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Research Report 1803

Development and Evaluation of Communication-Based Measures of Situation Awareness

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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The research reported herein was partially funded by the Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program.

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

The present investigation sought to develop and field test two new behavioral measures of situation awareness (SA) that rated the content of small unit radio transmissions. Initially, a four-person team generated an item pool of 318 critical incidents of communication behavior, each intended to represent either an outstanding, typical, or poor level of SA on the part of small unit leaders. A group of 24 independent evaluators then rated the degree to which they thought each of the 318 items was related to the concept of SA. The 20 items having the highest levels of agreement among the independent evaluators within each SA level were chosen to comprise the Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA) and the Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA) scale. Six field trials were then conducted with each of seven squad leaders and their respective squads. Based on their monitoring of squad and platoon radios, two independent raters completed separate RCCOLA checklists during each of the 42 total trials, as well as separate FELLA scales after the completion of each trial. Interrater agreement was generally high for both measures. Based on their methods of construction, we can also assume they possess some content-related validity.

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Research Report 1803

Development and Evaluation of Communication-Based Measures of Situation Awareness

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The Infantry Forces Research Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences conducts research that contributes to a better understanding of soldier-based instructional issues under its *Training Modernization for Infantry Forces* research program. In support of this objective, our scientists have participated in 14 field experiments conducted under the auspices of the Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. The last of these field experiments formed the basis of this report. It investigated the degree to which squad radios contribute to the battlefield situation awareness (SA) of squad leaders and squad members.

Prior to this field experiment, we developed a pair of new instruments for measuring the SA of small unit leaders based on information that could be gleaned from the unobtrusive real-time monitoring of platoon and squad radio networks. From an initial pool of 318 critical incidents of communication behavior, 60 were culled on the basis of high independent evaluator agreement to form the Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA) and the Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA) scale. This report documents the methodological development of these new SA measures and presents the results of a limited field evaluation involving seven squad leaders for six trials each.

Although the size of our squad leader sample prevents one from drawing any definitive conclusions about the RCCOLA and FELLA instruments, results were promising and generally positive. Both instruments demonstrated high levels of interrater agreement and both can be said to possess a certain measure of content-related validity, based on the way the instruments were constructed. We recommend their future use, for both training and continued research, in all situations where small unit radio networks can be monitored by qualified personnel. These results have been presented to key research sponsors in the MOUT ACTD and Objective Force Warrior (OFW) programs during March of 2003. We hope to interest you to learn more about the potential SA benefits of improved soldier communication at the small unit level.

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DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION-BASED MEASURES OF SITUATION AWARENESS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

It is generally accepted that the most precise way of gauging situation awareness (SA) is to use objective measures, where important aspects of the situations investigated can be accurately known to both research participants and experimenters. Unfortunately, objective measures are relatively obtrusive and difficult to administer. They also lack robustness across situations, as a new test must be developed for each experimental scenario. The present investigation sought to develop and field test two new behavioral measures of SA that were based on the content of small unit radio transmissions monitored by unobtrusive observers.

Procedure:

A team of four retired military personnel was given a two-hour training workshop on how to write critical incidents of communication behavior. Over the course of the next several weeks, the team generated a pool of 318 incidents of communication behavior, each intended to represent either an outstanding, typical, or poor level of SA on the part of squad and platoon leaders. This item pool was then given to a group of 24 independent evaluators. Each evaluator was asked to judge whether or not each item reflected the SA of small unit leaders. If they judged an item as being related to the concept of SA, they were also asked to indicate whether the item suggested an outstanding, typical, or poor level of SA. For each of the three levels of SA, the 20 items with the highest levels of agreement among the independent evaluators were formed into two communication-based SA measures. These were termed the Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA) and the Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA) scale. Although both measures were based on the same 60 items, they differed greatly in their format. The RCCOLA checklist was used to record how frequently a specific set of behaviors occurred during the course of a mission, while the FELLA questionnaire was completed at the end of a mission and asked raters to predict or estimate the likelihood these behaviors would occur in future missions along a seven-point Likert scale.

