

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PREPARING THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE WORKFORCE
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, it was clear that the Defense Intelligence Community was not entirely prepared to meet the challenges posed by terrorists. This Strategic Research Project is an attempt to investigate the status of the Defense Community's Civilian Intelligence Workforce ability to meet the rigorous demands of the 21st Century. Based on a survey of personnel officers at the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, National Security Agency, CENTCOM, JFCOM, SOCOM, and SOUTHCOM, it concludes that while there are strengths in the Defense Intelligence Community there are also glaring weaknesses in recruiting, training, retention, evaluation, promotion, and rewarding the workforce, but especially in the lack of "corporateness" among the Defense Intelligence Community's institutions. This SRP recommends the formation of a national Defense Intelligence Service that would include all civilian intelligence community officers. It further recommends that the civilian workforce be centrally managed, that a separate career track for technicians and specialists be established, and that an "up or out" system be adopted.

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PREFACE

Were it not for the assistance of a number of people at various Defense Intelligence Agencies and Joint Intelligence Centers, this SRP could not have been written. While I accept full responsibility for interpretation of the data, I would like to thank the following people who took time out of their busy day to answer my questions: Bob Cooney, Cathy Curridan, and Bob Stacey (DIA); Ruchard Lininger (NIMA); Brenda Krasnodemski (NSA); Margaret Esposito (CENTCOM); Tracy Adams (JFCOM); Chuck McGeary (SOCOM); and Cheri Kenyon (SOUTHCOM). I would also like to thank my Faculty Advisor Colonel Karen McClellan for her advice, guidance, and acute editorial eye. Finally, I would like to thank the Community of Civilian Defense Intelligence Officers that I have had the great privilege of working with at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center, National Ground Intelligence Center, Office of Prisoners of War and Missing in Action – Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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PREPARING THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE WORKFORCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

"I don't know any user of intelligence that's ever satisfied. The appetite is insatiable. One wants perfect visibility into everything including minds, people's minds, as well as things that aren't even observable because they're underground and are not known completely. No one's ever satisfied with intelligence."¹


—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
12 October 2002

Few realize that if one were to wander the corridors of the National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at Bolling Air Force Base, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) at the Washington Navy Yard, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) at Chantilly as well as several other Department of Defense intelligence centers, one would be struck by the large number of civilians that populate the premises of these intelligence institutions. Officially designated combat support agencies, civilians are nevertheless the core of the workforce; they provide most of the technical expertise and leadership, and, increasingly they are apt to serve in harms way alongside their military compatriots. In view of its critical role, the Defense civilian intelligence workforce will be the focus of this Strategic Research Paper.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as the United States and its allies fight a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), there are cries to reform the Intelligence Community (IC). Policy makers and legislators will draw new line and block charts, more money will be spent, some people will be shifted around, and there will certainly be talk about the need to "think out of the box." And, in the end, there will no doubt be improvements in the Defense Intelligence Community (DIC), but they will likely be improvements only on the margin. For there to be significant, positive change in the Intelligence Community, there must first be fundamental change in the way the DIC's civilian workforce is organized as well as how it recruits, trains, rewards, removes, and shapes its workforce. But above all, it must be a joint workforce organized into a Defense Civilian Intelligence Service that is well led, technically proficient, culturally aware, agile, flexible, and deployable.

The focus of this Strategic Research Project (SRP) is on how the DIC civilian workforce can be "transformed" to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. This paper will first address the fundamental question whether reform or transformation is necessary. Next it will present the results of a questionnaire on the current state of the DIC civilian workforce pointing out the

strengths and weakness in how the DIC recruits, trains, rewards, removes, and shapes its work force. Then there will be a short review of the legislation that shaped the institutions, workforce, and culture of the DIC. Finally, and most importantly, this SRP will present a series of recommendations on what must be done to transform and prepare the workforce for the future. The fundamental recommendation is that jointness is critical for the DIC and formation of a Defense Civilian Intelligence Service would help achieve this end.



DIA = DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

NIMA = National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NRO = National Reconnaissance Office

NSA = National Security Agency

JICs = Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Centers

Service Intelligence Centers = National Ground Intelligence Center, National Maritime Intelligence Center, etc.

Service Intelligence = 4th PSYOP Group, 66th MI Group, etc.

FIGURE 1

IS TRANSFORMATION OF THE DIC NECESSARY?

On 2 February 2002, some seven months before terrorists associated with Al-Qa'ida attacked the Twin Trade Towers and the Pentagon, George J. Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: "Since July 1998, working with foreign governments worldwide, we have helped to render more than two dozen terrorists to justice. More than half were associates of Usama Bin Ladin's Al-Qa'ida organization. . . . Usama Bin Ladin is still foremost among these terrorists, because of the immediacy and seriousness of the threat he poses. *Everything we have learned recently confirms our conviction that he wants to strike further blows against America. Despite some well-publicized disruptions, we believe he could still strike without warning* (emphasis added)."²

The Intelligence Community clearly anticipated that a terrorist attack on the United States was imminent, but it could not say when and where such an attack would occur. When the results of imprecision are the deaths of thousands of Americans, the costs – both human and political – are too high for anyone to accept. The result was intense soul searching and the establishment of a Special Joint Inquiry by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

But even before the Special Joint Inquiry, there was a widespread sense that "things were not quite right" in the IC. Indicative of this is that from 1995 through 2001 there were fourteen separate studies and reviews of the IC. For example, there was the 1995-1996 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown Commission), 1996 IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century (House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Study), 1998 Intelligence Community Performance on the Indian Nuclear Test (Jeremiah Report), and the 1999 Rumsfeld Commission on the Ballistic Missile Threat – and the list goes on.

There are a number of common threads throughout all of these studies. First, and most striking, these studies pointed to a need to share intelligence information among intelligence agencies and consumers. Second, they argued for greater "community" in the intelligence community. Third, they emphasized the need for better training and support for analysts. Fourth, throughout the IC language skills were found wanting. And finally they all stressed the need for a greater HUMINT (Human Intelligence) capability.

Recently the Special Joint Inquiry released its findings – and again its recommendations tended to echo those of earlier studies with calls for greater "cooperation," analytic training,

improved language skills, etc. Below are several of the conclusions that bear most directly on the civilian workforce.

- “Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community was neither well organized nor equipped, and did not adequately adapt, to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the domestic United States.”³
- “. . . the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was either unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of Intelligence Community resources necessary to combat the growing threat to the United States.”⁴
- “Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately share relevant counter-terrorism information, prior to September 11. This breakdown in communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in the agencies missions, legal authorities, and *cultures*. Information was not sufficiently shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agencies, but also within individual agencies, and between intelligence and the law enforcement agencies.”⁵
- “Analysis and analysts were not always used effectively because of the perception in some quarters of the Intelligence Community that they were less important to agency counter-terrorism missions than were operations personnel. The quality of counter-terrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many analysts were inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and without access to critical information.”⁶
- “Agencies within the Intelligence Community experienced backlogs in material awaiting translation, a shortage of language specialists and language qualified field officers, and a readiness level of only 30% in the most critical languages.”⁷

The most telling critique of the events of September 11 was that of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

“Perhaps the most fundamental problem illustrated by the findings of the Joint Inquiry Staff (JIS) in connection with the intelligence failures leading up to September 11 relates to the problem of persuading U.S. Intelligence Community agencies to share information efficiently and effectively. This problem is inextricably tied up with the longstanding problem of ensuring quality intelligence analysis within the Community, for without *access* to a broad range of information upon which to draw inferences and base conclusions, even the best individual analysts necessarily find themselves gravely handicapped.”⁸

It should be noted, however, that one theme stressed over and over again in all these studies was the need for “sharing,” “cooperation,” “jointness,” and “community.” The IC21 Staff Study of the House Permanent Select Committee was particularly eloquent in its plea for “corporateness”:

“We have concluded that a major key to an improved IC is the concept of ‘**corporateness**,’ i.e. for the agencies and employees of the IC to run, to function, and to behave as part of a more closely integrated enterprise working towards a highly defined common end: the delivery of timely intelligence to civil and military decision makers at various levels. We believe that this higher sense of corporate identity can be achieved without sacrificing services or functions properly designed to serve more parochial intelligence needs.”

So one can say, in view of all these studies, it was widely perceived both before and after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2002 that the Intelligence Community, while dedicated to service to the nation, was severely handicapped in the struggle with terrorism by bureaucratic and cultural obstacles that kept its various parts from working effectively together to combat the nation’s enemies.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW:

While it is clear that the Special Joint Inquiry and several other studies found a need for transformation and change in the Intelligence Community, do the Bush Administration’s cornerstone documents the National Security Strategy (NSS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reflect these same sentiments? Indeed, they do.

