future war will define the skills required in the twenty-first century, and an examination of infantry and police competencies will serve to identify possible solutions. The start point for this assessment is the enemy.

The Threat. The threat framework the U.S. Army currently uses is outlined clearly in FM 3-0, *Operations*. The critical features of the threat environment are state and non-state actors using traditional and nontraditional methods of warfare to affect U.S. interests throughout the world. According to FM 3-0, these threats would operate using the following principles:

1. Conduct force-oriented operations. Inflict unacceptable casualties [on U.S. forces].
2. Attempt to control the tempo. Create conditions to defeat US forcible entry operations.
3. Transition to a defensive framework that avoids decisive battle, preserves capability, and prolongs the conflict. If US forces deploy, use terrorist tactics and other attacks to erode public support, alliance or coalition cohesion, and the will to fight.
4. Use modernized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to conduct sophisticated ambushes. Destroy key operating systems or inflict mass casualties within and outside the theater of operations.
5. Use terrain and urban areas to disperse mechanized and armored units. Concentrate and disperse them as opportunities allow. Maneuver forces

during periods of reduced exposure to US technology. Use upgraded camouflage and deception capabilities.

6. Form coalitions against the US. (FM 3-0 2001, 1-9)

Each of these in turn will be examined to identify the skill sets to which they relate. As discussed prior, the U.S. Army leadership doctrine identifies four leadership skill sets, interpersonal skills, conceptual skills, tactical skills, and technical skills. The twenty-first century threat operating principles may necessitate more emphasis upon some of these skills.

The first Army leadership skill set is conceptual. This is of primary importance in dealing with the threat principles, for most of the principles are not simply tactical operations. Controlling the tempo, avoiding decisive battle, dispersing units and forming coalitions all require infantryman who understand the battlefield outside their field of vision. For example, enemy coalitions may involve parties not on the battlefield and these coalitions will have to be identified through careful collection and analysis of sources of support. For infantry forces this means changing their concept of priority intelligence requirements from the long established focus upon equipment and weapons, to focusing on labels of goods, and possible technology. The threat principles are strongly rooted in conceptual changes in how the infantry approaches combat. As the enemy mutates, it forces infantrymen to reconceptualize combat operations and the factors that influence them. This increases the need for infantrymen who have a high degree of conceptual skill.

The second threat operating principle increases the importance of the interpersonal skills. Specifically, the use of terrorist tactics and mass casualties in an effort to erode public support as described in principles three and four will require that

U.S. infantry employ interpersonal skills. U.S. forces must use interpersonal skills to reassure the public and foster cooperation between the military and the public when the public, either U.S. or international becomes a target of the enemy. As the largest component of U.S. military forces on the ground, infantrymen will be the primary link between the public in the theater of operations and U.S. forces. Increasing interpersonal competency in terms of cultural awareness and understanding will be critical.

One of the examples used in the introduction shows how cultural awareness and understanding support dealing with a populace under attack from terrorists. In the example from the introduction, the Serbs were threatened by the house-bombing, and because of this, they simply did not respond to normal American-infantry-style direct questioning. The interpreter, an ethnic Bosnian, who was culturally aware and actively engaged in supporting the unit, used his knowledge of the people, or interpersonal skills to put the people at ease and coax the necessary information out of the Serbs. More emphasis upon interpersonal skills will support operations against forces using the COE derived threat principles.

The third skill group is tactical. The threat principles continue to emphasize tactical skill, because in threat principle number one, the threat is focused upon force-oriented operations. The Vietnam War is one of the few examples of a U.S. military defeat. In that conflict, a smaller country was able to achieve victory by prolonging the war and inflicting a level of casualties unacceptable to the American people. The potential for threat forces to focus on this principle, and create massive casualties remains high as operations in 1993 in Somalia demonstrate. Thus, U.S. infantry forces must understand that tactical skill, or even tactical supremacy, is non-negotiable in the future.

The fourth U.S. Army leadership skill group is technical. This remains important in terms of employment of various systems; yet, it is not clear that the threat creates conditions that require improved technical competence. Proper employment of weapons and equipment is always important, and as the U.S. Army continues to develop new technologies, it will remain so. Yet, the threat principles do not show a significant employment of new technology. The use of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets does require an understanding of the threat capabilities, but this is insignificant when compared to the requirements to understand Soviet equipment during the Cold War.

Overall, the principles of threat operations for the twenty-first century create conditions which require soldiers to employ conceptual and interpersonal skills. As throughout history, the threat continues to evolve, conceptual skill is required to evolve with it. In terms of threat evolution, the normal progression of military development is to disperse. There are two approaches to finding a dispersed threat force, one is to increase technical skill and another is to increase conceptual skill.

Finding the Enemy

Threat principle number five describes enemy dispersion, which has great implications on the future battlefield and increases the requirement for conceptually competent infantry forces. This trend toward dispersion is a continuation of the “empty battlefield” concept of Paddy Griffith, described in *Forward into Battle*. Griffith writes that as weapons capabilities improved through the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth

centuries, military forces continued to disperse in order to preserve their forces. This has continued even in our most recent conflicts,

Others may adopt different countermeasures, but those the Taliban turned to by early November were the natural choices one could expect an adaptive opponent to try to implement when faced with capabilities like the [U.S.]. Again and again, from eastern front armies' response to artillery and machine guns in 1916-18, to the German Wehrmacht's response to Allied air supremacy in northwest Europe in 1944, to Vietcong and North Vietnamese armies' response to U.S. firepower in Vietnam, armies facing overwhelming firepower have dispersed, exploited cover and concealment, restricted their radio transmissions and adopted camouflage. (Biddle 2002, 20)

Griffith reports that, in Vietnam, a result of this dispersion was, "Surveillance was of paramount importance to the war in Vietnam, since in fighting against a regular army which opted to use guerilla tactics it was always very difficult to find the enemy" (Griffith 1981, 111). This makes locating the enemy a critical issue, for infantry forces must focus efforts upon finding the enemy before they can conduct their tactical tasks of "destroy or capture him." In efforts to locate the enemy U.S. forces increased reliance upon technology and technical skill. Yet, then as now, this did not provide a sufficient to accomplish the task, "The vast array of sophisticated American surveillance equipment never provided a complete answer to the problem of visibility in Vietnam" (Griffith 1981, 114). U.S. forces were not able to find the enemy effectively, and thus could not bring him to battle. In this case, what appeared to be an issue of technology and technical skill was not, and technical skill did not always provide sufficient means to succeed on the battlefield.