Six field trials were then conducted with each of seven squad leaders and their respective squads. All trials for a given squad consisted of variations of a reconnaissance/link-up mission and were completed within a 12-hour time period. Three squad radio conditions were used, with one day and one night trial conducted for each condition. The conditions were no squad radio, squad radio with only the squad leader transmitting, and squad radio with both the squad leader and squad members having the freedom to transmit. Based on their monitoring of squad and platoon radios, two independent raters completed a separate RCCOLA checklist during each of the 42 total trials, as well as a separate FELLA scale after the completion of each trial.

Findings:

Based on the percentage of nearly identical item scores (\pm 1), interrater agreement was found to be generally high for both the RCCOLA checklist (97.5%) and the FELLA scale (84.4%) across trials. Because they were constructed from items having a high level of agreement among independent evaluators, we can also assume both measures possess a certain amount of content-related validity. Though it did not approach statistical significance, a small consistent trend among the squad radio conditions and our communication-based measures was found. In particular, the highest average SA scores were obtained during trials when squad members were allowed to transmit freely, perhaps because there were a significantly greater number of audible squad radio transmissions during these trials (p < .001).

Utilization of Findings:

We recommend the use of RCCOLA checklist and FELLA scale in future research, field exercises, and virtual training environments where radio transmissions of small unit personnel can be monitored. Additional research is needed to increase the sample of small unit leaders, to determine the relationship of communication-based measures to more objective measures of SA, and to gauge their utility for a wider variety of soldier missions.

As squad and platoon radios are beginning to proliferate within small units, the ability of our soldiers to communicate effectively with each other will become a critical factor influencing their ultimate level of combat effectiveness. How squad members contribute, or fail to contribute, to the SA of their squad and platoon leaders is an after-action review topic that needs more emphasis. Similarly, we also need to understand and emphasize how the communication behaviors of small unit leaders contribute or detract from the situational understanding of their subordinates. Before the promise of better small unit communication can be realized, however, we must get trainers and observer/controllers to routinely monitor squad and platoon radios during field exercises and training center rotations. Once optimal squad and platoon radio communication procedures have been identified, they need to be formally introduced into appropriate institutional courses for the benefit of junior leaders. We believe that communication-based measures of SA, such as those explored in the present report, can serve an important role in improving the communication practices and resulting levels of situational understanding among all soldiers at the small unit level.

DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION-BASED MEASURES OF SITUATION AWARENESS

CO	N	LEI	VTS
\sim	Ή.	L	N I L7

	Page
Introduction	on
	nent of Situation Awareness Measures
	Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness
Future	Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness 4
Global	SA Assessment Item
Evaluation	n of Situation Awareness Measures
	ch Participants
Measur	res and Raters
	ure
	5
	n9
	s
1010101100	11
Annendix	A Independent Evaluation Questionnaire
Annendix	B Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA)
	C Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA) Scale
Appendix	D Observation Frequency of RCCOLA Items by Two Raters
пррепал	Over 42 Experimental Trials
	D-1
	List of Tables
Table 1	Number of Items Classified by Item Authors and Independent Evaluators
	as Outstanding, Typical, and Poor SA
Table 2	Mean Percentage of Evaluator Agreement for 20 Items Representing
	Each of Three Levels of SA
Table 3	Mean Scores of Two Raters for Three SA Measures 6
Table 4	Percentage of Interrater Agreement Across Items and Trials 6
Table 5	Mean Scores of Three SA Measures and Mean Number of Radio
14014 0	Transmissions for Three Squad Radio Conditions
	Transmissions for Times Squad Radio Conditions
	List of Figures
Figure 1	A comparison of the RCCOLA scores obtained from two raters across
J	42 trials (six trials for each of seven squad leaders)

DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION-BASED MEASURES OF SITUATION AWARENESS

Introduction

The present research effort is a largely serendipitous product of two ongoing lines of investigation, specifically research related to the measurement and training of situation awareness (SA) in Infantry leaders and research aimed at discovering the most effective tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to use with squad and platoon radio networks. In the first case, identifying SA requirements and their relationships with emerging technology was the focus of early thought in the area of Infantry SA (Graham & Matthews, 1999). Building upon the earlier theoretical work of Endsley (1995b), an Infantry-focused model of individual SA was developed (Endsley et al., 2000). As a prelude to developing an Infantry SA trainer, the highest-priority SA training requirements were also identified. These requirements were schema training, task management and prioritization, communications training, and contingency planning (Strater, Jones, & Endsley, 2001).