The National Security Strategy explicitly states: “We must transform our intelligence capabilities and build new ones to keep pace with the nature of (the) threats. Intelligence must be appropriately integrated with our defense and law enforcement systems and coordinated with our allies and friends.”⁹

No less significant, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review outlines four pillars of transformation necessary to create a U.S. military for the 21st Century. Not surprisingly one of the core pillars is “exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages.”¹⁰ One of several corollaries to transforming the U.S. military, the QDR notes, is the “need to attract, develop, and retain civilian personnel.”¹¹ The human resources portion will include “modernized recruiting techniques, more flexible compensation approaches, enhanced training and knowledge management, and career planning and management tools.”¹²

The message in both documents is clear. The Intelligence Community must transform. It must be more corporate, integrated, flexible, and agile.

THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY – ITS CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

It is clear that among policy makers there is dissatisfaction with the overall performance of the Intelligence Community, especially with the quality of analysis, the linguistic preparation of intelligence officers, the level of cooperation/sharing, and the sense of corporateness. Are these criticisms justified? Are these fundamental, structural weaknesses or can they be fixed by tweaks to the system? In an effort to answer these and other questions, a questionnaire was sent to several key DIC institutions:

- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
- National Security Agency (NSA)
- Central Command (CENTCOM)
- Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
- Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
- Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

Because of time constraints, it was not possible to send the questionnaire to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) or any of the Service Intelligence Centers such as the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC), or to all of the combatant commands. Nevertheless, it is believed that the above institutions constitute a representative sample of the DIC sufficient to allow one to draw some general conclusions.

The questionnaire addressed issues such as recruiting, security, training, evaluation, rewards, promotion, personnel flexibility, and retention of the civilian intelligence workforce. It was then sent to personnel officers in the above Agencies and Combatant Commands' Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs). Then a few days later, the personnel officers were interviewed over the telephone and their responses to each of the questions noted. In the case of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, the author conducted the interviews in person.

The personnel officers were asked to provide unclassified information on the nature of their respective civilian intelligence personnel systems and workforce. All those who answered

the questionnaire were helpful and positive on the merits of their own organizations. Their responses were written up by the author and are summarized in the appendix of this Strategic Research Paper.

Based on the responses, a number of narrow-gauge conclusions can be drawn on the state of the DIC's civilian intelligence workforce. Grouped under the subjects of "recruiting and security," "training," "evaluations, rewards, and promotions," and "personnel flexibility and retention," the more important of these conclusions are presented below. For ease of conceptual understanding, the DIA, NIMA, and NSA are grouped together under the rubric "Agencies" while CENTCOM, JFCOM, SOCOM, and SOUTHCOM are grouped under "Combatant Commands" or "JICs."

RECRUITING AND SECURITY

There is a significant difference between the Agencies and the Combatant Commands in recruiting efforts. The Agencies draw from a national pool of talent while the Combatant Commands draw from a local pool of talent.

The Agencies make a concerted effort to recruit from a national pool of talent. Besides advertising on the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) web page, the Agencies send out recruiters to college campuses across the country, attend job fairs (especially at military bases), and advertise in newspapers and journals. The Agencies are particularly anxious to recruit people of different ethnic backgrounds as well as to increase the number of women in their organizations. More so than the other Agencies, the NSA seeks highly trained engineers, scientists, and linguists.

The JICs, on the other hand, are content to recruit locally. They usually limit their advertisement to word of mouth and the obligatory web page announcements. As a result, recruits into the civilian intelligence workforce are often former military "buddies," especially recently retired military personnel who want to stay in the local area.

The Agencies have both summer internship programs and scholarship programs for selected students, but the Combatant Commands have neither.

As part of their effort to recruit and retain first rate talent, the Agencies maintain a summer internship program that brings selected college juniors and seniors into their agencies to work during the summer. After graduation, many return as full time employees. There is also a scholarship program aimed at "minority students" that will pay for their entire education at any accredited institution, usually elite institutions, in return for service at the Agency. The

Combatant Commands, with one exception, have neither an internship program nor a scholarship program.¹³

Both the Agencies and the Combatant Commands reported that hiring new personnel as intelligence officers often involves delays of a year or more while prospective intelligence officers await their security clearances, resulting on occasion in losing candidates to other employers.

While NSA reports that it has finally broken the security clearance cycle from date of submission of paperwork to issuance of the TS/SCI clearance including a polygraph to 89 days, this success is not widely shared. Indeed, one personnel officer declared: "The system is broken."¹⁴ According to the Defense Security Service, the defense agency charged with conducting background investigations for the Department of Defense, on the last day of 2002 there were over 39,000 investigations underway that were a year or more old.

The wait for a new officer's security clearance is a source of widespread frustration among leaders in the DIC. They need new personnel now, not tomorrow! Moreover, waiting a year or more for a clearance may result in the loss of the billet, either through a job freeze or billet elimination.

Because of the long wait for security clearances, the Agencies and Combatant Commands reported a predisposition among managers to hire retired and former military personnel because they usually "came with a security clearance."

Driven by bureaucratic necessity as well as cultural familiarity, DIC leaders often hesitate before they hire recent university graduates even though they may be superbly trained academically and linguistically proficient. It usually means a long delay while the prospective intelligence officer awaits his clearance. This is especially true if the candidate spent any time abroad in a major area of interest such as China or the Middle East. It is far easier to hire a retired soldier who already has a clearance and may already be trained than to run the risk of waiting a year or more and then losing the billet in the end.

The practice of hiring former military personnel is especially common in the JICs. One JIC reported that "most of the people we hire are former military."¹⁵ Another reported that in the last four to five years, they had hired only one person who did not already have a clearance.¹⁶ The Agencies, while they do not officially give preference to retired military (other than the normal veterans preference), do say that they hire many who have retired.

*There is a significant **difference** between the Agencies and the Combatant Commands in security standards, with the Agencies migrating towards mandatory polygraphs and the Combatant Commands not requiring the polygraph.*

It is interesting to note that for the Agencies, regular polygraph tests are a condition for employment or, in the case of the DIA, continued employment, while their use is rare in the JICs. Whether this makes the Agencies more secure or not is a point of contention. But it is clear that without a polygraph test, an intelligence officer is denied access to many SAPs (Special Access Programs). This means that intelligence officers in the JICs may be denied access to the full range of intelligence they need to do intelligence collection, planning, and all source analysis.

Furthermore, it is also an obstacle to full Intelligence Community integration. The polygraph is seen by many, especially those in the CIA, not only as a test that separates the trustworthy from the untrustworthy, but as a “defining experience” much like Marine Corps boot camp. One is psychologically stripped naked before strangers and forced to confront all of one’s sins and weaknesses. It is a trauma that – like boot camp – one never forgets.

TRAINING

There is a significant difference between the Agencies and the Combatant Commands in training standards with the Agencies requiring short but mandatory training and the Combatant Commands employing primarily OJT (on the job training).

All of the Agencies have introductory training courses that are mandatory for incoming intelligence officers. Designing effective introductory courses is a challenge to the training staff that must train new intelligence officers from different specialties, of different ages, and with varying levels of experience. A particular challenge is to educate young intelligence officers who have no military experience on the cultures of the military and the needs of the “war fighters.” And, of course, there is the challenge of educating the new officers in the technical aspects of the profession. While the quality and length of introductory training in the Agencies varies from a minimum of 30 days to 90 days, the Agencies clearly believe some sort of common, basic training is necessary if for no other reason than to help create an agency-wide sense of corporateness.

The JICs, on the other hand, have no formal training program. Often they hire retired and former military personnel, in part in order to avoid having to train new intelligence officers. On occasion, new officers are sent to training at DIA and elsewhere, but this is based on the availability of training funds. Sending a new officer to a month long training program in

Washington, D.C. or elsewhere can consume a large slice of a JIC's training budget for a year. As a consequence, OJT (on the job training) is the most common method of training new analysts. Such an approach provides an intelligence officer with an uneven skill set and certainly does little to advance any sense of IC corporateness.

The training of intelligence officers, especially analysts, is not a one time effort. It is a career long effort that must extend from junior through senior grades. The Agencies have made significant strides, given financial and time constraints, in training new officers and especially analysts, but they still fall well short of William Langer's injunction that the training of an intelligence analyst needs to be as rigorous as that given to a doctoral student in a first rate university. (William Langer was the founder of the Intelligence Directorate in the Office of Strategic Services.)

