

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**RESERVE COMPONENTS AND THE NATIONAL WILL: CLAUSWITZ, TOTAL FORCE POLICY, AND  
THE STRATEGIC REALITIES OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

by

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## ABSTRACT

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In early 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld questioned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, on military capabilities resident in the Reserve Components (RC). Secretary Rumsfeld's query highlighted a deepening Department of Defense concern regarding the ever expanding role of RC forces in the United States' military strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. This paper will review the historical development of America's RC and role of citizen-soldiers as a means of galvanizing the national will in support of military operations. It will also examine the linkage between Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz's concepts and the formulation of the Abrams Doctrine and Total Force Policy as they apply to the relationship between the national will and military success. Lastly, this narrative will analyze the relevancy that use of the RC equates to national will paradigm in the strategic environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.



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## RESERVE COMPONENTS AND THE NATIONAL WILL: CLAUSWITZ, TOTAL FORCE POLICY, AND THE STRATEGIC REALITIES OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

The Congress shall have the power to provide for the calling forth of the militia to execute Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasion;

—The United States Constitution  
Article I, Section 8, Clause 15

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;

—The United States Constitution  
Article II, Section 2, Clause 1

On March 29, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld queried the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, on military capabilities resident in the Reserve Component (RC). Specifically, Secretary Rumsfeld challenged the Department of Defense's (DoD) rationale permitting the Army to place an overwhelming percentage of some unit types in the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). This was a stratagem Rumsfeld viewed as restrictive to the degree "that no matter what we do, we have to activate people."<sup>1</sup> In a statement that captures the essence of his concern, Secretary Rumsfeld pointed out, "It doesn't make sense to have the people who are required very early in a conflict in the reserves..."<sup>2</sup> General Myers echoed Rumsfeld's anxiety, candidly admitting, "We need to look at that mix very carefully...you can't even do some of the things you need to do day to day without calling up the reserves."<sup>3</sup>

Secretary Rumsfeld's and General Myers' words underscore a rising concern among many military professionals, strategy analysts, politicians, and defense think-tank gurus, regarding the ever expanding role of RC forces in America's military strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Once viewed as only a strategic hedge to bolster active forces in long and protracted conflicts, RC forces today are on the leading edge of any U.S. military commitment. The RC is an essential element of all U.S. war plans. Reserve forces are a factor in all military deployments; being used early, often, and for extended periods of time.

Since September 11, 2001, well over 200,000 RC personnel have been called to active duty, with most serving for 360 days and a growing number entering a second year of active service.<sup>4</sup> The on-going war with Iraq, the very real specter of renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and the perpetual operational requirements inherent in the Global War on Terrorism

(GWOT) all but insure the mounting demands on the RC will be sustained, if not, exacerbated. The seriousness of this issue resonates along the corridors of the Pentagon's five rings and on Capitol Hill. It is no wonder Thomas Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, addressed the issue head-on during his very first Pentagon press conference, noting, "We should never have one more reservist on active duty than we need...but we don't need to have less than we have to do the job."<sup>5</sup>

To some, the traditional line between active and reserve forces has only become blurred; to more alarmed observers, reserve units have morphed, by default, into de facto active-duty units. During the last decade and especially over the last five years, evidence supports that the latter contention is much closer to the truth. Prior to 1990, the DoD called upon the RC at a rate of about one million man days a year, but since 1996, the figure has averaged an amazing 12.5 million to 13.5 million man days per year.<sup>6</sup> This dramatic rise is even more startling when considering the man-day totals do not reflect the by-law mandatory 39 days of training each RC member is required to conduct yearly.

It is not surprising that this unparalleled reliance on RC use is showing very real signs of strain. Leaders in DoD openly address the growing dilemma of increased RC operational tempo (OPTEMPO), admitting the frustration of "calling up the same people over and over again" and noting with equal angst, the stress this condition places on RC personnel, their families, and their employers.<sup>7</sup>

The news consortium has also picked up on the DoD's growing need to tap into RC force structure. Recent stories abound, both in electronic and traditional print media that amplify the mounting concern over the number and duration of RC mobilizations. Journalists have written of the "thousands of reservists" who have been yanked from colleges and universities and the impact their absence has taken on campuses across the nation.<sup>8</sup> The public is reminded of the significant sacrifice borne by reservists' families left at the home front; the income disparity between military pay and civilian wages, missed vacations, mounting bills, dwindling savings accounts, and a host of other travails.<sup>9</sup> Many of these stories seem to have been written with the sole purpose of tugging the heartstrings of even the most indifferent citizens.

During the ramp up in preparation for the war with Iraq, the Associated Press analyzed mobilization data and determined that RC units were being activated unevenly across the nation. That is, some states and territories<sup>10</sup> were providing more personnel than others, resulting in an alleged process of disproportionate burden sharing. The subtle implication was that the DoD mobilization process was orchestrated by some surreptitious policy of inter-state

favoritism. In actuality, the degree of mobilizations from one state to the next has more to do with skill sets and unit types required to execute missions, and the locations of those RC organizations, than any attempt, real or perceived, to place undo burden on particular states.<sup>11</sup> For example, the operational requirements in support of the GWOT place a very high demand on law enforcement skills. Consequently, activations of RC military police units have been robust and since these organizations are only located in certain states, unavoidable inequity occurs.

Occasionally, reports about RC mobilizations are less contentious. For example, the public can read about employers who go out of their way to extend benefits to deployed workers far beyond what is required by federal law, as a way of expressing appreciation for “the reservist who is risking his life for our freedom.”<sup>12</sup> Other reports tell of local communities who support their deployed troops. One recent story identified a Girl Scout troop that donated 31 cases of cookies to mobilized RC soldiers which truly captures the flavor of these good news stories.<sup>13</sup> These upbeat reports, however, represent the exception rather than the rule.

Media hyperbole aside, the overwhelming degree of empirical evidence above suggests Secretary Rumsfeld’s discomfort with the military’s insatiable dependence on RC forces is understandable. His quest for answers from Pentagon leadership seems prudent; and the effort put forth by untold numbers of uniformed and civilian action officers to address the issue, warranted. This intense attempt to pinpoint an origin for the bona fide imbalance in today’s active and reserve military component mix, though, may prove illusory. A discernable cause may not exist.

To be sure, force structure experts at all levels can offer up the usual list of contemporary culprits that drive the decisions behind which capabilities and what number of unit types will be in the active or reserve forces. This list is certain to include factors like changes to Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) language, Total Obligation Authority (TOA) shortfalls, end-strength reductions, and other less tangible but equally credible contributors to the formula.<sup>14</sup>

Additionally, rapidly changing strategic policy and national security demands play havoc with the force development community’s ability to design and implement requisite force structure adjustments. The force management process is by design, slow and deliberate and despite recent moves by the respected services to truncate the time line required to effect force structure change, demand far outpaces the ability to produce timely results. Too many times, tweaking the active component/reserve component (AC/RC) force ratio becomes the immediate stopgap fix.

All of these variables and circumstances legitimately contribute to the decision process

resulting in the current AC/RC force mix dilemma. Zeroing in on any one of them would certainly provide a valid response to Secretary Rumsfeld's inquiry and offer up a quick scapegoat to neatly fit on the blame line. Perhaps, however, this ubiquitous use of reserve forces is not the result of some failed process or policy gone awry, but the result of strategic forethought and initiative.

This paper argues that the current role of the reserve components, as an expanding element of the Nation's military instrument of power, represents at least in principle, the desired effect senior Pentagon leaders hoped for when they initiated the Total Force Policy after failure in Vietnam. The unprecedented rise in Reserve Component OPTEMPO is not because of some inherent design flaw in Total Force Policy directives, but rather is attributed to a drastically different geopolitical and national security environment. An environment far removed from the Cold War/Global War mentality that spawned its conception. Additionally, the emergence of the media as a serious tool for stimulating public support for military operations has shifted the Total Force Policy paradigm identifying RC mobilization as the means of achieving the national will. These factors point to an active component end strength increase as the most prudent means of meeting current national military strategy objectives while reducing the strain of multiple and prolonged RC deployments.

## **TOTAL FORCE POLICY**

The power of regulating the militia and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defence...It requires no skill in the sciences of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defence...This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority. It is therefore with the most evident propriety that the plan of the Convention proposes to empower the union "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia..."

—The Federalist No: 29 Hamilton  
January 9, 1788

We have to make our reliance on the Guard and Reserves real. No longer will the lyrics be any good. If we make it real in the eyes of the reserve components, then it will be real for the country.

—General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.  
Chief of Staff of the Army

America's capability to project forces anywhere on the globe, to meet the full spectrum of operations and sustain OPTEMPO throughout the duration of the mission, is a key element of

National Military Strategy (NMS). The reserve components play an important role in the execution of our NMS's goals by providing the augmentation needed by active military forces to operate simultaneously across a broad range of conflict. As the RC exists today, it is the lynchpin to current and future operations; a matter of fact emphasized by President George W. Bush when he stated:

Today's 1.3 million Guard and Reserve members are the descendents of America's Revolutionary War-era minutemen. You have stepped up to meet today's challenges. The National Guard and Reserves are a vital part of America's national defense.<sup>15</sup>

Each branch of military service has Reserve Component assets. For the Army, this includes the United States Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG).<sup>16</sup> The Army is the Nation's largest and most complex force. It consists of over 685 different unit types; each possessing varying operational capabilities.<sup>17</sup> In comparison to the other services, the Army is also unique in that a larger percentage of its force currently resides in the RC. Collectively, the ARNG and USAR account for 54% of the Army's total end strength.<sup>18</sup> Figure 1 depicts the Fiscal Year 02 end strength for all three Army components and the percentages and the combat (CBT), combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) summaries.




