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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**  
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**Weapons of Mass Destruction: Theater Strategic Deterrence**

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Strategy and Policy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## Abstract

### WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THEATER STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

The United States has entered the twenty-first century as the preeminent world power and possesses an unparalleled capability to influence the international community. With this power comes the responsibility to equitably establish an environment of international cooperation and freedom. Unfortunately, there are nations and organizations that view the efforts of the United States negatively, and are willing to actively oppose them. Since these nations and organizations are unable to confront the United States on a peer competitor basis, they may turn to asymmetric means to leverage their position. As the proliferation of key technologies and resources continues, it is likely that these nations and organizations will gain access to weapons of mass destruction and may employ them to achieve their objectives. Within this new environment, it is imperative that we empower our military leaders with the tools necessary to effectively deter our potential enemies from using weapons of mass destruction to obtain their objectives. A key element of this deterrence lies at the regional level and therefore must be executed by the geographic Combatant Commanders. Theoretically, the effective use of Flexible Deterrent Options should enable a commander to effectively deter the use of weapons of mass destruction, but current guidance does not provide an adequate framework to complete this mission. Considerable attention is required to revise current guidance to provide the Combatant Commander the resources necessary to prevent potential enemies from using these weapons.

Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are no longer the exclusive tools of the major world powers,<sup>1</sup> and the rapid proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction (WMD)<sup>2</sup> has enabled weaker nation states and some non-state actors to engage the international community in an asymmetric manner.<sup>3</sup> Historically, the United States has used a policy of deterrence to prevent WMD-capable nations from using these weapons against the United States and its allies. As more nations gain the technology and resources necessary to produce WMD, the ability to deter the use of these weapons becomes increasingly difficult. This is primarily due to a wider variety of actors capable of employing these weapons and the fact that some of these actors believe that restraint may limit their leverage in the international community.

Due to the growing WMD threat, it is imperative that we empower the United States' Combatant Commanders<sup>4</sup> of unified geographic commands with the tools necessary to deter the use of WMD in their areas of responsibility. Although the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) offers examples of flexible deterrent options (FDOs),<sup>5</sup> some related to WMD, these FDOs do not provide a viable planning construct to prevent the use of WMD. A customized planning construct should be developed within a simple framework to address the WMD threat so that Combatant Commanders can develop early responses to prevent the use of WMD within their geographic theaters.

With the exception of the JSCP, very little discussion is devoted to operational-level deterrence against WMD. By conducting a detailed review of strategic-level guidance on WMD deterrence, a framework can be established to provide the Combatant Commanders with the tools needed to implement an effective deterrence plan within their areas of responsibility. Due to the increasing number of nations that have the ability to employ

WMD, it is essential that this framework be adaptable to specific areas of responsibility and their associated threats. An analysis of the Iraqi threat within the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility will be used to illustrate the utility of a versatile WMD deterrence framework.

The WMD threat is a multifaceted problem that encompasses a broad range of diverse state and non-state actors. Though these state and non-state actors are all attempting to engage the United States in an asymmetric manner, there are some that may not respond to traditional deterrence.<sup>6</sup> The following discussion will be limited to improving the WMD deterrence capabilities of the geographic Combatant Commanders. The many other aspects of this issue will be left for additional papers.

### **The Geographic Combatant Commander's Role in WMD Deterrence**

As more state and non-state actors obtain the capability of employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it becomes increasingly difficult for national assets alone to deter their use. This requires the geographic Combatant Commanders to assume a greater role in the overall strategy to combat the threat of WMD and necessitates the creation of a tool to develop an effective theater deterrence plan.

Before an effective plan can be developed, it is important to understand the nature of the threat and how that threat has evolved over the last twenty years. As President Bush stated in his National Security Strategy, "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons ... occurs, weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations."<sup>7</sup> This is evident in the rapid increase of nations that possess, or are acquiring the capability to produce and deliver WMD.<sup>8</sup> With this growing threat comes the urgency to

develop viable deterrent options to protect the United States, our armed forces, and our allies around the world.

