

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE LONG TERM PLANNING PROCESS – A UNIQUE APPROACH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
OF FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE

by

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ABSTRACT

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This Strategy Research Project (SRP) has an aim to describe the long term planning process for the development of future structure of the Slovak armed forces. The aim is to describe the key features that made Slovakia's approach unique and that could in a general sense inspire planners of other countries. A very important step was an independent external defense assessment and defense review conducted by US and NATO teams. The subsequent assistance of Cubic Applications, Inc. (CAI) in the long term planning process was also critical. The output of the long term planning process was a set of strategic documents that included "The Military Strategy Of The Slovak Republic", "The Organizational Structure Of The Ministry Of Defense Of The Slovak Republic", "The Armed Forces Of The Slovak Republic – Model 2010" and "The Long-term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic."

The next important aspect was the planning structure of the long term planning process that included all elements of the Slovak military, as well as advisors from the US, UK, Germany, and France.

The planning methodology used an agreement on risk as a key to solving the force sizing problem along with rigorous cost analysis, and a focus on NATO requirements/interoperability. The next most important aspect of the long term planning process was understanding that implementation of the long-term plan will require a multi-year resource planning system with resource commitments.

My SRP did not describe the output of long term planning process "the future structure of armed forces" nor the details of the accompanying reform programs. Instead, this research focuses on explaining the process of undertaking major defense reform and some special features of the process.

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PREFACE

This Strategy Research Project (SRP) has an aim to describe the long term planning process for the development of future structure of the Slovak armed forces. The aim is to describe the key features that made Slovakia's approach unique and that could in a general sense inspire planners of other countries. A very important step was an independent external defense assessment and defense review conducted by US and NATO teams. The subsequent assistance of Cubic Applications, Inc. (CAI) in the long term planning process was also critical.

The output of the long term planning process was a set of strategic documents that included "The Military Strategy Of The Slovak Republic", "The Organizational Structure Of The Ministry Of Defense Of The Slovak Republic", "The Armed Forces Of The Slovak Republic – Model 2010" and "The Long-term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic."

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THE LONG TERM PLANNING PROCESS – A UNIQUE APPROACH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE

The Slovak Republic got an invitation to join NATO at the November 2002 summit in Prague. In comparison with other aspirants and even with the three new members, the Slovak Republic received very positive evaluation of its planning process and its result *“The Armed Forces of the SR – Model 2010”*.

In my SRP I will describe the key features that made Slovakia’s approach unique and that could in a general sense inspire planners of other countries.

Recently, Slovakia celebrated the 10th anniversary of its existence. The Slovak Republic was established on 1 January 1993 after a peaceful split of the former Czechoslovakia. The Army of the SR has undergone great change since this time. It has downsized, accepted responsibility for military bases and equipment throughout the country, and concurrently sustained an operational combat force—both Ground and Air. The Army of the SR inherited former Warsaw Pact legacy organizations, equipment, doctrine, and management systems. This legacy creates a number of problems as the Army of the SR seeks to become compatible and interoperable with Western doctrine and concepts. Because of the objective to achieve an invitation for NATO membership in 2002, it was important to adapt fundamental strategy, doctrine, organizational, and operational concepts to that end.

The new Slovak government elected in 1998 was interested in defense reform. As a result it “opened the door” for independent defense assessments and defense review with the aim to define main problems areas and recommend priority of transformation of armed forces and all defense systems.

All those studies confirmed the severity of the problems of the Army of the SR. Faced with this reality a major initiative was begun to restructure and reform the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. An intensive planning effort was initiated in March 2001.

THE UGLY DUCKLING – NEW COUNTRY IN THE MIDDLE OF EUROPE.

The “velvet” revolution in 1989 brought new possibilities and challenges for people in Czechoslovakia: freedom, democracy, the rule of law and the hope for a better life. But, it brought something more as well. For the Slovak nation it was also a historical possibility to create its own state and govern itself after a thousand years under Hungarian repression and seventy years of unequal life in a common state with the Czechs. On 1 of January 1993 two new countries appeared on the map of Europe. The Czech Republic that played the role of successor of the democratic Czechoslovakia that existed between the first and second World

Wars, the successor of the anti-communistic uprising in 1968 and the successor of all democratic changes in 1989. The Czech Republic was and has been automatically associated with the former Czechoslovakia in terms of democracy and progress. On the other side there was a second new country, Slovakia – the ugly duckling of Europe. From the beginning of its existence Slovakia was associated with nationalism and poor democracy. And something more. The peaceful divorce of the Czechs and Slovaks could become a very dangerous precedent for minority nations in Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy and others. There were not a lot fans of this new state. This situation became more critical after election in 1994 when an autocratic leader, Vladimir Meciar, in coalition with nationalist party formed a government.