In terms of skill sets, conceptual skills may provide a more successful answer. As the enemy continues to disperse and find methods to hide from U.S. surveillance systems, infantry forces will have to develop improved methods to find him. The information

available on the battlefield will have to be collected in an alternate manner and different factors may influence which pieces of information are important. Much of this discussion focuses upon intelligence sources, which is traditionally a function of military intelligence. Infantry forces, however, provide much of the means of collection, and will often provide the commanders of U.S. operational forces. It is the infantry leaders who must develop improved conceptual skill in intelligence collection and employment.

A second critical issue for the twenty-first century will be the ability to adapt to the threat. The futurists have focused upon the threat's trend toward dispersion leading eventually to the threat using criminal operating methods, and operating among the civil populace. As Robert Kaplan has written, "Existing distinctions between war and crime will break down as is already the case today in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Peru, or Columbia" (Kaplan 2000, 48-49). Kaplan goes on to quote Martin van Creveld, "urban crime may develop into low-intensity conflict coalescing along racial, religious, social, and political lines" (Kaplan 2000, 49). As discussed earlier in the future war section, the idea of crime interfacing with war is profound. For, as the threat described by US Army doctrine begins to disperse, it moves from the open, visually evident battlefield, to an operational world that is more difficult to identify.

Criminals normally operate outside the bounds of society, where illegal activities necessitate weapons, gangs and violence, and identity is guarded. Since man began living in cities, and governments were formed, this world of anonymity, funding, coalitions and smuggling has been the realm of the organized criminal. In efforts to avoid US surveillance technologies and battlefield capability, threat forces have turned to criminal groups and warlords for support. Current operations bear out this linkage.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is an example that supports this notion:

Defense Foreign Affairs had repeatedly said throughout the 1990s that the KLA--a criminal organization running narcotics, prostitutes and other illegal activities throughout Europe--had intended to seek to create a new country which would take over parts of Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania. The KLA/UCK forces were officially "disbanded" following the end of the NATO lead war against Yugoslavia in 1999 but, in fact continue to exist. They have been, in current Macedonian operations, operating under the nom de guerre of the National Liberation Army (NLA), but all reliable sources indicate that the NLA and KLA remained synonymous. (*Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 2001, 23)

This passage shows a linkage between criminals and the KLA. Originally, during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, it might not have been difficult for American leadership to accept a criminal organization that morphed into a freedom-fighting group. Such a group might have appeared as noble or good people, only doing wrong to thwart Serbs bent on genocide. However, in future war, the linkage between crime and war is sinister, for criminals have one objective, wealth, and war is profitable:

Once you establish the rule of law and start collecting taxes, or import duties, it threatens the smugglers, says a top police official in Kosovo's capital, Pristina. "So what do they do? Go out and kill Serbs. Stability isn't profitable, conflict is." Murders of minority Serbs and Gypsies in Kosovo are widespread, and draw scant condemnation even from moderate Albanians. Gunmen are increasingly fond of taking potshots at NATO's Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR) peacekeepers as well. One such incident led to a shoot-out between KLA fighters and the U.S. Army's 82d Airborne on March 8. (Nordland 2001, 45)

In this example, the critical link between crime and warfare is clearly made. The implications for skill set requirements are that infantrymen will have to employ the precursor competencies of self-awareness and adaptability. These competencies will provide the infantry force with the ability to re-conceptualize the mutating threat. Understanding that the threat is motivated by greed rather than, in this case ethnic hatred, is important, for it provides a new means to assess the threat's actions.

For example, a vehicle search that yields cases of illegal cigarettes provides evidence of smuggling. If the troops conducting the search understand that the threat deals only with ethnic and military issues, then they identify the cigarettes as a law enforcement problem, not an intelligence issue. Yet, if these same troops conceive of the threat as a force which works with, for and might actually be smugglers, then they understand that the cigarettes constitute an important source of economic support for the threat forces. While this may appear to be a simple conceptual step, the skill to adapt to the threat and re-examine operational methods and techniques is not simple. An example of failure to adapt is the French Army of 1940, who observed the German Army's operational methods in Poland in 1939, and did not adapt effectively in order to avoid defeat in 1940.

Based upon the complete examination of the future threat environment, it is clear that conceptual, interpersonal and adaptive skills will be very valuable in future operations. The conceptual skills will be valuable because the threat will continue to adapt to U.S. fighting methods. The infantry will have to adapt as well, with a focus upon identifying information about the enemy in order to find his forces dispersed throughout the battlefield. As the enemy disperses he will move into civilian areas, and this will increase infantry forces need for interpersonal skills to deal with the people. Understanding the requirements of the future battlefield lays the groundwork for examining current doctrine. For, the requirements imposed by the threat will provide a means to examine current doctrine to identify if it is sufficient to meet these requirements in future conflict. We will examine which skills the infantry and military police forces emphasize in their doctrinal publications.

