# U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES OFFICER ADVANCED EDUCATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE General Studies

by

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# MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

### ABSTRACT

# U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES ADVANCED EDUCATION, by LTC Mark Beattie, 75 pages.

TRADOC is redesigning its commissioned officer Intermediate Level Education (ILE) program to allow every active duty Army major to attend a resident CGSOC. The redesign changes the curriculum focus from terminal and enabling learning objectives to a competency-based learning approach based on the requirements of an officer's specific career field, branch, or functional area. FM 22-100 was selected as the basis for developing a framework of seven competencies that identify supporting skills and behaviors. The seven competencies consist of what Army officers must know and do to be successful. While these competencies are critical for all Army officers, alone they are inadequate for the advanced intermediate education needs of Special Forces (SF) officers. The thesis reviews the history of SF and SOF education to determine impacts on current CGSC SOF education. The SF competencies contained in FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, were selected as the doctrinal basis for identifying what an SF officer should know and do, proposing they be used to shape SF advanced ILE imbedded in ILE AOWC. The thesis reviews Army SOF 2010, U.S. Army Special Operations Command Strategic Planning Guidance, Army SOF Objective Force Concept (draft), and a SF Advanced Studies Program (draft) developed by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School to identify what SF is required to know and do now, and in the future. Further, the thesis compares the SF competencies to joint SOF learning areas prepared by USSOCOM to further define supporting learning areas that may be used to design SF ILE.

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# ACRONYMS

| AAP  | Advanced Application Program  |
|--|---|
| ARSOF  | Army Special Operations Forces  |
| AOC  | Areas of Concentration  |
| AOWC   | Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course  |
| AY   | Academic Year   |
| CAC  | Combined Arms Center  |
| CGSC   | Command and General Staff College   |
| CGSOC  | Command and General Staff Officers Course   |
| DA   | Department of the Army  |
| DJCO   | Department of Joint and Combined Operations   |
| DOD  | Department of Defense   |
| DOTMLPF  | Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and   |
|  | Education, Personnel, and Facilities  |
| FA   |   |
|  | Education, Personnel, and Facilities  |
| FA   | Education, Personnel, and Facilities<br>Functional Area   |
| FA<br>FM   | Education, Personnel, and Facilities<br>Functional Area<br>Field Manual   |
| FA<br>FM<br>ILE                                      | Education, Personnel, and Facilities<br>Functional Area<br>Field Manual<br>Intermediate Level Education   |
| FA<br>FM<br>ILE<br>JCS                               | Education, Personnel, and Facilities<br>Functional Area<br>Field Manual<br>Intermediate Level Education<br>Joint Chiefs of Staff  |
| FA<br>FM<br>ILE<br>JCS<br>JFK SWC&S                  | Education, Personnel, and Facilities<br>Functional Area<br>Field Manual<br>Intermediate Level Education<br>Joint Chiefs of Staff<br>U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Warfare Center and School   |
| FA<br>FM<br>ILE<br>JCS<br>JFK SWC&S<br>JSOFI         | Education, Personnel, and Facilities<br>Functional Area<br>Field Manual<br>Intermediate Level Education<br>Joint Chiefs of Staff<br>U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Warfare Center and School<br>Joint Special Operations Forces Institute  |
| FA<br>FM<br>ILE<br>JCS<br>JFK SWC&S<br>JSOFI<br>JSOU | Education, Personnel, and Facilities<br>Functional Area<br>Field Manual<br>Intermediate Level Education<br>Joint Chiefs of Staff<br>U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Warfare Center and School<br>Joint Special Operations Forces Institute<br>Joint Special Operations University |

| PERSCOM | Personnel Command                             |
|---------|---|
| PME     | Professional Military Education               |
| PSYOP   | Psychological Operations                      |
| SAIC    | Science Application International Corporation |
| SF      | Special Forces                                |
| SFODA   | SF Operational Detachment-A                   |
| SFQC    | SF Qualification Course                       |
| SOF     | Special Operations Forces                     |
| SOLE    | Special Operations Liaison Element            |
| TRADOC  | U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command       |
| TDA     | Table of Distribution and Allowances          |
| USSOCOM | U.S. Special Operations Command               |
| USASOC  | U.S. Army Special Operations Command          |
| UO      | Unconventional Operations                     |
| UW      | Unconventional Warfare                        |

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### CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

We must train for certainty but educate for uncertainty. (USSOCOM 1999, 2)

General Peter J. Schoomaker

The purpose of writing this thesis is twofold: first, to identify the competencies and critical learning areas that can support educating midcareer Special Forces (SF) officers; and second, to generate broader support for the advanced education of U.S. Army SF officers and special operations officers throughout the Special Operations community. I am qualified to write on this topic, having spent the past six years as an instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Much of this time has been dedicated to the establishment of focused special operations curriculum designed to prepare SF officers for duties beyond the Operational Detachment-A or "A-Team." While this study will focus only on the SF officer, the thesis findings will contribute to the overall special operations curriculum intended for all members of the special operations community, operators, and support personnel alike.

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 includes an introduction, significance of the study, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations. Chapter 2 is a historical overview of special operations education throughout the special operations community. Chapter 3 reviews the literature and discusses research methodology. Chapter 4 analyzes key documents identified during the literature review and evaluates data taken from two analytical models developed to help answer the thesis questions. Finally, chapter 5 outlines the findings and recommendations.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), through the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is redesigning its commissioned officer Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) program to allow every active duty Army major the opportunity to attend a resident Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC). In May 1997, the Science Application International Corporation completed an assessment of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and Senior College education to support the Officer Personnel Management System XXI task force review of officer professional development. The study objectives were to review existing Army military education level-1 and Military Education Level-4 education and alternatives and to assess current and projected needs for education at these levels. One of the recommendations was to send all Officer-Personnel-Management-Division-managed officers to obtain a CGSC education as soon as possible after selection for promotion to major. The chief of staff of the Army, through TRADOC, tasked the CAC commander to develop a concept for all active component category officers to receive a common field grade education. The universal Military Education Level-4 study group, under the direction of the CGSC deputy commandant, developed an ILE concept for all field grade officers (CGSC web page, 17 September 2002). TRACOC contracted with Cubic Defense Applications Group (Cubic) to prepare a study for the redesign (Richard F. Keller, letter to CGSC, 30 March 2001). Under the redesign, TRADOC will establish outlying campuses similar to CGSC, where noncombat arms and select functional area (FA) designated officers will attend a resident CGSOC. Combat arms (including SF) and combat service support Army officers, sister service

officers, and international officers will continue to attend CGSOC at Fort Leavenworth (LTC Steve Meddaugh, interview, 3 March 2002).

Under ILE, CGSOC consists of three instructional terms. During Term I, all officers are presented with the same "core instruction" to provide a common educational background (see figure 1).



The ILE concept provides for a common core course acceptable to and standardized across all career fields and FAs. The focus of the common core establishes a common Army operational war-fighting culture that prepares all field grade officers for service in division, corps, echelons above corps, and joint staffs (CGSC web page, 17 September 2002). Terms II and III of ILE are called the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC) and consist of a 264-hour common focused war-fighting program of instruction and 216 hours of either branch command or staff instruction or a specialtyfocused program. SF officers are assigned to a specialized Special Operations Forces (SOF) track to accommodate their unique blend of joint and interagency advanced warfighting needs (LTC Steve Meddaugh, interview, 3 March 2002). See figure 2 for the AOWC curriculum design approved by the CAC Commander.



# **AOWC Overview**

Legend: BFA: Battlefield Functional Area Johnson, SAIC contractor, ILE & AOWC SOF curriculum integrator)

The primary thesis question is: What are the competencies and learning areas that should shape an advanced war-fighting SOF-track curriculum for U.S. Army SF officers attending U.S. Army ILE? The supporting questions are: What critical competencies and learning areas found in the U.S. Army leadership manual, Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership*, should shape or may be leveraged in shaping a SOF-track curriculum? What are the unique joint and interagency war-fighting competencies and learning areas that should shape a SOF-track curriculum? How has the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) impacted SOF education? What are USSOCOM's and its subordinate component command responsibilities for intermediate-level education of SF and SOF officers?

### Assumptions

The research assumes several points: SF officers have some unique core competency and supporting skill educational needs that can be enhanced through a focused SOF specialty curriculum; the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Warfare Center and School (JFK SWC&S) will continue to support a focused specialty curriculum for SF officers in the CGSOC and ILE/AOWC; and CGSC and TRADOC leadership will continue to support a SOF-trackcurriculum in CGSOC and ILE/AOWC.

## Limitations

Research has identified only two SOF education studies conducted in the past. First, a Joint Special Operations Forces Institute (JSOFI)-Booz-Allen and Hamilton Study Team conducted a study from May to September 1995 (DOD 30 1996). The findings and recommendations from this study provided the basis for development of a SOF Education Implementation Plan (JSOFI 1995, 4). The second study was conducted based on a July 2001 USSOCOM-directed comprehensive analysis of SOF short-, mid-, and long-term education requirements (JE Sverdrup Technology, Inc. 2002, vii). USASOC has conducted no similar comprehensive Army SOF study.

### Delimitations

An overall framework for approaching intermediate level SF and SOF education is recommended, but a comprehensive listing of educational courses that a focused curriculum might contain is not identified. Only through the support and participation of both CGSC and the special operations community will a detailed listing of courses be developed. Ultimately, some courses may be taught using video teleconferencing, guest lecturers, and visiting instructors, or some specialized education needs may require visiting other locations.

#### Significance of the Study

SF branch is the only branch that has no formal advanced course and advanced education system for its officers. Yet, there has long been interest in providing advanced education for SF officers. In 1993, MG Sidney Shachnow, then the commandant, JFK SWC&S, conducted an ad hoc miniadvanced course for SF officers at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. However, high operational tempo within SF groups impacted participation, and there has been no subsequent attempt to conduct a similar course at Fort Bragg. MG Shachnow coordinated a similar forty-hour course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 6 to 10 June 1994 for SF officers graduating from CGSC. The follow-on course was never conducted again at Fort Leavenworth (email interview, 10 October 02).

During the April 2001 SF conference conducted at Fort Bragg, an 18A/SF Advanced Studies Program was one of several panel discussions directed by the commanders of both the USASOC and JFK SWC&S. It was discussed again at the June 2001 USASOC Education Conference at Fort Bragg. In a 20 March 2001 memorandum to the deputy commander, USSOCOM, the president, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), referred to the CGSOC Special Operations curriculum as a de facto Special Operations Command and Staff College. In March 2002, the JFK SWC&S committed \$120,000 to assist CGSC with Special Operations curriculum development and the integration of an SF and Special Operations curriculum into ILE and AOWC. A CGSC SOF-focused curriculum partially fills the advanced education void for SF officers at little additional expense to the U.S. Army and the SF community. This study, though specifically focused on SF officers, identifies critical competencies and skills for all within the special operations community.

#### Definitions

Advanced Application Program (AAP). The AAP is designed to provide CGSOC students the opportunity to conduct advanced studies related to the CGSOC core curriculum. It consists of several components including: areas of concentration (AOC), focused programs, FA requirements, graduate degree programs, and unrestricted AAP courses (CGSC 18 October 2002c, 1).

Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC). A seven-month CGSC course designed to develop operations career field officers with a war-fighting focus for battalion and brigade command capable of conducting full-spectrum operations in joint-multinational-interagency environment and with the requisite competencies to serve successfully as division through echelons above corps staff officers (CGSC Web page, 17 September 2002).

<u>Area of Concentration (AOC)</u>. AOCs are designed to broaden officers' knowledge and give them the opportunity to study subjects related to their career fields in greater depth (CGSC 18 October 2002c, 3).

<u>Combined Arms Center (CAC)</u>. The mission of the CAC is to educate officers in the art of command and staff functions of the combined arms at the tactical level and to educate officers in the operational art of war. CAC has responsibility for writing the doctrine for war fighting at the division and corps levels. CAC has a training development function for leader development and battle command and for experimenting with the concepts, methods, procedures, and means of battle command. In addition, CAC is responsible for providing vigorous training exercises for commanders and staffs, from brigade through corps levels, in the exercise of battle command. CAC is commanded by a lieutenant general who serves as the TRADOC, Deputy Commanding General for Combined Arms, the Commander of the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, and the Commandant of the Command and General Staff College (CAC web page, 15 November 2002).

<u>Command and General Staff College (CGSC)</u>. The CGSC is the Army's senior tactical school. It develops officers able to lead fighting units at the tactical and operational levels of war. The CGSC trains over 22,000 officers annually through its resident and non-resident programs (CGSC web page 1 October 2002).

<u>Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC)</u>. A ten-month course designed to educate selected officers in the values of the profession of arms, and in the conduct of military operations during peace, conflict, and war with emphasis at corps and division level. Students include Army active and reserve component officers, international officers, and officers from other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces (CGSC web page 1 October 2002).

<u>Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel</u> <u>and Facilities (DOTMLPF)</u>. At the strategic level, the Army has identified six imperatives: quality people, training, force mix, doctrine, modern equipment, and leader development. In organizations these imperatives translate into doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers--previously called DTLOMS (FM 22-100, 6-2). As of 12 December 2002, TRADOC directed that all future reference to the usage of this acronym to the joint acronym, DOTMLPF, which describes doctrine, DOTMLPF (TRADOC 2002a).

<u>Functional Area (FA)</u>. An FA is a grouping of officers by specialty other than an arm, service or branch that possess interrelated groups of skills and performs tasks that usually require significant education, training and experience. Although functional area requirements are predominately in the field grades, some captains will serve developmental tours in their functional area. After Career Field designation, functional area officers will serve repetitive and progressive assignments within their functional area at a time (DA 1998, 7).

<u>Interagency</u>. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective (JP 1-02 2001, 211).

<u>Joint</u>. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, and others, in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate (JP 1-02 2001, 219).

<u>Nonaccession Branch</u>. SF branch is a volunteer nonaccession branch that draws its officers from nearly all other Army branches. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command recruits SF volunteers. Officers who volunteer are selected by a HQDA centralized accession board and undergo a rigorous and demanding assessment, selection and training program to qualify as SF officers. Officers are not admitted to SF branch upon initial entry into the U.S. Army. They must be promoted to the rank of captain in the fourth through seventh year in service before eligible to undergo a thirty-day SF Assessment and Selection process to determine qualification to attend the SF Qualification Course (SFQC). Officers who are selected during SF Assessment and Selection and subsequently complete SFQC are branched as SF officers. This is normally accomplished during the third or fourth year of active federal service (DA 1998, 76; DA 1999c, 12; DA 1995, 117).

Officer Distribution Plan (ODP). Since the U.S. Army force structure exceeds the number of officers in the Army, the ODP was created. The ODP balances "faces and spaces" and manages shortages across the Army. PERSCOM Officer Personnel Management Directorate uses the officer requisition and assignment process to meet Army requirements. Requisitions identify a need for an officer to fill a valid, ODP supported position at a designated location during a specific reporting period (DA 1998, 36).

<u>SF Operational Detachment-A (SFODA)</u>. The basic element of SF is the SFODA, a twelve-man detachment. The SFODA is fully versed in light infantry tactics,

techniques, and procedures up to and including the battalion level. SFODAs are regionally oriented to ensure they have the resident skills and cultural understanding necessary to communicate with and influence their foreign counterparts. SFODAs have unique capabilities to fill the operational void between civilian dominated or civilian-led activities and military operations (FM 3-05.20 2001, 1-1, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8).

<u>Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA)</u>. A table that prescribes the organizational structure, personnel and equipment authorizations, and requirements of a military unit to perform a specific mission for which there is no appropriate table of organization and equipment (DA 1999c, 937).

<u>Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)</u>. Army command charged with the major Army missions of individual training and combat developments, TRADOC was established as the U.S. Army's overall development command in July 1973 (TRADOC web page, n.d.)

<u>U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFK SWC&S)</u>. The U.S. Army Special Operations school responsible for all doctrine, training, personnel prepotency and leader development for U.S. Army SOF (USSOCOM 1995a, C-7).

<u>U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)</u>. Formally established as a unified combatant command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, on 16 April 1987, and commanded by a four star general officer with the title of Commander, USSOCOM. All SOF of the Army, Navy, and Air Force based in the United States are placed under combatant command, USSOCOM. USSOCOM has three service component commands: USASOC, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Naval Special Warfare Command, Coronado, California; Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida; and one subunified command, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg. USSOCOM exists to provide SOF to the National Command Authority, regional combatant commanders, and American ambassadors and their country teams for successful conduct of special operations during both peace and war. USSOCOM prepares SOF to successfully conduct special operations, including civil affairs and psychological operations (Cubic 1998, 2-1)

### CHAPTER 2

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SOF EDUCATION

We hoped to have this course-administered prior to CGSC, but would be flexible. We settled for a little over forty-hours of instruction because we thought it would be acceptable to the field. We were wrong. Commanders were not interested in the professional development of their officers, they were more interested in how missions they were assigned came off. Selfish but true. (Electronic mail interview, 15 October 2002)

Major General (retired) Sidney Shachnow

Effective 9 April 1987, Department of the Army General Order No. 35 established SF as an "nonaccession branch." Since then, the SFQC has served as the basic introductory course for SF officers, much like the Infantry Officer Basic Course or Armor Officer Basic Course serves as an introductory course for second lieutenants in those respective branches. However, unlike other U.S. Army branches, no SF Officer Advanced Course has been developed to prepare officers for duties beyond those of commanding an operational detachment-A. Instead, the U.S. Army mandates in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 that all officers seeking accession into SF must first complete the infantry captains career course (DA 1998, 10). While this provides these officers accessing into SF with an advanced education, it does not provide them advanced SF and joint SOF education essential for duties beyond those of an SF Operational Detachment-A team commander.

It is valid to question what learning areas, if any, beyond the typical U.S. Army Advanced Course are necessary for SF officers. What job responsibilities do SF officers encounter for which other officer advanced courses do not prepare them? FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, outlines core competencies that have evolved over the years to dictate the needs of SF training (2001, I-6). They include war fighting, training, physical fitness, intercultural communications, interpersonal skills, nonverbal skills, language proficiency, area and cultural orientation, problem solving, clandestine infiltration and exfiltration, interagency, joint, and multinational operations, political awareness, operating in an austere or hostile environment, and advanced technology. These competencies are not unique to SF. Some SF competencies are common to all U.S. Army branches and sister services, while others are not appropriate for incorporation into a SOF-track curriculum. However, some SF competencies, such as intercultural communications, nonverbal skills, language proficiency, area and cultural orientation, and political awareness, are all SF war-fighting skills not emphasized by other Army branches or sister services, and should be incorporated into a SOF-track curriculum.

### Joint SOF Education

*Title 10, United States Code*, section 167, directs the Commander, USSOCOM, to train assigned forces to meet special operations mission taskings and to ensure interoperability with conventional forces and other SOF. The unique abilities of SOF are developed and honed through intensive training and education primarily at three SOF schools: the Army JFK SWC&S, Fort Bragg; the Naval Special Warfare Center, Coronado; and the Air Force Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field (DOD 1996, 1). USSOCOM's education responsibilities are derived further from the following Title 10 mandates: develop strategy, doctrine and tactics; conduct specialized courses of instruction for commissioned and noncommissioned officers; and monitor the professional military education (PME) of officers and enlisted personnel. Further, the commander, USSOCOM has the service-like responsibility of providing education 14 venues that specialize in the art and science of joint special operations (USSOCOM 2001, 1-2).

JFSOI was established on 8 April 1994 by General Wayne Downing, commander, USSOCOM, with the intent that it facilitate the integration of SOF into joint, combined, and interagency operations; act as USSOCOM's single focal point for joint doctrine development; standardize joint and common institutional SOF training to eliminate unnecessary redundancy and to achieve training efficiencies; and establish and maintain a comprehensive and coherent SOF PME system to enhance development of leaders (DOD 1996, 1). According to a JSOFI Education Study Executive Summary dated September 1995, the JSOFI charter included the responsibility for SOF officer and noncommissioned officer PME. This responsibility included the "promulgation and integration of SOF PME into the DOD and Service Schools." Of the responsibilities tasked to JSOFI, the highest priority was the education function. According to SGM (retired) Bob Gron, former Sergeant Major, USSOCOM, J3, training, "prior to JSOFI, USSOCOM joint education was managed and coordinated by the J5, with assistance from J3, Training" (email interview, 26 November 2002).

In 1995, a JSOFI-Booz-Allen and Hamilton Study Team conducted a SOF Education Study that was the impetus for USSOCOM Directive 621-1, *Education*, dated 10 October 1996. JSOFI was designated the proponent for the directive, which established an education strategy, common policies and procedures for the conduct and management of Joint-Special-Operations-Forces-specific education by USSOCOM and its components. Contained in the directive is "Appendix A," Joint SOF Learning Areas, containing eleven separate Special Operations learning areas developed to identify education requirements based on assignment, mission, and duties and responsibilities. The learning areas were to be incorporated into education shared by the leadership, the individual, and academic institutions, such as CGSC. General Peter J. Schoomaker, the subsequent USSOCOM commander, deactivated JSOFI on 1 October 1998. SOF institutional training and education was integrated under one office as the education responsibilities performed by JSOFI were transferred to the new USSOCOM Education and Doctrine Division. The initiative provided "economies of scale" as USSOCOM developed joint curriculum and distance learning requirements (email interview, Gaea D. Levy, JSOU, 7 November 2002). On 9 March 2001, USSOCOM Directive 621-1 was updated and the USSOCOM Operations, Plans, and Policy Center, Joint Doctrine and Education Division designated as the new proponent. This updated version eliminated the learning areas published in the 10 October 1996 version, but provided no alternative means to assist leaders, individuals, and academic institutions to focus areas of learning (USSOCOM 2001, 10).

JSOU was established in September 2000 as an institution of higher learning focused on joint special operations education. General Schoomaker established JSOU to meet the educational needs of special operators and non-SOF national security decision makers. JSOU's mission is to educate SOF executive senior and intermediate leaders and other selected national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, research, and outreach, in the science and art of joint special operations (JSOU web page, n.d.).