What was the situation in the Slovak military? The Slovak Army was created from 1/3 of the former Czechoslovak army. Historically, the majority of the combat forces of Czechoslovak army were located in the Czech part of republic, on the border with NATO. Ministry of Defense, General Staff and the main Headquarters were there. In the Slovak part there were mainly military schools, logistic depots, and hospitals. After the split of Czechoslovakia there were a lot of tasks and challenges facing the Slovak military. The new state had to create a Ministry of Defense and main Headquarters, move forces from the Czech part of the republic, and perform many other related tasks. From the beginning, there were attempts to modernize and to westernize the Slovak Army in order to become a member of NATO. The Meciar governments between 1994 to 1998 were significant time period for the Slovak military. The Minister of Defense, Mr. Jan Sitek, as a member of the Slovak government, led the Slovak Army toward NATO and in the same time as a member of the Slovak national party signed a petition against NATO membership and supported Slovak neutrality. This schizophrenic situation culminated in 1997 when Slovakia was refused from the “first wave” of NATO’s enlargement.

An election in 1998 brought new opportunity. Pro-western oriented parties defeat Meciar and created a coalition. The new government clearly stated its aim to reform the armed forces and become a member of NATO.

The Government will carry out the reform of the armed forces, continue their modernization and the establishment of units capable of autonomous action. It will make the structure of the ranks of armed forces more efficient and create ground forces and air force. It will reduce the number of members of the Army of the Slovak Republic with the perspective of gradual increase in professionalism and reduction of the basic military service to nine months. The Government will adopt measures to gradually improve the quality and intensity of military training.¹

But the new Minister of Defense, Mr. Pavol Kanis, was a member of the Party of the democratic left, the former Communist party. He promoted a lot of former communists to top positions in the Ministry of Defense. This caused new tensions. The Minister’s first and last

result was the document *“The Concept Of Reform Ministry Of Defense Until 2002 With Outlook To 2010”* approved by Slovak government in September 1999. This document started real change in the Slovak military, decreasing the number of personnel, creating land forces and air forces HQ, and most importantly relocated the General Staff from Trenčín to Bratislava (distance 120km) with the intention to integrate it with the Ministry of Defense.

A rumor about an independent assessment of defense conducted by the US government and an economical affair of the Minister of Defense caused an exchange on his post. The new minister, Mr. Jozef Stank, former ambassador to the Czech Republic, intensified the reform processes. He fully used the US government’s assistance in the planning process and was personally involved in it. His effort was successful and the Slovak Republic received an invitation for NATO membership at the Prague Summit in 2002.

COULD ASSESSMENTS LEAD TO THE FALL OF THE MINISTER?

The “Open Door” policy of the new government (after the 1998 election) brought a lot of teams from different countries with the aim to help the Slovak military, conduct an independent defense assessment and defense review and identify main problem areas and recommend priorities for transforming the armed forces and the whole defense system.

The most important were:

- The Army of the Slovak Republic combat capabilities evaluation – 1999,
- “C4 Study” completed by the US Air Force in July of 2000
- Defense reform study of the Slovak Republic – June 2000 by Major General Garrett of the US Department of Defense (Garrett study),
- Defense review of the Slovak Republic – January 2001 by Cubic Applications, Inc. (Cubic’s Defense review),
- Review of the management structure and administration of the MOD and GS – 2000 conducted by the United Kingdom, and referred to as the (Clarke Study),
- Assessment of Partnership for Peace Program – January 2001 conducted by NATO.

All those studies confirmed the severity of the problems facing the Army of the SR. Three of them had a direct impact on intensifying the reform effort.

The most significant was the Garrett’s study. It was the first complex study conducted by the US government. The findings and recommendations represented the official opinion of the US government. The Garrett Study primarily focused on *“The Concept Of Reform Ministry Of Defense Until 2002 With Outlook To 2010”* and compared this with the real status of forces. The main Garrett statement about “hollow forces”² became a tool used by opposition parties against the government and by some coalition partners against the Minister of Defense. They said that it

is the result of new government and particularly of a new Minister of Defense. The Garrett Study's assessment and its recommendations opened up discussion in the broad security and defense society and created the environment necessary for real reform of the security and defense system.