Understanding the motivations that drive potential adversaries to consider the employment of WMD is vital in developing an effective deterrence plan. Fundamentally, the motivation is based on the desire of these states to gain a military tool to leverage the international community. Basically, the United States' potential adversaries know they cannot gain a military edge with conventional weapons; therefore, they have a need to find an asymmetric means to gain the leverage they require. One of the easiest ways to gain this edge is through the use of WMD.<sup>9</sup>

This, coupled with the fact that the access to the knowledge and materials necessary to produce WMD has improved, gives more nations the ability to develop WMD. In recent years, even fissile material needed for nuclear weapons has become less difficult to acquire as more nations gain the ability to build and operate nuclear power plants that can produce weapons grade plutonium.

This growing threat has fortified the United States' need for a viable deterrence plan, while the increasing number of WMD-capable states has made it more difficult for a national-level deterrence plan to meet the needs of each situation. This growing diversity requires the United States to plan deterrence at all levels of power, including a strong deterrence posture at the geographic Combatant Commander level.

"Effective deterrence will depend on a range of nuclear and conventional response capabilities, as well as active and passive defenses, counterforce and consequence management capabilities, and supporting command, control, communications, and intelligence, in particular, military preparations for operations in [a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)] environment will make clear that the threat or use of NBC weapons will not deter the United States from applying military power in defense of its national interests. The United States is substantially improving its ability to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means, thereby decreasing the coercive value of NBC weapons against us and deterring adversaries from threatening or using such weapons."<sup>10</sup> -- Office of the Secretary of Defense.

## National Strategy

Before an effective analysis of the options available to the geographic Combatant Commander can be made, a thorough understanding of the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (WMD) is required. It is this strategy that provides the conceptual framework for formulating a specific Combatant Commander's deterrence plan.

After the devastating attacks on September 11, 2001, the President of the United States issued a revised *National Security Strategy* that specifically addressed the growing WMD threat. This strategy deviated from the conventional rationale on how to deter WMD use. Historically, it was believed that deterrence would only work if the deterrence message could be effectively communicated to a rational decision maker in such a manner that the enemy would feel at risk (i.e., the enemy knew a credible capability existed to respond to WMD use and knew it would be used.)<sup>11</sup>

The newly revised *National Security Strategy* removed the requirement for a rational decision maker and argued that an effective deterrence plan could hold radical regimes at risk. This conceptual change resulted in the release of the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* in December of 2002, which established the new "Pillars" of the United States' strategy. The basic tenants of this strategy call for counterproliferation, strengthened nonproliferation, and improved consequence management.<sup>12</sup>

This basic construct allows for theater plans to be developed without the need for a rational decision maker as a potential enemy. Even though the new strategy dismissed some paradigms of the Cold War deterrence plan, most fundamental tenants remained the same. Deterrence is still "the prevention from action by fear of consequences," and is fundamentally "a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of

unacceptable counteraction.”<sup>13</sup> Basically, it is the leveraging of the cost-versus-benefits equation to the point that an adversary would consider the benefits of employing WMD insufficient to justify the costs. As such, deterrence can be accomplished by either increasing the adversary’s costs or by reducing their benefits. This construct can improve the effectiveness of analyzing deterrent actions and can be easily adapted to the historical construct that grouped deterrent actions into those that deterred “by threat of punishment” and those deterred “by denial.”<sup>14</sup>

It is important to realize that the analysis for a deterrence plan is not focused on the enemy’s fielded forces or its civilian population, but rather on the individuals who control the employment of WMD.<sup>15</sup> The key to determining the effectiveness of deterrent actions occurs only when they are viewed from the perspective of the enemy’s cost-versus-benefits equation. Therefore it is essential to avoid the potential pitfall of mirror imaging the enemy. Additionally, this process is improved if the enemy’s probable target set can be determined along with their motivation to strike these targets with WMD.

A combination of analyzing the WMD deterrence problem from the enemy’s perspective and directing that effort against the enemy’s decision making process will be the framework around which a procedure will be developed to allow the geographic Combatant Commanders to develop effective WMD deterrence plans. Before this procedure can be developed, a clear understanding of existing guidance is required.

