

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE NATIONAL GUARD – INCREASED OPTEMPO BRINGS
PARADIGM CHANGE TO STRATEGIC RESOURCE**

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The National Guard - Increased OPTEMPO Brings Paradigm Change to Strategic Resource Unclassified				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Anderson, James R. ; Author				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Carlisle, PA17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE ,					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 20	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Rife, Dave RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil	
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified		19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number DSN	
				Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18	

ABSTRACT

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TITLE: THE NATIONAL GUARD – INCREASED OPTEMPO BRINGS PARAGIGM
CHANGE TO STRATEGIC RESOURCE

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 31 March 2003 PAGES: 20 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The history of the National Guard is rich in tradition and partnership with the United States Army. The Guard also has maintained the same relationship with each of its state governments. The National Guard is the oldest organized military force in the United States. The National Guard has been activated to fight with the U.S. Army for over 200 years in numerous conflicts around the world. At the same time the National Guard has been vigilant to each of the 54 states and territories where the Guard is missioned to assist with natural disasters and civic uprisings within the sovereignty of the state they reside. Today's world situation has increased the reliance of the National Guard to the U.S. Army. The increased reliance on the National Guard has changed the paradigm of the Guard and causes reason for concern for the long standing relationship and capabilities of the 200 year old strategic resource. Increased reliance equates to increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO). The National Guard is being called upon more than ever before to partner with the U.S. Army in order to fulfill the National Military Strategy (NMS). The deployments have increased due to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and peace keeping operations around the world. The deployments have the potential to strain the Guard to a point which would render the strategic resource to a state of non-operational. This would have a significant negative impact to the NMS and to each of the sovereign states. The purpose of this strategy research project (SRP) is to explore the areas of concern the Guard must consider in order to avoid becoming non-operational and maintain itself as a strategic resource that has been relied upon for centuries.

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PREFACE

I am so appreciative of the opportunity to attend the USAWC as a resident student from the MI ARNG. This opportunity is not anything that I have ever experienced nor could it be duplicated in any other fashion. I have been able to acquire a military education at the USAWC by submersing myself into academic culture and environment that the institution offers resident students. The experience, memories and friendships will be long lasting and I thank everyone who made the opportunity possible.

THE NATIONAL GUARD – INCREASED OPTEMPO BRINGS PARADIGM CHANGE TO STRATEGIC RESOURCE

Sound military institutions are organic growths and not structures. A sound national defense system is not like a tower of brick and stone that can be built *de novo* on the surface of the ground. It is, rather, like a living tree with roots deep in the political tradition and history of a nation. It is the province of the military statesman, not to invent something new, but to improve a living thing that already exists.¹

- Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer

Since the creation of the first militia regiments in 1636, the National Guard has been a continuous and substantial presence in the American defense establishment. Borrowing from John McAuley Palmer's metaphor that likens military institutions to living organisms, today's Guard stands as the oldest and most mature living tree among the country's military organizations.² The roots of the organization dig deep into American history, providing an immovable anchor from the Guard's long traditions, values and service.

An awareness of the Guard's core characteristics is necessary for a thorough understanding and appreciation of the full significance of the Guard's important role in history as a strategic resource. The National Guard has always relied upon volunteer citizen-soldiers to fill its ranks. Since the 1840's, when volunteer militia companies became widespread, citizen-soldiers have offered their time and service. Throughout the Guard's history, motivated citizen-soldiers have volunteered for many of the same reasons – the fondness of a military lifestyle, opportunities for self-improvement and adventure, a sense of camaraderie and friendship, family traditions, and the satisfaction of genuine service to their local community, state and nation.³

