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IN AN AGE OF AMERICAN DOMINANCE
DOES THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP MATTER?¹

Marten van Heuven

THE QUESTION

This question consists of three elements: The first is America, and the phenomenon of American dominance. The second is Europe, which I define broadly as including Ukraine and Russia. The remaining element is how these two entities interact. But the exercise of American dominance is changing, and so is Europe. Thus, we are looking at two moving targets, and the relationship between them.

APPROACH

The approach will be to note those elements that have not changed, to identify what has, and to conclude with an assessment.

During the Cold War, the transatlantic relationship was at the heart of the Western effort to deal with the threat of Soviet communism. It was the key to ultimate Western success. The United States had a vital interest in keeping Europe from being dominated by a hostile state. It became the leader of the effort to counter Soviet encroachment, as it had been in defeating Hitler Germany. To Europeans in Western Europe, the transatlantic link meant security that was vital to their freedom, reconstruction, and welfare. To many Europeans behind the Iron Curtain the transatlantic relationship was a promise for the future. The fabric of the relationship was reinforced by broadly shared values of democracy and human rights. With their vital interests at stake, and limited ability to protect them, Europeans accepted American leadership mostly without question. Thus, the transatlantic relationship mattered, both to the United States and to Europe .

¹ This annotated paper was the basis for an address to the International Affairs Forum, Traverse City, Michigan, on November 21, 2002. Marten van Heuven is a Senior Consultant at RAND and a Director of the Atlantic Council of the United States. These are the personal views of the author and do not reflect those of RAND or of the Atlantic Council. The draft benefited from comments by colleagues Robert A. Levine and David A. Ochmanek of RAND, Stanley R. Sloan of the Atlantic Community Initiative, and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN DOMINANCE

On the face of it, the notion of American dominance is pretty straightforward and familiar. In our lifetime, we have been used to seeing our country strong.² We are comfortable with the thought that the United States plays a leading role in the world to promote freedom, democracy, market economies, social justice, and human dignity.³

Dominance, however, has acquired a number of synonyms: superpower, hegemon, hyperpower. Some speak of American empire. Not all these labels are complimentary. Some are explicitly critical. And the criticism does not come only from abroad. Commentator Thomas Friedman writes: "But lately, I sense, coming from the Pentagon, a certain degree of imperial contempt for the rest of the world, especially the Arab-Muslim world. It is not healthy."⁴

The notion of imperialism conjures up other empires. There — the United Nations, the World Bank, NATO, the World Trade Organization — are based on charters and operate with rules that bear a heavy American imprint. Rome's empire, however, was the real thing, characterized by use of force, occupation, colonization, and satellites. The United States, in contrast, does not rule. It shrinks from mastery. It prefers access to ownership. It counts on the allure of the American way of life. American presidents are not emperors; they are elected for a term or two at most. They exercise power with the other branches of government.⁵

So American empire, if that is what we have, is unique. The original and ultimate aspiration of the American experiment has been freedom. Moreover, from the outset, the Pilgrims viewed their new country as directed by divine providence, as a shining city on the hill, a beacon for all mankind, a new

² Though we have been less sure how to use this dominance. See Richard N. Haass, "What To Do With American Primacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September-October 1999), p. 37. Moreover, power is an elusive concept: "On the one hand --- American power is now less fungible and effective than it might first appear. On the other, the United States is likely to remain preponderant well into the next century." Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (July-August 1999), p. 27.

³ The notion of dominance also illuminates occasional absence of leadership. See Norbert Walter, "Bush abdicates America's global leadership role," *International Herald Tribune*, August 29, 2002, p. 7.

⁴ Friedman goes on to say: "There is too much criticism-with-contempt oozing from the Pentagon, which, unfortunately, has become the voice of America lately. It feels as if America does not have a rounded foreign policy anymore, only a defense policy." Thomas L. Friedman, "Pentagon contempt is hurting the cause," *International Herald Tribune*, October 3, 2002, p. 5. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's reference to America being "the indispensable nation" correctly pointed to the fact that without the United States, global initiatives are unlikely to succeed. Her description of America "standing taller" than other countries, however, has been taken by some as overbearing, though it was probably meant to describe the fact that Washington as the target of many demands from all corners of the world has a better global overview.

⁵ See Andrew J. Bacevich, "New Rome, New Jerusalem," *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. XXVI, Number 3, Summer 2002, p. 50.

