

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE WHOLE IS GREATER THAN THE SUM OF THE PARTS: THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD  
AND HOMELAND SECURITY**

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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## ABSTRACT

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This SRP examines the national strategic importance of maintaining the Coast Guard intact through the 21<sup>st</sup> Century to preserve its vast, effective multi-functional capabilities. Provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and transferred the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) from the Department of Transportation (DOT) to this new Department, effective 1 March 2003. Authorization in the Act to transfer the Coast Guard to the DHS was not granted without considerable debate.

The debates surrounding the Coast Guard's move to the DHS centered on whether the new emphasis on the strategic objectives of homeland security would degrade the multi-functional services the Coast Guard provides to the nation. Many members of Congress expressed concern the proposed transfer could lead to a reduced focus on the Coast Guard's "non-homeland security" missions. One option proposed to alleviate such concerns was to divide the Coast Guard into two parts. The missions that focus on maritime homeland security would be transferred to the DHS, and the remaining non-homeland security missions would stay with the DOT. Ultimately the Coast Guard was transferred intact to the DHS.

The roles and missions of the Coast Guard are truly overlapping and interrelated. Indeed they are intrinsically interconnected in such a way that the Coast Guard's total service is considerably greater as a whole than the sum of its parts. As the DHS matures, members of Congress and DHS leaders will eventually question the need for the DHS to regulate so-called non-homeland security missions. Coast Guard officials must prepare for renewal of the option of dividing the Coast Guard. The greatest danger to maritime homeland security and to achieving other strategic national security interests would be to fragment the Coast Guard.



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## THE WHOLE IS GREATER THAN THE SUM OF THE PARTS: THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD AND HOMELAND SECURITY

This SRP examines the national strategic importance of maintaining the Coast Guard intact through the 21<sup>st</sup> Century to preserve its vast, effective multi-functional capabilities. Provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and transferred the U.S. Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation (DOT) to this new DHS. Authorization in the Act to transfer the Coast Guard to the DHS was not granted without considerable debate. “Whether to transfer the Coast Guard to the DHS became one of the more significant items of congressional debate on the merits of the Administration’s homeland security reorganization proposal.”<sup>1</sup>

### OVERVIEW

The debates surrounding the Coast Guard’s move to the DHS centered on whether the emphasis on the strategic objectives of homeland security would degrade the multi-functional services the Coast Guard provides to the nation. While many of the Coast Guard’s roles and missions directly support the three strategic objectives of homeland security – to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S; to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur<sup>2</sup> – some of its missions seem to contribute little to these objectives. Many members of Congress expressed concern that the proposed transfer could lead to a reduced focus on such Coast Guard “non-homeland security” missions as fisheries enforcement, maritime safety, marine environmental protection, and search and rescue.<sup>3</sup> Further, many in Congress believe that Coast Guard’s diverse missions do not fit neatly in any department. So many in Congress saw no overwhelming reason to transfer the Coast Guard from the DOT.<sup>4</sup>

One option considered to alleviate such concerns was to divide the Coast Guard into two parts. Missions that focus on maritime homeland security would be transferred to the DHS, and the other non-homeland security missions would remain with the DOT.<sup>5</sup> Admiral Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard, sternly objected to this division in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security:

The greatest danger to any Coast Guard mission would be to fracture the Coast Guard. Our multi-mission assets are critical to each of our five fundamental roles: Maritime Security, Maritime Safety, Maritime Mobility, Protection of Natural

Resources, and National Defense. These roles overlap, as Maritime Security and Maritime Safety are two sides to the same coin of protecting Americans. The same cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel that maintain Maritime Mobility also provide Maritime Safety and Security as well as Protect our Natural Resources.<sup>6</sup>

Following the Administration's announcement to reorganize the federal government to better deal with threats against America's homeland, Coast Guard and DOT officials supported the Administration's plan as a logical component of the proposed department. However, Coast Guard officials were adamant that for the Coast Guard to successfully perform its homeland security mission reorganization should include the following provisions:

- The Coast Guard should remain intact.
- The Coast Guard should retain its attributes as a military, multi-mission, and maritime service.
- The Coast Guard should retain its full range of missions.<sup>7</sup>

Throughout the hearings to form the new Department, Congressional members continued to express reservations about moving the Coast Guard from the DOT to the DHS. Initially, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee voted against the move to prevent the degradation of any non-homeland security mission.<sup>8</sup> The House and Senate then arrived at an agreement through compromise within the Act that met both Congressional and Coast Guard concerns. The Act stipulated the Coast Guard shall be maintained as a distinct entity, retaining its non-homeland security missions. Also, the Commandant of the Coast Guard will report directly to the Secretary of DHS.<sup>9</sup> Simultaneously, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 was passed by both the House and Senate with additional provisions of oversight of both the DHS and the Coast Guard, addressing lingering congressional concerns regarding the Coast Guard provisions in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.<sup>10</sup> The Coast Guard was then transferred to the DHS on 1 March 2003.

The roles and missions of the Coast Guard are indeed overlapping and interrelated; they are intrinsically interconnected in such a way that the Coast Guard's total service is considerably greater as a whole than the sum of its parts. Over its 212 years of organizational evolution, the Coast Guard has evolved into an efficient and effective service, earning a well-deserved reputation as one of the premier maritime organizations in the world. As DHS matures, members of Congress and DHS leaders will eventually question the need for DHS to

regulate so-called non-homeland security missions. Coast Guard officials must prepare for this inevitable line of examination. Many of the Coast Guard's missions may seem to contribute little to the overall security of our homeland. However, each role and mission works in concert with others to accomplish the strategic objectives of homeland security. They produce a symphony of skills and knowledge, law enforcement authority, command and control systems, and partnerships that have been orchestrated into one cohesive, potent Service. The greatest danger to maritime homeland security and achieving other strategic national security interests would be to fragment the Coast Guard.

## **HISTORY**

Given America's dependence on the sea, the formation of a Service focused on national maritime interests was predestined. The Coast Guard's multifunctional roles and missions were born mainly in response to impacts of outside events affecting vital national interests. These events eventually shaped the Service into a powerful tool of national policy, dedicated to preserving national interests.