FIGURE 1. TOTAL ARMY COMPOSITION

Together, the Active Army, the USAR, and the ARNG integrate to form a “homogeneous whole” known as the Total Force.<sup>19</sup> Total Force is the physical manifestation of a broad concept Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird espoused in August 1970. Laird’s plan required the RC to

replace the draft as the “initial and primary source” for reinforcing the Active Component in times of war and other national emergencies.<sup>20</sup> “Emphasis,” said Laird, “will be given to the concurrent consideration of Total Forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy...”<sup>21</sup>

Laird’s successor, James R. Schlesinger, formalized his predecessor’s concept into the DoD’s “Total Force Policy”; an emphatic directive which made the guard and reserves “the initial, primary, and sole augmentation to active forces.”<sup>22</sup> As such, Total Force Policy facilitated the changeover from conscription to volunteerism, allowing President Richard Nixon to end the draft on July 1, 1971. More importantly, it recognized that “increased reliance on the RC was a necessary element of successful future military operations”; regardless of size or scope.<sup>23</sup>

The Total Force Policy evolved through subsequent presidential administrations. Under President Ronald Reagan in 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger moved to put the RC in step with the Active Army in terms of equipment modernization. Secretary Weinberger recognized the immediate “need to replace and modernize our triad of strategic forces.”<sup>24</sup> Weinberger’s edict mandated units would receive resourcing based on deployment timelines rather than by component. In principle, the Army would modernize early deploying RC units before later deploying Active organizations.

During the Reagan Administration, the RC also realized tremendous gains in manpower; significantly outpacing the active component. Overall, the active component increased about five percent while the RC experienced an explosive thirty-five percent gain in personnel authorizations.<sup>25</sup> Weinberger’s directives had a profound effect on RC manning and readiness, thus enhancing their relevancy to the nation’s overall military strategy. President Reagan made this fact clear in January 1987, when he noted in his NSS:

Today, fully fifty percent of the combat units for land warfare are in the reserve component. Reserve units perform important missions and support functions on a daily basis. Their priority for manning, training, and equipment modernization is not based on their peacetime status as forces “in reserve,” but on the basis of their direct integration into the nation’s operational plans and missions. In many cases, the sequence of deployment in the event of conflict would place reserve component units side by side and sometimes ahead of Active duty forces.<sup>26</sup>

The administration of President George H.W. Bush ushered in the era of post-Cold War force structure reductions.<sup>27</sup> Fiscal austerity drove the DoD to downsize costly active forces and migrate their mission sets to the less expensive RC. Many believed that, due to the effectiveness of past Total Force Policy directives, the RC’s ability to assume a greater role in

the operational execution of the NMS represented an acceptable level of risk. According to President Bush, “as we adjust force structures, retaining reserve units is one alternative for reducing costs while hedging against uncertainties.”<sup>28</sup> During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the seminal military event during President Bush’s term in office, one of every four soldiers who deployed to Southwest Asia was a member of a National Guard or Reserve unit.<sup>29</sup>

Under President Bill Clinton, force structure reductions continued and the Total Force Policy increased in significance.<sup>30</sup> Secretary of Defense William Perry, in April 1995, “reemphasized a greater reliance on the RC as prudent and necessary in future policy, planning and budget decisions.”<sup>31</sup> His successor, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, in a memorandum signed September 11, 1997, affirmed the increased dependence on the RC towards meeting the nation’s strategic military objectives.

Cohen directed all Services to “remove all remaining barriers to the full and seamless integration of the Total Force” to provide the “flexibility necessary to respond to the full range of military options being experienced in today’s uncertain world.” The Secretary underscored his commitment by declaring, “Reservists today are essential players in the Total Force and are vital to our national security.”<sup>32</sup> In directing the services to remove all barriers, Secretary Cohen noted four specific principles required to reach his idea of Total Force Integration:

- Clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by senior leaders
- Clear and mutual understanding of the missions for each unit (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in service and joint/combined operations, during peace and war
- Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions
- Leadership by Active, Guard, and Reserve senior commanders to insure the readiness of the Total Force<sup>33</sup>

The Congressionally mandated and DoD conducted Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1997 further validated the importance of the Total Force Policy.<sup>34</sup> The QDR 97 was a painstakingly thorough and candid analysis intended to “provide a comprehensive discussion of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy.” Looking at the world security environment through 2015, the QDR outlined three tenets of American defense strategy.<sup>35</sup> The QDR panel established force structure and manpower requirements necessary to achieve the military strategy objectives. Specifically addressing the RC relevance to this strategy plan, the QDR noted:

Maintaining the integrated capabilities of the Total Force will remain essential for our strategy to succeed. In the post-Cold War era, the



Reserve Components have become and even larger percentage of the Total Force and are essential participants in the full spectrum of operations, from the smallest of small-scale contingency operations to major theater war. Guard and Reserve forces provide trained units and individuals to fight in wartime and to support the wide range of DoD operations in peacetime. Reserve forces are part of all war plans. No major operation can be successful without them.<sup>36</sup>

The QDR proposed force structure reductions totaling 15,000 personnel from the Active Army and 45,000 personnel from the RC. At first blush, the recommendation for a significant slash in RC manning appeared at odds with the QDR's acknowledgment of ARNG and USAR relevance to the nation's military strategy. The report avoided contradiction, however, by noting that large personnel savings could be gleaned from redesign and downsizing of combat structure. Efficiencies would be gained through organizational change, supported by technologically enhanced munitions and weapons systems. In theory, doing more with less.

Three months later, the findings of the National Defense Panel (NDP) further recognized the magnitude of the RC contribution to overall military strategy. In particular, the panel brought attention to the sharp increase in RC participation across the full spectrum of military operations and noted the trend appeared perpetual in duration. The NDP acknowledged force structure resizing was necessary in a post-Cold War strategic environment and noted the need for a corollary re-look at traditional RC roles and missions.

The NDP concurred with the QDR recommendation of stout force structure reductions and focused particular attention on the notion of a large standing strategic reserve; a holdover from the Cold War defense strategy. This posed a serious dilemma for Army leadership, since the majority of the strategic reserve in question was resident in the ARNG's combat maneuver separate brigades and divisions. While the QDR report recognized the need for retaining the National Guard's enhanced separate brigades<sup>37</sup> as a means to mitigate future threat and uncertainty, it questioned the utility of a large strategic reserve consisting of eight ARNG combat divisions. The QDR stopped short of calling for the elimination of the Guard's divisions, but subtly, yet effectively, made the point that further integration into the national military strategy was crucial to their future.

The NDP built on the QDR's recommendation and specifically offered up a number of potential solutions to achieve integration of RC structure into AC

organizations; foremost being conversion of some combat structure to combat support and combat service support<sup>38</sup> and an increased RC role in peace operations. The NDP report also stressed the need for equitable resourcing to insure RC preparedness, noting:

Reserve and Guard units must be prepared and resourced for use in a variety of ongoing worldwide operations. They will play an increasing role in a variety of these by relieving active units and reducing the operational and personnel tempos of frequent and lengthy deployments.<sup>39</sup>

As a result of QDR and NDP recommendations, several key initiatives stand out as bold attempts towards capturing the essence of the Total Force Policy. Each has had a very dramatic impact on RC roles, missions, and force mix. They are:

- Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS). An initiative to convert 12 ARNG combat brigades and two division slice elements to CS and CSS structure. The plan converts approximately 48K of ARNG combat force structure. The ADRS is scheduled to extend at least until FY 09 and has the potential to impact ARNG units from 38 of the 54 states and territories.<sup>40</sup>
- Active Component/Army National Guard Integrated Divisions (AC/ARNG). The AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept evolved from the ADRS and is a Secretary of the Army directive. Under this concept, a division headquarters commanded by an Active Army major general, provides training and readiness oversight (TRO) to three ARNG eSBs. The intent is to enhance pre-mobilization and post-mobilization preparation for war and facilitate a more rapid deployment process. There are two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions (the 7<sup>th</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup>) and both activated in June 1999.<sup>41</sup>
- Army Multiple-Component Units (Multi-COMPO). Multi-COMPO units combine personnel from more than one component on a single authorization document. There are over 30 Multi-COMPO units organized currently, with at least 60 programmed for activation by 2007.<sup>42</sup>
- ARNG Divisional Headquarters for Bosnia Command and Control. To reduce the OPTEMPO of Active Army units in Europe, ARNG units perform peacekeeping duties as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR), Bosnia. Thus far, the 49<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, 29<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry Division,

and the 28<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Infantry Division have served as the SFOR headquarters. This program has elements from all three components.<sup>43</sup>

President Bill Clinton's vision, articulated through his National Security Strategy, also embellished the importance of RC forces to military operations. Under Clinton's policy of global "peacetime engagement," the military was used extensively to help shape the world's geopolitical environment.<sup>44</sup> The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, Army General John M. Shalikashvili, identified a broad range of non-combat missions that fell under the umbrella of peacetime engagement activities. These mission sets included direct military-to-military contacts with foreign armies, humanitarian relief operations, international peacekeeping, and participation in counterdrug and counterterrorism programs.<sup>45</sup> America's military had become so persuasive an instrument of national power many viewed the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines as a finite "presence of American power" serving as "the hidden fist that keeps the world safe."<sup>46</sup>

The scope of this vision increased military deployments dramatically with nearly all requiring some degree of RC augmentation, in large part, because during President Clinton's watch, military capabilities had been reduced 40%.<sup>47</sup> As the 20<sup>th</sup> Century drew to a close, RC forces were actively involved in a myriad of missions that included combat, and including regional stability, forward presence, peacekeeping, readiness exercises, contingency operations, and homeland security. "The reserves are vital to America's military strength," said President Clinton, adding, "they are part of the total force we bring to bear whenever our men and women in uniform are called to action."<sup>48</sup> General Henry H. Shelton, General Shalikashvili's successor, underlined this point by stating, "We could not meet the commitments of our armed forces today, these demands being placed on us, without our Reserve Components."<sup>49</sup>

While increases in military deployments affect all branches of the service, the commitment of forces is more acute in the Army. Over the last decade, the army has been the DoD's force of choice to accomplish a majority of the nation's combat operations and peacetime engagement missions. Since 1992, the Army has deployed significant combat and support assets to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania. Since 1985, Army forces have rotated on six-month tours to keep peace in the Sinai Desert as an integral part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO-Sinai) battalion. Now, and for the foreseeable future, the Army will retain a robust peacekeeping presence in the war-torn Balkans region of Europe. Annually, the Army conducts massive training events in Southwest Asia, as a means of deterring aggression

in the Persian Gulf region, and provides a large percentage of the nearly two hundred and twenty thousand troops forward-based in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.<sup>50</sup>

With 54% of its force structure resident in the RC, it is not surprising, that the Army's "force of choice" status has resulted in an explosion in the demand for ARNG and USAR units. As of March 2003, Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel represented 148,612 of the 212,617 RC personnel called to active duty in support of the GWOT and Operation Iraqi Freedom. By comparison, the Air Force, with a 30,783 troops mobilized, was a distant second place.<sup>51</sup> The reasons for this imbalance are glaring when viewed in the context of military specialties and functional areas. These core competencies, as they are called, represent the groupings of the various skill sets required to execute the Army's varied missions. As depicted in Figure 2, the RC possesses the lion's share of most core competencies. In some cases, the Active Army has abdicated almost entire mission sets to the RC. Given the percentages reflected in Figure 2, and the fact that some of the most needed competencies for current military operations are found in the Civil Affairs, Military Police, Engineer, Chemical, and Medical branches, it should come as no surprise that operational use of the RC has increased over 1,000 percent in the last decade.<sup>52</sup>




FIGURE 2. CORE COMPETENCIES

## THE RESERVE COMPONENT: HISTORICALLY SPEAKING

Our reliance for protection and defense of the land must be mainly on our citizen soldiers, who will ready, as they ever have been ready in the times past, to rush with alacrity, at the call of their country, to her defense.