Today's National Guard remains a dual State-Federal force. Throughout the nineteenth century the size of the Regular Army was small, and the militia provided the bulk of the troops during the Mexican War, the early months of the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War. In 1903, important national defense legislation increased the role of the National Guard (as the militia was now called) as a reserve force for the U.S. Army. In World War I, which the U.S. entered in 1917, the National Guard made up 40% of the U.S. combat divisions in France. In World War II⁴, National Guard units were among the first to deploy overseas and the first to fight. Following World War II, National Guard aviation units, some of them dating back to World War I, became the Air National Guard (ANG), the nation's newest reserve component. The Guard stood on the frontiers of freedom during the Cold War, sending soldiers and airmen to fight in Korea and to reinforce the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the Berlin

crisis of 1961-1962.⁵ During the Vietnam War, almost 23,000 Army and Air Guardsmen were called up for a year of active duty; some 8,700 were deployed to Vietnam. Over 75,000 Army and Air Guardsmen were called upon to help bring a swift end to Desert Storm in 1991. Since that time, the National Guard has seen the nature of its Federal mission change, with more frequent call ups in response to crises in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the skies over Iraq. Most recently, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, more than 50,000 Guardsmen were called up by both their states and the federal government to provide security at home and combat terrorism abroad. Today's National Guard continues its historic dual mission, providing to the states units trained and equipped to protect life and property, while providing to the nation units trained, equipped and ready to defend the United States and its interests, all over the globe.

The history of the Guard is both prestigious and heroic. The increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) has brought a new sense of urgency to the Guard. The increased OPTEMPO is not likely to change since the rhetoric in the documents referred to later make specific mention of the Guard's critical and crucial role in our national defense strategy. President Bush's National Security Strategy (NSS) refers to using, "every tool in our arsenal" to defeat the threat.⁶ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward in the NMS states, "Successful execution of this strategy will require a truly joint, full spectrum force – a seamless mix of active and reserve forces..."⁷ The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that one indication of the increased operational tempo has been the growing reliance on the Reserve Component (RC).⁸ The Posture Statements from both the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki⁹ and the former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General (R) Russell C. Davis¹⁰ continue the theme of increased reliance on the RC. It is very clear that the policy documents referred to have described the "ends and means" to the NMS which has changed the paradigm of the National Guard. With the change in paradigm, there has to be consideration for the impact on the soldiers of the National Guard. The question, "Will the increased OPTEMPO of the National Guard, to support the NMS, fatigue this strategic resource to such an extent that the RC will be considered non-mission capable?" needs to be asked. The follow-up discussion to this question needs to take place at all levels in order to address the second and third order effects of the policy change.

Regardless how the Guard evaluates itself, the NMS "ends" are not going to be adjusted to better suit an OPTEMPO for the RC. The nation's NMS clearly has a direction in order to defend the nation. It is the effects of the "ways and means" provided by the RC soldiers which is the focus of concern for this strategy research project. Is the concern for the effects of the

increased OPTEMPO and paradigm change to the RC apparent to senior military and political leadership and not just from RC soldiers and their families? In order to seek answers to the concerns an exploration into whether the Department of Defense (DoD), National Guard Bureau (NGB), or other agencies are in fact considering the question, of how the increased OPTEMPO and paradigm change might affect citizen soldiers, revealed important findings.

INCREASED OPTEMPO

The effect of increased OPTEMPO on soldier and unit readiness is an important issue for military and civilian leaders. The reason for this concern is that while the size of the US military has decreased, the frequency of military operations has greatly intensified.¹¹ Over the past decade, the RC has made substantial contributions to the missions of the DoD. RC support has increased from 1.4 million duty days in Fiscal Year (FY) 1989 to nearly 13 million duty days in FY 2001.¹² The reasons for this increase are part of what is motivating change for the future.

During the COLD WAR military planners assumed the forces capable of defending Europe against Soviet aggression would be more than adequate to meet U.S. commitments elsewhere without significantly affecting the military's ability to perform its primary mission.¹³ Since that time both active and Reserve Component forces have evolved in the changing environment of the 1990's. The decrease in active forces began prior to Dessert Storm, due to the elimination of the threat from the USSR, and continued throughout the early part of the decade. Combat forces were reduced to ten divisions by 1993 and total end strength also decreased significantly. At the same time the mission load increased at a significant rate. Though the active and reserve forces had shrunk by over 40% since 1989, the number of deployments grew by over 300%.¹⁴ Compounding this situation is the fact that many of these new missions are open ended with no completion date set. The end result of the combination of downsizing, increase in missions, and greater impact on Active Component (AC) units and soldiers throughout the 1990's is that the RC became more and more critical in providing assets to reduce the demands on the AC forces. With approximately 54% of the Army now in the RC it has now become routine for the Army to call upon the RC to help carry out the NMS. Specific skill sets are also the reason for increased deployments of RC soldiers. Civil Affairs and Military Police military occupational specialties (MOS) seem to be the skills that are low density in the AC and high demand in today's military missions.

PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY CHANGES

In addition to the reduction of AC forces, several other events added to the increased dependence upon the RC. On May 3, 1995 President Clinton signed the Presidential Decision

Directive (PPD) 25.¹⁵ The document provided guidelines for deciding which United Nations (UN) Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) the U.S. should support politically and for deciding whether U.S. armed forces should participate. With PKO now a significant drain on U.S. Forces, concerns for the time limitations of 180 day activations for RC soldiers needed to be addressed. The 1994's Defense Authorization Act extended the involuntary call-up period to up to 270 days. The 1994 Active / Reserve Off-site Agreement was another major milestone in the reshaping of the RC mix. In this agreement, the Army National Guard (ARNG) picked up the vast majority of the combat units while the Army Reserve (AR) converted to combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. RC end strengths were also established. The Army National Guard (ANG) was now aligned as a smaller, balanced land force with combat, CS and CSS capabilities for both wartime and domestic missions.

Another reshaping event was the Army Division Redesign Study which developed out of the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. From this the ARNG realigned divisions with some converting to CS and CSS while maintaining eight combat divisions for warfighting missions. There were concerns already being voiced that questioned the negative effects of AC units performing PKO missions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conducted a study in January 1995 to assess the effects of a PKO mission such as the Sinai mission on the Army.¹⁶ The study found that assignment of an ongoing PKO mission to a battalion sized task force effectively reduced the Army's combat-ready force by a brigade and that the second and third order effects were felt in an even greater number of units. This was explained by illustrating how long it took to get the tasked battalion back into the training cycle of the brigade. The lack of synchronization in the training cycle negatively affected the entire brigade. In addition the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported it took up to six months for a combat unit to recover from a PKO mission and again reach combat readiness. The deployment pace for ARNG soldiers picked up as a result of those reports, and eventually the U.S. found itself involved in Bosnia and later Kosovo. Presently the ARNG continues to play an active role in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) / Kosovo Force (KFOR) missions. On December 4, 2000 the Army announced an updated Balkans rotation schedule for the next several years.¹⁷ The updated schedule identifies the units and dates of six month rotations. Six of the next eight Bosnia rotations place ARNG division headquarters in charge. Prior to General Shinseki approving the updated schedule, the CBO examined four options to restructuring the AC to improve its ability to conduct PKO while staying ready for conventional war. In summary, the report listed four possible ways to restructure the AC force to meet the need for PKO missions¹⁸. The first option suggested cycling some active duty units. Three existing brigades would be

selected and cycle through peacekeeping operations every six months. Option II considered reorganizing existing AC forces for PKO. Four existing brigades would be designated to carry out peace operations and also create three standing headquarters to lead those brigades. This option would increase the size of the AC forces. Converting one active duty heavy division into support units was the third option. The CBO final option suggested adding additional active duty forces to carry out PKO. The report also mentioned the use of RC forces to address the issue. The RC alternative was dismissed because of what the CBO considered “numerous” problems associated with deploying RC soldiers. Analysts identified problems associated with the call up of RC forces. Assembling entire units from disparate volunteers can be difficult and time consuming. Involuntary call-ups of RC forces, which require action by the President, can be politically difficult to obtain. The frequency of involuntary call-ups was also mentioned as harmful to recruiting and retention. It is now apparent that General Shinseki dismissed the advice of the CBO report when he reassigned the next several years of SFOR / KFOR rotations.

OTHER FACTORS

Several other factors increased today’s reliance on the Reserve components: the Abrams doctrine, evolving Total Force policies, the effects of force downsizing, and increasing mission demands.¹⁹ In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Army General Creighton Abrams asserted his belief that the nation must never go to war again without the support of the Guard and Reserve – a philosophy that aligns with Clausewitz’s trinity of war which began to influence military strategy. General Abrams realized the importance of soliciting public support for the military cause. The RC soldiers lived and worked in the vast reaches of America. These were the teachers, firemen, police officers, elected officials and students who would mobilize and deploy from their communities across America to support the military strategy when called to do so.