The Coast Guard is our nation's oldest maritime agency. It is an amalgamation of five former maritime federal services – the Revenue Cutter Service, the Lighthouse Service, the Steamboat Inspection Service, the Bureau of Navigation, and the Lifesaving Service. It has grown into a military, multi-mission, maritime service. These three descriptors encapsulate the nature and structure of the Coast Guard.<sup>11</sup> The service's core values of Honor, Respect, and Devotion to Duty provide the guiding principles upon which the character of its personnel and actions of the organization are built. The Coast Guard's motto of *Semper Paratus*, "Always Ready," epitomizes the Service's agility, flexibility, dedication, responsiveness, and commitment to the public. It is uniquely structured as a civil-military organization to execute both law enforcement and military duties. The men and women of the Coast Guard view themselves as public servants. Due to this closeness the Service maintains with the public, it enjoys extraordinary cooperation with other entities at home and abroad. Its humanitarian image embodies the service's ethos. The Coast Guard's dominant spirit of "can do-ism" fosters quick, positive results. Finally, its broad legal authority exceeds that of practically any other agency.

These defining traits emanate from the infusion of the predecessor services that make up the Coast Guard of today. Taken together, these attributes bind the men and women of the Coast Guard into a well-coached team and guide them to live up to the high standards of

excellence exhibited by their forerunners. The Coast Guard's evolution provides a glimpse of how the unique character and nature of this service was established to support national strategic interests.

#### 1790 TO 1915

To secure the financial independence of the new Republic, the First Congress at the behest of Alexander Hamilton passed the Tariff Act of 1790. This Act granted Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton the authority "to regulate the collection of duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, on goods, wares, and merchandises imported into the United States" and the means to collect the revenue through "the employment of boats which may be provide for securing the collection of the revenue."<sup>12</sup> Hamilton envisioned a maritime service of "A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, [which] might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of our laws."<sup>13</sup> Thus on 4 August 1790 Congress authorized construction of ten cutters for the protection of the customs revenue, the enforcement of tariff and trade laws, and the prevention of smuggling. This system of cutters was known as the Revenue Marine and placed under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department. The Revenue Marine was re-named the Revenue Cutter Service in 1863.

While Alexander Hamilton was arguing for the cutters to assist with collection of revenue for the new Republic, he persuaded Congress to place the Republic's lighthouses under central control. Hamilton realized the value of the lighthouses in assuring safe passage of commercial ships entering and leaving ports, hence producing revenue for the nation. The First Congress agreed and placed the lighthouses within the Treasury Department, establishing what became known as the U.S. Lighthouse Service.<sup>14</sup> In enacting legislation to create the Revenue Cutter Service and the U.S. Lighthouse Service, the First Congress determined several vital national interests of the new Republic and foresaw the multi-mission characteristics of today's Coast Guard, which provide safety of life at sea, security and safety of vessels and ports, prevention of smuggling, enforcement of maritime laws, and collection of revenue.

The Revenue Marine quickly accrued additional public service responsibilities in recognition of the inherent nimbleness and responsiveness of the service. The cutters were the only armed ships the country possessed, since the Navy was disbanded at the conclusion of the Revolution. At the advent of the Quasi War with France, the cutters were dispatched to help defend the Republic. During this period, Congress authorized the reestablishment of the Navy

and empowered the President to use the revenue cutters to supplement the fleet when needed. Since that time in 1797 until the present day, the Coast Guard and her predecessor service, the Revenue Marine, have participated in practically every major armed conflict the United States has been involved in. At the conclusion of the Quasi War, the revenue cutters were charged with enforcing not only customs laws, but also laws against the importation of slaves.<sup>15</sup> Protecting national security, collecting revenue, and enforcing laws for the nation etched the multifunctional trait the service is known for today.

The Revenue Marine began maintaining aids to navigation, assisting lighthouse personnel, and charting coastal waters during the first part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It also carried out various health and quarantine measures at major ports. In 1819 the Revenue Marine worked with the Navy to stop pirates from raiding merchant ships along the southern Atlantic coast and Gulf of Mexico, thereby enabling American imports and exports to safely reach their proper destination. Duties of environmental protection began in 1822, when cutters were dispatched to help prevent cutting live oak from public lands. Enforcement of immigration laws started in 1862 with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, which authorized the service to interdict illegal migrants. With the purchase of Alaska in 1867, the now-known Revenue Cutter Service saw its responsibilities for environmental protection greatly expand to protecting seal rookeries and enforcing fishing and game laws. Then in 1887 the first drug smuggling law was enacted.

During the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Revenue Marine also assumed the major task of patrolling the coasts to rescue distressed mariners, something it had done previously on an impromptu basis. In 1832, the Treasury Secretary ordered the cutters to commence limited cruising during the winter months to aid mariners requiring assistance.<sup>16</sup> Thus began a tradition of saving lives that today is one of the Coast Guard's most widely acclaimed missions.

During this same period steamboats were plying the nation's rivers and coastal waterways; however, boiler technology in the marine environment was not perfected and somewhat dangerous. Many catastrophic explosions over the years caused the loss of thousands of lives, prompting Congress to create an Act in 1838 to provide better security for passengers and crews in steamboats.<sup>17</sup> This legislation led to the creation of the Steamboat Inspection Service, placed under the control of the Treasury Department.

Upon a series of high profile shipwrecks and groundings with significant loss of life, the Congress again moved to create another maritime service, this one devoted to rescuing mariners in peril – the U. S. Lifesaving Service. This organization, created in 1878, manned coastal search and rescue stations. The Revenue Cutter Service worked closely with the Lifesaving Service. The Lifesaving Service attracted and trained a breed of courageous men imbued with a spirit of service that prevails in today's Coast Guard.

In 1884, concerns for the welfare and competence of mariners led to establishment of the last predecessor maritime service – the Bureau of Navigation. This organization supervised and regulated the merchant marine and was also placed under the Treasury Department. In 1903, the Department of Commerce and Labor was created; the Bureau of Navigation and the Steamboat Inspection Service were subsequently transferred to this new department. Duties of the Bureau of Navigation and the Steamboat Inspection Service were combined into a Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection Service in 1932; this service was renamed the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation in 1936.

Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century and into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Coast Guard's predecessors closely coordinated their various maritime activities. The Revenue Cutter Service and its precursor, the Revenue Marine, provided tender functions and examined lighthouses and aids to navigation for the Lighthouse Service; it helped establish lifesaving stations and provided inspectors for the Lifesaving Service; it provided field support for the Bureau of Navigation. The benefits of combining the nation's maritime services were becoming more and more apparent toward the latter part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>18</sup>

#### 1915 TO PRESENT

In 1915, President Wilson signed into law the bill that merged the Revenue Cutter Service and the Lifesaving Service under the name of the United States Coast Guard in "An Act to Create the Coast Guard."<sup>19</sup> This Act was not passed without considerable debate and uproar in the years preceding its passage. In 1911, President Taft designated his economic advisor, Professor Frederick Cleveland, to lead a commission to recommend ways to increase the government's efficiency. The Cleveland Commission believed unfunctional organizations were more efficient than a multi-functional organization. The Commission recommended:

- the Lifesaving Service and the Lighthouse Service be merged and transferred to the Department of Commerce and Labor;

- the functions and assets of the Revenue Cutter Service be apportioned out to other federal agencies; and
- the opinions of the Departments of Labor and Commerce, Navy, and Treasury be sought before President Taft submitted his own view to Congress.<sup>20</sup>

The Secretary of Labor and Commerce basically agreed with the Cleveland Commission's recommendations; he was quite willing to have the two proposed services under his control. The Secretary of the Navy only vaguely and lukewarmly supported the commission's recommendations. His response was guarded: "It is true that the chief functions of the Revenue-Cutter Service can be performed by the Navy, but this can not be done as stated in the Cleveland report in the regular performance of their military duties. All duties which interfere with the training of personnel for war are irregular and in a degree detrimental to the efficiency of the fleet."<sup>21</sup> He did allow that if the Revenue Cutter Service were disbanded, the Navy could use some of the cutters since it was short of smaller, shallow-draft ships. The Treasury Secretary and the Captain Commandant of the Revenue Cutter Service took great exception to the Commission's recommendations. The Treasury Secretary quickly objected: "The recommendation to abolish the Revenue-Cutter Service... came out of clear sky. No one connected with the service or with the Treasury Department... knew that the project was being considered. ... It came at a time when the service was performing conspicuous and heroic work and its fit equipment and its high usefulness were in immediate and conspicuous evidence."<sup>22</sup> He questioned the Commission's findings that abolishing the Revenue Cutter Service would result in greater economies. He also echoed the Navy's argument: "[The Navy] could never give the kind of degree of attention that is required of the Revenue Cutter Service and its officers and men trained in their particular duties for 120 years. The [Revenue Cutter Service's] work is alien to the work of the Navy, alien to the spirit of the Navy, and alien, I think, to its professional capacities and instincts – alien certainly to its training and tastes."<sup>23</sup>

The Captain Commandant of the Revenue Cutter Service stressed that without the Revenue Cutter Service the Departments of Commerce and Labor, Treasury, Justice, Interior, and Agriculture would have to recruit, train, outfit, and support their own respective maritime forces to fulfill their responsibilities.<sup>24</sup> He defended the diverse duties of the service in words that still apply to current Coast Guard activities:

That as the maritime functions and obligations of the government had increased, there was not enough work in a dozen activities to justify a separate department



for each. A cutter could attend to varied services while patrolling its own water; to have separate new ships and men for each of these services would be vastly more expensive. Pushing this argument, that the commission plan would be more expensive rather than more economical.<sup>25</sup>

While the future of the Revenue Cutter Service was being debated in Congress, the press and public opinion were strongly in favor of retaining the Revenue Cutter Service. The sinking of the Cunard Liner Titanic in 1912 gave the Cutter Service additional responsibilities – ice patrol in the North Atlantic to assure safe passage of ships. This mission anticipated the role of today's International Ice Patrol. Numerous members in Congress were also not in agreement with the Cleveland Commission's recommendation, which was endorsed by President Taft. Supporters in Congress, the press, and the public ultimately staved off the move to disestablish the Revenue Cutter Service.

Over the ensuing years Congress added other responsibilities to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard conducted inspections for the Steamboat Inspection Service to implement the Seaman's Act of 1915, enacted to make ships safer for seamen and passenger. Upon entering World War I in 1917, port security took on a prominent role, especially in the aftermath of the explosion of a ship carrying ammunition in the port of Halifax, Nova Scotia. This explosion leveled a large portion of the city and caused more than 1000 civilian deaths. The passage of the Espionage Act of 1917 gave the Coast Guard additional powers to prevent sabotage at the nation's ports. The Coast Guard subsequently established a Captain of the Port at each major port to regulate the movement of vessels, thus expanding the role of the Coast Guard in maritime mobility. Enforcement of Prohibition during the 1920s dramatically expanded the Coast Guard's role in interdiction operations. The Lighthouse Service was assimilated into the Coast Guard in 1939. The Motorboat Act of 1940 increased the Coast Guard's role to regulate the operations of motorboats from the standpoint of safety. World War II likewise prompted expansion of the Coast Guard's responsibilities to convoy protection, anti-submarine patrol, coast-watch, harbor security, and amphibious craft operations. The Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration believed it was more convenient and cost-effective to consolidate the functions of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation into the Coast Guard; subsequently, in 1946 Congress authorized the merger of these agencies with the USCG.<sup>26</sup> Congress then passed the Magnuson Act to enhance the Coast Guard's port security authority for times of peace after the explosion of a nitrate ship and shore installation at Texas City, Texas, on 16 April 1947 – a

tragedy that cost 561 lives.<sup>27</sup> The National Search and Rescue Plan was promulgated in 1950; it assigned the Coast Guard ultimate responsibility to coordinate all search and rescue activities in the maritime region.

President Lyndon Johnson transferred the Coast Guard to the newly formed Department of Transportation in 1967 largely as an administrative move. Many other duties were forthcoming, such as management of the cleanup of waters, prevention of marine pollution, protection of living marine resources, and adherence to global standards for marine safety and pollution control that arose from the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act, the Prevention of Pollution from Ships Convention, and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act of 1976. The Federal Boating Safety Act of 1971 and the Recreational Boating Safety Facilities Improvement Act of 1980 gave the Coast Guard greater responsibilities for coordinating the National Recreational Boating Safety Program and authority to enforce the program. A series of devastating oil spills, such as from the *Torrey Canyon* in San Francisco, led to the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972. The Coast Guard's law enforcement authority was broadened due to the war on drugs and enhanced preventive safety measures such as those enacted by the Federal Boating Act of 1971 and the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988. Other tanker accidents, such as those of the *Argo Merchant* and the *Exxon Valdez*, led to the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

At the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, still more functions are being added to the Coast Guard's varied roles and missions. With the recent passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Coast Guard's role in port and waterway security requires a monumental program to implement this essential component of our national maritime strategy for homeland security.

## **CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY**

Vulnerabilities in the maritime area pose particular challenges to the infrastructure of the nation. Maritime security is affected by a variety of factors – many global in scope. Among these are globalization, international migration, non-state actors, technological innovation, weapons of mass destruction, and information operations.<sup>28</sup>

## MAGNITUDE OF MARITIME SECURITY

America is a maritime nation, inextricably tied to the seas for our prosperity and security. Maritime industries and transportation systems vitally enhance our commerce. Preventing acts of terrorism against our ports and waterways and protecting the people and ships that use them are primary concerns in building a strategy to safeguard our homeland.

