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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CONTINUUM OF CAPABILITY – ARMY'S FORCE STRUCTURE TRANSFORMATION

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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CONTINUUM OF CAPABILITY - ARMY'S FORCE STRUCTURE TRANSFORMATION

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013 •

ABSTRACT

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The Army is in the midst of a "Transformation," a transformation into the Army of the future, abandoning 20th Century concepts. We are molding a military force that's capabilities based and responsive to new enemies but still maintains the ability to successfully conduct traditional war. The creativity required to do this cannot be limited to technological innovation, but must extend into areas that will expand the accessibility of the Army. This requires a force that has the ability to support a broad spectrum of requirements ranging from a myriad of contingencies and peacekeeping missions to a major theater conflict. In order to maintain relevance, Army structure and manpower must be realigned to respond to a volatile international climate.

This paper lays out the rationale for the creation of one Army that meets these requirements but does not emulate the integrated "one" Army that exists between the active component (AC), Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG). This proposal envisions one Army without components; spanning the full range of manpower availability; resourced by one appropriation; an Army that has manpower flexibility; an Army that is sustained by a single database and a homogenous personnel support system and, most importantly, an Army that is based on capabilities required to support the National Military Strategy. Examples of mobilization challenges, cost constraints, time limitations and multiple deployments that are eroding U.S. military effectiveness, will make the case for a service that is composed of soldiers who serve based on the needs of the Army and its mission requirements not restricted by boundaries that component subdivisions (COMPOS) create.

The Army's current structure and means of employment are rooted in centuries-old concepts that cannot produce a Total Force that meets the challenge of 21st Century commitments. This paper lays the framework for a fundamental change by demonstrating that the original intent of a reserve component is not applicable in current world politics; is not being observed by leadership; and under current doctrine, does not meet the needs of the National Military Strategy.

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PREFACE

On my way to the Army War College, I stopped in Arlington, Virginia, and had lunch with a business associate. During the course of the meal, we discussed "The Third Force", a concept proposed by Lieutenant General Helmley, Chief of the Army Reserve. The rationale for this "Third Force" was to provide Reserve Component manpower for a period that exceeded the traditional 14 days of annual training and the monthly weekend drills. When I left the restaurant and started driving the last leg of my trip to Carlisle, Pennsylvania, I took the Third Force idea enlarged upon it, twisted it around and developed the idea that initiated this paper. Mr. Ben McCulloch, a special thank you for planting the seed.

Rarely, do we find military institutions like the Army War College that cultivate and encourage creative and diverse thinking. To Professor Doug Johnson, a very special thanks. Not only did you provide technical expertise and moral support, you took it one step further by exposing my idea to others.

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CONTINUUM OF CAPABILITY - ARMY'S FORCE STRUCTURE TRANSFORMATION

ONE ARMY CONCEPT

The Army is in the midst of a "Transformation," a transformation into the Army of the future, abandoning 20th Century concepts. We are molding a military force that's capabilities based and responsive to new enemies but still maintains the ability to successfully conduct traditional war. The creativity required to do this cannot be limited to technological innovation, but must extend into areas that will expand the accessibility of the Army. This requires a force that has the ability to support a broad spectrum of requirements ranging from a myriad of contingencies and peacekeeping missions to a major theater conflict. In order to maintain relevance, Army structure and manpower must be realigned to respond to a volatile international climate.

This paper lays out the rationale for the creation of one Army that meets these requirements but does not emulate the integrated "one" Army that exists between the active component (AC), Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG). This proposal envisions one Army without components; spanning the full range of manpower availability; resourced by one appropriation; an Army that has manpower flexibility; an Army that is sustained by a single database and a homogenous personnel support system and, most importantly, an Army that is based on capabilities required to support the National Military Strategy. Examples of mobilization challenges, cost constraints, time limitations and multiple deployments that are "eroding U.S. military effectiveness,"¹ will make the case for a service that is composed of soldiers who serve based on the needs of the Army and its mission requirements not restricted by boundaries that component subdivisions (COMPOS) create.

The Army's current structure and means of employment are rooted in centuries-old concepts that cannot produce a Total Force that meets the challenge of 21st Century commitments. This paper lays the framework for a fundamental change by demonstrating that the original intent of a reserve component is not applicable in current world politics; is not being observed by leadership; and under current doctrine, does not meet the needs of the National Military Strategy.