Jerusalem. Over the years, the new Jerusalem also became the new Rome, in the sense that America's growing relations with the world were also driven by self-interest. Americans were finding that only by protecting the freedom of other countries could America guarantee its own well-being. By the time of President Wilson, American policymakers saw no distinction between American ideals — thought to be universal — and American interests, which became increasingly global.⁶ Once the smoke of World War II cleared, a "plain fact defined international politics: One nation with its own particular sense of how the world should operate stood like a colossus astride the globe."⁷ The fall of Soviet communism left the United States as the world's sole superpower.

Being a superpower, however, comes at a price. No one likes a hegemonic state, even a benign one. United States policy played a major role in coping — and then removing — the threat of Soviet communism. Yet I vividly remember the European peace marchers and the opposition to the deployment in NATO Europe of intermediate range ballistic missiles to counter the threat posed by Soviet SS-20s. "Ami go home" was never the policy of any free European country, but it was scribbled on many a European wall, for all to see.

Moreover, while there is substantial domestic support for the proposition of American global leadership, there are limits to the cost Americans are willing to bear. The \$48 billion dollar increase in next year's defense budget will be just a start.⁸ America's leaders will be required to make a sustained effort to explain that peacekeeping and the preservation of stability in key regions of the world are in America's interest and worth supporting. But even with such an effort, the issue of burden-sharing will not go away. Americans want to see a contribution by other countries and peoples, who profit from the security and stability provided by a United States-led effort. Furthermore, it is a matter for debate whether Americans have lost the stomach for sacrifice. I do not agree with the view that, after Mogadishu, America can only contemplate military action without significant casualties. If the president explains convincingly why the United States must risk casualties, the American public is likely to tolerate casualties for the right cause. But Vietnam demonstrated that, ultimately, any military action overseas that does not enjoy broad political support at home is not sustainable.

Personally, I like the description of American power by Joe Nye, now the Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard.⁹ He sees American power as distributed on

⁶Bacevich, p. 53.

⁷ These are the words of Andrew Bacevich. His views are explained in greater detail in *American Empire: Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, to be published imminently by Harvard University Press.

⁸ See Max Boot, "American hegemony will be expensive," *International Herald Tribune*, October 15, 2002, p. 6.

⁹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (July-August 1999), p. 24. Nye concludes that the United States is a preponderant, not a

a three-tiered chessboard, but distributed differently at each level. At the military level, the United States is paramount. At the economic level, the United States exerts power, along with the European Union (EU), China, and Japan. At the third level, Americans are part of a fabric of cross-border transactions that no government controls: transfer of information, terrorist traffic in weapons, financial transactions, cultural events. This picture drives home the point that American power is relative, not absolute.

While American dominance has entered political discourse only recently, the United States has often thrown its weight around. In the nineteenth century, the westward expansion of the country gradually replaced British, French, and Spanish influence, by a mix of diplomacy, money, and the use of military force, all buttressed by the belief in manifest destiny. Early in the twentieth century, the United States replaced Spain in the Caribbean and in the Philippines. In Europe, American forces made a crucial difference in World War I. In World War II, the United States led the effort to defeat Nazi Germany in Europe and Japan in the Pacific. America headed the United Nations coalition that reestablished the security of South Korea. The United States was the undisputed leader in the fight against Soviet communism. American diplomacy provided the key to German unification. Though today's focus on American dominance is new, I tend to think that, in relative terms, the United States was more powerful in 1945 than it is today. So there has been no significant change; the possession of power by the United States has been a fact for a long time. Moreover, American power is likely to last well into the present century.¹⁰

THE USE OF AMERICAN DOMINANCE.

What has changed, however, is the use of American dominance.

First of all, America faces a different threat environment. New and acute is the threat of terrorism, where the enemy is not a state but a shadowy and loose group of persons, capable and willing even to kill themselves as they inflict harm on others.¹¹ This phenomenon is global.

dominant, power. In doing so, he illuminates, perhaps inadvertently, the point that feelings about American power have less to do with the possession by the United States of power than by the way the United States exercises its power.

¹⁰ "The United States will continue to be a major force in the world community. U.S. global economic, technological, military, and diplomatic influence will be unparalleled among nations as well as international organizations in 2015. This power not only will insure America's preeminence, but also will cast the United States as a key driver of the international system." *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts*, National Intelligence Council, NIC 2000-02, December 2000, p. 12.

¹¹ Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk is said to have remarked once that at any time of the day or night, two thirds of the people in the world are awake, and some of them are up to no good.