Based on, the Garrett Study, the Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic requested assistance in March 2000 from the US DOD to provide services necessary to plan and support Slovak defense modernization efforts. The US Department of Defense selected Cubic Applications, Inc. (CAI) to provide this support. This assistance was planned in three phases. The first Phase of this effort was initiated in September of 2000, consisted of a "top-to-bottom" assessment of the current defense posture within the Slovak Republic.³ Its principal focus was to address the current status, practices, legislation, regulations and policies, and to provide prioritized recommendations. As requested by the Minister of Defense, this Defense Review should be "build" on:

- The Garrett study,
- "Clarke Study;"
- and a "C4 Study".

The second phase was to help Slovak military experts to create a "Long Term Plan" for the implementation of approved recommendations of Cubic's *"Defense Review"*. The third phase was to help implement the "Long Term Plan". The contract was signed by the General Director of Defense policy and Defense planning for a period of five years.

Result of the first phase was Cubic's Defense Review that confirmed most of the Garrett Study's findings, and agreed with the majority of its recommendations—the same is true with respect to the Clarke and C4 Studies.

Cubic's Defense Review was delivered in January 2001 and NATO Assessment was delivered in February 2001. Both of those documents highlighted many areas where reform had to be intensified as well as those areas where current defense plans were too ambitious. A common finding in these assessments was that the Army of SR failed to move more quickly to a force based upon western doctrine and more realistic threat conditions. They were especially critical of inadequate resource levels given the planned size of the force and the large amount of equipment that needed to be modernized. They expressed the need to finalize an overall military strategy.

The combination of this negative report and personal involvement in an economic scandal caused the Minister of Defense to lose support of his own political partners. The new Minister of

Defense, Mr. Stank came with the clear aim to lead the Slovak military towards NATO membership and receive at the Prague summit of NATO invitation for it.

The new Minister of Defense faced many problems: he needed to get back the support of the government and parliament, he needed to get the right people in the right positions, he needed to develop a sound plan with a clear picture of the future of the Slovak military, and last but not least, he had to solve problems caused by the lack of resources. He decided to solve all these problems very promptly.

First, immediately after he was approved by the President, he appointed new people to top positions in the MOD. The new people were not the typical uniformed political cronies, but experts in their field. As an example could be listed Mr. Rastialav Kacer, new state secretary (deputy minister), Mr. Dusan Svobodnik, new General director of Department of Foreign affairs, and Mr. Gabriel Kopecky, new General director of Department of Defense policy and defense planning. It was a very important signal not only for all military people but for members of parliament and for NATO.

Secondly he used all results that had been reached in cooperation with Cubic Application and launched a major planning initiative to restructure and reform the Slovak armed forces. An intensive planning effort was started in March 2001.

THE PLANNING STRUCTURE OF THE LONG TERM PLANNING PROCESS

The Long Term Planning Process was initiated in March of 2001 by the Minister of Defense's Order No 9, dated 8 March 2001 with the clear aim to develop the following documents:

- The Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic,
- The Organizational Structure of the of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic,
- The Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010,
- The Long-term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic.

DOCUMENTS

Document "*The Military Strategy Of The Slovak Republic*" represented the Minister of Defense's main tool for communicating with parliament, and at the same time, was the top level strategic document from which all others document should flow. This was the first document that represented a political consensus on defense between the armed forces and parliament.

The document *“The Organizational Structure Of The Ministry Of Defense Of The Slovak Republic”* was supposed to solve the problem of an unstable top level structure of the MOD and General Staff. The intent of the document *“The Concept Of Reform Ministry Of Defense Until 2002 With Outlook To 2010”* was to integrate the MOD and GS. This, however, did not succeed and a lot of parallel and overlapping structures were created.

The purpose of the document *“The Armed Forces Of The Slovak Republic – Model 2010”* was to provide a clear picture of the future Slovak armed forces, that are interoperable with NATO and fully based on Military strategy.

The document *“The Long-term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic”* answered how to reach The Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010. It represented the “way” through which the overall reform plan could be achieved.

THE PLANNING STRUCTURE

The planning structure was based on the Minister of Defense’s Order, and consisted of a Steering Committee and five Working Groups.

The working conditions were very significant. The Steering Committee and the five Working Groups were located in five big rooms in the basement of the GS and their members worked there every day full time.