Without a more robust and rigorous training program for civilian intelligence officers throughout the DIC, the civilian intelligence community workforce will not measure up to the demands that the decades ahead will place on it.

Neither the Agencies nor the Combatant Commands require mid or senior level training, except for DISES (Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service).

With the exception of DISES (civilian equivalent of general officers), none of the Agencies or JICs has mandatory mid and senior level training. There are various courses available that address mid and senior level concerns, but there is no systematic, common, training program. Indeed, many of the courses of value to mid and senior level officers have limited enrollments and admission is competitive.¹⁷

Personnel officers at both DIA and NSA pointed to this lack of mid and senior level training as a significant shortcoming in their agencies. However, financial constraints and, to a lesser degree, cultural obstacles prevent the institution of mid and senior level training. Nevertheless, the failure to train adequately mid and senior level intelligence officers is a serious shortcoming. Unless it is rectified, the DIC civilian workforce will not maximize its potential.

There is no formal mandatory training program for Defense Civilian Intelligence Officers in joint intelligence, that is intelligence across the intelligence specialties HUMINT (Human Intelligence), MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence), SIGINT (Signal Intelligence), IMINT (Imagery Intelligence), and analysis.

Current training is Agency centric. With perhaps the exception of the Joint Military Intelligence College which each year admits a handful of students – usually active duty officers,

there is no formal, mandatory joint training program in the DIC. New analysts, in particular, do not have a sense of being a part of a larger community. They perceive themselves as DIA officers or NSA officers, not community officers. Not surprisingly, agency centric training creates an intelligence officer who has a poor understanding of the structure and culture of other intelligence institutions. This is especially pronounced among those officers in the JICs who may be “joint” within the context of the uniformed military, but are parochial in the sense of an Intelligence Community corporateness.

One old intelligence hand once observed: “Each agency tends to run its own training programs, in its own style, emphasizing its own values. The result is an intelligence system in which values and cultures differ remarkably. . . . The result has been the creation of a fraternal atmosphere among those who train together, and this has created problems over the long run, since those who do not belong to the fraternity are rarely allowed access to its activities.”¹⁸ If, as others have called for, the DIC is to achieve a sense of corporateness, it must teach “intelligence jointness.” To date this is still only a concept, not a fact.

Only NIMA and NSA have developed programs – both very new – to train civilian intelligence offices in leadership and management. The Combatant Commands and DIA have no such training effort underway.

In reflection, it is odd that the Defense civilian intelligence workforce, immersed as it is in a broader military culture, has been slow to grasp the distinction between leadership and management and even slower to train leaders rather than just managers. Leadership is a core military value defined as “Be, Know, and Do.” More specifically, leadership can be summarized as “know your job,” “set the example,” “take care of your subordinates,” and “be honest.” Teaching leadership has only recently become a part of the training program in some of the Agencies, and it is not at all addressed in the JICs. Although progress is being made, leadership has yet to become a core value in the DIC. Unfortunately, many supervisors still perceive their responsibilities narrowly as giving orders, filling out time cards, writing appraisals, etc.

In November 2002, NSA took a bold step towards inculcating a culture of leadership when it founded the Center for Leadership and Professional Development. According to its mission statement, “The Center will focus on the leadership and professional development of all employees from the moment they walk in the door until they leave Agency employment. Our goal is to create a corporate approach to career development and to improve the assessment, selection, and development of managers and leaders at every level across all Agency

organizations. We hope to create and develop a leadership cadre at NSA that is valued and recognized for its ability to engender trust, foster teamwork, and motivate and develop people toward exceptional mission performance.”¹⁹

NIMA also recently established a School of Leadership and Professional Studies. “Designed to develop leaders with specific skill sets at each band level, the program challenges participants to explore and develop their personal leadership talents through self-assessment, historical case studies, role-playing, and the study of leadership theory.”²⁰

Is this the latest business school management babble? Perhaps, but it is significant that this is the first time that any Agency has explicitly identified the need to train leaders. It is the first time that any concrete steps have been taken to establish a school or center dedicated to training leaders. No doubt, it will take time to implant notions of leadership into the culture of these Agencies. Meanwhile, the rest of the DIC has yet to address the issue of leadership.

In view of the current practice of promoting intelligence officers to senior ranks based on their analytical or operational abilities rather than leadership, it is particularly critical that a leadership ethos be established within the DIC. All too often, intelligence officers find themselves promoted into leadership/management positions without the training, experience, or psychological inclinations for the task.²¹

Leadership makes all the difference. It is not enough to have bright, talented, and motivated people. Without leaders to shape and direct, the workforce is apt to fall into dysfunctional efforts, morale will sink, and little will be accomplished.

Only NIMA and NSA have robust language training programs for intelligence officers; DIA and the JICs generally downplay the importance of language training.

The very purpose of the DIC is to collect and analyze intelligence on foreign countries in which the majority of people speak a language other than English. One might expect, therefore, that language training and language skills for intelligence officers would be emphasized throughout the Intelligence Community. Sadly it is not. There are exceptions such as the NSA with its language training program at Fort Meade, Maryland. NIMA integrates area studies into its language program. Called LASTRA, it is a “language program uniquely tailored to the professional needs of NIMA analysts. . . designed to teach the fundamentals of the language along with area studies background of the analyst’s region. The courses are an introduction to the language with an emphasis on the four skills of reading, writing, listening, and speaking.”²²

At DIA, language training is easily available to intelligence officers in the DO (Directorate of Intelligence), that is the clandestine and overt HUMINT collectors. Elsewhere at DIA, language training is by exception. Not a single analyst position in either the Directorate of Intelligence or in the J-2 is coded "language essential." Consequently, funding for language training is limited. Moreover, managers are often reluctant to release intelligence officers for language training during the day fearing it will decrease productivity.

None of the JICs reported any sort of language training. Clearly it is not a priority. No doubt, it is viewed a distraction from core intelligence production efforts.

In retrospect, it is no surprise that the Special Joint Inquiry in the aftermath of 11 September found, "a shortage of language specialists and language qualified field officers." DIA and the JICs are symptomatic of a widespread attitude in the DIC toward language training: it is nice to have, but it is also a mission distracter and not worth monetary investment.

EVALUATIONS, REWARDS, AND PROMOTIONS

There is no standard civilian personnel evaluation system in the DIC. Personnel evaluation inflation is rampant across the DIC.

There are as many DIC personnel systems as there are Agencies and JICs. Clearly this indicates a high degree of disjointedness and lack of corporateness. It makes it difficult, if not impossible, to measure performance across organizational boundaries.

Complicating this situation is the fact that civilian intelligence officers are not evaluated against their peers, but against a prescribed set of criteria. Moreover, both the Agencies and JICs report rampant evaluation inflation. Indeed, one personnel officer at a JIC reported, "It is 'few and far between' when a civilian intelligence officer receives less than a 'superior' on a five point system with 'superior' being the best."²³ Office of Personnel Management regulations, which technically are not binding on the DIC but for reasons of culture are followed, proscribe competitive rating systems whereby only a certain percentage of officers are given top ratings and another percentage average ratings. As a consequence, most intelligence officers are rated as above average.

This is not a problem confined to just the DIC. According to one federal report, "Federal agencies gave 85 percent of their senior executives the highest possible performance rating – an assertion that virtually everyone in Washington is way above average."²⁴ In 2000, five federal agencies gave 100 percent of their senior executives the highest rating and another six agencies gave 90 percent the highest rating.²⁵

Most Agencies employ an application based centralized promotion system for mid and senior ranks while the Combatant Commands employ a traditional civil service application based system.

The Agencies in recent years have moved toward “centralized promotion” systems, at least for the more senior grades, whereby centralized promotion boards review the files of all those eligible for promotion. Centralized promotion boards are handicapped by the current system whereby most intelligence officers are rated “above average” and where officers are not evaluated in reference to their peers. This is, nevertheless, an improvement over the previous system whereby patronage tended to govern promotions.

Centralized promotion boards, while they allow an Agency to look across the spectrum of the Agency for the best talent, usually exclude from consideration those outside of their respective Agency. For example, a well-qualified Middle Eastern intelligence analyst at the National Ground Intelligence Center will not be considered for promotion and/or assignment to a Middle Eastern analyst position at the Defense Intelligence Agency and vice-versa.