A March 2002 JSOU Requirements Analysis recommended three broad functions for JSOU. First, it was to serve as a focal point for SOF strategic integration for SOF education, identifying emergent SOF requirements and developing courseware. Second, it was to provide SOF education integration focusing on existing executive, senior, and intermediate-level resident and nonresident courses of study furthering the education of SOF leaders and selected non-SOF personnel in joint special operations. This function further requires JSOU to develop SOF-specific programs to supplement or fill existing voids in PME curricula, placing them in the appropriate programs of instruction at the appropriate institutions. The third and last recommended function requires JSOU to develop a state-of-the-art SOF Education Information Technology Architecture capable of providing the broadest capability of education support (JE Sverdrup Technology 2002, 43-44).

The JSOU requirements analysis further recommends adopting USSOCOM SOF truths (humans are more important than hardware, quality is better than quantity, SOF cannot be mass produced, and competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies (JP 3-05 1988, II-3)) as SOF's guiding tenets for education, with one addition: SOF operators must be trained for the known and educated for the unknown (JE Sverdrup Technology 2002, 45). This is significant to my study because the last recommended tenet, quoted from General Schoomaker, is incorporated, along with the SOF truths, into an SF education model that appears in chapter 5.

USSOCOM Directive 621-1, 9 March 2001, formally recognized a Joint Special Operations Education Conference that meets, as required, to provide a forum to receive USSOCOM commander guidance, share ideas and methods, discuss issues and solve problems, and coordinate and align SOF education efforts. In this venue, USSOCOM formally recognizes SOF faculty members, such as those at CGSC, as invited attendees. However, SOF faculty from CGSC were not included in a USSOCOM-sponsored 0-6level Joint Special Operations Education Council, designated to develop strategy, implementation, and integration plans, vet joint special operations education issues, and provide feedback and recommendations to the USSOCOM board of directors (USSOCOM 2001, 8). The formal exclusion of CGSC faculty from the USSOCOM Education Council does not seem warranted when considering the 20 March 2001 memorandum from the president, JSOU (discussed in chapter 1), to the deputy commander, USSOCOM, referring to the CGSC Special Operations curriculum as a de facto Special Operations Command and Staff College.

#### Joint SOF Education Vision, Goals, and Key Themes

When General Wayne Downing directed the establishment of JSOFI, USSOCOM undertook the first significant efforts to fulfill its education responsibilities derived from *Title 10, U.S. Code,* Section 167. General Downing included in his efforts both a "SOF Education Vision," and PME goals: "To provide our soldiers, sailors, and airmen with the education tools and opportunities to advance in their chosen profession . . . to prepare them to successfully meet the challenges and uncertainties of joint, combined, and interagency operations." Further, General Downing established the following education goals for USSOCOM: enhance ability to think and do, emphasize the art of war over the science of war, provide a global perspective from the operational level, and promote greater mission understanding (USSOCOM 1996, 1-1). The strategy emphasized that the long-term health of USSOCOM rests upon joint SOF education becoming a core SOF value, and directed that each service component implement the USSOCOM education program. The overarching goal of the program was to produce professional special operations officers and noncommissioned officers who had the necessary technical, leadership and professional education to grow as special operators while remaining fully competitive for promotion and command (USSOCOM 1996, 1-2).

USSOCOM's education system under General Downing, included instruction delivered through a variety of means, making maximum use of USSOCOM component schools, such as the JFK SWC&S. USSOCOM Directive 621-1, dated 10 October 1996, directed that SOF representatives at service and joint PME institutions filling formally recognized SOF chairs and those serving as SOF faculty members (i.e., CGSC SOF faculty) provide current SOF information to the non-SOF community and those SOF members attending in-residence PME. One of the key tasks specified was to incorporate SOF learning objectives into the curricula of their respective schools (USSOCOM 1996, 2-3.

Subsequent USSOCOM commanders have continued to emphasize SOF education, retaining education of officers and noncommissioned officers, as the command's primary education responsibility. However, as USSOCOM commanders have changed, so have the guidance and priorities disseminated to SOF chairs and SOF faculty members at PME institutions. In a 29 January 1997 memorandum for CGSC SOF faculty member LTC Curt Weimer, U.S. Army General Henry H. Shelton, Commander, USSOCOM, stated, "It is essential that I provide you with my intent - what is important for the command, and what is important for you to teach the largely non-SOF leaders that attend CGSC." Unlike General Downing, whose priority was the professional education of SOF officers and noncommissioned officers, General Shelton's priority target audience at CGSC was the non-SOF leaders. In fact, General Shelton made no mention of the professional education of SOF officers attending CGSC. In contrast, General Peter J. Schoomaker, subsequent USSOCOM Commander, stated in a 13 August 1999 memo to all PME SOF chair-holders and faculty members, "Help the SOF students at your institution learn how to think and not just what to think. Encourage them to develop the analytical methodologies that will serve them well in ill-defined environments." He further stated, "As a stakeholder, your active participation in the development and execution of a comprehensive SOF education strategy is vital to this Command's ability to effectively guide the development of not only SOF personnel, but also our non-SOF customers."

In contrast, in a memo titled "Academic Year 01-02 Emphasis," the commander, USSOCOM, makes two significant changes in his guidance to PME institutions. For the first time ever, the commander, USSOCOM, communicates guidance only to "formal" SOF chairs, excluding service intermediate-level PME SOF faculty. This is highlighted when the memorandum directs SOF chair-holders to "expand your reach through better relationships and support to other educational institutions such as Service intermediatelevel education institutions." However, USSOCOM's most significant change in guidance to SOF chairs is its shift in priorities from the professional education of SOF officers to non-SOF students. Rather than simply not address SOF officers, the memorandum emphasizes the importance of educating non-SOF leaders over SOF officers attending PME institutions. These changes in USSOCOM's PME education emphasis mark a significant departure from the PME education priorities of both General Downing and General Schoomaker. Further, they are confusing for service intermediatelevel PME institutions. Are service intermediate-level PME institutions no longer important to USSOCOM? Are the SOF faculties at these institutions excluded from the current SOF chair guidance to focus on non-SOF leaders rather than SOF leaders? Since CGSC graduates nearly thirteen hundred future leaders from all services and over eighty different countries annually, CGSC would seem to be an important PME institution. In contrast, each senior PME institution graduates approximately 250-350 officers, and neither SOF and nor-SOF graduates of senior PME institutions are likely to be significantly influenced at such a late juncture in their careers. Additionally, the academic year 01-02 emphasis is contrary to USSOCOM Directive, 621-1, Joint Special Operations Education System, dated 9 March 2001, which states, "USSOCOM's primary responsibility is the education of SOF. A secondary responsibility is the education of selected DOD, interagency, and international military personnel in the requirements, capabilities, and limitations of U.S. joint special operations organizations" (p. 3).

### U.S. Army SOF Education

All USSOCOM components, to include USASOC, are tasked in USSOCOM Directive 621-1 to implement USSOCOM's joint special operations education program. Among the other requirements outlined in chapter 4 (Responsibilities), components are directed to "develop high-value joint courses of instruction which fulfill the vision and goals outlined in USSOCOM Directive 621-1." Yet, the only JFK SWC&S joint SOF course of instruction identified in the 1995 SOF Education Study was a CGSOC sixtyhour SOF advanced studies course (A533, Advanced Special Operations Studies). The 1 March 2002 JSOU *Executive Summary & Main Report: Joint Special Operations University Requirements Analysis* did not attempt to identify joint SOF instruction within component schools. According to LTC Bob Clossom, Deputy Director, Training and Doctrine, JFK SWC&S, the focus of the JFK SWC&S is training, not education. Chapter 3, DA Pamphlet 351-4, *U.S. Army Formal Schools Catalog*, lists no JFK SWC&S joint SOF courses of instruction and no advanced SOF or advanced joint SOF education courses for intermediate level SF or SOF officers (email interview, 18 November 2002). Colonel Hank Harris, Director of Training and Doctrine, JFK SWC&S from 1999 to 2002, stated that he does not recall the JFK SWC&S ever offering any joint or joint SOF courses of instruction (email interview, 19 November 2002). It appears that USASOC has yet to directly implement USSOCOM's guidance to "develop high-value joint courses of instruction which fulfill the vision and goals outlined in USSOCOM Directive 621-1." Yet it is unfair to say USASOC has not attempted to pursue, at least indirectly, this area, because it has. Nor can it be said the command has not, nor does not, informally fund efforts towards joint education, because it does. Each year USASOC provides guest speakers, adjunct instructors, computers, software, and exercise support. This informal support is considerable, and an extremely important aspect of the SOF curriculum.

Between June and December 1987, the Department of Joint and Combined Operation's (DJCO) Counter Revolutionary Warfare Committee established a SOF Coordination Desk based on increased emphasis given to SOF. This increased emphasis coincides with USSOCOM's establishment as a unified combatant command on 16 April 1987. The SOF Coordination Desk, staffed by the two SF officers assigned to the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Committee, was designed to ensure SOF was properly integrated into all CGSC instruction and was responsible to work with the CGSC service elements to ensure their SOF was integrated into the CGSOC curriculum (CGSC 30 January-31 December 1987a). This responsibility was transferred to the DJCO Low Intensity Conflict Proponency office between July 1988 and 31 December 1988 (CGSC 31 July-31 December 1988d). The first SOF elective offered at CGSC was A533, Special Operations Forces, a thirty-hour course added during academic year (AY) 1987-88. CAC historical archives do not reflect the course being added; however, the course appears in CGSC Circular 351-1, *United States Army, Command and General Staff Catalog*, dated May 1987. Previous archived CGSC course catalogs contain no SOF courses. The course was designed for all U.S. students to gain an appreciation of SOF capabilities, limitations, and mission support requirements, and gain a working knowledge of SOF employment in global operations throughout the spectrum of conflict (CGSC 1987b, 98). Apparently the course was not intended as the foundation of a SOF curriculum, since it was not mandated for SF or SOF officers.

On 26 May 1988, DJCO conducted the first annual SOF Symposium for CGSOC. The results of the symposium were not available in historical archives; however, records reflect that the CAC commander signed a SOF Integration Action Plan that DJCO implemented through its Counter Revolutionary Warfare Committee. A copy of the plan could not be located in the historical archives (CGSC January-June 1988c).

A council of colonels for the integration of SOF into TRADOC functions convened on 9 and 10 June 1988 to discuss and work issues outlined in the CAC SOF Integration Plan. The council was given oversight and steering responsibilities, which were to guide the SOF Integration Action Plan through general officer decisions and TRADOC implementation (CGSC 17 June 1988b). According to the memorandum, the council addressed the following issues: (1) General Officer Education, (2) Integrate Master Plans, (3) Teaching Scenarios, (4) SOF Instruction, (5) Training Support Packages, Issue (6) SOF Manpower Requirements, (7a) Scenarios and (7b) Training Simulations, (8) Special Operations Staff Officers Course, (9) Joint Integration, (10) Combat Training Centers, (11) Wargames/Models, and (12) Research and Development. The 17 June 1988 CGSC memorandum reported that issues 1, 3, 4, 5, 7b, 9, and 10 were "on schedule," while issues 2, 6, 7a, 11, and 12 were listed as "problem issues." Further, the memorandum reported that the council completed Issue 8, Special Operations Staff Officers Course. These efforts, less than one year after the establishment of USSOCOM, represent a U.S. Army willingness to integrate SOF into TRADOC education and to address unique advanced education requirements of SOF officers. A second SOF Integration Council of Colonels met on 12 December 1988 and reported all activities proceeding on schedule (CGSC July-31 December 1988d). No further indications in CAC historical summaries that the SOF Integration Council of Colonels ever met again were found.

A533, SOF, was offered again during AY 1988-89 (CGSC May 1988c, 103). During AY 1989-90, it was redesignated A556, and redesignated again to A554 during AY 1990-91 (CGSC May 1988c, 103; CGSC 6 November 1990b). Notably, during AY 1989-90 and 1990-91, CGSC established "SF" as one of three Areas of Concentrations (AOC) (CGSC May 1989b, 68). This represents TRADOC's and CGSC's recognition of the unique education needs of SF officers. SF officers were required to complete 210 hours of elective courses, of which ninety hours were mandated. Required courses included: A554, a thirty-hour SOF course, plus two additional thirty-hour courses from a list including regional studies, Internal Defense and Development, Small Wars, Internal War and Revolution, and Drugs (CGSC 6 November 1990b, enclosure 3). Unlike previous years, A554 was listed as supporting only the Officer Professional Management System functional area of SF during AY 1990-91. However the course was modified and recommended for officers who had served or who expected assignment to or in support of special operations organizations. The 1990-91 SOF course incorporated "employment planning," a subject previously not studied (CGSC July 1990c, 81).

SF was eliminated as a stand alone AOC during AY 1991-92 and incorporated under a new Joint and or Combined AOC (CGSC July 1991b, 62). SF officers were required to take A554, Special Operations Forces, and required to fulfill the joint AOC curriculum requirements (CGSC July 1991b, 47) for the next eight years until AY 1999-2000.

Although the SOF Integration Council of Colonels implied in June 1988 that a Special Operations Staff Officers Course was established, the first documented attempt to establish a formal course did not occur until the summer of 1993 at Fort Bragg. As mentioned earlier, MG Sidney Shachnow, then Commander, JFK SWC&S, conducted a mini-advanced course for SF officers who had completed the Operational Detachment-A level of their careers. According to MG Shachnow,

We hoped to have this course administered prior to CGSC, but would be flexible. We settled for a little over forty hours of instruction because we thought it would be acceptable to the field. We were wrong. Commanders were not interested in the professional development of their officers, they were more interested in how missions they were assigned came off. Selfish but true. We ran one course, but it was such a hassle to get the attendance, and I did not get the unqualified commitment from the Commanders that we did not repeat it again. I concluded early on that unless we made it a gate toward upward mobility and mandatory it would not work. There just was not enough time left in my military career to see it worked to a satisfactory conclusion. I retired that year. (Email interviews, 15 October 2002 and 1 December 2002) In 1994, the JFK SWC&S coordinated with CGSC to add a USASOC-sponsored forty-hour end of course SF Advanced Studies Program conducted at Fort Leavenworth (CGSC 13 May 1994d; USASOC 14 April 1994). This course was conducted only once, from 6 to 10 June 1994. According to MG (retired) Sidney Shachnow, "JFK SWC&S lost interest and did not support the continuation of this program. It was something that got lost in the hassle" (email interview 11 November 2002).

In July 1994, LTC Stan Moore proposed a sixty-hour Advanced Special Operations Studies program of instruction and coordinated a JFK SWC&S-prepared memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the commander, JFK SWC&S and the deputy commandant, U.S. Army CGSC. The program of instruction content focused on joint and Army SOF doctrine, student research, and senior SOF guest speakers, and included planning time for the college's capstone exercise, Prairie Warrior (CGSC 29 July 1994c). However, the DJCO acting director recommended against signing the draft MOA because it provided the JFK SWC&S the authority to approve course content, proposing it be amended to provide the JFK SWC&S an opportunity to only recommend course content (CGSC 22 November 1994b). Apparently this issue was never resolved between CAC and the JFK SWC&S, since the MOA prepared by the JFK SWC&S was never signed.

Nevertheless, the program of instruction was approved and implemented during CGSC AY 1994-95 as A553, Special Operations Advanced Studies, and mandated for all SF officers. The course of instruction remains a part of the CGSC SOF-track curriculum, though now exclusively as a guest speaker program. A554 was retained in the CGSC curriculum during AY 1994-95, but rewritten as a SOF overview course for non-SOF officers (CGSC 4 August 1994e, 6). This course was dropped during AY 2000-01 because of expanding instructor requirements to support the SOF officer-focused curriculum, and because of the relatively small numbers of non-SOF students who were able to enroll. The decision to eliminate the course was at the time in accordance with USSOCOM directive 621-1 primary and secondary responsibilities, and the USSOCOM commander's guidance to PME SOF faculty. The decision is not in accordance with the current USSOCOM Commander's AY 01-02 Emphasis, but remains in accordance with the current USSOCOM directive 621-1.

During AY 1995-96, DJCO eliminated its only officer-distribution-plan (ODP) supported SF officer position from the CGSC TDA (CGSC 1995a). Apparently, this decision was not well received within the Army SOF community, since in 1996 a one-page CGSC information paper, "SOF representation at CGSC" (date not indicated) outlined a need for an 04 or 05 SF ODP-supported officer on the CGSC TDA to serve as the college SOF subject matter expert to write SOF courses of instruction and lessons and coordinate SOF component participation during the CGSC capstone exercise. Attached as an enclosure to this document is a 17 November 1996 memorandum from the CAC commander, LTG L. D. Holder, in response to the commander, JFK SWC&S. The CAC commander memo begins, "I share your concern about adequate representation for all our Army branches and sister services at CGSC. I endorse the idea of adding additional USSOCOM ODP supported SOF personnel to support the overall CGSC curriculum." LTG Holder continues later by saying, "I welcome additional USSOCOM ODP supported instructors (MAJs/LTCs) in CGSC. One of these could fill a specific 'SOF

Chair' and serve as the 'SOF SME.' Currently, the civil affairs/psychological operations (PSYOP) position is unfilled and is projected to remain unfilled. Your support in filling this position would greatly enhance the SOF curriculum" (CGSC 17 November 1996b). It is unclear exactly what prompted the CAC commander's memorandum to the JFK SWC&S commander, but it seems that it responded to a U.S. Army SOF community concern that there was not sufficient ODP SOF representation on the CGSC TDA to ensure SOF integration into the CGSC curriculum. Further, it seems that the JFK SWC&S commander made some mention to the CAC commander regarding a "SOF Chair." I can only speculate that the use of the term SOF Chair in this instance referred to the possibility of a formal SOF chair at CGSC, such as those at senior service PME institutions. Regardless, no formal SOF chair was ever approved or funded at CGSC by USSOCOM. However, an SF Lieutenant Colonel was requisitioned in 1996 to fill a CGSC ODP-supported TDA position during CGSC AY 1997-98. That position remains the only ODP-supported SF officer position on the CGSC TDA. All other SF officers assigned to CGSC fill either combat arms or branch immaterial TDA positions.

During AY 1996-97, the Introduction to SOF course was redesignated A524, and Advanced Special Operations Studies redesignated A525. Additionally, A526, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, was introduced to the CGSC curriculum for the first time (CGSC 13 September 1996a, 4). All three courses remained unchanged during AY 1997-98. However, as Prairie Warrior grew to include more robust student planning staffs, the SOF curriculum had to change in order for its students to remain relevant within the exercise. On 4 March 1998, CGSC approved a twenty-seven-hour AAP, A519, Advanced Special Operations Planning Course, in support of Prairie Warrior
(CGSC 24 February 1998b). On 29 October 1998, the course was redesignated A574, Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (Joint Force Special Operations Component Command) Planning Seminar, and approved by CGSC to be increased to eighty-one hours (CGSC 16 October 1998c). During AY 2001-2002, this course was expanded to incorporate an additional twenty-seven hours of special operations doctrine instruction conducted by visiting JSOU instructors (CGSC 2001-2002, 79). The twentyseven hours of joint special operations doctrine was subsequently extracted and formed a stand-alone course (A571, Joint Special Operations Doctrine Seminar) presented by JSOU during AY 2002-03 (CGSC 18 October 2002c, 9).

On 19 August 1998, CGSC approved two additional twenty-seven-hour SF elective courses (CGSC 18 August 1998d). First, a Prairie Warrior planning seminar (A576, SF Operational Planning Seminar) was designed around a deployed SF battalion in a foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency environment. This course was expanded to eighty-one hours during AY 1999-2000, redesignated Asymmetrical Threat & Counterinsurgency Planning Seminar, and incorporated international officers, who simulated a host nation light infantry division (CGSC 1999-2000, 78). A deployed SF battalion was replicated around joint SOF and Army combat support and combat service support officers, who were responsible for advising and assisting the international officer host nation division prepare a counterinsurgency campaign plan. Both U.S. and international officer staffs participated in Prairie Warrior, conducting counterinsurgency, while the JSOTF and JPOTF Planning Seminars supported theater-wide conventional operations. A576 was expanded to 108 hours during AY 2001-2002, adding twenty-seven hours of insurgency and counterinsurgency educational classes (CGSC 2001-2002, 81). The course was eliminated for AY 2002-2003 during the CGSOC transition to ILE AWOC, when TRADOC and CGSC chose an exercise design focused on small tactical level computer-simulation-driven exercises, and de-emphasized operational level joint, multinational, and interagency exercises. JSOU agreed to present a twenty-seven-hour insurgency and unconventional warfare course (A577, Insurgency and Unconventional Warfare Course) during this AY for all SOF officers and other interested CGSC officers to preclude the elimination of these forms of warfare (CGSC 18 October 2002c, 7).

The second course added during AY 1998-99 was A575, Special Forces Operations Base/Forward Operations Base Procedures, an elective designed to prepare non-branch-qualified SF officers to become familiar with SF operational base and forward operational base procedures, apply tactical and operational level doctrine as a member of an SF operations base or forward operations base staff, and acquire skills for the administrative training and garrison responsibilities of a battalion and group operations officer, company commander, and executive officer (CGSC 27 October 1998a, 71). This course remains a part of the SOF curriculum, though it was renamed the SF Company Command, S-3, XO Course/Forward Operations Base Course.

During AY 1999-2000, the CGSC deputy commandant approved a focused SOF curriculum track under the joint area of concentration. This recognition of the unique joint and interagency war-fighting education requirements of SF and SOF officers is reminiscent of the SF AOC that was instituted as part of CGSOC during AY 1990-91. JFK SWC&S-funded SOF curriculum contractors are presently integrating the SOF curriculum into ILE AOWC.