During the same period the Total Force concept emerged. The Total Force concept emphasized the increased reliance on the reserves for warfighting. As defense budgets declined, the RC was recognized as a cost-effective way to maintain military capabilities in peacetime.

In the 1990s, force downsizing, along with reduced budgets and rising operational tempo, spurred an increase in the use of the RC. In part this increase occurred to relieve stress on the Active force. It also occurred because the RC was the repository for capabilities needed in the later phases of major theater war.

FUTURE MISSIONS

There is discussion that argues that the capability of the National Guard to assist in routine and contingency planning, consequence management activities and in incident response should be enhanced.²⁰ The capability to deploy from the U.S. for some of the Guard forces will become a lower priority. First call on designated elements of the Guard force structure may eventually be linked to requirements for WMD and other contingency management within the U.S., and only secondarily to any requirement to deploy on short notice in support of major theater contingency plans.²¹ This will require a transformation in thinking on the part of the Guard. The Guard's highest priority would possibly then become pre-attack, attack management, and post-attack contingency management within U.S. borders.

Prior to the events of September 11, 2001 and the most current QDR, DoD conducted the Reserve Component Employment 2005 (RCE-05) Study.²² A Senior Steering Group (SSG), co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, the Director, Joint Staff J-8, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, was established to oversee the study. The SSG created four panels to conduct the study – Missions and Capabilities, Force Mix Employment Alternatives, Assessment, and Resources – to examine the range of issues mandated by FY 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance.

The study reviewed employment of the RC, and developed several recommendations to enhance the role of the RC in the full range of military missions from homeland defense to major theater wars (MTWs). The study examined how to make the RC easier to access and use, and how to better train, equip, and manage it to ensure effective mission fulfillment. The study examined the future role of the RC from three areas: homeland defense, smaller-scale contingencies (SSC), and MTWs. Certain key themes emerged as particularly important to ensuring an effective future Total Force.

Given the increasing threats to the territory, population, and infrastructure of the United States, the RC should play an expanded role in providing homeland defense capabilities. The study suggests new ways for the RC to:

- Assist in managing the consequences of attacks within the United States involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons;
- Protect critical US infrastructure from physical and information operations attacks and;
- Participate in manning a national missile defense system should one be deployed.²³

The literature supports the fact U.S. participation in SSCs will continue to be selective, the demand for SSC operations is likely to remain high over the next 15-20 years. Increasing the role of the RC in SSCs where feasible will provide some OPTEMPO relief for the AC, and build RC operational skills. The study recommends new way for the RC to:

- Provide additional high-demand low-density capabilities for SSCs; and
- Assume a greater role in sustained operations like SFOR and KFOR.²⁴

The most stressing requirement for the U.S. military remains our commitment to being able to fight and win two MTWs nearly simultaneously. While substantial portions of the RC are already integral to the warfighting effort, the role of combat units of the Army National Guard (ARNG) can be further clarified.

- Augment critical combat capabilities in specific warfighting areas;
- Develop post-mobilization training standards and deployment timelines for ARNG divisions; and integrate the RC more fully into the deliberate warplans.²⁵

More recently the GAO conducted a study, "DoD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between Reservists and Their Employers."²⁶ The study, which was in response to a request from the Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, asked the GAO to review the issues and challenges surrounding the increased use of reserve forces. The objectives of the study were: (1) determine how increases in the military operations have affected operational tempos of the RC and (2) assess relations between reservists and their civilian employers.²⁷ To gain first-hand information on how deployments might be affecting RC soldiers and their employers the report's data set included 870,000 reserve members from which 1608 reservists serving in 22 high OPTEMPO units and 111 employers were surveyed.²⁸ Focus group discussions were also conducted with RC soldiers who had recently deployed.