Another change is heightened awareness of the threat of weapons of mass destruction. To make things worse, we are now also at risk of cyber terrorism, which could inflict serious damage to the communications and financial infrastructure on which our society has come to depend. The American government also faces the issue of nuclear proliferation on an unprecedented scale, and is forced to consider new ways of countering this phenomenon. These problems, moreover, are all global in nature.

The world community faces the additional problem of failed states. As we have seen in Albania and Somalia, failed states produce regional instability. Moreover, they can become a haven for terrorism. This, too, is a global problem.

Generally, the world faces more instability in the years ahead. In the words of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, "The Caucasus, Central Asia, Northern Africa and the Middle East all offer a rich current and potential cocktail of instability."¹² Instability begets spillover, as people seek to escape areas of conflict and seek to move to other countries, legally or illegally. This is also a global problem.

Second, after a post-Cold War decade of unsatisfactory attempts to define the era and America's role in the world,¹³ the administration has articulated a new strategy.¹⁴ The strategy has not yet earned a brand label, but the essence calls for American assertiveness abroad to strengthen democracy, human dignity, and economic growth through free markets and free trade. It questions the utility of arms control agreements. It calls for enduring American military supremacy.¹⁵ Furthermore, it declares that the United States will take preemptive military action in cases where its vital interests are regarded as in danger. Finally, it looks for support from the international community but makes clear that the United States will not be hampered by international opinion to do what it considers necessary in its own interests. Capturing the essence of the new strategy, the President has explained that "the U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that

¹² In a speech in Brussels on October 3, 2002, entitled "NATO: A Vision for 2012."

¹³ Various terms have been suggested to replace the doctrine of containment and describe "the new world order": assertive multilateralism, democratic engagement, enlargement, epoch of mutualism. None, however, captured the imagination of the American people and none gained political currency.

¹⁴ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, Washington, D.C., September 17, 2002. The document pulls together the substance of several speeches made by President George W. Bush. Together, they add up to a blueprint of the current administration. The difference between this strategy and that pursued by the Clinton administration is less sharp than might appear. Some elements were already discernible before the current administration took office. What is different, though, is the threat perception after 9/11.

¹⁵ "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, p. 30.

reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.”¹⁶ The new security strategy is also clear on the importance of Europe: “There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.”¹⁷

Finally, there has been a change in style with which Washington deals with other countries, and with European countries in particular. The change has been evolutionary. In the Balkan crisis, Washington, even while undecided whether to get involved, denigrated European efforts to cope with the crisis.¹⁸ The British, French, and German participants at the Dayton conference came away feeling that they had been shut out from any meaningful role.¹⁹ The Kosovo campaign was conducted with vigorous American input, though the complications of the targeting process still rile Pentagon officials. The Bush administration, while preaching the virtues of humility in dealing with other nations, took a number of policy decisions that were not only badly received in much of Europe, but were announced in a way that left European officials increasingly apprehensive about the course of American policy.²⁰

THE NEW EUROPE

Now let me turn to the other part of the transatlantic relationship. Europe can be defined variously in geographic, political, religious, or cultural terms. For the purposes of our discussion, I shall assume that Europe denotes all members, or would-be members, of NATO and of the European Union (EU), including Russia and Ukraine.

Some things about Europe will not change. European history, culture, industrial capacity, inventiveness, and educational level constitute the essence of Europe. European values, political thinking, and sense of human rights parallel those in America. They create strong and enduring links. In population

¹⁶ *National Security Strategy*, p. 1.

¹⁷ *National Security Strategy*, p. 25.

¹⁸ A case in point is the death by faint praise, which the Clinton administration administered to the plan designed by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary David Owen for the division of Bosnia.

¹⁹ For the views of the negotiations by the lead American negotiator, see Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War*, Random House, New York, 1998. For the views of the British lead negotiator, see Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, “Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia,” *Survival*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Winter 1996-97), p. 45.

²⁰ This apprehension has also been reflected on this side of the Atlantic. “The Bush administration has promoted this war {on Iraq} with something less than a punctilious regard for fact, or, for that matter, tact. It implied a non-existent connection between Al Qaeda and Saddam. It suggested the imminence of an Iraqi nuclear capability that is hardly imminent. It shredded international law and precedent by asserting that it can do whatever it wants in the name of self-defense. This is not a doctrine, it’s an impulse.” Richard Cohen in *The Washington Post*, as reprinted in the *International Herald Tribune*, September 27, 2002, p. 8.

and the size of its economy, Europe is on a par with the United States. Mutual trade and investment are at record levels. European firms are a significant source of employment for Americans, and vice versa.