It is generally accepted that the most precise way of gauging SA is to use objective measures, where various aspects of the situations investigated can be accurately known to both research participants and experimenters (Endsley, 1995a; Redden & Blackwell, 2001). There the focus of measurement is on the degree to which individual perceptions of situational characteristics differ from what is known to be "ground" truth. Though their reliability and validity are usually more than adequate, objective measures are relatively obtrusive and difficult to administer. They also lack robustness across situations (i.e., a new test must be developed for each experimental scenario). Together with the present investigation, some recent research efforts have explored the use of more subjective alternatives to traditional methods of measuring SA objectively (Matthews, Beal, & Pleban, 2002; Strater, Endsley, Pleban, & Matthews, 2001).

In the second case, while attempting to categorize and quantify radio transmissions in previous investigations of the relationship between various small-unit radio TTPs and SA (Christ & Evans, 2001; Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab & Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 1999; Redden & Blackwell, 2001), observers noticed that some squad leaders appeared to have greater SA than others, based solely on the nature and content of their radio communication with superiors, peers, and subordinates. The present research effort is an attempt to quantify this earlier behavioral observation. We seek to eventually develop communication-based measures of SA that will reliably differentiate the performance of small unit leaders and will closely mirror the psychometric properties of more objective SA measures.

The present report is organized around two separate, though interrelated, research efforts. First, we document the methodological development of two communication-based SA measures from a common pool of over 300 behavioral incidents. These measures are a behavioral checklist called the Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA) and a questionnaire called Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA). Second, we present the results of a limited number of field trials of these measures that were conducted with Infantry squad leaders and their squads. In the last section of the report we discuss future potential uses of the two scales.

Development of Situation Awareness Measures

Our approach to developing communication-based SA measures involved the use of the critical incident technique, originally described by Flanagan (1954). Four retired military personnel were given a two-hour training workshop on how to write suitable incidents of communication behavior. This training stressed four characteristics of critical incidents: their behavioral nature, specificity, ability to differentiate among people, and clarity. Examples of both acceptable and unacceptable incidents were provided. The first few incidents written by each participant were critiqued and suggestions for improvement were offered. Over a subsequent period of several weeks, participants generated a pool of 318 behavioral incidents on their own, each intended to represent either outstanding, typical, or poor SA on the part of platoon or squad leaders. In addition to using their own experience, the four item authors consulted a variety of publications to stimulate thought about item content and to widen the conceptual coverage of the item pool. These publications included doctrinal manuals (Department of the Army, 1992, 1994), the results of a recent SA requirements analysis (Strater et al., 2001), various bulletins and reports of the Center for Army Lessons Learned, as well as Combat Training Center compendia.

After editing to create a common style, the 318 behavioral incidents were given to a group of 24 independent evaluators. Each evaluator was asked to judge whether or not each item reflected the SA of small unit leaders. If they judged an item as being related to the concept of SA, they were also asked to indicate whether the item suggested outstanding, typical, or poor SA. The questionnaire used in the independent evaluation is shown in Appendix A. The group of independent evaluators included active duty military personnel (n = 9), retired military personnel (n = 7), and civilian scientists familiar with military field research (n = 8). Table 1 shows the level of agreement on item content between the item authors and the independent evaluators. Generally, items written to reflect poor or typical levels of leader SA were viewed as such by a majority of the independent evaluators. However, items written to reflect outstanding SA were, more often than not, seen as reflecting a typical level of SA. This effect was strongest among the active duty military evaluators.