—President James K. Polk  
May 1846

Of the citizen army, the National Guard is in the first category of importance. It must be healthy and strong, ready to take its place in the first line of defense in the first weeks of an emergency...

—General of the Army George C. Marshall  
September 1945

The importance of citizen-soldier participation to an American war effort is grounded in an undeniable historical foundation that pre-dates the birth of the Nation. Before the American Revolution, local militia units formed to provide defense to the individual colonies; mainly against Indian attacks. The first formal militia unit organized on December 13, 1636, in the Massachusetts Bay Colony.<sup>53</sup> This armed citizenry was important because almost all colonists “abhorred the idea of a standing army.” They associated such professional forces with the despot kings and monarchs from which they had fled Europe to avoid.<sup>54</sup>

Beginning with the War of Independence (1776-1783), General George Washington’s small regular Continental Army joined together with the “minutemen” of the thirteen colonies to battle the British forces of King George III. Since that time, America’s standing armies have been augmented by citizen-soldiers formed from within the communities of the nation. These citizen-soldiers existed informally as individual state militias; their existence being grounded in the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which identifies “a well grounded militia” as being a vital ingredient towards insuring “the security of a free State.” This bifurcated military system has been in existence since then, but has been refined and evolved through a series of follow-on laws and codes. Some of the more instrumental legislative actions include:

- The Militia Act of 1792 clarified the role of the militia and standardized unit structure
- The Dick Act of 1903 provided Federal funding of the state militias and formalized periods of mandatory training
- The National Defense Act of 1916 guaranteed the state militias as the primary reserve force and gave the president the authority to mobilize them during war or national emergency. The act also made the term “National Guard” mandatory for the organized state militias and

established a separate federal reserve comprising the Officer Reserve Corps (ORC) and the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC)

- The National Defense Act of 1920 combined the ORC and ERC into one uniform Organized Reserve Corp (ORC)
- The National Guard Mobilization Act of 1933 made the National Guard a component of the Army
- The Armed Forces Act of 1952 reorganized the ORC into the United States Army Reserve<sup>55</sup>

Except for the Vietnam War, large numbers of RC members were mobilized and had served in all of America's military conflicts. For example, seventeen ARNG combat divisions fought as part of General of the Armies John J. Pershing's American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in World War I (1914-1918).<sup>56</sup> In addition, the Officer Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps provided nearly 170,000 soldiers to the AEF.

During the Second World War (1941-1945), four of the first five combat divisions deployed to the European and Pacific Theaters were ARNG units and the 29<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division from Virginia and Maryland Army National Guard, spearheaded the Normandy Invasion on D-Day, June 6, 1944. The Organized Reserve (representing the combined ORC and ERC) provided 26 army combat divisions as well as sailors of the Naval Reserve who contributed significantly to the U.S.-led victory in World War II.<sup>57</sup>

Many reserve component soldiers of the Army Guard and Organized Reserve also saw extensive combat in the Korean War (1951-1955), with the latter providing nearly 240,000 soldiers.<sup>58</sup> And for the first time, airmen of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard actively participated in a major armed conflict. The successful performance of active military forces during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 was influenced tremendously by partial mobilization of the Air and Army National Guard and the newly reorganized Army Reserve.<sup>59</sup> Reserve forces of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard mobilized after the North Koreans seized the American ship *Pueblo* in 1968. They joined reservists from both the Army and Air Force and remained on active duty until North Korea released the ship's crew one year later.<sup>60</sup>

However, these numerous illustrative examples of historic participation of reserve forces in combat roles should not be validated in terms of combat power brought to battle. Rather, it should be measured by the effect the mobilizations have on the psyche of the U.S. populace as it "provides the critical link between the military and the American people, a link essential for victory."<sup>61</sup>

In armed conflict and military operations other than war involving reserve forces, the general population was directly touched, thus impelling Americans to become actively involved in the prosecution of the effort. In almost all instances, the Philippine War (1899-1902) being one exception, this participation has been positive and it has had a solidifying effect on the popular sentiment of the general masses. Widespread agreement of public opinion crystallizes into overwhelming support for the government's pursuit of its military objectives.

This fact cannot be argued when viewed in the historical context of the American military experience. The vast majority of soldiers who fought in the American Civil War (1861-1865) were non-Regular Army combatants. They were, for the most part, volunteers and draftees who formed militias from within their own towns and villages and entered federal service as collective units. The American populace, North and South, clearly identified with these citizen-soldiers and bestowed upon these "community sons" almost unwavering support.<sup>62</sup>

The American Indian Wars (1860-1880), in contrast, were fought almost exclusively by Regular Army soldiers. American response to these military operations was ambivalent at best. Occasionally, tragic events like the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer's 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry at the Battle of the Little Big Horn in 1876 invoked outrage, raised public ire, and stirred interest within the consciousness of the American public, but these instances were sporadic at best. For the most part, the average American citizen tolerated the Army's activity during the Indian Wars more than they supported it.<sup>63</sup>

The Spanish-American War (1898), the first conflict waged by the United States on soil foreign to the North American Continent, like the American Civil War, was one fought by large contingents of volunteers and state militias. Units like Colonel Teddy Roosevelt's all-volunteer "Rough Riders" captured the attention of mainstream America more so than any Regular Army unit could hope for.<sup>64</sup> All across the United States, "the citizen-soldiers left their home districts, to the cheers of crowds of well-wishers and the salutes of bands, cannon, and steam whistles."<sup>65</sup> They marched aboard ships, some to sail the Atlantic, others to traverse the Pacific; all awash in the euphoric rush of public support, emboldened in the perception that the virtue of their mission personified the will of the nation.

#### **CLAUSWITZ AND THE NATIONAL WILL**

The concept of a militia embodies the idea of an extraordinary and largely voluntary participation in a war by the whole population.

—Carl von Clausewitz  
On War

Use of the Reserve Components invokes the national will.

—Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3  
Briefing Slide, March 2002

Military strategist, and former Army infantry officer, the late Harry G. Summers, Jr., noted in his analytical study, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, “public support must be an essential part of our (U.S.) strategic planning”, implying military successes rarely occur without the backing of the people.<sup>66</sup> Summers’ observation is not unique; instead it is one of the benchmark tenets outlined in the renowned Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz’s classic study of strategy, On War.

Clausewitz postulated war consists of three vital elements, “The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second, the commander and his army; the third, the government.”<sup>67</sup> Under this model, the government creates the policies and establishes the strategic objectives; the military body provides the tools – manpower, hardware, and planning – necessary to achieve the objectives; and the people, who either support or abandon the military effort. Contemporary military scholar, LTC Antulio J. Echevarria II, implies that Clausewitz’s three elements show themselves:

through the government (*die Regierung*), which attempts to direct war toward some objective; through military actors, such as the commander (*der Feldherr*) and his army (*sein Herr*), who must deal with the unpredictability of combat; and through the populace (*das Volk*), who act as a reservoir of the emotional power necessary to sustain a serious struggle.<sup>68</sup>

Clausewitz refers to this triad as the “paradoxical trinity of war.” The components of this triad, he writes, “are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another.” Ignoring any of these three, not understanding their mutual association, or attempting to alter the balance between them, is tantamount to military defeat; to do so, writes Clausewitz, “...would be totally useless.”<sup>69</sup>

Clausewitz’s assertion, that success in war requires the study or the exploitation of all three elements of his trinity, is clearly focused at the highest level of warfare planning. His position that war is “suspended between the magnets of government (political purpose), army (chance), and people (passion and violence)”<sup>70</sup> reflects influences far removed from battlefield commands and soldiers. According to Clausewitz, “It would be fallacy to commit the army without first committing the people...commitment of the army to prolonged combat without the commitment of the people is impossible.”<sup>71</sup>

Applying contemporary terms to Clausewitz’s trio of magnets allows us to define



government as the *Command Authority*– the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) – providing the strategic objectives; the Army as the *combatant commanders* creating the necessary war plans; and the people as the *national will* furnishing the civilian support necessary to uphold both of the others. In the ideal situation, all three together in a balanced and supporting relationship would likely insure success in a military campaign. Conversely, victory would be impossible when one or more was wanting or altogether missing.