Three new SOF electives were added during AY 2000-01. First, A576, Special Operation Historical Studies, a twenty-seven-hour course was added (CGSC 6 February 2001a). It was not offered during AY 2001-02, but was reintroduced during AY 2002-03, as well as integrated into the ILE AOWC SOF curriculum (CGSC 2001-2002; CGSC 18 October 2002c, 7). Secondly, A577, Special Operations Forces Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, was introduced and taught during a twoweek period prior to Prairie Warrior. The course was intended to familiarize SF and SOF officers with three digital systems they would likely encounter in operational units. They included the Global Command and Control System-Army, Maneuver Control System, and All-Source Analysis System. This course has not been continued in subsequent years; however, it should be reintegrated in some fashion to prepare SF and SOF officers for the digital environment in which they will work. The third SOF AAP approved for addition to the CGSOC curriculum was A579, the Civil-Military Operations Planners Course. However, though it was approved during AY 2000-01, it was not offered until AY 01-2002 (CGSC 6 February 2001a, 3). Lastly, A862, Special Operations Airpower in the Joint Campaign, was introduced during AY 2002-03. This was the first Air Force Special Operations course of instruction conducted at CGSC, representing an attempt to satisfy the needs of all joint SOF (CGSC 18 October 2002c, 9).

# <u>Summary</u>

Within the Army, the founding of USSOCOM seems to have provided the impetus for increased emphasis on SF and SOF in general. This is evident from CGSC archives, which reflect a CAC SOF Council of Colonels established to integrate SOF into different levels of TRADOC education and the establishment of an SF AOC less than a 31

year after the establishment of USSOCOM. However, this increased interest in SF and SOF was short lived. Shortly after Desert Shield and Desert Storm, joint and multinational operations took on greater significance within CGSOC, and SF was subordinated under a new Joint and Combined AOC. The reason for this relegation seemingly occurred for two reasons. First, increased emphasis given to joint and multinational operations after the Gulf War was reflected within TRADOC and CGSOC. Second, the number of assigned SOF officers within the new Department of Joint and Combined Operations was reduced to just one SF officer. It appears that the increased emphasis given to joint and multinational operations and lack of assigned SOF community instructors resulted in SF and SOF losing emphasis within CGSC. Whether an accurate assessment or not, the SF AOC was eliminated, and SF and SOF education remained relatively low priority until AY 1998-1999, when it began a five-year expansion that continues today. It seems the JFK SWC&S recognized the TRADOC and CAC change in priorities. The proposed MOA, prepared by the JFK SWC&S, between the JFK SWC&S and CAC suggests that. Despite the fact that the 1994 MOA was never resolved or signed, the JFK SWC&S began and continues to provide significant support to the SOF curriculum. Moreover, the entire U.S. Army and joint SOF communities now provide thousands of dollars in SOF curriculum support annually.

*Title 10, United States Code*, Section 167, leaves much to the interpretation of USSOCOM and military service departments. It directs the commander, USSOCOM, to train assigned forces to meet special operations mission taskings and to ensure interoperability with conventional forces and other SOF (DOD 1996, 1). Though USSOCOM was established in 1987, it was not until 1994 that General Wayne Downing

took the first steps to fulfill USSOCOM's Title 10 responsibilities. Since then, the level of emphasis and interpretation has varied from commander to commander. As USSOCOM is not a service, only "servicelike," it seems that some USSOCOM commanders choose to view service departments as responsible for the professional education of their officers. Likewise, past USSOCOM subordinate service component commanders appear to have relied on their respective service departments for the professional education of their officers. Despite the efforts of MG Sidney Shachnow in the mid 1990s, USASOC and the JFK SWC&S have relied on TRADOC to provide SF officers with advanced and intermediate education. Additionally, TRADOC, through CGSC, carefully protects its PME duties and responsibilities. This was demonstrated in 1994 when the JFK SWC&S attempted to take responsibility for course content in a Special Operations Advanced Studies Course. CGSC disagreed with the JFK SWC&S proposal, and the proposed MOI between the two institutions was never agreed upon or signed.

#### CHAPTER 3

#### LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The U.S. Army SF and Army Special Operations communities have long maintained a focus on training versus education. This was documented in a USSOCOMsponsored SOF Education Study conducted from May to September 1995. While the JFK SWC&S has conducted some studies to determine the intermediate and advanced education requirements for SF officers, only USSOCOM has made any significant effort to address the professional education of SOF officers. The following outlines existing studies and U.S. Army manuals that will assist in answering the thesis questions.

*18A/SF Advanced Studies Program.* During January 2001, an Individual Task Working Group established broad individual tasks for 18A/SF officers. During March 2001, a working group reviewed the tasks and examined a potential structure for an 18A/SF Officer Advanced Course. The purpose of the course was to produce SF officers with enhanced SF skills and abilities who are prepared for duties as an 0-4, 18A, in any organization and level, from an SF group through joint headquarters elements, and anywhere in the interagency community. Further, the course was designed to develop SF majors able to persuasively articulate the need for unconventional warfare and or unconventional operations (UW/UO), and then capable of integrating UW/UO throughout the operational continuum to support the attainment of U.S. national objectives (U.S. Special Forces Command 2001, seminar 7, draft 18A Advanced Studies Program). The draft 18A/SF Advanced Studies Program document is significant because it is the only known formal effort by the SF community to pursue advanced education for intermediate level SF officers. Though only a draft document that outlines broad critical tasks, the 18A/SF Advanced Studies Program does provide a framework for identifying the competencies, learning areas, and supporting tasks that should be a significant contributor to any intermediate level SF/SOF curriculum.

Department of Defense Inspector General (IG) Audit Report 97-012, U.S. Special Operations Command Training and Education Program, 30 October 1996. The objective of this IG audit was to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the USSOCOM training and education program. The audit further outlined a number of JSOFI initiatives, to include its development of a SOF Education Strategy, and a supporting SOF Education Study, conducted from May-September 1995 by a JSOFI-Booz-Allen & Hamilton study team. This was the first study of this type, and it identified learning shortcomings within USSOCOM. The purpose of the study was to determine education requirements and capabilities and to recommend solutions to correct identified deficiencies. The study relied on an extensive review of SOF customers, SOF officers and NCO leadership, and SOF and non-SOF PME institutions and schools (USSOCOM 1995a, 1, 3). Subsequent queries for documents outlined in the audit led to USSOCOM Directive #621-1, 10 October 1996, which established common policies and procedures for the conduct and management of Joint-Special-Operations-Forces-specific education by USSOCOM and its components. Within the directive is Appendix A, Joint SOF Learning Areas, containing eleven separate Special Operations learning areas that were identified in the May to September 1995 education study. The appendix, published only in draft format, contains learning areas that identify knowledge areas for primary, intermediate, and senior officers, as well as noncommissioned officers. Because this is the only known list

of intermediate and senior joint SOF learning areas formally compiled, it will serve an important part of the thesis analysis.

USSOCOM Directive #621-1 (9 March 2001) eliminated Appendix A, Joint SOF Learning Areas. According to Colonel (retired) Brian Maher, Assistant President, JSOU, "I wanted to use Appendix A as a starting point for the March 2002 'JSOU Requirements Analysis' study, and to possibly have the learning areas revalidated. USSOCOM wanted the learning objectives eliminated because they were seen as holdovers from JSOFI" (email interview, 13 March 2002). Even though the current directive no longer contains SOF education leaning areas, it remains a valid source for this thesis because it provides current USSOCOM education goals.

Intermediate Level Education Needs Analysis, Volume I (30 March 2001). The above-mentioned 1997 Science Application International Corporation study, which resulted in a chief of staff of the Army tasking to develop a concept for all Active Component Category officers to receive a common field grade education, generated a 24 August 2000 CGSC Deputy Commandant Statement of Work (DABT 65-98-D-002) contracted to Cubic Defense Applications Group, to examine the CGSOC curriculum and identify the educational needs required of graduates to meet the demands of the full spectrum operational environment (Cubic 2001). The 'Needs Assessment' served as the basis for the design phase of both the CGSOC ILE common core curriculum and the AOWC. The Cubic assessment recommends a competency-based learning approach for ILE and AOWC, and recommends using the seven leader competencies contained in FM 22-100 around which to build the new course. *Objective Force Concepts for Army Special Operations Forces (DRAFT).* This document is the conceptual basis for development of the Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) objective force capabilities and operational and organizational plans. These concepts, objective force capabilities, and operational and organizational plans will be assessed in war games, studies, experimentation, analyses, testing, and simulations in order to refine them and develop insights. The insights will identify specific changes needed in DOTMLPF. This document is significant because it identifies the capabilities of ARSOF, to include SF, in the future (TRADOC 15 July 2002, chapter 3).

*Executive Summary & Main Report, JSOU Requirements Analysis, 1 March 2002.* In July 2001, USSOCOM directed that a comprehensive analysis of short-, mid-, and long-term education requirements be performed for SOF. Additionally, the study, entitled *JSOU Requirements Analysis Study*, was to provide a needs-to-solution analysis for JSOU. This is the second and latest USSOCOM study that included an analysis of SOF education. This study was not chartered to identify SOF learning objectives. However, as it does include recent analysis of SOF education, it is relevant to this thesis.

Strategic Planning Guidance, Achieving USASOC Objectives for the 1st Decade of a New Millennium, USASOC 2001. The current USASOC Strategic Planning Guidance contains themes that are particularly relevant to this study. It provides overall direction for the development of the Program Objective Memorandum 04-09. It is significant because it discusses SOF capabilities, and validates a critical task list for all U.S. Army SOF. Hence, it provides some insight into how ARSOF and SF should be educated.

U.S. Army FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (June 2001). This is the keystone manual for SF doctrine. It describes SF roles, missions, capabilities,

organization, command and control (C2), employment, and sustainment operations across the operational continuum Additionally, it outlines the SF core competencies that I will analyze in relation to Army core competencies and SOF learning areas contained in USSOCOM Directive #621-1, 10 October 1996.

USSOCOM Strategic Compass, 5 October 2001. This is a compilation of documents, including a commander, USSOCOM memorandum, titled "The Way Ahead," service component and theater special operations command missions, USSOCOM's vision, mission statement, core values, and SOF truths. Other documents include Future Concepts Working Group initiatives, headquarters vision and mission statement, Title 10 responsibilities, USSOCOM strategic direction, and selective strategic issues. This document is significant because it represents SOF direction from a strategic perspective.

FM 22-100, *Army Leadership: Be-Know-Do, August 1999*. This manual outlines character (Be) and competence (Know and Do) acts necessary to achieve excellence. *Intermediate Level Education Needs Analysis*, Volume I, 30 March 2001, recommends redesigning intermediate level Army officer education based on a competency-based learning approach, focusing specifically on the competence acts of know and do, and their seven supporting skills.

Army Special Operations Forces Vision 2010, 7 April 1997 (ARSOF Vision 2010). The relevance of ARSOF Vision 2010 to this thesis is contained in three areas. First, ARSOF's contribution to the five DOD joint operational concepts (information superiority, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics). Second, the identification of the year 2002 as when Army SOF must identify the changes in determining, documenting, and approving war-fighting requirements in the domains of DOTMLPF. Education of SF leaders falls under the category of leader development. Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21, 31 March 1999, and Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 01, 1 October 1998, are used only to identify criteria for entry into the SF career field. Third, *ARSOF Vision 2010* identifies critical tasks that present and future ARSOF must know and do. Thus, it will help identify the competencies that should shape a SF officer intermediate level advanced education curriculum.

#### Research Methodology

Under ILE, CGSOC instructional Terms II and III are called the AOWC. As part of the redesign, TRADOC decided to change the officer ILE curriculum focus from terminal and enabling learning objectives and knowledge transfer to a competency-based learning approach. The new curriculum concentrates on developing field grade leader competencies, skills and behaviors, and supporting performances using FM 22-100 as the basis for developing a framework of seven competencies that identify supporting skills and behaviors. According to the ILE needs analysis prepared by Cubic, the "Be" characteristic or character (a person's inner strength) is fully grounded when an officer attends ILE, and an area that cannot be taught in an educational environment, only reinforced (Cubic 2001, 12-1). In other words, an officer's character is formed during the early years of his or her life, or as a young officer, and will not likely be shaped or reshaped while attending ILE.

The research analysis includes a study of three strategic level SOF documents that outline competencies and skills that SF and SOF soldiers must know and do today and in the future. This portion of the study is important for supporting the author's viewpoint that SF competencies, not Army competencies, should be the basis for shaping intermediate level advanced SF education and answering the primary thesis question, What are the competencies and learning areas that should shape an AOWC SOF-track curriculum for U.S. Army SF officers attending U.S. Army ILE?

Army competencies are appropriate for all students receiving ILE common core instruction. AOWC is intended to develop requisite competencies for officers to serve successfully during the remainder of their Army careers (CGSC web page 17 September 2002). Only eight of the ten SF competencies (war fighting; training; intercultural communications; problem solving; interagency, joint, and multinational operations; political awareness; and advanced technology) listed in FM 3-05.20 are used to support the analytical models. The remaining two competencies (physical fitness and clandestine infiltration and exfiltration) are excluded because neither is the focus of CGSC education. Figure 3 is an example of the first analytical model used to compare SF and Army competencies. U.S. Army FM 3-05.20 states, "Special Forces possess distinguishing core competencies, and many are derived from the Unconventional Warfare mission. These competencies have evolved over the years due to changing mission requirements and focus by the geographic Combatant Commanders to dictate the needs of Special Forces training" (2001, I-8).

Even though this manual does not further state that SF core competencies should likewise dictate the educational needs of SF, it is this author's opinion that it is appropriate to expand this statement to include education.



Figure 3. Comparison of Army and SF Competencies

The documents selected to support this assertion are *ARSOF Vision 2010*, *U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Strategic Planning Guidance, 2001*, and the *Objective Force Concept for SF (draft)*.

Next, two analytical models designed to identify learning areas and supporting learning objectives that further answer the primary thesis question are discussed. The first model compares Army core competencies with SF core competencies. The purpose for comparing them is to determine similarities, overlaps, and variations. Overlaps represent intersect points between Army and SF core competencies. The intersect points identify Army competency education that SF officers can leverage. Similarities identify competency education that SF officers might be able to leverage. SF competencies that distinctly differ from Army competencies identify education that must be provided via an SF-focused curriculum. Results from this analysis will focus curriculum developers on existing or projected education AOWC opportunities, and identify Army competency learning areas and supporting learning objectives within AOWC that fulfill or in part support SF advanced war-fighting education needs.

The second analytical model compares the eight SF competencies mentioned above with five joint SOF learning areas and special needs learning areas contained in Appendix A (joint SOF learning areas) to USSOCOM Directive 621-1, 10 October 1996. The purpose is to identify joint SOF learning and special needs areas that complement SF competencies and supporting skills and performances. The supporting joint SOF learning objectives that directly or indirectly support SF competencies could validate some current CGSOC SOF curriculum learning objectives and identify new learning objectives that should be considered for integration into the CGSC AOWC SOF-track curriculum. Appendix A (joint SOF learning areas) contains more than 165 supporting learning objectives. Accordingly, I am limiting my discussion to an overall analysis of the five basic joint SOF learning areas and special needs learning areas 8, 9 and 11, and a detailed discussion of one representative learning area. Table 1 is an example of the model constructed to identify valid tasks. The results of the comparison to all learning areas and special needs are located in appendix A. The five basic SOF learning areas include: learning area one, joint SOF; learning area two, joint service operations; learning area three, multinational operations; learning area four, interagency operations; and learning area five, information warfare. The three special needs areas include: special need eight, regional requirements; special need nine, Special Operations Liaison Element; and special need eleven, commanders. The other special needs areas do not directly support an SF or SOF focused curriculum, or the learning areas contained in the special need is

contained in one of the five basic SOF learning areas. For example, special need one, Joint PSYOP is appropriate for a PSYOP planner, but is far more comprehensive than necessary for an SF officer. Additionally, many of the PSYOP planner subordinate learning objectives are similar to those contained in SOF learning areas one through five. Likewise, special needs two (the joint staff NCO) learning objectives are extracted from those already contained in SOF learning areas one through five. Similarly, special needs three (doctrine writers at component headquarters and joint staffs special needs); special needs four (component headquarters and joint staffs, to include Special Operations Commands); special needs five (joint staff planners); and special needs seven (SF, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Foreign Squadron, Selected Sea-Air-Land Teams) are each built from learning objectives extracted from SOF learning areas one through five.

Table 1. Learning Area 1: Joint SOF (SOF learning about SOF)

|                | Learning Area 1.1 National policy & joint Special Operations Forces                             |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
|----------------|---|---|---|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|
|                |   | Primary                                     | Primary   | Intermediate   | Intermediate  | Intermediate   | Intermediate   | Intermediate   | Intermediate   | Intermediate   |
|                |   | major<br>participants and<br>their roles in | Know<br>fundamental<br>principles and<br>joint doctrine<br>applicable to<br>SOF | Comprehend<br>national policy<br>for the<br>employment of<br>SOF and the<br>policy<br>imperatives<br>that guide<br>military<br>operations. | for SOF as it<br>relates to the larger<br>body of joint<br>doctrine;<br>understand its<br>application for<br>planning and | SOF<br>commanders to<br>determine force<br>structure and<br>Major Force<br>Programs (MFP)<br>11 budget | Know how joint<br>doctrine for<br>SOF provides<br>guidance for<br>training,<br>material and<br>operational<br>requirements<br>necessary to<br>prepare SOF to<br>conduct<br>assigned<br>missions and<br>collateral<br>activities. | Apply current<br>SOF policy<br>and doctrine<br>and adapt it to<br>the rapidly<br>changing<br>environment<br>and evolving<br>mission set. | Comprehend<br>how national<br>policy and<br>download to the<br>for SOP are<br>developed to<br>include how<br>the principal<br>players<br>interact to<br>produce key<br>documents<br>and decisions. | Comprehend<br>the impact of<br>current trends<br>in policy and<br>underlying<br>assumptions<br>about the use<br>of military<br>forces as they<br>impact on the<br>employment<br>of SOF |
| ŝ              | Warfighting   |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| s Competencies | Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TIP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires                          |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs                            |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Forces         | Problem<br>Solving  |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Special Fc     | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                | Political<br>Awareness  |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| - 1            | Advanced<br>Technology  |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |

Lastly, a review the draft 18A/SF Advanced Studies Program developed by the JFK SWC&S during the spring of 2001 will be conducted. The purpose for including this document is to provide an objective review of the proposed program, outline how the AOWC SOF curriculum fulfills a portion of the proposed requirements, and hopefully resurrect the proposed advanced studies program within the U.S. Army SOF community. The broad 18A/SF officer critical tasks identified by the program assist in answering the primary thesis question.

# CHAPTER 4

# ANALYSIS

# ARSOF Vision 2010

The Army's decision to remake ILE and AOWC based on the requirements of an officer's specific career field, branch or FA is intended to provide a quality, tailored education linked to the Officer Personal Management System (U.S. Army News Release 2003). TRADOC's subsequent decision use FM 22-100 competencies as the basis upon which all instruction will likely produce a field grade officer with a warrior ethos, grounded in conventional Army war-fighting doctrine, with appropriate technical, tactical, and leadership competencies and skills to be successful. FM 22-100 competencies are critical for all Army officers. However, the author proposes that alone, they are inadequate for SF officers. To fulfill the Army's intent to base AOWC on the requirements of an officer's specific career field or branch, the SF competencies outlined in FM 3-05.20 should be the basis upon which AOWC is designed for SF officers. The following examination of three SOF strategic planning documents is crucial, and the basis on which the primary thesis question is answered. Subsequent comparisons of SF competencies to Army competencies and joint SOF learning areas respond to supporting thesis questions.

Though published in 1997, *ARSOF Vision 2010* remains consistent with current strategic SOF planning documents. Of note, it emphasizes language skills and cultural expertise, each a facet of the SF intercultural competency. These are skills that Army competencies do not emphasize or support. Additionally, *ARSOF Vision 2010* underscores the importance of joint and interagency interoperability and the use of SOF 45

to integrate U.S. conventional and interagency forces into a coalition with a host nation. It continues by referring to SOF as "global scouts," who provide combatant commanders with military and interagency connections in any potential crisis. These traits are fundamental to the SF competency, interagency, joint, and multinational operations, further underscoring that SF competencies should be the basis for designing SF officer education during AOWC (USASOC 1997, 5-6). Though the Army's conceptual competency does list cultural awareness as a supporting performance, it has yet to be integrated into ILE core education or AOWC instruction.

Of note, *ARSOF Vision 2010* emphasizes that education should encourage leadership and creative, thoughtful solutions (USASOC 1997, 3). These two broad themes should shape the AOWC SF and SOF-track curriculum at CGSC and, when appropriate, each individual course of instruction.

ARSOF Vision 2010 states the need by 2002 to know what DOTMLPF changes will be necessary for ARSOF, emphasizing, "We must determine the best way to employ ARSOF built on good people who are well trained and well educated '(USASOC 1997, 9). Neither of these two extracts directly assists in shaping a CGSC SF and SOF curriculum, but both indicate the importance of deciding now if leadership development for the future SOF force is adequate. Part of that decision should consider SF officer leader development and the need for an 18A/SF Advanced Course (USASOC 1997, 9, 10).

# USASOC Strategic Planning Guidance 2001

The current USASOC Strategic Planning Guidance states that leadership development must be reviewed for relevancy, capability, and capacity to ensure that basic 46 and advanced SOF skills are adequately preparing SOF personnel to meet the worldwide conditions and challenges of the present and the future. Additionally, it maintains that changes by 2010 will include more joint and more interagency collaboration, and places more emphasis on teaching NCOs, junior officers, and warrant officers joint war planning and fighting skills (USASOC 2001, 21). These extracts express the importance of joint education and joint war planning, and stress the significance USASOC places on leadership.

