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AS THE WORLD CHANGES - SO MUST THE COAST GUARD

By

LCDR Aldante Vinciguerra, USCG

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal view and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

03 February 2003

Advisor:

Prof. Donald Chisholm

Joint Military Operations Department

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Introduction

Since September 11, 2001, national security has risen to the forefront of the American psyche. The focus on defending the homeland has become so great that an entire Cabinet Level Department has been created to support this mission. The Coast Guard, an agency founded in 1790 as the Revenue Marine whose charter was to protect the economic national security of the United States, is again being called upon to ensure national security.¹ Not only is America's economic stability at risk, the physical safety of its citizens is also being threatened. The President has directed the small service to assume the role of lead federal agency for maritime homeland security. Protecting our most extensive and vulnerable region, America's waterways, is an enormous responsibility and may require adjustments to the service's present command and control structure. The thesis of this paper is that the following changes in command and control should occur within the Coast Guard to successfully prosecute the maritime homeland security mission: the Commandant must divest operational command to the Area Commanders, the Marine Safety and Operations communities must overcome cultural biases, and the Coast Guard must create a functional operational staff. As the National Defense Panel eerily predicted in 1997, "The United States enters the new millennium facing challenge very different from those that shaped our national security policy during the almost 50 years of the Cold War."²

The paper is organized into six sections. The first section identifies likely terrorist threats to the maritime environment. The second and third sections will discuss new mission requirements and available assets. The divestiture of the Commandant's operational duties will be addressed in the fourth section. The fifth section will describe the cultural disparity that exists between the Marine Safety and Operations divisions and why they must rise above these differences. The last section

will describe how the present structure of a divided support staff must transform into a unified operational planning staff.³

Immediately following the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, national security again became the Coast Guard's primary mission. The change in focus for every operational cutter and ashore unit occurred virtually overnight. In the months following the attack, a cultural change reverberated through the Coast Guard. There was a massive increase in the number of Coast Guard personnel receiving small-arms training. Robust 100-person harbor defense units - Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) - were created to defend major ports and waterways.⁴

All thirteen Cyclone-class patrol craft were acquired from the Navy and augmented with a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) to provide both waterway security and a vessel escort capability in major U. S. ports.

The Maritime Threats

To understand why changes are necessary in the command and control structure, a discussion of likely terrorist threats, required counter-terrorism missions, and available assets is essential. Terrorism usually takes one of six forms: hijacking, bombing, arson, assault, kidnapping or the taking of hostages.⁵ The present threats are lethal and the mission requirements are different from what has been expected of the Coast Guard in the past. Change is required to meet these new demands. Terrorism has seriously threatened the United States population and its highly complex infrastructure. Although the devastating events of September 11 precipitated a considerable increase in protective measures, security requirements, and overall awareness, the country still remains extremely vulnerable to a wide variety of terrorist threats and activity.⁶ The maritime environment is one of America's most exposed areas. The porous nature of its numerous rivers, ports, and inlets provide terrorist networks with relatively easy entry into the United States for illegal alien

immigration, contraband, explosives, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) material. At the turn of the 20th Century, the defense against enemy vessels or illegal maritime importation was established mostly at the terminal area of normal shipping routes in the vicinity of major ports.⁷ Although this technique has not changed in the last century, an enormous amount of un-inspected containerized cargo still passes through major American ports on a daily basis. Only 2 percent of the seven million containers that arrive in U. S. ports each year are inspected.⁸ Because one can easily avoid commercial ports and still gain access to the interior of the country through secondary waterways, completely securing the littoral region is an insurmountable problem.

A second major maritime threat comes from the potential for high-jacking commercial vessels not unlike the high-jacking of commercial airliners used to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. After gaining control of a large commercial cargo carrier, terrorists could bring the vessel up to high speed for a suicide attack on critical infrastructure and exposed public areas within a seaport.⁹ These mammoth vessels often carry massive amounts of toxic chemicals, volatile fuels, or environmentally-damaging crude oil. The force that one of these masses of steel can generate on impact is enough to thoroughly incapacitate a major port for months and severely affect the economy of that region. Just how severely is indicated by the longshoremen strike of 2002 which shut down west coast ports for over a week; it cost an estimated 1 billion dollars a day.¹⁰ In addition to the kinetic damage, if toxic chemicals are released or crude oil dumped, the effects would be catastrophic and the damage to the environment felt for years. Adding WMD to this scenario, such as a planted chemical or biological agent, would complicate the problem further.

