

# **Unconditional Surrender: A Modern Paradox**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## Abstract

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER: A MODERN PARADOX,  
by MAJ Thomas A. Shoffner, [REDACTED], 50 pages.

PII Redacted

This study determines whether or not unconditional surrender leads to a more lasting peace. The answer is paradoxical—yes, unconditional surrender can achieve the desired effects; however, it is no longer a suitable policy in the twenty-first century, due to the threat of nuclear escalation and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Using the methodology of historical and descriptive comparison, the findings reveal the following: persistence of bellicose means and will have a direct impact on the duration of the ensuing peace; and victory results in a more lasting peace when the enemy's will is removed. Considerable attention should also be given to post war settlement efforts with regard to financial aid and reconstruction. The Marshall Plan is a prime example. The findings also discover the existence of a perceived cultural bias in the West towards warfighting. This bias is described as the Western lens, which places inordinate significance on the aspects of time and decisiveness that can produce false expectations. Although demanding unconditional surrender, *carte blanche*, is not likely in the foreseeable future, there are methods governments can use to ensure certain conditions for war termination are met unconditionally. As long as these conditions remove an adversary's belligerent intentions, then the possibility exists for an enduring peace to ensue.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE.....	1
ABSTRACT.....	2
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	6
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	7
2. LITERARY REVIEW.....	10
A. PRIMARY SOURCES.....	11
B. SECONDARY SOURCES.....	12
3. ANALYSIS.....	16
A. DEFINING WAR.....	16
B. UNDERSTANDING VICTORY.....	17
C. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ENDURING PEACE?.....	23
D. UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER.....	24
I. ARGUMENTS FOR.....	25
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST.....	30
III. EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTS.....	33
4. CONCLUSION.....	35
A. THE PARADOX OF UNCONDITIONAL.....	35
I. UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER LEADS TO A MORE LASTING PEACE.....	35
II. UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER IS NO LONGER VIABLE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY.....	40

B. WESTERN MISPERCEPTIONS OF WAR.....	42
I. MISUNDERSTANDING WAR AND PEACE .....	42
II. THE BIAS OF THE WESTERN LENS.....	45
5. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	53

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. Clausewitzian Victory Model.....	12
2. Sliding Scale of Victory.....	13
3. Persuading the Enemy to Acknowledge Defeat.....	14

## ABBREVIATIONS

M	Means to Resist
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
NCA	National Command Authorities
Pr	Power to Resist
RDO	Rapid Decisive Operations
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
U.S.S.	United States Ship
VE Day	Victory in Europe Day
W	Will to Resist
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

To begin an examination of the case for unconditional surrender, there is perhaps no better place to start than on the deck of an American battleship, in 1945. At precisely 0908 on the morning of the second of September, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, accepted the formal surrender of Japan, thus officially ending World War Two.<sup>1</sup> To the credit of the Allies, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers (Germany, Japan, and Italy) would last for more than fifty years and is still in effect today. The acceptance of Japanese capitulation aboard the U.S.S. Missouri, anchored in Tokyo Bay, may be the last time the world witnesses a nation surrendering ‘unconditionally.’ Consideration of the ensuing decades of peace provided the genesis for this monograph: Does unconditional surrender lead to a more lasting peace?

This argument holds that once diplomacy fails, the foundation for a lasting peace can be built upon the effects achieved by demanding an unconditional surrender. These effects are the removal of not only the enemy’s means and will to wage war, but also his intentions to threaten peace. However, enduring peace requires more than just unconditional surrender, it requires a dedicated post war policy. The massive Allied reconstruction efforts that followed World War Two, and Allied recognition of important cultural sensitivities of the vanquished nations, led to the lasting peace that followed.

Unfortunately, there now exists a paradox with regard to unconditional surrender. Although it can achieve the desired effects of a lasting peace, unconditional surrender is no longer a suitable policy for the twenty-first century. Modern complexities in international relations negate the likelihood unconditional surrender will ever be mandated in the same circumstances it was during World War Two. The reasons for this are nuclear weapons and weapons of mass



destruction (WMD). Even though the Cold War averted the actual use of WMD for a half century (through a policy of Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD); today the use of biological, chemical or even nuclear weapons by rogue states is a real possibility. The presence of WMD remains a contributing factor as to why we have not seen a demand for an unconditional surrender since World War Two.

The study of unconditional surrender begins with a review of the literature that helped shape the findings with regard to war, defeat, surrender and victory. The literary review is contained in Chapter Two.

Chapter Three embodies the analysis of the concept of unconditional surrender. This chapter begins with establishing definitions of war and then transitions to understanding the concept of victory. With this underpinning, the study develops the notion of a “*Sliding Scale of Victory*” which is used to explain and comprehend four historical examples of surrender. The factors for the sliding scale are the removal of the enemy’s belligerent means and will to resist—the assertion being: persistence of means and will have a direct affect on the duration of the ensuing peace. Building upon these historic examples, unconditional surrender is reviewed. Particular attention is given to the arguments both for and against unconditional surrender as well as the time period of the arguments. This historical context is then contrasted against our contemporary international environment in order to explain what has changed in the twenty-first century.

The conclusion, Chapter Four, discusses two revelations. The first is that unconditional surrender is a modern paradox. Although unconditional surrender enables a more lasting peace to be established, the carte blanche use of unconditional surrender is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The second revelation is that the West has certain misperceptions of war. These misperceptions are the misunderstanding of war and peace, and the bias of the Western lens. The

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<sup>1</sup>National Archives Publication No. 46-6, *The End of the War in the Pacific: Surrender Documents in Facsimile*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1945),1.

misunderstanding war and peace manifests itself in a restrictive political-military mindset that misuses the popular term 'decisive victory.' The Western lens describes a cultural bias Western nations appear to have, especially the United States, with regard to time and decisiveness. This bias tends to manifest itself in the demand for quick action that resolves an issue once and for all (decisiveness). However, this bias can lead to false expectations if the desired end state is not achieved rapidly or in a decisive manner.

This study ends with a recommendation, Chapter Five, which addresses four insights. First, if peace is to last, the political objectives must be carefully articulated so that the end state achieves the removal of the enemy's instruments of war (means) and his belligerent intentions (will). Second, understanding the culture of one's adversary will be critical in future conflicts, especially with regard to the adversary's notion of defeat. Understanding how the enemy defines defeat and meeting those conditions should be incorporated as a logical line of operation in an effort to achieve victory. Third, Western powers must be aware of the biases the Western lens may have towards war, especially with regard to time and decisiveness, and understand how a non-Western adversary may attempt to leverage these two biases. And fourth, further research is needed on the subject of transitioning from war termination to post war settlement.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERARY REVIEW

This chapter reviews the literature on unconditional surrender and those works that proved most helpful in formulating the ideas conveyed in this study. The intent with reviewing the primary sources was to gain a first hand appreciation for the issues involving unconditional surrender from those who were actually involved in imposing the terms. In this regard, the memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant and Winston S. Churchill provided an interesting contrast with regard to unconditional surrender. For Grant, surrender was an operational event that contributed to the Union's overall strategy for victory. For Churchill, as well as the other Allied leaders, surrender was a matter of national policy and pride. Unconditional surrender established the conditions to be met in order to achieve the desired end state of Allied grand strategy. These conditions were captured for posterity in the National Archive facsimiles. The exact wording of the surrender documents was impressive in their strength, simplicity, and clarity of purpose. These documents provided the groundwork for a lasting peace.

Secondary sources cited are the works that proved influential in organizing the theoretical and historical issues with regard to unconditional surrender. Carl von Clausewitz's work, *On War*, remains a timeless theoretical piece with regard to war, but clearly reflects a Western approach to warfighting. The terms and circumstances of war termination do not always establish conditions for lasting peace. Paul Kecskemeti's work on strategic surrender shed light on the risks of demanding unconditional surrender in the nuclear age, while other works, especially those of Handel and Ikle, debated the issues of war termination vice post war settlement. The recent works of Beschloss and Pearlman provided keen insight and a relevant historical perspective for the European and Pacific Theaters of War.

## PRIMARY SOURCES

There are three important primary sources with regard to unconditional surrender: the memoirs of Winston Churchill and Ulysses S. Grant; and the facsimiles of the instruments of surrender for World War Two.

*The Hinge of Fate* was one of six books in Winston Churchill's memoirs of World War Two. This work provided a behind the scenes narrative of the discussions between the three Allied leaders who agreed upon unconditional surrender as the Allied political aim for the war. Churchill cited extensively the correspondence before and after the historic Casablanca Conference of 1943, and commented on his own public statements made during the war. This work was helpful in understanding the British perspective and context of the first half of World War Two and the circumstances that led to the demand for an unconditional surrender. Churchill's work was especially valuable since he was one of the three principals at Casablanca, and because Roosevelt's untimely death in 1945 prevented the American president from conveying his personal thoughts on the matter of surrender. Unfortunately, relevant sources in English were not available at the time of this study that would have enabled an examination of the personal views of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.