The next very important aspect was that all elements of the Slovak military, as well as advisors from the US, UK, Germany, and France, were represented in the working groups. This was important because all aspects could be immediately discussed from different points of view

The Steering Committee was led by The State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense with The Chief of the General Staff as a Deputy Chairman. The five Working Groups worked under the direction of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff.


There was one more significant aspect in the process of creating the working groups - the selection of their members. Usually people with new western education were selected. But this approach created a parallel planning structure with unclear responsibilities. In some cases pre-existing organic structures of MOD or GS overlapped with working groups. For example, the General Director of the Department of Modernization of the MOD had the main responsibility to plan the modernization of the Slovak army, but another general led Team D, among the working groups, with the same responsibility.

In time, it was apparent that this was intentional. People involved in The Long Term Planning Process became the “core” of the new MOD and GS that was later created based on the document *“The Organizational Structure of the of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak*

Republic”. For example in the case of the Department of Modernization, the chief of working group D became a general director of this department.

The Integration group was led by the deputy of The Chief of the General Staff and consisted of the leaders of teams A,B,C,D, advisors, lawyers, the chief of the resource analysis group and administrative personnel. Meetings of the integration group were held every working day at 8.00hrs with the aim to integrate and coordinate the teams’ work.

FIGURE 1 THE PLANNING STRUCTURE OF THE LONG TERM PLANNING PROCESS⁴



Team A, Force Requirements, was led by the general director of Department of Defense Planning of the MOD and as his deputy was assigned Chief of Strategy planning staff of the General Staff (J5). The main task of the team was to conduct the force development process from the creation of planning scenarios, thru defining objectives, and creating affordable force structure options.

Team B, Personnel and Leader Development, was led by the Chief of Personnel of the General Staff (J1) with the main task to develop support programs necessary to achieve Slovak military reform:

- Reduction of senior officers,
- Acquisition of officer, NCO and enlisted
- Recruiting
- Retention
- Compensation
- Competitive selection
- Personnel management
- Quality of Life

Team C, Training and Doctrine, was led by the Chief of Operations of the General Staff (J3) with the main task of developing support programs:

- Unit Training
- Initial Entry Training
- Mobilization Training
- NCOES
- Doctrine
- Training Management

Team D, Logistic and Basis, was led by the Chief of Logistics of the General Staff (J4) with the main task of developing support programs for:

- Logistic Doctrine
- Supply Class
- Logistic Structure
- Medical Support
- Core Basing
- Automation
- Host Nation Support
- Infrastructure
- Equipment Modernization

The planning structure and its work processes were two of the most significant features that contributed to the success of the long term planning process. Especially important was the

involvement of the Senior Leadership, their entire staff and advisors from the US, UK, Germany, and France.

THE STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

The Garrett Study contained extensive comments on Security and Military Strategy. One of its main recommendations was that the government should complete these key documents as soon as possible. It was also highlighted that these documents had to be in place before doctrine and strategy could be presented as a cohesive unit to the military, the government, and to the public.

The Garrett Study acknowledged that document development and revision had already begun and described some differences between the US and Slovak approaches. It further acknowledged that elements of a national military strategy already appeared in various existing Slovak documents to include: The Concept Of Reform Ministry Of Defense Until 2002 With Outlook To 2010 (1999), The Defense Strategy (1999), and The Defense Doctrine (1996). Core strategies highlighted in these included:

- defend the country in case of low or medium intensity armed conflict;
- prevent and mitigate natural disasters, catastrophes, and accidents;
- and with NATO membership, defend Slovakia and NATO member states, eliminate risks and threats of a non-military character, and perform assignments under international organizations such as the UN.

The Garrett study's conclusion was that current SR policy and strategy-related documents had ample detail as to what had to be accomplished, but very little guidance on how to achieve these goals. This was a major obstacle to national defense reform. It emphasized that documents being established by the SR must correct this omission and recommended the highest priority on their completion, publication, and periodic review.⁵

In March 2000 three teams were drafting these strategic documents. Security Strategy of the SR was developed by the governmental working group led by Minister of Foreign Affairs together with The Minister of Defense. Defense Strategy of the SR was developed by The Defense Policy Department of the MOD and Military Strategy of the SR by J5 of GS. Responsibility for development was moved just in case of Military Strategy from J5 to Steering Committee of the new planning structure. This happened for two main reasons. First, work on the Security and Defense Strategy was just being finished, and second, that Military Strategy was a critical input to the planning process. The new force structure and supporting programs created based on this document.