### **Existing Deterrence Guidance**

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides a large selection of flexible deterrent options (FDOs) that can be used in a wide variety of situations to prevent them from evolving into crises.<sup>16</sup> The versatility of these FDOs provides the Combatant

Commanders with a broad base from which to initiate deterrent operations. Unfortunately, this versatility also opens the planners up to the possibility of improperly selecting FDOs; improperly selected FDOs may inadvertently encourage the enemy into using weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

An initial review of the Military FDOs listed in the Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (Annex A) shows that many of these actions tend to demonstrate the conventional capabilities of the United States' armed forces through the use of forward presence. While this may illustrate the United States' military superiority, it also tends to mass military forces within the effective weapons range of an enemy's WMD delivery system.<sup>17</sup> This may push a potential enemy into thinking WMD use is not only desirable, but, given the obvious superiority of U.S. forces, is the only option that allows any chance of victory. The organization of the FDOs does not allow planners the ability to quickly assess the effects of mass and theater dominance on WMD deterrence.

The influencing of WMD-capable states through the use of FDOs must be done in a manner that does not tilt the enemy's cost-versus-benefits analysis to the point that WMD use appears desirable. The current construct of FDOs offers no safeguards against inadvertent escalation and relies heavily on the experience and judgment of the planners. This dependence on the judgment of the planners can be reduced. One way to reduce it is to provide planners with the information necessary to identify the trade-off between the use of certain FDOs and their associated effects on the deterrence of WMD use. Another way to reduce the risk of escalation is by modifying the planning process to include a framework that independently evaluates the WMD deterrence afforded by any employment scheme used by a Combatant Commander. The later of these two options allows for a more responsive

system that can be applied against any state and some non-state actors and can be easily enhanced by adding a limited portion of the first option.

### **Analysis Framework**

The general process of developing a deterrence framework can be broken into five steps. Each of these steps depends on some level of understanding of the enemy's mindset and/or capabilities. Due to the inevitable uncertainty associated with this sort of analysis, it is strongly recommended that this process be completed using both a "most dangerous" and "most likely" assessment. In situations where higher risk is involved, it may be necessary to restrict actions based on the "worst case" scenario, but in most situations the "most likely" assessment will be adequate.

- *First*, an analysis of the enemy's capabilities must be performed to evaluate the extent of their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) systems. This analysis needs to look at both the weapons and delivery systems - including covert or deceptive delivery systems.
- *Second*, a breakdown of viable target types needs to be accomplished. This is somewhat dependent on the weapon and its delivery system, but also involves an analysis of regional dynamics that may promote the selection of certain targets and preclude others. This analysis can be continued through the identification of actual targets when tactically required, but can be limited to broader categories when developing a deterrence plan.
- *Third*, an evaluation of the adversary's cost-versus-benefits equation must be completed to determine likely "triggers" that could make the employment of WMD more favorable or even necessary. It is important that this analysis be done from the mindset of the adversary, since the basis for decision making may differ drastically from that of the United States.

- *Fourth*, a list of potentially viable deterrent options can be created using the available flexible deterrent options (FDOs) as a guide; this can then be weighed against the framework established in the previous steps.
- *Fifth*, the potential FDOs are placed against the enemy's WMD capabilities, target list, and likely "triggers" (identified in steps 1-3) to determine the effectiveness of the WMD deterrence posture.

<b>WMD Deterrence Framework Development Process</b>	
1.	Adversary WMD threat assessment (Weapons and delivery capability)
2.	Potential target category list development
3.	"Trigger" evaluation
4.	Generate list of viable FDOs
5.	FDO list assessment

**Table 1: WMD Deterrence Framework Development Process**

This process can be repeated as the dynamics of the situation shape the course of action. The nature of this procedure will force planners into reassess the WMD deterrence posture as the plans are modified.

Another tool that can improve the application of this process in crisis situations would be to include a WMD deterrence effects reference for individual FDOs. This would improve the ability to rapidly complete this process during time critical planning. However, commanders must be warned that this may limit a complete analysis. Caution must be used in developing an effects reference for FDOs since this may lead planners to omit some regional considerations not applicable to all situations. Additionally, an effects reference only accounts for individual FDOs and would not provide any assistance in determining the combined or synergistic effects of multiple FDOs.