Many U.S. students of military art believe America is “best defended through a partnership between the government, the military, and the people,” and contend that in democratic societies like the United States, mustering the will of the people behind a political goal is paramount to guaranteeing the success of a military strategy.<sup>72</sup> Likewise, losing support is the quickest route to defeat. The conventional wisdom of this argument indicates that, prudent is the political leader who identifies and implements a strategy best positioned to gain and retain support of the populace. President Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War (1961-1973), and President George H.W. Bush during the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), are contemporary examples of American Commanders-in-Chief, who in the case of the former, failed, and the latter, succeeded, in the task of galvanizing the national will.<sup>73</sup>

In Vietnam, President Johnson refused to fully mobilize the military’s reserve components. His decision rejected the advice of his top military advisors. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Harold Johnson, who in May 1965, formally presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) a proposal for the mobilization of the ARNG and the USAR. The other service representatives on the staff quickly approved the measure, but President Johnson rejected the plan.<sup>74</sup>

The JCS were unanimous in their recommendation in favor of RC mobilization and the reasons for President Johnson’s rebuff of his key uniformed leaders advice invites speculation. Historian, John K. Mahon, surmised in his comprehensive study, History of the Militia and the National Guard, that Johnson balked at reserve mobilization “to conceal from the American people the high level of military commitment that the nation was making in a distant land.”<sup>75</sup>

Army officer and historian, H.R. McMaster, on the other hand, hypothesizes in his critically acclaimed study of the Johnson Administration during the Vietnam War, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, that Johnson’s actions were a deliberate and calculated attempt to mislead the American public to protect his domestic social programs.<sup>76</sup> The analysis of other respected historians has also presented evidence that clearly indicates President Johnson realized the effects mobilization would have on the American people and feared it would jeopardize his

“Great Society” social programs.”<sup>77</sup> In the words of President Johnson:

...history provides too many cases where the sound of the bugle put an immediate end to the hopes and dreams of the best reformers: The Spanish-American War drowned the populist spirit: World War I ended Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom: World War II brought the New Deal to a close. Once the war (Vietnam) began, then all those Conservatives in the congress would use it as a weapon against the Great Society.<sup>78</sup>

Though successful in protecting his social agenda, President Johnson undermined his military leaders by denying them the reserve component forces they needed to implement their war plans.<sup>79</sup> Even more damaging, his decision set the conditions that reduced the American people's support for the conflict, and this erosion of support disrupted the balance within the Clausewitzian trinity, as the national will needed to sustain the military operations necessary to meet the government's strategic objectives evaporated.

The citizen-soldiers of the mobilized RC forces bring with them trained and qualified military manpower, and, more importantly, the support of the towns and communities they leave behind. Regard for military actions engaged by “impersonal” standing armies can wane, however, interest in efforts waged by the sons and daughters of entire communities remains as long as the reserve soldiers are deployed. Retired General Edwin Burba, Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command, fully recognized this phenomenon when, commenting on RC unit activations for the Persian Gulf War remarked, “When you come to war, you bring America with you.”<sup>80</sup>

President Johnson and his advisors ignored this fact, and in doing so, failed to fully bring the war home to the American public. In the minds of many military leaders, this loss of public attachment stripped the command authority and the military of the public support needed to sustain the commitment necessary to fight the Vietnam War in a way to achieve strategic objectives.

Certainly, it is arguable that during the entire Vietnam experience one or more of Clausewitz's trinity tenets were missing from the U.S. war effort. Our political leadership was frequently guilty of issuing ambiguous orders and trying to tactically manage the war from the Oval Office. Likewise, military leadership failed to adapt to changing enemy tactics or to fully grasp the political nuances of the conflict. The American people, for their part, demonstrated the national will to approve the military action early on, but with time and escalating U.S. body counts, lost resolve and divorced themselves from support of the war effort.

As demonstrated above, it was President Johnson's failure to keep the passion of the people united behind his prosecution of the war, however, that sealed America's doom in

Vietnam with certainty. The balance, within Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" for Vietnam, had been upset and neither of the two remaining elements could stabilize the imbalance.

Some debate the failure to retain public approval as inevitable, given the failings of the President, his advisors, and senior military leadership, but the fact remains, the American people's support began to wane long before President Johnson lost his strategic vision or General Westmorland<sup>81</sup> emphasized body counts over realistic tactical objectives. As early as June 1966, less than a year after the first large deployment of forces to Vietnam, the polls note that American opinion for sustaining the war began a dramatic shift towards supporting troop withdrawals.<sup>82</sup> The national will was lost because American leadership failed to elicit their passion for the cause. In cognitive step with Clausewitz, retired Army Colonel Harry G. Summers wrote of the defeat, "The Vietnam War had reemphasized the critical importance of the relationship between the Army and the American people."<sup>83</sup>

### **ABRAMS DOCTRINE AND TOTAL FORCE**

A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve forces.

—Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense  
August 21, 1970

The military leaders who survived the humiliating setbacks of Vietnam did not fail to note President Johnson's error. Taking the lead was Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton W. Abrams, who, as commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1967-1972, experienced first hand, the debilitating effects evaporation of public support had on the U.S. war effort. He believed that the failure to mobilize the RC at the beginning of the war was a crucial mistake.<sup>84</sup>

Abrams accepted that inability to sustain national will was the primary reason for the loss in Vietnam; a belief he never formally stated, but one he certainly communicated sotto voce to his subordinates behind closed doors. As evidenced by General John Vessey, an Abrams subordinate, who stated, "He (Abrams) thought an awful lot and concluded that, whatever we're going to do, we ought to do it right as we are as a nation. Let's not build an Army off in the corner someplace. The armed forces are an expression of the nation...And part and parcel of that was that you couldn't go to war without calling up the Guard and Reserves."<sup>85</sup>

General Abrams stubbornly clung to his belief that reserve unit participation was crucial to securing and retaining the nation's will during war. His thoughts, opinions, and concerns became the nucleus for the Abrams Doctrine. The Abrams Doctrine was a set of principles that

served as an important corollary to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's Total Force Concept, which at the time was an abstract idea in the initial phase of conception.

The context of the Abrams Doctrine was simple, but in its scope, overarching. It supported the retention of combat structure in the RC adequate to mitigate risk in a Cold War threat environment. The Abrams Doctrine also led to the creation of the Roundout Brigade concept. This ambitious and revolutionary program permanently assigned ARNG maneuver brigades to selected Active Army divisions. In theory, these roundout brigades would mobilize, deploy, and enter combat as the active division's third brigade. Most importantly, however, Abrams championed the cause for directing the transition of a much larger percentage of CS and CSS, (transportation, logistics, engineer, maintenance, medical, and others) to the RC. Together with the Total Force Policy, the Abrams Doctrine initiated the paradigm shift transferring these essential capabilities, to wage and sustain war, to the RC.

General Abrams intentionally assured RC personnel were embedded deeply into modern military force structure.<sup>86</sup> In doing so, he guaranteed the Army would never again be able to conduct significant military operations like Vietnam, without initiating National Guard and Reserve call-ups.<sup>87</sup> Prior to the Abrams Doctrine and Total Force Policy, the combined percentage of all CS and CSS structure resourced in the RC was about 46%. In the years since, that percentage has grown considerably and currently stands at 72%.<sup>88</sup>

#### **THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: A CASE STUDY OF TOTAL FORCE SUCCESS**

The success of the guard and reserve participation in Desert Shield and Desert Storm cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance, and reinforcing the policies and decisions made over the last 10 years to strengthen the Total Force concept.

—General Colin Powell

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

From the U.S. Army, we got the National Guard 142<sup>nd</sup> Artillery Brigade with two batteries each of MLRS and M110. By golly, they were good!

—Brigadier Hammerbeck

Commander, 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade (UK)

Today, in what can only be judged a fitting epitaph to General Abrams visionary guidance, U.S. military forces cannot deploy anywhere nor execute any significant mission without some degree of RC mobilization. A Vietnam War veteran and commander of the U.S. Army 7<sup>th</sup> Corps in the Persian Gulf War, retired General Fred Franks offered this assessment of the impact:

This gave Abrams and the Army what it needed to blend together the

active component and the reserve component into what became the Total Army Concept. Never again would the active forces be called upon to fight a war alone. The reserve component – the force closest to the every day fabric of American life, to the American people – would be fighting along with them.<sup>89</sup>

In every significant military operation that has taken place since Vietnam, RC personnel have augmented the active forces involved. Many, like Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada and Operation Just Cause in Panama, were limited in scope and involved mostly RC volunteers. It was not until the Persian Gulf War that the full potential of Abrams Doctrine and Total Force Policies were thoroughly realized. During the massive troop build-up in the Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti deserts, followed by the quick and decisive military offensive, the profound impact of Total Force was fully and indisputably validated.

On August 7, 1990, President George H.W. Bush ordered the 82d Airborne Division to deploy in defense of Saudi Arabia against Iraqi forces massed on the Kuwait border. In the tense days after, he clearly stated his strategic objectives to his military leaders and the American people. On August 23, he authorized the reserve force mobilization needed to meet the military plan and to secure public support. The first RC units began arriving in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) just 17 days later.<sup>90</sup> According to General H. Norman Schwartzkopf, Commander, Central Command (CENTCOM):

The President's next move was to call up the Reserve Component... and by doing so he gave a powerful signal to the people of the United States that we had a job to do as a nation. I was in favor of this move: I'd always been convinced that one of the terrible mistakes we'd made During the Vietnam War was *not* mobilizing (the reserves) – Washington sent our soldiers into battle without calling on the American people to support them.<sup>91</sup>

By the time the ground phase of the war began on February 23, 1991, more than 230,000 RC personnel had been ordered to active duty, representing almost half of all the soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors in the KTO. The 22<sup>nd</sup> Support Command (SUPCOM), the logistics headquarters tasked with the gargantuan task of supplying, moving, feeding, and supporting the seven-plus divisions of American combat forces and some of the Coalition Force organizations, was comprised of 70% RC personnel. LTG Gus Pagonis, 22<sup>nd</sup> SUPCOM Commander, frankly noted, "I owe much of the success of my command to the talents of our flexible and well trained reserve component...those talents came to the Army as a direct result of the Total Force approach."<sup>92</sup>

President Bush's decision to mobilize the RC, coupled with strong and decisive

command authority presence and competent military leadership, created an aura of public support that was as inspiring as it was approving. It fostered a climate that allowed Clauswitz's trinity of war principles to exist in harmonious concert with each other. Unlike Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War succeeded because the elements of passion remained in balance with the tendencies of chance and reason. President Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney learned from the mistakes of President Johnson and his advisors. They clearly established viable and attainable strategic military objectives and effectively communicated their goals to their key military leaders. In turn, they provided General Schwartzkopf with the reserve forces needed to secure the public support necessary to achieve American strategic objectives.