“The Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic” became the keystone document and principal source of guidance for defense reform. As required by the Defense Planning System, The Military Strategy was developed during 2001 to provide the strategic guidance for the armed forces. In accordance with The Defense Strategy, this document focuses on ensuring that Slovakia remains secure from external threats posed by the changing security environment in Europe by supporting peace and stability within the region and by the deterrence of adversaries that may directly threaten the sovereign territory of Slovakia, its vital interests, or those of its allies.

In support of this goal, the framework for The Military Strategy includes the three-tiered approach. Ensuring the capability to conduct unilateral combat operations, as well as those supporting coalition and NATO forces, was fundamental to the strategy and to the modernization of the Armed Forces. Also fundamental was clearly defining the likely threats to the security of the Slovak Republic and the derivative missions and tasks upon which the military reform program was to be based.

The Military Strategy became the most critical document from a force development perspective. It directed a three-tiered force design: the High Readiness Force, Forces at Lower Readiness and Long Term Build-Up Forces. These forces should be relatively small, of high quality, well trained and equipped and capable either unilaterally or in cooperation with or as part of the North Atlantic Alliance, to defend the Country or its allies against any military or non-military threats.⁶

The force development process was based on the Garrett study's recommendations and contained five-phases:

Phase One, definition of required military capabilities based on the missions and tasking contained in the Military Strategy;

Phase Two development of the “Objective Force,” a realistic, unconstrained forces (resource availability is not a consideration) that is primarily focused on Major War.

It will be only needed in case of a major war — but this event is unlikely, therefore the entire Objective Force does not need to be resourced.

Phase Three of the process was the documentation, by organization of the Objective Force in the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE). The TOEs provides the total, detailed requirements concerning mission; organizational structure; personnel by grade, skill and quantity; and, equipment by type and density.

Phase Four was the development and design of several affordable force structure options with consideration of availability of resources oriented on regional armed conflict.

Phase five, the final phase, was the selection and documentation (TOE) of a single option, from the Affordable Force risk-considered options developed in the previous phase that should represent the optimal force for the SR: the Program Force. The Program Force should be affordable within allocated resources and should reflect the Military Strategy requirements, including those aspects concerning acceptable risk and readiness levels.

HOW MANY IS ENOUGH?

One of the main tasks of working group A was to answer the question “what size of forces do we need?” Document “*The concept of reform of MOD until 2002 with outlook to 2010*” set the size of forces at 30,000 military personnel. In this time it meant downsizing from 45 thousand or 1/3. One group of planners said that more force were needed based on threat analysis, while a second group argued that the force should be smaller due to lack of available resources.

The key to solving the force sizing dilemma was an agreement on risk. The Objective or Planning Force (represented Low Risk) was developed based on Major Armed Conflict Scenario. This force structure provides the required capability to deal with the risk outlined in



This portion of the objective force is not affordable to maintain at peace time. They may or may not exist on paper but there are no personnel specifically identified and there is no equipment in storage. If needed personnel will come from the eligible male population - this would be total mobilization of the Slovak Republic - a highly unlikely event.

This portion of the objective force represents optimal affordable mix of standing forces and mobilization forces. Since the SR cannot afford a large standing Army, the goal should be to keep as many activated units as possible at high readiness - this permits the best condition for training and operations.

FIGURE 2 RISK ANALYSIS

the threat analysis. The Objective Force was a balanced force which provides all of the capability needed to fulfill the missions and tasking in the Military Strategy and provides a basis should full mobilization be required. However, it was a force that the Slovak Republic could not afford. The Structure of Objective Forces SR⁷ represented total strength 60, 658 personnel and required 68,7 B SK to maintain this structure at the peace time.

Objective forces were divided to two parts. The unaffordable portion of the force includes capabilities that may be required in the event of major war, but the likelihood of needing them was determined to be so low, and the warning time so long, they were not included in the regular mobilization structure.

The affordable portion of the force includes that portion of the mobilization system, and mobilization structure, that will be funded and available in peacetime. This aspect is especially important relative to the extent of war stocks and stored equipment.

Several Affordable Force options were developed and one of them was selected for future detailed planning - The Program Force, referred to as The Armed Forces of the SR - Model 2010. They are resource constrained forces that reflect the Military Strategy requirements, consider the level of risk acceptable to the Nation and focused on Regional Armed Conflict.