Lastly, USASOC Strategic Planning Guidance 2001 validates the nine SOF missions, as the command's core tasks. While not all nine SOF missions are within the scope of SF officers, validation of these missions as the command's core tasks emphasizes the need to educate SF officers for what they are required to know and do. Basing SF officer advanced education based on SF competencies, rather than Army competencies, seems more likely to prepare these officers for what they must know and do throughout the remainder of their careers (USASOC 2001, 12).

# "Objective Force Concept for Army SOF" (Draft)

Despite the fact that the "Objective Force Concepts for SOF" is only a draft document, it gives insight into SF and SOF well into the future. In fact, this document could be viewed as the most relevant planning tool available for shaping intermediate level SF and SOF officer education. A central theme within the document is that ARSOF, in general, will operate as joint operational organizations with joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TRADOC 2002, Part I). Moreover, it supports all joint SOF learning areas extracted from Appendix A of USSOCOM Directive 621-1, dated 10 October 1996. Additionally, the SF objective force concept emphasizes the importance of 47 in-country expertise, cultural understanding, language, and interpersonal skills. These are basic to SF competencies, however, are not significant aspects of Army competencies.

Chapter 3, "Objective Force Concept for SF," repeatedly refers to building rapport with indigenous populations, cultural sensitivity, and self-sustainment. Even more significant is that it states that the objective force SF core competency is to negotiate and leverage indigenous and surrogate partners to achieve U.S. objectives. Army competencies outlined in FM 22-100 simply do not reinforce these skills. The SF core competencies outlined in FM 3-05.20 are focused on advising and assisting host nation forces. Additionally, chapter 3 emphasizes that future SOF command and control will be "born joint and integrate information from joint, multinational, and interagency players" (TRADOC 2002, chapter 3). This supports the importance of joint and joint SOF education and joint SOF war planning being integral to any SF intermediate level or advanced education curriculum.

The above discussion of *ARSOF Vision 2010*, USASOC strategic planning guidance and objective force concepts for ARSOF supports the position that SF officer intermediate advanced education should be based on SF competencies and not Army competencies

# U.S. Army and SF Core Competencies Comparison

Using FM 22-100, TRADOC and CGSC developed a framework of seven competencies that identify supporting skills and behaviors, excluding character (Be), as a part of the framework. Those seven competencies include interpersonal, conceptual, technical, tactical, influencing, operating, and improving (FM 31 1999, 1-3). Figure 3 depicts the author's view of how Army competencies correspond to SF competencies.

The first SF competency to be discussed is intercultural. It consists of interpersonal skills, nonverbal skills, language proficiency, and area and cultural orientation. According to FM 3-05.20, interpersonal skills are the ability to listen with understanding, the ability to maintain an open mind, and the sensitivity to observe and grasp the essential components of a given situation. Nonverbal skills refer to understanding gestures and behavior. Language proficiency refers to speaking one of more native languages of a targeted region. Area and cultural orientation is a thorough understanding of the cultural and religious history and the social, political, and economic dynamics of given population groups (FM 3-05.20 2001, 1-7). This SF competency is oriented to interaction with host nation counterparts, while the comparable Army competency, "interpersonal" skills, is directed at interaction with U.S. soldiers. This is the greatest variation between these two competencies. The second difference between the two is the SF focus on area and cultural orientation. However, the Army "interpersonal" competency has supporting performances (conflict resolution, negotiating, and conflict resolution) that would benefit SF officers, if incorporated into AOWC.

Problem solving for SF is the ability to analyze a situation, then adapt and apply U.S. doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, equipment, and methods in a culturally sensitive and appropriate manner to resolve difficult issues in nonstandard situations. The comparable Army competency is "conceptual" or conceptual thinking. Again, the most significant difference between this comparable SF and Army competency is the focus. SF is directed towards advising and assisting host nation forces, while the Army is directed inward towards its own operations. The second variance is that the Army includes

cultural awareness in its conceptual competency, while SF includes cultural awareness as a part of its intercultural competency.

From here forward the thesis discussion is not as straightforward because there is not a simple comparison of one SF competency to one Army competency. In nearly all instances, individual SF competencies align with multiple Army competencies.

Starting with the Army "technical" competency, the Army includes in this competency job-related abilities and basic soldier skills, including leveraging of technology skills, resourcing skills, prediction of second and third order effects, knowledge of equipment skills, and information dominance (FM 22-100 1999, 4-11, 4-12). Additionally, supporting performances include knowing how to operate the Army's digital command and control systems, and understanding how the Army runs, to include training and time management, campaign planning, and using the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) (Cubic 2001, 12-12). This one Army competency incorporates two SF competencies: advanced technology and war fighting. The SF advanced technology competency is adapting military and civilian technology in innovative ways. This SF competency directly corresponds to the Army's "technical" competency, but differs in its use of nonstandard, off the shelf technology. SF officers can benefit from ILE and AOWC instruction on the use of standard Army command and control systems that are used by SF and SOF organizations. However, the use of nonstandard civilian technology is an area that, if added, must be incorporated in the CGSC SOF curriculum.

The SF war-fighting competency is comparable to the Army's technical competency. The latter's focus is on job-related abilities and basic soldier skills (FM 22-100 1999, 4-11, 4-12). The SF war-fighting competency is comparable in that its focus is

on conventional maneuver tactics, combat patrolling, light infantry tactics, techniques, and procedure skills, and the integration of fire and maneuver skills. It further includes advanced training in operations, intelligence, medical, engineering, communications, PSYOP, and civil affairs skills. Army technical competency supporting skills that directly support these areas will enhance the SF and SOF-track curriculum. PSYOP, and civil affairs skills are not a part of the Army's technical competency, and must be incorporated in the SF and SOF-track curriculum (FM 3-05.20 2001, 1-6).

Next, the Army tactical competency involves solving tactical problems concerning the employment of units in combat, doctrine skills, and synchronization skills. Further, it includes a multitude of supporting performances, to include Army and joint operational doctrine, battalion through corps and joint task force operations, battlefield operating systems integration and synchronization, terrain analysis and mobility, battletracking, battlefield functional areas, homeland defense, and military operations other than war (FM 22-100 1999, 4-12; Cubic 2001, 12-13). The SF competencies of problem solving, political awareness, and intercultural skills correspond to the Army "tactical" competency. The SF problem-solving and intercultural competencies were discussed above. The parallel between these competencies and the Army's tactical competency is within joint doctrine, joint task force operations, and military operations other than war. FM 3-05.20 defines problem solving as the ability to analyze a situation, then adapt and apply U.S. doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and equipment (2001, 1-8). The Army conceptual competency includes critical reasoning and thinking (FM 22-100 1999, 4-6). A definite parallel exists between the two. However, a difference again lies in the Army's focus on internal operations, where the SF competency is oriented toward

adapting U.S. doctrine, tactics, and equipment in relation to advising and assisting host nation forces. ILE & AOWC will offer SF many opportunities to exercise critical reasoning and thinking skills, and these opportunities should be seized. However, relating to a foreign counterpart is not an area reinforced or exercised in ILE and AOWC; thus, it will have to be integrated within the SOF-track curriculum.

The SF political awareness competency includes three aspects: understanding U.S. policies, goals and objectives; being able to articulate them to convince foreign counterparts to support them; and understanding the political context within which a foreign counterpart operates (FM 3-05.20 2001, 1-8). Like the previous SF competencies, this competency focuses on working with and advising foreign counterparts. While much of the this competency can be satisfied by ILE's joint professional military education requirements, CGSC has yet to institute any instruction or exercise that supports convincing foreign counterparts to support U.S. objectives or understanding the political context within which a foreign counterpart operates. Likewise, this is not currently a part of the CGSC SOF curriculum and should be reviewed to determine how to integrate these learning objectives.

The Army's "influencing" competency consists of two very broad skills, communicating and decision making (FM 2-100 1999, 4-2 - 4-5; Cubic 2001, 12-15). What distinguishes this Army competency from other similar Army competencies is that it is part of doing rather than knowing. Some supporting performances include envisioning, media support, maintaining and building teams, personal courage, and shaping of the environment (Cubic 2001, 12-16). Comparable SF competencies are interagency, joint, combined and multinational operations, and political awareness. The first of these two SF competencies is focused on filling the operational void between civilian-dominated or civilian-led activities and military operations, facilitating joint operations, enabling combined operations, and integrating foreign, regular, or irregular forces into a multinational operation (FM 3-05.20 2001, 1-8). The link between the two SF competencies above and the Army influencing competency lies in the Army's supporting behavior of team building. SOF curriculum developers should seek ILE and AOWC opportunities that may support this similar SF competency. However, because the Army's focus is building the Army team rather than the joint or multinational teams, ILE and AOWC may not support these SOF competencies.

The SF political awareness competency on the surface appears to align with the Army influencing competency, but when Army competency supporting behaviors are reviewed, the link becomes more difficult to establish. Beyond embedded joint instruction in CGSC, this Army competency and its supporting behaviors do not provide much promise for providing any direct complimentary education to the SF political awareness competency.

The Army operating competency consists of several supporting behaviors that appear to provide significant promise for supporting comparable SF competencies; interagency, joint, and combined and multinational operations; austere or hostile environments; and training. The first of these SF competencies was discussed above. The second of the three consists of operating in austere or hostile environments for extended periods of time with little or no external support (FM 3-05.20 2001, 1-8). The SF training competency consists of assessing individual and unit requirements, developing and implementing programs, and subsequently assessing programs. The Army operating competency supports behaviors focused on planning, to include coalition planning, decentralized decision making, joint teams and operations, operational assessment, interagency assessment, and decision points and branches, which are all excellent supporting behaviors that may provide opportunities from which SF officers may benefit (Cubic 2001, 12-16--12-17).

The last Army competency for comparison is "improving." Supporting behaviors include assessing both individuals and units with the intent of developing and transforming both for the future (Cubic 2001, 12-18--12-19). Individually, this involves mentoring individuals with the purpose of professional development. The most similar SF competency is training, which I outlined above as assessing individual and unit requirements, developing and implementing programs, and subsequently assessing programs. There is no difference between this SF competency and Army competency when SF are assessing their own unit or assessing and advising a foreign counterpart. Thus, the ILE curriculum potentially may offer opportunity for SF and SOF officers to leverage this supporting behavioral skills education.

# Comparison of SF Competencies and Joint SOF Learning Areas

As outlined above, the second analytical model compares the eight SF competencies with the SOF learning areas and special needs learning areas contained in Appendix A (Joint SOF Learning Areas) to USSOCOM Directive 621-1, dated 10 October 1996. The purpose of conducting this comparison is to identify the joint SOF learning areas and subordinate learning objectives that support SF competencies and, thus, might be integrated into a focused intermediate level SOF curriculum at CGSC. The discussion is limited to an overall analysis of the five basic SOF learning areas and

special needs learning areas 8, 9 and 11, followed by a detailed discussion of one of those learning areas. As a result of this study, it is believed that the other special needs areas are beyond the education requirements of intermediate SF officers.

In nearly all instances, joint SOF primary learning objectives should be studied on an individual basis either prior to arriving at CGSC or as part of supporting reading in preparation for classroom instruction. They represent information that individuals need to know, but which does not require subsequent analysis or synthesis. As a part of this study, SOF learning areas and special needs areas and individual learning objectives are rank ordered. This rank ordering is based on a score attained by dividing the total number of SF competencies identified as supporting a subordinate learning area by the relevant learning objectives contained under an individual subordinate learning area. Learning area 3, subordinate learning area 3.1, joint SOF applications in multinational operations, as shown in table 2 was selected to illustrate this process. This learning area was chosen for two reasons. First, it scored the highest among the joint SOF learning and special needs areas. Second, it is the only learning area or special needs area that has only one subordinate learning area. Thus, it is feasible to discuss this learning area in its entirety in a relatively short space. All other joint SOF learning areas and special needs areas contain multiple subordinate learning areas and multiple subordinate learning objectives, requiring a significant amount of space and time to discuss. The analytical results for all five joint SOF learning and special needs areas are located at appendix A.

|                  | Learning Area. 3.1 – Joint SOF applications in Multinational Operations (MNO).   |  |   |  |   |   |   |  |
|------------------|--|--|---|--|---|---|---|--|
|                  |  | Primary  | Primary   | Intermediate   | Intermediate  | Intermediate  | Intermediate  |  |
| ces Competencies |  | Know the<br>range of<br>tasks SOF<br>could<br>perform in<br>MNO. | Know the basic<br>capabilities and<br>limitations of<br>SOF in the<br>multinational<br>environment. | Comprehend<br>the<br>implications<br>of MNO on<br>Joint SOF<br>doctrine. | Comprehend<br>the range of<br>SOF tasks in<br>MNO activities. | Comprehend the cultural,<br>organizational and political<br>influences, to include<br>DOD, NGOS, PVOS, D'S,<br>GGA, the media and public<br>opinion on the<br>development and<br>application of SOF in<br>Multinational Operations. | Comprehend MNO<br>command and<br>control (C2)<br>relationships. |  |
|                  | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |  |   |  |   |   |   |  |
|                  | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   |  |   |  |   |   |   |  |
|                  | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills, area<br>& cultural awareness,<br>language proficiency   |  |   |  |   | х   | х   |  |
|                  | Problem<br>Solving   |  |   | Х  | Х   | Х   | Х   |  |
|                  | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   |  |   | х  | х   | Х   | х   |  |
|                  | Political<br>Awareness   |  |   | Х  |   | Х   | Х   |  |
| OL               | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |   |  |   |   |   |  |
| Special Forces   | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |  |   |  |   |   |   |  |

Table 2. Learning Area 3: Multinational Operations (MNO) arning Area. 3.1 – Joint SOF applications in Multinational Operations (MNO

In this instance, fourteen SF competencies that are supported by the subordinate learning objectives contained in this learning area were identified. Thus, by dividing the fourteen SF competencies by the four intermediate level subordinate learning objectives, a score of 3.5 is assigned to learning area 3. A higher score is better as it represents a greater number of SF competencies supported by a learning area. The more SF competencies supported by a learning objective, the greater its educational return. In theory, this formula should dictate which learning areas should be given greater priority in an academic environment, and certainly should be considered. However, it is not proposed that the results here be strictly used to develop or modify an existing curriculum. The author does believe that the results should be reviewed and considered, as the analysis is based on the only set of SOF learning areas ever formally developed within USSOCOM.

Following is the rank ordering of the five joint SOF learning areas and special

needs. Appendix C contains the results of the analysis for each learning area and special

needs.

*Learning Area 3: Multinational Operations.* 14 competencies divided by 4 learning objectives = Average of 3.5 SF competencies supported

*Special Needs 8: Regional Requirements.* 86 competencies divided by 29 learning objectives = Average of 2.97 SF competencies supported

*Special Needs 11: Commanders.* 97 competencies divided by 35 learning objectives = Average of 2.77 SF competencies supported

*Learning Area 2: Joint Service Operations (SOF integration with General Purpose Forces).* 39 competencies divided by 16 learning objectives = Average of 2.44 SF competencies supported

Special Needs 9: Special Operations Liaison Element. 67 competencies divided by 28 learning objectives = Average of 2.4 SF competencies supported

*Learning area 5: Information Warfare.* 7 competencies divided by 3 learning objectives = Average of 2.33 SF competencies supported

*Learning Area 4: Interagency Operations.* 23 competencies divided by 10 learning objectives = Average of 2.3 SF competencies supported

*Learning Area 1: Joint SOF (SOF learning about SOF).* 22 competencies divided by 12 learning objectives = Average of 1.83 SF competencies supported

In addition to a rank ordering of joint SOF learning and special needs areas,

ordered individual learning objectives are ranked without regard to their learning area or

special needs category. Each learning area and subordinate learning objective was

reviewed to determine how many SF competencies a learning objective supported. The

range was from none to all eight SF competencies used for the analysis. Only those

learning objectives that supported three SF learning objectives or more were included.

This list, located at appendix C, included fifty-seven joint SOF learning objectives that

supported three or more SF competencies. Consequently, 108 joint SOF learning objectives supported from none to two SF competencies.

In order to provide some insight as to how it was determined if an SF competency supported a joint SOF learning objective, the author has chosen to discuss Learning Area 3: Multinational Operations, outlined above in figure 3. The first learning objective evaluated against the eight SF competencies was "comprehend the implications of multinational operations on joint SOF doctrine." This requires problem solving, an SF competency. Thus, this learning objective supports learning in this competency area. Second, working in a multinational environment supports the SF interagency, joint and combined operations competency. Next, working in a multinational environment typically requires SF to integrate host nation forces into the multinational operation. Thus, this learning objective further supports the SF war-fighting competency. In order to properly work with host nation forces and a foreign counterpart, SF officers must be sensitive to U.S. policies, goals, and objectives and be able to articulate them in a manner that convinces their foreign counterparts to support them. Similarly, they must understand the political context within which their counterparts operate (FM 3-05.20 2001, 1-8). Consequently, this joint SOF learning objective further supports the political awareness competency.

The second learning objective evaluated was "comprehend the range of SOF tasks in multinational operations activities." While this learning objective supports the overall learning area very well, it supports only two SF competencies. Comprehending the range of SOF tasks during multinational operations requires an individual to fully grasp the nature of the multinational operation as it relates to SF and SOF capabilities and limitations. Hence, the SF problem-solving competency is supported by this learning objective. Secondly, the multinational nature of this learning objective, like the previous learning objective, supports the SF interagency, joint and combined operations competency.

The third joint SOF learning objective evaluated was "comprehend the cultural, organizational, and political influences, to include DOD, nongovernmental organizations, governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, international organizations, other government organizations, the media and public opinion on the development and application of SOF in multinational operations." This learning objective implies an understanding of how these organizations influence the development and application of SOF in multinations. Accordingly, this learning objective supports the SF problem-solving competency. Terms, such as "cultural," establish a relationship to the SF intercultural competency. Likewise, words, such as "political influences," and acronyms, such as "DOD," demonstrate a relationship to the SF political awareness and interagency, joint, and combined operations competencies.

The last learning objective evaluated was "comprehend multinational operations command and control relationships." When considered in the context of the entire learning area and other learning objectives, this requires going beyond just knowing the participants, necessitating the analysis of the operational and political environment, thus, supporting the SF problem-solving competency. A study of any multinational operation would likely involve some political facet, since by definition it involves two or more sovereign nations. When one views these varied characteristics together, this learning objective supports the political awareness, interagency, joint and combined operations, and intercultural SF competencies.

## 18A/SF Officer Advanced Studies Program

During the April 2001 SF Branch conference, seminar groups were established to address changes within SF. Seminar 7 was directed to validate the need for an 18A/SF Advanced Course and to provide recommended milestones for implementation of the program. Figure 4 outlines the seminar's final recommendation for an 18A/Special Force Officer Advanced Course. Bottom line, the seminar, chaired by Brigadier General Tom Csrnko, recommended only considering an SF masters program, and suggested it be moved from the JFK&SWSC to JSOU. The translation here is that the Army SOF community validated advanced education of 18A/SF officers, but recommended the passing the responsibility to JSOU, that is, to USSOCOM, since JSOU is a part of requirement for USSOCOM. A January 2001 Individual Task Working Group established broad Individual tasks for 18A/SF officers. A subsequent March 2001 Working Group reviewed the tasks and examined the potential structure for an 18A/SF Officer Advanced Course, not merely a masters program, as was recommended in April 2001 (U.S. Army Special Forces Command 2001, UW brief). The goal of the 18A Advanced Studies Program is to produce 18A's with enhanced SF skills and abilities who are prepared for duties as 0-4s, 18A's in any organization and at any level (from the SF ODB to service and joint headquarters elements to anywhere in the interagency community) and are able to persuasively articulate the need for UW/UO, and then capable of integrating UW/UO throughout the operational continuum to support the attainment of U.S. national objectives (U.S. Army Special Forces Command, 18A

Advanced Studies Program). Table 3 reflects highlights of three of the proposed six modules. In table 3, the critical tasks are compared to determine how they align with the eight SF competencies used in the two previous analytical models. A complete outline of the 18A/SF Advanced course with tasks is located at appendix B. The course is an excellent framework for advanced 18A/SF education, identifying broad critical tasks that should be integrated into intermediate level SF education. However, the broad framework is only an initial draft that, to the author's knowledge, has not been further considered or coordinated outside of U.S. Army Special Forces Command and USASOC. The course consists of three phases, a nonresident, preresident, and resident CGSC.

Phase I consists of distance-learning and correspondence-course-based instruction, extensive reading, research, and writing requirements to enhance an SF officers initial branch qualifying assignment as a captain.



|                |   | Table 3   | 3: April 2001 Special Forces Conference 1  | 8AAdvanced Studies Program   |
|----------------|---|---|--|--|
|                |   | TASK MODULE F<br>Demonstrate a thorough<br>knowledge of the<br>structure, organization,<br>lactics, techniques and<br>procedures applied in the<br>execution of<br>Linoanzentional<br>Warfaret/Inconventional<br>Operations (WW/CO)<br>within the Special Forces<br>Group. Focus on all<br>functions and echelons<br>within the SP Group. | TASK MODULE II:Demonstrate a thorough<br>knowledge of the <u>Theory Concept, Destrine</u> ,<br>and <u>History of UWUO and apply this to likely</u><br><u>Jutters SF UWUO activities and requirements</u> .<br>The student must demonstrate a thorough<br>understanding of the application of UWUO by SF<br>across the conflict continuum, from Peacetime<br>Engagement through Conflict Resolution to<br>Support and Stability Operations and back to<br>Peacetime Engagement, to include the linkage of<br>these activities with the activities of all other US<br>governmental agencies, to include conventional<br>military operations. | TASK MODULE III: Demonstrate a <u>therough knowledge</u><br>of the authority, mission, organization, structures and<br><u>support/supporting relationships of SF/NOF at echelons</u><br><i>Includes</i> gaining <u>althorough understanding of these</u><br><u>factors for all service and Joint SFO Granarizations</u> ,<br><u>including the JCS, USSOCOM, the Unified and Specified</u><br><u>Commonston and SOC's and the Theater Service</u><br><u>Component Headquarters, Service Headquarters,<br/>MACON's and Component Commands, MOC and the<br/><u>Special Mission Unit community</u>. Also includes a thorough<br/>understanding of Milary Force Frequent MPI in resourcing<br/>responsibilities and the relationship of this program to Service<br/>resourcing activities</u> |
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   | х   | Х  |  |
| cies           | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  | Х   |  |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   | х   | Х  |  |
| Щ              | Problem<br>Solving  |   | Х  |  |
|                | Interagency,<br>Ioint, Combined<br>& Multinational<br>Operations  | Х   | Х  | х  |
| orc            | Political<br>Awareness  | Х   | Х  |  |
| Ц              | Advanced<br>Technology  |   |  |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>–Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile, remote<br>& austere environments<br>with little or no external<br>support | х   | x  |  |

Phase II is projected to be a three-week course conducted in conjunction with, but just prior to, reporting into resident CGSC. The purpose of phase II is to ensure all participating 18A's possess the same baseline of knowledge and information regarding SF/SOF doctrine, futures concepts, emerging technology, and the SF, UW and UO contribution to U.S. national policy objectives. The Phase II culminating event requires the SF officers to develop and brief a UW/UO campaign plan for a specific region in a future setting (ten-twenty years out) as a member of a working group.