Infantry Doctrinal Analysis

Infantry doctrine is focused upon the traditional mission of the infantry: to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or repel his assault by fire, close combat or counter attack. The competency most closely associated with this mission is tactical, with some emphasis upon technical skills as well. The manuals which make up both the operational and training doctrine define the manner in which the infantry approach the Army leadership skill sets.

Before discussing infantry doctrine, it is important to understand how the U. S. Army applies its doctrine. There are two types of important doctrinal materials used by the U.S. Army. These are: the Field Manuals (FM); the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) documents. Field manuals outline how the army employs its forces. Within the field manuals there are several overarching documents that outline concepts for operational employment. There are also specific field manuals that outline the employment of specific units. The ARTEP includes mission training plans (MTP) for each type of unit in the Army. “The MTPs provide a clear description of “what” and “how” to train to achieve critical wartime mission proficiency for each unit echelon” (HTAR 2002, 15-27). In effect, these are the procedures that the Army has determined are critical to performing a specific type of unit’s wartime task. This group of documents, focused upon the primary infantry skills and tasks, will provide the background to identify infantry competencies. Finally, the most important factor in understanding how the Army applies its doctrine is stated in FM 3-0, “Army doctrine is authoritative but not prescriptive” (FM 3-0 2001, 1-14).

U.S. Army infantry doctrine is defined in both critical groups of documents. The infantry has published field manuals for all size units from the infantry brigade to lowest levels, the squad and platoon. Also, the Mission Training Plans (MTP) define the tasks, conditions and standards of infantry missions. The MTPs outline the procedures or steps for any given infantry task. We will examine each of these in turn to identify how these documents deal with law enforcement related issues. Also the Army has recently identified and created a number of documents and training plans to deal with the task “search” that also have bearing on the topic as well.

One of the critical issues in examining the infantry field manuals is the date of publication. Many of the most important manuals have not been updated since the 1991 Gulf War. The result is that these manuals remain focused on a post-cold war threat, and not the current COE. The squad, company, and light infantry battalion manuals all have this flaw. The only manual published since the COE has been developed is FM 3-90.3, *The Mounted Brigade Combat Team Manual*. While this manual does not specifically cover infantry skills, it provides insight into how the infantry applies the leadership skills.

One of these topics is urban operations. In urban operations, the mechanized brigade applies these fundamentals: conduct aggressive ISR operations, understand the human dimensions, separate noncombatants from combatants, avoid the attrition approach, control what is essential, maximize effects without unnecessary collateral damage, conduct close combat and transition control (FM 3-90.3 2001, 7-3, 4). These fundamentals focus upon two areas already identified as important in twenty-first century operations: conceptual and interpersonal skills. The terms “interpersonal skills” is almost enumerated in “understand the human dimension,” but it is also important in identifying

noncombatants and combatants as well. Conceptual competencies are emphasized in avoiding collateral damage and the attrition approach. Both of these concepts require thinking outside the tactical problem as well as solving it. Finally, conducting close combat returns to the traditional tactical skill set. The most recently published infantry manual appears to support many of the earlier findings of the threat analysis, and shows the increased importance of interpersonal and conceptual competencies.

Significantly, *The Brigade Mounted Combat Team* does not provide specific methods for infantry to employ these competencies. It increases the value of the competencies without discussing how an infantry unit or soldier achieves success in employing the competencies. Thus, the infantry soldier is required to employ conceptual and interpersonal competencies, but is not told how to develop or create success using these competencies.

The lower unit Army manuals do not correct this oversight. FM 7-30, *The Infantry Brigade*; FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion*; and FM 7-10, *The Infantry Company*, do not discuss competencies beyond tactical skills at all. For example, the introduction to FM 7-30, *The Infantry Brigade*, states:

The Army classifies its activities as war and operations other than war (those activities that occur during peace and or conflict). US Army operations are varied and range from aid and assistance to foreign governments to full combat operations against a well-armed hostile force. Army brigades must continue to deter aggression worldwide and should deterrence fail, be prepared to defeat any enemy across a wide range of threats. This challenge ranges from conflict with an emergent superpower to a hostile regional power; or against a less sophisticated, but no less determined, insurgent force. This range of threats and missions indicates future US operations will be decidedly joint in nature. (1993, 1)

Many of the concepts outlined in this paragraph clearly appear to be non-tactical; yet, in the body of the manual these nontactical topics are not discussed at all. The various

chapter topics and descriptions of the infantry's tasks bear this out. For example, chapter one begins with the infantry brigade's mission, the traditional infantry mission. *The Infantry Brigade*, while introducing the requirement for competency beyond the traditional requirement for combat capability, does not discuss the implications of this requirement.

The lower level manuals follow this pattern. *The Infantry Battalion* begins with:

The infantry battalion serves many roles on the airland battlefield. It engages most often in close battles and may conduct raids or stay-behind operations as part of a tactical combat force. Also due to their rapid deployability by air, infantry units are ideally suited for executing strategic contingency operations and establishing lodgments. (FM 7-20 2000, 1-1)

This introduction at least deals with contingency operations. *The Infantry Company*, the next lower level manual, does not even include this portion, "The infantry rifle company is organized and equipped to close with the enemy, to kill him, destroy his equipment, and shatter his will to resist" (2000, 1-1). In much the same manner, *The Infantry Squad and Platoon*, the lowest level collective infantry field manual, is combat focused. It uses the same mission for the infantry as the brigade manual, discussing closing with the enemy by fire and maneuver.

The U.S. Army infantry manuals generally do not deal with any other competencies than tactical. There is good reason for this, for the combat tasks of the infantry even at the lowest levels are complex. The complex nature of these tasks requires extensive training and detailed schemes of operations. However, as discussed previously, this traditional combat focus may not adequately prepare U.S. infantry forces to find and finish the threat in the twenty-first century. Unfortunately, the Army's training system does not provide a means to overcome this deficiency.