Affordable portion of the force includes that portion of the mobilization system, and mobilization structure, that will be funded and available in peacetime. This aspect is especially important relative to the extent of war stocks and stored equipment.

THE RIGOROUS COST ANALYSIS

The Long Term Planning Process represented the first time that rigorous cost analysis was incorporated into defense planning. The cost analysis model that was used was based on the methodology of the "Defense Resource Management Model"⁸.


The basic steps were to predict the annual funding level for years 2002 to 2010, determine a ratio between operation and modernization cost for every year of reform, and develop, methodology for cost analysis.

THE PREDICTION OF ANNUAL FUNDING LEVEL FOR YEARS 2002 TO 2010 AND A RATIO BETWEEN OPERATION AND MODERNIZATION COST

A very important criterion used in developing the details for SR Force 2010 was the annual funding level that could be expected for military activities. The government's commitment of approximately 1.89% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the MOD budget through 2005 was the basis for planning. Planners also took into account the commitment beginning in 2006 to increase the defense budget to a minimum of 2% of GDP. With GDP at 1,058 billion SKK and

forecasted to grow to 1,242 billion SKK by 2010, this equates to approximately 20B SKK in 2001 stable prices. In the force development process, this was the amount used to constrain the force to an affordable level. Of the 20B SKK, personnel and operating costs represent 15B SKK (75 percent) and investment costs represent 5B SKK (25 percent).

FIGURE 3 PREDICTION OF ANNUAL FUNDING LEVEL FOR YEARS 2002 TO 2010



Basic assumptions⁹:

- Budget limit 1.89% GDP = 20B SK to 24B SK
- (Potential for 2.00% beginning in 2006)
- Personnel, Ops & Training Allocation = 75%
- Investment Allocation (Equip/Infrastructure) = 25%

Objective forces (forces needed to address all threats listed in the military strategy) were divided into two parts. The unaffordable portion of the force includes capabilities that may be required in the event of major war, but the likelihood of needing them is determined to be so low, and the cost so high, that they are not included in the regular mobilization structure. The

affordable portion of the objective force includes that portion of the mobilization system, and mobilization structure, that will be funded and available in peacetime.

THE COST ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY


The cost analysis methodology was based on methodology of “The defense resource management model”. This analysis becomes the basis for programming and plan implementation. The cost analyses were conducted for every phase of the force development process, including “Objective Force,” and several affordable force structure options for the Programmed Force.

The cost model consisted of operational costs (recurring cost) and cost of programs for implementing reform (non-recurring cost).

The operational costs (recurring cost) included:

- personnel cost (salary, insurance fund, retirement fund, personal material supplies),
- cost of operation of equipment (training, maintenance, repairs and other associated cost),
- unit associated cost (utilities, maintenance and repairs of building, rents and other),
- cost of maintenance and renewal of war resources,
- cost of maintenance of mobilization ability (training of reserves, maintenance of reserve equipment and supplies).

FIGURE 4 THE COST ANALYSIS RESULTS¹⁰



The cost of programs for implementing reform (non-recurring cost) included:

- cost of personnel programs,
- cost of equipment modernization,
- cost of equipment procurement,
- cost of creation of war resources,
- investment building,
- cost of force reorganization,
- cost of other transitive programs.

Application of rigorous cost analysis showed that there are basically three variables that influence overall costs. These are force structure size (with direct associated personnel costs and indirect associated unit operational cost) readiness (with direct associated costs of operations) and modernization (procurement of new equipment). The rigorous cost analysis secured optimal balance among them.

INTEGRATION REFORM ACTIVITIES - ALL FUNCTIONAL AREAS

Until the basic strategic documents were in place it was understandable, that the reform effort of the Departments of the MOD, staff of GS and Land and Air forces HQs had not been coordinated towards common aims. The Long Term Planning Process built on the set of strategic documents and on recommendation of the Garrett and Cubic studies. Clear aims and tasks of working groups covered all functional areas from development of force structure thru doctrine development, personnel management reform, leader development, training, equipment modernization, logistics modernization and basing concepts. The method of work and its timing secured coordination, relationship a feedback among the planning group.

The program force structure became the basis for determining requirements for:

- bases and training areas.
- personnel requirements for each grade and skill.
- military training to include the training of conscripts, commanders and staffs, as well as unit training at all levels.
- Modification of the school system to support a Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) and the implementation of sequential training and education.
- Basic management systems in personnel management
- Logistics systems
- Etc.