For their part, the American people reacted just as Clauswitz had theorized, and visionaries like Abrams and Laird had predicted. They, the American people, became emotional participants in the conflict having been directly touched by the operation through the mobilization of their communities and towns. Americans threw their considerable support behind the operation from the moment the first active troops deployed and their enthusiasm continued to grow with every announced mobilization of a reserve unit. An official Department of the Army After Action Report following the war confirmed this by directly stating:

...Reserve Component call-ups bolstered the support of the population from communities throughout America. Community leaders, school children, and the general public lined the streets waving flags and cheering when the units deployed from home station. This grass roots support extended from local to state level officials greatly enhancing the public support for Operation Desert Storm. The mobilization of the Reserve Component should be considered early in a conflict to garner the will of the people in support on national objectives.<sup>93</sup>

The ground swell of national support afforded the U.S. deployments to Saudi Arabia for the Persian Gulf War was not an accident, nor was it a positive aberration of public sentiment. Instead, it was the expected result of a military and political lesson learned from defeat in Vietnam and the failure of American civilian leadership to understand the significance of Clauswitz's "paradoxical trinity." It is difficult to imagine General Abrams, Secretary Laird, and all the other civilian and military leaders responsible for recognizing the failures of Vietnam, did so without Clauswitz's triad of tenets well in mind.

#### **BEYOND DESERT STORM: THE COSTLY PRICE OF SUCCESS AND A REEVALUATION OF THE KEY TO NATIONAL WILL**

The Army Reserve will never be the same again...The timing of our call ups, (and) the expectations of the American people as to what the Army Reserve needs to do and how it has to do it, have changed forever.

—LTG Thomas J. Plewes, Chief of the Army Reserve  
January 22, 2002

If reservists are consistently and involuntarily activated for operations perceived to be routine, public support for serious crises will become more difficult to build.

—Stephen M. Duncan, Former Assistant Secretary of  
Defense for Reserve Affairs

If the first Persian Gulf War serves as the epochal validation of Total Force Policy, what can be made of the condition pervasive in today's strategic military environment regarding the unprecedented use of RC forces? Does the current doctrine of embedding RC personnel into the fabric of every operational military plan serve as further confirmation of Total Force virtues, or does a policy resulting in tens of thousands of reservists serving in 50 countries around the globe represent a doctrine in serious need of overhaul?<sup>94</sup> Do current policy devices, like the *Limited Call to Active Duty Program*, signify a sincere effort to enhance professional development within the ranks of RC officers by offering opportunities for accession onto active duty for one-year periods, or is the program a veiled attempt to fill critical active duty officer vacancies?<sup>95</sup> Is the mobilization requirement for RC military police personnel in a post-9/11 threat environment dangerously undermining the effectiveness of civilian law enforcement agencies throughout the country? Is the loss of officers from our nation's police forces to military call-ups analogous to "robbing Peter to pay Paul?"<sup>96</sup> Does the frequent and long-lasting use of RC personnel characterize the underlying intention of Total Force Policy; does it represent the post-Vietnam War end-state General Abrams and his subordinates envisioned? Is it the ironclad guarantor of national will and military victory Clausewitz postulated?

And what of Secretary Rumsfeld's vexation over escalating use of the RC, the concern that served as the start point for this discussion. Have the military services, especially the Army, erred in their attempts to embrace Total Force Policy to the degree that the most routine military operation is now non-executable without prodigious degrees of RC augmentation? Better yet, how long can the RC continue to function at the current OPTEMPO levels before the stress of prolonged mobilization, family separation, and employer fatigue begin to take their toll? And what event will trigger the political imbroglio that will inevitably result should the RC institution collapse from the weight of undue burden?

If, in fact, conclusive answers are even obtainable goals, some observations can be made, that may prove beneficial to those tasked with resolving the RC debate. Doing so, may help them better tailor it in a way to insure adaptability in the nation's evolving military strategy. For starters, one can not deny the success of Total Force Policies. More than any other

initiative, Total Force facilitated the nation's move from a conscript-based military, seen by most Americans as institutionally inequitable, to the all-volunteer force.<sup>97</sup> The all-volunteer force has been a success by any measuring stick and despite recent furtive, albeit, headline grabbing, moves by some politicians to resume the draft, America is not likely to ever return to conscription to fill the ranks of the armed services.<sup>98</sup>

Likewise, only the most ardent critic or nonplussed observer could quibble with the assertion that reserve forces in all five armed services have improved immeasurably as a result of Total Force. A quote by then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak, underscores this point. General Krulak, a commander not known for making glib or politically correct comments, announced in a 1995 policy statement, "There is only one Marine Corps – a Total Force Marine Corps. The days of two Marine Corps (one active, the other reserve) are gone forever...the full acceptance of this reality is crucial to our future."<sup>99</sup> Driving home a similar point, Stephen M. Duncan, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, noted in 1997, "The quality of the modern American reservist is undeniably the best in the world."<sup>100</sup> Few could honestly make these claims before Total Force.

Accepting the conclusion that Total Force Policy has been a successful paragon of military change begs the question, has it become a victim of its own achievement? Perhaps Total Force has made the active and reserve *playing field* too level or maybe a strategy-altering event like the end of the Cold War is the root cause of today's mobilization dilemma. Remembering that Abrams, Laird, Schlesinger, et al cobbled together their Total Force ideas with loss in Vietnam fresh in their minds and facing the legitimate specter of a looming Soviet Union-backed military attack in Europe, sheds useful light on the problem.

The Total Force architects were motivated by one dominant desire: Guaranteeing the nation's will behind any substantial armed conflict. The size of the military operation was an important caveat because the probability of large scale war was the foremost threat of the Cold War era. The following passage by Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at prestigious King's College, presents the context in which the Total Force planners viewed the connection between the active and reserve components. Discussing Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's deployment timetable during the opening stages of the Berlin Crisis of 1961, Freedman noted:

The essential point being that the present preparations would rapidly create a force in being, in the continental U.S., of six Army and two Marine divisions. In the event of a rapidly developing crisis, appropriate numbers of these (active) divisions could be deployed to Europe and reserve divisions called up to take their place, so that up to six divisions



and supporting units could be promptly deployed as needed.<sup>101</sup>

The Total Force architects realized public support was imperative for big wars and less needed for small deployments. Small scale contingencies and peace operations, for them, were the dubious exception rather than the likely rule.<sup>102</sup> Drawing from Clausewitz's theories, and historical insights gained throughout the American military experience, they correctly determined RC participation as the mechanism to guarantee public support.

As demonstrated by the example of the Persian Gulf War, the creators of Total Force did not err in their assumptions. They are rightly entitled to the laurels of that victory. If turnabout is fair play, then, should the blame for today's over reliance on the RC be placed at their feet? The answer is unequivocal, No! No, because in fairness, those behind the Total Force Policy had no way of knowing, if, or when, the Cold War would end. They could not have predicted the dramatic changes the demise of the Soviet empire would have on U.S. military strategy. They could not have reasonably envisioned a military environment in which numbers of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions far surpass instances of traditional combat operations. Nor could they have conceived of a RC division headquarters commanding active units during military deployments or the National Guard and Reserve providing the bulk of the personnel needed for contingency operations.<sup>103</sup>

While it's true the attacks against America on September 11, 2001 may alter future military operations, the verdict is not set. The ambiguity of threat types, that is, clearly defined enemy templates, cause haziness with regards to configuring and deploying armed forces.<sup>104</sup> Certainly, President George W. Bush's doctrine of pre-emptive military action against foes, America's first new national security strategy in 50 years, could result in a marked increase in operations with a combat flavor, but there is no sign the frequency of non-combat missions will abate.<sup>105</sup> And, even if the number of peacekeeping missions does decline, this may not spell relief for overextended RC forces now, and in the foreseeable future. According to military analyst and historian, Frederick W. Kagan:

Already it is being estimated that at least two divisions – and possibly more – will be required to maintain peace in postwar Iraq and help establish a new government there. By the 3 to 1 logic of deployments (in which one unit is deployed, one is recovering from its deployment and one is preparing for deployment to an area), it would take six of our 10 (active) divisions just to maintain two in Iraq. Three more would be required to maintain one in Afghanistan (and we will not be able to reduce that requirement without sacrificing much of what we gained by defeating the Taliban in the first place). With only two divisions earmarked for Korea, that is one more than the available force. Even the lowest estimate of what will be needed to keep the peace in Iraq

is enough to break the back of the Army.<sup>106</sup>

Even if one is skeptical of Professor Kagan's assessment, Washington insiders hint at an Iraqi occupation force upwards of 100,000 troops, the majority being American, engaged in a long-term peacekeeping mission in that country.<sup>107</sup> Barring a quick and substantial increase in active duty end-strength, such estimations can only spell more work for the reserve components. Such an increase is highly unlikely and this factor alone will render any serious discussion about reducing reserve component OPTEMPO pointless, and leave the search for a quick fix to the problem, futile. If we could somehow pull our forces from Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, reduce our footprint in Europe, and scale back our presence on the Korean Peninsula today, an optimistic contemplation that in today's strategic environment is illusory at best, the demands for the GWOT and Iraq occupation will still "break the bank" of the current active duty force pool. Given this circumstance, it is little wonder the idea of a U.S. created and supported Foreign Legion-like military force is one of several current options floating around defense think-tanks to remedy the problem of increasing RC mobilizations.<sup>108</sup>

The fact remains, the integration of the active and reserve components as executed through Total Force Policy has succeeded far beyond the most sanguine expectations of its authors. True to the intent of Total Force designers, the active component cannot execute any combat operation without RC augmentation. Unfortunately, because of post-Cold War force structure reductions, the RC has become the active component's support base for all other types of operations as well; a parameter more prolific in an era where, ironically, lesser scale conflicts usually translate to a more troop intensive and time consuming obligation.<sup>109</sup>

And while the Clausewitzian *raison d'être* that public support is the harbinger of military success, is still theoretically sound, use of the RC may not be the omnipresent trigger that invokes the national will as it once proved to be. Thus, there may be an even more influential factor at the disposal of U.S. political leaders to help build public consensus, which may be the power and influence of the media

Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the President to cultivate public support. Fortunately for the Commander-in-Chief, he has several entities he can turn to in this onerous undertaking. He usually has at his disposal numerous diplomatic experts and political pundits eager to champion the validity of his selected course of action, an army of *spin doctors*<sup>110</sup> molding the public's perception of the circumstances surrounding the event. The President can also rely on a bevy of pollsters capable of structuring polling data to influence public opinion,<sup>111</sup> and a news media capable of beaming stories and footage of strife, disaster, and destruction to every

American household with nearly real-time quickness.