## **Sample Application of WMD Deterrence Framework**

To help illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework, a hypothetical analysis of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat will be conducted below. This discussion is not intended to provide a complete analysis of the Iraqi WMD threat, but rather to illustrate the process of using a planning construct to evaluate a WMD deterrence posture. As such, this analysis will generally be based on real world conditions in the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility as of January 2003, but will be confined to unclassified material.

In this example, the United States is continuing its efforts to leverage Iraq into complying with United Nations Security Council Resolutions to disband its WMD programs.<sup>18</sup> Many of the actions taken by the United States are directly from the list of flexible deterrent options (FDOs) provided in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (Annex A) and therefore can be easily analyzed. It is clear that our national level leadership has considered the impact of these actions on the overall WMD deterrence posture,<sup>19</sup> and this example illustrates how the Combatant Commander for CENTCOM could use the proposed framework to determine the best FDOs.

### ***Step 1: Adversary WMD threat assessment***

The British government assesses Iraq has the ability to deploy some of its chemical weapons "within 45 minutes of an order to use them," and that some of these weapons are capable of achieving ranges of 650-850 kilometers (~400-525 miles).<sup>20</sup> Additionally, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assesses that Iraq's WMD program is limited to chemical and biological weapons.<sup>21</sup> It appears that Iraq has the ability to deliver WMD to reach some U.S. allies including the countries of Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

This range also allows Iraq to reach some U.S. forward staging bases and operation centers in Bahrain, Qatar, and Turkey. The nature of chemical and biological weapons limits their capability to create physical destruction, but enhances the capabilities against unprotected personnel.<sup>22</sup>

Iraqi WMD system limitations drastically reduce the probable target categories. This limited target base will likely be present for all countries that do not have nuclear weapons or Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) systems<sup>23</sup> necessary to achieve a global reach.<sup>24</sup> Iraq has a limited ability to employ its WMD by fixed wing aircraft or UAVs,<sup>25</sup> but the detectability and limited range of these platforms does not significantly enhance the overall threat.<sup>26</sup>

Additionally, Iraq's ability to covertly deploy a chemical or biological weapon is not addressed in recent unclassified intelligence reports, but currently appears less likely due to the close supervision of its personnel by United Nations (UN) inspectors.<sup>27</sup> Note that this situation could change quickly if UN inspectors were expelled from Iraq. Based on this analysis, it appears reasonable to conclude that Iraq's WMD capabilities are centered on its ability to deliver chemical or biological weapons with its medium range ballistic missiles.

### ***Step 2: Potential target category list development***

The previous step limited the probable area of attack to a 525 miles ring around the Iraqi border. This geographic limit on the target base simplifies the analysis.

Given the area that is held at risk, it is likely that Iraq will concentrate WMD attacks on targets that will either deliver an asymmetric military or civil response. Additionally, due to weakening international support for military action against Iraq,<sup>28</sup> any leverage Iraq can gain against the United States could disrupt the plans for any multilateral operations. Based

on these assumptions, the target base remains relatively robust but lacks any isolated target that, if struck, could drastically shift the balance of military power in the region.

At the operational level, the identification of specific targets is only required if a specific target group offers a particularly beneficial dividend. In our case, the international targets that appear to offer a significantly greater benefit to Iraq include several targets in and around Israel. This requires planners to specifically analyze the effects of targeting areas like Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, or U.S. forces in the area. This process can be repeated for other target groups as necessary.

This step of the WMD deterrence framework does not readily identify methods to protect specific targets, but rather allows the planner to identify the various target categories for use in later analyses. This target list will be used later in this procedure to evaluate overall WMD deterrence posture.

### ***Step 3: Trigger evaluation***

The purpose of this step is to identify the motivators behind the enemy's decision making process. It is not necessary to determine the point at which a trigger becomes a decisive factor in determining the use of WMD, but rather it is vital that all triggers are identified to allow for a comprehensive analysis later in the procedure.

Fundamentally, there are two general categories of triggers. The first are defensive in nature and become more likely as critical assets are placed at risk. The possibility of such a trigger being activated tends to increase drastically when the enemy is placed on "death ground" due to the shift in the cost-benefits-equation toward an "at all costs" mentality. The second category of triggers is offensive in nature and is likely to be used as a tool to gain the initiative prior to extensive conventional actions.