There had to be very close communication and cooperation among the planning groups because their outputs were interrelated. For example:

- Developed force structure requires certain number of personnel
- Number of personnel requires certain levels and types of training
- Levels and types of training require fuel and spare parts
- Fuel and spare parts require financial resources
- If there are not enough financial resources, force structure must be changed

The typical planning loop during the development of an option of affordable forces was:

- Group A developed force structure,
- Group B developed required structure of personnel,
- Group C developed required level of individual and unit training,
- Group D developed required war resources and basis plan,
- Group for resource analysis applied the cost analysis model and compared the result with available resources. If the developed option was unaffordable it gave the recommendation to adjust this option. In some cases this loop was conducted several times to reach an affordable properly mixed force structure.

FOCUS ON NATO REQUIREMENTS/INTEROPERABILITY

The Slovak Republic signed the Partnership for Peace program in 1994. Since then, it has been involved in The Planning and Review Process (PARP). This planning process was focused on selected forces (units) that have been prepared for multinational peace operations. Prior to 1999 the MOD and GS were unintegrated and located 120 km apart. Consequently, reform of overall force structure was also separated at this time. PARP was under control of Department for International affairs (with separate part of budget) and all reform attempts were under control of Department of Defense Policy and Defense Planning. This situation created many problems.

The long term planning process represented the first time that a commitment to develop forces matched resource commitments.

Those forces in accordance with Military strategy are:

- one Mechanized Battalion,
- one Engineer Company,
- one Military Police Platoon,
- one Flight of four MI-24 Combat Helicopters,

- one Flight of four MI-17 Transport Helicopters,
- one SHORAD Battery.

To reach required NATO standards and be able to operate together with forces of NATO countries the Slovak republic adopted 64 Partnership goals and developed the Membership action plan for preparing the Slovak Republic for NATO membership. From 64 Partnership Goals are 24 General Partnership Goals, 21 Land Force and 19 Air Force Partnership Goals. The Partnership goals are oriented to major areas:

- Adapting National Legislation and Strategies
- C3
- Logistics and Infrastructure Interoperability
- Language Training and Preparation of People
- Defense Planning and Resource Management
- Modernization of Armament & Military Equipment

The Membership Action Plan for preparation the Slovak republic for NATO membership and 64 Partnership Goals became part of The Long Term Planning Process as a first priority.¹¹

LEGISLATIVE REFORM

The Minister of Defense said many times during the planning process that the planning effort must progress that regardless of the 2002 election results the reforms will continue. The planning occurred within the context of the possibility of a comeback by former autocratic Prime Minister Meciar. One of the major tools to create conditions for Slovak military reform and to make it irreversible was legislative reform. The major objective of legislative reform was to implement legislative changes that will allow the Ministry of Defense and General Staff to complete detailed, time-phased plans to establish SR Force 2010.

The key planned legislative acts were:

Constitutional Act on the Security of the SR that arranges relationships related to safeguarding of the SR security, establishes conditions for declaring and terminating individual crisis situations in the SR, establishes the jurisdiction of the Security Council of the SR, limits the jurisdictions of the Security Councils of regions and districts.¹²

Defense Act that in connection with the Constitutional Act on Security, limits the extent of SR defense and sets out tasks and responsibilities of all legal bodies and authorities providing defense.¹³

Armed Forces Act that stipulates matters of the armed forces, outlines their composition and tasks, arranges their system of management and development, and outlines their legal subjectivity and method of funding.¹⁴

The successful legislative reform was one of the key conditions for reform of the Slovak military.

DEVELOP FINANCIALLY SOUND MULTI-YEAR PROGRAM

The aim of Long Term Planning Process was not only to define *“The Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic”* and the future Structure of the of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic and *“The Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010”*, but to develop a multi-year program, outlined specific steps for getting there. *“The Long -Term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic”* partly contains this multi-year program in a broad sense. However, the multi-year program is precisely contained in *“The Program Plan for 2003 to 2008”* which is the document guiding the programming phase.

A very important aspect of the long term planning process was understanding that implementation of the long-term plan will require a multi-year resource planning system with resource commitment. This process should be simply structured for developing plans and programs and making them happen through a systematic and balanced allocation of resources.