Phase III consists of Army resident CGSC instruction and is aimed at preparing each SF officer for a follow-on branch qualifying assignment as a company commander, battalion S-3/XO or group S-3 in an SF group. Every SF officer will conduct an individual study and research of a targeted region, subsequently completing a master's thesis to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the historical, cultural, political, and other influences within the selected region, and to ensure that he is able to apply UW/UO in support of the U.S. national objectives for that region. Additionally, SF officers participate in seminar type learning and attend guest lectures (U.S. Army Special Forces Command 2001).

Regarding education conducted on an individual basis, significant effort is necessary to determine how it would be evaluated, what institution would be responsible for overseeing such a program; what education would be conducted in residence, and what organization would have responsibility for organizing and implementing an inresidence portion. Additionally, analysis must continue to link the six task modules to the three phases of the course: nonresident, preresident, and resident. While much would be required to coordinate and implement this proposal, it is the most comprehensive attempt to resolve this educational void within the SF branch. The author's only critique of the proposal is that it is solely focused on unconventional warfare and does not incorporate operational level, joint, and joint SOF theater-wide planning education. The most recent USASOC Strategic Planning Guidance (2001) and Draft Objective Force Concepts for Army Special Operations Forces both project more emphasis on joint operations in the future. Likewise, this represents the position of the joint staff and DOD. Officers and NCOs who understand the concepts of joint, joint SOF, command and control, capabilities and limitations, and others will be most successful in the future. Their successes and shortcomings will have a direct impact on future successes and failures of the SOF community. Thus, limiting this aspect of the joint and joint SOF military education is a shortcoming with potential negative impacts on all of SOF. Lastly, the proposal to conduct a three-week minicourse just prior to CGSC is an excellent idea.

However, the cost in time, qualified instructors, classroom resources, and others may preclude this from being supported. A feasible alternative is to incorporate this phase into CGSC, conducted immediately following ILE core instruction. It may not be possible to implement the entire phase in a three-week period following ILE core instruction, but it may feasible for it to be conducted between November and January of the academic year.
### CHAPTER 5

### FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### What influence has USSOCOM had on SOF education?

Title 10, United States Code, Section 167 directs the Commander, USSOCOM, to train assigned forces to meet special operations mission taskings and to ensure interoperability with conventional forces and other SOF (DOD 1996, 1). In my view, SOF education has markedly improved over the years since the founding of USSOCOM. JSOFI was established in 1994 to preserve a broad and consistent SOF PME system to improve the development of leaders. However, a formal SOF PME system did not exist then, and in the author's view a truly formal SOF PME system does not exist now. USSOCOM Directive 621-1 states that the Joint Special Operations Education System complements and supplements existing service and joint professional military education (USSOCOM 2001, 6). This is an accurate characterization of the system. But what is not clear is that if service and joint PME institutions do not have a SOF PME program, then USSOCOM has nothing to complement and supplement. TRADOC and CGSC had no SOF PME program prior to the establishment of USSOCOM, and until AY 1998-99 the program was inconsistent at best. Support has varied depending on the number of assigned SOF instructors, operations tempo, and SOF visibility with current DOD operations.

The responsibility for professional education begins with USSOCOM, and must include an emphasis on the professional education of SOF officers attending PME institutions, at both intermediate and senior levels. USSOCOM was established over fifteen years ago, and for fifteen years it has directed much of its education efforts on

educating DOD, interagency, and international military personnel about SOF. This is emphasized in USSOCOM's 2001-02 memorandum to formal SOF chairs. These efforts may be appropriate at senior level PME institutions, and possibly at the Air Force and Navy equivalents to CGSOC, where the numbers of SF and SOF officer student population does not exceed more than thirty officers. However, such an effort is not appropriate for CGSC based on the large number of SF and SOF officers presently attending CGSOC, and even larger numbers projected to attend ILE and AOWC in the future.

The USASOC and CAC initiative to establish a SOF element resident at CAC and CGSC will provide a formalized stable organization to oversee SF and SOF PME at CGSC. However, this does not directly resolve the SOF PME issue. PME goes well beyond simply establishing a SOF element. USSOCOM's interpretation of its responsibilities under Title 10, and, subsequently, USASOC's involvement in SF and ARSOF PME are the issues. USSOCOM is presently content to "complement and supplement" existing service PME primarily through the USSOCOM SOF chair program. Additionally, USSOCOM supports intermediate level PME SOF faculty through JSOU. However, only SOF chairs are members of the USSOCOM formal Joint Special Operations Education Council, and recently only SOF chairs receive USSOCOM commander PME guidance. In the author's opinion, the exclusion of intermediate PME SOF faculty as formal members of the SOF education council, and elimination of intermediate PME institutions from formal USSOCOM PME communiqué is detrimental to SOF PME. The Army CGSC SOF curriculum is the only true effort to provide intermediate SOF PME education within all of DOD, reaching the largest number of both

SOF and non-SOF leaders of all PME institutions. Further, it reaches both SOF and non-SOF leaders at the point in their careers when they are first learning operational level and joint doctrine, not at the end of their careers like those attending senior level PME institutions. SOF officers attending any other service intermediate level PME institution receive little, if any, joint SOF education at a juncture in their careers when their familiarization with joint and joint SOF doctrine is essential. Ultimately, the knowledge of joint and joint SOF may be the difference between the life and death of SOF soldiers, sailors and airmen. The Army intermediate PME institution is focused on educating officers for duties as DOD's dominant "Land Force," not DOD's dominant "Special Operations Force." The ILE AOWC focus is battalion and brigade command, and developing competencies to serve successfully at division through EAC staffs. Neither the current CGSOC focus nor future ILE AOWC focus is designed to prepare SF and SOF officers for success during the remainder of their careers. The author is confident the other service PME institutions are likewise focused on educating their officers based on their service's role within DOD, not on special operations. Thus, unless USSOCOM and USASOC take responsibility for shaping the professional education of their officers, SOF officers will not receive tailored SOF education for duties as intermediate- and seniorlevel officers. It is the author's opinion that USSOCOM must take a more aggressive stance regarding SOF PME, with particular focus on intermediate level PME. Each service PME institution should provide sufficient SOF-specific education to prepare SOF officers for joint SOF duties as field grade officers. If this is not feasible, then the author proposes that the Army CGSC SOF track being integrated into AOWC become USSOCOM's intermediate-level PME SOF education for all joint SOF officers.

Regardless, the author strongly recommends USASOC formally commit to intermediate and advanced PME education of its officers in coordination with TRACOC. This commitment should be implemented in conjunction with the establishment of the SOF element at CAC and CGSC.

### Why should SF competencies be the basis for intermediate level SF officer education?

ILE is tied to the requirements of an officer's specific career field, branch, or FA, and is intended to produce a field grade officer with a warrior ethos grounded in warfighting doctrine, and who has the technical, tactical, and leadership competencies and skills to be successful in his or her career field, branch, or FA (Fort Leavenworth Lamp, U.S. Army News Release, "Army Approves Changes to Officer Education System," 6 February 2003, 12). U.S. Army FM 3-05.20 states, "SF possess distinguishing core competencies, and many are derived from the Unconventional Warfare mission. These competencies have evolved over the years due to changing mission requirements and focus by the geographic Combatant Commanders to dictate the needs of SF training" (2001, I-8). The author contends the term training should include education. Hence, Special Forces competencies, not Army competencies, should be the basis for shaping intermediate level advanced SF education. Army competencies are appropriate for all students undergoing ILE common core instruction. However, AOWC is intended to develop requisite competencies for officers to serve successfully during the remainder of their Army careers. ARSOF Vision 2010, USASOC's 2001 Strategic Planning Guidance, and the Objective Force Concepts for Army SOF (draft) document what SOF and SF are required to know and do now and into the future. All that SF are directed to know and do in each of these documents is based on the SF competencies and supports the premise for basing AOWC SF officer education on SF competencies. A specialized curriculum designed to teach or reinforce SF skills based on SF competencies supports TRADOC's intent to prepare each officer to be successful in his or her individual career field.

### What relevant SOF learning areas can contribute to SF intermediate-level education?

This study identified several joint SOF learning areas determined through a 1995 JSOFI-Booz-Allen study that was conducted in part to assist USSOCOM service components, theater special operations commands, and PME institutions to identify critical learning areas for joint SOF. The SF competencies were compared with the five joint SOF learning areas and three additional special needs areas to determine both the most important learning areas and special needs from the entire grouping. While, the assessment is only a subjective analysis, the results should be reviewed and given strong consideration for incorporation into an intermediate level SF, ARSOF, or joint SOF curriculum. In order of priority, they include multinational operations, regional requirements (regional and cultural knowledge), commanders (component knowledge, command and control, planning, training), joint service operations (SOF integration with general-purpose forces), Special Operations Liaison Element, information warfare, interagency operations, and joint SOF (SOF learning about SOF).

This study further identified a draft 18A Advanced Studies program developed by the JFK SWC&S during the spring of 2001. The program was designed as a formal, masters degree equivalent course of study with the goal to produce 18A/SF officers with enhanced SF skills and abilities who are prepared for duties as 0-4s, in any organization and at any level (from the SF ODB to service and joint headquarters elements to anywhere in the interagency community) are able to persuasively articulate the need for 69 UW/UO, and are capable of integrating UW/UO throughout the operational continuum to support the attainment of U.S. national objectives (Compact Disk, Special Forces Branch Conference, April 2001, 18A Advanced Studies Program). This program and SF community ultimate goal for all SF officers is clearly beyond what a typical U.S. Army advanced course will provide. Hence, the author strongly recommends incorporating the draft 18A/SF Advanced Studies program outlined above into the overall SOF track specifically for SF officers. However, as concluded by MG Sidney Shachnow, former Commandant, JFK SWC&S, unless it is made a mandatory gate toward upward mobility this concept will not work. This reinforces the previous recommendation that USASOC pursue a more active role in ARSOF PME.

The proposed SF advanced studies program consists of three phases (nonresident, preresident, and CGSC resident) and six task modules beginning after assignment to an SF group and ending with resident CGSC. Only USASOC can direct that the program be compulsory for all SF officers. The author believes that if properly manned and resourced, the CAC and CGSC SOF element could manage it through to completion of a military masters of science for every SF officer.

### What Army competencies, if any, support SF advanced education?

There are several Army competencies that have supporting learning areas that offer potential for complementing and reinforcing SF competencies. In this section each will only be briefly reviewed. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed discussion.

First, the Army "interpersonal" competency has supporting performances of conflict resolution and negotiating. Clearly this would benefit SF officers if incorporated into AOWC. ILE and AOWC instruction on the use of standard Army command and

control systems that are used by SF and SOF organizations provides an opportunity to leverage existing instruction. Likewise, Army technical competency supporting skills that directly support conventional maneuver tactics will enhance the SF and SOF-track curriculum. In general, ILE & AOWC instruction offers SF officers many opportunities to exercise critical reasoning and thinking skills, and these opportunities should be seized. Much of the SF political awareness competency can be satisfied by ILE's Joint Professional Military Education I blocks of instruction. However, CGSC has yet to institute any instruction or exercise that reinforces or simulates working with foreign counterparts. Likewise, this is not currently a part of the CGSC SOF curriculum and should be reviewed to determine how to integrate these learning objectives. SOF curriculum developers should seek ILE and AOWC opportunities that support the interagency, joint, and multinational operations, and political awareness SF competency. The Army operating competency supports behaviors focused on planning, to include coalition planning, decentralized decision making, joint teams and operations, operational assessment, interagency assessment, and decision points and branches, which are all excellent supporting behaviors that may provide opportunities from which SF officers may benefit. Lastly, the ILE curriculum may offer an opportunity for SF and SOF officers to leverage Army improving competency instruction as it relates to unit assessments.

### Do SF have unique competencies upon which advanced education should be based?

SF have many unique competencies and learning areas that should shape SF and SOF education. The intercultural SF competency is oriented to interaction with host nation counterparts, while the comparable Army competency, "interpersonal" skills, is

directed at interaction with U.S. soldiers. The Army's competencies are generally oriented inward, while SF competencies are oriented outward, specifically focused on foreign counterparts. This is the single greatest difference between SF and Army competencies, and truly highlights the necessity for SF competencies to be the basis for intermediate advanced education. In fact, adoption of SF competencies as the basis for developing AOWC SF supporting learning areas supports the Army's intent to tie ILE and AOWC to the requirements of an officer's specific career field, branch or FA. Additionally, it supports the Army's intent for ILE and AOWC to produce field grade officers who have the technical, tactical, and leadership competencies and skills to be successful in his or her career field and branch, or FA.

ARSOF 2010, USASOC Strategic Planning Guidance 2001, and the SF Objective Force Concept (draft) all reinforce the need to use SF competencies as the basis for developing AOWC SF learning objectives. Each highlight in-country expertise, cultural understanding, language, interpersonal skills, and importance of negotiating and leveraging indigenous and surrogate partners to achieve U.S. national objectives. These are basic SF competencies not reinforced in ILE and AOWC, which must be addressed and incorporated into the SOF-track curriculum.

### Areas for Further Inquiry

As a part of this study, the author creates a bridge between SF competencies and some joint SOF learning areas. In the author's view, the bridge should be contained within the competencies. No one should be required to mentally create the bridge by assuming that is what was or should be intended within the explanation of an SF competency. Thus, the author recommends that the SF competencies outlined in FM

3.05.20 be evaluated to determine if they adequately prepare SF officers for operational and strategic level skills required during the bulk of their years as Army majors and beyond. For instance, while SF competencies require that officers and NCOs have an understanding of joint operations, the focus is at the tactical level, not at the operational level, the level of war at which all SF and SOF officers inevitably must learn to function and operate if SOF are to be effectively and properly employed as a joint force by operational level planners. Ultimately, this affects how tactical level SF are employed in support of the operational level of war.

### Recommendations

USASOC and CAC should validate SF competencies as the basis for SF officer intermediate level education within ILE AOWC. Further, USASOC should also develop a comprehensive list of competencies to shape ARSOF intermediate education.

USSOCOM should initiate an update of joint SOF learning areas. The joint SOF learning and special needs areas developed in 1995 remain excellent tools to assist in focusing SOF education. However, the fact is they are over seven years old and need to be updated. The War on Terrorism is in its second year, and the U.S., in conjunction with coalition partners, is presently engaged in a second war with Iraq. Lessons learned from both Afghanistan and Iraq will impact both the joint SOF learning areas and supporting learning objectives. An updated listing of learning areas will assist senior and intermediate PME institutions develop joint SOF courses of instruction.

Additionally, it is recommended that the JFK& SWCS support a study to develop intermediate level learning areas and objectives for SF officers. The purpose should be to expand the 18A/SF Advanced Studies Program goal of preparing SF majors with enhanced SF skills and abilities for duty in any organization, at any level, from SF company level to service, to joint headquarters elements, and to the interagency community. The SF major should be able to persuasively articulate the need for UW/UO, and capable of integrating UW/UO throughout the operational continuum to support the attainment of U.S. national objectives. This initiative should be done in conjunction or simultaneously with a review to SF competencies.

The author further recommends the two broad themes "leadership and creativity," outlined in *ARSOF Vision 2010*, shape all SF and SOF education. Leadership and creative, thoughtful solutions should be the foundation upon which the CGSC SOF-track for SOF leader education is designed. SF competencies and joint SOF learning areas should make up the remaining components of SF intermediate advanced education. Figure 5 depicts a graphic view of a proposed SF education model. Next, the author recommends USASOC direct the draft 18A/SF Advanced Studies Program be mandatory for all SF officers. SF officers should enroll after reporting to their initial SF assignment after completing SFQC. Successful completion is attainment of a Master of Military Art and Science degree upon graduation from CGSC. Lastly, the author recommends the CAC and CGSC SOF element be manned and resourced to manage this program for USASOC.



## APPENDIX A

## ANALYTICAL MODELS



| Army Competencies           | Special Forces Competencies  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Interpersonal Skills 🔺      | Intercultural Communications   |
|                             | <ul> <li>Interpersonal Skills</li> <li>Nonverbal Skills</li> <li>Language Proficiency</li> <li>Area &amp; Cultural Orientation</li> </ul>                |
| Conceptual Skills           | • Problem Solving  |
| Technical Skills 🗧          | <ul> <li>War -fighting</li> <li>Physical Fitness</li> <li>Clandestine Infil &amp; Exfil</li> <li>Advanced Technology</li> </ul>                          |
| Tactical Skills 🗲           | <ul> <li>Political Awareness</li> <li>Problem Solving</li> <li>Intercultural Communications (language proficiency &amp; cultural orientation)</li> </ul> |
| Influencing <del>&lt;</del> | <ul> <li>Interagency, Joint, Combined &amp;</li> <li>Multinational Operations</li> <li>Political Awareness</li> </ul>                                    |
| Operating                   | <ul> <li>Austere or Hostile Environments</li> <li>Training</li> <li>Interagency, Joint, Combined &amp;<br/>Multinational Operations</li> </ul>           |
| Improving                   | • Training   |

#### Learning Area 1: Joint SOF (SOF learning about SOF) Learning Area 1.1 National policy & joint Special Operations Forces

|                | Learning Area 1.1 National policy & joint Special Operations Forces   |   |  |   |  |   |  |  |   |  |
|----------------|---|---|--|---|--|---|--|--|---|--|
|                |   | Know basic<br>national policy,<br>major | Primary<br>Know<br>fundamental<br>principles and<br>joint doctrine<br>applicable to<br>SOF | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>national policy<br>for the<br>employment of<br><u>SOF</u> and the<br>policy<br>imperatives<br>that guide<br>military<br>operations. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>cut of Strategies<br>for SOF as it<br>relates to the larger<br>body of joint<br>docrine:<br>understand its<br><u>application for</u><br><u>planning and</u><br><u>conducting special</u><br><u>missions across the</u><br>range of military<br>operations. | doctrine provides<br>guidance for<br>SOF<br>commanders to<br>determine force<br>structure and<br>Major Force<br>Programs (MFP)<br>11 budget | Intermediate<br>Know how joim<br>doctrine. For<br>SOF provides<br>guidance for<br>training,<br>material and<br>operational<br>requirements<br>necessary to<br>prepare SOF to<br>conduct<br>assigned<br>missions and<br>collateral<br>activities. | Intermediate<br>Apply current<br>SOF policy<br>and doctrine<br>and adapt it to<br>the rapidly<br>changing<br>environment<br>and evolving<br>mission set. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>how hational<br>policy and<br>joint doctrine<br>for SOF are<br>developed to<br>include how<br>the principal<br>players<br>interact to<br>produce key<br>documents<br>and decisions. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>the impact of<br>current trends<br>in policy and<br>underlying<br>assumptions<br>about the use of<br>military forces<br>as they impact<br>on the<br>employment of<br>SOF |
| S              | Warfighting<br>Conventional<br>tactics, Light Inf<br>TTP to Bn Level,<br>Integrate fires  |   |  |   | х  |   |  |  |   |  |
| Competencies   | Training<br>Assess unit<br>programs, develop<br>& implement<br>programs   |   |  |   |  |   | х  |  |   |  |
| mpet           | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |   |  |   |  |   |  |  |   |  |
| CC             | Problem<br>Solving  |   |  | Х   | Х  | Х   | Х  | Х  | Х   | Х  |
| ces            | Interagency,<br>Ioint/Combined<br>Operations  |   |  |   | Х  |   |  |  |   |  |
| or             | Political<br>Awareness  |   |  | Х   |  | Х   |  | Х  | Х   | Х  |
| al I           | Advanced<br>Technology<br>Austere or  |   |  |   |  |   |  |  |   |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>– Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |   |  |   |  |   |  |  |   |  |

| Learning Area 1.2 - | <ul> <li>SOF roles, mission areas</li> </ul> | , collateral activities | , organizations capabilities & limitations. |
|---------------------|--|-------------------------|---|
|---------------------|--|-------------------------|---|

|                |  | -  |   |  |  |   |  |   |  |
|----------------|--|--|---|--|--|---|--|---|--|
|                |  | Primary<br>Know the<br>primary<br>mission areas<br>and collateral<br>activities of<br>SOF<br>organizations | Primary<br>Know how<br>SOF forces<br>are<br>operationally<br>organized and<br>interact with<br>each other | Primary<br>Know the<br>general<br>capabilities<br>and<br>limitations<br>of SOF<br>units. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>SOF's primary<br>mission areas,<br>SOF's collateral<br>activities, and the<br>organization<br>within USSOCOM<br>service staffs and<br>[OASD (SO/LIC)]. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>the<br>capabilities<br>and<br>limitations of<br>SOF | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>how to employ<br>/ integrate joint<br>SOF. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>how to<br>employ SOF<br>organizations<br>unilaterally | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>the<br>implications of<br>evolving<br>missions on<br>SOF<br>organizations,<br>structure and<br>training. |
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional<br>tactics, Light Inf<br>TTP to Bn Level,<br>Integrate fires   |  |   |  |  |   |  |   |  |
| S              | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   |  |   |  |  |   |  |   | х  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |  |   |  |  |   |  |   |  |
| pet            | Problem<br>Solving   |  |   |  | х  | Х   | х  | Х   | Х  |
| Com            | Interagency,<br>Ioint, Combined<br>& Multinational<br>Operations   |  |   |  | х  | х   | х  |   |  |
| es             | Political<br>Awareness   |  |   |  |  |   |  |   |  |
| orc            | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |   |  |  |   |  |   |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |  |   |  |  |   |  |   |  |