BACKGROUND

Title X, U.S. Code (USC), Armed Forces, sections 10101-10107 outline the purpose and composition of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

"The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components."²

The language of the law indicates the intent of the reserve component is to augment active duty units in the time of war or national emergencies. It wasn't until the early 1970's that the purpose of the reserves took on an additional perspective. At the end of the Viet Nam conflict, General Creighton Abrams realized that President Johnson was able to sustain operations in Vietnam because the Army activated several combat service support units for the war mission. "This military action prevented an extensive call-up of the US Army Reserve and Army National Guard³...." When President Nixon made the decision to downsize the active Army, General Abrams deactivated several combat service support (CSS) units and realigned others. General Abrams' thought process followed two avenues. "The first was that the US Army Reserve and Army National Guard would receive initial training from the active Army in specialties that had civilian applications. The second was that downsizing would force the Commander-in-Chief to call up CSS."⁴ This initiated the concept that the United States Army could not go to war without the reserves. This step was taken not because of any superior capabilities that were inherently in the Reserve Component (RC), but because General Abrams felt the American public ought to have a stake in the involvement. The need to have an American commitment occurred when the majority of U.S. citizens believed that Viet Nam resulted from an overzealous Secretary of Defense who did not answer to the people. In Abrams' thinking, Americans should be intimately involved in the conflict to which they had given their sons and daughters as well as their tax dollars. It is not clear if including the reserve component in the war fight was intended to serve the American greater good or was a means of downsizing the Army to meet Presidential guidelines. General Abrams thought he was initiating a bond that gave Americans a personal involvement in defending our way of life or fighting for the rights of others to determine how they were governed. However, the idea of incorporating American public support for military operations by insuring a reserve call-up during conflicts may not have been as successful as intended. Rand studies show that 89% of the American population does not personally know anyone serving in the military. This may indicate that Abrams' attempt to create a link between the people and the military may have been a failure or may have been based upon faulty assumptions.

Today we find the Army's key strategic force structure is imbedded in the reserves – force structure that plays primary roles in any contingency or conflict. The Army Reserve is 18% of the Army and 100% of the Army's training divisions, prisoner of war brigades and railroad units. The USAR force structure makes up 97% of the Army's civil affairs units, 67% of the medical brigades, 70% of the hospitals and 44% of all logistical support.⁵ Abrams' intent in placing CSS in the reserves was to create a dependency that occurred usually during war or national emergency – and not as a means of meeting daily mission requirements. Today, members of the Reserve Component are serving alongside their active duty counterparts, supporting both contingencies and routine military operations. "Active forces can maintain high operational levels for limited periods, but they cannot sustain them indefinitely, unless they are augmented by Reserve Component support."

Reserve Component soldiers performed 35,000 man-years of work in Fiscal Year 1999, double the support provided in 1994. That was the forth-consecutive year the Reserve Component provided that level of support.⁷ Now Reserve Component force structure is being used over and over again to the point where unit capabilities are being strained.

Unprecedented Guard and Reserve deployments over the last decade - and no let up in sight - are worrying civilian employers concerned about the impact of that situation on their workplaces, according to a recent Defense Department study. Reserve-component deployments have increased 1,300 percent since the Berlin Wall collapsed in 1989. "The old Cold War commitment for reservists, which called for duty on one weekend a month and two weeks each summer, is largely a thing of the past," Charles L. Cragin, principal deputy assistant secretary for reserve affairs, said recently. "Many of today's Guard and Reserve personnel are often serving far in excess of this."⁸

The Army has become reliant on force structure that is intended to "provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require...."⁹ Congress (and General Abrams) did not intend to augment the Army's daily operational requirements by using the RC as a manpower source provider. Current operational necessities have been interpreted as falling within "such other times as the national security may require..." a condition not envisioned by the framers of the law.

RESERVE COMPONENT ISSUES

The RC has always had mobilization challenges and current deployment conditions have changed radically since the end of the cold war. I was involved in the RC mobilization process for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom (ONE-OEF). I witnessed the difficulty in

accessing the RC at combatant command level. The time constraints and the mobilization system's lack of responsiveness to "exceptions to the rule" created inefficiencies. Desert Storm initiated the concept of identifying individuals for mobilization as opposed to units. This made it necessary to create derivative Unit Identification Codes (UIC's) and then issuing orders for the new (derivative) unit. This practice has been continued during OEF/ONE. There were occasions when the appropriate chain of command was not correctly identified. Special Operations Forces (SOF) that were aligned to Army Reserve Elements (ARE's) were initially identified as subordinate to United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), when in fact they are Troop Program Unit (TPU) force structure subordinate to the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC). This misidentification delayed mobilization of key individuals assigned to combatant commanders while the Department of the Army (DA), USARC, Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM), and Forces Command argued over who was ultimately responsible for executing the unit mobilization order.