The situation in the JICs is even more constrained in that they follow the traditional civil service model. A senior position is advertised, all the applications are gathered in, the civilian personnel office determines who are the most qualified applicants, and the list is forwarded to the hiring official for decision. Not infrequently, promotions to senior grades are “wired.” That is, the senior management wishes to promote a particular intelligence officer. First, the job description is written so that very few people meet all the requirements of the position except the person for whom the job is intended. Next, the job announcement is advertised, but not widely disseminated, with a short window for applications. If the application window is four weeks or more, this usually is an indicator of an open competition. Again this system tends to close from consideration a wide band of talented and experience officers in favor of a local candidate.

All Agencies and Combatant Commands give small to moderate bonuses to intelligence officers. DIA is experimenting with the award of large bonuses to selected performers.

For any leader, rewarding hard working, talented subordinates is a challenge. It is especially so for the government leader who, unlike his non-government counterpart, has a limited number of options available to him. Taking advantage of legislation passed over a decade ago that permits the IC to award bonuses for outstanding performance, and based on

the assumption that financial reward is a primary motivator for civilian intelligence officers, all the Agencies and the JICs now regularly distribute bonuses.

In many DIC institutions the award of bonuses has become ritualized. Indeed, in some places they have come to be seen as entitlements. One JIC reported that 98 percent of all intelligence officers received some cash award each year. According to the personnel officer, cash awards are normally given at the end of the appraisal period based on the amount of money budgeted, which is usually between 1.2 percent and 3.0 percent of base pay.²⁶

Concerned with the ritualistic awarding of bonuses and the fact that the sums awarded were so insignificant as to have little impact, DIA is experimenting with awarding selected bonuses but only to those who have done truly outstanding work. As a consequence, the minimum bonus is \$3,000 and can range up to \$9,000. And, in a very small number of cases, a centralized Agency board will award bonuses up to \$25,000.²⁷

PERSONNEL FLEXIBILITY AND RETENTION

The Agencies have flexibility in moving intelligence officers both within their respective "home offices" and geographically; the Combatant Commands are limited in their ability to manage their intelligence officers and cannot move them geographically.

Recognizing the need to move civilian intelligence officers according to operational needs, the Agencies have taken steps insure that they have the freedom to assign intelligence officers to positions, even in distant geographical locations, although it may be against the desires of the individual intelligence officer. Moreover, the leadership of the various Agencies reserve for themselves the right to move intelligence officers from billet to billet according to Agency needs. This represents a major cultural change for the civilian intelligence workforce which heretofore often saw itself as permanently assigned to particular locations, if not to particular billets.²⁸ In the JICs, while intelligence officers can be shifted from billet to billet (provided they are of the same occupational specialty and grade) they cannot be sent to distant geographical stations, except on TDY (temporary duty).

The Agencies and the Combatant Commands do not have an "up or out system" to replenish the senior ranks of the civilian intelligence workforce nor do they have a mandatory retirement age.

None of the Agencies or JICs had statistics on the average time in grade of senior intelligence officers. But anecdotal evidence suggests that it is not uncommon to find GG-15s and DISES who have held senior rank for one or more decades. This suggests that stagnation among the Defense civilian intelligence community management is a problem. Instead of a

periodic inflow of new ideas and approaches, there is a tendency for the same managers to hold onto their positions year after year.

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

In the preceding discussion of the results of the questionnaire, a number of strengths and weaknesses associated with the DIC's civilian workforce were noted. This section will seek to expand upon those observations and place them in a broader context – namely how prepared the civilian workforce is to meet the rigors of the 21st Century.

The DIC is constrained in its efforts to hire the “best and the brightest” from this nation’s best universities and from the broader civilian workforce by a bureaucratic and lethargic security clearance system that forces IC managers to opt for those who already possess security clearances instead of those who may be the best qualified.

While the Agencies are now making an effort to recruit nationally and the JICs not at all, the pressures to hire new personnel quickly, and preferably already trained, mitigate against efforts to find the best talent available. Mental capital – the quality of the minds and the level of education of the workforce – is the very foundation of the civilian intelligence workforce. If the DIC does not seek out and get the very best people, then, in the long run, regardless of how many computers are purchased and what new collection systems are fielded, the IC will fall short of its mission.

The DIC does not manage or develop its workforce well.

It is an old adage in the DIC that each intelligence officer is his own best career manager. It is, however, an adage born more of cynicism and desperation than of self-determination. With the exception of NSA, much of the Defense Civilian intelligence Workforce is mired in the old civil service tradition of direct, open, and competitive application for each billet. This may sound fair and just, but it creates a sclerotic, bureaucratic personnel management system that works against the concept of career development and the development of widely experienced, well-rounded corps of intelligence officers.

For those who seek periodic renewal and new challenges, the career development norms for most of the DIC can be very bleak. It starts with the initial job into which a young person is hired – for example, as a Latin American defense economist. If the position is banded for GG-09 to GG-12 and the intelligence officer performs reasonably well, he can expect to be promoted periodically every few years until he reaches GG-12, without ever leaving his position. If, during the ten to fifteen years it takes to make GG-12, the intelligence officer decides he

would like a new challenge and would like to work on the Latin American defense industry account in another division, he must either wait until a position opens up in that division and then apply for it, competing against several other officers, or he must convince his current division chief to work a billet swap with the other division chief. An even more complicated career move might be to apply for a rotation with another directorate or another IC agency. But these types of moves can be challenging. One must first learn about the opening, then one must receive permission to apply for the position (since it is a rotation and not a billet opening). (Many managers are loath to give up a good officer, especially if they get no one in return.) Then he must apply for the rotation and compete against others. There is no personnel board or personnel chief that periodically moves intelligence officers around to give them broadening experience. Each officer is left to his own devices and initiative.

Frankly many intelligence officers, especially analysts, are happy with this approach. They tend to be introverts who are happy to spend their entire career studying, for instance, aircraft assembly plants in a particular country, never venturing far from their computer screens. Adherents to this school of thought argue that in-depth knowledge of a topic or country is critical for successful intelligence analysis and this knowledge can only be gained by years of dedicated service in the same billet on the same topic.

Without a doubt, in-depth knowledge is important. But as Robert Gates, former DCI pointed out, "It is often forgotten that the CIA analyst on Iran in the 1970s (who failed to predict the fall of the Shah of Iran) had worked on Iran for twenty years. That, in my view, was part of the problem. Although a deep understanding of a country's politics and history will help in understanding its actions and reactions, the fact is that in most countries actions are part of a long, continuous chain of events. Thus those most familiar with these long, slow processes are those who will find reasons to say that the warning signs of instability have occurred before, fit into a historical pattern, and therefore can be dismissed."²⁹

As alluded to above, NSA is an exception to this model. NSA employs a "rank-in-person" system and for the last several years it has employed a model whereby key component heads (chiefs of directorates) can and do move intelligence officers periodically. With the formation of the Center for Leadership and Professional Development, much of the authority and responsibility for career developing moves will be shifted to the Center.

Meanwhile, the rest of the DIC has no centralized board, no mechanism in place to move intelligence officers periodically from one assignment to another within the same agency, or between agencies, to develop officers with greater depth and experience. It is imperative that some sort of centralized personnel system be developed at least within the Agencies and the

JICs but preferably across Agency boundaries to move officers. Not only would it develop a more experienced and well-rounded officer, but it would also avoid intellectual stagnation and bring in new ideas and approaches.

While some intelligence officers may be comfortable doing the same thing year after year, there are dangers inherent to the integrity of the intelligence process. Besides avoiding intellectual stagnation, long serving intelligence officers are more apt to become wedded to one approach or one conclusion. This is especially dangerous, when in spite of intelligence information that suggests otherwise, intelligence officers are loath to abandon a position they have held for years because they might be embarrassed.

The DIC does not have an effective means to replace "failed" intelligence officers or an effective way to refresh its senior ranks periodically.

People and the bureaucracies that people inhabit do not like to address it, but failure, like success, is a constant; sometimes it is more frequent than at other times, but it is always there. The challenge to the DIC leader is not to ignore the issue, but to address a key problem: What is one to do with the intelligence officer who fails as an analyst, operator, engineer, or leader?

For that officer who is a lazy, dishonest non-performer, the solution is straightforward. First, the leader contacts a staff lawyer so that an "air tight" legal strategy can be developed to remove the non-performer. Then the non-performer is counseled, his failures are noted and written-up, and a formal warning is given. The process is repeated if the individual's performance continues to be sub-par. Then, there is usually one or more appeal hearings while the non-performer appeals his appraisal and "warning." And, finally, if all the proper steps are taken, after a year or so, the termination order is issued. Not an inspiring method, but it is an effective one provided the leader/manager has the intestinal fortitude for the task. Few do, and that is likely the reason why the "federal government's termination rate for poor performance is less than one-tenth of one percent."³⁰

But what if the intelligence officer who failed is honest, hard working, well meaning and, by the way, has a wife and three kids? The response of the typical DIC leader is less straight forward and much more contorted. Sometimes the officer is moved and given a less demanding job. Other times a work-around is developed. The officer "keeps" his job, or at least the title, but his duties are transferred to another officer who does the job. And, on occasion, the officer is kept in place, but the leader micromanages him. In the end, no one wants to "fire" this type of non-performer, especially if someplace less demanding can be found to use his talents and experiences.