#### Learning Area 1.3 - SOF heritage, history and culture

|                             |  | Primary  | Intermediate  | Intermediate   |  |  |  |
|-----------------------------|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|
|                             |  | Know the<br>history, heritage,<br>culture and core<br>values of SOF<br>and its major<br>organizations. | Comprehend the<br>historical basis for<br>establishment of<br>USSOCOM, its<br>component<br>commands, OASD<br>(SO/LIC) and their<br>structure, policies and<br>strategies. | Comprehend the<br>history, heritage,<br>culture and core<br>values of SOF and<br>its major<br>organizations. |  |  |  |
|                             | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| S                           | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| Special Forces Competencies | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |  |   |  |  |  |  |
|                             | Problem<br>Solving   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| s Cor                       | Interagency,<br>Joint, Combined<br>& Multinational<br>Operations   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| rce                         | Political<br>Awareness   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| Fo                          | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| Special                     | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostlie, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |  |   |  |  |  |  |

| Learning Area 2: Joint Service Operations (SOF integration with General Purpose Forces) |
|---|
| Learning Area 2.1 - Joint doctrine for SOF at the operational/theater level.            |

|                |  | Primary<br>Know joint<br>SOF doctrine<br>at the theater /<br>operational<br>level. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>joint SOF<br>doctrine at the<br>operational /<br>theater level. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>theater<br>command and<br>control<br>relationships<br>as they apply<br>to SOF | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>concepts of<br>joint task force<br>organization,<br>employment,<br>sustainment<br>and operations,<br>with special<br>emphasis on<br>SOF | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>roles and<br>missions of<br>SOF in joint<br>theater - level<br>operations. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>general purpose<br>force doctrinal<br>missions,<br>organizations,<br>capabilities and<br>limitations. |  |  |  |  |
|----------------|--|--|---|---|---|--|---|--|--|--|--|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |  |   |   |   |  | х   |  |  |  |  |
|                | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   |  |   |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |  |   |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| pet            | Problem<br>Solving   |  | Х   | Х   | Х   | Х  | Х   |  |  |  |  |
| Com            | Interagency,<br>Joint, Combined<br>& Multinational<br>Operations   |  | х   | Х   | х   | х  | Х   |  |  |  |  |
| es             | Political<br>Awareness   |  |   |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| orc            | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |   |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>-Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |  |   |   |   |  |   |  |  |  |  |

| ÷              |   | Primary   | Primary   | Primary                 | Primary  | Intermediate  | Intermediate   | Intermediate  | Intermediate  | Intermediate   | Intermediat   |
|----------------|---|---|---|-------------------------|----------|---|--|---|---|--|---|
|                |   | Know how<br>SOF<br>integrates<br>into joint<br>theater-level<br>planning. | Know the<br>principles of joint<br>crisis action<br>planning, to<br>include those<br>described in Joint<br>Task Forces (JTF)<br>headquarters'<br>Mission Tasking<br>Packet (MTP). | Know the<br>purpose and | Know how | Comprehend<br>how SOF<br>integrates into<br>joint theater-<br>level<br>planning | Comprehend<br>the Joint<br>Strategic<br>Planning<br>System (JSPS),<br>adaptive force<br>packaging and<br>Time-Phased<br>Force and<br>Deployment<br>Data <u>TPFDD</u><br>development. | Comprehend<br>The purpose<br>and<br>applications of<br>JOPES. | Comprehend<br>joint <u>crisis</u><br>action planning<br>fundamentals,<br>to include those<br>described in | Know the<br>fundamental<br>principles,<br>concepts and | Comprehend<br>how SOF is<br>organized to<br><u>plan_execute</u><br>and <u>sustain</u><br>for joint<br>operations. |
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional<br>tactics, Light Inf<br>TTP to Bn Level,<br>Integrate fires  |   |   |                         |          |   | de relogateta.   |   |   |  |   |
| icies          | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  |   |   |                         |          |   |  |   |   |  |   |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |   |   |                         |          |   |  |   |   |  |   |
| on             | Problem<br>Solving  |   |   |                         |          | Х   | Х  | Х   | Х   | х  | Х   |
|                | Interagency,<br>Joint, Combined<br>& Multinational<br>Operations  |   |   |                         |          | Х   | Х  | Х   | Х   | Х  | х   |
| or             | Political<br>Awareness  |   |   |                         |          |   |  |   |   |  |   |
| ιH             | Advanced<br>Technology  |   |   |                         |          |   |  |   |   |  |   |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |   |   |                         |          |   |  |   |   |  |   |

### Learning Area 2.3 – Peacetime Operations.

|                             |   | Primary   | Primary  | Intermediate   | Intermediate  |
|-----------------------------|---|---|--|--|---|
|                             |   | Know the<br>capabilities<br>and<br>limitations of<br>SOF in joint<br>Peacetime<br>operations. | Know the cultural, organizational<br>and political influences of alliance or<br>coalition partners, Private Volumeer<br>Organizations (PVOs), International<br>Organizations (Sto), Bepartnent of<br>Delense (DOD), Not Governmental<br>Organizations (Not Governmental<br>Organizations (Not Governmental<br>Organizations (Not Governmental<br>Organizations), Not Governmental<br>Organizations (Not Governmental<br>Organizations), Not Governmental<br>Organizations (Not Governmental<br>Organizations), Not Governmental<br>Organizations (Not Sto), Net<br>Methyla (Not Sto), Net<br>Organizations | Comprehend the cultural,<br>organizational and political<br>influences of alliance or coalition<br>partners, PVOs, IOs, DOD,<br>NGOS, OGA, the media, and<br>public opinion on the<br>development of plans and<br>application of SOF in Peacetime<br>Operations. | Apply knowledge of roles,<br>missions, organizations,<br>capabilities and limitations of<br>major participating agencies in<br>application of SOF in Peacetime<br>Operations. |
|                             | Warfighting<br>Conventional<br>tactics, Light Inf<br>TTP to Bn Level,<br>Integrate fires  |   |  |  |   |
| ncies                       | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  |   |  |  |   |
| ipeter                      | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |   |  |  |   |
| οu                          | Problem Solving   |   |  | Х  | Х   |
| es Co                       | Interagency,<br>Joint, Combined<br>& Multinational<br>Operations  |   |  | Х  | Х   |
| orc                         | Political<br>Awareness  |   |  | Х  | Х   |
| Ē                           | Advanced<br>Technology  |   |  |  |   |
| Special Forces Competencies | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>– Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |   |  | Х  | Х   |

# 80

| Learning Area 2.4- | Support & | Sustainment | planning. |
|--------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
|--------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|

| -              |   | Primary  | Intermediate  | Intermediate   | Intermediate   |  |  |  |
|----------------|---|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|
|                |   | Know how<br>to plan for,<br>request and<br>receive<br>sustainment<br>support in<br>the joint<br>arena. | Comprehend<br>fundamental logistic<br>and other support<br>requirements (to<br>include intelligence<br>fire support,<br>communications) for<br>SOF in joint<br>operations | Comprehend Special<br>Operations-unique<br>logistics assets and<br>structure that are<br>available to support SOF. | Comprehend service<br>and theater<br>responsibility for<br>providing common<br>and / or troop<br>support to SOF. |  |  |  |
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| ies            | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills, area<br>& cultural awareness,<br>language proficiency  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| ube            | Problem<br>Solving  |  | Х   | Х  | Х  |  |  |  |
| s Com          | Interagency,<br>Joint, Combined<br>& Multinational<br>Operations  |  | х   | х  |  |  |  |  |
| ë              | Political<br>Awareness  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
| ō              | Advanced<br>Technology  |  | Х   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |  | Х   | х  |  |  |  |  |

Learning Area 3: Multinational Operations (MNO) Learning Area. 3.1 – Joint SOF applications in Multinational Operations (MNO).

|                |  | Primary  | Primary   | Intermediate   | Intermediate  | Intermediate  | Intermediate  |  |
|----------------|--|--|---|--|---|---|---|--|
|                |  | Know the<br>range of<br>tasks SOF<br>could<br>perform in<br>MNO. | Know the basic<br>capabilities and<br>limitations of<br>SOF in the<br>multinational<br>environment. | Comprehend<br>the<br>implications<br>of MNO on<br>Joint SOF<br>doctrine. | Comprehend<br>the range of<br>SOF tasks in<br>MNO activities. | Comprehend the cultural,<br>organizational and political<br>influences, to include<br>DOD, NGOs, PVOS, D'S,<br>GGA, the media and public<br>opinion on the<br>development and<br>application of SOF in<br>Multinational Operations. | Comprehend MNO<br>command and<br>control (C2)<br>relationships. |  |
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |  |   | х  |   |   |   |  |
| cies           | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   |  |   |  |   |   |   |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills, area<br>& cultural awareness,<br>language proficiency   |  |   |  |   | х   | Х   |  |
| lui            | Problem<br>Solving   |  |   | Х  | Х   | Х   | Х   |  |
| s Cc           | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   |  |   | Х  | х   | Х   | х   |  |
| ce             | Political<br>Awareness   |  |   | Х  |   | Х   | Х   |  |
| j              | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |   |  |   |   |   |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |  |   |  |   |   |   |  |

|               |  | 0  |  | 0   | 0  |   |  | 0   | • •  |   |
|---------------|--|--|--|---|--|---|--|---|--|---|
|               |  | Primary<br>Know the<br>purpose, roles<br>and<br>organization of<br>the principal<br>US government<br>agencies that<br>routinely<br>interact with<br>SOF, and the<br>linkage<br>between those<br>organizations<br>and SOF | Primary<br>Know the<br>roles,<br>missions and<br>organizations<br>of the Civil-<br>Military<br>Operations<br>Center<br>(CMOC) and<br>its interaction<br>with the IOs,<br>OGAs, NGOs<br>and PVOs. | Primary<br>Know how<br>to access<br>additional<br>information<br>on OGAs,<br>NGOs, IOs<br>and other<br>potential<br>players in<br>interagency<br>operations<br>using<br>available<br>information<br>technology. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend the<br>types of agencies<br>and combinations<br>include the<br>interagency<br>Working Group,<br>that may<br>participate with<br>SOF throughout<br>the range of<br>military operations<br>acapabilities,<br>limitigions and<br>coordination<br>requirements. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>the roles,<br>missions and<br>organization<br>of the CMOC<br>and its<br>interaction<br>with the IOs,<br>OGAs, NGOs<br>and PVOs. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>the nature of<br>support SOF<br>may provide to<br>OGAs, IOs,<br>PVOs and<br>NGOs in<br>accordance<br>with legal<br>considerations<br>and rules of<br>engagement. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>the nature of<br>support OGAs,<br>IOs, PVOs and<br>NGOs may<br>provide to SOF<br>in accordance<br>with legal<br>considerations. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>the national<br>level<br>interagency<br>process in<br>terms of<br>policy<br>formulation<br>and decision-<br>making in the<br>use of<br>military force. | Intermediate<br>Know the<br>potential roles<br>and agendas<br>of allies,<br>NGOs, PVOs,<br>IOs and other<br>participants<br>that impact<br>upon SOF<br>across the<br>range of<br>military<br>operations |
| ies           | Warfighting<br>Conventional<br>tactics, Light Inf<br>TTP to B n Level,<br>Integrate fires  |  |  |   |  |   |  |   |  |   |
| ompetencies   | Training<br>Assess unit<br>programs, develop<br>& implement<br>programs  |  |  |   |  |   |  |   |  |   |
|               | Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |  |  |   |  |   |  |   |  | х   |
| $\mathcal{O}$ | Problem<br>Solving   |  |  |   | Х  | Х   | Х  | Х   | Х  | х   |
| Forces        | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   |  |  |   | Х  | Х   | Х  | Х   |  | х   |
| or            | Political<br>Awareness   |  |  |   |  |   | х  | Х   | Х  | х   |
| lΕ            | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |  |   |  |   |  |   |  |   |
| Special ]     | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>–Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |  |  |   |  |   |  |   |  |   |

# Learning Area 4: Interagency Operations Learning Area 4.1. Interagency / non-governmental organizations' roles across the range of military operations.

### Learning Area 4.2 Country Team organization, capabilities and limitations.

|                |  | Primary  | Primary<br>Know how  | Intermediate  | Intermediate  | Intermediate                          |  |
|----------------|--|--|--|---|---|---------------------------------------|--|
|                |  | Know the<br>functions of the<br>Country Team's<br>key players and<br>linkage between<br>the Country team<br>and Host Nation. | to access<br>additional<br>information<br>on the<br>Country<br>Team using<br>available<br>information<br>technology. | Comprehend the<br>role of the<br>Country Team in<br>meeting national<br>security<br>objectives. | Comprehend the<br>capabilities and<br>limitations of the Country<br>Team. | Comprehend<br>the concepts<br>of FID. |  |
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional<br>tactics, Light Inf<br>TTP to B n Level,<br>Integrate fires  |  |  |   |   |                                       |  |
| ies            | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   |  |  |   |   |                                       |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |  |  |   |   |                                       |  |
| du             | Problem<br>Solving   |  |  | Х   |   |                                       |  |
| Cor            | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   |  |  | х   | Х   | х                                     |  |
| es             | Political<br>Awareness   |  |  | Х   | Х   | Х                                     |  |
| orc            | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |  |   |   |                                       |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |  |  |   |   |                                       |  |

| Learning area 5: Information Warfare                      |
|---|
| Learning Area 5.1 Information dominance in SOF operations |

| Learning Area 5.1 Information dominance in SOF operations. |   |  |   |   |  |   |  |   |   |  |
|--|---|--|---|---|--|---|--|---|---|--|
|  |   | Primary  | Primary   | Primary   | Primary  | Primary   | Intermediate   | Intermediate  | Intermediate  |  |
|  |   | Know the<br>Information<br>Warfare (IW)<br>implications<br>on special<br>operations. | Know the<br>basic roles,<br>capabilities<br>and<br>limitations of<br>SOF in<br>information<br>warfare | Know the<br>relationship<br>between<br>Command and<br>Control<br>Warfare (C2W)<br>and IW as it<br>applies to SOF. | Know the<br>elements<br>of C2W as<br>it applies<br>to SOF. | Know how to<br>access<br>additional<br>information<br>on SOF-<br>related<br>subjects using<br>available<br>information<br>technology. | Comprehend<br>the implications<br>of Information<br>Warfare on<br>special<br>operations. | Comprehend the<br>requirements for<br>planning C2W, as<br>it applies to SOF,<br>at the operational<br>level of warfare. | Comprehend<br>the roles,<br>capabilities and<br>limitations of<br>SOF in C2W. |  |
|  | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   |  |   |   |  |   | Х  | Х   | Х   |  |
| cies   | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  |  |   |   |  |   |  |   |   |  |
| ompetencies  | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |  |   |   |  |   |  |   |   |  |
| Ē  | Problem<br>Solving  |  |   |   |  |   | Х  | Х   |   |  |
| C  | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  |  |   |   |  |   |  |   |   |  |
| Se   | Political<br>Awareness  |  |   |   |  |   |  |   |   |  |
| Ore  | Advanced<br>Technology  |  |   |   |  |   |  | Х   | Х   |  |
| Special Forces   | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |  |   |   |  |   |  |   |   |  |

#### Special Needs 8: Regional Requirements SN 8.1: Regional Operating Environment.

|                |   |  |   |  |   |  | 1  | 1  |   |  |
|----------------|---|--|---|--|---|--|--|--|---|--|
|                |   | Primary  | Primary   | Primary  | Primary   | Intermediate   | Intermediate   | Intermediate   | Intermediate  |  |
|                |   | Know the<br>countries, key<br>terrain and<br>predominant<br>physical<br>characteristics<br>of the AOR /<br>region in<br>which you<br>will be<br>operating. | Know the<br>fundamental<br>cultural<br>considerations<br>that will affect<br>your<br>interaction<br>with the local<br>population. | Know the<br>fundamental<br>religious<br>tenets that<br>guide the<br>conduct of<br>the local<br>population. | Know the<br>political and<br>economics<br>structure<br>within<br>which you<br>will be<br>operating. | Comprehend<br>the<br>implications of<br>the physical<br>environment on<br>SOF operations<br>within the<br>AOR. | Comprehend<br>implications of<br>cultural,<br>religious,<br>political and<br>economic<br>factors on SOF<br>missions, roles<br>and operations<br>within the<br>AOR. | Apply<br>knowledge of<br>the operating<br>environment to<br>plan the<br>appropriate use<br>of SOF in<br>support of the<br>regional<br>CINCs<br>objectives. | Apply knowledge of<br>the operating<br>environment to<br>determine how best<br>to employ SOF in<br>support of the<br>regional CINC's<br>theater strategy. |  |
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   |  |   |  |   |  |  |  |   |  |
| ncies          | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  |  |   |  |   |  |  |  |   |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |  |   |  |   | Х  | Х  | Х  | х   |  |
| on             | Problem<br>Solving  |  |   |  |   | Х  |  | Х  | Х   |  |
|                | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  |  |   |  |   |  |  | х  | х   |  |
| rce            | Political<br>Awareness  |  |   |  |   |  | Х  | Х  | Х   |  |
| Fo             | Advanced<br>Technology  |  |   |  |   |  |  |  |   |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |  |   |  |   | x  |  |  |   |  |

#### SN 8.2: Regional security objectives, threats and issues.

| ĺ              |  |  |  |  |  | ×  | · · ·   | a .   |  |
|----------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|---|--|
|                |  | Primary<br>Know the<br>fundamental<br>importance of a<br>specific AOR to<br>the United States. | Primary<br>Know the<br>fundamental<br>security issues<br>of a specific<br>host nation. | Primary<br>Comprehend<br>the relationship<br>between a<br>mission in a<br>specific AOR<br>and how it<br>satisfies US and<br>possibly host<br>nation security<br>objectives | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>US national<br>security<br>objectives and<br>military<br>objectives in<br>the theater. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend<br>the nature of<br>threats to US<br>national<br>security<br>interests in the<br>theater. | Intermediate<br>Comprehend the<br>principal national<br>and regional<br>security objectives,<br>threats and<br>security issues of<br>the nations that<br>comprise the<br>AOR. | Senior<br>Comprehend<br>the linkage<br>between the US<br>National<br>Security<br>Strategy,<br>Military<br>Strategy,<br>Military<br>CINCs theater<br>strategy. |  |
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |  |
| cies           | Training<br>Assess unit<br>programs, develop &<br>implement programs   |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |  |
| Competencie    | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |  |  |  |  | х  | х   |   |  |
| m              | Problem<br>Solving   |  |  | Х  |  | Х  | Х   | Х   |  |
|                | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   |  |  |  |  |  |   | Х   |  |
| ce.            | Political<br>Awareness   |  |  | Х  | Х  | Х  | Х   | Х   |  |
| For            | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for<br>extended periods in<br>hostile, remote &<br>austere environments<br>with little or no<br>external support |  |  |  |  |  |   |   |  |

#### SN 8.3. Forces in Theater

| 1              |   | Primary | Primary   | Primary  | Intermediate  | Intermediate   | Intermediate  | Intermediate                | Intermediate  | Senior  |
|----------------|---|---------|---|--|---|--|---|-----------------------------|---|---|
|                |   | broad   | Know the<br>US general -<br>purpose<br>forces<br>located in<br>the AOR<br>and their<br>broad<br>missions. | Know the<br>predominant<br>regional<br>military<br>forces in<br>theater. | Comprehend the<br>organization,<br>general<br>capabilities,<br>limitations,<br>missions of the<br>US forces<br>located in the<br>AOR and forces<br>allocated to the<br>regional CINC. | Comprehend<br>the mission and<br>command and<br>control<br>relationship<br>between SOF<br>and general<br>purpose forces<br>in theater. | Comprehend<br>the types of<br>augmentation<br>forces that may<br>be required to<br>support<br>regional<br>contingency<br>plans and the<br>process to gain<br>access to those<br>forces. | missions in<br>which US SOF | role of applicable<br>Country Teams<br>in the theater on<br>SOF operations<br>in the AOR, and<br>the coordination<br>requirements<br>between SOF in<br>theater and<br>appropriate | Apply knowledge of the<br>AOR, linkage between the<br>National Military Strategy,<br>National Military Strategy<br>and Country Team<br>objectives, and forces in<br>theater to employ SOF in<br>the AOR, synchronize SOF<br>and general purpose forces<br>operations and meet the<br>CINC's intent. |
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   |         |   |  |   |  |   |                             |   |   |
| ncies          | Training<br>Assess unit<br>programs, develop &<br>implement programs  |         |   |  |   |  |   |                             |   |   |
| ompetencies    | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |         |   |  |   |  |   |                             |   | Х   |
| on             | Problem<br>Solving  |         |   |  | Х   | Х  | Х   | Х                           | Х   | Х   |
| C              | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  |         |   |  | х   | Х  | х   | Х                           | х   | Х   |
| rce            | Political<br>Awareness  |         |   |  |   |  |   |                             |   | Х   |
| Ð              | Advanced<br>Technology  |         |   |  |   |  |   |                             |   |   |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |         |   |  |   |  |   |                             |   |   |