The final issue in examining infantry doctrine is to identify the procedures outlined in the mission training plans (MTPs). These documents outline the actual standards Army forces must achieve to be considered proficient in a given critical task. Unfortunately, the MTPs are focused upon traditional infantry tasks. For example, of the seventy-three tasks listed in the battalion level MTP, ARTEP 7-20 MTP, only three are directly related to stability operations. These tasks, conduct a cordon and search of an urban area, secure a base camp, and conduct civil military operations, do not begin to fulfill the requirements of the Twenty-first century battlefield. Yet, there is another flaw in the MTP system. The tasks only focus upon tactical skills. They only provide a limited training standard for execution.

MTPs use a training system focused upon discrete tasks, and the operational environment is devoid of such simple events. For example, a leader might develop a lane to train the company level task “cordon and search,” and, if he is a good trainer, he will add role-players to enhance the scenario. By the MTP standard he is not required to do this, and in the real environment, role-players will not replicate all of the factors which will play into an actual cordon and search, such as people leaving the cordon to go to work, or crying children, or discovered unexploded ordnance. The task “cordon and search” is only a small part a cordon and search operation. Units which execute the task during actual operations often have a complete standard operating procedure including candy for children, employing a medical team to treat civilian sick as well as injured soldiers, and probes and shovels for clearing latrines and dung-heaps. Yet, the discrete task method does allow for simple grading to an identifiable standard. On the complex

future battlefield, discrete task based training might not be enough training to ensure infantry units achieve success.

U.S. Army infantry doctrine deals primarily with the traditional combat role of the infantry soldier. While many of the field manuals discuss the requirement for further competencies, the actual procedural manuals, the MTPs, do not develop the actual skills required to execute these tasks in training (FM 7-0 2001, 2-13). Two recent Army training developments support the requirement to develop competencies, one in doctrinal development, and the other in operations.

Units in the field have developed training programs in support of non-traditional infantry competencies. In December 2002, the Army published ST 3-90.15, *Tactics, Techniques and procedures for Tactical Operations Involving Sensitive Sites*. The ST designator on this manual reflects that the topic is emerging doctrine, and the Army expects two to three revisions prior to publishing the document as a field manual. With a view of the Twenty-first century threat very similar to the threat described here, the preface of the ST reads,

ST 3-90.15 discusses actions Army forces take at sensitive sites incident to combat operations. ST 3-90.15, does not discuss operations conducted by Army forces as part of stability operations not in a combat zone or those related to peace time military engagement. This manual focuses on actions taken against a sensitive site operated by an enemy in a combat zone. While such actions are normally incident to offensive and defensive operations, Army forces can expect to conduct them in combat zones as part of a stability operation, or, in rare cases, a support operation. (ST 3-0.15 2002, iii)

This makes clear that the intended scope of the manual is both traditional infantry combat tasks, and nontraditional infantry tasks. It is focused upon developing the conceptual and tactical skills, regardless of the combat nature of the mission.

Furthermore, understanding the concept of a sensitive site requires adaptability and self-awareness. This quote explains what a sensitive site is,

a geographically limited area with special diplomatic, informational, military or economic sensitivity to the United States. Examples of sensitive sites include war crimes sites, critical hostile government facilities, areas suspected of containing persons of high rank in a hostile government, document storage areas for enemy classified files, or research and production facilities involving breakthrough technologies. (ST 3-0.15 2002, iv)

A sensitive site is a complex area that might have specific diplomatic or cultural value to the U.S. national interests. Encountering such a site itself might change the nature of the infantry soldier's task. Soldiers must understand that the nature of the environment, the sensitive site itself, might change the nature of their roles as combat soldiers. These troops might have to undertake security operations to secure the site and refrain from traditional combat tasks. This requires an ability to understand their mission, that is self-awareness, and the ability to adapt to the situation in order to achieve success. Sensitive sites provide further evidence that infantry forces will require more than simple tactical skills in the twenty-first century, and that the skill to adapt and be self-aware will also be of great importance.

In a similar vein, U.S. forces in Kosovo have required improvement in noncombat, conceptual competencies. Upon deployment, an infantry battalion discovered the following deficiencies:

U.S. maneuver battalions began conducting cordon and search operations with very limited success. We planned and executed our cordon operations precisely as we had trained to do them when preparing in Central Europe, but were not getting worthwhile finds in actual practice. Meanwhile, the battalions of other nations enjoyed a great deal of success their cordon and search operations. We were surprised to learn that the British army runs a National Search Center (NSC) in Chatham, England, has a formal search task organization, and that every

soldier in every British maneuver battalion has received search training.
(Simpson 2002, 1)

The article goes on to relate how U.S. forces created a train the trainer team, sent them to England to the NCS, and also brought British NCS trainers to Kosovo to run a two-week course for deployed units. The results were exceptional. As one infantryman reported, “This training will help me perform my peacekeeping mission better. However, the skills I learned, how to clear a room, perform a route search, and search personnel, are also skills I can use in warfighting” (Simpson 2002, 2). In this example, even a young private shows an understanding of how conceptual skills transfer from noncombat to warfighting, or combat tasks.

The key here is that, while both of these examples deal with search doctrine and training, they describe requirements on the current battlefield for conceptual skills. It is appropriate that the Army is taking action to correct these deficiencies today. Yet, the fact remains that infantry doctrine emphasizes only tactical skills. In searching for solutions to this shortfall we then turn to organizations that have traditionally dealt with both the tactical and conceptual nature of conflict, law enforcement agencies. In order to understand how such agencies organize and deal with their various skill requirements, this study will use the doctrine of the U.S. MP as an outline of police functions.