The problem, of course, is that the “failed officer” is usually a senior officer – GG-14, GG15, or DISES. He does not lose his grade, just his responsibilities. This is certainly a humane action. But like many other bureaucratic efforts, it has second and third order effects. For example, in most of the Agencies and the JICs, these are controlled grades. There is a maximum number of GG-14, GG-15, and DISES slots. So, while the failed officer continues to hold his grade, others are doing the work of the “failed” officer but are not compensated for their efforts with the appropriate grade because of grade controls.

Fortunately most DIC officers do not fail; most are good at what they do. And most are happy achieving whatever level of bureaucratic success may come their way. Of course, not everyone can be a senior intelligence officer, especially a GG-14 or above. While precise unclassified data is not available, it is clear that civilian defense intelligence officers share a common bond with airline pilots and university professors. They do not like to retire! But unlike airline pilots who must retire at age 60 and university professors who must retire at 70 years of age, there is no mandatory retirement age for intelligence officers. Consequently, it is not at all uncommon to find senior defense intelligence officers well into their late 60s or early 70s still serving.

Further complicating this phenomenon is that senior officers who have little or no prospect of further promotion are prone to stay on in their senior grades for many years – indeed, for decades. At the Defense Intelligence Agency, for instance, there are two DISES, still serving, who were inducted into the DISES ranks in 1982 when the grades were first created. One senior Intelligence Community officer recounted his Agency’s efforts to deal with this problem: “Soon it became clear that potential retirees were either not leaving fast enough or were seeking ways to stay on. Intelligence managers tried new schemes, including payoffs for early retirement, or so-called buyouts that provided enough cash so that personnel who did not have enough time in the system to retire might be induced to seek other employment.”³¹ Even with enticements, it was difficult to open up the ranks to allow people with new ideas and approaches into the mid and senior ranks.

Complicating the problem with personnel stagnation is the difficulty of measuring performance. The current evaluation system throughout the DIC is rife with “evaluation inflation” and bureaucratic controls that prevent leaders from measuring the performance of subordinates vis-à-vis their peers. Currently, an Intelligence Community leader must rate each of his subordinates against a set of criteria, but must not rate them in relation to their peer group. Consequently, everyone can be rated “outstanding” and there is no way to determine who is the “most outstanding,” “second most out standing,” etc.

It is critical, therefore, that the DIC adopt an “up or out” system whereby intelligence officers must be periodically promoted or, if not promoted, then retired. But first the archaic evaluation system must be changed so that each person is rated in relation to his peers.

The DIC does not have a system to recognize and reward those who excel as technicians, specialists, and analysts rather than as leaders and managers.

There is an old Cossack saying, “Not every Cossack becomes a hetman (chief).” This is no less true today. And in this era of flattened management schemes, it is more true than ever. Moreover, for the DIC to be effective in the 21st Century, it must place a heavy premium on “mental capital,” that is, hiring, training, retaining, and rewarding bright people. This includes people who are scientists, engineers, academics, and thinkers.

An intelligence officer should not have to seek leadership/management positions to be rewarded. This is not a new observation. Over the years, there has been much discussion about developing a second rank or compensation structure that would reward good analysts, scientists, or engineers for being good at what they do without requiring them to become managers and leaders. As the DIC continues to move further along the “knowledge-based continuum,” it must take active measures to make such a system a reality.

There is a propensity to try to apply the “for profit business model” to compensation schemes in the Intelligence Community. Under this model, a high performer is quickly recognized and rewarded with a substantial bonus. DIA’s new bonus program is a correct step in this direction. But government, unlike business, is unlikely to be able to pay the level of bonuses that really make a difference. A \$3,000 bonus, for instance, after taxes results in a net award of around \$1,800 – not a significant amount when compared to a private sector bonus. Moreover, technical and academic personalities who comprise much of the Intelligence Community are often not motivated by money as much as by other benefits such as a TDY to a foreign country or a private office with a door.

It is clear that some sort of compensation and recognition system for the technical, analytical, engineering, and scientific portion of the DIC’s civilian workforce is imperative. And as noted earlier, this portion of the workforce must be included in a revised, competitive evaluation system as well as an “up or out” promotion system.

WHY ARE WE THE WAY WE ARE? - EVOLUTION OF THE DIC’S CIVIL SERVICE

At its core the Defense Intelligence civilian workforce is a product of the history and culture of the United States civil service. The DIC workforce, while shaped in part by defense concerns, is also reflective of the prevailing social and political norms of the day.

Founded in the late 18th Century, the civil service was small and reflected the prevailing concerns of the day with limited government. Emphasis was on competence and efficiency and its members were expected to reflect the interests of the ruling upper class elites.³² This changed with the election of President Andrew Jackson who was suspicious of ruling elites. He dismissed the need for a professional civil service arguing, “the duties of all public officials are . . . so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance.”³³ Jackson brought to the civil service the “spoils systems” whereby civil service appointments were awarded to friends of the current administration without reference to merit or efficiency. The demands of the Civil War, however, unmasked a corrupt and inefficient civil service. This led to demands for reform. Consequently, in 1871 Congress authorized President Grant to appoint a Civil Service Commission and to establish regulations for admitting people into the civil service.³⁴ But all was still not well with the civil service.³⁵ The weakness and corruption of the civil service was driven home to the American public by the assassination of President Garfield by a disgruntled office seeker. Public outrage to this act led to the Pendleton Act of 1883 that introduced the notion of “merit” into the civil service. The Pendleton Act created competitive entrance examinations, provided relative job security from partisan political motivated removal, and established a neutral, nonpartisan civil service. The Pendleton Act laid the ground work for the United States civil service for the next fifty years, shaping it well into the 20th Century. Not until the 1920s was the civil service further modernized with the Classification Act of 1923 that defined grades, qualifications, and salary ranges. Later in 1939 the Hatch Act limited the political activities of federal officials. Then in 1940 the Ramspeck Act extended the civil service to include employees in the legislative and judicial branches of government.³⁶

Those handful of civilians who served in America's nascent intelligence services on the eve of World War II until the late 1940s worked under the civil service laws of the era. This began to change with the National Security Act of 1947 that established the Department of Defense – and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). But the first real exception to the civilian personnel system for intelligence officers did not take place until the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 which provided special administrative authorities and responsibilities to both the Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence.³⁷ This Act gave the CIA special rights -- not accorded to other departments of the government -- to hire, compensate, and move its employees. Significantly this act did not effect civilian intelligence officers in the Department of Defense who continued to work under the regular civil service laws for several decades. Another decade would pass before *some* civilian intelligence personnel in the Department of

Defense would be effected by legislation similar to that governing CIA personnel policies. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 authorized the Secretary of Defense “to establish such positions, and to appoint thereto, without regard to the civil service laws, such officers and employees, in the National Security Agency, as may be necessary to carry out the functions of such agency.”³⁸ The Act also provided the Agency with flexibility as regards to compensation, benefits, and incentives. But significantly, this legislation did not effect all civilian intelligence officers; those serving in the various military departments – Army, Navy, and Air Force – then a major portion of the workforce, continued under the traditional civil service rules and regulations.

Meanwhile, the rest of the DIC continued to grow. On 1 August 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency was established – not by legislation or even presidential directive, but by directive of the Secretary of Defense. The staffs of the service intelligence centers and more importantly the JICs of the Combatant Commands became increasingly robust. Yet like DIA, their civilian intelligence personnel systems remained unaffected by enabling legislation.

This began to change in 1978 with the first major reform in the civil service since the Pendleton Act of 1883. While the Reform Act of 1978 did not directly effect the DIC, it did create an environment whereby additional reforms in the DIC could take place. The Reform Act of 1978 abolished the Civil Service Commission replacing it with two new agencies – the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit Systems Protection Board. More significantly, the Reform Act of 1978 established the Senior Executive Service, established a system for productivity merit pay, established protection for governmental “whistle blowers,” and established the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) as an analog to the National Labor Relations Board.³⁹ Significantly this legislation bars employees of intelligence agencies from engaging in collective bargaining.⁴⁰

By the mid-1980s, enabling legislation that would cover the rest of the DIC gained impetus. The Intelligence Authorization Act of FY 1985 allowed the DIA to design a personnel system that would provide “more attractive and flexible career opportunities” and would allow the leadership “to more effectively manage” the intelligence workforce.⁴¹ Yet the services and the JICs were not covered by any special legislation.