In the case of Iraq, the analysis of triggers must be performed from Saddam Hussein's perspective. There is clear evidence that self-preservation is a key motivator behind his cost-versus-benefits equation; therefore, any threat to his life or his ability to remain in power are likely triggers.

Due to the intense pressure on Iraq to disband its WMD program, it is highly unlikely Saddam Hussein would use WMD to initiate an offensive because of the significant international pressure that would result from such a use. Similarly, any actions that would disclose an Iraqi WMD capability or would completely remove that capability are also likely triggers. It is unlikely that the loss of military units or geographic areas would trigger the use of WMD unless these losses set the conditions for Saddam Hussein's overthrow.

It is important that these triggers be evaluated in reference to the decision maker's analysis and not that of the people or government. Due to Saddam Hussein's insistent denial of a functioning WMD program, it is unlikely that he would employ WMD without a strong trigger. This will significantly simplify the following steps.

***Step 4: Generate list of viable Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs)***

The selection of FDOs is a function of both the operational needs of the Combatant Commander and the desire to establish a deterrent posture. It is essential that all actions falling into the realm of deterrence be included in the selection process even if they are being executed for other reasons (e.g., the arrival of U.S. naval units in a regional port for logistic support must be included in the list of FDOs because they impact the deterrence posture even though there are not dedicated deterrent assets).

This example will assume the following FDOs will be used to deter Iraq from using its WMD: (1) Deployment of a carrier battle group (CVBG), (2) deployment of a Marine

Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), (3) deployment of an Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), (4) continued economic sanctions, and (5) continued international pressure through the United Nations (UN).

The effects of these FDOs will be evaluated as a set in the next step to achieve an assessment of the synergistic effects of this FDO package.

**Step 5: FDO list assessment**

The assessment of the overall WMD deterrence posture is accomplished by evaluating the effects of the FDO set on the enemy's WMD capability, target list and triggers.

- The FDO set selected in step 4 may reduce Iraq's ability to employ WMD by degrading Iraq's ability to maintain their systems. This is a long-term effect and should not have an appreciable impact in the short-term.
- The continued international pressure from the UN limits the enemy's ability to continue development and severely restricts the ability to maintain, maneuver and employ these weapons. This combined effect significantly reduces Iraq's ability to employ WMD as long as UN inspectors are allowed to continue their activities.
- Conversely, the employment of fixed military forces expands the enemy's target list and creates a potential target that can decisively shift the regional balance of power. This addition to the target base increases the potential benefit of employing WMD.

Considering these two effects on Iraq's WMD threat does not reveal any conclusions until they are weighed against Saddam Hussein's trigger mechanism. Due to the lack of a direct impact on any of his triggers and the continued reduction in Iraq's WMD capability,

the overall deterrence posture gradually improves as UN inspections continue. In general, this set of FDOs accomplishes the desired effect of improving the WMD deterrence posture.

### **Scenario Summary**

As can be seen from this example, the benefit of analyzing the deterrence posture in this manner lies in the ability to consider the effects of several FDOs as a package, thereby limiting unnecessary individual FDO analysis and improving the accuracy of the overall product. Due to the structured nature of this analysis, it is particularly useful for staffs operating in dynamic situations where continual reevaluation is required. This system also enforces a logical and thorough analysis process that holds the promise of improved overall effectiveness.

The critical weakness of this framework is its dependence on looking at these issues from the adversary's point of view. If a planner incorrectly mirror images enemy intentions or script writes their responses, the negative results can be devastating. Incorporating this process into deliberate planning, to produce accurate assessments of enemy capabilities, target selection, and decision-making, can further minimize this possibility. This will allow planners to adapt to crisis situations with less uncertainty and should allow for a better end product.

### **STRATCOM's WMD Deterrence Role**

Historically, the deterrence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use against the United States has been a function of Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and as such did not significantly involve the staffs of the geographic Combatant Commanders. STRATCOM's role throughout the Cold War was basically to present a viable deterrence to Soviet strategic forces to prevent a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. The general concept of a

mutually assured destruction was sufficient to counter the threat of a single nation and was ultimately successful in restraining the two superpowers from using their WMD.