Ulysses S. Grant's memoirs provided a unique personal perspective of the first experience of unconditional surrender in American history. This surrender occurred during the American Civil War when Ulysses S. Grant demanded an unconditional surrender from the Confederate forces defending Forts Henry and Donelson in February of 1862.<sup>2</sup> Grant demanded an unconditional surrender from Confederate forces a second time during the siege of Vicksburg in July 1863. He was attempting to use unconditional surrender as a way to achieve the defeat of the Confederate forces at Vicksburg, which would result in an operationally decisive victory. Although initially Grant called for an unconditional surrender, he eventually conceded to certain

terms (allowing Confederate forces to leave Vicksburg with limited supplies provided they first signed paroles) and accepted a conditional surrender. Grant later explained his actions when he wrote, “Had I insisted upon an unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty-thousand men to transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the Mississippi.”<sup>3</sup> The conditions of surrender at Vicksburg demonstrated Grant’s appreciation of the second and third order effects that might follow a decisive victory at the operational level of war. This forethought and understanding of what could follow victory provided an interesting contrast against the next time American forces imposed unconditional surrender — eighty years later.

The United States Archives provided facsimiles of the actual terms of surrender for both Germany and Japan. The specificity of the instruments of surrender clearly convey three essential Allied demands: the need for immediate cessation of hostilities by the surrendering forces; the immediate forfeiture of any means to resist; and the establishment of the Allied authority as supreme.<sup>4</sup> By demanding such terms, the Allies sought to strip away the Axis ways and means for waging war in order to achieve their political aims. It is interesting to note, however, that these terms for surrender focused on war termination and not necessarily post war settlement. Chapter Four discusses the post war strategy that emerged to ensure the risk of Axis powers threatening the future peace was greatly reduced.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

There are multiple volumes written concerning surrender and its consequences. For this study, four individuals were most influential: Carl von Clausewitz, Michael I. Handel, Fred Charles Ikle, and Paul Kecskemeti. The two most interesting historical sources were the recent works by Michael Beschloss and Michael D. Pearlman.

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<sup>2</sup>Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant*, ed. E.B. Long, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1982), 159.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 293.

Clausewitz, the Prussian military theorist, provided much of the background work and philosophical underpinning for developing the definitions for war, victory, and defeat that this study explores. From these concepts, it was possible to construct a framework for considering unconditional surrender. Two chapters from his work, *On War*, were particularly useful, Chapter One from Book One, and Chapter Four from Book Four. Chapter One, *What is War?*, provided the definition for war that contained the two critical elements that enable a nation to prosecute hostilities—means and will. Chapter Four, *The Engagement In General—Continued*, provided the insight for the notion of the *Sliding Scale of Victory* that is discussed in Chapter Three of this paper.

Dr. Michael I. Handel's 1978 monograph titled, *War Termination—A Critical Study*, was an extremely helpful source for understanding the concept of war termination. War termination proved to be a major factor in the arguments against the use of unconditional surrender as a wartime policy. (This is explained further in Chapter Three.) Handel addressed the fact that while much has been written on war termination, there remains a great deal of dissatisfaction with understanding its implementation. He attributed this dissatisfaction to the lack of precise terms and definitions. To remedy this, Handel provided his own definitions for the matter. He proposed two principle categories into which most literature should be considered, either peace studies or war termination. He stated that peace studies “cover such subjects as the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace, disarmament and arms control, peaceful change, and the behavior of states before, during and after war.”<sup>5</sup> Handel explained that war termination “refers to the narrower problem of how to end wars once they have erupted and is less concerned with its antecedents.”<sup>6</sup> Handel then provided a useful classification of war termination research into five

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<sup>4</sup>National Archives Publications Numbers 46-4, *Germany Surrenders Unconditionally*, and 46-6, *The End of the War in the Pacific*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), 1.

<sup>5</sup>Michael I. Handel, *War Termination—A Critical Study*, (Jerusalem, Israel, Alpha Press, 1978), 10.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

categories: *normative studies*, which dealt with emotional aspects of war termination such as philosophy and religious studies; *economic theories*, which dealt with the conditions and long range effects on peace; *international law*, which dealt with the formal arrangements, such as cease fire agreements and treaties; *diplomatic history*, which examined the study of international politics; and lastly, the *theory of international relations* which dealt with the individual, the state, and the international system.<sup>7</sup> This taxonomy provided a useful construct with which to examine further works.

Fred Charles Ikle's work, *Every War Must End*, is a benchmark for any study concerning surrender. Ikle's broad experience provided an insightful perspective: from that of a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, or as head of the Rand Corporation, to that of serving in the administration of three presidents, the last being the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy during the Reagan Administration. *Every War Must End* addressed the concern that most historians and commentators focus on why wars begin, but neglect to examine how they end. Understanding how wars end is core issue for war termination. Those who opposed the use of unconditional surrender as a political aim argued that the cost required, in terms of national resources, to achieve the conditions for war termination in World War Two were too high. First published in the early 1970s, Ikle's work was updated to bridge the critical period in American foreign policy from the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 to the Gulf War in 1991. His work stressed the important fact that although military victory may be easy to determine following a war, the verdict in political terms must wait to see if the peace endures.

In 1957, Paul Kecskemeti wrote one of the most influential works on surrender in the nuclear age. His book, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat*, provided excellent analysis of the conditions leading to the demand of unconditional surrender in World War Two. He presented four case studies of surrender that occurred during the war and wrote a persuasive chapter on surrender in future strategy. Kecskemeti concluded that the need for future

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 12.

survival would have to override any 'deeply rooted traditional attitudes' on surrender. His arguments are among the most compelling with regard to avoiding the term 'unconditional surrender,' carte blanche, for future political war aims.

Presidential historian, Michael Beschloss, provided one of the most intriguing narratives with regard to the unconditional surrender of Germany in World War Two. His book, *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman, and the destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945*, detailed the behind the scene developments for each of these war time presidents. *The Conquerors* was thoroughly researched, well documented, and an easy read. Based on recently unclassified historical records from America, Great Britain, and the former Soviet Union, Beschloss was able to get to the heart of the matter with regard to the Allies' concern of preventing Germany from threatening future world peace.

Dr. Michael D. Pearlman, a military historian at the Combat Studies Institute, presented an extremely insightful and concise study of the complex issues facing the United States following the surrender of Nazi Germany. *Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb* assessed the traditional concerns of ending the war against Japan, as well as the overriding factors facing President Truman in the decision to drop the atomic bombs. This work cleverly showed the limitations of unconditional surrender and the high price that may be extracted from both sides to enforce a strategy that does not allow any room for negotiation. It was very useful in understanding the conditions and environment that fueled the arguments against the policy of unconditional surrender, which were prevalent during the final months of the war.



## CHAPTER THREE

### ANALYSIS

This research paper answers why unconditional surrender leads to a more lasting peace. The bedrock of this argument rests in understanding what purpose an unconditional surrender serves and how this type of surrender sets the conditions for a lasting peace. However, before addressing these two principles, it is first necessary to establish a common understanding for the definition of war and victory.

### DEFINING WAR

Clausewitz provided definitions of war and victory that are commonly accepted by military historians. In his book *On War*, Clausewitz stated his definition for war in his opening chapter: “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”<sup>8</sup> This immediately conjures up images of a struggle to impose one’s desires over another, quite possibly involving violence. Clausewitz further clarified with an explanation on how to overcome the enemy. He explained,

To overcome your enemy, you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. *the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.*<sup>9</sup>

For some, it may be helpful to express this statement in the form of a mathematical equation where the power to resist (Pr) is the product of the enemy’s means (m) and his will (w) to resist, or  $Pr = (m) \times (w)$ . By describing Clausewitz’s explanation in this manner, it reduces the complex issue of war to the essence of its two critical components: the enemy’s means to resist and his will to resist. Thus, it can be logically stated that in order to defeat an enemy one must defeat his means and/or his will to resist. To further understand these two aspects of the essence of conducting war, the means and will can be considered an expression of the instruments (means) and intent (will) for pursuing the desired political aim. Reduction of an adversary’s means and

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<sup>8</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), 83.

will might also be used as a measure of effectiveness for determining the conditions for war termination.

## UNDERSTANDING VICTORY

Defining victory is complex because there is no doctrinal definition for the term.<sup>10</sup> Consequently, civilian sources must be used to help define the term. The American Heritage Dictionary provided the following definition of victory: “Final and complete defeat of the enemy in a military engagement.”<sup>11</sup> Although perhaps useful to some, this definition by itself is not sufficient and can be misleading for students of military history for two reasons. First, this definition is declarative in the sense that victory can be final. Victory alone is not a lasting end state, but rather one that can change over time. Secondly, this simple definition fails to address the level of war being fought. Victories may be achieved at one of three levels of war: tactical, operational, or strategic. This paper will focus on the strategic level of war. It is not the intent of this study to find exceptions with civilian dictionaries, but rather to find a more complete understanding of what victory actually means. Once again, Clausewitz’s *On War* sheds some light on this matter.

In Book Four, Chapter Four, Clausewitz explained, “Every engagement is a bloody and destructive test of physical and moral strength. Whoever has the greater sum of both left at the end is the victor.”<sup>12</sup> Keeping Clausewitz’s earlier proposition in mind, the power to resist is the product of the means and will to resist, one may see the correlation of the physical strength to the means to resist and the moral strength as the will to resist. In the end, the one who has the

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 86.

<sup>10</sup>This study examined five authoritative publications in an attempt to find an official definition of victory. None contained the definition. The publications were: Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*; Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*; Joint Publication 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*; Army Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms*; and Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*.

<sup>11</sup>*The American Heritage Dictionary*, 2d College ed., s.v. “Victory.”


<sup>12</sup>Clausewitz, *On War*, 274.

“greater sum of both” will be the victor. This would imply that the victor could be able to impose his will upon the conquered since the loser has lost the ability to resist.<sup>13</sup>

Clausewitz further explained his concept of victory as consisting of three elements!<sup>14</sup>

1. The enemy’s greater loss of material strength.
2. His loss of morale.
3. His open admission of the above by giving up his intentions.