Military Police Competency Approach

Like the infantry, MP doctrine will provide a window into identifying how the MP deal with skill sets. By understanding how MP approach their tasks, this study will be able to identify which skills are most valuable to MP in executing their missions. MP organize their activities in five categories, maneuver and mobility support, area security,

internment and resettlement, law and order, and police intelligence operations. As identified earlier, not all of these functions are relevant to twenty-first century infantry operations. Some of these functions take place on the battlefield concurrent to combat operations, and these functions will remain the functions of military police during future combat operations. Each of these functions will be described in terms of the skills that they support.

The MP force relies heavily on conceptual skills. These are most clearly identified in two unique areas of police operations: law and order, and police intelligence operations. Each of these law enforcement functions deals with the mental activity of applying forms and models to many pieces of information, which are received from various sources over time. These conceptual forms and models create enhanced understanding of criminal activity. This is, in effect, mentally vying with the enemy over time, and challenge of such mental grappling is one of the reasons for the popularity of television crime dramas.

Law and order operations involve conceptual skills because they involve both routine crime prevention measures and criminal investigation. The functions are specific enough to warrant their own manual, FM 19-10, *Military Police Law and Order Operations*. Crime prevention deals with both conceptual skills and interpersonal skills. In terms of conceptual skills, “Crime prevention is an ongoing process of planning, implementing measures, evaluating their effectiveness, modifying measures, and developing further information” (FM 19-10 1987, 6-1). Thus it is a dynamic endeavor requiring continuous planning and evaluation, both of which are conceptual competencies.

Likewise, investigation requires conceptual skills through collection of data about the crime, and analysis of the data to identify and apprehend the criminals. As addressed in the threat discussion, the enemy has shown a continual trend toward dispersion. As this trend continues, infantry forces may need the conceptual ability related to investigation as they identify information requirements and create mental systems of how the threat operates. While investigation is one facet of police conceptual competencies, police intelligence operations employ the same principles over time.

Police intelligence operations employ conceptual skills in a holistic manner. For infantry forces, understanding this conceptual model may be very valuable. Due to the requirement to protect the citizens, police employ local patrols; often in a routine area, and over time police forces have learned to capitalize upon this system. As police interact with the populace, or simply observe the neighborhood, they gather various pieces of information. Examples include car parking patterns, and when stores open and close. Police intelligence operations collect, analyze, and interpret this information. The conceptual ability to identify trends over time and link apparently random events to develop indicators of criminal action, methods, and intent requires a high level of competency. Infantry forces in the future face a threat that adapts quickly, receives support from sources off the battlefield, and has many possible motivations. Due to these factors, the conceptual ability to apply police intelligence operations will be important.

Interpersonal skills are also an important competency for military police forces. Cooperation with the populace is critical to crime prevention, internment and resettlement, and police intelligence operations. For police forces, the people provide a vast set of eyes and ears. Maintaining a positive relationship between police forces and

the people is critical to gathering this information from the people. It is important to note that this occurs on two levels. The higher-level interpersonal issue is fostering a positive police image in the populace, and the individual interpersonal skills are questioning, interviews and interrogation. Police forces understand that these issues occur in tandem on the battlefield and discuss these issues in their doctrine.

The MP doctrinal approach to patrols provides an example of how interpersonal skills are integrated MP operations. Infantry forces traditionally conduct patrols to make contact with, or to gain intelligence on enemy forces. MP use patrols to accomplish these tasks also, but, "Military police practice preventive patrolling" (FM 19-10 1987, 8-1). This concept causes the MP force to develop specific skill sets in order to benefit from employment of patrols.

FM 19-10, *Law and Order Operations*, articulates this clearly.

MP on patrol work for positive community relations. Public cooperation and understanding benefit both the community and the MP. The handling of incidents requires observation, approach, and tactful corrective action or assistance by MP. MP behavior is professional while on duty. MP follow proper procedure for handling incidents. Their behavior is impartial, not judgmental. (1987, 9-2)

The MP understanding the potential contributions of patrolling supports the development of interpersonal skills within the MP force.

Tactical skills are not often associated with police forces, yet it is one of their core competencies. Area security requires tactical skills, as do police patrol procedures. Many of the simple day-to-day functions of military police assume tactical competency. For example, the apprehension of suspects requires police units develop plans and execute them quickly, "The need to apprehend an offender can occur with little warning.

It can happen at anytime [and requires] speed in erecting barricades, redeploying patrolling units. [It also requires that] a plan of action for each type of apprehension is immediately available” (FM 19-10 1987, 10-3). There are two techniques for apprehension: cordon and pursuit. Both of these require police officers that understand how the suspect might use weapons and terrain to his advantage. The military police make tactical skills an important, but anticipated factor in their approach to their missions.

The final skill set is technical, and, for the military police, is anticipated in their activities. Inherent in military police function is understanding and employing the laws of the nation. These laws are technical in nature and the requirement to provide Miranda Rights to apprehended suspects is a good example of how these technical issues are an integral factor in police functions. The military police functions of internment and resettlement and mobility support are also technical competencies. Internment and resettlement require technical understanding of the rules and procedures for handling friendly and enemy prisoners as well as for moving, handling and dealing with refugees. Mobility support is much the same, for in controlling traffic, there are definite constraints, limitations and procedures for traffic use and control. Thus, the MP requires a highly developed group of technical skills.

As alluded to in the previous sections, the military police also have specific skill sets which do not fall under the Army leadership model, and have been described as restraint and impartiality (Kaldor 1999, 127-130). Restraint, as has been discussed in the literature review, is a function of the police because they act within the community to protect it. Because of this, the object of their violence is a citizen whom is also the object

of their protection. Infantry must also use restraint, as discussed in the same chapter, yet it is not in the same manner as police. Police used force as a last resort to protect citizens; infantry forces use restraint for a number of reasons, to reduce collateral damage, to prevent escalation of violence in a stability environment. However, infantryman must also understand that they possess the capability for dispute-ending destruction, and when employed with thought and care, this destruction can prevent escalation of violence. Thus, infantrymen must be skilled in restraint, for they can at times control enormous firepower, and if used properly restraint can prevent further conflict.