Increasingly, it is the news media, not RC mobilization that is a President's most powerful ally in a crusade to galvanize the will of the people. As *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* military reporter, Ed Offley noted, "The news media is not the enemy, but rather the battleground on which the struggle for public support...will be fought."<sup>112</sup> In particular, televised media, with its revolution in satellite imagery and instantaneous audio-visual feeds, has had a tremendous effect on U.S. diplomacy in the last decade. The very strong argument can be made that President George H.W. Bush reluctantly authorized the deployment of Marines to Somalia in 1992 on a humanitarian mission, only after a relentless barrage of television footage depicting the human suffering, induced by famine in that nation, caused American public opinion to nearly demand the action.<sup>113</sup>

More recently, America's decision not to intercede and stop the genocidal slaughter of some 800,000 Tutsi tribal members during the 1994 Rwandan Civil War illustrates the degree to which the media's influence on public opinion affects political decision-making regarding the use of military force. The massacre of almost one million innocent men, women, and children, was a tragic event that initially received sporadic media coverage in the U.S. Consequently, the American public expressed little interest in the crisis. According to Professor Samantha Power, author of A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide:

The Clinton Administration did not actively consider U.S. military intervention, it blocked the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, and it refrained from undertaking softer forms of intervention...officials believed the American people would oppose U.S. military intervention in Central Africa...they looked at op-ed pages of elite journals...to gauge public support...at the height of the war in Bosnia, the op-ed pages of America's newspapers had roared with indignation; during the three-month genocide in Rwanda, they were silent...<sup>114</sup>

Both the Somalia and Rwanda cases accentuate the tremendous effect today's media has on the American public with regards to what citizens view as vital and supportable roles for the use of military force. And, just as importantly, how politicians interpret the public's reaction. This media phenomenon, once known as the "CNN Effect"<sup>115</sup>, is the factor many argue as more responsible vis-à-vis RC mobilization for formulating policy as it pertains to the use of military force, the ability to jumpstart public support, and in the end game, solidify the national will. As noted by journalist and international affairs analyst, Johanna Neuman, "In Somalia, the conventional wisdom holds that pictures got the U.S. in" and the same images forced public opinion to coalesce in support of the operation.<sup>116</sup>

As noted above, many observers feel the “CNN Effect” has virtually hijacked U.S. foreign policy and has had more than just a hand in determining the direction of many of America’s military operations at the close of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.<sup>117</sup> Lt. Col. Robert “Buzz” Patterson, USAF (Ret.), in his expose, Dereliction of Duty: The Eyewitness Account of How Bill Clinton Compromised America’s National Security, underscored this point, when he stated, “We’d turn on CNN and look for our next assignment, our next conflict...the televised suffering of global conflict and ethnic strife seemed to be the common denominator.”<sup>118</sup> The above suggests that today’s media revolution invokes an undeniable effect on determining when, where, and under what circumstances, the American people will endorse the military option as an instrument for coercing or defeating an enemy.

This condition also provides American political leaders with a double-edged sword, as the media effects can also quickly erode public support – regardless of whether RC personnel are involved – if a military operation runs into trouble. The agonizing video of dead American Special Operations soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by Somali gunmen following the Battle of the Black Sea, October 1993, is a painfully clear example of this consequence.<sup>119</sup> Within days of the shocking spectacle, President Clinton, sensing the total collapse of public support, pulled the plug on the operation and abruptly ended America’s mission in Somalia.

Just eight days later, in what can only be termed a sad addendum to the Somalia tragedy, Clinton ordered the heavily armed *USS Harlan County* to forego an attempted forced entry into a Haitian harbor “defended” by a gathering of lightly armed revolutionary thugs and CNN reporters.<sup>120</sup> One can assume that for President Clinton, a “black eye” for the U.S. Navy’s prestige was a modest price to pay for avoiding the public opinion setback an altercation with the Haiti hoodlums, so soon after the disaster in Somalia, would have caused. The President and his advisors fully believed that the whims of the electorate were a valid reflection of the media and the public’s emotions were “driven by the latest incidents portrayed on network television.”<sup>121</sup> It was this apprehension regarding the power of the media that many thought, caused President Clinton to emphatically declare he had no intention of deploying ground troops against the Serb army at the start of Operation Allied Force in 1999. The controversial statement was denounced by many military planners, but some, like Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Wesley K. Clark, viewed it as a savvy preemptive political move designed to head off a potentially divisive public debate of the mission.<sup>122</sup>

Figure 3 depicts results of a *Washington Post – ABC News* poll taken while President George W. Bush was engaged in the arduous task of building the case for war against Iraq. It

shows that public support for the war jumped a very telling 12 percentage points between March 9<sup>th</sup> and March 17<sup>th</sup>. Telling, because the spike occurred only after the President addressed the nation via the media on the 17<sup>th</sup> to outline his military objectives, even though, by the time the earlier March 9<sup>th</sup> poll was taken, significant RC mobilizations had been well under way.

**Would you support or oppose the United States going to war with Iraq? Would you support/oppose it strongly or only somewhat?**

	-----Support-----			-----Oppose-----			
	NET	Strongly	Somewhat	NET	Strongly	Somewhat	No opinion
3/17/03	71	54	16	27	19	8	3
3/9/03	59	40	19	35	21	14	6

FIGURE 3. POLLING DATA

### CONCLUSION

Assuming in this case polling numbers do not lie, maybe it is time for DoD to recognize the fact that RC mobilization is no longer the quintessential ingredient securing the nation's will as it applies to the use of military force. If anything, the problems associated with multiple and extended use of the National Guard and Reserves, especially the strain put on the employers of deployed citizen-soldiers, may seriously undermine future military endeavors. Not to mention igniting a potential powder keg of discontent within the states and territories as frustrated governors try to balance rising demands to combat terrorism within their borders while increasingly losing reservists to federal missions. This scenario is not as far fetched as it may seem, for it would not be the first time state chief executives locked horns with the federal government over the President's prerogative regarding the use of National Guard personnel.<sup>123</sup>

Now may also be the time for Congressional leadership to take a long hard look at increasing personnel end-strength among the active duty services.<sup>124</sup> True, the Soviet Union has gone away, and with its demise, so to has any justification for a roll back of military force structure to Cold War levels, but that is not to say a rational increase may not be the order of the day. There is no denying military OPTEMPO has increased dramatically since the eradication of communism in Europe. To verify this claim, one need just question any service member who has served over the last 15 years; or better yet, ask any reservist old enough to remember the halcyon days when, for most RC personnel, deployment meant a 15–30 day participation in annual REFORGER exercises in Germany, not a six-month to one year tour of duty in a third world trouble spot.<sup>125</sup>

There is nothing to suggest America's propensity to execute military operations will subside anytime soon. Historically, since becoming a world power after victory in the Spanish-American War, U.S. forces have battled alongside or against, combatants on nearly every continent. During the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, these martial activities supported the U.S. goal of establishing strategic colonial bases, while in the latter half of the century, engagements have been focused on combating communist revolutionaries and other anti-democracy radicals. Since September 11, 2001, eradicating terrorists and the nations that promote them have become additional mission sets. Traditionally, then, there is little to imply the U.S. will abandon such a concrete precedent.<sup>126</sup>

The volatile geopolitical world landscape, brimming with developing nation states, ruthless and oppressive regimes, and countries besieged by racial, tribal, economical, and other equally devastating forms of internal strife, will continue to influence the frequency American military personnel find themselves in harm's way. Since the end of World War II, "between 150-160 wars and civil conflicts have raged around the world" representing a "bewildering diversity of separatist wars, ethnic and religious violence, coup d'etat, border disputes, civil upheavals, and terrorist attacks...".<sup>127</sup> And while the current National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, insists that future U.S. intervention in humanitarian missions will be increasingly rare, given the United States' ascendancy as the world's police force, American participation in other forms of military action, whether directly or peripherally, will be nearly unavoidable.<sup>128</sup>

These factors, when coupled with the United States' pledge to apply military power to influence political and civil environments and promote democracy, leave little doubt that American military forces will continue to engage enemy belligerents at an ever-expanding pace. Barring an increase of active duty force structure, reservists from all components will persist in shouldering an asymmetrical share of the burden. This is not to say that America's reserve components will seek emancipation from this obligation; to the contrary, guardsmen and reservists will continue to answer the nation's call whenever the tocsin of war is sounded. Their participation, though, while unselfishly willing and invoking the finest spirit of America's citizen-soldier heritage, will have much less to do with galvanizing the national will, but more to do with mitigating the risk of an under-resourced active component.

WORD COUNT = 12,053



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "Capabilities in Guard and Reserve," message for General Myers, Washington, DC, March 29, 2002.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Speech to the Reserve Officers Association, January 21, 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Thom Shanker, "U.S. Military Considers Limits on Role of Reserve Forces," New York Times, January 26, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Schlesinger, "Defense Set to Realign Active, Reserve Units," Boston Globe, January 27, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas Hall, Text of Pentagon Press Conference, November 19, 2002.

<sup>6</sup> Man-day is a DoD unit of measure the equivalent of one calendar day. For example, 10 RC soldiers supporting a 10 day exercise equals 100 man-days. More telling, the 12.5 to 13.5 million man-day per year increase of the last five years has the net effect of adding 35,000 troops to full time active duty.

<sup>7</sup> Schlesinger, Robert. "Defense Set to Realign Active, Reserve Units." Boston Globe, January 27, 2003. Comments made by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Thomas Hall.

<sup>8</sup> Associated Press, Army summons college students for duty, article, February 22, 2003.

<sup>9</sup> Christian Davenport, "Called-Up Reservists Take Big Hit in Wallet: Families Struggle on Military Salary," Washington Post, March 4, 2003.

<sup>10</sup> Reserve component units exist in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

<sup>11</sup> Associated Press, Troop call-ups fall unevenly across nation, article, March 11, 2003.

<sup>12</sup> Marguerite Higgins, "Employers salute reservists, expand benefits," Washington Times,



February 28, 2003.

<sup>13</sup> “Girl Scouts Donate Cookies to Deployed Troops,” Delaware National Guard News Online March 6, 2003; available from <<http://www.DelawareNationalGuard.mil>>; Internet; accessed March 12, 2003.