Table 1
Number of Items Classified by Item Authors and Independent Evaluators as Outstanding, Typical, and Poor SA

		In	tent of Item Author	S
		Outstanding	Typical	Poor
Majority Rating	Outstanding	28	1	1
of Independent	Typical	91	60	11
Evaluators	Poor	1	20	105
	Total	120	81	117
	Agreement %	23.33	74.07	89.74

After the results of the independent evaluation were tabulated, the 318 items were sorted according to their level of evaluator agreement, from highest to lowest. There were 28 items that fewer than 20 independent evaluators thought reflected some level of SA. These were eliminated from any further consideration. An additional 108 items were eliminated because the majority of evaluators disagreed with the intent of the item authors. For example, 17 of the evaluators thought item 40 represented an outstanding level of leader SA, while six thought it represented a typical level of SA, and one was not convinced it represented SA at all. This item was dropped because the authors had intended it to reflect a typical level of SA. For each SA level, the 20 items having the greatest independent evaluator agreement were selected for inclusion in the RCCOLA and FELLA scales. Agreement statistics for the 60 chosen items are shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Mean Percentage of Evaluator Agreement for 20 Items Representing
Each of Three Levels of SA

	Mean % of Evaluators Who Thought	Mean % of Evaluators Who Agreed
Item SA Level	Items Related to SA	with Author's Intent about SA Level
Outstanding	93.12	63.33
Typical	91.87	82.92
Poor	91.46	88.96

Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness

As shown in Appendix B, the 60 items selected as a result of the independent evaluation were formed into a behavioral checklist titled the Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA). This SA measure was designed to enable observers to record the occurrence of SA-related communication behaviors in real time while listening to the squad and platoon radio networks of a squad leader. Similarly, RCCOLA items were designed to be suitable for the assessment of platoon leader SA, by listening to company and platoon radio networks. Every time a particular behavior was heard, observers or raters would place a checkmark next to that item on the checklist. Thus, it was possible for each RCCOLA item to receive multiple checkmarks, one for each occurrence of a particular behavior.

Items representing outstanding, typical, and poor SA were segregated and then grouped into four temporal categories: planning/preparing, movement, actions on enemy contact, and miscellaneous. These categories were chosen to hasten the ratings process under real-time conditions, making it easier for observers to locate particular items as a mission unfolds. The categories were not thought to be underlying factors of an SA construct. The miscellaneous category included items that could occur at any time during a mission. For each trial or mission, the RCCOLA measure is scored as follows:

<u>number of outstanding checkmarks</u> - <u>number of poor checkmarks</u> total number of outstanding, typical, and poor checkmarks

Possible RCCOLA scores can range from -1 to +1, with a score of 0 indicating a typical level of SA for squad leaders.

Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness

The same 60 items selected from the independent evaluation were also formed into what we called the Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA) scale (see Appendix C). Unlike the RCCOLA measure, the FELLA scale was designed to be completed at the end of an experimental trial or operational mission. Further, the FELLA items were listed in random order, without grouping them into categories. The FELLA scale was designed to be more future oriented and subjective than the RCCOLA measure, asking raters their expectations of the likelihood of particular leader behaviors occurring in subsequent missions.

The 60 FELLA items were scored on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from "Highly Unlikely" (1) to "Highly Likely" (7), with the scale's midpoint being "Hard to Say" (4). The 20 items representing a poor level of leader SA were reverse scored. An overall FELLA scale score was obtained by calculating the mean of the 60 items. Thus, possible overall scores could range from 1 to 7.

Global SA Assessment Item

Finally, a global assessment item was added to the end of the FELLA scale. This item asked raters about their overall expectations of a leader's SA level in future missions. The global assessment item was scored on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from "Poor" (1) to "Outstanding" (7), with "Center of Mass" being the midpoint anchor. If a large enough leader sample could be obtained in future experimentation, this item could help to determine the relative contribution of particular leader behaviors to the overall concept of SA.

Evaluation of Situation Awareness Measures

Field trials using the RCCOLA checklist and the FELLA scale were conducted as part of a larger field experiment investigating the degree to which squad radios enhanced soldier SA. Sponsored by the Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program, this experiment was a direct follow-on effort to an earlier experiment whose results have already been reported in detail (Christ & Evans, 2002; Redden & Blackwell, 2001). The earlier experiment involved the use of experienced squads conducting offensive and defensive missions in an urban environment, where squad members maintained direct visual contact with each other much of the time. In contrast, the present experiment involved the use of relatively inexperienced squads conducting reconnaissance and link-up missions in a largely wooded environment, where the squad's two teams were geographically

separated from each other most of the time. Each team approached a fenced compound from different directions, where they were instructed to surreptitiously report any activities of observed enemy and civilian personnel. Later, the teams linked up at a designated checkpoint, which served as another site for the observation and reporting of enemy and civilian activities.