Validation of war fighting requirements is done by Theater Combatant Commanders and services identify units in support of those requirements. Department of the Army - Operations, Deployment and Mobilization (DAMO-ODM) took the posture that they had the responsibility for requirement validation in addition to identifying supporting units or individuals. This conflict in basic functions resulted in arguments between U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the Department of the Army (DA) and produced obstacles in the mobilization process. Six months through the first year's mobilization, DAMO-ODM sent out a tasker to combatant commanders requesting justification of short and long term mission requirements. CENTCOM felt that it was the role of the theater combatant commander to determine and validate requirements and not provide justification to the services. All this added to the CENTCOM's frustration with the mobilization system.

This leads to another issue – by law, partial mobilization is for 24 months, and while only under full mobilization does a reserve component soldier serve the duration of the war plus 6 months¹. What happens after a soldier serves 24 months of a partial mobilization? What trained and ready individual steps into the vacancy created after the completion of 24 months? Is there a vacancy to step into? Implications are that after a soldier has completed his mobilization requirements he must vacate the billet to allow a second soldier to occupy that billet to be subsequently mobilized. Does this mean the first soldier must move out of the selected reserves and into the ready reserves since he is no longer a mobilization asset? In the case of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA's) there is no one waiting in the wings. The Joint Training Manning Document (JTMD) does not allow for "double slotting". Who continues the

battle? Will we limit all conflicts to 2 years duration so that the trained reservist can be utilized? The RC is less flexible and has downsized almost 25% since Desert Storm. "Some of the RC logistical support that deployed during the Gulf War was in the form of lower-level units, e.g., sections, platoons, and companies. These were attached to higher-level AC units, which provided the necessary command and control. Since much of the capability has migrated to the RC, those units will have to provide the command and control."¹⁰

War plans call for RC to supplement active structure. Now, well over 100,000 combat support and combat service support reservists are required to be in place by the 75th day of a major conflict.¹¹

Theater commanders require an easily accessible force that can rapidly respond to global missions without excessive restrictions or costs.¹² RC mobilization does not respond to these parameters. Mobilization is a time consuming process and creates impediments that in turn create many limitations time sensitivity being among the worst.

OLD AND NEW TRENDS

The recently released National Military Strategy (NMS), 2002, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) both cite a "paradigm shift in force planning."¹³ This force-sizing construct shapes forces to:

- Defend the United States;
- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts;

Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.

Although the 2002 NMS varies somewhat in the verbiage from the 1997 NMS, two basic premises were retained that lend themselves to discussion: (1) Capabilities vs. threat based force and (2) overlapping major conflicts vs. two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. These discussions will no doubt be heated and emotional as leadership decides the force structure that will support these concepts. The subsequent Total Army Analysis (TAA) has the potential to develop a new and innovative force. The transformed Army will have to be more optimally structured and more efficiently employed than is the case today.

The Army's active strength is 480,000 (46.4% of the total force). Of this, the Army considers 293,000 (61%) available for deployment. Others are assigned as follows:

Special Operations

12,500*

TTHS (schools, transit, medical, etc.)	63,000
Institutional Army (Joint, DOD, recruiting, etc.)	<u>111,500</u>
	187,000 (39%)

*Arguably the SOF community is deployable on any give day, however, its deployment does not come under Army's jurisdiction.

"On any given day in 2002, the Army has about 140,000 soldiers deployed in operations, exercises or forward stationed in over 120 countries. The Army reports deployments are up 300% from the early 1990's with a 30% cut in end strength. For the Army to meet all of its requirements, it has had to call on the ARNG and USAR forces at unprecedented numbers. It is not surprising that a December 2000 U.S. General Accounting Office study concluded that the Army lacked about 26,000 soldiers for its requirements."¹⁴

Partly in response to this shortfall in Active component soldiers, the role of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard will have to expand further to support the 2002 NMS. As of 31 December 2002, 29,927 Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers were mobilized in support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.¹⁵ In addition, "the Army is alerting about 26,000 National Guard and Reserve troops to prepare for duty, largely in the Persian Gulf region"¹⁶. In calendar year 2002, an additional 10,896 Army Guard or Reserve soldiers were providing airport and critical facility security, while in January 2003, "some 8,000 to 10,000 Army National Guard and Reserve members are expected to be mobilized, mainly to help fill a shortage of security personnel at Air Force bases in the United States."¹⁷

Once again, this brings us to the mission of the reserves. The Army has become too reliant on a force whose role is to "provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require."¹⁸ Increased use of the reserves may be beneficial in our current environment, but is contrary to Congressional intent.

A NEW APPROACH

Force structure must be more flexible and match the spectrum of time commitments and manpower availability. This proposal envisions the creation of a force that is responsive to the Army's mission by providing a more viable and ready force (read as capabilities based).