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#### SN 8.4: Other key regional players and agendas

| 1              |   | Primary   | Intermediate   | Intermediate   | Senior  |  |  |  |
|----------------|---|---|--|--|---|--|--|--|
|                |   | Know the<br>major<br>national,<br>regional and<br>international<br>organizations<br>currently<br>operating in<br>the AOR tha<br>may impact<br>on SOF<br>operations. | Comprehend<br>the roles,<br>agendas and<br>influence of<br>major PVOs,<br>IOs, regional<br>organizations<br>and NGOs<br>operating in the<br>AOR. | Comprehend coordination<br>mechanisms and<br>procedures in place in<br>theater between SOF, the<br>regional CINC's staff,<br>standing JTFs and<br>applicable Country<br>Teams and PVOs, IOs,<br>regional organizations<br>and NGOs in the theater. | Comprehend the<br>implications of these<br>regional actors, their<br>impact on SOF<br>operations and how<br>to exploit their<br>presence to enhance<br>SOF effectiveness in<br>theater. |  |  |  |
| S              | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   | operations.   |  |  |   |  |  |  |
| ncie           | Training<br>Assess unit<br>programs, develop &<br>implement programs  |   |  |  |   |  |  |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |   |  |  |   |  |  |  |
| on             | Problem<br>Solving  |   | Х  | Х  | Х   |  |  |  |
|                | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  |   | Х  | Х  | х   |  |  |  |
| rce            | Political<br>Awareness  |   | Х  | Х  | Х   |  |  |  |
| E<br>D         | Advanced<br>Technology  |   |  |  |   |  |  |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |  |  |   |  |  |  |

#### SN 8.5: Regional CINC's missions and strategy.

|                             |   | Primary  | Intermediate   | Intermediate   | Intermediate  | Intermediate   | Senior  |  |  |
|-----------------------------|---|--|--|--|---|--|---|--|--|
|                             |   | Know the<br>missions of<br>SOF<br>organizations<br>in the AOR. | Comprehend<br>the regional<br>CINC's<br>missions and<br>their<br>relationships<br>to US<br>national<br>security<br>objectives. | Comprehend<br>the CINCs<br>regional<br>strategy,<br>campaign plan<br>and applicable<br>contingency<br>plans. | Comprehend<br>the objectives<br>of Country<br>Teams that are<br>major players in<br>the execution of<br>the regional<br>strategy. | Comprehend the<br>missions of SOF<br>organizations in<br>theater and how<br>they support the<br>regional CINC. | Apply knowledge of<br>the CINC's missions<br>and his campaign<br>plan to develop<br>supporting plans that<br>integrate and<br>optimize SOF. |  |  |
|                             | Warfighting   |  |  |  |   |  |   |  |  |
|                             | Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |  |  |  |   |  |   |  |  |
| lcies                       | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  |  |  |  |   |  |   |  |  |
| ipeter                      | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |  |  |  |   |  | Х   |  |  |
| on                          | Problem<br>Solving  |  | Х  | Х  | Х   | Х  | Х   |  |  |
| ss C                        | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  |  | Х  | Х  |   | х  | Х   |  |  |
| rce                         | Political<br>Awareness  |  | Х  |  | Х   |  | Х   |  |  |
| Бо                          | Advanced<br>Technology  |  |  |  |   |  |   |  |  |
| Special Forces Competencies | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>– Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |  |  |  |   |  |   |  |  |

### SN 8.6: Current Operations.

|                |  | Primary<br>Know the<br>missions,<br>names of<br>operations<br>and forces<br>currently<br>employed in<br>the AOR. | Intermediate &<br>Senior<br>Comprehend the<br>missions, task<br>organizations,<br>intent and<br>objectives of<br>current<br>operations in the<br>AOR. | Intermediate &<br>Senior<br>Comprehend the<br>interaction<br>between military<br>staffs and other<br>government and<br>nongovernmental<br>agencies in support<br>of ongoing<br>operations in the<br>AOR. |  |  |  |
|----------------|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| Competencies   | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| petei          | Interpersonal skills, area<br>& cultural awareness,<br>language proficiency  |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| mj             | Problem<br>Solving   |  | Х   | Х  |  |  |  |
| Co             | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   |  | Х   | Х  |  |  |  |
| ses            | Political<br>Awareness   |  |   | Х  |  |  |  |
| orc            | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |   |  |  |  |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |  |   |  |  |  |  |

#### SN 8.7: SOF Roles, missions and collateral activities in the AOR.

|               |   | Primary   | Primary  | Primary   | Intermediate   | Intermediate   | Intermediate   | Intermediate  | Senior  |
|---------------|---|---|--|---|--|--|--|---|---|
|               |   | Know the<br>existing roles,<br>missions and<br>collateral<br>activities of<br>SOF<br>organizations<br>in the AOR. | Know<br>fundamental<br>command and<br>control<br>relationships<br>applicable to<br>SOF<br>organizations<br>in theater. | Know the basic<br>structure and<br>force<br>composition of<br>JTFs and / or<br>JSOTFs existing<br>in theater. | Comprehend the<br>strategic and<br>tactical mobility<br>issues associated<br>with integrating<br>SOF into the<br>regional CINC s<br>campaign plan. | Comprehend<br>roles, missions<br>and collateral<br>activities of SOF<br>organizations in<br>theater. | Comprehend<br>command and<br>control<br>relationships<br>that affect SOF<br>organizations<br>in theater. | Comprehend<br>the nature of<br>major issues<br>affecting the<br>integration of<br>SOF and<br>general purpose<br>forces in<br>theater. | Apply<br>knowledge of the<br>theater, available<br>SOF<br>organizations<br>and forces to<br>develop and<br>implement plans<br>for the<br>employment of<br>those forces in<br>support of the<br>regional CINC. |
| s             | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   |   |  |   |  | x  |  |   | х   |
| ncie          | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  |   |  |   |  |  |  |   | X   |
| Competencies  | Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |   |  |   |  |  |  |   | Х   |
| <sup>on</sup> | Problem<br>Solving  |   |  |   | Х  | Х  | Х  | Х   | Х   |
| Ś             | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  |   |  |   |  | Х  | х  | Х   | Х   |
| orc           | Political<br>Awareness  |   |  |   |  |  | Х  | Х   | Х   |
| Ц             | Advanced<br>Technology  |   |  |   |  |  |  |   | Х   |
| Special       | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |  |   | х  | х  |  |   | х   |

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#### Special Need 9: Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) SN 9.1: Role of the SOLE.

|                             |   | Comprehend<br>the<br>fundamental<br>reasons for<br>establishing a<br>SOLE. | Comprehend<br>the principal<br>role, functions,<br>capabilities and<br>limitations of<br>the SOLE. | Based on knowledge<br>of SOLE manning<br>requirements,<br>comprehend the<br>processes by which to<br>gain augmentation<br>personnel for both<br>Active and Reserve<br>components. | Apply knowledge of<br>SOF and<br>conventional air<br>assets' capabilities<br>and limitations to<br>optimize the<br>integration of SOF<br>into the theater air<br>campaign plan. |  |  |
|-----------------------------|---|--|--|---|---|--|--|
|                             | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   | Х  | х  |   | Х   |  |  |
|                             | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  |  |  |   |   |  |  |
| encies                      | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |  |  |   |   |  |  |
| pet                         | Problem<br>Solving  | Х  |  |   | Х   |  |  |
| lom                         | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  | х  | х  |   | Х   |  |  |
| SS (                        | Political<br>Awareness  |  |  |   |   |  |  |
| orce                        | Advanced<br>Technology  |  | Х  |   |   |  |  |
| Special Forces Competencies | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |  |  |   |   |  |  |

#### SN 9.2. Service and Joint SOF doctrine.

|                |  | Comprehend<br>primary service and<br>joint doctrine for the<br>employment of both<br>conventional and<br>SOF air assets,<br>particularly for Joint<br>Suppression of<br>Enemy air Defense<br>(JSEAD), EW, and<br>CSAR. | Comprehend<br>the doctrinal<br>basis for SOF<br>air mission<br>planning<br>requirements<br>and processes. | Comprehend<br>the fundamental<br>doctrinal<br>guidelines that<br>govern the<br>organizations,<br>structures and<br>functions of<br>joint air<br>operations<br>centers (JAOC). | Comprehend the JFACC<br>concept of operations,<br>particularly the elements<br>of air objectives, master<br>air attack plans, ATO<br>cycle and responsibilities<br>in that process, and the<br>ATO generation. |
|----------------|--|--|---|---|--|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  | х  | х   | Х   | х  |
| ncies          | Training<br>Assess unit<br>programs, develop<br>& implement<br>programs  |  |   |   |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |  |   |   |  |
| OL             | Problem<br>Solving   |  |   |   |  |
|                | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   | Х  | Х   | Х   | х  |
| rc             | Political<br>Awareness   |  |   |   |  |
| НC             | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |   |   |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>–Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |  |   |   |  |

#### SN 9.3: Conventional and SOF Service component capabilities and perspectives.

|                |  | Comprehend the<br>capabilities and<br>limitations of<br>SOF component<br>command air and<br>aviation assets | Comprehend the<br>capabilities and<br>limitations of<br>conventional air<br>and aviation<br>assets. |  |  |  |
|----------------|--|---|---|--|--|--|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  | Х   | Х   |  |  |  |
|                | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |   |   |  |  |  |
| ster           | Problem<br>Solving   |   |   |  |  |  |
| mpe            | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   | Х   | х   |  |  |  |
|                | Political<br>Awareness   |   |   |  |  |  |
| ces.           | Advanced<br>Technology   |   |   |  |  |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hosfile<br>Environments<br>– Operate for extended<br>periods in hosile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |   |  |  |  |

#### SN 9.4. Operational-level knowledge.

|                |  | Comprehend<br>the warfighting<br>CINC's intent<br>and how SOF<br>air assets can<br>be optimized to<br>facilitate his<br>intent. | Comprehend the<br>fundamentals of<br>operational level<br>planning for both air<br>and surface operations | Apply principles of<br>campaign planning<br>to integrate SOF and<br>conventional forces<br>in synchronized air<br>and land campaigns. |  |
|----------------|--|---|---|---|--|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  | Х   | х   |   |  |
|                | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   |   |   |   |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |   |   |   |  |
| ter            | Problem<br>Solving   | Х   | Х   | Х   |  |
| mpe            | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   | х   | Х   | х   |  |
|                | Political<br>Awareness   |   |   |   |  |
| ces            | Advanced<br>Technology   |   |   |   |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Coperate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |   |   |  |

#### SN 9.5: Technical knowledge.

|                             |   | Comprehend the<br>functions and<br>applications of the<br>Contingency<br>Theater Air<br>Planning System<br>(CTAPS) and its<br>value in designing<br>air campaign<br>plans. |  |  |  |
|-----------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| S                           | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn                                     |  |  |  |  |
| cie                         | Level, Integrate fires  |  |  |  |  |
| etena                       | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs                            |  |  |  |  |
| Special Forces Competencies | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency |  |  |  |  |
| ces                         | Problem<br>Solving  |  |  |  |  |
| ıl For                      | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  |  |  |  |  |
| ecia                        | Political<br>Awareness  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{S}\mathbf{p}$      | Advanced<br>Technology  |  |  |  |  |

#### SN 9.6: Theater-specific considerations.

|                |   | Comprehend the<br>regionalCINC's<br>mission, intent,<br>regional strategy<br>and theater<br>campaign plan. | Comprehend the<br>roles, missions<br>and intent of both<br>the sending and<br>gaining<br>commands<br>between which<br>the SOLE<br>members liaise. | Comprehend the<br>organization,<br>functions,<br>capabilities and<br>limitations of<br>joint air<br>operations<br>centers in theater. | Comprehend how to<br>tailor the theater -<br>specific SOLE to<br>meet the<br>requirements of<br>those theater -<br>specific joint air<br>operations centers. |
|----------------|---|--|---|---|--|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   |  |   |   |  |
| Se             | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  |  |   |   |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |  |   |   |  |
| du             | Problem<br>Solving  | Х  | Х   | Х   | Х  |
| Cor            | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  | Х  | Х   | Х   | Х  |
| ses            | Political<br>Awareness  | х  | х   |   |  |
| orc            | Advanced<br>Technology  |  |   |   | X  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |  |   |   |  |

#### SN 9.7. Command relationships and interaction between headquarters.

|                |  | between the Joint<br>Forces Special<br>Operations<br>Component<br>Commander<br>(JFSOCC) and the<br>theater Special<br>Operations | Comprehend the<br>relationship between<br>the JFSOCC and the<br>Joint Force Air<br>Component<br>Commander<br>(JFACC), to include<br>command<br>relationships and<br>liaison requirements | Comprehend<br>the<br>relationship<br>between the<br>JFSOCC and<br>the SOLE. | Comprehend<br>the<br>relationship<br>between the<br>JFSOCC, the<br>JTF and the<br>regional<br>cINC. | Comprehend<br>the<br>responsibilities<br>of the SOC and<br>the JFSOCC<br>with respect to<br>the JFACC. | Comprehend the<br>relationship of<br>the SOLE with<br>the Joint Special<br>Operations Air<br>Component<br>Commander<br>(JSOACC). | Comprehend the<br>relationship between<br>the SOLE and the<br>JFACC, their Joint<br>Targeting Coordination<br>Board (JTCE) and the<br>Board (JTCE) and the<br>Board (JTCE) and the<br>Center (JACC, to<br>include liaison<br>requirements and<br>tasking authorities and<br>proceeding and a sects. |
|----------------|--|--|--|---|---|--|--|---|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |  |  |   |   |  |  |   |
| cies           | Training<br>Assess unit<br>programs, develop &<br>implement programs   |  |  |   |   |  |  |   |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |  |  |   |   |  |  |   |
| m              | Problem<br>Solving   | Х  | Х  | Х   | Х   | Х  | Х  | Х   |
| •              | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   | Х  | Х  | Х   | Х   | Х  | Х  | х   |
| ce             | Political<br>Awareness   |  |  |   |   |  |  |   |
| OL             | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |  |   |   |  |  |   |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |  |  |   |   |  |  |   |

#### SN 9.8: Synchronization and coordination

|                |   | Apply knowledge<br>of the theater<br>campaign plan and<br>supporting<br>component plans<br>to articulate<br>commander's<br>intent and key<br>elements of the<br>operational plans<br>between<br>organizations with<br>which SOLE<br>members interact. | Comprehend joint<br>operational control<br>and coordination<br>measures appropriate<br>to the SOLE, to<br>include Joint SOF<br>Operations A reas<br>(JSOAs) and No Fire<br>Areas (NFAs),<br>implications of heir<br>use, to include<br>fratricide prevention,<br>and coordination<br>requirements inherent<br>in their use. | Apply knowledge<br>of joint operational<br>percention<br>principles to<br>allocate air assets<br>and assign,<br>deconflict control,<br>coordinate and<br>redirect mission<br>activities. | Apply knowledge of joint<br>operational planning<br>provide the second second second second<br>employment of conventional<br>and SOF air assets with<br>ground operations in the deep<br>battlespace to include<br>intelligence gathering, target<br>selection, approximation of<br>assets, determining how to<br>assets, determining how to<br>appendix the second second second<br>personnel. |
|----------------|---|---|---|--|---|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   | х   | х   | х  | Х   |
| cies           | Training<br>Assess unit<br>programs, develop &<br>implement programs  |   |   |  |   |
| Competencie    | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |   |   |  |   |
| m              | Problem<br>Solving  | Х   | Х   | Х  | Х   |
| s Cc           | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  | Х   | Х   | Х  | Х   |
| ce             | Political<br>Awareness  | Х   |   |  |   |
| or             | Advanced<br>Technology  |   |   |  |   |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |   |  |   |

#### Special Need 11: Commanders / Senior Enlisted Advisors (SEAs). SN 11.1. Challenges of the command and the operating environment.

|                |  | Comprehend<br>USCINCSOC's<br>command<br>philosophy,<br>imperatives and<br>strategic<br>perspective on<br>the command. | Comprehend current<br>and evolving SOF<br>roles and missions,<br>their relationship to<br>the National Security<br>Strategy and National<br>Military Strategy, the<br>implications of<br>evolving missions on<br>SOF units and how<br>those organizations<br>will advance the<br>security interests of<br>the U.S. | Apply knowledge of<br>the NSS and NMS<br>and their<br>organization's<br>mission to articulate<br>to members of their<br>command why they<br>will be tasked with a<br>given mission. | Evaluate and<br>analyze the<br>thesis of<br>Theory of<br>Special<br>Operations. | Comprehend the<br>complexity of the<br>multinational and<br>interagency<br>operating<br>environment, to<br>include planning<br>and coordination<br>implications for<br>members of SOF<br>commands. |  |
|----------------|--|---|--|---|---|--|--|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |   |  |   |   | х  |  |
| ies            | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   | х   |  | Х   |   | х  |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |   |  |   |   |  |  |
| ıpε            | Problem<br>Solving   | Х   | Х  |   | Х   | Х  |  |
| Con            | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   | Х   | Х  | Х   |   | Х  |  |
|                | Political<br>Awareness   |   | Х  | Х   |   | х  |  |
| orc            | Advanced<br>Technology   |   |  |   |   |  |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |  |   |   |  |  |

#### SN 11.2. Component organizations, capabilities and perspectives.

|                |  | Comprehend<br>ARSOF<br>organization,<br>fundamental<br>doctrine,<br>missions and<br>current<br>capabilities. | Comprehend<br>CG USASOC's<br>command<br>philosophy,<br>vision and<br>imperatives for<br>ARSOF. | Comprehend<br>US AFSOC<br>organization,<br>fundamental<br>doctrine,<br>missions and<br>current<br>capabilities. | ComprehendCG<br>US AFSOC's<br>command<br>philosophy, vision<br>and imperatives for<br>US AFSOF. | Comprehend<br>NAVSPECWARCOM<br>organization,<br>fundamental doctrine,<br>missions and current<br>capabilities. | Comprehend CO<br>NAVSPECWAR<br>COM's command<br>philosophy,<br>vision and<br>imperatives for<br>his command. | Comprehend<br>JSOC's<br>missions,<br>roles,<br>organization,<br>capabilities<br>and its<br>interaction for<br>his command. | Comprehend<br>developments in joint<br>doctrine applicable for<br>SOF organizations, to<br>include most recent<br>publications, major<br>recent doctrinal<br>changes and<br>developments, major<br>issues and responsible<br>agencies that can<br>benefit from the<br>operational<br>experience of<br>students. |
|----------------|--|--|--|---|---|--|--|--|---|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  | х  |  | х   |   | х  |  | х  | х   |
| cies           | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   | x  | х  | х   |   |  |  |  |   |
| ompetencie     | Interpersonal skills, area<br>& cultural awareness,<br>language proficiency  |  |  |   |   |  |  |  |   |
| dι             | Problem<br>Solving   |  |  |   |   |  |  |  |   |
| Con            | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   | х  | х  | х   | Х   | х  | х  | х  | Х   |
| es             | Political<br>Awareness   |  |  |   |   |  |  |  |   |
| orc            | Advanced<br>Technology   |  |  |   |   |  |  |  |   |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Coperate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |  |  |   |   |  |  |  |   |

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### SN 11.3. Peacetime operations / deployments.

|                |   | Comprehend<br>the missions<br>and SOF<br>organizations<br>that are<br>currently<br>being<br>deployed. | Comprehend<br>the implications<br>of deployment<br>trends on<br>organizations<br>students will<br>command. | Comprehend<br>the roles of<br>SOCs and<br>other<br>organizations<br>that interact<br>with<br>deploying<br>SOF units. | Comprehend<br>C4I issues in<br>commanding /<br>supporting<br>deployed SOF<br>organizations. |  |  |
|----------------|---|---|--|--|---|--|--|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   |   |  |  |   |  |  |
|                | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  |   |  |  |   |  |  |
| Competencies   | Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |   | Х  |  |   |  |  |
| te             | Problem<br>Solving  | Х   | Х  | Х  | Х   |  |  |
| mpe            | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  | х   | Х  | х  | х   |  |  |
| 2              | Political<br>Awareness  |   | Х  |  | Х   |  |  |
|                | Advanced<br>Technology  |   |  |  |   |  |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>- Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |  |  | X   |  |  |

#### SN 11.4. Joint Operational planning / execution.

|                             |  | Evaluate recent operational<br>deployments to determine factors<br>leading to mission success or<br>failure, particularly in terms of<br>leadership, training and joint /<br>interagency coordination and<br>synchronization, and determine<br>how to overcome similar issues<br>during the student's command tour. |  |  |  |  |
|-----------------------------|--|---|--|--|--|--|
|                             | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  | X   |  |  |  |  |
|                             | Training<br>Assess unit<br>programs, develop &<br>implement programs   | Х   |  |  |  |  |
| encies                      | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |   |  |  |  |  |
| bet                         | Problem<br>Solving   | Х   |  |  |  |  |
| ComJ                        | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   | х   |  |  |  |  |
| ces (                       | Political<br>Awareness   | Х   |  |  |  |  |
| ore                         | Advanced<br>Technology   |   |  |  |  |  |
| Special Forces Competencies | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |  |  |  |  |

### SN 11.5. Training.

| ompetencies    |   | Comprehend<br>the principles<br>of training<br>management<br>as applied in<br>USSOCOM,<br>USASOC and<br>USASFC. | Comprehend<br>the implications<br>of the operating<br>environment in<br>developing unit<br>training<br>programs. | Comprehend how<br>SOF is integrated<br>into exercises at<br>the Joint Readiness<br>Training Center,<br>and how those<br>exercises can be<br>tailored to support<br>unit training goals<br>and objectives. | Comprehend<br>the Joint<br>Special<br>Operations<br>Awareness<br>Program and its<br>value as a staff<br>training and<br>education tool. | Comprehend<br>regional<br>requirements in<br>developing<br>training<br>programs. | Comprehend<br>additional<br>training<br>opportunities<br>embedded in<br>other<br>organizations'<br>training<br>programs. | Apply<br>knowledge of<br>the above to<br>produce a unit<br>training<br>program. |  |
|----------------|---|---|--|---|---|--|--|---|--|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires   |   |  |   |   |  |  |   |  |
|                | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs  | Х   | х  | х   | х   | Х  | х  | Х   |  |
|                | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency   |   |  |   |   | х  |  | x   |  |
|                | Problem<br>Solving  | Х   | Х  |   |   |  | Х  | Х   |  |
|                | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations  |   |  |   | Х   | Х  |  |   |  |
| C .            | Political<br>Awareness  |   |  |   |   | Х  |  | Х   |  |
| rces           | Advanced<br>Technology  |   |  |   |   |  |  |   |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>– Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |  |   |   | x  |  | х   |  |