Continuing this method of deterrence may appear as a viable option, but fails to account for the asymmetry that has evolved since the end of the Cold War. Only a few nations are capable of delivering a sufficient quantity of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to assure destruction of the United States; this has prompted weaker nations to find other asymmetric avenues to engage the United States.<sup>29</sup>

This shift to an asymmetric balance of power has required a greater level of analysis to interpret the intentions and capabilities of potential enemies. This shift away from a focused enemy and the rise of numerous new WMD-capable states required a change in how the United States views deterrence. As such, the burden of deterrence has shifted to the geographic Combatant Commanders and is becoming an essential part of their staff's mission. It is the translation of the new strategic guidance into practical deterrent options that will work against potential adversaries.

### **Recommendations**

The need for a viable deterrence plan against the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a continually growing concern of the United States; it needs to be addressed at every level of our decision making process. Any analysis focused on identifying weaknesses in the United States' WMD deterrence policy will at the very least generate a great deal of debate on the matter and ultimately will improve awareness of the threat.

The plan presented in this paper is designed to empower the geographic Combatant Commanders' planning staffs to thoroughly analyze the WMD threats in their areas of responsibility and allow them to develop a viable set of flexible deterrent options (FDOs).

These staffs need to review their current planning processes and incorporate a WMD deterrence assessment tool, similar to the one presented in this paper, into their procedures to ensure adequate attention is being given to the issue of WMD theater strategic deterrence. Specifically, they should review their crisis and deliberate planning guides in addition to the reassessment of the WMD deterrence postures afforded by their existing deliberate plans.

### **Crisis Planning Guides**

Crisis planning guides should be revised to include a WMD deterrence assessment tool to allow Combatant Commanders the ability to evaluate the effects of crisis response on the overall WMD deterrence posture. It is essential that these steps are incorporated into the crisis planning guides to allow for rapid assessment of the situation. Additionally, it is recommended that consideration be given to provide a limited assessment of certain preplanned actions on the overall WMD deterrence posture. This limited assessment allows crisis managers to rapidly review WMD deterrence effects with limited assets and time. This option clearly does not provide a product that is as accurate as a full analysis, but provides enough information in a timely manner to allow a crisis manager to rapidly identify the need for reassessment or reallocation of deterrence assets.

### **Deliberate Planning Guides**

The recommended changes to the deliberate planning guides differ slightly from those recommended in the crisis planning guides in that less emphasis is placed on rapid decision making and more emphasis is placed on thorough analysis. This subtle shift in emphasis is easily accomplished by omitting any previous assessment from the planning guides. Whereas the limited assessments in the crisis planning guides allows the crisis managers to rapidly review WMD deterrence effects, the same tools would tend to limit the

deliberate planner's independent assessment and may tunnel his analysis away from an accurate evaluation. Even though a limited cross reference system between FDOs and their effects can be developed, this type of tool would lend itself to simplifying the analysis process and may errantly guide the planner away from an accurate assessment of the overall expected result. As such, cross-referenced FDO lists are only recommended for use in crisis planning guides and within some training documents.

### **Reassessment of WMD deterrence postures**

Lastly, all existing deliberate plans need to be reviewed and revised as necessary to incorporate a WMD deterrence assessment. This process will not only improve existing plans, but will also allow planners to become familiar with the dynamics specific to their areas of responsibility. The review process should be codified into a structured process that will ensure the assessments remain relevant as regional and world dynamics change.

### **Conclusion**

The United States has entered the twenty-first century as the sole global power and as such has gained an unprecedented position on the world stage. As other nations endeavor to leverage their ideas and interests upon the international community, it is likely that they will eventually find themselves in opposition to the policies of the United States. Without a means to leverage the United States on a peer competitor basis, some states may turn to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a means to engage the United States in an asymmetric manner.

This growing WMD threat has required the United States to take a hard look at its deterrence posture and as a result has forced the Combatant Commander to assume an ever greater role in WMD deterrence. The lack of a flexible planning tool to analyze the

effectiveness of a deterrence posture greatly limits the effectiveness of the Combatant Commanders to execute this facet of their mission. It is imperative to revise current planning procedures to incorporate these concepts before crisis forces an untimely, unplanned, and “off the cuff” solution.