Other things in Europe, however, have changed. The end of the Cold War has led to greater independence of Europe from the United States. Secure and prosperous as never before, Europe has turned mostly inward, paradoxically just as global challenges elsewhere have started to preoccupy the United States. European feelings that it can stand on its own feet has led in some quarters to the belief that Europe should be a counterweight to the United States. Nonetheless, all European governments continue to set great store on their relationships with the United States.

Despite all the talk about member countries ceding sovereignty to the EU, Europe today is much like what it has been since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, a collection of states. Even as the significance of nonstate actors is growing, this situation is likely to persist. In NATO, member states have undertaken common commitments to safeguard their security, but have retained their national prerogative to decide how. In the EU, there has been significant pooling of national competence in certain areas, notably trade, the new Euro currency, and interest rate policy. Furthermore, a limited group of EU countries has agreed, in the so-called Schengen accord, to a common border. But foreign, defense, fiscal, and economic policies remain firmly under national control.

NATO

The organization that most vividly personifies the transatlantic relationship is NATO. But persistent questions are heard whether the alliance remains relevant now that the Soviet threat has disappeared. Yet NATO has been adapting. It has helped keep the peace in Bosnia. It has waged war in Kosovo. It has provided stability in Macedonia. Significantly, it has been the vehicle for a cooperative relationship with Russia. It remains a unique venue for organized consultations among its members and with candidate members on security and other issues, including nuclear proliferation and terrorism. NATO maintains an integrated military command structure; it has also been providing opportunities for the militaries of its members and the so-called Partnership for Peace countries to cooperate and train together. The United States has been the leading member of NATO. NATO, in turn, has been the organizational foundation for the American security presence in Europe.

The question of NATO's relevance remains on the table, however. The addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members added to NATO territory, but also raised the question whether a larger alliance can continue to function and protect all its members the way the old alliance has. NATO's

enlargement to twenty-six countries — being consummated as I speak — raises the same question.

Moreover, NATO as such has not been America's preferred choice for military engagements out of the NATO area.²¹ In the Gulf war, Washington used a coalition of the willing. In Afghanistan, Washington, in effect, turned down a NATO offer to help. Washington's preferences have been driven by a number of factors. One is the experience with the difficulties of "target selection by committee" in Kosovo. Another factor is the inability of the European NATO members to provide significant forces and capabilities outside the European area of operations.²² A third may be that Washington does not want to tie its hands with allies who may not agree, either on the nature of the threat or on the appropriate response. As to the Europeans, they are torn between the desire to participate as fully as possible in any NATO operation, and the apprehension of being part of a process that, because of American dominance, they cannot control. Recently, driving through Vermont's capital, Montpelier, I found myself behind a truck which carried a bumper sticker. It read: "Get in, sit down, shut up, hold on." That's how I image some of our European allies must feel at times.

European Union

The organization that increasingly represents Europe is the EU. The United States is not a member. Nonetheless, the United States interacts intensively with the EU, at many levels. Washington maintains a diplomatic mission to the EU in Brussels; conversely, the European Commission has a mission in Washington. Twice a year, representatives of the outgoing and incoming EU presidencies and EU officials meet with the American president. A so-called transatlantic dialogue has been the framework for a multifaceted dialogue on a list of issues, though the length of the list has distracted from any sense of

²¹ This may be changing. "Donald Rumsfeld's Pentagon ruthlessly excluded NATO forces from the war in Afghanistan and has been deeply skeptical about whether the alliance still has a value beyond political symbolism and Balkan peacekeeping. — [But] inside the Bush administration — a consensus is growing that the United States needs help from NATO in Iraq and was wrong to turn away allies in Afghanistan." Jackson Diehl, "NATO's future is at stake," *International Herald Tribune*, September 17, 2002, p. 4. For a European call for the transformation of NATO into a global alliance, see Bronislav Geremek, Jacques Lanxade, Peter Mandelson, Margarita Mathiopoulos, and Klaus Naumann, "A global future for a balanced NATO," *International Herald Tribune*, June 6, 2002, p. 4. For contrasting American and European views about the future of NATO, see Stanley Sloan and Peter van Ham, "What future for NATO?" *Centre for European Reform*, Working Paper, October 2002.