Such agents can be transported in standard shipping containers and might go unrecognized by first responders until mass casualties are present weeks

later.¹¹ The devastating consequences of such an attack and the relative ease with which an unprotected ship could be pirated compel U. S. forces to counter this threat.¹²

Another very real threat to both commercial shipping and military vessels must also be addressed. Military warships and merchant vessels are most vulnerable when in port or transiting within restricted waters. A suicidal terrorist in a small boat laden with explosives could inflict severe damage on an unprotected war ship or merchant vessel. This was evidenced by the October 2000 attack in Yemen on the USS COLE (DDG 67) which killed 17 sailors and resulted in extensive damage, including a 40 foot hole in the warship's side.¹³ A similar scenario could occur while a warship transits San Diego Harbor during the summer season when hundreds of pleasure boats may impede a vessel's progress. These boats often come within 50-feet to get a photograph. Maintaining security zones around warships or chemical-laden merchant vessels while they transit inland waterways is a daunting task. The terrorist weapons used in this threat are low-tech, self-sacrificial, asymmetric, and unconventional; their stealth profile makes them all the more sinister and deadly.¹⁴ This is but a small sample of the threats the Coast Guard now must address in meeting its homeland security responsibilities.

New Mission Requirements

The Coast Guard has four critical capabilities that support the National Security Strategy: coastal defense and interdiction, vessel escort duties, sea marshal responsibilities, and port security.¹⁵ These security capabilities provide the foundation upon which the Coast Guard will execute its maritime homeland security mission. The primary mission requirements must be understood prior to developing a viable operational command and control structure. The Sea Marshal program aims to defeat or deter terrorist threats to a commercial merchant vessel as described in the

vessel hijacking scenario. This program places an armed Coast Guard team aboard a merchant vessel prior to its inbound or outbound transit to provide protection to the pilot, master, and bridge navigation team while also ensuring the safe movements of deep-draft vessels.¹⁶ Benefits of the program include a credible deterrent, sustained positive control of vessels, immediate response capability, and on-scene liaison should an incident occur.¹⁷

Vessel escort duties provide direct protection to both merchant and military vessels against external terrorist threats, such as small-boat attacks, while transiting internal waters. The mission requires Coast Guard and Navy surface assets to transit with either a High Interest Vessel (HIV) or capital naval warship. HIV is designated by Coast Guard Headquarters because of the dangerous nature of the vessel's cargo, or because the last port of call, registry or crew is from a suspect nation.¹⁸

The escort may also require an air asset to ensure security from the countless threat possibilities in the littoral environment. Wayne P. Hughes correctly noted in a recent *Proceedings* article, "The clutter that complicates coastal operations was, a century ago, the coastal shipping, fishing boats, shoals, islands, cliffs, and inlets of the enemy's waters. Now coastal clutter also includes a high density of electronic signals and commercial aircraft. This greatly complicates your effort to detect, track, target and destroy them."¹⁹ Although Mr. Hughes is describing enemy littorals in the article, his description describes most United States littoral regions and major inland waterways.

Harbor defense, port security, and coastal defense are all critical missions conducted by the Coast Guard to ensure homeland security. These missions directly affect the well-being of U. S. citizens by providing maritime presence, protecting maritime resources, enforcing U. S. laws and treaties, and ensuring U. S. maritime sovereignty.²⁰ Harbor defense

involves federal, state, or local vessels patrolling U. S. harbors and defending the maritime infrastructure, including the protection of moored vessels, pier structures and navigational aids. Port security not only encompasses harbor defense, but also the protection of shore-side infrastructures, including wharf facilities and emergency response capabilities. Coastal defense involves a layered defense and intelligence network to prevent the importation of prohibited contraband and to halt illegal alien immigration. Just as Alexander Hamilton on April 23, 1790 presented to congress a bill for the construction of ten Revenue Marine cutters to ensure the economic security of a young nation, littoral protection still remains a primary national security issue.²¹ The difficulty of this mission is evidenced in a statement released by the IRA following a failed assassination attempt on Margaret Thatcher, "Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always."²²