The second police specific skill is impartiality, and this skill is not likely to become a major factor for infantry skill sets. Police are impartial in order to maintain legitimacy with the populace. For example, police who are seen as racially biased have difficulty dealing with minority communities in their area. Infantry forces may need this competency in specific situations, but not in all situations. In stability operations it may be important for infantry forces to appear to be fair and impartial with all ethnic groups; yet, in combat situations, or in high-threat areas, one group may be more of a threat than another. This group would warrant increased inspections and checks, and this treatment would not appear impartial to anyone. Finally, national policy may require infantry forces to show favoritism toward one group and not toward another. Thus, while impartiality is an important and valuable police competency, it will not likely become an important infantry skill.

Military police provide a versatile capability because all of the skills are integral to their law enforcement and combat functions. Due to the law-enforcement focus, the

noncombat skills of conceptual, interpersonal, and technical skills are given greater importance and focus, without detracting from tactical combat skills.

Conclusion: Training and Competencies in Context

Finally, this study will analyze how these skills might be developed, or trained. FM 22-100, The Army Leadership Manual dated 1999, discusses some of the ways that the Army develops skills within its leaders, and these are applicable to developing the skill sets required in the future by the infantry force. In terms of development and organizational understanding, the military police provide examples of how this development might be institutionalized.

As stated earlier tactical skill involves applying warfighting doctrine within the commander's intent, professional knowledge and warfighting skill, and the ability to plan for and execute offensive, defensive, stability and support. Importantly, Army leadership doctrine adds one final note to the definition of tactical skills, "You enhance tactical skills when you combine them with interpersonal, conceptual and technical skills" (FM 22-100 1999, 2-107). Understanding that tactical skills are complimented by the other skills may provide infantry forces with the leverage to develop all of the skills, and concurrently enhance tactical skills as well. If the U.S. Army infantry force re-conceptualizes its approach to tactical skill, and incorporates conceptual, interpersonal and technical skills into its doctrine, it may increase both infantrymen's tactical skills and be better prepared for the challenges of the future battlefield.

Military police provide a concept of how conceptual skill might be incorporated into doctrine. As the major U.S. Army Military Police field manual, FM 3-19.1, states,

The MP's capabilities are further enhanced by their training, mind-set, and experience in dealing with people in highly stressful and confusing situations. Although capable of conducting combat operations when needed, the MP are highly practiced in de-escalation and in employing minimum essential force to contain potentially violent situations. This mind-set serves as the framework for MP law-enforcement training. Furthermore, this mind-set is exercised and reinforced daily in peace-time law enforcement operations. MP soldiers learn and receive constant reinforcement training in controlling a situation on the spot before it escalates and cannot be controlled. (1999, 11-7)

This passage demonstrates the need for interpersonal skills to be an integral part of military police operations. Young military police soldiers are trained to expect that their day-to-day operations will require both the tactical skill to apprehend a suspect and the interpersonal skill to de-escalate a conflict. The MP force has made noncombat skills a part of their institutional climate. This fosters development of all skills as an important part of MP functions. Infantry forces could learn a great deal from this conceptualization of their tasks, for altering the infantry approach to the various competencies to include valuing noncombat competencies would increase support for developing the required skills of the future.

Given a changed background, infantry forces would be better able to develop a full range of competencies. Army leadership doctrine identifies methods for developing competencies.

Army leaders who take their units to a combat training center (CTC) improve their skills by performing actions-by doing their jobs on the ground in the midst of intense simulated combat. But they don't wait until they arrive at the CTC to develop their skills; they practice ahead of time. (FM 22-100 1999, 2-109)

While this may not appear revolutionary, it is important, because if not focused upon in training these skills will not be developed. For example, in the cordon and search training lane discussed earlier, the lane might be developed with role-players, who are provided to

force the unit to conduct negotiations. Yet, in the after-action review (AAR), if the interpersonal skill of negotiation is not discussed, the soldiers conducting the training will not increase their capability in that skill. Thus, as infantry doctrinal approach changes to value noncombat skills, the training approach should change also.

Finally, the nature of the MP duty is developmental, and may provide insight for infantry leaders in methods to further increase capabilities. Few U.S. Army Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) actually execute their wartime missions daily operations during peacetime. Army cooks, who prepare and serve food to soldiers daily in mess halls are one example and MPs conducting traffic duty on Army posts world-wide are another. This provides a unique development opportunity for MP forces, for young MP soldiers are able to execute their operational missions and develop required competencies on a daily basis even in peacetime. So, on any given day, a sergeant is training his soldiers in MP competencies, whether technical, as in traffic ticket writing, or interpersonal as in dealing with a domestic disturbance. MP forces practice continuous training and development in their required skill set, and are able to achieve a high level of competency.

While not in an operational environment, infantry forces might approach training in the same manner, and many do. Using operations orders routinely and executing standard taskings in habitual units are methods for infantry units to achieve developmental training in noncombat skills. In effect operationalizing day-to-day activities in terms of conceptual, interpersonal, and technical skills provides a way of infantry forces to foster their development. For example, in developing training plans for an infantry unit, leaders might approach compromise on competing training programs as

a negotiation training activity, and review it in terms of interpersonal competency development.