**Annex A**

**Flexible Deterrent Options**

Unclassified Extracts from Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (CJCSI 3110.01B), App. B to Encl. C. (15 November 2001)

Figure B-1. EXAMPLES OF MILITARY FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS (FDOs)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Deploy ISR assets to the area</li><li>• Move MPS to region/Deploy OPP &amp; SLRP</li><li>• Increase military exchanges and staff visits to the area</li><li>• Move Marine Expeditionary Brigade to region</li><li>• Conduct aircraft fly-overs</li><li>• Upgrade alert and DEFCON status</li><li>• Pre-stage sealift and airlift delivery platforms/vessels, supporting equipment and personnel to air and sea ports of embarkation and debarkation.</li><li>• Increase exercise activities, schedules, and scope</li><li>• Deploy on-call Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW)</li><li>• Increase strategic reconnaissance</li><li>• Deploy the forward deployed ARG/MEU (SOC) to the region</li><li>• Increase naval port calls or air squadron visits to the area</li><li>• Deploy AWACS to region</li><li>• Increase mobile training teams</li><li>• Open pre-positioned stockage facilities</li><li>• Use naval or air capability to enforce sanctions</li><li>• Open and secure sea and air LOCs/PODs</li><li>• Move pre-positioned ships into the region</li><li>• Deploy CVBG to region</li><li>• Protect friendly C4ISR assets</li><li>• Deploy intelligence collection and analysis teams to area</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Activate Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC)</li><li>• Exercise WMD passive defense</li><li>• Initiate or increase show-of-force actions</li><li>• Pre-stage airlift and airlift support assets</li><li>• Begin moving forces to air and sea ports of embarkation</li><li>• Generate/deploy nuclear forces</li><li>• Deploy JSTARS to area</li><li>• Increase C4ISR processing and transmission capability</li><li>• Pre-stage or deploy contingency-ready brigades</li><li>• Emplace logistic infrastructure were possible</li><li>• Establish curfews and impose restrictions on leaves, separations, and retirements</li><li>• Increase informational efforts<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- PSYOP</li><li>- Mission awareness</li><li>- Measures directed at the opponent's military forces</li></ul></li><li>• Implement meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion of enemy informational assets</li><li>• Deploy naval Surface Action Group to the region</li><li>• Use Force Module Packages (FMP)</li><li>• Deploy bombers to operating bases</li><li>• Deploy Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force to region</li></ul>
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Figure B-2. EXAMPLES OF DIPLOMATIC FDOs

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduce international diplomatic ties</li> <li>• Increase cultural group pressure</li> <li>• Alter existing meetings, programs, or schedules</li> <li>• Prepare to withdraw US embassy personnel</li> <li>• Pursue measures to increase regional support</li> <li>• Identify the national leader who may be able to solve the problem</li> <li>• Develop or work within existing alliance or coalition (avoid unilateral actions when possible)</li> <li>• Show international resolve</li> <li>• Alert and introduce special teams             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Public diplomacy</li> <li>- Mobile Training Team (MTT) Communications</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures</li> <li>• Use the UN or other international institutions</li> <li>• Identify clearly the steps to peaceful resolution</li> <li>• Restrict activities of diplomats</li> <li>• Reduce national embassy personnel</li> <li>• Take actions to win support of allies and friends</li> <li>• Coordinate efforts to strengthen international support</li> <li>• Promote democratic elections</li> <li>• Heighten informational efforts directed at:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International community</li> <li>- People within the host nation</li> <li>- Coalition formed to overcome the situation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
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Figure B-3. EXAMPLES OF ECONOMIC FDOs

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seize real property in the United States</li> <li>• Embargo goods and services</li> <li>• Cancel US-funded programs</li> <li>• Heighten information efforts directed at:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Financial institutions</li> <li>- Reducing or eliminating corporate transactions</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freeze monetary assets in the United States</li> <li>• Freeze international assets</li> <li>• Enact trade sanctions</li> <li>• Encourage corporations to restrict transactions</li> <li>• Reduce security assistance programs</li> </ul>
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Figure B-4. EXAMPLES OF INFORMATION FDOs