Available Assets

In addition to the redeployment of numerous Coast Guard assets immediately following the 9/11 attacks, many other organic resources will have to be identified to meet mission requirements. The Coast Guard will continue to draw assets from nearly all its field offices. Coast Guard Station offices will supply small boats (41 feet and less) for the harbor defense mission, Group offices will provide coastal patrol vessels (87 feet to 110 feet) for the vessel escort mission, and cutters (210' and greater) and Coast Guard aircraft (HH-65 helicopters and HU-25 jets) will be used for escort cover and coastal defense. Port Security Units (PSU), and Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) will provide port security, harbor defense, a Sea Marshal capability, and a resource for insertion in response to a hostile vessel takeover. Coast Guard buoy tenders will ensure navigational aids are properly positioned and provide a limited

escort capability. The personnel at a Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, normally staffed by vessel inspectors, incident investigators and spill responders, will arm themselves with small arms weapons and lead in the Sea Marshal program. Tactical command and control will also reside at the Marine Safety Office.

To effectively conduct the security missions discussed in the previous section, a collaborative effort of many agencies and their assets is critical. In addition to organic Coast Guard assets, interagency cooperation will also be required for a successful homeland security program. Many of these assets will come from the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies to provide streamlined solutions to resource shortfalls.²³ Other federal agencies whose direct participation in maritime security is vital include the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Health and Human Services, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and U. S. Customs Service.²⁴ If the maritime situation requires, these agencies will provide both manpower and equipment in either a crisis management or consequence response capacity.

Success in maritime homeland security will also depend on outside intelligence agencies providing the Coast Guard timely and accurate information. Note that the ability to integrate all-source intelligence turned the tide to favor the Coast Guard during the 1920's rum wars.²⁵ The lessons of the past remain relevant today; useful intelligence is the critical force multiplier in any interdiction effort. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), El Paso Intelligence Center and National Imagery and Mapping Agency are all crucial to maritime homeland security. It must also be noted that often the most valuable intelligence is not gleaned from intercepted signals or satellite imagery, but from information obtained

from the indigenous population.²⁶ Human intelligence (HUMINT) is recognized as one the best sources in combating terrorism and conducting interdiction operations. Unfortunately, many of the HUMINT sources the federal government worked hard to develop were decimated as anti-intelligence lobbyists in the 1970's sought and succeeded in destroying the nation's extensive foreign surveillance network.²⁷ HUMINT sources are just now being developed to infiltrate terrorist cells. It may take years before valuable, consistent intelligence products are produced. This deficiency makes sharing intelligence even more critical to operations conducted by agencies within the Department of Homeland Security.²⁸ The intelligence division within the Coast Guard must initiate, develop, and foster strong working relationships with other federal intelligence agencies. Creating a liaison seat for these agencies within the service's intelligence division would provide an excellent foundation. In addition to properly responding to the numerous threats in prosecuting the maritime security missions, the Coast Guard is still expected to perform its entire traditional mission set. The ability to meet these competing demands will require a robust command and control network.

A Shift of Responsibility at the Top

The present command and control system employed by the Coast Guard is outdated. It is unable to adequately conduct joint operations while meeting the numerous challenges posed by its present intra-service mission set. The command structure is disjointed, inefficient, and void of sound planning processes. These deficiencies are evident in the minimal unity of effort observed while conducting traditional missions. Functioning as fully independent entities for years, Coast Guard cutters and personnel have consistently operated under a much decentralized command structure. This has included independently adjusting schedules, developing training programs and prosecuting law enforcement cases. Given the new terrorist

threat factor and the potentially disastrous consequences which may result, it is imperative that unity of effort be achieved through unity of command.

The central principle of command and control is clearly expressed by Milan Vego, "Unity of command means having a single commander control all forces assigned to a particular mission. It is achieved principally by establishing clear-cut division of responsibility, inter- and intra-service integration, cooperation, and interoperability."²⁹

The 2001 CONPLAN states, "Command and control in responding to a terrorist threat or incident is a critical function which demands a unified framework for the preparation of plans, training of forces, and execution of orders."³⁰ To meet the challenges ahead, the Coast Guard must conduct vital restructuring at the top. The Coast Guard Commandant, unlike the other armed service chiefs, is both administrative and operational commander for the service. This dual hat obliges the Commandant to interact with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the service chief and with the individual combatant commanders as the Coast Guard's operational commander.