The GAO study reported the average OPTEMPO since 1992 increased only slightly until 2001. Although component averages have not increased appreciably, all the components contain some individual reservists who are in units or occupations that have been affected disproportionately. During the past 3 years OPTEMPO with the Army National Guard averaged between 40 and 44 days per year, but hundreds of ARNG soldiers from units in Texas, Georgia, and Virginia were deployed to Bosnia for 6 months or more. Hundreds more are scheduled to participate in future six month deployments. Reserve Component soldiers in the fields of aviation, Special Forces, security, intelligence, psychological operations, and civil affairs have experienced OPTEMPO two to seven times higher than average reservists.²⁹ The war on terrorism has led to major increases in reserve participation. About 35,000 reservists were on duty supporting worldwide military operations during an average day in fiscal year 2000,

compared with over 95,000 supporting the war on terrorism on March 19, 2002.³⁰ As of February 27, 2003 there were 168,083 Guard and Reserve soldiers serving on active duty³¹. The increases compare to 50,000 Reserve Component soldiers mobilized to support Operation Desert Storm.

The GAO study also analyzed relations between reservists and their employers. Issues with employers included notification, benefits, re-employment rights and terminations.³² The GAO Study suggests that DoD's activities to enhance reserve-employer relations are not as effective as they could be. Both employers and reservists claimed that frequently they were not given 30-days advance notice of deployments, and some employers wanted the right to verify reserve duty less than 30 days on a case by case basis. Several recommendations designed to enhance DOD's management of relations between reserve component soldiers and their employers were made. The recommendations are directed at seeking more complete information on employers, more systematic reporting of contacts with reservists and employers in the field, and a more formalized program for addressing the needs of students. The study concluded that effective management activities, aimed at enhancing relations between reservists and their employers, did not meet the intent. DoD must be able to communicate directly with employers. Good relations between reservists and their employers are important, because deployments can be disruptive to employers, and difficulties, if not resolved, could lead some reservists to abandon military service. Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) has an active program to address problems that arise between reservists and their employers. However, to date, there is no federal statute to protect students, who make up an estimated one-third of all reservists, against loss of tuition, credits, and educational standing due to unexpected or extended deployments.³³ Such difficulties could discourage this portion of DoD's force from joining and remaining in the reserve.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Most recently, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA) released the review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense. The review states that the United States Reserve Components comprise 1.2 million service members – approximately 46.8 percent of the nation's total military force. The RC units are located in nearly 5000 cities across the United States. They are citizen soldiers that play a dual role as both professional military personnel and responsible citizens in their communities. Thus, RC soldiers are a vital link between the military and the American public. Each RC contributes to the Total Force in different ways, spanning the spectrum from dedicated peacetime roles to

wartime support alongside their active-duty counterparts. Today the Guard and Reserve have been integrated into the planning and execution of all military operations and have been an essential element to their success. Reserve personnel are involved in many ongoing contingencies including those in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Southwest Asia, and the Sinai. More than 90,000 reservists have supported Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. The mobilizations and deployments for the impending war with Iraq have increased since the New Year. The contribution of the reserves has increased dramatically since the mid 1980s from approximately 1 million man days of mission support to nearly 13 million man days in recent years.³⁴ The reserves will continue to make a significant contribution to the nation's defense. As the Total Force transforms to meet the challenges of the future, it is essential that the RC be part of the transformation. Transformation of the military forces is a central undertaking of the DOD. One important aspect of transformation addressed in the OASD-RA review is the appropriate mix of AC and RC forces in order to fulfill the missions and responsibilities that constitute today's national defense.

DEFENSE STRATEGY-PARADIGM CHANGE

Since the COLD WAR the Reserve components have become an integral part of every military operation. According to the intent of the most recent NMS the Guard and Reserve will continue to play an important role in the future. The OASD-RA review found considerable evidence that the balance of capabilities in the AC and RC today is not the best for the future.³⁵ Not addressing the changing missions and demands of the Total Force will keep things status quo. Changes are needed that will enhance military capabilities and overhaul management systems in order to more effectively and efficiently fulfill the mission of the DoD. This will result in a paradigm change for the RC force.