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Impose sanctions on C4ISR technology transfer</li> <li>• Maintain an open dialog with the press</li> <li>• Protect friendly C4ISR assets</li> <li>• Heighten public awareness of the problem and potential for conflict</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encourage public/international support for US policy</li> <li>• Promote selected issues as lead stories</li> <li>• Increase C4ISR processing and transmission capability</li> <li>• Interrupt satellite downlink transmissions</li> </ul>
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## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2001), 109.
- <sup>2</sup> **Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):** Specifically, a WMD is any weapon capable of a high order of destruction and/or capable of causing extensive casualties. In general, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons are a subset of WMD and though the terms can be used interchangeably, WMD will be used unless the more specific type of weapon is required for clarity.
- <sup>3</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2001), 4.
- <sup>4</sup> **United States Combatant Commanders:** This term refers to the nine Unified Combatant Commanders of the United States, of which, five are given geographic areas of responsibility (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM). Formerly these Combatant Commanders were referred to as CINCs (Commanders in Chief).
- <sup>5</sup> **Flexible Deterrent Options:** An adaptive planning construct that is focused on the early response to a situation to deter it from evolving into a crisis. FDOs span all forms of governmental powers including military, diplomatic, economic and informational options. [*Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 98-1*, (CJCSM 3110.01B 15 Nov 2001) Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001: App. B to Encl. C.]
- <sup>6</sup> John F. Reichart, *Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: A Neglected Challenge*. National Defense University Strategic Forum, Number 187 (December 2001). 3: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum187.html> [21 December 2002].
- <sup>7</sup> George W. Bush, President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2002), 13.
- <sup>8</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2001), 109.
- <sup>9</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2001), 1.
- <sup>10</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2001), 69.
- <sup>11</sup> Keith B. Payne, "Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons from History," *Comparative Strategy* (Vol. 14 No. 4, October 1995), 351.

- <sup>12</sup> Department of Defense, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2002), 2-5.
- <sup>13</sup> Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02)*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), 156.
- <sup>14</sup> Captain James Fitzsimonds, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Considerations for the Operational Commander," (NWC 2115B), (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002), 18.
- <sup>15</sup> Keith B. Payne, "Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons from History," *Comparative Strategy* (Vol. 14 No. 4, October 1995), 348-49.
- <sup>16</sup> Department of Defense, *Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 98-1*, (CJCSM 3110.01B), (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), App. B to Encl. C.
- <sup>17</sup> Captain James Fitzsimonds, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Considerations for the Operational Commander," (NWC 2115B), (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002), 3, 8, and 12-13.
- <sup>18</sup> Steven R. Weisman, "Time for Decision on Iraq is Nearing, White House Says," *New York Times*, 19 January 2003:  
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/19/international/middleeast>> [20 January 2003]
- <sup>19</sup> David E. Sanger, "Bush Warns Foes Not To Use Weapons of Mass Destruction on U.S. Troops," *New York Times*, 11 December 2002:  
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<[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq\\_wmd/Iraq\\_Oct\\_2002.htm](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm)> [12 December 2002]
- <sup>22</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2001), 114.
- <sup>23</sup> Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) missile systems are typically capable of ranges of greater than 5500 kilometers (3400 miles). [Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2001), 115]

- <sup>24</sup> Only the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France are assessed as having a long-range ballistic missile system, but several other states are actively developing systems to give them this capability in the near future. [Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2001, 115.)]
- <sup>25</sup> **UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle):** A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles. [*Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Joint Publication 1-02 12 April 2001, Amended 25 September 2002) Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002: 553.]
- <sup>26</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), 22-23: <[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq\\_wmd/Iraq\\_Oct\\_2002.htm](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm)> [12 December 2002].
- <sup>27</sup> British Government, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government*, (London: Stationery Office, 2002), 1-25: <<http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/reps/iraq/iraqdossier.pdf>> [12 December 2002].
- <sup>28</sup> Maggie Farley and Paul Richter, "Move by France Ups the Stakes," Los Angeles Times, 22 January 2003: <[https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird.cgi?doc\\_url=/jan2003/e20030122148209.html](https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird.cgi?doc_url=/jan2003/e20030122148209.html)> [22 January 2003].
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