With the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1987, the services received “greater comparability with CIA, NSA, and DIA for the civilian intelligence personnel.”⁴² These were important steps forward for the DIC, but major rigidities and discontinuities still existed across the Community.

The next major step in organization of the DIC’s personnel system came not from legislation, but by DoD Directive 1400.35, “Defense Civilian intelligence Personnel System

(DCIPS)” which became effective on 19 March 1999.⁴³ DCIPS is an effort to organize the DIC’s civilian workforce across institutional boundaries. According to the implementing Directive, “DCIPS shall provide for mobility and flexibility in assignments throughout the DoD Intelligence Components” and it “shall be implemented so as to improve the acquisition, diversity, skill mix, professional development, and long-term retention of a high quality workforce in the DoD Intelligence Components and the Intelligence Community workforce at large.”⁴⁴ Significantly the Directive establishes a Defense Civilian Intelligence Board that “shall advise. . . on Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System matters.”⁴⁵ DCIPS, while it is an important step forward, in essence only increases coordination rather than integration among the DIC’s institutions.

Reviewing the legislative history of the Intelligence Community allows one to come to a better understanding of the culture as well as how and why the DIC’s civilian personnel system evolved the way it did. It also provides one with a sense of what sort of change is possible under current legislation.

- The CIA’s personnel system was created out of “whole cloth” with its establishment in 1947. From the beginning, the CIA was given special rights and exemptions to manage its workforce, and, therefore, to develop its own unique culture.
- The NSA, shortly after its founding, benefited from special legislation that allowed it to develop and manage its workforce in ways distinct from the rest of the civil service.
- It was not until nearly forty years after the founding of the CIA that the DIA and the services received special legislation that permitted them to manage their civilian workforces in a manner similar to that of the CIA and NSA.
- The most recent effort to coordinate civilian personnel policies in the DIC is DCIPS and it rests on DoD Directive rather than legislation.

The cultural implications of this evolutionary history are significant. Because the DIA and the services’ civilian intelligence personnel practices evolved out of the normal civil service culture, the civilian intelligence workforce has assimilated a number key values:

- Job Entitlement for Life
- Geographic Stability
- Emphasis on Fairness Over Effectiveness in Promotion

- Apolitical Workforce

It is clear that the legislation currently in place permits the DIC's leadership to exercise a great deal of leeway over how the civilian intelligence workforce is recruited, trained, and managed. It does not, however, provide much freedom to creatively address concerns such as retention, removal, or compensation.

There are other restraints on the way the senior leadership of the DIC addresses civilian intelligence personnel issues -- many of them political and cultural. For example, there is a widespread reluctance to get "too far out front" of the rest of DoD, risking the ire of the Under Secretary of Defense for Manpower who is trying to manage the rest of the DoD civilian workforce. There is also the concern that the Office of Personnel Management, which must manage the entire federal workforce, would weigh in against any overly radical changes.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this Strategic Research Project was to outline what steps, if any, are necessary to prepare the Defense Civilian Intelligence Community workforce for the rigors and demands of the 21st Century. But first, this SRP addressed the question whether transformation of the DIC was necessary. Based on the results of Congress' Special Joint Questionnaire into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 as well as the conclusions of fourteen other similar studies, it was clear that some change was necessary in the nation's Intelligence Community, especially as regards to "corporateness." This conclusion was supported by both the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review.

This SRP next addressed the current state of the Defense Civilian Intelligence Community workforce. Based on the results of a questionnaire sent to several of the major Agencies (DIA, NSA, and NIMA) as well as among several of the JICs (CENTCOM, JFCOM, SOCOM, and SOUTHCOM), a number of observations were made on how the DIC recruits, trains, retains, rewards, promotes, and moves its civilian intelligence officers.

RECRUITING AND SECURITY

There is a significant difference between the Agencies and the Combatant Commands in recruiting efforts. The Agencies draw from a national pool of talent while the Combatant Commands draw from a local pool of talent.

The Agencies have both summer internship programs and scholarship programs for selected students, but the Combatant Commands have neither.

Both the Agencies and the Combatant Commands reported that hiring new personnel as intelligence officers often involves delays of a year or more while the prospective intelligence officers awaits their security clearances, resulting on occasion in losing candidates to other employers.

Because of the long wait for security clearances, the Agencies and Combatant Commands reported a predisposition among managers to hire retired and former military personnel because they usually "came with a security clearance."

There is a significant difference between the Agencies and the Combatant Commands in security standards with the Agencies migrating towards mandatory polygraphs and the Combatant Commands not requiring the polygraph.

TRAINING

There is a significant difference between the Agencies and the Combatant Commands in training standards with the Agencies requiring short but mandatory training and the Combatant Commands employing primarily OJT (on the job training).

Neither the Agencies nor the Combatant Commands require mid or senior level training, except for DISES (Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service).

There is no formal mandatory training program for Defense Civilian Intelligence Officers in joint intelligence, that is intelligence across the intelligence specialties HUMINT (Human Intelligence), MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence), SIGINT (Signal Intelligence), IMINT (Imagery Intelligence), and analysis.

Only NIMA and NSA have developed programs – both very new – to train civilian intelligence offices in leadership and management. The Combatant Commands and DIA have no such training effort underway.

Only NIMA and NSA have robust language training programs for intelligence officers; DIA and the JICs generally downplay the importance of language training.

EVALUATIONS, REWARDS, AND PROMOTIONS

There is no standard civilian personnel evaluation system in the DIC. Personnel evaluation inflation is rampant across the DIC.

Most Agencies employ an application based centralized promotion system for mid and senior ranks while the Combatant Commands employ a traditional civil service application based system.

All Agencies and Combatant Commands give small to moderate bonuses to intelligence officers. DIA is experimenting with the award of large bonuses to selected performers.

PERSONNEL FLEXIBILITY AND RETENTION

The Agencies have flexibility in moving intelligence officers both within their respective "home offices" and geographically; the Combatant Commands are limited in their ability to manage their intelligence officers and cannot move them geographically.

The Agencies and the Combatant Commands do not have an "up or out system" to replenish the senior ranks of the civilian intelligence workforce nor do they have a mandatory retirement age.

Third, this SRP noted four broad gauge, yet major weakness in the Defense Civilian Intelligence Community that must be addressed if the DIC is to be ready for the demand of this new century.

The DIC is constrained in its efforts to hire the "best and the brightest" from this nation's best universities and from the broader civilian workforce by a bureaucratic and lethargic security clearance system that forces IC managers to opt for those who already possess security clearances over those who may be the best qualified.

The DIC does not manage or develop its workforce well.

The DIC does not have an effective means to replace "failed" intelligence officers or an effective way to refresh its senior ranks periodically.

The DIC does not have a system to recognize and reward those who excel as technicians, specialists, and analysts rather than as leaders and managers.

Finally, this SRP discussed the legislative history that laid the foundation for the DIC's various civilian personnel systems. And it was noted that the current DIC leadership has substantial flexibility in implementing changes in the way civilian intelligence officers are recruited, trained, and managed, but limited powers to effect retention, removal, and compensation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Defense Intelligence Community is best characterized as a loosely coordinated confederation of Agencies, JICs, service intelligence centers, and service intelligence units. Each entity recruits, trains, rewards, retains, removes, and shapes in its own way. Clearly such a confederation lacks "jointness" and a "sense of corporateness." As a consequence, while it is not dysfunctional, the DIC operates in a less than efficient manner. The challenge is how to lash together all the unique and valuable capabilities of the various components of the DIC in such a manner as to overcome suspicion, parochial cultures and bureaucratic barriers to produce a smoothly functioning team.

The first and most important step is to create a Defense Intelligence Service modeled after the State Department's Foreign Service. It would be an elite, selective organization that would include all civilian intelligence officers in the Agencies, JICs, service intelligence centers, and service intelligence units.

The Defense Intelligence Service (DIS) would centrally manage all personnel to include recruiting, training, moving, retaining, and removing intelligence officers. The DIS would, to the maximum degree feasible, periodically move intelligence officers among the various DIC elements. Intelligence officers would no longer be allowed to "camp out" in Washington, D.C., Honolulu, Tampa, Fort Bragg, or Molesworth. Moreover, intelligence officers would periodically be moved within a DIC element in order to provide new challenges and career growth. Over time this would significantly break down parochial cultures, lessen suspicion, and result in the improved sharing of intelligence.