The new defense strategy calls for a fresh examination of how active and reserve capabilities are organized. The "threat-based" approach of the past has been replaced by a "capabilities-based" approach. Rather than planning defenses according to who might threaten the United States, the new strategy considers "how" the country might be threatened. The new defense strategy also places more emphasis on Homeland Security (HLS). These changes in emphasis require a more flexible force. The new strategy also calls into question the balance of capabilities with Active and Reserve component forces. Two overarching themes have become the basis for recommendations of how the RC forces can transform to meet the challenges set forth in the new NMS. The two themes are to rebalance to enhance capabilities and creating flexibility in force management.³⁶

Rebalancing the existing force mix will enhance force capabilities within current end strength. The OASD-RA review evaluated options for improving force capability across the full spectrum of DoD mission requirements. It considered the level of acceptable risk to meet both the challenges that the Services face today and also those that will arise in the future. The concepts presented suggest that the Services may realize greater agility and flexibility in the force by changing the allocations of capabilities between the Active and Reserve components.

Demands on the military are creating constraints and imbalances in force capabilities that can lead to shortages in some areas. The OASD-RA review suggested several approaches for the shortages.

To address platform-based shortages, the review recommends expanding the use of reserves through the use of mixed units to augment the manpower assigned to weapons systems. It is also suggested to upgrade older less capable equipment in reserve units to improve interoperability, address platform shortages, and ease operational burden. To address skills based shortages a deeper pool of either Active or Reserve Component personnel should be created. If military skills are needed intermittently or for surge requirements, then a larger Reserve Component rotational pool should be created. To ease shortages in civilian acquired skills, that are hard to develop and retain in the AC force, the review suggested an increase in the rotational pool in the RC.³⁷

HLS is receiving priority focus across the federal government. While the precise roles and missions of the many agencies involved are being determined, it is certain that the DoD, including the RC, will have an important role.

Another area considered by the OASD-RA review was that of changing priorities for traditional missions. The RC has been the repository for the forces needed for major combat operations. Converting some ARNG heavy combat forces to more flexible, multi-purpose forces, while the AC is incorporating similar concepts, needs to be accelerated. Initial stages of smaller scale contingencies often require an immediate response that cannot be provided by some types of RC units. In the later stages of the small scale contingencies the Guard and Reserve forces can shoulder a greater load. While in peacetime operations, Guard and Reserve forces can support AC in forward presence and PFO.

In addition to expanding force capability through rebalancing the OASD-RA review suggested creating flexibility in force management. A capabilities-based force, which can quickly respond to unknown requirements in the future, requires a new approach to force management and organization. The DoD could more effectively employ its force, both AC and RC, across the full range of operational requirements if it adopted a new availability and service paradigm – a continuum of service³⁸. A continuum of service would allow for participation from

0 to 365 days a year. The continuum would facilitate development and use of a “variable pool” of reservists who might volunteer to serve beyond the traditional 39 days of service in selected missions or functional areas. A continuum of service would also offer the DoD an opportunity to develop new forms of affiliation between the military and individuals. Through innovative forms of affiliation, the RC can attract individuals on a part time basis – another approach to help meet the challenge of developing and keeping cutting edge skills in the military. To be the most effective, the continuum of service must be supported by a new management paradigm that simplifies access to the reserves and streamlines personnel management practices.

Annually the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) provides the Annual Defense Report (ADR). ADR 2002 is the most recent report. In the report several references to the reliance and importance of RC are addressed. The first comes from a separate report from the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB)³⁹ The mission of the RFPB is to examine multi-service policy issues affecting the RC and/or their members as referred by the SecDef, other DoD officials, the Chairman, or any member of the Board. The Board was concerned with RC participation in HLS mission long before the events of September 11th. The ad hoc committee met three times before September 11th. The Board’s position at the time of the attack on the Pentagon and World Trade Center Towers was that HLS mission should not be assigned solely to any one RC. Because of the scope the Board held that the Guard and Reserve must be fully integrated into this important mission. The Board maintains a list of standing issues it monitors. For the first time in the history of the RFPB, RC directors and chiefs unanimously told the Board that they consider healthcare issues to be the number one obstacle to seamless integration. Modernization of RC equipment is another perennial Board issue. The key to a viable and fully integrated Total Force is complete interoperability. This is not possible if Guard and Reserve units do not modernize concurrently with their AC counterparts. The hand-me-down ideology is a remnant of a Cold War strategy that relied on the Guard and Reserve to be a force in reserve rather than an active participant in the NMS. Today Guard and Reserve units are forward deployed for long periods of time, often in combat and either intermixed with AC units or replacing them altogether.