As with previous discussions, these three elements fit into either of two categories: means or will. The enemy’s material strength is a manifestation of his means to resist. The enemy’s loss of morale and his giving up of his intentions is an expression of his will to resist. For further clarification, it may be helpful to illustrate this concept in the following manner (see Figure 1):




**Figure 1**

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<sup>13</sup>One should note that there is a significant mathematical difference in these two statements. In the earlier statement it would indicate that the power of the enemy’s means to resist is the *Product* of means and will. As the product of these two variables, it is logical to conclude that if either is equal to zero the product must then be zero. Yet in his description of victory, it is the *Sum* of the physical strength (means) and moral strength (will) that determines the victor. The logic implies that either the means or the will can be zero and one could still be the victor. However, his argument is not mathematically commutative logic. Perhaps one should not attempt to reduce the nature of warfare, a qualitative element, to a simple quantitative, or linear, mathematical statements of logic. The purpose for using these equations is to derive the essence of war’s two critical components (means and will) and establish their correlation to the physical and cognitive realms.

This model expresses victory as a condition consisting of three elements that can be categorized as either the enemy's means to resist or his will to resist, one can then ask to what extent the enemy must lose his means or will to resist before one can declare victory?

For the sake of this argument, there are four conditions or degrees of victory that are possible. These degrees of victory are based on the extent of loss of the enemy's will and means to resist. The extent of loss may also possibly set the conditions for how long a peace may last. To illustrate this, the reader should consider the degrees of victory as a variable on a linear scale. The left end of the scale represents an indecisive victory; the right end represents a decisive victory. The degree of victory on this scale is dependant on the extent to which the enemy means and/or will to resist have been lost, either partially or completely. This notion can be graphically depicted in the following manner (see Figure 2):



1. **Decisive Victory:** Means (Complete Loss); Will (Complete Loss)
2. **Solid Victory:** Means (Partial Loss); Will (Complete Loss)
3. **Limited Victory:** Means (Complete Loss); Will (Partial Loss)
4. **Indecisive Victory:** Means (Partial Loss); Will (Partial Loss)

Figure 2

The real question, however, is how long will the condition of peace last. This arguments suggests the conditions for an enduring peace are directly related to the enemy's will and means to resist,


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<sup>14</sup>Clausewitz, *On War*, 277.

with the more critical of the two being the enemy's will. If the conflict is resolved without the complete removal of the enemy's will to wage war, then the result will be an uncertain peace that will be relatively short in duration. However, if the enemy's belligerent intent (will) is removed, identified in Figure Two as the threshold, then victory with an enduring peace will result.

At this point it is appropriate to consider the antithesis of victory: defeat. Victory cannot be achieved if the vanquished is not willing to acknowledge defeat. The enduring challenge of the warfighter is forcing the enemy to accept that he has been defeated. Clausewitz's "trinity" example of the three aspects of war (people, passion, and probability), may be used to illustrate the conditions that may compel an enemy to understand that he is defeated (see Figure 3):<sup>15</sup>

### **Persuading the Enemy to Acknowledge Defeat**



- 1. His means to resist must be destroyed, typically his armed forces.**
  - 2. The enemy government has to acknowledge this destruction.**
  - 3. This destruction of the means to resist must be witnessed by and understood by the people.**
- Together, the people and the government embody the enemy's will to resist.**

**Figure 3**

This illustration is but one example of a possible victory model. The material strength of a nation is represented by its military force, which possesses the instruments (Clausewitzian means) to resist. Likewise, the people embody a nation's morale that directly relates to the nation's will

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<sup>15</sup>For a complete discussion of Clausewitz's ideas on defeat refer to *On War*, Book 4, Chapter 4.

to resist. The government, with its intentions, represents the other aspect of a nation's will and directs the nation's desire to prosecute war or threaten peace.

In this particular case, the model illustrates what I would describe as a *limited victory* (see also Condition 3, Figure 2). History provides an example with the German defeat of France in 1940. The Wehrmacht decisively defeated the French armed forces, thus destroying French means to resist. The French government signed a surrender treaty and established the new Vichy government that was subservient to Germany, thereby acknowledging the destruction of the French means to resist. And this destruction of the means to resist was witnessed by the French people at the beaches of Dunkirk and further understood as they were forced to watch the triumphant Wehrmacht march down the Champs d'Elysees in Paris in 1940. What is important in this example, however, is the fact that the Germans, although attacking the French means and will to resist, only achieved a limited victory. Germany succeeded in forcing a complete loss of the French means to resist (the French army), but they only achieved a partial defeat of the French will to resist (as evident by the French Underground resistance movement).

The Allied defeat over Nazi Germany in World War II is an example of what one could define as a *decisive victory* (see Condition 1, Figure 2). The German means to resist were either completely lost or forfeited when they signed the surrender documents agreeing to the terms of unconditional surrender. Likewise, the German will to resist, mainly perpetuated through the doctrinal beliefs and practices of the Nazi party, was expunged. This removal of the will to resist came in the form of the death of the head of the Nazi Party, Adolf Hitler, the purge of the Nazis from Germany via Nurnberg trials, de-Nazification efforts, and post war activities. Thus in the decade following VE Day (Victory in Europe Day), the German means and will to resist the Allied forces were removed.

An example of a *solid victory* is the Vietnamese defeat of the French in Indochina in 1954 (see Condition 2, Figure 2). Following the defeat of the beleaguered French forces at Dien Bien Phu, the Vietnamese succeeded in forcing the French to negotiation at the peace tables. Although

the French forces at Dien Bien Phu were captured, this tactical victory by itself did not mean the French means to resist had been removed. The Vietnamese victory did however, trigger a more significant loss for the French—the loss of their will to continue the fight in Indochina. As a result, the French withdrew their forces from Indochina and Vietnam was subsequently divided into two separate nations. The victory of the Vietnamese over the French illustrates an example of the means to resist only being partially lost, but the will to resist being completely lost. The French lost the power to resist because they lost the will to resist: hence,  $P_r = (m) \times (w)$ , and  $(\text{means}) \times (0) = \text{zero}$ .

Another useful example to compare against the sliding scale of victory is the 1991 Gulf War (see Condition 4, Figure 2). This is an example of what one could define as an *indecisive victory*. In this case, the coalition forces achieved only a partial destruction of the Iraqi means and will to resist. Considerable means of the Republican Guard forces were allowed to escape destruction by the allied coalition and the driving forces behind the Iraqi will to resist, Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath party, remained in power. Consequently upon cessation of combat operations, significant Iraqi military means and the will of the Iraqi government to resist remained intact. As a result, the victory was indecisive. This indecisive victory was overshadowed by the impressive fact that the coalition achieved one of the quickest tactical victories in the history of warfare. Massive destruction of a major portion of an enemy army was achieved in only four days of ground combat operations and the air campaign had destroyed a number of strategically significant targets. By all Western metrics of destruction and operations analysis there was a one sided tactical victory clearly in favor of the allied coalition. However, the indecisiveness of the allied coalition victory was not fully apparent until several years after the conflict. Repeated Iraqi challenges to United Nation's sanctions that ended the war, with violations of the no-fly zone restrictions and reportedly continuing to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD), clearly demonstrate that the level of completeness of the so called victory was less than originally perceived.

The 1991 Gulf War illustrates an important limitation in applying Western logic against non-Western entities. How could the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, consider himself victorious with the bulk of his forces destroyed, strategic targets reduced to rubble, and his residual army forced to withdraw back into the midst of his remaining population center? Iraq is a culture with tribal values that places great importance on honor and saving face. The fact an enemy did not destroy his adversary may be interpreted not as a Western act of mercy, but rather as a sign of weakness—despite how close to death one might have come. This type of logic is contrary to Western thinking. However, it illustrates the greater challenge of understanding how one's adversary may choose to define defeat. In a culture with strong tribal values, it may be that the loss of the enemy's means is not nearly as significant to him as is the loss of his will. As long as he saves face, he retains honor within his tribe and can live to fight another day. In conflicts against cultures with a tribal heritage, greater emphasis should be placed on targeting the destruction of the enemy's will. As previously mentioned, the enemy's will is manifested in two entities—the people (a nation's morale) and the government (a nation's intent). Since world opinion does not tolerate the destruction of a people (genocide), then the removal of an adversary's government appears to be the most acceptable way to destroy an enemy's will. Consequently, facing an enemy with an asymmetric value set suggests that extraordinary measures must be taken to understand the 'foreign' mindset when formulating war termination and post war options, if an enduring peace is to be achieved.

### **WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ENDURING PEACE?**

To this point, we have explored an enduring definition of war, as well as the concepts of victory and defeat. From this common understanding, it is appropriate to address the question of how a nation-state can achieve an enduring peace when engaged in war. The answer lies in the effects that result from achieving an unconditional surrender—the



removal of the enemy's means and will to resist. The enemy's means to resist are removed by defeating an adversary's material strength (military force). The enemy's will to resist is removed by defeating both the morale of the adversary's people, and defeating the adversarial government that guides the intentions of the enemy's state. The Allies understood these three elements during World War Two and insisted on a policy of unconditional surrender.

## UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

The Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, defined unconditional surrender in the following manner: "An unconditional surrender is one in which a body of troops gives itself up to its enemy without condition."<sup>16</sup> However, what makes unconditional surrender unique is the fact that it does not involve bargaining. Prior to the American Civil War, surrender had always involved some form of mutual concessions. For example, when a fortress was sieged the besieged governor came forward under the recognized gesture of a white flag and established contact with the commander of the siege army. Once contact was made, the besieged governor would propose terms of capitulation. It was then up to the commander of the siege army to either accept or reject the terms. As Christopher Duffy described in his book *Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660-1860*, acceptable capitulation from the defender's perspective was one that, "made generous provisions for the life, liberties and property of the townspeople, and for the freedom and honor of the garrison."<sup>17</sup> Although this is a tactical example, it gets to the heart of the matter—surrendering forces is about some sort of negotiation or bargaining. The

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<sup>16</sup>Department of the Army, FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), Chapter 7, Section V, Subsection 478.

<sup>17</sup>Christopher Duffy, *Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660-1860*, (London: Greenhill Books, 1975), 189.

reason unconditional surrender is so alarming is because it implies that there *isno room for bargaining*.<sup>18</sup>

## ARGUMENTS FOR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

The reason for seeking an unconditional surrender lies in four principle considerations. First, a nation-state at war may perceive the need for the enemy nation-state to realize, acknowledge, and thoroughly understand that it is defeated once victory is declared. Any room left for bargaining may lead to future problems. Second, a nation-state at war may perceive the enemy nation-state as a threat to regional security due to its bellicose intentions. This being the case, the belief that peace is not possible without a purge of the enemy's national leadership and supporting regime may support the call for unconditional surrender. Third, unconditional surrender may be declared to demonstrate firm resolve to a coalition partner (such as the Soviet Union in World War Two), and also prevent other members of the coalition from seeking a separate peace. And lastly, unconditional surrender may also be used to rally political support. Combinations of these four categories were clearly present the last time unconditional surrender was declared as a matter of national policy; that being World War Two.

The first category, the need for a nation-state to thoroughly comprehend the fact that it was defeated, was most certainly prevalent in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's mind when he called for the terms of unconditional surrender during World War Two. As historian Michael Beschloss noted in his book *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945*, Roosevelt understood the failures of the Versailles Treaty that ended World War One. As the Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War One, Roosevelt believed the Versailles Treaty was one of the significant reasons why the Germans did not acknowledge defeat. He argued that had Western Allies penetrated deep into Germany, and subsequently occupied the conquered nation, the notion of defeat in the German mindset might

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<sup>18</sup>Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat*, (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1957), xi. Kecskemeti stated that, "All surrender involves an element

have prevailed. Without these conditions however, Roosevelt felt that the Germans would “convince themselves that they had not really lost the war.”<sup>19</sup> He was convinced that the Western Allies should have occupied Germany in order to “train the Germans to give up their old ambitions of dictatorship, a strong military and a world empire.”<sup>20</sup> The challenge of convincing a conquered enemy that he was in fact defeated was one lesson that Roosevelt would not forget.

With regard to the dangers of bargaining away a lasting peace, Paul Kecskemeti identified in his 1957 Rand Corporation study of strategic surrender that, “President Roosevelt and his advisors felt that the Germans had been left with the impression that they had quit in 1918, not because they had been defeated but because they had been offered acceptable terms.”<sup>21</sup> This illustrates Roosevelt’s perception of the potential dangers associated with bargaining away too much at the peace table. It also helps explain why in 1944 Roosevelt defended his position on unconditional surrender by stating, “Practically every German denies the fact they surrendered in the last war. But this time they are going to know it.”<sup>22</sup>

This desire to ensure the Allies of World War II would have free reign in determining the terms for peace was also echoed across the Atlantic. In defending the Allied position of unconditional surrender, Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated the following to the House of Commons on 22 February 1944:

The term ‘unconditional surrender’ does not mean that the German people will be enslaved or destroyed. It means however that the Allies will not be bound to them at the moment of surrender by any pact or obligation...No such arguments will be admitted by us as were used by Germany after the last war, saying that they surrendered in consequence to President Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points.’ Unconditional surrender means that the victors have a free hand.<sup>23</sup>

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of bargaining, or mutual concessions. No surrender can be literally unconditional.”

<sup>19</sup>Michael Beschloss, *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1941-1945*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 11.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 12.

<sup>21</sup>Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender*, 217.

<sup>22</sup>Beschloss, *The Conquerors*, 7.

<sup>23</sup>Winston Churchill, *The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 690.

The fear of an inadequate and compromised surrender, brought about through some sort of bargaining, clearly appears to be one of the underlying reasons behind the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. For with a compromised surrender, the Allies felt they could not ensure that the pugnacious *will* of the defeated enemy had been removed. Without this condition, they feared that the armistice ending World War Two would simply result in a postponement of World War Three. After all, this is what happened as a result of the Versailles Treaty and that mistake was to be avoided.

The second category that may apply to the demand for unconditional surrender is when an enemy nation-state is perceived as a threat to regional security. If the power of this nation-state resides exclusively in one person or his loyal regime, and that nation-state is perceived as an aggressive, untrustworthy state, then a mandate for unconditional surrender may go out in order to purge the threatening nation-state of its corrupt leadership and power base. Hitler's Nazi Germany of World War Two most certainly fit this category. Almost immediately after Hitler rose to power in 1933 he demonstrated to the world that his nation could not be trusted to honor diplomatic agreements and that they had clear aggressive intentions. By the start of World War Two, Germany's diplomatic track record spoke for itself. On 16 March 1935, Germany denounced the disarmament clause of the Versailles Treaty. On 15 September 1938, Germany demanded and was given the Sudetenland portion of Czechoslovakia. On 10 March 1939, Hitler succeeded in annexing the rest of Czechoslovakia. On 28 April 1939, Germany denounced both the German-Polish Agreement of 1934 and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935. And on 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland thereby triggering Britain and France's declaration of war against Germany on 5 September. This marked the beginning of World War Two in Europe. Even two years later when the future of Europe still hung in the balance, Germany once again tipped the scales of international opinion and asserted its aggressive and hostile tendencies. On 22 June 1941, Germany unleashed its war machine by invading the Soviet Union. Hitler again clearly demonstrated that Germany was a not only a continued threat to

regional stability, but also a threat to the future balance of power in Europe. With this in mind, the Allied demand for unconditional surrender remained steadfast.<sup>24</sup>

Roosevelt insisted that Germany “must not allow the seeds of the evils we shall have crushed to germinate and reproduce themselves in the future.”<sup>25</sup> In his 1943 press conference at Casablanca, in which the Allied call for unconditional surrender was first publicly used, Roosevelt declared “peace can come to the world only by the total elimination of German and Japanese war power.” He insisted on the unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy, and Japan, stating that the Allies would seek to destroy “the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and subjugation of other people.”<sup>26</sup> For Germany, the primary actor fueling this desire for ‘conquest and subjugation’ was clearly Hitler supported by his Nazi party. The Allies understood that merely destroying an enemy’s *means* to resist would be insufficient to insuring a lasting peace. What was required was the removal of the enemy’s *will* to resist and threaten the future peace. The morale of the enemy had to be broken in order to remove the people’s will to resist and the government had to be defeated, if not removed, in order to eliminate the enemy’s bellicose intentions. Churchill’s speech of 30 June 1943 reflect an understanding of these conditions:

We, the United Nations, demand from the Nazi, Fascist, and Japanese tyrannies unconditional surrender. By this we mean that their will power to resist must be completely broken, and that they must yield themselves absolutely to our justice and mercy. It also means that we must take all those far-sighted measures which are necessary to prevent the world from being again convulsed, wrecked, and blackened by their calculated plots and ferocious aggressions.<sup>27</sup>

Another example of the need to expunge corrupt leadership from the enemy nation-state is found in the October 1943 ‘Moscow Declaration’ that was issued as a joint statement signed by Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The declaration’s focus was on exacting

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<sup>24</sup>Drew A. Bennett, “Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Forcing Unconditional Surrender on Germany,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 2002, 43.

<sup>25</sup>Beschloss, *The Conquerors*, 12.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>27</sup>Churchill, *The Second World War*, 688.

justice for war crimes and “decreed that Germans accused of atrocities would be ‘sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done.’”<sup>28</sup> As Michael Beschloss recorded, “The three victors would jointly try major war criminals whose offenses were not restricted to one country.”<sup>29</sup> For the Allies, these conditions would only be possible by demanding unconditional surrender.

Political aims are the third category that may compel a nation-state to demand unconditional surrender. For example, prior to the 1943 Casablanca Conference the Soviet Union was the only nation of the ‘Big Three’ Allied nations decisively engaged in a land war against Germany. The promised ‘second’ Allied front had yet to materialize and the Soviet Union continued to absorb the brunt of Hitler’s wrath. By declaring the terms of unconditional surrender, Roosevelt articulated British and American political resolve to pursue the war against Germany to the very end, even though the cross channel invasion against occupied France would not occur for another year. Another political reason for demanding an unconditional surrender was that this demand decreased the likelihood that one of the three Allies might attempt to strike a separate peace on their own. If a separate peace was declared by one of the Allied nations, it might very well unhinge the anticipated post war efforts.<sup>30</sup>

A fourth principle consideration to justify demanding unconditional surrender is that this demand would rally domestic political support. As Kecskemeti pointed out in his Rand study, the West tends to portray wars in a crusading manner. He wrote:

Democratic cultures are profoundly unwarlike: to them, war can be justified only if it is waged to eliminate war. It is this crusading ideology, which is reflected in the conviction that hostilities cannot be brought to an end before the evil enemy system has been eradicated.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Beschloss, *The Conquerors*, 21.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>31</sup>Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender*, 26.