Infantry forces can develop proficiency in noncombat skills. This change requires a re-conceptualization of how soldiers employ the various skills to achieve success in given missions. Infantry forces must alter the manner in which they approach their tasks. They must understand the value of the opening quote of this paper by former-Marine Corps Commandant Krulak for the future battlefield will require more than tactical skill to achieve victory. The future battlefield will necessitate forces that can deal with the conceptual challenges of finding the enemy. It will require interpersonal skills to deal with many cultures under stressful and possibly violent situations, and it will require absolute tactical supremacy, while employing highly technical equipment. All of these skill requirements must be assumed into the manner which infantry forces approach their mission and training. No longer can the infantry force approach conflict with the idea that their task end with “close with and destroy the enemy;” rather, the infantry supported by and in conjunction with many other U.S. Army and service units have to deal with the aftermath of conflict. They must be prepared. Once the infantry force develops the understanding that good tactics result from good conceptual, interpersonal and technical skills it will become easier for infantry forces to develop proficiency in these skills competencies. The important point is that the future environment also requires increased capacity in all of the various skill groups.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Contemporary conflict will continue to put U.S. Army forces in the forefront of “harm’s way.” As a consequence the Army must prepare its personnel to be effective warfighters--and more. The President and Congress have and will continue to mandate Army forces to be peacekeepers, humanitarian assistance provider, law and order enforcers, and who knows what else. In any case, given the diversity of missions in the complex and transparent security environment of twenty-first century conflict, American soldiers at all levels must be good soldiers. Additionally, they must also consistently and constantly display political-cultural sensitivity, considerable restraint, consummate professionalism, and iron discipline. (2002, 27-28)

Max Manwaring, *The Inescapable Global Security Arena*.

The Army has faced challenges in the past and will continue to face challenges in the future, and the Army’s success is determined by how effectively it adapts to these changes. Currently, national strategic objectives require the Army to execute both warfighting and peacekeeping missions, which is a challenge for the Army. The Army’s overarching doctrinal manual, FM 1, seeks to adapt to this requirement by integrating both warfighting and peacekeeping operations into its base mission. Dealing with both warfighting and peacekeeping missions also require transitions, and possibly the need to execute both mission simultaneously. The U.S. Army infantry, as one of the primary ground combat units of the Army must prepare for these transitions and missions. In seeking to understand how the infantry might deal with this requirement the military police provide a good example. The MP execute both warfighting combat tasks and peacekeeping mission as part of their routine function.

Using the U.S. Army leadership skill sets of conceptual, interpersonal, tactical, and technical skills this study examined how both organizations integrated these skills

into their doctrine to achieve success in both warfighting and peacekeeping functions. This resulted in a number of insights: the relative value of the skills in future operations, the relationship of the skills to each other, and the value of the precursor skills.

The Leadership Skills

The changing nature of the security environment calls for a re-conceptualization of tactics in the infantry doctrine. Infantry doctrine today is focused upon tactical skills, yet tactics is best described as combination of the other three Army leadership skill sets: conceptual, interpersonal and technical skills. Conceptual skill is used in tactics to visualize possible enemy actions and motivation and analyze terrain. Interpersonal skill is part of tactics in evaluating subordinates, understanding the effects of combat and peacekeeping upon subordinates, and in communicating conceptual ideas. Finally, tactics requires not only technical understanding in terms of systems, but also technical skill in employing the procedures and techniques for various specific missions, be they techniques of assault or prisoner search. Thus, tactics may best be described as the simultaneous application of the leadership skills to achieve a military objective.

Understanding that conceptual, interpersonal, and technical skills are prerequisites for tactical skills raises their value for the infantry. Yet, this is only a portion of the value of the leadership skills for, in the future, they will become a more important part of U.S. Army mission requirements. In describing the characteristics of future operations, FM 1 says,

While technology will be critical to achieving greater operational agility and precision lethality, the human dimension of war will also take on increase importance. The Soldier will remain the centerpiece of Army formations; and as the complexity of operations increases, well-trained and disciplined Soldiers and leaders will become more important than ever. The pervasive nature of

information means that Soldiers on point become the critical instruments of diplomacy. (2001, 36)

In the future, the operational security environment and the national strategic objectives together require soldiers who are able to conceptualize their environment and requirements correctly, understand the diplomatic and cultural implications of their actions, and apply technology and procedures correctly. Conceptual and interpersonal skills will be critical to success in future U.S. Army operations.

The Meta-Competencies

The precursor skills of self-awareness and adaptability have also been called meta-competencies (Briscoe and Hall 1999, 11), and they will be of great importance in the future. To reiterate, self-awareness is the ability to assess personal or unit capabilities, and learn to overcome the weaknesses. Adaptability is the ability to recognize change in the operating environment and adapt in order to succeed.

A final example from Kosovo will show how these skills affect the fundamental manner in which an organization executes its mission. Units must conceive of their mission correctly in order to define achievable results. In peacekeeping missions success is often difficult to define. Kosovo was no exception, and the popular conception of the conflict in Kosovo may also have been flawed.

Walking patrols through ethnically mixed neighborhoods and seeing the people daily led me to question the general reasons for the conflict in Kosovo. The professional development program of my battalion included reading books about the Balkans prior to the deployment. Most of these books argued that ethnic hatred and cultural clashes fueled the war (Kaplan 1993, 39-40). Yet, my observations led to a different understanding. The

people had more in common and most Americans. The Serbs and Albanians living in the area lived and farmed in a remarkably similar manner. Neither group appeared very religious, for the mosque and churches in the villages were both rarely visited. Of the four Albanian villages in the sector, only two played a call to prayer regularly. In conversations with both Serbs and Albanians both groups talked of friends among the opposite ethnic group. Often the only voiced issue between groups was memory of the ethnic violence perpetrated by one or the other group during the actual conflict. So, while ethnic issues may have fueled the war originally, it did not appear to be the significant factor during for the six-month rotation.