<sup>14</sup> Department of the Army, U.S. Army War College, How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 15, 2001). The DPG is the principle DoD planning document reflecting the president’s National Security Strategy (NSS) goals and objectives. The DPG identifies key planning and programming priorities needed to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS). The TOA refers to the sum of the budget authority for a given fiscal year plus unobligated balances, offsetting collections, and transfers that are available for obligation in the fiscal year. End strength refers to number of personnel Congress authorizes to the various braches of service during a given time period.

<sup>15</sup> President Bush made these comments in a speech before a gathering of Army personnel at Fort Stewart, Georgia, February 13, 2002.

<sup>16</sup> The other service RC organizations within the DoD are: United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR), Air National Guard (ANG), United States Naval Reserve (USNR), and the United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR). The Department of Homeland Security manages the seventh RC organization, the United States Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR).

<sup>17</sup> United States, Department of the Army, Briefing, DAMO-SSW, Capabilities in the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, undated.

<sup>18</sup> The RC percentages for the other services are: Air Force – 33%, Navy – 19%, Marine Corps – 19%, Coast Guard – 18%.

<sup>19</sup> Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Readiness of the Selected Reserve, Memorandum, August 23, 1973.

<sup>20</sup> Robert W. Sennewald and James D. Blundell, The Active and Reserve Components: Partners in the Total Army, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, December,

1989), 9-10.

<sup>21</sup> Secretary of Defense Melvin B. Laird, Memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, August 21, 1970.

<sup>22</sup> Michael D. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 278.

<sup>23</sup> Daniel Egbert and Leigh Newman, An Assessment of Issues Relating to the Access of Reserve Components, (McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 2001), 19.

<sup>24</sup> Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, (NY: Warner Books, 1990), 50.

<sup>25</sup> United States, Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990, 226. Active component personnel increased from 2,040,000 to 2,133,000 (less than 5%) while the selected reserve increased from 869,000 to 1,171,000 (35%).

<sup>26</sup> President Ronald W. Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1987, 30-31.

<sup>27</sup> Institute of Land Warfare, Fiscal Year 2003, Army Budget – An Analysis, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2002), p. 37. Since 1989, the Army end strength has been reduced by 33% and its infrastructure by 21%.

<sup>28</sup> President George H.W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990, 27.

<sup>29</sup> Stephanie Gutmann, The Kinder, Gentler Military: Can America's Gender-Neutral Fighting Force Still Win Wars?, (NY: Scribner, 2000), 134.

<sup>30</sup> Although force structure reductions continued during the Clinton Administration, a reduction of defense spending as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had a more significant impact on U.S. armed forces. During the period 1992-2000, the percentage of the GDP budgeted for defense fell from 4.8 to 2.7. By comparison, during the Reagan Administration's years of military buildup, the percentage peaked in 1987 at 6.2%.

<sup>31</sup> United States, Department of the Army, Briefing, DAMO-SSW, Capabilities in the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve, undated.

<sup>32</sup> United States, Department of Defense, Briefing, ASD-RT&M (Readiness), Force Structure – Total Force, Undated, 43.

<sup>33</sup> Dallas D. Owens, AC/RC Integration: Today's Successes and Transformation's Challenge, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2001), 8.

<sup>34</sup> The Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996 directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a QDR of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense programs and policies with the intent of establishing a revised defense program through 2005.

<sup>35</sup> The QDR's three tenets were: to shape the strategic environment in accordance with U.S. interests; to respond to a full spectrum of threats; to prepare for future dangers.

<sup>36</sup> United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997.

<sup>37</sup> The Enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB) program was a key component of the DoD's "Bottom-Up Review" released in September 1993. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that the ARNG would contribute 15 "enhanced readiness brigades" to the national defense. The Army would insure the eSBs were organized and provided with the resources in order to train, mobilize, and deploy to a war zone within ninety days of mobilization. The eSBs would receive priority for manning, modernization, and training resources over the ARNG's other major combat units.

<sup>38</sup> United States, Department of Defense, Report to the Commission of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces: Directions of Defense, May 24, 1995, i-viii, pp., 2-23 – 2-25. The DoD's Commission on Roles and Missions Study (CORM), released in May 1995, was much more pointed when questioning the relevancy of the eight ARNG combat divisions to the NSS. The CORM advocated for the reorganization of half the divisional structure into support units and the outright elimination of the remaining half of combat structure.

<sup>39</sup> United States, Department of Defense, Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, December 1997, 7.

<sup>40</sup> Author, Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS) briefing, DAMO-FMF, 15 May 2000.

<sup>41</sup> Author, Active Component/Army National Guard Integrated Divisions, Information Paper, DAMO-FMF, 21 February 2002.

<sup>42</sup> LTC Ben Rivera, AC/RC Integration Item 97-32, Multiple-Component (Multi-COMPO) MTOE Units, December 2001; available from <<http://www.paed.army.mil/acrc/topics.htm>>; Internet; accessed March 6, 2003.

<sup>43</sup> Egbert and Newman, 25.

<sup>44</sup> Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging war and Keeping Peace with America's Military, (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 97.

<sup>45</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, 1995, i-iii, 8-9.

<sup>46</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, (NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), 373.

<sup>47</sup> Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden: On the Ground with Special Forces in Afghanistan, (NY: Random House, 2003), 23.

<sup>48</sup> President William J. Clinton, Speech to the United States Chamber of Commerce, January 1999.

<sup>49</sup> General Henry H. Shelton, Comments to the Reserve Officers Association in Boston, Massachusetts, July 2, 1998.

<sup>50</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone, (NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 144.

<sup>51</sup> Department of Defense, "Defense Link," March 21, 2003; available from

<<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/mar2003>>; Internet; accessed March 21, 2003. The Marine Corps is third with 19,711, followed by the Navy with 9,875 and the Coast Guard with 3,636.

<sup>52</sup> Egbert and Newman, Preface.

<sup>53</sup> David R. Millar, The Militia, the Army and the Independency in Colonial Massachusetts (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1967), 41.

<sup>54</sup> Benson Bobrick, The Triumph of the American Revolution: Angel in the Whirlwind, (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 326.

<sup>55</sup> The Army National Guard Website, "history of the National Guard," available from <<http://www.arng.army.mil/history/Constitution>>; Internet; accessed December 18, 2002.

<sup>56</sup> Department of the Army, The Army National Guard in Conflict, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army Printing Office, 1994), p. 15. Army National Guard combat divisions comprised 40% of the total AEF. Six ARNG divisions were among the eight total U.S. divisions the German High Command rated as superior. This group included the 28<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division from Pennsylvania which General Pershing dubbed the finest unit under his command during the war.

<sup>57</sup> The 32<sup>d</sup>, 34<sup>th</sup>, 37<sup>th</sup> and the Americal Divisions were the four ARNG early deployers. All total, ARNG units participated in 34 separate combat campaigns and National Guard soldiers earned 20 Medals of Honor, 50 Distinguished Service Crosses, and over 500 Silver Stars for heroic actions in combat. Over 200,000 members of the Organized Reserve participated in World War II, representing 29% of all Army officers. Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, "Reserve History," available from <<http://www.ocar.army.pentagon.mil/history>>; Internet; accessed October 15, 2002.

<sup>58</sup> The Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, <<http://www.ocar.army.pentagon.mil/history>>; Internet; accessed October 15, 2002.

<sup>59</sup> John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 228-229. "In the end, a total of 21,067 Air Guardsmen were involved...while 45,000 Army Guardsmen mobilized. Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, "Army Reserve

History,” available from <<http://ocar.army.pentagon.mil/history>>; Internet; accessed October 17, 2002. The Army Reserve contributed 69,000 soldiers in support of the Berlin Crisis of 1961.

<sup>60</sup> A.J. Langguth, Our Vietnam: The War, 1954-1975, (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 480. All total, about 14,000 reservists were called to active duty during 1966-1969 for what is unofficially referred to as the Second Korean Conflict.

<sup>61</sup> Harry G. Summers, Jr., “Reserve that trump card,” Army Times, November 10, 1997.

<sup>62</sup> Russell F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 233.

<sup>63</sup> Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891, (NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973), 406-415.

<sup>64</sup> The formation of the “Rough Riders” – the 1<sup>st</sup> Volunteer Cavalry Regiment – served as the genesis of the New Mexico National Guard.

<sup>65</sup> Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire, (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing, 1996), 107.

<sup>66</sup> Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1982), 4.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Antulio J. Echevarria II, Globalization and the Nature of War, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003), 9-10.

<sup>69</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), II, 89.

<sup>70</sup> Dr. Thomas Huber, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College C610 Syllabus, 1996, 12.

<sup>71</sup> Clausewitz, On War, 76.

<sup>72</sup> The Adjutants General Association of the United States, "National Military Strategy and The Rebuttable Presumption," available from <<http://www.ngaus.com>>; Internet; accessed December 12, 2002.

<sup>73</sup> There are a number of valid factors contributing to the U.S.'s strategic in the Vietnam War. One of the most prevailing, however, points to the evaporation of civic support for the war cause that began in earnest after 1969. In contrast, during the Persian Gulf War, the development and retention of unwavering public support for the war effort was an inarguable contributor to America's victory over Iraq.

<sup>74</sup> Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Soldier: America's National Guard and Reserve Forces & the Politics of National Security, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 90.

<sup>75</sup> Mahon, History of the Militia, 242.

<sup>76</sup> H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, (NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 326.

<sup>77</sup> Summers, On Strategy, 7.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> For the record, a small RC mobilization did occur after the Tet Offensive in 1968 but the impact caused little more than a ripple with regards to effecting public support. A total of 35 Army Reserve units and eight National Guard units deployed to Vietnam. Only 15,000 of the available 1,040,000 reservists deployed to Vietnam. Bill Minutaglio, First Son: George W. Bush and the Bush Family Dynasty, (NY: Times Books, 1999), 121.

<sup>80</sup> General Burba as quoted by Harry G. Summers, Jr., in the article, "Reserve that trump card", Army Times, November 10, 1997.

<sup>81</sup> General William C. Westmoreland was commander of United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and United States Army, Vietnam, at the peak of the Vietnam War, 1964-1968. He also served as Chief of Staff of the Army, July 1968 - June 1972.