The DIS should develop a mandatory comprehensive training program for all intelligence officers from entry level through mid to senior level. A fundamental component of all training would be an emphasis on leadership – what a leader must know, be, and do. Besides imparting valuable technical skills, the training program would seek to impart a sense of corporateness and jointness.

No less important is that the DIS embark upon a centralized recruiting program directed towards recruiting nationally with the goal of bringing into the DIS the best talent in the nation – without regard as to whether the candidate already holds a security clearance or not.

The DIS should develop a leadership/management track and a specialist/technical career track whereby over the span of a career an intelligence officer could have a full and satisfying career without necessarily becoming a leader/manager or visa versa. Such a program would provide escalating rewards based on performance and experience.

Measuring individual performance is critical although sometimes unpleasant. The DIS would be able to develop a common personnel evaluation system balanced in such a manner so as to prevent "evaluation inflation." Leaders/managers need a way to distinguish and reward the best performers whether through promotion, bonuses, or some combination.

Stagnation, especially among the leaders, must be avoided. Consequently, the DIS would have an "up or out system." That is, after a set period of time, if an intelligence officer was not promoted to the next senior grade, he would be separated/retired from the DIS. Unlike the military where there is a necessary emphasis on youth, the "up or out system" could be more tolerant of longer times in grade, but still intelligence officers who have failed to be promoted after perhaps ten or twelve years in grade would be separated.

One should have no illusions. The establishment of a Defense Intelligence Service would require on the part of the DIC's leadership political will and the expenditure of political capital. But in the end, the Defense Intelligence Community, while still not a perfect institution, would be the stronger for it and better prepared for the challenges of the 21st Century. Even more importantly, the nation will be that much more secure.

Below is an appendix that consists of four tables that present the results of a questionnaire sent to personnel officers at three Agencies and four JICs.

**APPENDIX
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE**

	DIA	NIMA	NSA	CENTCOM	JFCOM	SOCOM	SOUTHCOM
Do you send out recruiters to colleges & job fairs?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Do you pay for prospective job candidates to travel to your agency?	No ⁴⁶	No ⁴⁷	Yes	No	No	No	No
Do you require that most of your job candidates have a TS/SCI security clearance before you hire them? ⁴⁸	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
For those job candidates who do not already have a TS/SCI clearance, do you have to wait long for them to be cleared?	No ⁴⁹	Yes	No ⁵⁰	Yes	No ⁵¹	Yes	Yes
Do you sometimes lose job candidates to other employers because the wait for a clearance is so long?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No ⁵²	Yes
Do you often find that your agency prefers to hire those who already have clearances because the wait time for a clearance is so much less.?	Yes ⁵³	Yes	Yes ⁵⁴	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Do you normally require a polygraph test before hiring a new job candidate?	No ⁵⁵	No	Yes	No	No ⁵⁶	No ⁵⁷	No
Do you have difficulty recruiting qualified people from various ethnic groups and genders?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No

Does your agency have an internship/scholarship program?	Yes/Yes	Yes/No	Yes/Yes	Yes/No	No/No	No/No	No/No
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TABLE 1. QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS RECRUITING & SECURITY

	DIA	NIMA	NSA	CENTCOM	JFCOM	SOCOM	SOUTHCOM
Does your agency, service center, or JIC have a general entry level training program for all new intelligence officers?	Yes ⁵⁸	Yes ⁵⁹	No ⁶⁰	No ⁶¹	No	No	NA ⁶²
Does your agency, service center, or JIC have any mandatory mid-level or senior level training programs	No ⁶³	No	No	No	No	No	NA
Does your agency as a matter of course offer language training to all interested intelligence officers	No ⁶⁴	Yes ⁶⁵	Yes ⁶⁶	No	No	No	NA
Does your agency offer any specific training programs for managers/leaders?	No ⁶⁷	Yes ⁶⁸	Yes ⁶⁹	No	No	No	NA

TABLE 2. TRAINING

	DIA	NIMA	NSA	CENTCOM	JFCOM	SOCOM	SOUTHCOM
Are there centralized promotion boards or must an officer apply for a position?	Yes ⁷⁰	Yes ⁷¹	Yes ⁷²	No ⁷³	No ⁷⁴	No	No ⁷⁵
Can intelligence officers receive bonuses?	Yes ⁷⁶	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes ⁷⁷	Yes
Are intelligence officers evaluated by quotas?	No ⁷⁸	No	No ⁷⁹	No	No	No ⁸⁰	No ⁸¹

TABLE 3. EVALUATIONS, REWARDS, AND PROMOTIONS

	DIA	NIMA	NSA	CENTCOM	JFCOM	SOCOM	SOUTHCOM
Can an intelligence officer be moved involuntarily by management from one position/billet to another?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes ⁸²	Yes	Yes	Yes
Can an intelligence officer be moved involuntarily from geographical place to another?	Yes ⁸³	Yes	Yes ⁸⁴	No	No	No	No
Do civilian contractors working for your organization perform many of the same duties as your intelligence officers?	Yes ⁸⁵	No	No ⁸⁶	Yes	Yes	No ⁸⁷	Yes
What is the average grade and time in grade?	GG- ⁸⁸ ₁₃	GG-11/12	GG-13	Unknown ⁸⁹	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Do you have a mandatory retirement age?	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Does your agency have an “up or out”	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

system?							
Can your agency effectively remove unproductive people?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

TABLE 4. PERSONNEL FLEXIBILITY & RETENTION

WORD COUNT=12,814

ENDNOTES

¹ Donald Rumsfeld, "Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with The New York Times" (Interview with Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, The New York Times. Also participating were Victoria Clark, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), United States Department of Defense News Transcript, 12 October 2002; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2002/t10222002_t0812nyt.htm; Internet; accessed 11 March 2003.

² George J. Tenet, "Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet as Prepared for Delivery Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security, 2 February 2000"; available from www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/SSCI-Tenet-2Feb2000.htm; Internet; accessed 23 February 2003.

³ Congress, Senate and House of Representatives, "Findings of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001," Final Report, Part 1, December 10, 2002, The Joint Inquiry, The Context, Part 1, Findings and Conclusions, 6.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid. 8.

⁶ Ibid. 7.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Richard C. Shelby, Senator, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Additional Views of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community," 21-22; available from <http://intelligence.senate.gov/pubs107.htm> >; Internet; accessed 23 February 2003.

⁹ George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 30.

¹⁰ Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 30 September 2001), 32.

¹¹ Ibid. 5.1

¹² Ibid.

¹³ CENTCOM has a summer internship program.

¹⁴ Margaret Esposito, CENTCOM personnel specialist, telephone interview by author, 12 November 2002. (This sentiment of the CENTCOM personnel officer is also widely echoed in the IC.)

¹⁵ Tracy Adams, JFCOM personnel specialist, telephone interview by author, 21 November 2002.

¹⁶ Chuck McGeary, SOCOM personnel specialist, telephone interview by author, 9 December 2002.

¹⁷ Each year the Agencies send a select few officers to attend senior service colleges such as the National Defense University, Army War College, Air War College, and the Naval War College as well as the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

¹⁸ Arthur S. Hulnick, Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 20. (Here Hulnick was largely referring to the clash of cultures between the DI and DO at the CIA, but the observation is apt and applicable to the Defense Intelligence Community as a whole.)

¹⁹ Deborah A. Bonanni, Deputy Associate Director, Education and Training, NSA, Senior Executive Message to the (NSA) Work Force, 27 November 2002.

²⁰ Richard Lininger, NIMA Human Resources, written response to questionnaire, January 2003.

²¹ Hulnick, 134-135 observed, "A second major difference between the CIA and the military concerns training for leadership and management. Military officers are trained early on how to lead, as well as how to manage, based on the assumption that they will have to do both in the years ahead. The CIA does not train its managers until they actually take on a position that requires management skill, and they do not train people for leadership roles at all. CIA managers tend to advance because they are good analysts or operations offices, not because they display talent as leaders."

²² Lininger.

²³ McGeary.

²⁴ Stephen Barr, "Federal Diary: 2004 Civil Service Raise Gets No Respect in President's Budget," The Washington Post, 4 February 2003, B2. (This is apparently a direct quote from the 2004 White House Budget Proposal.)

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid. (This was the assessment of the SOCOM personnel officer, which, in this author's experience, is a method of operation not dissimilar from many other DIC organizations.)