This new force would be a force without built in redundancies. I propose a force with one supporting infrastructure; one appropriation; one personnel system; and one set of rules, regulations and procedures – not three as is currently in effect.

In order to start down this path, we need to rid ourselves of all current or perceived constraints on force structure thinking. The new Army will no longer pre-ordain units as active component, USAR or ARNG – it will not think in terms of compos. It will no longer equate combat service support (CSS) or civil affairs units to the reserves. It will not think of Special Forces residing in the AC or ARNG. All force structure will be without an affiliation to a component or compo. In this new Army all units are created equal – just the way the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) starts its force structure analysis.

"The Total Army Analysis (TAA) process is a phased force structure analysis process. It examines the projected Army force from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. The product of the TAA is the Army's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force. The TAA serves as the bridge between OSD/JS guidance and the Army's planning and program building process, balancing the Army's force structure requirements against available and planned resources."¹⁹

TAA consists of four phases: (1) force guidance, (2) quantitative analysis, (3) qualitative analysis, and (4) leadership review and POM development. It is not until the end of phase four, after the force has been scrutinized, reviewed, and approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army that the force documentation process begins. For resourcing purposes, the POM force is then apportioned among four components (active – compo 1, National Guard – compo 2, reserve – compo 3 and unresourced – compo 4). In this proposal, the apportionment step is eliminated.

There is no distribution among components. So what is the next step if there is no designation a unit to a component? In its place there will be a prioritized ranking of all units.

As in the past, resources will be constrained and will never make it possible to resource the total force., It will continue to be necessary to prioritize units so constrained resources can be applied based on the Army's needs.

In order to develop a prioritized list (1-n), the total force (MTOE and TDA) is inspected and prioritizing criteria applied. This ranking must be determined by applying equitable, consistent, non-prejudicial criteria, applicable to all force structure (Figure 1). The company should be used as the smallest denominator in ranking. Using organizations above company level will not provide the degree of accuracy necessary to provide recruiting and enlistment data that will be needed in subsequent steps.

Some recommendations for prioritizing criteria are: OPTEMPO:

Current, projected, historical and doctrinal employment. Unit associations, support relationships, reoccurring operational requirements.

Mission Priority:

Time Phased Force Deployment (TPFD)

Operational/support mission requirement

Deployment:

Frequency of rotational requirements

Strategic Reserve

Units initially uncommitted

Daily Operational Requirements for Combatant Commanders:

Routine requirements

Readiness Factors:

Unit training time required to maintain a C3 readiness level.

Recruiting/Retention

Capabilities Resourcing

Capability Factors	High	Med	Low
ОРТЕМРО			
Deployment Historical Current Projected			
Daily Operational Requirements of Comb. Cmdrs			
Unit Readiness Training			
Soldier Training Investment			
Unit Status Report (USR)			

FIGURE 1. CAPABILITIES RESOURCING MASTER

Criteria are applied universally and a final 1-n list is created.

The following example is meant to show the procedure and does not represent actual unit data.

For example, take 5 companies, one each: civil affairs, military police, graves registration, bakery, and signal. The first step is to complete a Capabilities Resourcing Matrix (a new term for the Army's lexicon) for each unit (see Figure 1).

CA Co Capability Factors	High	Med	Low
ОРТЕМРО	X	2	3
Deployment			
Histor <u>ical</u>	X		
Current	X		
Projected	X		
Daily Operational Requirements of Comb. Cmdrs	X	,	
Unit Readiness Training	X		
Soldier Training Investment	X	,,,,,,,,	
Unit Status Report (USR)		X	
	C1-2	C3	C4-Below

FIGURE 2. CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPABILITIES

MP Co Capability Factors	High	Med	Low
OPTEMPO	X	2	3
Deployment			· · · ·
Histor <u>ical</u> Current	X		
Projected	X	· · · ·	
Daily Operational Requirements of Comb. Cmdrs	X		
Unit Readiness Training			X
Soldier Training Investment			X
Unit Status Report (USR)	C1-2	X C3	C4-Below

FIGURE 3. MP CAPABILITIES

Graves Reg Co Capability Factors	Low		
OPTEMPO			X
Deployment			
Historical			X
Current			X
Projected			X
Daily Operational Requirements of Comb. Cmdrs			X
Unit Readiness Training			X
Soldier Training Investment			X
Unit Status Report (USR)	C1-2	X C3	C4-Below