America's maritime domain encompasses nearly 3.4 million square miles of territorial seas, along with exclusive economic zones encompassing some 95,000 miles of coastline; 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal, and coastal waterways; as well as international waters and other maritime regions of importance to national security. The seas link America with world trade and enable the U.S. to project military power in protection of national security interests abroad. America's dependency on the seas as avenues of national security and prosperity cannot be overstated.

The U.S. is the world's leading trading nation, accounting for nearly 20% of the annual global ocean-borne overseas trade.<sup>29</sup> Approximately 95% of our nation's international trade and 25% of domestic goods are carried in ships through the 361 U.S. commercial ports, which house more than 3,700 terminals that handle passenger and cargo movements. Some 14.2 million containers and 2.3 billion tons of commodities flow through U.S. ports yearly.<sup>30</sup> The U.S. marine transportation system in 1996 "generated 13.1 million jobs and personal income of \$494.2 billion, resulted in sales of \$1.5 trillion, contributed \$742.9 billion to the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and generated nearly \$200 billion in federal, state, and local taxes.<sup>31</sup> Some 141 million passengers per year are transported on the nation's waterways.<sup>32</sup> Approximately 72 million Americans participate in recreational boating annually, operating some 17 million boats, and spending \$23 billion per annum on boating related goods.<sup>33</sup> More than eight million recreational fishermen take 64 million fishing trips per year, launching from one of the nation's thousands of harbors, marinas, and boat ramps.<sup>34</sup> Commercial and recreational fishing annually contributes \$111 billion to state economies, and about 110,000 commercial U.S. fishing vessels operate from America's ports.<sup>35</sup> The cruise ship industry spent \$6.6 billion on goods and service in 1997, generating 176,000 jobs, with a total economic impact of \$11.6 billion.<sup>36</sup> Ninety percent of U.S. military materials move through our nation's seaports during times of military intervention.<sup>37</sup> Over 7,500 foreign-flagged ships carrying some 200,000 multi-national mariners make more than 51,000 U.S. port calls to offload and load billions of tons of

cargo.<sup>38</sup> Approximately, 285 billion barrels of oil are transported in vessels through U.S. waterways.<sup>39</sup> The economic contributions of U.S. maritime-dependent activities cannot be overstated.

“Nowhere is the gap between vulnerability and capability greater than along the Nation’s sea borders. Asymmetrical military and terrorist threats have a natural gateway into America via the marine transportation system.”<sup>40</sup> Seaports are of great economic importance to our nation and are inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Seaports provide a ready avenue for the introduction of many different types of threats because of their expansive size, open accessibility by water and land, locations in large metropolitan areas, and the sheer amount of people and material being transported through them. The waterways and ports link to 152,000 miles of rail, 460,000 miles of pipelines, and 45,000 miles of interstate highways.<sup>41</sup> The combination of many different transportation modes and the concentration of passengers, high-value cargo, and hazardous material further make seaports potential targets. Of the millions of containers that enter this country every year by ship, only about two percent are physically inspected.<sup>42</sup> The activities and facilities at seaports, such as petroleum tank farms and other hazardous material storage facilities, are intertwined with the infrastructure of the city.<sup>43</sup> A terrorist act at a port could result in extensive loss of lives, property, and business; could disrupt operations of the harbor and the transportation infrastructure; could cause extensive environmental damage; and could significantly disrupt the flow of trade.<sup>44</sup> Consider the impact of a mere slowdown of stevedore work during a recent West Coast labor dispute in 2002!

## MARITIME CHALLENGES

America is an open society. This openness promotes freedom of movement for people and cargoes across our borders. This freedom of movement enhances the nation’s economic system. It also leaves the homeland vulnerable to several kinds of threats.

The expeditious flow of commerce through our ports is essential to the health of our national economy. The biggest challenge facing our marine transportation system is to ensure that legitimate cargo is not unnecessarily delayed when enhanced security procedures are implemented.<sup>45</sup> Slowing the flow long enough to inspect all or a statistical selection of imports would be economically intolerable.<sup>46</sup>

If security procedures impede trade, the economic impact will be felt worldwide. Sustained global prosperity depends upon America accommodating the global trade that is predicted to double or triple in the next 20 years. Our government is obligated to find ways to minimize disruptions to the flow of trade caused by security requirements; but our government is also obligated to keep illegal immigrants, drugs, weapons, and other contraband from entering into America. The goal of sustaining global economic prosperity depends on free movement of vessels, people, and goods at the ports. On the other hand, ensuring maritime security to prevent catastrophic events may require tightening down the ports. The interests of prosperity and security should not be competing when they serve the transcendent national interest.<sup>47</sup> Balancing the tension of these interests is a delicate and sensitive process, especially when disruption of trade could have catastrophic consequences at home and abroad.

Key security issues regarding the marine transportation system include supporting national security programs; maintaining the flow of traffic; and safeguarding the nation's waterways, ports, facilities, vessels, individuals, and property in the vicinity of the port from accidental or intentional damage or injury.<sup>48</sup> The Marine Transportation System Task Force of 1998 identified five strategic initiatives related to marine transportation security, with the preponderance of implementation under the Coast Guard's purview.<sup>49</sup>

- Improve security awareness.
- Identify vulnerabilities and improve transparency.
- Ensure qualified operators.
- Forge stronger public/private partnerships.
- Strengthen international cooperation.

Transnational threats from individuals and groups using the vast oceans, sea-lanes, and marine transportation system to conceal criminal activities such as delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will challenge America as never before. Some of the more menacing current threats include:

- Multinational-Multiflagged Ships Serving U.S. Ports: Borderless finance, increasing complexity of international maritime and tax laws, and the institution of multinational corporations have obscured control of ship and cargo movement.<sup>50</sup> This can create deceitful ship registry practices in a number of countries, thereby hiding the identities of true ownership and interests.