#### SN 11.6. Readiness Issues.

|                |  | Comprehend the<br>levels of funding<br>USSOCOM and<br>component commands<br>provide to subordinate<br>organizations, and<br>what areas<br>commanders are<br>willing to accept risk<br>of under funding. | Comprehend the<br>current and projected<br>impacts of resource<br>constraints on<br>training, equipment<br>readiness and quality<br>of life within<br>USSOCOM and how<br>the command is<br>managing associated<br>risks. | Analyze and<br>evaluate alternative<br>measures to live<br>within resources<br>constraints and still<br>maintain required<br>level of readiness. | Comprehend the<br>impact of high<br>operations tempo<br>on quality f life<br>and readiness, and<br>generate<br>alternatives to<br>minimize the<br>negative impacts<br>of high operations<br>tempo | Comprehend<br>potential training<br>and readiness gains<br>to be accomplished<br>through AC / RC<br>integration. |  |  |
|----------------|--|---|--|--|---|--|--|--|
| Competencies   | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |   |  |  |   |  |  |  |
|                | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   | х   | х  | х  | Х   | Х  |  |  |
|                | Interpersonal skills, area<br>& cultural awareness,<br>language proficiency  |   |  |  |   |  |  |  |
|                | Problem<br>Solving   | Х   | Х  | Х  | Х   | Х  |  |  |
|                | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   |   |  |  |   |  |  |  |
| Co             | Political<br>Awareness   |   |  |  |   |  |  |  |
| ces            | Advanced<br>Technology   |   |  |  |   |  |  |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Environments<br>– Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |  |  |   |  |  |  |

#### SN 11.7. Tools to assist commanders.

|                |  | Comprehend the<br>role of the Senior<br>Enlisted Advisor<br>(SEA) in SOF units,<br>his potential to assist<br>the commander,<br>factors that may<br>inhibit that potential<br>from being realized,<br>and the perspectives<br>of SEAs of sister<br>SOF units. | Comprehend the<br>range of<br>intelligence<br>assets a SOF<br>commander may<br>request in<br>support of his<br>missions, the<br>capabilities and<br>limitations of<br>those assets, and<br>procedures he<br>may use to<br>request assets. | Comprehend both<br>operational and<br>routine garrison legal<br>authorities and<br>restrictions under<br>which a SOF<br>commander must<br>operate, to include the<br>legal nuances of<br>conducting peacetime<br>operations in a<br>multinational<br>environment. | Comprehend the<br>role of the<br>commander with<br>respect to the<br>media and public<br>diplomacy, with<br>both domestic<br>and host nation<br>audiences. | Comprehend the<br>professional<br>development and<br>education<br>program of SOF<br>officers and<br>NCOs, and the<br>commander's<br>role in the<br>development of<br>his subordinate<br>leaders. |  |  |
|----------------|--|---|---|---|--|--|--|--|
|                | Warfighting<br>Conventional tactics,<br>Light Inf TTP to Bn<br>Level, Integrate fires  |   | Х   | х   | Х  |  |  |  |
| ies            | Training<br>Assess unit programs,<br>develop & implement<br>programs   | Х   | х   | Х   |  | Х  |  |  |
| Competencies   | Intercultural<br>Interpersonal skills,<br>area & cultural<br>awareness, language<br>proficiency  |   |   | х   | Х  |  |  |  |
| lu             | Problem<br>Solving   | Х   | Х   | Х   | Х  | Х  |  |  |
|                | Interagency,<br>Joint/Combined<br>Operations   |   | Х   | Х   |  | Х  |  |  |
| ces            | Political<br>Awareness   |   |   | Х   | Х  |  |  |  |
| orc            | Advanced<br>Technology   |   |   |   | Х  |  |  |  |
| Special Forces | Austere or<br>Hostile<br>Environments<br>-Operate for extended<br>periods in hostile,<br>remote & austere<br>environments with<br>little or no external<br>support |   |   |   |  |  |  |  |

### APPENDIX B

### THE 18A ADVANCED STUDIES PROGRAM

- 1. <u>Definition</u>: The 18A Advanced Studies Program is a formal, master's degreeequivalent course of study aimed at producing 18A's fully capable of planning and integrating Unconventional Warfare/Unconventional Operations (UW/UO) into Theater and Strategic plans developed to support U.S. national objectives throughout the operational continuum.
- 2. <u>Target Audience</u>: The 18A Advanced Studies Program is a mandatory requirement for all 18A's. Enrollment will occur following completion of the Special Forces Qualification Course. Course completion will coincide with graduation from CGSC.
- 3. <u>Purpose</u>: The 18A Advanced Studies Program will:
- Enhance the entry-level skills of the 18A in order to better prepare him for assignments at echelons above the ODA.
- Enable the Field Grade 18A to better inform and educate DoD and non-DoD personnel regarding SF/SOF capabilities and UW/UO.
- Cause the 18A to develop an enhanced level of expertise regarding the culture, history, political dynamics, centers of gravity, and agents of/for change within a specific geographic region of the world.
- Enable the 18A to apply his regional expertise in advising key military and civilian leaders as to how UW/UO may best be employed in that region to support the attainment of U.S. national objectives throughout the operational continuum. Further, to enable the 18A to plan and execute those full-spectrum UW/UO activities.
- 4. <u>Goal</u>: The Goal of the 18A Advanced Studies program is to produce 18A's with enhanced SF skills and abilities who are prepared for duties as an 0-4, 18A in any organization and at any level (from the SF ODB to Service and Joint headquarters elements to anywhere in the interagency community) and are able to persuasively articulate the need for UW/UO, and then capable of integrating UW/UO throughout the operational continuum to support the attainment of U.S. national objectives.
- 5. <u>Methodology/Sequencing</u>: The 18A Advanced Studies Program will be conducted in three phases:

- Phase I (Non-Resident Phase): The 18A will enroll in the Advanced • Studies Program during his initial Branch-Qualifying (BQ) assignment. Phase I completion must be certified before the student reports for Phase II of the program. Phase I will consist of distance-learning and correspondence course-based instruction, extensive reading, research and writing requirements. Phase I will apply an initial focus on Task Module I topics (see following definition of Task Modules for details) in order to enhance the value of instruction to his BQ experience and to his unit of assignment. Remaining Phase I requirements will apply a balance of topics from remaining task modules as determined by curriculum developers to ensure that learning is both logical and progressive. Note that instruction for Task Module V and VI requirements may also be initiated during this phase if the post-CGSC assignment/regional focus decision can be made during that timeframe. A later decision in this regard may preclude inclusion of Task Module IV and V topics into Phase I.
- Phase II (Pre-Resident): The 18A will report to a TDY enroute location (TBD) to participate in this phase prior to reporting (PCS) to CGSC. While a precise timeframe cannot be determined at this point, this phase should not exceed three weeks in duration. The priority of effort during this phase will be to ensure all participating 18A's possess the same baseline of knowledge and information regarding SF/SOF Doctrine, Futures Concepts, emerging technology, and the SF/UW/UO contribution to U.S. national policy objectives. As the Phase II culminating event and while organized as work groups, the Phase II students will be required to develop and brief a UW/UO campaign plan for a specific region in a futures setting (10-20 years out).
- Phase III (Resident): Completed in conjunction with CGSC, Phase III instruction is aimed at preparing the 18A student for his follow-on BQ assignment as a Company Commander, Battalion S-3/XO or Group S-3 in a SF Group. Phase III applies a focus on study of a targeted region and will consist of individual study and research, combined (Seminar) learning opportunities and guest lectures and a Masters thesis-equivalent writing requirement to ensure that the student possesses a comprehensive understanding of the historical, cultural, political and other influences within the region and is able to apply UW/UO in support of the U.S. national objectives for that region.

### 6. Task Modules:

• TASK MODULE I: Demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the structure, organization, tactics, techniques and procedures applied in the execution of Unconventional Warfare/Unconventional

Operations (UW/UO) within the Special Forces Group. Focus on all functions and echelons within the SF Group. Includes, but is not limited to, refresher and advanced training in the 18A tasks addressed in SFQC. Most, if not all, training requirements may be satisfied during the non-resident phase of the 18A ASC.

- TASK MODULE II: Demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the Theory, Concept, Doctrine, and History of UW/UO and apply this to likely future SF UW/UO activities and requirements. The student must demonstrate a thorough understanding of the application of UW/UO by SF across the conflict continuum, from Peacetime Engagement through Conflict Resolution to Support and Stability Operations and back to Peacetime Engagement, to include the linkage of these activities with the activities of all other U.S. governmental agencies, to include conventional military operations. Includes extensive non-resident readings and case studies coupled with a resident phase lecture series.
- TASK MODULE III: Demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the • authority, mission, organization, structure and support/supporting relationships of SF/SOF at echelons above the SF Group. Includes gaining a thorough understanding of these factors for all Service and Joint SOF Organizations, including the JCS, USSOCOM, the Unified and Specified Commands and SOCs and the Theater Service Component Headquarters, Service Headquarters, MACOMs and Component Commands, JSOC and the Special Mission Unit community. Also includes a thorough understanding of Military Force Program MFP 11 resourcing responsibilities and the relationship of this program to Service resourcing activities (for example, the distinction between funding responsibilities for the provision of Army-Common equipment and material to Army SOF and those for the provision of SOF-unique commodities to those same Army units, etc.). Most training requirements for this module may be satisfied during the non-resident phase of the 18A ASC with selected portions conducted during the TDY enroute or resident phases.
- TASK MODULE IV: Demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the impact and influence of non-SOF or "external" entities on the conduct of US-sponsored UW/UO. The student must gain a thorough understanding of the impact of external influences on the planning and execution of UW/UO activities. These external entities include the Interagency Community (including the Country Team and the MILGROUP), NGOs, PVOs and other Volunteer Organizations, Multi-national Corporations, Conventional Military

Forces (US and other Third Country Forces), Alliances (UN, NATO, etc.) and others. Most instruction for this module may be satisfied during the non-resident phase with selected portions addressed during the Pre-resident Phase and/or resident phases.

- TASK MODULE V: Demonstrate fundamental knowledge of the culture, history, influences, and agents of/for change within a specific geographic region. The learning objective of this module is to enable the 18A ASC student to gain a fundamental understanding of the culture, history, influences, and agents of/for change within a specific geographic region. Instruction for this module should be included in all phases with extensive readings and case studies in the non-resident phase coupled with an extensive lecture series during the Pre-Resident and the Resident Phases.
- TASK MODULE VI: Apply the knowledge gained in previous modules, in concert with the current U.S. foreign policy objectives for his designated region, to advise key military and civilian leaders on the application of UW/UO within that region, to achieve or influence outcomes favorable to U.S. interests and objectives. Armed with this knowledge, the 18A applies his extensive knowledge of UW/UO to develop sound advice regarding future policy objectives. Instruction for this module should be included in all phases with extensive readings and case studies in the nonresident phase coupled with a lecture series during the Pre-resident and the Resident Phases. The final requirement should cause the student to write a master's degree-equivalent thesis regarding the impact of UW/UO on U.S. foreign policy in his specific region. Topic selection will be tightly controlled with approval authority vested at senior-leader level. Satisfactory completion of this thesis must be considered a prerequisite for completion of the 18A ASC.

### APPENDIX C

### PRIORITY OF JOINT SOF LEARNING OBJECTIVES

1. Following is a prioritized listing of joint Special Operations Forces learning objectives based on the number of Special Forces competencies that support an individual learning objective. The greater the number of competencies that support a learning objective, the greater value it is attributed.

- A. Eight of eight SF competencies
  - (1) Special Needs 8: Regional Requirements

a. Special Needs 8.7: SOF Roles, missions, and collateral activities in the AOR.

(1) Apply knowledge of the theater, available SOF organizations and forces to develop and implement plans for the employment of those forces in support of the regional CINC.

B. Six of six SF Competencies

(1) Special Need 11: Commanders

a. Special Needs 11.7. Tools to assist commanders.

• Comprehend both operational and routine garrison legal authorities and restrictions under which a SOF commander must operate, to include the legal nuances of conducting peacetime operations in a multinational environment.

### C. Five of five SF Competencies

(1) Special Need 11: Commanders

a. Special Needs 11.1. Challenges of the command and the operating environment

• Comprehend the complexity of the multinational and interagency operating environment, to include planning and coordination implications for members of SOF commands.

b. Special Needs 11.4. Joint Operational planning/ execution.

• Evaluate recent operational deployments to determine factors leading to mission

success or failure, particularly in terms of leadership, training and joint / interagency coordination and synchronization, and determine how to overcome similar issues during the student's command tour.

- c. Special Needs 11.5. Training
- Comprehend regional requirements in developing training programs.
- Apply knowledge of all learning objectives to produce a unit-training program.
- d. Special Needs 11.7. Tools to assist commanders.

• Comprehend the role of the commander with respect to the media and public diplomacy, with both domestic and host nation audiences.

D. Four of four SF Competencies

(1). Learning Area 2: Joint Service Operations (SOF integration with Gen Purpose Forces)

a. Learning Area 2.3 - Peacetime Operations.

• Comprehend the cultural, organizational and political influences of alliance or coalition partners, PVOs, IOs, DOD, NGOs, OGA, the media, and public opinion on the development of plans and application of SOF in Peacetime Operations.

• Apply knowledge of roles, missions, organizations, capabilities and limitations of major participating agencies in the development of plans and application of SOF in Peacetime Operations

b. Learning Area 2.4 - Support & Sustainment planning.
Comprehend fundamental logistic and other support requirements (to include intelligence fire support, communications) for SOF in joint operations

(2) Learning Area 3: Multinational Operation

a. Learning Area 3.1 - Joint SOF applications in multinational operations.

• Comprehend the cultural, organizational and political influences, to include DOD, NGOs, PVOs, IOs, OGA, the media and public opinion on the development and application of SOF in Multinational Operations.

• Comprehend MNO command and control (C2) relationships.

(3) Learning Area 4: Interagency Operations
a. Learning Area 4.1. Interagency/nongovernmental organizations' roles across the range of military operations.

• Know the potential roles and agendas of allies, NGOs, PVOs, IOs, and other participants that impact upon SOF across the range of military operations

# (4) Special Needs 8: Regional Requirements

a. Special Needs 8.1: Regional Operating Environment

• Apply knowledge of the operating environment to plan the appropriate use of SOF in support of the regional CINC's objectives.

• Apply knowledge of the operating environment to determine how best to employ SOF in support of the regional CINC's theater strategy.

#### b. Special Needs 8.3. Forces in Theater

• Apply knowledge of the AOR, linkage between the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, CINC's regional strategy and Country Team objectives, and forces in theater to employ SOF in the AOR, synchronize SOF and general purpose forces operations and meet the CINC's intent. *Special Needs 8.5: Regional CINC's missions and strategy.* 

• Apply knowledge of the CINC's missions and his campaign plan to develop supporting plans that integrate and optimize SOF.

d. Special Needs 8.7: SOF Roles, missions, and collateral activities in the AOR.

• Comprehend roles, missions, and collateral activities of SOF organizations in theater.

(5) Special Need 9: Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE)

a. Special Needs 9.8: Synchronization and coordination

• Apply knowledge of the theater campaign plan and supporting component plans to articulate commander's intent and key elements of the operational plans between organizations with which SOLE members interact.

(6) Special Need 11: Commanders

a. Special Needs 11.3. Peacetime operations/deployments.

• Comprehend the implications of deployment trends on organizations students will command.

a. Special Needs. 11.7. Tools to assist commanders.

• Comprehend the range of intelligence assets a SOF commander may request in support of his missions, the capabilities and limitations of those assets, and procedures he may use to request assets.

E. Four of eight SF Competencies

(1) Learning Area 1: Joint SOF (SOF learning about SOF)

a. Learning Area 1.1 National policy & joint Special Operations Forces

• Comprehend current Service and Joint doctrine for SOF as it relates to the larger body of joint doctrine; understand its application for planning and conducting special operations missions across the range of military operations.

(2) Learning Area 2: Joint Service Operations (SOF integration with Gen Purpose Forces)

a. Learning Area 2.1 - Joint doctrine for SOF at the operational/theater level.

• Comprehend general-purpose force doctrinal missions, organizations, capabilities, and limitations.

b. Learning Area 2.4 - Support & Sustainment planning.

• Comprehend Special Operations-unique logistics assets and structure that are available to support SOF.

(3) Learning Area 3: Multinational Operations (MNO)

a. Learning Area 3.1 - Joint SOF applications in Multinational Operations.

• Comprehend the implications of MNO on Joint SOF doctrine.

(4) Learning Area 4: Interagency Operations

a. Learning Area 4.1. Interagency/nongovernmental organizations' roles across the range of military operations.

• Comprehend the nature of support SOF may provide to OGAs, IOs, PVOs, and NGOs in accordance with legal considerations and rules of engagement.

• Comprehend the nature of support OGAs, IOs, PVOs, and NGOs may provide to SOF in accordance with legal considerations.

b. Learning Area 4.2 Country Team organization, capabilities, and limitations.

• Comprehend the role of the Country Team in meeting national security objectives.

## (5) Learning area 5: Information Warfare

a. *Learning Area 5.1. Information dominance in SOF operations*Comprehend the requirements for planning C2W, as it applies to SOF, at the operational level of warfare.

#### (6) Special Needs 8: Regional Requirements

a. Special Needs 8.1: Regional Requirements

• Comprehend the implications of the physical environment on SOF operations within the AOR.

b. Special Needs 8.2: Regional security objectives, threats and issues.

• Comprehend the nature of threats to U.S. national security interests in the theater.

• Comprehend the principal national and regional security objectives, threats and security issues of the nations that comprise the AOR.

• Comprehend the linkage between the U.S. National Security Strategy, Military Strategy and the regional CINC's theater strategy.

c. Special Needs 8.4: Other key regional players and agendas

• Comprehend the roles, agendas and influence of major PVOs, IOs, regional organizations, and NGOs operating in the AOR.

• Comprehend coordination mechanisms and procedures in place in theater between SOF, the regional CINC's staff, standing JTFs and applicable Country Teams and PVOs, IOs, regional organizations and NGOs in the theater.

• Comprehend the implications of these regional actors, their impact on SOF operations and how to exploit their presence to enhance SOF effectiveness in theater.

d. Special Needs 8.5: Regional CINC's missions and strategy.

• Comprehend the regional CINC's missions and their relationships to U.S. national security objectives.

e. Special Needs 8.6: Current Operations.

• Comprehend the interaction between military staffs and other government and nongovernmental agencies in support of ongoing operations in the AOR. f. *Special Needs 8.7: SOF Roles, missions and collateral activities in the AOR.* 

• Comprehend command and control relationships that affect SOF organizations in theater.

• Comprehend the nature of major issues affecting the integration of SOF and general purpose forces in theater.

(7) Special Need 9: Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE)

a. Special Needs 9.1: Role of the SOLE.

• Comprehend the principal role, functions, capabilities and limitations of the SOLE.

• Apply knowledge of SOF and conventional air assets' capabilities and limitations to optimize the integration of SOF into the theater air campaign plan. *Special Needs 9.4. Operational-level knowledge.* 

• Comprehend the war-fighting CINC's intent and how SOF air assets can be optimized to facilitate his intent.

• Comprehend the fundamentals of operational level planning for both air and surface operations

c. Special Needs 9.6: Theater-specific considerations.

• Comprehend the regional CINC's mission, intent, regional strategy and theater campaign plan.

• Comprehend the roles, missions and intent of both the sending and gaining commands between which the SOLE members liaise.

• Comprehend how to tailor the theater-specific SOLE to meet the requirements of those theater-specific joint air operations centers

Special Needs 9.8: Synchronization and coordination

• Comprehend joint operational control and coordination measures appropriate to the SOLE, to include Joint SOF Operations Areas (JSOAs) and No Fire Areas (NFAs), implications of their use, to include fratricide prevention, and coordination requirements inherent in their use.

• Apply knowledge of joint operational planning and execution principles to allocate air assets and assign, deconflict, control, coordinate and redirect mission activities.

• Apply knowledge of joint operational planning principles and component capabilities to synchronize the employment of conventional and SOF air assets with ground operations in the deep battle space, to include intelligence gathering, target selection, apportionment of assets, determining how to attack targets, and recovering personnel.

(8) Special Need 11: Commanders

a. Special Needs 11.1. Challenges of the command and the operating environment

• Comprehend USCINCSOC's command philosophy, imperatives and strategic perspective on the command.

• Comprehend current and evolving SOF roles and missions, their relationship to the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, the implications of evolving missions on SOF units and how those organizations will advance the security interests of the U.S.

• Apply knowledge of the NSS and NMS and their organization's mission to articulate to members of their command why they will be tasked with a given mission.

b. *Special Needs 11.2. Component organizations, capabilities and perspectives.* • Comprehend ARSOF organization, fundamental doctrine, missions and current capabilities.

• ComprehendU.S.AFSOC organization, fundamental doctrine, missions, and current capabilities

c. Special Needs 11.3. Peacetime operations / deployments.

• Comprehend C4I issues in commanding / supporting deployed SOF organizations.

d. Special Needs 11.7. Tools to assist commanders.

• Comprehend the professional development and education program of SOF officers and NCOs, and the commander's role in the development of his subordinate leaders.

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