In the aftermath of the mobilizations for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom, the Board agreed that the mobilization process needs to be reviewed. Related areas to mobilization; full time support, access cards, family readiness, and timely orders and pay, were identified as concerns and suggestions for improvement were given. A final recommendation by the RFPB in the Annual Defense Review (ADR) 2002 is for a Total Force education summit which will address the lack of knowledge and understanding of the RC. Initial planning for the

summit will focus around the concept that more effective education is the key to integration, efficiency, and understanding of the RC. As of the end of CY 2001, attempts by the Services to comply with the Secretary's mandate for an education summit have fallen dormant.

The ADR 2002 concludes by stating the defense of this nation has been based in large part on the concept of the civilian who prepares for active service during peacetime and becomes a soldier-at-arm in times of national emergencies. Today's RC, comprised of National Guard and Reserve forces are an integral part of the defense strategy and day-to-day operations of the U.S. military. They have been assigned missions that are among the first needed during national emergency or war. Since 1990, there have been six (6) occasions on which the President has initiated an involuntary call-up of RC members to active duty.⁴⁰

As recent as January 16, 2003, the concern for RC units and soldiers is still being addressed. The chairman of the Total Force Subcommittee lead a congressional delegation on a 10-day tour of U.S. military bases in Europe that focused on problems facing National Guard and reserve members. Rep. John McHugh, R-N.Y., chairman of the newly renamed Total Force Subcommittee, was worried that cuts in active-duty personnel have left the military too dependent upon reservists.⁴¹ The subcommittee was concerned with the increased demand and how troops are coping with that and for how long they can sustain the extra demand on their time and families. The committee reported that members of the Guard and reserves are juggling their new missions in the fight against global terrorism and a possible war with Iraq with their traditional duties. They believe RC soldiers could start bailing out unless relief is provided⁴². The committee heard about strained marriages, lost businesses and jobs. The increased demand and additional duties points to the need to reconsider troop strength. The Bush administration has opposed efforts in Congress to increase personnel, arguing that the military can reduce the burden of deployments just by making adjustments in how the current force is used. The administration is also pushing privatization of some jobs in order to save money.

CONCLUSIONS

It is apparent from the review of the literature that the senior military and political leadership do have a grasp of the increased OPTEMPO and the need for paradigm change of the RC is on the top burner. The literature suggests that the senior military and political leadership are investigating ways to make the RC an even more integral part of the NMS. Re-allocating units between the AC and RC to better meet the current mission needs along with fixing the interoperability of equipment seem to be the most pressing items. Other agencies as

well as the leadership talk about the concern they have for the increased OPTEMPO and paradigm change that is facing the RC. Action plans addressing fixes to the second and third order effects; health care upon activation, employer conflicts, student conflicts, RC unit fragmentation through deployments, and recruiting and retention issues, to name several, have not yet taken shape. The bureaucracy of government is not keeping pace with the increased OPTEMPO of the RC soldiers needs. The citizen-soldier is a reflection of our society and that is why the senior military and political leadership need to take action to avert societies' discontent with what appear to be major issues concerning RC soldiers.

In order to understand the magnitude of the RC concern the bureaucracy should re-visit Clausewitz's remarkable "trinity of war".⁴³ The trinity's premise is that the social, political and military constructs are all in agreement and aligned toward the NMS. The National Guard soldier is an integral part of each of those constructs. The uniqueness of Guard membership has ramifications for each of the three elements of the Clausewitz model. Guard members are considered citizen soldiers by definition. Like no other military force, Guard members are citizen soldiers with political and social affiliations to their state and the local communities in which they reside. They are also sworn to the same oath of enlistment as the active force which obligates them to defend and uphold the Constitution of the United States. This unique relationship has withstood many years, but today's national military strategy probably presents a test like no other time in the Guard's long history. Increasing the reliance on the Guard and its' OPTEMPO, which makes the Guard a critical partner in the "total force", will be a challenge.