²⁷ Each key component, that is the Directorate of Intelligence, J-2, Directorate of Operations, Directorate for Policy Support can award bonuses up to \$9,000. Then there are a few bonuses at the Agency level that go up to \$25,000.

²⁸ In fairness, it must be said that in this author's experience there was little resistance among civilian intelligence officers in moving from billet to billet. The notion, however, that one could be sent to some distant station far from say Washington, D.C. is entirely new.

²⁹ Robert Gates, "Analysis – Discussion," in Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action, ed. Roy Godson (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989), 118.

³⁰ Barr, B4.

³¹ Hulnick,. 203.

³² Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil Service (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958), 534.

³³ "Public Administration: History," The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 26, Macropaedia, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1997), 296.

³⁴ "Civil Service: History: In the United States," Infoplease.com; available from <www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0857364.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 February 2003.

³⁵ Van Riper, 537.

³⁶ For many years a little known section of the Ramspeck Act allowed displaced Congressional employees to be appointed to positions in the Competitive Civil Service without competing for the position. See James B. King, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management, "Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Civil Service," Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives at a Hearing on The Ramspeck Act 24 May 1995; available at <www.opm.gov/speeches/html/052495.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 February 2003.

³⁷ Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, "Key Events in CIA's History"; available from <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/facttell/keyevent.htm>> ; Internet; accessed 22 February 2003.

³⁸ National Security Agency Act of 1959, PL 86-36, 50 U.S. Code 401.

³⁹ Prentice Hall Documents Library, "The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978"; available from <<http://hcl.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/dye/docs/civilser.htm>>; Internet; accessed 23 February 2003.

⁴⁰ Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, PL 95-454 (S 2640), October 13, 1978, Title VII, Section 7103. (Curiously this section mentions explicitly the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, but not the Defense Intelligence Agency while all the other Titles of this law mention the Defense Intelligence Agency explicitly.)

⁴¹ Department of the Army, Personnel Management: Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS) – Policies and Procedures, Army Regulation 690-13 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 28 September 1990), 1-1.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Charles J. Cunningham, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), "Implementation of the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS)," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of Defense Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency, Washington, D.C., 20 July 1999; available from www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-cp/dcips/implement.asp; Internet; accessed 23 February 2003.

⁴⁴ Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Department of Defense Directive: Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS), Number 1400.35, 18 March 2002," 2.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 5.

⁴⁶ On rare occasions the Agency will pay for prospective candidates to visit.

⁴⁷ On rare occasions the Agency will pay for prospective candidates to visit.

⁴⁸ All the Agencies involved will make a tentative job offer to a job candidate without a TS/SCI clearance. However, candidates will not be able to start work until they receive a clearance. A TS/SCI clearance is a requirement for employment.

⁴⁹ While the personnel manager at DIA said clearances take only 60 days to a few months, this assessment was strongly refuted by two division chiefs who claim it takes a year or more.

⁵⁰ While recognizing this was a problem, NSA claims that it now has an 86 day turn around time from the moment the paperwork for a TS/SCI is turned in (including the polygraph test) until a clearance is granted!

⁵¹ Since most of the people hired at JFCOM are former military personnel who already have a clearance, there is usually not much of a delay in obtaining a TS/SCI clearance.

⁵² In the last four to five years, SOCOM has hired only one person who did not already have a TS/SCI clearance. Consequently, SOCOM has not encountered a problem with losing job candidates while waiting for their clearance.

⁵³ Often former military personnel are recruited for work at DIA because of the experience they bring. However, one cannot deny that those who already hold a clearance enjoy an advantage.

⁵⁴ While former military personnel do not receive a preference in hiring, they often bring many skills as well as a clearance with them.

⁵⁵ Although a polygraph test is not required during the hiring stage, all DIA employees are required to take the polygraph (usually within a year of employment) as a condition of employment.

⁵⁶ Occasionally some billets will require the individual to take a polygraph as a condition of employment.

⁵⁷ Occasionally some billets will require the individual to take a polygraph as a condition of employment.

⁵⁸ DIA has a mandatory "DIA 101" course as well as other training that lasts 30 days. Supervisors can and usually do require additional training.

⁵⁹ NIMA has an 80 day mandatory training period.

⁶⁰ NSA does not have a required training program although most linguists attend a mandatory training program for a few weeks.

⁶¹ Most of the JICs reported they depend on OJT although some analysts are sent to DIA for some training.

⁶² The SOUTHCOM representative did not feel knowledgeable enough to discuss training issues.

⁶³ DIA does not have a mandatory mid or senior level training program, except for DISES. While DIA does offer some mid and senior level training program, admission is competitive. DIA recognizes this as a short coming, but lacks funding for mid and senior level training programs.

⁶⁴ Except for those in the Operations Directorate, language training is by exception and requires special funding and permission.

⁶⁵ NIMA's LASTRA language training program is tailored to the needs of the analyst.

⁶⁶ NSA believes they have the finest language training program and school in the United States, and quite probably they are correct.

⁶⁷ DIA offers some courses in the mechanics of management, i.e. filling out time cards, evaluations, etc., but not in leadership.

⁶⁸ NIMA has established the National Geospatial Intelligence College to train leaders and managers.

⁶⁹ NSA has established the Center for Leadership and Professional Development to train leaders and managers.

⁷⁰ DIA has a new promotion system. For GG-12 and below, the key components (directorates) rule on promotions. For GG-13 and above, there is an Agency-wide promotion board.

⁷¹ NIMA uses centralized promotion boards for each occupational grouping/organization including imagery analysts.

⁷² NSA grade structure is governed by “rank-in-person” rather than “rank-in-position.” This means that a person’s rank travels with the intelligence officer and is not position dependent. Promotion is centralized within the Groups, i.e. SIGINT, Information Assurance, etc.

⁷³ A rank/pay grade is associated with each position. In order to be promoted an individual must apply for that position. There is no grade banding.

⁷⁴ There is a career ladder for GG-11 and GG-12, but promotion to GG-13 and above is based on direct application.

⁷⁵ The journeyman level is GG-12. Promotion up to and including GG-13 is “inventory based,” that is, it is automatic after a set period of time if an individual meets all the requirements for promotion. Promotions to GG-14 and GG-15 are based on applications for a specifically advertised position.

⁷⁶ At DIA an intelligence officer may receive a bonus of not less than \$3,000, but not more than \$9,000 from his key component (directorate). At the Agency-wide level an intelligence officer may receive a bonus from \$10,000 to \$25,000.

⁷⁷ Cash awards are given at the end of the appraisal period based on the amount of money budgeted which is usually between 1.2% and 3.0% of base pay. Approximately 98% of all personnel receive some cash award.

⁷⁸ OPM regulations prohibit a quota system. DIA, however, is planning to implement a system that, while technically not a quota system, does require a supervisor to rank-order his subordinates. DIA uses a three tiered rating system – “exceeds,” “meets,” and “does not meet” expectations. In 2002, 38% of all DIA employees received an “exceeds,” 62% received a “meets,” and only one person received a “does not meet.”

⁷⁹ NSA uses a five tiered system. Since there are no quotas, 97% of all NSA personnel received a “met objective” or higher rating.

⁸⁰ There are no quotas. Evaluation inflation is rampant. “It is ‘few and far between’ when a civilian intelligence officer receives less than a ‘superior’ on a five point system with ‘superior’ being the best.”

⁸¹ There are no quotas with grade inflation the rule. Most intelligence officers receive the highest level “outstanding.”

⁸² The JICs reported that there was some flexibility to move people around who were in the same career field series, but not outside of the career field.

⁸³ Not until 30 August 2000 did the DIA reserve for itself the right to move intelligence officers against their own personal wishes from one geographical location. However, according to DIA officials, they have never invoked this right.

⁸⁴ Like the DIA, while NSA reserves the right to move intelligence officers against their will, it has never done so.

⁸⁵ Most of the respondents indicated that there is an increase in the number of contractors; most are working in support roles such as computer support, but some are performing traditional intelligence-analysis roles.

⁸⁶ NSA's goal is to achieve a workforce that is 50% civilian, 25% military, and 25% contractor with the contractors primarily in support roles.

⁸⁷ Approximately 1/3 of the intelligence workforce is civilian . There are 160 contractors in the intelligence workforce at SOCOM although most are computer hardware and software specialists.

⁸⁸ Because of security concerns, it is not possible to discuss the number of intelligence officers in each grade or the number of years officers there is in a given grade. There was, however, a general consensus that senior people were often in senior grades for many years.

⁸⁹ Because the JICs are comparatively small and their rank structure generally low, none of the JIC personnel officers knew the average grade for intelligence officers in their respective organizations.

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