Planning, in the context of resource management, includes the definition and examination of alternative strategies, the analysis of changing conditions and trends, analysis of threat and technologies, as well as economic assessments. It also involves efforts to understand both change and the long-term implications of current choices and is basically a process for determining requirements.

Programming includes the definition and analysis of alternative forces, weapon systems, and support systems, together with their multi-year resource implications; and the evaluation of various trade-off options. It is a process for balancing and integrating resources among the various programs according to certain priorities. The result of the programming process is a long-range resource plan.

The work in developing the Long Term Plan for SR Force 2010 was very much a planning effort – but it also included a considerable amount of activity generally found in the programming phase of the PPBS.

Budgeting includes formulation, justification, execution, and control of the budget. It is a process for developing financial details for approved programs and materials necessary for

debate by Parliament. Budget structure is tied to Law and directives from the Ministry of Finance.

In this regard the programming aspect is most critical. The defense planning guidance approved by the Minister of Defense set basic procedures, subjects, timetables, and the program structures. The defense planning guidance also laid out objectives, management guidance and assessment measures for each program.

The Program Development Committee was created and chaired by General Director for Planning and Resource Management. The Co-Chair was the Chief of Staff of Strategic Planning (J-5). The main responsibilities were process determination, development of defense planning guidance, and program and budget integration.

Program Analysis Groups (PAGs) were informal organizations (similar to teams A, B, C, D from long term planning process) with main responsibility to assist in developing the Programs. PAGs were created for each program of management.

Program structure of the programs of management

1. Personnel
2. Equipping
3. Leader Development
4. Training
5. Operations
6. Sustaining
7. Infrastructure

For example: The Infrastructure subset of the multi-year program was developed under the leadership of the General Director for Modernization and Infrastructure. But the office does not do this in isolation. There is active involvement from those staff elements with a vested interest in Infrastructure (Representants from HQs, J1, J3, J4, J5). This PAG will bring to the Program Development Committee a proposed multi-year approach for funding the infrastructure program. A principal task will be to argue and resolve priorities. For example they must come to agreement on what priority is provided to QOL relative to training area improvements - these are competing demands for resources.

Program structure of the main programs provides high level decision makers (Minister of Defense, Government of the SR, Members of Parliament) a meaningful structure to measure outputs. Main programs were set according to the Military strategy of the SR.¹⁵

Main Program

- 1 Command and Management

- 2 High Readiness Forces
- 3 Lower Readiness Forces
- 4 Long Term Build Up Forces
- 5 Support Forces & Capabilities

The result of the programming phase of the new introduced multi-year resource planning system was *“The Program plan of the Ministry of Defense for years 2003 to 2008”*. This document was approved by the government of the SR on 24 September 2002.¹⁶

The program plan elaborated on the long term plan, and contains description of main programs with detailed resource allocation. It is the basis for budget development for fiscal year 2003 and gives predictions for the next five years.

Immediately after the approval of the *“Program plan of the Ministry of Defense for years 2003 to 2008”* a new program cycle started with the aim of developing a new program plan for years 2004 to 2009.

Implementation of the cyclic multi-years planning cycle is a vital requirement for sustaining any reform effort.

CONCLUSION

As stated in The Military Strategy, Slovakia's strategic goal is to build a relatively small, high-quality force appropriately armed and trained for integration in NATO collective defense arrangements. This force must be capable of defending the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and participating with NATO forces across a spectrum of military operations.

The current structure must transition to a future force capable of fighting across the spectrum of war as a coalition member. SR Force 2010 emphasizes force structure that is affordable by the Republic of Slovakia and capable of contributing combat power to the NATO alliance.

The future force will be developed in accordance with the long-term modernization plan, that was developed by planning structure that involved all elements of the MOD, GS, major HQ, agencies and with the assistance of American friend and British advisors. A lot of unique approaches were part of the planning process.

The long term plan assumed certain budgetary levels of support. The financial resources available for SR Force 2010 are expected to remain at least at level of 1.89% of the GDP until 2005. The objective of the resource strategy is to achieve budget increase to level of 2% of the GDP after 2005 and to bring about a proper balance between operational budgets and modernization investment programs for capital equipment and infrastructure.

A major goal of SR Force 2010 is to reduce the overall manpower levels from the current level of over 40,000 (including civilian employees) to approximately 24,000 personnel. To achieve the Military Strategy goals within projected budgets, the Ministry of Defense has approved SR Force 2010 force structure levels and all supporting programs.

Word count: 6720

ENDNOTES

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