- Smuggling: Drugs, illegal aliens, and contraband are routinely smuggled into America in small oceangoing vessels and among legitimate cargoes in large commercial ships. Migrant and drug smuggling also compound the threat of terrorism, because they contribute to the illicit movement of people, money, technology, and weapons across borders.<sup>51</sup>
- Weapons of Mass Destruction: The transport of WMD and their components can readily be concealed in legitimate trade or smuggled into America via the sea. Likewise, many types of cruise missiles carrying WMD could be launched with relatively little risk of detection from hundreds of miles at sea by small freight vessels or possibly from larger fishing vessels.<sup>52</sup>
- Trade Access: The world's increasingly interrelated trade and economic structure dictates that no nation or group of nations should deny the U.S. maritime trade access.<sup>53</sup> Likewise, the U.S. must deny trade access only with irrefutable justification of such denial.
- Maritime Food Supply: As the world's population continues to grow, competition for the marine food source will increase exponentially. This stress is further exacerbated with the advent of advanced technology that is capable of harvesting the ocean's food sources to extinction.<sup>54</sup>
- Environmental Protection: Massive marine pollution incidents can cause grave ecological and economic damage, destroying the food chain that sustains marine life, impacting climatic patterns, and disrupting military operations.<sup>55</sup>
- Crime and Violence: Terrorism, piracy, and other maritime crimes obstruct free trade and threaten national security, human and marine life, commerce, stability, and freedom of navigation.<sup>56</sup>
- Mass Migration. The sudden outpouring or the continual migration of economic or political refugees via the sea taxes maritime forces, humanitarian organizations, and nations for sanctuary support.<sup>57</sup>

## **ROLES AND MISSIONS VALIDATION**

Coast Guard roles and missions contribute directly to the economic, environmental, and physical security of the United States. Its roles and missions have been validated three times over the last 40 years. A Roles and Mission Study of 1965 (the Ebasco Report) and of 1982 supported all the Coast Guard's varied responsibilities.<sup>58</sup>

<p><b>Maritime Security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Drug Interdiction</li> <li>• Alien Migrant Interdiction</li> <li>• Exclusive Economic Zone &amp; Living Marine Resource Law/Treaty Enforcement</li> <li>• General Maritime Law Enforcement</li> </ul>
<p><b>Maritime Safety</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Search and Rescue</li> <li>• Marine Safety</li> <li>• Recreational Boating Safety</li> <li>• International Ice Patrol</li> </ul>
<p><b>Maritime Mobility</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aids to Navigation</li> <li>• Icebreaking Service</li> <li>• Bridge Administration</li> <li>• Waterways/Vessel Traffic Management</li> </ul>
<p><b>Protection of Natural Resource</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marine Environmental Protection</li> <li>• Domestic Fisheries Enforcement</li> <li>• Protected Living Marine Resource Law Enforcement</li> </ul>
<p><b>National Defense</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General Defense Operations</li> <li>• Maritime Interception Operations</li> <li>• Military Environmental Response Operations</li> <li>• Port Operations, Security, and Defense</li> <li>• Peacetime Military Engagement</li> <li>• Coastal Sea Control Operations</li> <li>• Polar Icebreaking</li> </ul>

TABLE 1. THE FIVE COAST GUARD ROLES AND THEIR CORRESPONDING MISSIONS. (Source: U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian. Coast Guard Publication 1)

The latest and most comprehensive study of the Coast Guard was completed in 1999. President Clinton established an Interagency Task Force to “provide advice and recommendations regarding the appropriate roles and missions for the United States Coast Guard through the year 2020.”<sup>59</sup> His Executive Order directed the Interagency Task Force to identify and distinguish the roles, missions, and functions that might be added or enhanced, maintained at present levels, reduced or eliminated, or moved to another organization. The Task Force gathered and analyzed data from around the world, visited Coast Guard units throughout the nation, heard testimony from experts and representatives of organizations that rely upon Coast Guard operations, and solicited responses from key stakeholders, individuals, and organizations with an ongoing or past relationship with the Coast Guard.<sup>60</sup> The Task Force was comprised of senior leaders of 16 different agencies within the federal government: Department of Transportation, Department of State, Department of Treasury, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of

Commerce, Department of Labor, Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Management and Budget, National Security Council, The White House, National Economic Council, Domestic Policy Council, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Council on Environmental Quality, and the U.S. Coast Guard. They concluded:

The Coast Guard's roles and missions support national policies and objectives that will endure into the 21st century.

The U.S. will continue to need a flexible, adaptable, multi-missioned, military Coast Guard to meet national maritime interests and requirements well into the next century.

In order to hedge against tomorrow's uncertainties, the Coast Guard should be rebuilt so as to make it adaptable to future realities.

In keeping with its well-deserved reputation as one of the Federal Government's most effective and efficient organizations, the Coast Guard should continue to pursue new methods and technologies to enhance its ability to perform its vital missions.

The recapitalization of the Coast Guard's Deepwater capability is a near term national priority.

The Deepwater acquisition project is a sound approach to that end and the Interagency Task Force strongly endorses its process and timeline.<sup>61</sup>

## **STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF COAST GUARD**

The Coast Guard is recognized as the world leader in maritime safety, security, mobility, and environmental protection. The Coast Guard's broad legal authority, multi-mission assets, unique civil-military nature, command and control systems, maritime expertise, disposition to coordination and cooperation with all responsible public, private, and international entities, and operational nature make it an extraordinary instrument to secure America's maritime national security interests.

## **IMPORTANCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY**

U.S. Presidents have routinely found the Coast Guard an extremely useful instrument for responding to national emergencies, enforcing national policy, and maintaining and protecting national security interests abroad. The Coast Guard's military, multi-mission character – along with its non-threatening, humanitarian image and its status as an armed service – gives the President a unique instrument of national policy.<sup>62</sup> For example, the Coast Guard is designated the lead agency for maritime drug interdiction under the National Drug Control Strategy. The Coast Guard represents America in the UN-sponsored International Maritime Organization. Under the National Contingency Plan, Coast Guard Captains of the Port are the pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinators for oil and hazardous substance incidents in coastal waterways. The Service is the nation's lead maritime law enforcement service, enforcing federal laws, regulations, treaties, and international agreements on the high seas and waters



under U.S. jurisdiction. The Coast Guard has specific national defense responsibilities. It is the lead agency for maritime search and rescue and the lead agency for maritime homeland security.

The United States is signatory to over 120 international maritime agreements. The Coast Guard provides technical advice and support for the formation of these agreements, usually acting as the principal agency in negotiations. It also provides representatives and advisors to U.S. delegations dealing with maritime affairs and supports diplomatic missions abroad by assigning Coast Guard officers to several U.S. embassies.<sup>63</sup>

The Coast Guard's humanitarian image makes it less threatening to other nations' sovereignty. Thus, the Coast Guard becomes a valuable asset in domestic or international situations where DOD assets might appear threatening or be politically unacceptable.<sup>64</sup>

The Coast Guard's cultural tendency to cooperate makes it a valuable instrument in dealing with foreign governments. For example, it negotiated bilateral agreements on local sovereignty issues for ice breaking, search and rescue, overflights, host nation participation in law enforcement operations, and many other international and multinational endeavors.<sup>65</sup>

Its cutters are designated U.S. warships, which affords the service certain rights under international conventions, such as the right for its cutters to approach any vessel to ascertain its identity and country of origin. It also enables the President "to assert principles of national sovereignty, such as freedom of navigation, with vessels viewed as less threatening than U.S. Navy ships."<sup>66</sup> Coast Guard cutters are built primarily for maritime enforcement missions, but they are also exceptionally suited to supplement the Navy as needed for "low end" missions such as harbor/coastal defense, convoy escort, and maritime interdiction. The Coast Guard is a complementary and non-redundant force-at-hand available to Combatant Commanders as a specialized instrument in supporting the nation's security.<sup>67</sup>