FIGURE 4. GRAVES REGISTRATION CAPABILITIES

Bakery Co Capability Factors	High 1	Med	Low 3
ОРТЕМРО			X
Deployment Histor <u>ical</u>			X
Current Projected		x	X
Daily Operational Requirements of Comb. Cmdrs			X
Unit Readiness Training		x	
Soldier Training Investment		X	
Unit Status Report (USR)	C1-2	X C3	C4-Below

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FIGURE 5. BAKERY CAPABILITIES

Signal Co Capability Factors	High	Med	Low
OPTEMPO		х	
Deployment			
Historical	X		
Current		Х	
Projected		Х	
Daily Operational Requirements of Comb. Cmdrs			Х
Unit Readiness Training	X		· · · · · ·
Soldier Training Investment	X		
Unit Status Report (USR)		<u> </u>	
1 (7	C1-2	Ċ3	C4-Below

FIGURE 6. SIGNAL CAPABILITIES

The CA Company's computations are as follows:

7 "X's" in the High column (7 x 1 = 7)	7	
1 "X" in the Low column (1 \times 3 = 3)	<u>3</u>	
		Total 10
The MP Company's computations are as follows:		
5 "X's" in the High column (5 x 1 = 5)5		
1 "X" in Med column (1 x 2 = 2)	2	
2 "X's" in Low column (2 x 3 = 6)	<u>6</u>	
		Total 13
The Graves Registration Company's computations are as	follows	:
1 "X" in the Med column (1 x 2 = 2)	2	
7 "X's" in the Low column (7 x 3 = 21)	<u>21</u>	
		Total 23
The Bakery Company's computations are as follows:		
4 "X's" in the Med column (4 x 2 = 8)	8	
4 "X's" in the Low column (4 x 3 = 12)	<u>12</u>	
		Total 20
The Signal Company's computations are as follows:		
3 "X's" in the High column $(3 \times 1 = 3)$	3	
4 "X's" in the Med column $(4 \times 2 = 8)$	8	
1 "X" in the Low column $(1 \times 3 = 3)$	<u>3</u>	
		Total 14

The five units are then ranked from 1-n (a lower score identifies a higher priority)

- 1- CA Co
- 2- MP Co
- 3- Signal Co
- 4- Bakery Co
- 5- Graves Registration

The next step is to segregate structure into yearly training time (measured in days).

Not all units require 365 days of training to remain at C3; not all units have an OPTEMPO requirement that necessitates 365 days of duty; not all units have daily operational requirements in support of combatant commanders. Units can be categorized into training blocks (Figure 7). This paper uses blocks of 365, 270, 175, 90, 39 and 15 days. (These are

based on personal experience; follow on studies may indicate more appropriate time groupings.)

Based on previously cited criteria, some units are identified as needing 365 days of yearly training. This could be because of unique specialties or deployment factors indicating a higher demand. Special Operations Forces (which include civil affairs) and military police companies have high OPTEMPO and easily fall within the 365 day window. Other units have less OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO and a shorter yearly training requirement. A personnel services company may only have a yearly training requirement of 175 days because of limited daily operational requirements or readiness factors. A heavy transport company may be able to retain a C3 rating and meet its mission requirements with 90 days of yearly training.

Using our previously cited examples (CA, MP, Graves Registration, Bakery and Signal Companies), we can determine their Yearly Training Requirement.

The CA Company has a high OPTEMPO, an extensive deployment requirement, and in order to maintain readiness - unit level and soldier training requirements are extensive. This indicates a 365-day category is appropriate for the CA unit.

Only the MP Company has a daily operational requirement for a combatant commander. This automatically places the unit in a 365-day category.

The Signal Company is more challenging to rank. It has a high requirement for time invested in unit and soldier training, and is projected for moderate deployment. This unit could be identified for 175 or 90 days of yearly training, depending on the uniqueness of the unit.

The Bakery Company falls equally between the Medium and Low categories on the Capability Factors Matrix, indicating low deployment (translate as use) but a moderate training requirement. A recommendation for 90 or 39 days of yearly training is most appropriate for this unit.

On the other end of the spectrum, is the Graves Registration Company. Most of the Capability Factors are in the low range indicating a lesser annual requirement. A recommendation of 39 or 15 day Yearly Training Requirement would be presented.