This requirement overworks Headquarters staff personnel while underutilizing the second echelons staffs (Coast Guard Area Commands).³¹ The Area Commanders are delegated responsibility for Coast Guard operations in their respective regions. There are two Area Commanders, one for the Pacific region and one for the Atlantic and Gulf regions. They are both vice admirals and since they hold three star rank, they are not seen as equivalents when meeting with Department of Defense combatant commanders.³²

The Commandant of the Coast Guard must relinquish his duties as operational commander and maintain the traditional role of a service chief.

These responsibilities include administration, budgeting, procurement, training and doctrine development, thus making him a force provider rather than an operational commander. The operational responsibilities of the

Coast Guard should be transferred to the Area Commanders, and the position of Area Commander elevated to the rank of four star admiral. Although this restructuring will require congressional legislation, it is vital in meeting the challenges of today's diverse political landscape. As Vice Admiral Hull noted in a recent *Proceedings* article, "Balancing mission and resources will require reaching out to and coordination with other federal agencies, international partners, state and local governments, industry, private citizens, and volunteer organizations. This would ensure all agencies are complementary and that unity of effort is achieved in meeting emerging requirements."³³ As a result of the service's broad law enforcement authority and existing tactical command and control structure, the Coast Guard has been assigned lead federal agency (LFA) for maritime homeland security.³⁴ The Area Commander has also been given the power to request and receive DOD forces through NORTHCOM.³⁵ To interact effectively with the above mentioned agencies and DOD elements, a four star Coast Guard admiral at the operational level provides the authority necessary to meet its LFA requirements.

Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, has affirmed the customary role of the Coast Guard supporting the Navy would not be invoked and it would be naval assets supporting the Coast Guard wherever required in the war on terrorism.³⁶ Although not in the DOD, the position of Coast Guard Area Commander should be equivalent to that of a combatant commander who reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security rather than the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁷ The importance of this job can not be overstated. A failure in this newly restructured maritime security mission will almost certainly result in the death of U. S. civilians. These obligations can not be met through the use of Coast Guard assets alone. The service's fleet of ships and aircraft are aging and in limited supply. Interaction and assistance from other agencies will be vital to meet the current

requirements for port security. The Coast Guard's role of supported commander is a significant departure from its traditional supporting role. (see Appendix A, paragraph 9)

Some would argue there is no justifiable reason to increase the number of four star admirals, creating another top heavy armed service. In this fiscally constrained environment, creating two higher paying salaries is not only a burden on the effort to streamline management, but fiscally foolhardy. A second argument opposing the division of operational and administrative commands is the Coast Guard's strong record of success with the present system. Nevertheless, it must be noted the country now faces new challenges and the terrorist threat to the safety of American lives has increased significantly. This is apparent by the ominous trend concerning terrorist group's desire to acquire and willingness to use WMDs and other 'unthinkable weapons' like the sarin gas release in Japan and the attempt to release cyanide gas during the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.³⁸

The armed services are top heavy and will remain so as technological advancements continue to increase both battle-space size and weapon employment ranges. Battles of the past, where massive armies faced each other on a confined battlefield in a war of attrition, are over. The skill level of service personnel required to operate and manage the support of new technologically advanced systems has risen considerably. Armed forces of today are smaller in size and made up of more highly-trained advanced personnel. Finally, many of the homeland security missions require civil support (CS) assistance. Department of Defense forces will be asked to support the Coast Guard with the CS mission of homeland security, transferring these forces to a four star Coast Guard command will ease both facilitation and coordination.

Teamwork - One Coast Guard

The Coast Guard transformation must start at the Area Commander level because it is at the Area staff where the operational level must be created. Nevertheless, before an effective operational staff can be created, the marine safety and operations communities must overcome their cultural biases. They are obliged to disregard differences and find cohesion in supporting the Coast Guard's primary objective of protecting American citizens. The smallest armed service was unique from its inception. It was formed when the military Revenue Cutter Service merged with the civilian U. S. Lifesaving Service and created the modern day U. S. Coast Guard in 1915.³⁹ Another civilian agency, the U. S. Lighthouse Service, was placed under the Coast Guard in 1939 by President Roosevelt. This merge brought many civilian lighthouse personnel into the service's military structure.⁴⁰ The Coast Guard is one of the five armed forces, yet has expanded its missions considerably by merging with civilian agencies. It is viewed as both a military service and a humanitarian organization performing civil missions. This dual identity created an environment where Marine Safety and Operations personnel often view one another in a different light.