A 1995 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation specifies four missions where Coast Guard core competencies will formally contribute in the national defense of America:<sup>68</sup>

- Maritime Intercept Operations
- Port Operations, Security and Defense

- Military Environmental Response Operations
- Peacetime Military Engagement

Many emerging democratic nations face similar problems of exploitation of natural resources, illegal maritime trafficking, and environmental degradation. These are primary Coast Guard mission areas. Coast Guard personnel are ideally suited to conduct training in these maritime security missions due to their multi-mission capabilities. These multinational engagement activities leverage Coast Guard efforts to be more successful in its domestic missions.<sup>69</sup> “Developing nations benefit from the Coast Guard experience to craft their own national approach to maritime security challenges of the future: drug interdiction, illegal maritime migrations, marine environmental protection, fisheries protection, etc.. Not only do the host nations improve their own maritime security, but they become better partners working with the United States to address these transnational threats on an international basis.”<sup>70</sup> Coast Guard forces are included in the major contingency plans of the geographic Combatant Commanders for the missions specified in the 1995 MOA, with the understanding that Coast Guard forces are adaptable to other specialized missions.<sup>71</sup> Taken together, the Coast Guard offers very broad support of national security, support that extends beyond America’s national defense missions. Overall, the Coast Guard provides a maritime resource with capabilities not available elsewhere in government.<sup>72</sup>

## IMPORTANCE TO HOMELAND SECURITY

Terrorism on U.S. soil has consistently been defined as a criminal act. Homeland security is ultimately enforced by civil authority. As a federal law enforcement agency, the Coast Guard has been designated the lead agency for establishing a maritime security strategy that supports the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The Coast Guard is also responsible for preserving living marine resources from foreign encroachment, preventing environmental damage, and responding to spills of oil and hazardous substances – all critical elements of homeland security.

### **Principles of Maritime Homeland Security**

Terrorists’ capacity to do harm within the U.S. depends on their ability to get themselves and their weapons across our borders. To protect America from threats emanating from the

sea, effective maritime homeland security is built upon the principles of awareness, prevention, detection, response, and consequence management.<sup>73</sup> Accordingly, the Coast Guard's homeland security mission is "to protect the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine Transportation System and deny their use and exploitation by terrorists as a means for attacks on U.S. territory, population, and critical infrastructure."<sup>74</sup> The Coast Guard's maritime homeland security goals are to maintain:

- Public confidence in the security of the ports, waterways, and maritime borders.
- Maritime Domain Awareness.
- Ability to interdict threats.
- Positive and controlled movement of high interest vessels.
- Protection of critical infrastructure.
- Active presence for both deterrence and response capability.<sup>75</sup>

By leveraging its multi-mission capabilities the Coast Guard is thus able to achieve its *Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security* with minimal interference with the openness of U.S. society through the following strategic objectives:

Prevent terrorist attacks within, and terrorist exploitation of, the U.S. Maritime Domain.

Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism within the U.S. Maritime Domain.

Protect U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, coastal approaches, and the boundaries and seams between them.

Protect the U.S. Marine Transportation System while preserving the freedom of the U.S. Maritime Domain for legitimate pursuits.

Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may occur within the U.S. Maritime Domain as either the lead federal agency or a supporting agency.<sup>76</sup>

### **Elements of the Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security**

To effectively achieve the strategic objectives of safeguarding America's maritime interests, the Coast Guard has identified several ways to achieve maritime homeland security:<sup>77</sup>

- Close Port Security Gaps: Implement a layered defense of the maritime domain, pushing our borders out as far as possible, thereby strengthening the port security postures while reducing the vulnerability of strategic economic and military ports.

- Conduct Enhanced Maritime Security Operations: Maintain an increased level of security operations of our ports and waterways by conducting risk assessments; by strengthening the security posture to reduce vulnerabilities; by controlling the movement of high-interest vessels so that the vessels do not become either a target or a weapon; and by increasing the level of active presence of Coast Guard assets, which is a necessary condition for enforcing law, maintaining sovereignty, and deterring violators and aggressors.<sup>78</sup>
- Increase Maritime Domain Awareness: Create a more comprehensive awareness of threats and activities in the maritime domain and leverage existing partnerships and relationships with the commercial and private sector to achieve actionable information. The Coast Guard has developed a program of “Maritime Domain Awareness,” which is supported by both the Administration and Congress. Maritime domain awareness “is the effective knowledge of all activities and elements in the maritime domain that could represent threats to the safety, security, or environment of the United States or its citizens. The objective is timely delivery of actionable information, drawn from all available sources, to the appropriate law enforcement agency or military command.”<sup>79</sup>
- Build Critical Security Capabilities and Competencies: Expand the core competencies and recapitalize vital assets of the Coast Guard to provide a greater presence in the open ocean and within our ports and waterways.
- Ensure Readiness for Homeland Defense Operations: Prepare civil and military forces to easily shift between homeland security and homeland defense operations.
- Leverage Partnerships to Mitigate Security Risks: Nourish partnerships and provide leadership between the public and private sectors at home and abroad so the ports and waterways security of America is not left just to governmental agencies to raise the collective consciousness of America’s security profile.<sup>80</sup>

## **ENDURING VALUE OF A MULTI-MISSION MARITIME SERVICE**

The Coast Guard's strength resides in its multifunctional capabilities. The ability to field versatile platforms and develop multitalented Coast Guard personnel in the conduct of the full spectrum of maritime affairs is perhaps its most important core competency.<sup>81</sup> All mission capabilities complement one another. The emergent and dynamic nature of the Coast Guard's business mandates that the Service's basic operational principles are agility, responsiveness, and decisiveness. The multifunctional characteristics of the Coast Guard promote nimble,

conclusive, and rapid response to each diverse mission as it arises. The Center for Naval Analysis' research on the value of the Coast Guard to the nation concluded that:

The Coast Guard's enduring worth to the nation is as a coordinator and provider of maritime services. It provides essential services, where and when required, and it bonds, focuses, and coordinates disparate actors, ensuring that the job gets done. This quality is unique among federal agencies and is not duplicated in government or private institutions. No other agency has the breadth of responsibility; existing authority; varied skill set... international and domestic web of contacts, partnerships and working relationships; or predilection for cooperation and coordination, or is as result-oriented...<sup>82</sup>

The Center's praise of the Coast Guard thus acknowledged the synergy brought about by the interdependency and interconnectivity of all the Coast Guard's missions.