		V	J = /			
Unit*	365	270	175	90	39	15
Signal Co			x			
MP Co	X					
Graves Reg Co					x	
Baking Co				х		
CA Co	X					

Yearly Training Requirement

(In days)

*These are hypothetical examples - not based on actual analysis

FIGURE 7-YEARLY TRAINING REQUIREMENT

It would be expected that extensively deployed and uniquely skilled units such as intelligence, security, law enforcement, and communications (information management) would be on one end of the spectrum, while some transportation, baking and graves registration units would be on the opposite end. Historical data, a unit's deployment data and USR ratings should be used to assist in determining the yearly training requirement. The length of training time a unit requires for maintaining C3 readiness has the possibility of intensive and animated debate. Other variables that are applicable across all structure can be added to better define the ranking (i.e. recruiting, retention, and equipment issues to name a few). Some unit's historical OPTEMPO, deployment timeline and readiness factors indicate 365 days of operational support while other units have a training requirement that could be met with 270, 175, 90, or as little as 15 training days to support the NMS. The examples provided are focused on units – the basic output of the TAA process. This approach is appropriate for arraying capabilities as well. The matrix is flexible and responsive to a changing environment.

DETERMINING UNIT MAKEUP

Once a unit's ranking is ascertained and the yearly training time requirement determined, we approach the issue of manning the force. Using the Yearly Training Requirement Matrix, it was determined if a unit has a yearly training requirement of 365, 270, 160, 90, 39 or 15 days.

The MTOE/TDA of each unit is then analyzed for major operational specialties (MOS's). For example, MOS sorts the force structure that falls within the 365-day category. In the case of our example, the MTOE for our MP and CA units are reviewed. MOS – type and quantity of each, identifies the personnel positions. In our example, we would determine the number of 38A officer positions and the numbers of 38 series enlisted positions that are available in our CA unit. All other MOS's within that CA Company would also be identified and quantity determined (i.e. the number of administrative assistants [71L], supply specialists [92Y], drivers [88M], etc). This procedure is done for each unit on the 1-n list in each time category.

APPLYING MANPOWER

Now the challenge is to fill the unit.

When a soldier enlists, the annual number of days the soldier is available for duty is determined based on the enlistee's preference. A soldier can enlist for any one of the major time blocks on the Yearly Training Requirement Matrix (i.e. 365, 270, 160, 90, 39 or 15 days). However, the number of days a soldier commits to dictates the type of unit and MOS the soldier may enlist for.

A soldier who is willing to commit to 365 days a year will have the opportunity to engage in an enlistment contract in a MOS that falls within the 365 day category. In our example, the soldier may enlist in MP or CA Company. A soldier who selects a yearly availability of 90 days will have the opportunity to enlist in a career field that falls within 90-day parameters. This means the soldier could not be an MP or CA soldier, but could opt for a Bakery Company.

Enlistments will continue to follow guidance provided in AR 601-210 and 10 USC 651(a). Applicants enlisting in the RA incur an 8-year statutory requirement. Officers entering military service must complete a total of 8 years military service obligation (10 USC 651); warrant officers incur a 6-year active duty service obligation (AR 350-100). The limitations to MOS or branch are determined by the yearly training requirement. An additional example is for an officer wishing to pursue a signal career (25 series) but who is only willing to commit to 90 days of annual active duty. The Capabilities Resource Matrix determined that signal units require 175 days of yearly training. This soldier's commitment to 90 days falls short of the 175day requirement; therefore a career in signal is not an option. However, the soldier can reconsider his time commitment and increase it to 175 days, or reconsider a career opportunity based on specialties that fall within the 90-day parameter.

If, at a later time, the soldier is able to increase his annual service obligation to 365 days, and is willing to commit to a longer service commitment, he may be retrained in a career

field that falls within the 365-day category (provided a unit vacancy exists). The opposite is also true. A soldier that determines that 175 days is more than he wants to serve at the time (and all contractual obligations are met), he may cross over to another time category – again – as long as a vacancy exists and the soldier is willing to commit to any additional contractual requirements resulting from the move.

The possibility exists that a specialty is initially determined to fall within one time category and because of emerging requirements; it subsequently becomes in higher demand. The unit can be moved along the Yearly Training Matrix, and volunteers can be solicited to increase their commitment on a temporary or permanent basis. The Matrix is capabilities based and therefore is flexible and responsive to the needs of the Army.

This program allows the Army to be responsive to the needs of its soldiers, and soldiers satisfy the needs of the Army.

COSTS

There is a potential cost to institute this program. There are some major expenses looming on the horizon. There is a cost to realigning equipment and moving a unit's geographical location. There is a cost of travel and per diem for soldiers serving annual periods less than 140 days. However, there are areas to garner savings. A unit's location is no longer dependent on demographics. Soldiers can be brought from any location (including OCONUS) to serve their annual enlistment obligation at a military facility making it is possible to locate all units on existing military installations.

The savings from eliminating three supporting infrastructures is a positive result of this initiative. There is one personnel system, one pay system, one set of regulations, and best of all – one appropriation.