The violence continued in specific patterns, and to accomplish our mission and was to provide a safe and secure environment for all Kosovars, the unit continued to seek solutions. During the rotation, the battalion dealt with a number of specific threats. One of these was a directed effort to destroy Serbian homes. For a period of five weeks abandoned Serb homes were destroyed by bombs on Saturday evening between eight and ten o'clock. The targeted home were usually on high traffic routes or on the fringes of the Serb communities. The unit's investigation revealed that, as the Serbs moved out of the area, wealthy Albanians bought the homes. Slowly the Albanians were constricting the Serb communities and the land the Albanians secured as the Serbs moved was most often economically valuable. Yet that was not all, for some Albanians provided useful information to U.S. forces, such as likely targets for bombings. Not all Albanians were motivated by hatred. Surprisingly, within weeks bombs destroyed these Albanian informants' properties as well.

As discussed earlier, the anti-Serb forces, the Kosovo Liberation Army were connected to criminal organizations, and this was the critical link in understanding the threat actions. For, understanding that the threat forces acted to scare Serbs off of their land so that wealthy Albanians could purchase it allowed U.S. forces to identify which homes would be lucrative targets. As a result, U.S. forces were able to provide better protection for them. This also provided insight into how the threat received funding and operated.

The adaptive skill required in making this leap and developing a new understanding of the threat's motivation was key to comprehending the threat's operational methods. This had two results; first, some leaders within the unit simply could not adapt their thinking and adjust their operational methods to deal with the criminal nature of the threat. Second, it provided soldiers and leaders who could adapt an alternate and effective manner of conceptualizing threat actions. Those soldiers who could adapt were able to operate with greater effectiveness and achieve the unit's goals; providing a safer environment.

The research has identified solutions to the initial questions. The military police integrate all of the leadership skills into their doctrine and this provides insight into how all of the skills might contribute to the infantry force in the future and in how to develop greater tactical skills as well. This understanding is not revolutionary, but is an approach to nontactical skills which, until now has been neglected. The infantry force can achieve proficiency in these competencies as it reconceptualizes its approach to tactical competence.

Still, there may be more to study in terms of competencies. This paper has applied a doctrinal model of competencies to future requirements. In business competency research this might be called a strategy approach to competency requirements. This approach identifies competency requirements in terms of future requirements. There are other methods of developing competency requirements such as research-based approaches that examine competency requirements based upon historical information (Briscoe and Hall 1999, 2). Further research might apply such a system to infantry competency requirements in the future.

However, understanding competency requirements may not be enough to stimulate successful change. History provides a key lesson in unit resistance to re-conceptualizing conflict. General Abrams approach to the Vietnam War provides insight into how all of the leadership skills are required to succeed in conflict, and how he faced opposition to his ideas.

In 1968, after the North Vietnamese Tet offensive, General Creighton Abrams replaced the General William Westmoreland as commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam. Abrams' vision for winning the war was different than the "body-count" approach used previously. Abrams instead focus upon a "one war" concept. This idea was aimed at,

Identification and exploitation of the enemy's logistics nose, emphasis on security of the populace, and the territorial force improvements that provided it, effective interdiction of enemy infiltration, and development of more capable armed forces for the South Vietnamese. (Sorely 1999, 23)

This notion takes all of the leadership skills into account, for identification, exploitation and interdiction of enemy forces requires both conceptual and tactical competency.

Likewise, security of the populace, territorial force improvements, and development of

capable South Vietnamese forces involve interpersonal and technical skills. General Abrams, fighting the war thirty years ago, understood that success in that war involved more than tactical competency. In fact, it required full application of all of leadership skills.

General Abrams' holistic approach to the Vietnam War produced results on the battlefield, but the war had already been lost in American minds. Still, not all of the forces under his command adapted to his concept of the war. In the following passage, General Abrams passionately describes his frustration with subordinate commanders and their forces that, despite his "one war" concept focused upon tactical success rather than success in the full range of the leadership skill,

It's like the 173rd Airborne. They've got rigging equipment, and they've got TO&Es for air-dropping wherever in the world the United States wants to put them, and they're airborne trained and they're all 'all the way, sir' and all that kind of stuff, We don't *need* it! We don't *need* it!

Instead, Abrams insisted, what they've got to do is get out there and cream the VCI, get out there in little units muckering around at night, helping the goddamn villagers, seeing that the goddamn rice stays in the warehouse and so on, and--Christ, there isn't room for a *parachute*! The only thing you can do is use it for a picnic with the villagers or something. And, unfortunately, the 22nd Division can't see that. It isn't being a great division, going out battling with *regiments* and *battalions*, and so on! Goddamn it, the name of the game that's got to be done is this other thing!! And that's what *needs* to be done in Binh Dinh! And that's what--he banged the table--the 22d Division can't *see* that!! And that's what the Division Commander is psychologically indisposed to do! And what *everybody's* got to do, instead of talking about going off to war and *battling* with the-- Christ, they've been down there licking their chops waiting for the 3rd NVA to come back! Well. Of course if the 3rd NVA came back they'd clean their clock, but that's the day they're waiting for--when the 3rd NVA comes back! W-e-l-l, *bullshit*! The thing you can't do what you're *organized* for, you *can't* do what you're *trained* for. You've got to go out to do what has to be done right now in this country! *Everybody's* got to do it!! (Sorely 1998, 135)

The U.S. infantry must be prepared to do what needs to be done and re-conceptualize its doctrinal approach to developing tactical skill. It may achieve greater capacity for success

if it integrates all of the leadership skills into its doctrinal concepts. Finally, as the Army adapts to the future and prepares for transitions, other branches may observe how infantry forces deal with new requirements and adapt their concept of tactical skill in much the same manner.

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