Research Participants

Research participants were seven squad leaders, each having two teams of either three or four men each. Most of these squad leaders were relatively inexperienced, either having been recently assigned to the squad or having been assigned to a temporary squad leadership position. In some cases, squad leaders had no prior field training experience with their squads. Our research focused only on the SA of the squad leaders, as reflected in their radio communications with squad members and with a simulated platoon leader. The platoon leader's role was played by an experimenter whose outgoing radio transmissions were largely dictated by a rehearsed mission script for each trial.

Measures and Raters

A team of two retired Infantry officers served as independent raters, each completing a separate RCCOLA checklist during each trial, as well as a separate FELLA scale and global assessment item immediately after the completion of each trial. One member of the rating team participated in rating all seven squad leaders. The second member of the rating team rated only the first three squad leaders. A third retired Infantry officer served as the second rater for the last four squad leaders. Finally, a civilian member of the research staff separately logged the number and types of radio transmissions heard over the squad and platoon radio networks using a real-time categorization scheme described by Christ and Evans (2002). Specifically, each squad and platoon radio transmission was logged into one of 15 mutually exclusive categories: Provide Acknowledgment, Provide Direction, Provide Information (Friendly), Provide Information (Threat), Provide Opinion, Request Acknowledgment, Request Direction, Request Information (Friendly), Request Information (Threat), Request Opinion, Unrelated to Mission, Administrative/Other, Inaudible, Break Squelch, or Hot Microphone.

Procedure

Each of the seven squad leaders completed six trials. Consequently, each SA measure was used during each of the 42 separate trials. The average duration of each trial was 41 minutes, with the reconnaissance portion requiring an average of 20 minutes and the link-up portion requiring an average of 21 minutes. Each squad leader's first three trials were conducted during daylight hours and their last three trials were conducted at night. All trials for an individual squad leader were completed over a 12-hour period. For scheduling reasons, the order of day and night trials was not counterbalanced across squad leaders, so visibility level was not a factor analyzed in this experiment.

There were three squad radio conditions evaluated in the experiment, with each day and night trial having a different squad radio condition. One day trial and one night trial for each squad leader was conducted without squad radios. In this baseline condition, the squad leader

used a radio only to communicate with the platoon leader. On all other trials, the squad leader had two radios, one to communicate with his squad members and the other to communicate with the platoon leader. In the second squad radio condition, only the squad leader could initiate transmissions over the squad radio. Squad members could listen and acknowledge the receipt of a squad leader transmission, but could not initiate transmissions themselves. In the third squad radio condition, squad members were free to initiate transmissions at any time, either to their squad leader or to other squad members. The order of these squad radio conditions was largely counterbalanced across trials. Three different Opposing Force (OPFOR) scripts and two different lanes of movement were used alternately across trials, insuring that each squad leader encountered a novel set of circumstances on each of his six trials.

Results

Due to the relatively small sample of squad leaders (n = 7) and the variability in their performance across trials, our analyses were based principally on the use of descriptive statistics. As shown in Table 3, the performance of the squad leaders, averaged across raters and trials, tended to fall within the middle and lower ranges of our three SA measures.

Table 3
Mean Scores of Two Raters for Three SA Measures

SA Measure	M	SD	Potential Range	Actual Range
RCCOLA Checklist	-0.18	0.33	-1.00 to +1.00	-1.00 to +0.55
FELLA Scale	4.04	0.79	1.00 to 7.00	2.24 to 5.96
Global Assessment Item	3.04	1.38	1.00 to 7.00	1.00 to 6.00

Note. RCCOLA = Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness. FELLA = Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness. Table entries are based on six trials for each of seven squads.

The percentage of interrater agreement on our three measures was found to be generally high, as shown in Table 4. A plot of RCCOLA total scores for the two raters across 42 trials is shown in Figure 1. The integers shown in the body of Figure 1 are squad leader numbers. Each squad leader is shown six times, once for each trial. Some squad leaders demonstrated a fairly consistent level of performance across trials (e.g., Squad Leader 5), while others were highly inconsistent (e.g., Squad Leader 1).