The Army could now realign resources to meet fluid requirements during a budget year. The ability to meet manpower requirements by having all personnel funded by Military Personnel, Army (MPA) – a single appropriation instead of three – makes the military pay system responsive instead of cumbersome.

There are subsequent ramifications to the Army POM process. There is no need to fund additional military pay to support reserve component schools or special programs within the Army's Training Program Evaluation Group (PEG). The need for special dollars is eliminated because the manpower necessary to support all missions is funded through MPA. Schools no longer require separate funding lines to support reserve component unique requirements. It would be feasible to limit the POM process to acquisition, research and development programs.

(That's a discussion that will have to be addressed in another Strategic Research Project – certainly not this one!) This program eliminates the requirement for Presidential Reserve Call-Up (PRC) and Partial Mobilization.

This force structure was aligned based on the Capabilities Requirements Matrix, and subsequently daily and contingency operational requirements were resourced. Requesting individual volunteers to enlist for time blocks less than 365 days fulfills unique manpower capabilities.

The requirement for full mobilization remains. In the case of national emergency, Congress can call up all forces. Once the state of national emergency exists, Congress can extend full mobilization by activating the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Retired Reserve to organize additional units beyond the currently approved force structure.

This proposal provides the ability to align force structure based on needs, capabilities and requirements. The Army's current force structure alignment is not responsive in supporting global missions. Not all force structure currently aligned with the active component is needed on a daily basis, while some structure that resides in the reserves is repeatedly called upon to meet daily missions. This program corrects that misalignment.

THE LAW

Title X, U.S. Code (USC), Armed Forces, sections 10101-10107 specifically outlines the purpose, composition of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency. The need for a reserve component is identified in law – and it is recognized that this program eliminates that need. This paper has demonstrated that the original intent of a reserve is not applicable in current world politics; not being observed by leadership; and under current doctrine, does not meet the needs of the National Military Strategy.

Either essential war fighting force structure should be reclaimed from the reserve component and incorporated back into the active component (at a huge cost) or structure should be realigned based on a capabilities matrix. Reorganizing to an all active force does not negate the purpose of reserve forces, it provides realignment. The reserve component is incorporated into a total force concept. The consequence of that act serves the country but subsequently requires a change in law.

This proposal does not eliminate the National Guard; however, it does require redirection of their mission. The National Guard becomes an instrument of the states in their Homeland Defense infrastructure and is organized to support a state (versus national) mission. Force

structure that is aligned to support a combat mission is not as beneficial to a state as combat service support. Water purification units provide greater benefit during an emergency than infantry divisions. This is already a topic of discussion and is not a new initiative.

This proposal should not change the total Army end strength: the existing active and Reserve Component would be merged into one Army of equal size, but now arrayed across the spectrum of manpower availability. Title X (USC), sec 115, gives the Secretary of Defense a role in determining end strength - "upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is in the national interest, the Secretary may increase the end strength authorized." (The section continues with the specific circumstances under which end strength may increase and by what percentage.) During the programming years (POM), the SecDef has the authority to determine end strength. It is only during the budget year that service personnel end strength is a Congressional responsibility as outlined in Title X, (USC), and numbers are authorized by Congress.

CONCLUSION

Retired General Gordon R. Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff from 1991-95, testified about the state of the U.S. military before the House National Security Committee, "We knew the world would be chaotic, we understood that, but we did not understand the enduring nature of it, that it would just go on and on and on, and that we would have so much going on simultaneously. I think what this political body here must understand is that no one in America predicted that."²⁰ This was testimony on October 7th, 1998 – almost 3 years before September 11th and our subsequent involvement in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and potentially, Iraq.

The world continues to be a chaotic, hectic, unpredictable and in constant turmoil and America responds to the challenges by calling its Army to task. No one foresaw that the Army's challenges would exceed active component capabilities, necessitating the nearly continuous deployment of Reserve Component forces to fulfill world requirements. The Army's current force structure alignment has lost its application and does not support the current political climate.

On November 1st, 2002, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfield wrote in a memo to Dov Zakheim and Steve Cambone (OSD-Comptroller), "Today we had a briefing on reserves and active duty personnel. It is very clear that there are some distinctive tasks only found in the reserves that are not found on active duty, which means if you want to do those things you have to activate reservists. That seems to me to be unwise."²¹ The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, current and former Army Chiefs of Staff have called for the Army to mold

and transform in order to maintain relevancy. They have cited instances of over extension of the active component and the inability of the current force structure to maintain demanding operational levels. The military's leadership continues to express their opinions and warnings with regard to the continued deployment and use of Reserve Component soldiers, yet no one has altered the force structure to realize a change in RC PERSTEMPO.