America does not need two separate Coast Guard forces to conduct so-called homeland security and non-homeland security missions. "Any attempt to enforce an artificial distinction between homeland security and non-homeland security responsibilities ignores the Coast Guard's long-standing doctrine of operating as a multi-mission service. The Coast Guard has never categorized its responsibilities as either 'homeland' or 'non-homeland' security or required that its forces be assigned to one or the other."<sup>83</sup> To operate otherwise would reduce the Coast Guard's readiness and introduce duplication and inefficiencies into the Coast Guard, an organization that routinely has been judged to be one of the most effective and efficient government agencies in the world.<sup>84</sup>

All current Coast Guard functions provide essential services requiring Federal direction, as validated by the three independent Task Forces on the Roles and Missions of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard's multi-mission capability produces synergy of effort. The advantages of a multifunctional organization are difficult to quantify. But the consequences of splitting the service apart would severely impact its readiness to accomplish its missions in the stellar fashion Americans have come to expect. Functions have been continuously added to the Coast Guard because its history validated that they fit there best. There was simply no better way to perform them independently. With each added task has come a body of law and regulations and new relationships with other authorities, private organizations, foreign governments, and international institutions – all building upon one another.<sup>85</sup> In validating the Coast Guard's missions, the Interagency Task Force of 1999 found that the confluence of Coast Guard duties produced efficiencies and synergies that would be lost in any shift of its roles and missions.<sup>86</sup>

The Coast Guard's multi-capable assets were specifically designed to meet multiple mandates. The Coast Guard stresses economy of force. It has indeed perfected this concept. Not every Coast Guard responsibility requires full-time dedicated assets for their discharge, yet these responsibilities require dispersed and vigilant assets at all times if they are to be readily used when and where required.<sup>87</sup> Its many different functions cannot be easily split because its vessels and personnel are multi-functional, and substantial efficiencies are realized from not duplicating these capabilities. The need for unity of command and unity of effort on the seas and waterways requires preservation of its multi-mission integrity so it can respond to threats against our homeland while continuing in its other key functions. The Interagency Task Force on the Coast Guard Roles and Missions of 1999 concluded:

While national policies from which Coast Guard missions are derived can be thought of in discrete terms, Coast Guard people and capital assets by which those policies are implemented are a unified whole. This is the essence of the term "multi-mission" – a singular, integrated human and capital asset system (ships, aircraft, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance [C4ISR]) with multiple synergy, capabilities, functionality, and civil and military policy utilities. This multi-mission capability make the Coast Guard one of the most efficient agencies in government – multiple outcomes from a single capital base give the American taxpayer maximum "bang for the buck" from the Coast Guard. ... Overall national policy for the Coast Guard must be drawn in such a way that the adaptability, flexibility, efficiency, and multiple policy utility of today's Coast Guard – the thing that makes today's Coast Guard a unique instrument of national policy – is preserved and enhanced, and not compromised.<sup>88</sup>

The Coast Guard leads in providing all non-DOD maritime security needs of America because of its unique set of multi-mission competencies, capabilities, and authorities. Its multi-mission 7X24 response capabilities across the spectrum of maritime operations offer a scalable command and control framework suitable for preventing or responding to any domestic maritime crisis. It offers extensive multifunctional experience in consequence management from natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, floods, etc.) and maritime accidents (e.g., oil and hazardous material spills, bridge collapses, shipboard explosions, etc.). Its network of coastal small boat stations, Captains of the Port, Marine Safety Offices, air stations, and cutters provides an active presence throughout the nation to prevent and respond to safety and security incidents. This multi-mission experience has made the Coast Guard the most proficient agency anywhere for conducting emergency response operations through the Incident Command Structure.<sup>89</sup>

The Coast Guard can skillfully assume a variety of responsibilities because the skills and competencies required to respond to a safety incident are the same as those required for a security incident. Coast Guard missions follow a common sequence of actions: monitor, detect, identify, investigate, respond, act, and record. This sequence is basically the same for law enforcement, national security, environmental protection, and lifesaving missions.<sup>90</sup> “The combination of multi-mission trained crews and multi-mission suitable equipment is a force multiplier, whose combined efficiencies and savings are self-evident.”<sup>91</sup> The Coast Guard’s vast web of cooperative arrangements with other agencies, officials, authorities, institutions, and organizations (at home and abroad) provide another force multiplier that was born from its multi-functional capabilities.<sup>92</sup> Consider the following examples of how missions are integrated at the unit level:

- A Coast Guard boarding team conducting a routine fishery boarding inspects a vessel on a host of laws and regulations that span multiple missions pertaining to practically every aspect of the fishing vessel – the documentation papers; the safety equipment; the fishing gear; the fish catch logbook; the fish caught; engine spaces; the structural integrity of the vessel; the man size compartments; the crew’s identification; the weapons. Throughout the boarding the vessel and crew’s identification are verified with a shore-based intelligence fusion center. The boarding team ensures the fishermen are fishing in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, while noting any suspicious activity. If the boarding team or fusion center establishes probable cause a law has been violated, a citation or an arrest and seizure may be forthcoming. In this typical scenario, the Coast Guard is enforcing fishery laws, immigration laws, custom laws, pollution laws, safety laws, and drug laws to name a few. Further, the Coast Guard cutter gains valuable experience in identifying legitimate fishing practices and techniques. This enables the cutter to quickly ascertain if a fishing vessel they approach is engaged in legitimate fishing or some kind of illegal activity – such as smuggling drugs, illegal aliens, or terrorists.
- While a cutter is enforcing a safety zone of an area sparked with protest activities, the cutter retrieves a navigational buoy that broke its mooring from a vessel traffic scheme in the vicinity of the safety zone. While towing the buoy to a nearby harbor, it receives a distress call from a nearby recreational boater that their boat is uncontrollably taking on water. The cutter launches a small boat to render assistance to the boater. This scenario is not uncommon for a Coast Guard cutter; one cutter performing numerous missions – rapidly, decisively, and simultaneously.