Thus, by calling for an unconditional surrender against an enemy, a nation may be able to rally public support to continue the war for a prolonged period of time in order to eradicate the perceived evil.

To this point we have reviewed the reasons in support of a nation-state calling for unconditional surrender: the need for an enemy nation-state to understand that it is truly defeated; the need to avoid bargaining pitfalls at the peace table; the need to remove an aggressive and hostile regime from power; and the need to demonstrate political resolve.

However, this study would be remiss if it did not consider the arguments against demanding an unconditional surrender, before concluding whether or not unconditional surrender leads to a more lasting peace in today's complex domestic and international environment.

### **ARGUMENTS AGAINST UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER**

Compelling arguments against the use of unconditional surrender can fall into one of three categories. They are the concern that: unconditional surrender may be too politically restrictive (by not allowing negotiations); unconditional surrender may prolong a war; and unconditional surrender provides no alternative for the enemy but to resist to the end. Again, World War Two provides several examples for each concern.

Unconditional surrender allows no room for bargaining and therefore limits the options of the political leaders. In his work, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat*, Paul Kecskemeti illuminated several points that support the concern that unconditional surrender is too politically restrictive. A principle theme was that surrender is about bargaining and as such there has to be some degree of give and take on both sides to reach an effective settlement. Kecskemeti stated, "All surrender involves an element of bargaining, of mutual concessions. No surrender can be literally unconditional."<sup>32</sup> This describes the paradox of unconditional surrender. If one nation continues with the destruction of the other, and leaves his enemy nothing to bargain with (whether it is land, forces, or resources), then the losing side may have no alternative but to

continue fighting if for no other reason than to preserve remnants of its ethnic identity. Although it may be politically desirable to end the fighting sooner, the national decision makers calling for the terms of unconditional surrender may find themselves with no alternative but to continue prosecuting the war, when the other side refuses to concede to the terms of unconditional surrender. This leads to a second criticism against unconditional surrender—prolonging war and destruction.

The fear of a prolonged and bloody war was certainly apparent during World War Two. However, this fear assumed different characteristics depending on the theater of war. In Europe, the claim that unconditional surrender prolonged the war is debatable. On one hand following the Casablanca Conference of 1943, German propagandist Joseph Goebbels “warned the German people that the unconditional surrender demand was hard proof that if the Allies won the war, they would enslave and exterminate them.”<sup>33</sup> This concern of stiffening enemy resistance and prolonging the war was a concern of Churchill as well. On the other hand, Colonel Drew A. Bennett pointed out in his article on Germany’s unconditional surrender, that Hitler’s resolve to fight to the bitter end left the Allies with few options. Hitler was even quoted as saying, “We will never capitulate, never...We might be destroyed, perhaps; but we will drag a world with us—a world in flames.”<sup>34</sup> With such guidance, a conditional surrender becomes less of an option.

In the Pacific, the fear that the policy of unconditional surrender prolonging the war was clearly evident, especially following Germany’s surrender in May 1945. Senior American officials, both military and civilian, questioned the utility of insisting that Japan surrender unconditionally. Three leading Navy admirals, Leahy, King, and Nimitz, were on record against it,<sup>35</sup> and Secretary of War Stimson expressed concern about increased American casualties that would be inflicted by the Japanese in an all out suicidal defense. Stimson’s concern was based on

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., xi.

<sup>33</sup>Beschloss, *The Conquerors*, 14.

<sup>34</sup>Bennett, “Heads I Win, Tails You Lose,” 42.



the results of the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa during which American forces suffered significant losses.<sup>36</sup> What was more shocking was the apparent fact that Japanese forces were electing to fight to the death or commit suicide, rather than surrender. Army estimates at the time forecasted 2.5 million Japanese fighting to their deaths in the event of an American invasion of their homeland.<sup>37</sup> It is interesting to note that the Japanese warrior code of ethics, *bushido*, viewed surrender as a disgraceful act. *Bushido* stressed the need for a warrior to be totally committed to the battle, fighting to the death if necessary.<sup>38</sup> This was demonstrated in the Japanese use of suicide pilots, *kamikazes*, who elected to fly their aircraft into naval vessels and die in a flame of glory rather than surrender and face the shame of surrender. The strident unwillingness of the Japanese to surrender, incessant and mounting casualties in the Pacific, coupled with the desire to quickly terminate a war that had lasted for more the four years, contributed directly to President Truman's historically courageous decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Fortunately his bold decision generated a paradigm shift in Japanese attitudes with the unprecedented destructiveness of the two atomic weapons.

It is important to note, however, that in both theaters of war the *political act* of declaring unconditional surrender did not necessarily prolong the war. It was the unwavering condition of 'no negotiation' demanded by the Allies that persuaded the Axis to hold out on their final decision to surrender. With regard to the European Theater of Operations, Kecskemeti pointed out that, "The criticism usually leveled at a policy, namely that it needlessly prolonged the war, is, however, rejected, mainly because it cannot be squared with actual German behavior during the terminal stage."<sup>39</sup> As for the Pacific Theater of Operations, Army Chief of Staff, George C.

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<sup>35</sup>Michael D. Pearlman, *Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1996), 6.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>38</sup>For further readings with regard to *Bushido* and Japanese martial philosophy see Oscar Ratti and Adele Westbrook's book *Secrets of the Samurai*, (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1973).

<sup>39</sup>Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender*, xi.

Marshall, continued to ask for a precise definition of the term 'unconditional surrender' in hopes that a clarified Allied intention might induce the Japanese to surrender.<sup>40</sup>

The fear of leaving no alternative but to fight to the death is the third argument against unconditional surrender. What options are left when an enemy is not allowed to bargain for peace? As Kecskemeti pointed out, "In settling conflicts, it is better to assess the enemy's bargaining position realistically than to concentrate on reducing it to zero."<sup>41</sup> This concern becomes even more apparent when dealing with an enemy who possesses weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is conceivable that if a nation possessing WMD is not offered a position to bargain, they may feel compelled to use its WMD in a last ditch effort rather than capitulate. The concern of a maniacal leader, who perceives that he has no alternatives remaining, may decide to 'drag the world down in flames' rather than capitulate. Kecskemeti further stated that, "Since the loser has a desperate last recourse, he cannot be treated as if he were defenseless."<sup>42</sup> This point brings up the question of the risks of demanding an unconditional surrender in a world full of WMD.

Contrary to the international conditions that the Allies faced in World War Two, there are currently nation-states with WMD that could dramatically change the course of international relations. The use of nuclear weapons could cause catastrophic losses, which would outweigh any political advantage that may be derived from victory. Consequently, the reality of mutually assured destruction (MAD) suggests that the insistence of unconditional surrender is unlikely.<sup>43</sup>

## EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTS

Upon weighing the arguments for and against the viability of unconditional surrender, it is interesting to note that the arguments fall into two distinct categories with regard to victory: *war termination* or *post war settlement*. Some may argue that because they are two separate

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<sup>40</sup>Pearlman, *Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb*, 8.

<sup>41</sup>Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender*, xii.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 254.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 249.

categories they cannot be compared to one another. One can at least evaluate the arguments on their own merits. With this in mind, it is important to recall what Dr. Michael I. Handel wrote in his critical survey on war termination. He stated, “We must therefore conclude that war termination is a necessary but not sufficient condition for peace, since the discontinuation of hostilities does not perforce include positive progress towards peace.”<sup>44</sup>

Unconditional surrender did contribute to achieving a lasting peace following World War Two. This is clearly demonstrated by two of the three arguments in favor of unconditional surrender: the need for the enemy to understand he is defeated, and the need to remove a threat to future peace. Both of these arguments focus on the aspect of *post war settlement*. The third argument, demonstrating national resolve, is not necessarily germane since it deals more with sustaining or prosecuting the war than war termination or post war settlement. Therefore, turning our attention to the first two arguments, we see that unconditional surrender exceeded the requirements Handel mentions for war termination and set the conditions for the peace that ensued in the post war settlement. In reviewing the surrender documents of World War Two, we see how the foundation for a lasting peace was laid. The enemy acknowledged defeat by agreeing to end hostilities and abandon his means to resist. By the enemy acknowledging Allied authority as supreme, the Allies succeeded in obtaining what Churchill described as ‘free hand’ to remove any material, persons, or conditions that they perceived as a threat to future peace.

The arguments against unconditional surrender (politically restrictive, prolongation of the war, and no alternative for the enemy but to resist), focus on the aspect of *war termination*. These arguments focus on matters that delay achieving victory in a timely manner. The major argument against unconditional surrender today is the use or threatened use of WMD, or perhaps more accurately, MAD. The risk of a war leading to annihilation through the use of WMD clearly makes any policy that does not allow for negotiations an unacceptable posture.

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<sup>44</sup>Handel, *War Termination*, 10.