<sup>82</sup> Robert Mann, A Grand Illusion: America's Descent into Vietnam, (NY: Basic Books,

2001), 512.

<sup>83</sup> Summers, On Strategy, 113.

<sup>84</sup> National Guard Association of the United States, Abrams Doctrine: Then, Now, and in the Future, Symposium Proceeding, July 1993, 8-9.

<sup>85</sup> Adjutant Generals Association, "National Military Strategy," available from <<http://www.ngaus.com>>; Internet; accessed December 12, 2002. As a point of interest, General Vessey began his military career as an enlisted soldier in the Minnesota National Guard (MNARNG). He was with the MNARNG's 34<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division when it was ordered to active duty in February 1941. He served with the 34<sup>th</sup> throughout several Mediterranean campaigns and while a first sergeant, received a battlefield commission in 1944 during the Anzio Beach invasion.

<sup>86</sup> Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 360-368.

<sup>87</sup> LTG Thomas J. Plewes, Chief of the Army Reserve, as quoted: Lt. Col. Randy Pullen, "Army Reserve Chief Discusses Rapid Transition to War," January 9, 2003, available from <<http://www.ocar.army.pentagon.mil>>; Internet; accessed January 10, 2003.

<sup>88</sup> Mike Burchett, Briefing, DAMO-FM, Overview of the Army for the Chief of Staff, February 2001.

<sup>89</sup> Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr., (RET), Into the Storm: A Study in Command, (NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1997), 88.

<sup>90</sup> National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard After Action Report (2 August 1990 – 28 February 2001): Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, June 1991, 123, 132.

<sup>91</sup> General H. Norman Schwarzkopf written with Peter Petre, The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero, (NY: Bantam Books, 1992), 323.

<sup>92</sup> LTC William G. Pagonis with Jeffery L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains: Lessons of Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press,



1992), 101.

<sup>93</sup> National Guard Bureau, After Action Report, 6.

<sup>94</sup> Linda D. Kozaryn, "Reserve Duty Changed Forever," American Forces Press Services, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve Website, January 22, 2003, available from <<http://www.esgr.org/employers/news>>; Internet; accessed March 17, 2003.

<sup>95</sup> United States Army Personnel Command Public Affairs Office, Army calls RC officers to volunteer for active duty, article ArmyLink News Website, November 5, 2002, available from <<http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/nov2002>>; Internet; accessed November 19, 2002.

<sup>96</sup> According to a survey by the Washington, DC-based Police Executive Research Forum, 44% of America's law enforcement agencies have lost personnel to military call-ups since September 11, 2001.

<sup>97</sup> Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 138-139.

<sup>98</sup> Charles B. Rangel, Rep-NY (D), "Bringing Back the Draft," New York Times, Op-Ed article, December 31, 2002. During the debate prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Congressman Rangel, together with Rep. Jim McDermott (D), Rep. John Conyers (D), and other politicians floated the idea of reinstating the draft. Military and civilian defense leaders quickly denounced the move as being entirely unnecessary. Consensus soon began to form that the draft idea was an underhanded attempt to sway public opinion away from the Bush Administration's plan to disarm Saddam Hussein by force.

<sup>99</sup> General Charles C. Krulak, The 31<sup>st</sup> Commandant's Planning Guidance, August 1995, A-7.

<sup>100</sup> Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 242.

<sup>101</sup> Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam, (NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 70.

<sup>102</sup> Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, (NY: Basic Books, 2002), 341.

<sup>103</sup> Cohen, Annual Report, II-140. Since March 2000, ARNG divisions have provided the command and control of the peacekeeping forces for the Stabilization Force (SFOR) – Bosnia. The ARNG and USAR also provide the bulk of the forces in SFOR-Bosnia and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

<sup>104</sup> Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History, (NY: Borzoi Books, Published by Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 7.

<sup>105</sup> David E. Sanger, “Bush’s Doctrine of War,” Washington Post, March 17, 2003.

<sup>106</sup> Frederick W. Kagan, “Pearl Harbor 2003?,” Washington Post, March 18, 2003.

<sup>107</sup> Tony Karon, “Bush Writes His Own History,” Time Magazine commentary, March 15, 2003.

<sup>108</sup> Peter Schweizer, “All They Can Be Except American,” New York Times Op-Ed, February 18, 2003.

<sup>109</sup> The build up of forces and logistical tail necessary to support large scale offensive operations is significant, however, the requirement begins to subside shortly after hostilities end. By comparison, small scale operations like peacekeeping and humanitarian actions initially require just as many troops, but usually for a much longer period of time, if not, indefinitely.

<sup>110</sup> “Spin Doctoring” is political jargon referring to the actions of individuals (“spin doctors”) who manipulate the facts of a particular event/circumstance so that it retains a positive reflection (spin) for their candidate, political party, political cause etc.

<sup>111</sup> Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency, (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 150. The author points out that President Clinton drew heavily on the advice of his chief pollster, Stanley Greenburg, prior to announcing his plan to deploy 25,000 American soldiers to Bosnia as part of the United Nations Stabilization Force in 1994. According to Drew, Greenburg assured Clinton that “Bosnia was a subject on which public opinion could be shaped.”

<sup>112</sup> Ed Offley, “The Military-Media Relationship in the Digital Age”, Digital War: A View

From the Front Lines, ed. Robert L. Bateman III, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999), 258.

<sup>113</sup> Famine was the root cause of the starvation problem in Somalia but it was exacerbated by internal civil war-like conditions that seriously undermined non-governmental organization disaster relief efforts. U.S. Marines arrived with the initial mission of stabilizing the area and managing the distribution of food and medical supplies.

<sup>114</sup> Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, (NY: Basic Books, 2003), 373-374.

<sup>115</sup> Named after the Atlanta, Georgia-based, *Cable News Network*: a 24 hour-a-day world-wide electronic news agency, at one time, considered by many to be the global leader in reporting.

<sup>116</sup> Johanna Neuman, Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?, (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 228.

<sup>117</sup> Offley, Digital War, 270.

<sup>118</sup> Lt. Col. Robert "Buzz" Patterson, USAF (Ret.), Dereliction of Duty: The Eyewitness Account of How Bill Clinton Compromised America's National Security, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2003), 112.

<sup>119</sup> Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, (NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999). On 3-4 October 1993, about 160 members of Task Force Ranger (Army Rangers, Delta Force operatives, and Navy SEALs) engaged in a brutal firefight with thousands of armed Somali militiamen and civilians. The battle is named for the neighborhood in which the combat action took place. Eighteen American soldiers and over 500 Somalis were killed in the action.

<sup>120</sup> Bob Shacochis, The Immaculate Invasion, (NY: Viking Penguin Press, 1999), The *USS Harlan County* contained the soldiers and equipment of Task Force Haiti, an United Nations-flagged effort to bring humanitarian aid to embattled Haiti. The Army Special Forces soldiers aboard the ship were so disgusted that the *Harlan County* left without a fight, they

unceremoniously renamed the ship, *USS Moron*.

<sup>121</sup> David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals, (NY: Scribner, 2001), 208.

<sup>122</sup> General Wesley K. Clark, U.S. Army (Retired), Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Book Group, 2001), 206.

<sup>123</sup> Kenneth W. Starr, First Among Equals: The Supreme Court in American Life, (NY: Warner Books, 2002), 232-233. "In the 1980s the nation debated what our foreign policy should be toward Central America. Several governors, including Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts and Rudy Perpich of Minnesota, ordered the National Guard units within their states not to participate in military training exercises in Honduras. The governors had taken this action as a way of expressing their disapproval of U.S. aid to rebel forces in Nicaragua. Congress passed a law to prevent states from conducting their own foreign policies. The governors challenged the law in the Supreme Court of the U.S. and lost The Rehnquist Court's decision in *Perpich v. Department of Defense* (1990) recognized that under the Constitution the federal government, not the states, has the authority to conduct foreign affairs." And in doing so, use the individual state and territory National Guards to help execute those policies. Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution, (NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 99. "...the Court upheld congressional power to authorize state National Guard units ordered to active federal duty outside the United States without either state governor's consent or a national emergency. Citing the broad military powers conferred on Congress under Article I's plain language, Justice Stevens spoke for an unanimous Court in rejecting Minnesota's assertion of states' rights..."

<sup>124</sup> Interestingly, Congress has historically had a much closer rapport with the Reserve Component (especially the National Guard) than with the active branches of U.S. armed forces. One reason is the National Guard's unique dual role status, having both a state and a federal mission. A small number of current U.S. representatives actively serve in the RC, to include Rep. Steven Buyer (R-IN) who was called to active duty in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in Marc 2003.

<sup>125</sup> Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 282-283. "The real thrust of European training became the

annual Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises in which Regular and ARNG units flew to Europe, drew equipment from pre-positioned stocks, and participated in large maneuvers. REFORGER exercises trained ARNG leaders in mobilization and deployment procedures under realistic and stressful conditions and familiarized all soldiers with NATO operations.”

<sup>126</sup> Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Ear of Violent Peace, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), and The War of 1898 and U.S. Interventions, 1898-1934, An Encyclopedia, edited by B.R. Beede, (NY: Garland Publishing, 1994). During the Spanish-American War, U.S. military forces fought alongside Cuban rebels in Cuba, native rebels in Puerto Rico, and Filipino revolutionaries in the Philippines, to rid all three islands of Spanish forces. After defeating the Spanish, the Americans then engaged in a four-year war with the same Philippine rebels they assisted during the Spanish conflict. From 1900 to 1933, American troops battled revolutionaries in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, and fought Mexican rebels during the Mexican Revolution. American troops deployed to China in 1900 to help quell the “boxer Rebellion” and fought, from November 1918 to April 1920, against Communist troops during the Russian Revolution. More recently, Americans deployed twice to Lebanon (1958 and 1982-84) and engaged religious radicals and fought a low intensity conflict against pro-Communist forces in the Dominican Republic (1965-66). U.S. soldiers battled rebels in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua from 1981 until 1992 and participated in campaigns against rebel insurgencies in number of places to include: Greece (1947), Afghanistan (1980), and Angola (1985).

<sup>127</sup> Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, (NY: Warner Books, 1993), 12, 98, 105.

<sup>128</sup> Condoleeza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, 79, no. 1, (2000): 53.

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