²² A proposed remedy is a so-called Response Force, made up of units that are equipped with precision munitions and integrated information systems, and that have trained together. See "New Capabilities: Transforming NATO Forces," The Atlantic Council of the United States, Policy Paper, September 2002. At the time of this writing, it appears that the administration will propose such a course at the NATO summit meeting in Prague in November. See Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, "Europeans should say 'yes' to Rumsfeld," *International Herald Tribune*, October 24, 2002, p. 4.

priorities. In contrast, the interface on trade issues has had a high profile. Steel tariffs are but the latest example.

On foreign policy issues, the EU has both a Commissioner for External Affairs and a High Representative for External Relations and Common Security, presently the highly capable former Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana. Nonetheless, decision-making in these areas remains firmly in national hands.²³ As a result, Washington continues to deal on foreign and defense issues, as it must, with national capitals. This arrangement is congenial both to the United States and to the governments of the large EU countries. It sits less well, however, with the other European countries, who are concerned that this leaves them out of the loop.

The ability of the EU to act for Europe in the fields of foreign and defense policy is hampered by two factors. One is that on major issues, key European countries often don't agree. This was evident throughout the Balkan crisis. More recently, it was illuminated sharply by the public position of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder that Germany would not participate under any circumstances in military action against Iraq, even as the United Kingdom was advocating precisely such action. The other can be captured in one word, namely, capabilities. At present, good intentions to the contrary, EU countries are not able now to field significant forces for global tasks out of the European area. To do so would require major budgetary commitments. These are not likely to be forthcoming. Moreover, with few exceptions, the gap between the capabilities of American and European forces is growing, making combined operations increasingly impractical.

There is another problem. The decision to enlarge the EU by another ten members will create a community of twenty-five states. The method by which the EU reaches decisions will have to be entirely revamped. Moreover, there is no clarity yet on how much larger the EU should become eventually. For now, Turkey has been told to wait. Moreover, the positions of Ukraine and Russia with respect to the EU are wide open.

Underlying all these issues is a basic question. It relates to the nature of the EU. Will it be a confederation of countries that share decision-making? Or will it become a true federation, in which national states pool sovereignty to be exercised by an international bureaucracy under some form of elected European parliamentary control. A constitutional convention is currently under way in Brussels under the chairmanship of former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. By 2004, EU countries are scheduled to reach fundamental decisions. It would not surprise me if this timetable slipped. Transatlantic

²³ The EU tries to speak with one voice, and does so on some issues that represent the lowest common denominator. On key issues, however, they are often far apart.

relations with a European entity that is redefining itself so fundamentally will put a premium on American patience and imagination.

Key European Countries

Under present circumstances, therefore, Washington will be dealing with European countries individually, or in groups, on many transatlantic issues. Five large European countries stand out, with a sixth--Turkey--in the unsure position of being a member of NATO but not scheduled to join the EU any time soon. Moreover, patterns are shifting.

The United Kingdom has been a solid member of NATO but has been ambivalent about the EU. It has not adopted the Euro. London, traditionally, has seen itself as an interlocutor between continental Europe and Washington. Germany, following unification, has pushed for a federal EU but has begun to take independent steps in foreign policy. France, in its quest for influence and a special role, long counted on French-German cooperation to drive the EU forward, but now seems more intent to do so by itself within the EU. Italy and Spain are increasingly influential in EU councils. They are located closer to possible future areas of tension and conflict in the Middle East and the Gulf. France and Italy have also tended toward an active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, despite the fact that on occasion their initiatives have been at cross-purposes with those of the United States.

Russia

Russia is a crucial partner in the transatlantic relationship.²⁴ During the Cold War, the threat of Soviet communism was the glue that held the West and NATO together. Now, the relationship has changed drastically; a weakened Russia is turning to the West. NATO's relationship with Russia is one of cooperation. It is institutionalized in the new NATO-Russia Council. Washington maintains an active relationship with Moscow on key issues, such as the reduction of nuclear weapons, safeguarding fissile material, export controls, and missile defense. European countries have also intensified trade with, and assistance to, Russia, though the pattern remains haphazard. The stakes are high. Russia is a major supplier of energy to Europe. Because of its location and size, even a benign Russia is a factor her western partners must reckon with. A Russia with renewed vigor and intent upon establishing dominance in its large neighborhood would be a strategic challenge to the West.