History shows us that the peace with Germany, Italy, and Japan that followed after World War Two has lasted for more than fifty years. It is too simplistic to conclude that unconditional surrender, alone, leads to a more lasting peace and should therefore be demanded again in the future. However, unconditional surrender did establish necessary conditions that contributed to the lasting peace that followed. Those effects, along with the consideration of nuclear escalation or retaliation with WMD, form the paradox of unconditional surrender. This paradox will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **CONCLUSION**

Unconditional surrender is a modern paradox. Although the effects resulting from an unconditional surrender lead to a more lasting peace, it is not a viable option for the twenty-first century, due to the threat of nuclear escalation (resulting in MAD) and the proliferation of WMD. Moreover, the West has certain misperceptions of war, namely, the misunderstanding of the relationship between war and peace, and the bias of the Western lens. This misunderstanding of the relationship between war and peace manifests itself in a restrictive political-military mindset that misuses the popular term ‘decisive victory.’ The bias of the Western lens affects the West’s perspective on war, which can lead to false expectations that may prove hazardous. These expectations reveal themselves in the demand for quick action (with respect to time) that resolves an issue once and for all (decisiveness). However, these expectations can lead to miscalculations if the desired end state is not achieved rapidly or in a decisive manner.

### **THE PARADOX OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER**

#### **UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER CAN LEAD TO A MORE LASTING PEACE**

Unconditional surrender enables a more lasting peace. However, three circumstances should be considered in reaching this conclusion. Unconditional surrender may be necessary in

order to set the conditions on which a future peace can be built, but unconditional surrender, by itself, doesn't necessarily guarantee a lasting peace. Unconditional surrender should be recognized as an extreme method to achieve peace that could have latent adverse consequences. And post war actions should be considered in a holistic manner that includes the notion of restoring a nation's viability and dignity over a period of time, if a lasting peace is to be achieved.

Following World War Two, unconditional surrender, by itself, did not achieve a lasting peace, but it did set the conditions for an enduring peace in two ways. First, unconditional surrender achieved two necessary effects that enabled an enduring peace to take hold: the removal of both the enemy's *means* and *will* to not only resist but also to threaten future peace. Second, unconditional surrender created the conditions upon which the Allies could restructure new forms of government in the conquered nations. It was the willingness of the victors to rebuild a nation from a clean slate, and their ability do so, which made a significant impact on the peace that followed.

The removal of the enemy's *means* and *will* was achieved through the two rules of unconditionality, which were clearly articulated in the surrender documents of World War Two. Kecskemeti described the rules as follows:

First, there was the 'no negotiation' rule, prescribing that there could be no dealings with enemy leaders except to instruct them about details of orderly capitulation. Second, there was the 'no recognition' or 'vacuum' rule, prescribing that immediately after capitulation the enemy leaders would cease to exercise any political authority whatever, and that no other indigenous body would be recognized as representing the losing society—i.e., the enemy's acceptance of a political vacuum at the top was made a necessary condition for ending hostilities.<sup>45</sup>

The 'no negotiation' rule addressed the enemy's instruments (Clausewitzian *means*) for pursuing belligerent interests. This rule was reflected in the clause that specified the surrender of all armed forces for each respective country. Each nation, upon completion of signing the terms of surrender, was to cease hostilities and surrender their military forces to the Allies.

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<sup>45</sup>Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender*, 219.

Subsequently, the Allies imposed post war demilitarization programs for each country that ensured the former belligerents would not have the capability to threaten future peace.

The ‘no recognition’ (of political authority) rule addressed the enemy’s pugnacious will. This rule articulated that the respective enemy surrendered ‘unconditionally’ and that the Allied powers would have supreme authority. This ‘no recognition’ rule was even more clearly stated in the Japanese instrument of surrender. The last paragraph of that document specified the following:

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.<sup>46</sup>

By agreeing to these terms, the Allies assumed the responsibility of filling the leadership void created by the capitulation of the enemy governments. Filling this void gave the Allies the freedom to reconstruct the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government in the manner they saw fit. This supreme authority also enabled the Allies to hold military tribunals in order to try former Axis leaders found guilty of war crimes. By these actions, the Allies were able to influence the character and predilection of the future governing bodies for each country. Removing the belligerent means and the will of the former Axis governments enabled a lasting peace to take hold.

The second consideration, with regard to unconditional surrender, is that the term unconditional surrender should be recognized as a drastic diplomatic position. This term allows no room for negotiation and could very well lead to a strategy of attrition, which would likely incur costly conditions for war termination. Although Italy and Germany surrendered unconditionally, had it not been for the dropping of two atomic bombs and the opening of a second front against the Soviet Union, Japan’s unconditional surrender could have been very

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<sup>46</sup>National Archives Publication No. 46-6, *The End of the War in the Pacific*, 12.

costly.<sup>47</sup> For Japan, these extenuating circumstances forced rapid capitulation. Had this not occurred, the Allies would likely have suffered greatly since the Japanese leadership determinedly resisted accepting the terms of unconditional surrender. To fully appreciate the magnitude of this dilemma, the Japanese disposition should be viewed in the context of the period. While still insisting upon unconditional surrender, the United States itself was facing war weariness. As Pearlman concluded in his work, “They [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] had spent the war worrying that the public will would exhaust itself short of achieving the unconditional surrender of Japan. Perhaps it had, although no one would admit it.”<sup>48</sup> Because the will of a nation’s people and government to sustain a war is one of the factors at risk when the demand for unconditional surrender is made, the nation’s will to prosecute the war will most likely decrease over time as the cost of war increases. Therefore, wars of attrition may adversely affect national will and should not be forced upon a nation without considerable forethought.

The third consideration, with regard to unconditional surrender, is that building a lasting peace should be considered in a holistic manner that includes the notion of restoring a nation’s viability and dignity. Neither is rebuilt overnight; they are recovered over time and with significant investment.

Two essential tasks for rebuilding a nation’s viability are establishing a stable economy and providing internal security. For both Europe and Japan, it took the Allies several years and dedicated reconstruction programs to rebuild the war torn countries. The European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, is an excellent example of a post war effort designed to reestablish economic stability. Announced at Harvard University in June 1947, the Marshall Plan was intended to “reduce the hunger, homelessness, sickness, unemployment and political

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<sup>47</sup>Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture, The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), 264.

<sup>48</sup>Pearlman, *Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb*, 24.

restlessness of the 270 million people in sixteen nations of West Europe.’<sup>49</sup> The plan’s focus was aimed at increasing production in the war torn countries, expanding foreign trade for Europe, enabling economic integration and cooperation in Europe, as well as attempting to control inflation. The Marshall Plan also paid for European farmers and industrial technicians to visit the United States to leverage American methods of farming and industry. The program cost was \$13.3 billion dollars over a period of four years.<sup>50</sup> This example is significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrates the fact that post war reconstruction occurs over a period of years, not months. Second, it demonstrates that the victor must not only be willing to help rebuild the war torn countries, but also to underwrite post war reconstruction at considerable cost. The ensuing economic stability will play a critical role in establishing viable governments that can then manage their own economic engine and wean themselves off the reliance of the foreign aid.

Providing internal security and stability to a war torn nation is the other important aspect a victor should address if an enduring peace is desired. With a defeated nation surrendering its army, and most likely having its civilian police force significantly purged, the question of internal security and stability within a defeated nation becomes an issue.

The role of the United States Army in Europe, following World War Two, is a prime example of how former combat units were transitioned to constabulary roles. These units, consisting primarily of highly mobile armor and cavalry organizations, provided occupied counties an interim security force until a reformed police force and national defense force could be established. In post war Germany, the constabulary mission lasted for six years (1946-1952) and involved three brigades and ten regiments of constabulary forces. The brigades were placed in each of the three German states of the American occupation zone and the regiments were responsible for the smaller political boundaries. The constabulary forces were responsible for performing police missions as well as providing combat forces, if needed. Communications and

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<sup>49</sup>George C. Marshall Foundation, (Lexington, Virginia: VMI Parade, 2003), available from [http://www.marshallfoundation.org/about\\_gcm/marshall\\_plan.htm](http://www.marshallfoundation.org/about_gcm/marshall_plan.htm); Internet; accessed 17 February 2003.



intelligence units, as well as air liaison units, supported constabulary forces. Each regiment also had a motorcycle platoon for traffic control, a horse platoon for patrolling difficult terrain, and a light tank company to serve as a mobile reserve. In addition to these units, reconnaissance troops conducted local patrols to ensure the Army's presence was felt in the occupied zones. These forces remained in place until a viable German national infrastructure could be established.<sup>51</sup>

Restoring a nation's dignity is the other concept in the holistic approach to establishing a lasting peace. Cultural considerations can play an important role in helping to establish this condition, as seen with post war Japan. General Douglas MacArthur, who served as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), consciously decided to allow the Emperor of Japan, Hirohito, to retain his throne. Historically, the emperor was the spiritual leader of the nation. The pre-war Meiji Constitution described the position as "sacred and inviolable...descending from a line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal."<sup>52</sup> Realizing this, SCAP planners recommended leaving the emperor in position, albeit with limited governing control, in order to "perpetuate the stabilizing influence of the throne while eliminating its dangers. Its role was to be the same as the century before, the source of spiritual leadership."<sup>53</sup> Doing so, MacArthur maintained the Japanese dignity associated with the institution of the emperor and leveraged this to help reestablish order and control in a conquered land. By allowing a country to retain its historical cultural identity, providing it is not contrary to reconstruction objectives, a nation may be able to sustain its pride and motivation until the new government is established.

## **UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER IS NO LONGER VIABLE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

Although unconditional surrender can lead to an enduring peace, this desire is checked by the reality of a world proliferated with WMD. Any insistence upon unconditional surrender

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Center for Military History, (Fort. McNair, DC: CMH Publications, 2001); available from <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/lineage/Constab-IP.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 February 2003.