How many times and for how long can the Guard mobilize and deploy before the loss to its infrastructure becomes overwhelming? The infrastructure constructs that render the Guard a viable strategic resource are strength management, Military Occupational Specialty Qualification MOSQ, ESGR, and support from soldier's families. Will soldiers continue their membership after their initial enlistment is fulfilled if they know they are going to deploy more often in support of homeland defense and/or peace keeping operations around the world and still not have resolution to current mobilization and deployment issues? Will there be soldiers interested in joining the RC forces knowing the chance of deployment is immanent? Will soldier's employers tolerate the inconvenience and disruption that deployments cause their businesses? Finally, will soldier's families tolerate increased deployments?

In order to achieve the intent of Brig. Gen. McAuley Palmer's metaphor, "It is the province of the military statesman, not to invent something new, but to improve a living thing that already exists.", I believe there needs to be serious consideration of the second and third order effects to the increased reliance and OPTEMPO of the Guard in support of the NMS. The fact that the

problem has become less transparent in communities throughout the United States and elected officials are now seeking information gives me a better feeling about reaching a practical and equitable resolve. In the past the RC senior leadership has saluted smartly and drove on. This continued the systemic problem of doing more with less. The literature review brings validity to the seriousness of the problem. The studies and commissions provided credible and authentic data to allow us to raise the question: "Will the increased OPTEMPO of the National Guard, to support the National Military Strategy, fatigue the strategic resource to such an extent that the Guard will become non-mission capable?"

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ENDNOTES

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- ² Ibid.,
- ³ Ibid., 370.
- ⁴ Roger C. Schultz, The Army Guard Posture Statement (Washington, D.C.: National Guard Bureau, September 2002), 1.
- ⁵ Ibid.,3
- ⁶ George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002),1.
- ⁷Richard B. Meyers, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 2002), i.
- ⁸Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, September 2001),8.
- ⁹Eric K. Shinseki, The Army-Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, September 2002)
- ¹⁰Russell C. Davis, National Guard Posture Statement (Washington D.C.: National Guard Bureau, September 2002)
- ¹¹ Carl A. Castro and Amy B. Adler, "OPTEMPO: Effects on Soldier and Unit Readiness" Parameters, (Autumn, 1999) 85-86.
- ¹² Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, September, 2002),7.
- ¹³ Congressional Budget Office, Making Peace While Staying Ready for War (Washington, D.C.; Department of Defense, December 1999)3.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 5.
- ¹⁵ Steven R. Bowman, Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 8Jun01) 5.
- ¹⁶ Making Peace While Staying Ready For War (Washington, D.C., Congressional Budget Office, December, 1999)10.
- ¹⁷ Bowman, 2.
- ¹⁸ Making Peace While Staying Ready For War, (Washington, D.C., December 1999) 11.

- ¹⁹ Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense 23.
- ²⁰ Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR McNair Paper 62. Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C. National Defense University, 2000),55.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Department of Defense, Reserve Component Employment Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, July 1999),3.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 2.
- ²⁶ General Accounting Office, DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between Reservists and Their Employers (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, June 2002),12.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 30.
- ²⁸ Ibid., 2.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 3.
- ³⁰ Ibid., 6.
- ³¹ Department of Defense News Release, No. 084-03, February 26, 2003. Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/d20030226ngr.pdf>; Internet; accessed.
- ³² Ibid., 22.
- ³³ Ibid., 25.
- ³⁴ Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense, 12.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 36.
- ³⁶ Ibid., ix.
- ³⁷ Ibid.,46.
- ³⁸ Christopher Prawdzik, "Sketching a New Paradigm," National Guard Magazine (22October2002): 24-26.
- ³⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Defense Report, 2002 (Pentagon, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, December, 2002) 10.

⁴⁰ Ibid., chp. 5

⁴¹ Rick Maze, "Lawmakers to visit European Bases", Army Times (16January2003): 11.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Michael Howard, Clausewitz (New York: Oxford, 1983), 73.

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