- A Marine Safety Office (MSO) is responsible for vessel inspection, marine casualty investigation, licensing and documentation of vessels, licensing and certificating of merchant marine personnel, port safety, and environmental protection. Its primary function is to promote marine safety and security throughout the diverse maritime industries in its area of responsibility in order to protect personnel and property, and to ensure that marine commerce and trade is carried out in an orderly and safe fashion. The MSO activities cover a broad spectrum of vessels, facilities, and their crews, ranging from small fishing boats, tugs, mineral and oil supply vessels, to large sophisticated tankships and cargo vessels. The MSO monitors the movement of vessels within the port; establishes safety and security zones as appropriate; responds to marine pollution and environmental damage incidents; issues permits for Marine Regattas and parades; conducts hazardous material container inspections and marine transfer facility inspections; investigates marine casualties; inspects vessels; runs the Port State Control program; oversees the Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Program; licenses mariners; issues vessel documentation; and runs the Regional Exam Center. It is the lead agency for the Federal Response Plan and Area Contingency Plan regarding maritime incidents. It has a multitude of partnerships within the port and with local governments to manage and protect the ports and waterways within its area of responsibility (e.g., Sea Partners, Harbor Safety Committee, Marine Exchange, and Steamship Operators Association). The designated Captain of the Port at each MSO directs facility and terminal operators of designated waterfront facilities, cruise ship passenger terminals, and oil/bulk hazardous material facilities in their zones, assuring compliance within appropriate security guidelines. Their contingency plans for consequence management are based on the Incident Command Structure. They coordinate first responders to major marine incidents. Their responsibilities transcend every Coast Guard role. Each department in the MSO works in concert with all others. Everything the MSO does affects the security of the port and waterways within their sector. It would be unrealistic to separate an MSO into two distinct entities based on missions being designated as either homeland security or non-homeland security related.
- The 37,000 all-volunteer Coast Guard Auxiliary force is primarily responsible for boating safety. These volunteers are active members of their boating community. They circulate actively about the boat docks performing courtesy examinations of vessels. They augment regular Coast Guard functions by providing first responder assistance to search and rescue



cases and man some of the Coast Guard's Group Operations Centers. They provide platforms to assist in enforcing safety and security zones. They are an active force-in-being on the waterfront, providing invaluable presence in their local communities – and presence is a form of deterrence.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Develop a metric that shows the economy of force of the multi-mission aspect of Coast Guard assets.

The Coast Guard should provide some measure of effectiveness/efficiency which attempts to quantify the multi-mission characteristics of the Coast Guard. It is important for the Coast Guard to keep Congress apprised of its efforts and to share with Congress its strategic direction. However, it must be understood that the most enduring contributions the Service provides to the public are intangible. Defining intangible benefits is difficult. Developing a metric to show economy of force will only document a fraction of the value of the multifunctional capabilities of the Coast Guard. A strategy to articulate the immense value of keeping all the current missions within the Coast Guard is paramount. Most of the intrinsic value of keeping the Coast Guard intact is best articulated through its organizational evolution.

Dissuade members of Congress from grouping missions into categories as either homeland security related or non-homeland security related.

There is no reliable distinction between homeland security and non-homeland security missions. The so-called non-homeland security missions do in fact support the strategic objectives of the Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. In the totality of "full-spectrum" maritime preparedness and response, each mission supports, complements, and reinforces other missions to achieve the objectives deemed of national importance. Missions may be thought of as distinct in nature during the authorization and appropriation process in building the fiscal year budget of the government. However, to separate the mission at the Coast Guard unit level would be unrealistic and create

false perceptions that Coast Guard missions can be separated and are not integrally connected. The Coast Guard's missions have evolved over two centuries because the nation has asked more and more of the Service as threats and technology have evolved.

## **CONCLUSION**

The interconnectivity and inseparability of Coast Guard missions has grown a force with “full-spectrum” situational awareness, capable of rapid response to almost any maritime situation. More than just maintaining Maritime Domain Awareness, Coast Guard multi-mission assets operate along the horizontal, the vertical, and the diagonal axes of organizations in government and private sectors. The Coast Guard’s continued demonstrated ability to operate with any organization connected with maritime interests, to influence maritime organizations on safety and security matters, to access foreign government resources, and to influence a host of agencies, at home and abroad, is based on its total multi-mission capabilities. This intact, multi-mission capability must be sustained to assure the safety and security of America’s maritime national interests.

Word Count: 9120



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<sup>41</sup> U.S. Department of Transportation, vii.

<sup>42</sup> Loy and Ross, 3.

<sup>43</sup> General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful GAO-02-993T (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 05 August 2002), 5.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>45</sup> James M. Loy, The Unique Challenges of Maritime Security. Speech. Washington, D.C., The Propeller Club of the United States, 31 October 2001; available from <<http://www.uscg.mil/Commandant/Speeches/Propeller%20Club%20MariSec%20103101.htm>>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2001.

<sup>46</sup> Loy and Ross, 1.

<sup>47</sup> Loy, The Unique Challenges of Maritime Security.

<sup>48</sup> U.S. Department of Transportation, 88.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>50</sup> Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Maritime Challenges 1997 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy, March 1997), 6.

<sup>51</sup> Loy, The Unique Challenges of Maritime Security.

<sup>52</sup> Loy and Ross, 2.

<sup>53</sup> Office of Naval Intelligence, 7.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Capron, 202.

<sup>59</sup> Presidential Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions, The U.S. Coast Guard of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century; Washington, D.C. January 2000, 1-1.

<sup>60</sup> Presidential Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions, 1-6.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 4-1 - 4-4.

<sup>62</sup> Roth and Kohout, 19.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 27.

<sup>66</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, 40.

<sup>67</sup> Presidential Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions, 4-13.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, 2-30.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, 4-15.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, 47.

<sup>73</sup> Loy, The Unique Challenges of Maritime Security.

<sup>74</sup> Thomas H. Collins, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, 3.

<sup>75</sup> U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. Port and Maritime Security Strategy.

<sup>76</sup> Thomas H. Collins, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, 16.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*, 20.

<sup>78</sup> Thomas H. Collins, Before the Gathering Storm, speech, Washington, D.C., National Defense University, 09 October 2002; available from <[http://www.uscg.mil/Commandant/speeches\\_Collins/2002-10-09NDUShort3.doc](http://www.uscg.mil/Commandant/speeches_Collins/2002-10-09NDUShort3.doc)>; Internet; accessed 24 October 2002.

<sup>79</sup> Loy and Ross, 2.

<sup>80</sup> James M. Loy, "Always Prepared – The Coast Guard's Continuing Role in Homeland Security," Journal of Homeland Security May 2002 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/displayArticle.asp?article=55>>; Internet; accessed 30 October 2002.

<sup>81</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, 42.

<sup>82</sup> Roth and Kohout, 38.

<sup>83</sup> Stubbs.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>85</sup> Roth and Kohout, 9.

<sup>86</sup> Presidential Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions, 4-31.

<sup>87</sup> Roth and Kohout, 34.

<sup>88</sup> Presidential Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions, 4-2.

<sup>89</sup> Loy, The Unique Challenges of Maritime Security.

<sup>90</sup> Stubbs.

<sup>91</sup> Roth and Kohout, 34.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, 20.





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