<sup>52</sup>Russell Brines, *MacArthur's Japan*, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1948), 84.

might very well lead to a Pyrrhic, rather than decisive, victory. Therefore, it must be concluded that any *blanket demand* for unconditional surrender is an unrealistic expectation in the foreseeable future. Consequently, unconditional surrender has become a modern paradox.

Weapons of mass destruction add a dimension to international relations that cannot be ignored without considerable risks—risks that would exceed any political advantage that might be derived from a victory. These risks are in the form of catastrophic losses to national assets, the likelihood of indiscriminant killing of civilians, and the capability to drastically alter or impede an adversary's means to prosecute war, almost instantly. Combined with the increasing number of nations seeking WMD capabilities, these risks are alarming. Currently, there are more than ten nations with known nuclear weapons (the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, South Africa, as well as some former Soviet republics).<sup>54</sup> These lists do not include those nations who are currently pursuing the development of biological or chemical weapons as well as sophisticated delivery means, such as ballistic missiles. Nations in this category include: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Cuba.<sup>55</sup>

Given the destructiveness and the proliferation of WMD, foregoing diplomatic options for bargaining is unwise. Unconditional surrender implies no negotiation and in today's strategic environment, advancing the notion of no consideration for negotiation could prove very risky if not suicidal. The complex transnational relationships today beg for multinational considerations in settling strategic disputes. Unilateral positions that demand the totality of unconditional surrender are extreme positions that are difficult to defend. Today's diplomats and strategists will have to find other means to achieve the same desired end state.

For example, although demanding a surrender using the words 'unconditional' is not likely in the future, it does not mean that governments will refrain from using the term

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<sup>53</sup>Ibid., 85.

<sup>54</sup>John T. Rourke and Mark A. Boyer, *International Politics on the World Stage*; available from <http://www.mhhe.com/catalogs/007248179x.mhtml>; Internet; accessed 11 March 2003.

'unconditional' when certain conditions must be met for war termination. This was the case on 8 August 1990 when President George H.W. Bush stated that, "we [the United States] seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait."<sup>56</sup> While the president did not call for an unconditional surrender, he invoked the term 'unconditional' to clarify the conditions required to meet the coalition forces requirement for war termination. Perhaps this method will be used again when the future peace is threatened. Governments might possibly call for specific 'unconditional' terms to be met in order to resolve the crisis, such as: destruction of WMD, removal of certain political leaders (such as dictators), and/or the expunging of supporting political regimes and security forces. Demanding that certain terms be met unconditionally would enable a nation to achieve the net effect of declaring unconditional surrender without being restricted to a position of no negotiation.

## **WESTERN MISPERCEPTIONS OF WAR**

### **MISUNDERSTANDING WAR AND PEACE**

In developing this monograph, three aspects with regard to understanding war and peace are apparent. First, there is a danger in defining too narrowly a wartime policy that restricts flexibility. Second, the American concept of enduring peace needs to be reconsidered in light of the changing global environment. And third, the notion of decisive victory may exemplify the limitations of a Western, or in this case an American, approach to war.

If a nation, while trying to formulate a strategic decision, fails to fully consider the full scope of war it may find itself with a strategy and policy that lacks the flexibility to achieve desired objectives. For example, a demand for unconditional surrender by allies could be an extreme position and would not likely work in today's environment. The consequences for such a

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<sup>55</sup>“Analysis: Capabilities of U.S. ‘Rogue States,’” BBC News, 15 May 2002; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1988810.stm>; accessed on 8 March 2003. .

<sup>56</sup>John T. Fishel, *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm*, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 12.

position are too risky and the world situation is too complex. The threat of nuclear war, or retaliation with WMD by the enemy or even a third party, could rapidly escalate to unwanted levels of war and destruction. Consequently, diplomats today are forced to carefully weigh positions and statements in order to avoid causing unstable or threatening conditions, which could significantly expand a war or generate unsatisfactory consequences. In a similar vein, complex global issues, such as fighting transnational terrorism, do not necessarily lend themselves to being solved with narrowly defined positions. This being the case, the United States is dangerously close to setting itself up for failure with regard to a restrictive political-military mindset. This failure is in the misuse of the popular term ‘decisive victory.’

Although the phrase ‘unconditional surrender’ has not been used since the end of World War Two, the concept of decisive victory has emerged in the American military lexicon and, in fact, can be as misleading and restrictive as the term unconditional surrender. In addressing this misconception of victory, Dr. Colin Gray described in his article, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, the notion that decisive victory should be considered on a broad scale. He stated three reasons. First, “decisive victory, and indecisive victory even more so, is hard to translate into desired political effect.” Second, “decisive victory is probably best viewed as a range of possibilities, rather than a stark alternative to the failure to achieve such a success.” And third, “even if we affirm that decisive victory is our doctrine and military intention, in practice, a number of degrees of decisiveness are likely to prove acceptable.”<sup>57</sup> Gray argues for the need to have more broadly defined terms that allow for the flexibility in achieving the desired results.

If decisive victory is perpetuated as the only acceptable solution to conflict, then any government that espouses this condition may find itself more restricted than ever. Redefining victory on a broader scale would allow greater flexibility in achieving desired political effects. If

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<sup>57</sup>Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2002), 18-20.

this does not occur, then future success may hinge on the single condition of decisive victory, which at a strategic level may simply not prove feasible.

The second issue for consideration is the concept of peace. German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, described the problem succinctly when he wrote, “In war the result is never final.”<sup>58</sup> He went on to describe his views in the following manner:

Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.<sup>59</sup>

While Clausewitz may be at an extreme in defining the likely duration of peace, I submit that Americans may be at the opposite end. Americans have come to expect a short war with a decisive outcome that leads to immediate peace. This difference might be for a couple of reasons.

First, America has been spared from the ravages of war on their homeland for over one hundred and forty years. Although the United States fought in both world wars, and several limited wars in the twentieth century, it was spared the physical damages of war. Since the wars were conducted on foreign soil, American citizens were able to continue their daily routines in peace. These conditions led to a sense of security and a misunderstanding of the true nature of peace. However, America’s comprehension of peace changed on 11 September 2001, when the United States became the victim of a terrorist attack that claimed the lives of over 3000 Americans. For the first time in over a century, the damages and horrors of war were brought to the shores of the continental United States. Immediately following the terrorist attacks of 2001, the American sense of security was clearly altered; time will tell if it remains changed.

Secondly, the United States developed a notion that peace was a guaranteed condition simply because of America’s military might. The reason for this is not hard to follow. After World War Two, the United States emerged as one of two super-powers. Following the Cold War, America became the world’s only super-power. The prevailing thought was that any nation

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<sup>58</sup>Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*

who decided to engage the United States in combat would simply fail. Iraq in Desert Storm is a recent example that demonstrates this point. However, success on the battlefield in tactical operations does not necessarily lead to strategic success. Vietnam bears testament to this. Enduring peace requires more than military strength and success on the battlefield. Today's complex global environment, with the threat of WMD and transnational terrorists, requires a more comprehensive perspective on the constituent factors that lead to lasting peace.

The third aspect of understanding war and peace regards America's notion of decisive victory. From an American standpoint, decisive victory implies that swift and violent military action, perhaps unilaterally, can achieve a victory that obtains the desired political objectives. This definition can be misleading. This simplistic logic can wrongly conclude that military action alone can solve complex problems and achieve a lasting peace. This line of thinking tends to focus on simply removing the means that threaten peace, and most likely does not address the problems of removing the will that may also be a threat to peace. The 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 Air War in Kosovo are two prime examples. While quick military victories, with quantifiable results, may have been achieved, they were far from decisive in the broader sense. It is misleading to think that rapid military action alone, without a presence on the ground and without economic and diplomatic considerations, can lead to a lasting peace. In considering decisive victory, Gray's study concluded four important points:

1. Decisive victory is both possible and important, though it is never guaranteed.
2. One size cannot fit all in the deterrence or conduct of war.
3. Decisive victory, though a meaningful concept, is not a clear-cut alternative to defeat, or even to indecisive victory.
4. The fact of U.S. interest in the concept of decisive victory is in itself politically and culturally revealing.<sup>60</sup>

Gray's fourth point is the one most troubling. He alludes to the fact that perhaps decisive victory has become an American conception of war and may not be shared by her allies. Referring to Europe, Gray also stated, "There is a time and sometimes a place for insistence upon decisive

victory. Europeans, snake bitten by two world wars “at home,” are less than intrigued by means and methods to achieve such military success.”<sup>61</sup> If this perception is accurate, and America is the only nation concerned with achieving decisive results, then perhaps it is time for the United States to reconsider the lens it uses to comprehend war.

### THE BIAS OF THE WESTERN LENS

When examining this lens that Western nations have historically used to view war, two major exceptions stand out. First is the West’s emphasis on, and quite often its miscalculation of, *time*. The second is the West’s insistence for *decisive* conclusion to operations. The two factors, time and decisiveness, may be mutually inclusive, but not necessarily apparent, when considering conflicts between Western nations. They are quite apparent, and perhaps mutually exclusive, when the enemy changes to a non-Western player or when the cultural rules of engagement shift radically. A quick review of some major conflicts over the last century helps illustrate this point. Consider first the emphasis on and miscalculation of time.

During World War One, the German’s designed and executed the Schlieffen Plan, which was intended to defeat France in a few short weeks.<sup>62</sup> However, due to unfortuitous events and considerable enemy resistance, the elusive victory was stretched out for four years and eventually went to the Allies. The plan for a short campaign was continually adjusted to reality. The emphasis on time and its corresponding miscalculation failed to prepare the belligerents for a lengthy campaign and contributed to results that were neither quick nor victorious.