Marine Safety personnel are closely aligned with civil service agencies while Operations personnel are more military minded. Both communities are proud of their military service, but the division is easily recognizable. The majority of Marine Safety personnel working at field offices wear civilian clothes and constantly interact with civilians from the maritime industry. Very few personnel receive use of force training or weapons qualifications. This presents industry with a less threatening appearance and has worked well when interfacing with merchant vessel masters or offshore drilling companies.⁴¹ These relationships are critical in successfully prosecuting the Marine Safety regulatory mission. In

recent years, many pacifists joined the Coast Guard knowing conventional armed service duties could be avoided by choosing the Marine Safety career path. Marine Safety personnel also receive extensive training in the maritime industry field, often resulting in high paying jobs on the civilian side upon discharge. This has caused some animosity in the Operations community regarding the direction with which the Coast Guard is positioning itself for the future.

Operations personnel in the Coast Guard are mostly cutterman, airmen, small boat operators, Port Security Unit and Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) personnel. They wear uniforms on duty and perform the more active functions in the service such as ice-breaking, search and rescue, counter-narcotics, and military support to DOD assets. The hours are long and Operations personnel are often away from home for extended periods while Marine Safety personnel go home almost every evening. Although this causes some bitterness among the Operations community, the animosity is not all one-side. Operations personnel are often promoted faster, and most captains and flag officers have operational backgrounds. Unfortunately, an extremely small number of officers are allowed to crossover to the other community beyond their first four years of service. This is likely a major contributing factor to the lack of understanding and cooperation that occurs between the divisions.

Prior to September 11th, the missions of each community were diverse enough that little interaction between Marine Safety and Operations personnel was required. Both communities provided excellent service and were successful working independently of one another. The mission requirements described earlier significantly changed following the terrorist attacks. This new mission set requires extensive coordination and cooperation between the two communities. Either community can not succeed without considerable assistance from the other. To be a successful

service, both will need to stop promulgating biased opinions, cease turf battles, and come together in support of the Coast Guard's primary objective. An increase in crosspollination between the divisions will enhance understanding and promote teamwork. The method with which Academy graduates are indoctrinated into the Coast Guard is an excellent system and should be expanded. All officers who ascend from the Coast Guard Academy are required to serve two years aboard a cutter following graduation. This practice should be extended to all Officer Candidate School graduates as well. This would enhance crosspollination and increase respect between the officers in both Marine Safety and Operations. Since service attitudes permeate down from the officers, it is their cultural bias that must change. The idea of one Coast Guard working together in pursuit of a common goal is necessary before the creation of an operational staff has any opportunity for success.

The Operational Staff

The Coast Guard does not have a unified operational command structure equal to the other armed services. The small service needs to think big and step away from its present staff architecture. It must take a lesson from the other armed services by learning and embracing the operational level of warfare. In today's world, asymmetric threats such as sabotage and chemical or biological attacks directed against American vulnerabilities are likely. These threats require extensive planning and coordination to effectively counter.⁴² To provide sufficient homeland security for such asymmetric attacks and simultaneously prosecute its many other missions, the Coast Guard must revamp its archaic command and control structure at the staff level. It must have a strong operational level focus to ensure adequate employment of scarce intra-service resources and effective inter-service and interagency cooperation.

The evolving terrorist environment requires centralized direction and decentralized execution continuously supported by the timely flow of relevant information and intelligence both up and down the chain of command.⁴³ An inability to provide adequate centralized direction is the weak point in the Coast Guard's present command architecture. As stated in Joint Pub 3-0, "Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission."⁴⁴ The Coast Guard Area Commander's staff must be organized properly in order to develop coherent direction for subordinate commands. Presently, Coast Guard Area staffs are divided into two main operating programs: Marine Safety and Operations.

As described previously, every mission in support of homeland security will require significant interaction and cooperation between both the Marine Safety and Operations communities within the Coast Guard. The dividing line drawn on the Area Command flow chart must be erased (see Appendix B). The focal point for developing, coordinating, and implementing a Coast Guard national security program should reside with the operational staff.⁴⁵ A sound command structure must be carefully organized to ensure unity of command, unity of effort, and centralized planning.⁴⁶ The division that exists between the Marine Safety Section and the Operations Section prevent attainment of all three. Plans are being formulated, budgets are being proposed, and resources are being allocated by separate planning groups.