I am not recommending an incremental change, but an evolutionary transformation. Creating a single component that is resourced incrementally based on unit readiness, force requirements and mission capabilities is not an easy concept to accept. The military is steeped in tradition and is prone to resist change – and this is a substantial change. But, if the Army opts not to change, the alternative is potential misuse and eventual breakdown of strategic capabilities.

This paper is only meant to provide a broad bush stroke and not intended to answer all the issues this proposal will no doubt create. Training and equipping the force as well as personnel demographics are all areas of exploration. Cost savings and process efficiencies are offshoot studies that need investigation. The limitations of this paper (and my experience) do not allow for in-depth answers to all the questions this proposition generates - but that should encourage follow on examination.

"We are, after all, standing on the threshold of a new millennium. America's Army must change profoundly, not only to address the effects of post-Cold War downsizing but also to meet the unpredictable and unprecedented challenges of this new age."²²

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ENDNOTES

¹Gerry J. Gilmore, " Under funding, multiple deployments could 'break the force,' Sullivan says," <u>Army News Service</u>, 9 October 1998.

²<u>Armed Services</u>. <u>U.S. Code</u>, vol. 10, sec 10102 (1994).

³ "The first Army Reserve units were ordered to active duty in 1968. There was no largescale call-up for Vietnam; however, as President Johnson favored a minor role for the Army Reserve and other reserve forces. Ultimately, some 5,900 USAR soldiers comprising 42 units were ordered to active duty, and 3,500 soldiers in 35 units went overseas." Webmaster, Office of the Chief Army Reserve. "United States Army Reserve – History," Army Reserve Online September 2002. Available from < <u>http://www.army.mil/usar/index.htm</u>>; Internet; accessed 12 September 2002.

⁴John Pike, "U.S. Army Reserve – History," <u>Global Security.org</u> December 2002;available from < <u>http://198.65.138.161/military/agency/army/usar-history</u>>; Internet; accessed 12 September 2002.

⁵ Thomas J. Plewes, "Army Reserve Transition to War Briefing to Nominative CSM Conference," briefing slides, Fort McPherson, U.S. Army Reserve Command, 8 Jan 2002.

⁶Office of the Secretary of Defense. <u>Fiscal Year 1999 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy</u> <u>Board, Reserve Component Programs.</u> (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2000), .

⁷lbid.

⁸ http://www.aerotechnews.com/starc/2002/101000/Guard_Reserve.html

⁹<u>Armed Services.</u> <u>U.S. Code.</u> vol. 10, sec 10102 (1994).

¹⁰John Halliday, David Oaks, and Jerry Sollinger. <u>Breaking the Mold – A New Paradigm for</u> the Reserve Components, Issue Paper, Rand Corporation, n.d.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹²During ONE/OEF, the Secretary of Defense gave the service secretaries the option of providing travel and per diem in addition to base pay and allowances to mobilized soldiers. Mobilized RC soldiers are encumbered with the expense of maintaining their home of record in addition to the cost of living at the mobilization site. All service secretaries opted to pay the travel and per diem costs as a gesture to alleviate the cost burden realized by mobilized soldiers. This is not in keeping with the Joint Travel Regulation¹ and resulted in a \$5 billion dollar non-programmed bill to the Army¹. The \$5 B dollars were not recouped through the Congressional Supplemental process and required the Army to realign dollars from resource challenged programs to pay the cost.

¹³Donald Rumsfeld, <u>National Military Strategy</u>, <u>Pre-Decisional Draft 9/19/02 (</u>Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 2001), 17.

¹⁴ "Peacekeeping Saps Military", <u>NewsMax.com Wires</u>, 18 January 2002.

¹⁵"National Guard and Reserve Mobilized as of December 31, 2002," 2 January 2003; available from <u>http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2002/d20021231ngr.pdf;</u> Internet: accessed 2 January 2003.

¹⁶effrey Gettleman, "Duty Calls, and Citizens Become Soldiers," <u>New York Times</u>, 29 December 2002, sec. 1A, p.16.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸<u>Armed Services</u>. <u>U.S. Code</u>, vol. 10, sec 10102 (1994).

¹⁹Department of the Army. <u>Total Army Analysis</u>. Army Regulation 71-11. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 29 December 1995), 1.

²⁰Gerry J. Gilmore, "Under-funding, multiple deployments could 'break the force,' Sullivan says." <u>Army News Service</u>, 9 October 1998.

²¹ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "Role of Reserve Components," memorandum for Comptroller of the Office of Secretary of Defense. Washington, D.C., 1 September 2002.

²² David McCormick, <u>The Downsized Warrior: America's Army in Transition (New York, NY:</u> New York University Press, 1998).

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