During World War Two, the Germans initially faired somewhat better. In less than a month, the Germans succeeded in forcing the capitulation of France in 1940, but they learned the wrong lesson from their unexpected success.<sup>63</sup> When the Wermacht applied the same Blitzkrieg tactics against the Russians a year later, things backfired. Instead of completing a campaign that

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<sup>60</sup>Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, 32-36.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 35.

<sup>62</sup>Ernest R. and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present*, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1977), 931.

was designed to achieve victory in six months, the campaign dragged into a five-year struggle. The end result was the Allied victory over Germany with the Russians leading the charge in the final Battle of Berlin. The German Blitzkrieg campaign against the Russians, with attendant miscalculations of time, produced catastrophic results.

On the other end of the spectrum, sometimes victory is achieved much sooner than expected. The Gulf War of 1991 is one such example. After only one hundred hours of ground combat, the Iraqi forces called for a cease-fire. This rapid victory was totally unexpected and caught the coalition forces unaware. Although the coalition was quick to capitalize on the victory, hindsight now shows that perhaps they learned the wrong lesson with respect to time. Twelve years later the prevailing attitude, on the eve of what is being called the Second Gulf War (March 2003), is one of an anticipated rapid victory. Experts are calling for a repeat performance by Iraqi forces and anticipate the possible war to be over in just a few weeks or months. However, while the military actions of the campaign may be concluded quickly, the removal of the ruling regime and reconstruction of the country are expected to take much longer.

This underestimation of the enemy leads to the second point. The West, and particularly the United States, has an overwhelming desire to conclude conflicts decisively. Again, reviewing the wars of the last century helps illustrate this notion.

In World War One, the Allies incorrectly referred to the conflict as the “War to End All Wars.” This title demonstrates the West’s desire to bring closure on things, especially in regard to something so horrendous as war.

In World War Two, the Allies who were frustrated at the failed Versailles Treaty were determined to not let history repeat itself. The demand went out for ‘unconditional surrender’ so that this time the Allies could settle things once and for all and also establish the necessary conditions for an enduring peace.

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 1061.



During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur, following his relief as commander of United Nations forces in Korea, expressed his dissatisfaction with the concept of fighting a 'limited' war. In his speech before Congress in the spring of 1951, he voiced his frustration by stating there was "no substitute for victory." This feeling of dislike for limited wars was also captured in T.R. Fehrenbach's history of the Korean War titled *This Kind of War*. Fehrenbach wrote:

There was frustration in the spring of 1951, but no change of policy. The world had changed, and America was being forced to change with it. Containment, as developed by the Truman Administration, was not a satisfying answer. Millions disliked it or distrusted it, but could put forth no better course.<sup>64</sup>

This dislike of limited war illustrates a Western view of warfighting that only a clear-cut victory will suffice. What surprised the United Nations Forces in Korea was the fact the communist forces were willing to fight a protracted war against one of the strongest forces on earth. However, for the Chinese and North Korean forces, a quick and decisive victory was not a pressing issue and they would leverage the element of time to their advantage.

This leveraging of time was exploited against Western forces again during the Vietnam War. The communist forces of North Vietnam settled in for a protracted attrition based strategy, using Mao's guerrilla warfare tactics, to fight a militarily superior enemy—the United States. Frustrated at the inability to achieve a decisive strategic victory (despite never suffering a tactical defeat), and war weary after ten bloody years of fighting, the United States finally withdrew from Vietnam in 1975 and declared a "peace with honor."<sup>65</sup> The notion of not achieving a decisive victory was not forgotten by the American soldiers who fought there.

Sixteen years later, during the 1991 Gulf War, America would finally satisfy its desire to obtain what it perceived to be a rapid and decisive victory. Against the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein, the coalition forces achieved an overwhelming military defeat, the likes of which had

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<sup>64</sup>T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 422.

<sup>65</sup>Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 692.

never been witnessed in the history of the world. In just one hundred hours of ground combat, the coalition was able to almost completely envelope invading Iraqi forces and force their leaders to the negotiation table. Victory appeared decisive. This penchant for decisive outcomes is reflected in the titles of the Army's official account of the war, *Certain Victory*, and the Navy's official account, *Desert Victory*. These service histories convey an attitude that victory had at last prevailed and the experience in Vietnam was avenged. Ironically though, time has had final say with regard to the decisiveness of the 1991 Gulf War victory. Mistakenly, the coalition forces allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power and develop his means to threaten regional peace. Consequently, the victory of the Gulf War appears more inconclusive than ever. The 1991 decisive military victory may get the chance to be replayed, hopefully at the same loss exchange ratios as before.

What is important in the last two examples, America's war in Vietnam and its war with Iraq, is that in both conflicts the United States applied the Western metric of time and decisiveness as a measure of effectiveness. The problem is that these criteria are Western standards applied against non-Western enemies. Not only are these criteria not sufficient, they can produce misleading estimates of the outcome. The United States would be wise to carefully consider the cultural aspects of its future enemies, especially with regard to their concept of time and decisive victory, before it goes to war against a non-Western enemy again.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper began as an attempt to understand how the military can help achieve a more lasting peace. To accomplish this, World War Two was the obvious starting point since the war's termination and unconditional surrender enabled a peace to last for over fifty years. However, four insights emerged as the quest for the secret to achieving a lasting peace unraveled. If peace is to last, the desired political objectives must be carefully articulated. Understanding the culture of one's adversary is crucial. Western powers need to be cognizant of distortions their Western lens may cast when viewing wars from their own perspective. These insights, plus the need for further research in the transition from war termination to post war settlement, lead to the following recommendations.

First, the military can help achieve a more lasting peace when both military and political planners understand and work together toward the desired political objectives. If a nation simply wants to repel an aggressor or inflict punitive damage against an enemy, the military alone can do so, and often quite effectively. However, as this study has pointed out, unless an adversary's belligerent *means* and the *will* to threaten future peace are removed, then whatever peace is achieved will likely be short lived. It is imperative that military planners understand that a plan must address removal of both the enemy's means and will. Working in concert with their political colleagues, they can then set the appropriate political objectives and terms for surrender. Likewise, it is crucial that the military describes the operational conditions on the battlefield that would facilitate war termination. Given that war termination has been achieved, and the national command authorities are satisfied with the terms for surrender, the military must be prepared to assist in the transition from war termination to post war settlement. Post war settlement will most likely involve the military transitioning from offensive and defensive combat operations to stability and support operations. As previously mentioned with the constabulary forces of World

War Two, the military has done this mission before and can quickly adapt to the execution of this role.

Second, sufficient time and effort should be dedicated to understanding the culture of one's adversary. By understanding an adversary's culture, it will enable the understanding of how the enemy is inclined to define victory, and more importantly, acknowledge defeat. As discussed in Chapter Three, enemies with tribal legacies will place considerable value on the ability to close with and engage enemy forces, then live to tell about it. For tribal cultures, defeat on the battlefield (as defined by our Western lens) may be viewed as secondary as long as the tribal honor remains in tact. Military planners in this environment should realize it may be more important to target a tribal enemy's will, not just his means, in order to defeat him.

The third recommendation is for Western powers to understand their inherent cultural biases regarding the role of military operations to achieve political objectives. As mentioned in Chapter Four, two dominant Western traits are the aspects of time and decisiveness. The United States, in particular, has expressed these two ideas in a recent concept called Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). Joint Forces Command defined RDO in the following manner:

Rapid Decisive Operations - Rapid decisive operations is a concept for future operations. A rapid decisive operation will integrate knowledge, C2, and operations to achieve the desired political/military effect. In preparing for and conducting a rapid decisive operation, the military acts in concert with and leverages the other instruments of national power to understand and reduce the regional adversary's critical capabilities and coherence. The US and its allies asymmetrically assault the adversary from directions and in dimensions against which he has no counter, dictating the terms and tempo of the operation. The adversary, suffering from the loss of coherence and unable to achieve his objectives, chooses to cease actions that are against US interests or has his capabilities defeated.<sup>66</sup>

While this definition may be appealing to a technologically superior, if not arrogant force, it is not without criticism. Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II published a critical review of this concept in November 2001. His review identified several faulty underlying

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<sup>66</sup>United States Joint Forces Command Glossary; available from <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm#R>; accessed on 8 March 2003.

assumptions of the RDO concept; two are illustrative of the Western bias for time and decisiveness. The first is the assumption that the “National Command Authorities (NCA) will desire military forces that are rapid and decisive in all scenarios. Political leaders might well prefer a gradual approach in most cases.”<sup>67</sup> The second is that RDO assumes the following:

One can identify, attack, and destroy whatever an adversary values most, in so doing break his will to fight. Ideology and political realities make this a facile solution for some situations and completely unrealistic for others.<sup>68</sup>

Echevarria explained, “Attacking what the enemy values most is not always the best route to the objective.”<sup>69</sup> The RDO Concept may not be the panacea it is portrayed to be. Future planners would be wise to avoid creating unrealistic expectations for military operations if they are unable to achieve their political objectives in a rapid or decisive manner.

The final recommendation is that future efforts be directed toward understanding and enabling the transition from war termination to post war settlement. While the military’s inclination may be to return home as quickly as possible, their stabilizing effect in a war torn, chaotic environment may prove the critical element that enables peace to take root. World War Two would certainly bear witness to this.

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<sup>67</sup>Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Rapid Decisive Operations: An Assumption-Based Critique*, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2001), vi.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., vii.

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