²⁴ For a recent call for the establishment of a genuine trilateral partnership between Russia, Europe and the United States, see "The Twain Shall Meet: The Prospect for Russia-West Relations," *The Atlantic Council of the United States*, the *Centre for European Reform*, and the *Russian Academy of Sciences*, Policy Paper, 2002. But Henry Kissinger warns that the proliferation of NATO members and institutions threatens to dissolve the alliance into a multilateral mishmash. Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* Simon & Schuster, New York, 2002, p. 44.

For President Vladimir Putin's Russia, the transatlantic relationship matters.

A TENTATIVE ANSWER

What insights emerge from a situation of transatlantic estrangement, in which the United States sees its principal challenges elsewhere than in Europe, and is disposed to exercise dominance, and Europe is preoccupied getting its new and larger house in order, and is unable to exercise military power outside its area?²⁵

The many transatlantic links underline the value of strong transatlantic relations. Also, the suggestions for recalibrating the balance are on the mark: Europeans should take on a larger share of global tasks, and America should be more forthcoming in sharing decision-making.²⁶

It seems to me that the crux of the matter lies in the idea of Europe whole and free. This goal, articulated by an American president a decade ago, was thought to be achieved by the fall of communism, the rebirth of a western-oriented Russia, German unification and, now, the incorporation of many new members into NATO and the EU. These momentous changes have seemed to suggest that America could turn its attention elsewhere.

I submit that the fruits of this gigantic strategic achievement are just beginning to ripen. The transatlantic vineyard will need more careful tending before it can count on a rich crop. With Europe now whole and free, this is not the time for America to turn away. Instead, America has to use its imagination to leverage its global dominance by working with the new Europe to meet the global challenges ahead.

Europeans will welcome an American approach that draws them in, makes them part of the process, and gives them the opportunity for effective input. Continued American involvement with and in Europe will provide not just physical and political security, it will also help mitigate the many differences

²⁵ For a recital of the issues on which the United States and Europe have parted ways, see Jessica T. Matthews, "Estranged Partners," *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2001, p. 48. An additional complicating factor is that Europe "is confused, uneasy and uncertain about what Washington really intends." Flora Lewis, "U.S. foreign policy confuses allies," *International Herald Tribune*, March 16-17, p. 8.

²⁶ These suggestions are explained in *America and Europe, A Partnership for a New Era*, David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee (eds.), RAND, 1997. Elsewhere, Gompert draws attention to the "cumulative effects of post-cold war divergence in strategic outlooks, disparity in global responsibilities, and differences in domestic socioeconomic priorities," and notes that the European experience in coping with terrorism makes the case for transatlantic cooperation against terrorism, calling for "a new political bargain" that "should assuage both U.S. concerns about European shirking and European concerns about U.S. unilateralism." "Treat Europe as a Full Partner, and It Will Be," *RAND Review*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 27 and 28.

among Europeans which, in the absence of the United States, could make European agreement on key issues hard to reach.

For America, the advantages are obvious. The United States would avoid bearing the burdens, the costs, the risks, and the political opprobrium alone. Working with the new Europe would give strength to American ideals, forge stronger policies, and lay the basis for a constructive global role enjoying a broad basis of international support. America can get real help in coping with the new challenges of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

SOME QUESTIONS FOR AMERICANS

The approach that I suggest, however, requires that Americans ask themselves some basic questions.²⁷

Do we see ourselves as a shining city on the hill, now forced to defend ourselves against potential evildoers, or as global activists who seek to spread the advantages of freedom, democracy, market economies, and human dignity?

What approach do we favor: Reliance on military power to deter and defeat potential enemies to our way of life, or the strengthening of institutional norms and standards of global behavior?

Finally, do we accept that, in relationships between states, as between individuals, common tasks require accommodation to the interests and perspectives of others?²⁸

²⁷ Henry Kissinger has his own questions: "What, for our survival, must we seek to prevent no matter how painful the means? What, to be true to ourselves, must we try to accomplish no matter how small the attainable international consensus, and, if necessary, entirely on our own? What wrongs is it essential that we right? What goals are simply beyond our capacity?" (p. 31 of *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*).

²⁸ In a letter to alumni of the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University, dated October 28, 2002, Dean Joseph S. Nye, Jr., states: "The need for international cooperation is great, and the costs of 'getting it wrong' are tremendous, both in terms of loss of life and dissolution of international goodwill." Stanley Sloan sees three possible scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations. A worst case is a grudging "marriage of convenience." A middle road would be a course of continuity and adaptation. The third possibility might be to grow the relationship into a closer cooperation community. "NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Crisis Continuity or Change? Headline Series, *Foreign Policy Association*, No. 324, Fall 2002.