To be effective, marine safety personnel should be completely integrated throughout the operational staff elements. There should be one operational staff structure combining the personnel from both divisions. Presently, the staff at an Area Command does not actually plan and coordinate operations like a typical operational staff, instead it provides only support while the planning is delegated to the tactical level. To

meet homeland security requirements, the Area staff should be prepared to facilitate the fusion of information from all intelligence sources. Second, they need to ensure an appropriate balance between the many competing Coast Guard missions. Lastly, they need to be resourceful in matching constraints to operational policy.⁴⁷ This requires much more than mere support from the Area staff, it requires intense planning and coordination.

Conclusion

To successfully prosecute the homeland security mission with its limited assets and numerous threats, the Coast Guard requires both innovative thinking and organizational restructuring. The primary objective of the Coast Guard is the protection of American citizens. Meeting this objective requires ingenuity and a willingness to accept change. The Coast Guard Commandant must divest all operational control to the Area Commanders; an action that goes beyond simple delegation. This change must be written into congressional legislation and passed as law. The Coast Guard must be in sync with the other armed services if it to effectively perform its new mission set. Intelligence and doctrine will also play an especially critical role prosecuting its missions. When working with limited resources, Coast Guard forces executing the homeland security mission must be supported by timely and focused intelligence as well as effective command and control if they are to successfully unravel the complex environment of the maritime littoral.⁴⁸

By observing the physical location of each division in any staff office, the separation between the marine safety community and the operations community is apparent. Each division and its supporting staff are almost always located at opposite ends of the hallway or on different floors. Very little interaction or meaningful cooperation occurs between the two staffs. A new operational staff must be created combining the

divided marine safety and operations staff personnel and creating one coherent planning unit. Within the service, cultural biases and traditional philosophy on meeting mission requirements must not only be reevaluated, but disregarded when they no longer support the collective good. Although these changes may seem extensive, successfully combating terrorism requires bold initiative. President Abraham Lincoln's statements to congress in 1862 concerning emancipation still hold true today in the battle against terrorism:

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty; we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.⁴⁹

NOTES

¹ Howard Bloomfield, The Compact History of the United States Coast Guard, (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1966), 6.

² Bruce B. Stubbs, America's Coast Guard – Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (G-O), 2000), 51

³ The term unified in this context refers to the unification of the Marine Safety and Operations divisions within the Coast Guard. It is not a reference to a Unified Command established between coalition nations.

⁴ U.S. Coast Guard, Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and Projected Operational Environment (POE) for Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST), COMDTINST M3501.39 (Washington: 2002), 2.

⁵ Jonathan R. White, Terrorism an Introduction (Canada: Wadsworth Group, 2002), 16.

⁶ Colonel John A. Martin, Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 31.

⁷ Russell Grenfell, Art of the Admiral (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1937), 48.

⁸ Otto Kreisher, "Mineta: Maritime Security a 'High Priority' Balancing the Benefits of Ocean Transport Against the Risk of Terrorist Attacks", Sea Power, May 2002, <http://www.seapowermagazine.org/may_2002/46_kreiser.htm> (25 January 2003)

⁹ U.S. Coast Guard, Sea Marshal Escort Program, MSOSFBINST 16601 (California: 2002), 1.

¹⁰ Justin Pritchard, "West Coast Shippers, Union Strike Bargain", Wausau Daily Herald, 25 November 2002, <<http://www.wausaudailyherald.com/wdhbusiness/276404112298270.shtml>> (25 January 2003)

¹¹ CONPLAN – United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 01 JAN 2001), 11.

¹² Bruce B. Stubbs, America's Coast Guard, 46.

¹³ Roger A. Lee, "Attack on the USS COLE", The History Guy, 10 November 2003, <http://www.historyguy.com/uss_cole.htm> (11 January 2003).

¹⁴ Admiral J. Paul Reason with David G. Freymann, Sailing New Seas (Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1998), 9.

¹⁵ Bruce A. Stubbs, The U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.: US Coast Guard Headquarters (G-), 2000), 53.

¹⁶ U.S. Coast Guard, Sea Marshal Escort Program, 3.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 5.

¹⁹ Wayne P. Hughes, "Take the Small Boat Threat Seriously," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 126 (October 2000), 104.

²⁰ Bruce A. Stubbs, U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role, 45.

²¹ Irving H. King, George Washington's Coast Guard, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1978), 15.

²² Jeffrey D. Simon, U.S. Countermeasures Against International Terrorism, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, March 1990), 3.

²³ Neil D. Ruenzel, "Searching for Relevance", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 128 (October 2002), 58. Author believes the Coast Guard does a poor job both selling itself to the public and in fighting for funds in the Congressional battlefield. He feels the service waits in the background and accepts whatever scraps are leftover; service is supported by an extremely weak lobby.

²⁴ CONPLAN, 4-5.

- ²⁵ Eric A. Ensign, Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea 1920-1933 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, January 2001), 62. The Rum Wars took place following the inactment of prohibition. They involved the interdiction and confiscation of illegally imported alcoholic beverages. The Coast Guard played a significant role tracking and interdicting illegal smugglers at sea.
- ²⁶ Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism Understanding the New Security Environment, (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003), 301.
- ²⁷ Ernest W. Lefever, "The Essential CIA", The American Legion, 154 (January 2003), 37.
- ²⁸ Todd Datz, "Integrating America", CIO Magazine, 01 December 2002, CIO Media, Lexis-Nexis. (05 December 2002)
- ²⁹ Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000), 187.
- ³⁰ CONPLAN, 15.
- ³¹ The Coast Guard's chain of command goes from Headquarters to Area Commands (2) to District Commands (9). Beneath Districts are the Groups, Air Stations, cutters, small boat stations, and all other units.
- ³² Bruce B. Stubbs, U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role, 204.
- ³³ Vice Admiral James Hull, "Brokering the Coast Guard's Resources", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 128 (December 2002), 46.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, 48.
- ³⁶ Otto Kreisher, Sea Power.
- ³⁷ The combatant commander issue is beyond the purview of this paper, but a short summary is worth mentioning. There are two distinct echelons in providing direct protection to the United States, homeland security and homeland defense. In homeland security, the Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for all maritime issues and it is in this realm that America is most vulnerable with its many miles of coastline and 350 ports. The DOD will act in a supporting role. In homeland defense, the roles are reversed with DOD (NORTHCOM) being supported by the Coast Guard. In combating the terror war, homeland security is a permanent mission requiring a permanent command. On the other had, homeland defense is a mission activated only on a temporary basis and in response to a sustained threat such as tanks coming across the Mexican border or enemy paratroopers landing in Chicago. The terrorist modus operandi does not lend itself well to the homeland defense mission. Typically, combatant commanders require time to build up forces prior to mounting a military response. Terrorist attacks occur immediately, with little warning, and are not sustained. Homeland security provides the best C2 mechanism for deterrence and response against terrorist attacks. Due to the permanent nature of this mission, the combatant commander should lie within the Department of Homeland Security. Since the mission of homeland defense is temporary and the opportunity for NORTHCOM to act in a supported role remote, that command should be activated as a Joint Task Force when required. Although this proposed system may anger many DOD traditionalists, the terrorist threat requires constant attention. That continuous attention and ability to direct immediate action can only be provided by agencies within homeland security. Unlike homeland security, homeland defense is not an incessant mission requiring constant monitoring.
- ³⁸ Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000), 220.
- ³⁹ Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 1 January 2002), 54. The Coast Guard's first doctrinal publication attempting to define what the Coast Guard is and what it does. It provides a sound history lesson. Future publications should address procedural issues more specifically while also providing more common direction for the Coast Guard.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 40.
- ⁴¹ In the Coast Guard, 'Industry' is used to describe personnel who work for any aspect of the commercial maritime shipping or drilling industries.
- ⁴² Bruce B. Stubbs, America's Coast Guard, 48.
- ⁴³ Admiral J. Paul Reason with David G. Freymann, 21.
- ⁴⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, 10 September, 2001), II-17.
- ⁴⁵ Bruce B. Stubbs, U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role, 183.
- ⁴⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, (Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, 13 January, 1999), II-1.
- ⁴⁷ Vice Admiral James Hull, 46.
- ⁴⁸ Bruce B. Stubbs, America's Coast Guard, 39.
- ⁴⁹ James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Volume VI, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897), 142.

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