Table 4
Percentage of Interrater Agreement Across Items and Trials

SA Measure	N	% of Identical Item Scores Between Raters	% of Nearly Identical Item Scores (+/- 1)
RCCOLA Checklist	2520	91.3	97.5
FELLA Scale	2520	52.9	84.4
Global Assessment Item	42	59.5	100.0

Note. RCCOLA = Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness. FELLA = Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness.




Figure 1. A comparison of the RCCOLA scores obtained from two raters across 42 trials (six trials for each of seven squad leaders).

Although we had no expectation that all RCCOLA items could be observed during the course of every conceivable type of mission, we found that 23 of the 60 items (38%) were never observed by either rater during our field trials. These unobserved items included 12 of the 20 outstanding SA items (60%), 2 of the 20 typical SA items (10%), and 9 of the 20 poor SA items (45%). Most of these unobserved items can be attributed to the nature of the reconnaissance and link-up mission scenarios used in the present experiment. Because squads were expected to observe the enemy without being detected and to refrain from engaging them with weapons,

RCCOLA items involving ammunition resupply, fire control, and casualty evacuation behaviors were unlikely to occur. However, there were also a few RCCOLA items that could conceivably have occurred, but were just never observed among the squad leaders in our sample (e.g., "treats a sound recommendation or advice from subordinates as an interruption and takes no action"). The frequency with which each RCCOLA item was observed is shown in Appendix D.

During the course of data collection, raters noticed it was harder to form an opinion about a squad leader's level of SA on baseline trials, when no squad radio was used. This anecdotal finding was supported by a comparison of the average number of items receiving a rating of four on the FELLA scale across the experimental radio conditions. When no squad radio was used, 45 of the 60 items were rated as "hard to say" by the two raters on average. When a squad radio was used, with squad members listening but not transmitting, the average number of items rated as "hard to say" fell to 21. That number was reduced even further, to 18, when squad members were allowed to freely transmit. These overall differences across conditions were found to be statistically significant, F(2,12) = 42.41, p < .0001. Pairwise comparisons using the Least Significant Difference Test indicated that both squad radio conditions were significantly different from the no squad radio condition (p < .001), though the two squad radio conditions were not significantly different from each another.

Though it did not approach statistical significance, there was a small consistent trend among the squad radio conditions and our three communication-based SA measures (see Table 5). For each measure, the highest SA scores were obtained during trials when a squad radio was used, particularly when squad members were allowed to transmit freely. In addition, significantly greater numbers of audible squad radio transmissions occurred during these trials, F(1,6) = 22.24, p < .001.

Table 5
Mean Scores of Three SA Measures and Mean Number of Radio Transmissions for Three Squad Radio Conditions

		SA Measure		Audible Squad Radio
Squad Radio Condition	RCCOLA M (SD)	FELLA M (SD)	Global Item M (SD)	Transmissions M (SD)
No Squad Radio	-0.21 (.49)	4.00 (.39)	2.89 (1.44)	none
Squad Radio (only SL could transmit)	-0.21 (.08)	4.01 (.87)	3.04 (1.45)	37.29 (6.91)
Squad Radio (SL & squad members could transmit)	-0.11 (.06)	4.11 (1.03)	3.18 (1.34)	124.64 (26.35)

Note. RCCOLA = Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness. FELLA = Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness. There were 14 trials for each squad radio condition, one day trial and one night trial for each squad leader.

Discussion

Although the size of our squad leader sample limits the conclusions one can draw from the field trials, the findings obtained were largely positive. Our communication-based measures of SA appear to have a sufficient level of interrater agreement. Additionally, they possess a certain measure of content-related validity based on the way they were constructed (i.e., SMEs had to agree that items reflected leader SA in order to be included on the RCCOLA checklist and FELLA scale). The measures also appear sensitive to differences in the way squad radios were used (e.g., whether or not squad members were allowed to transmit). For these reasons, we recommend the use of the RCCOLA checklist and FELLA scale in future research, field exercises, and virtual training environments where radio transmissions of small unit personnel can be monitored. Further research is needed to increase the sample of small unit leaders, to determine the relationship of communication-based measures to more objective measures of SA, and to gauge their utility for a wider variety of soldier missions.

Raters had more difficulty using the FELLA scale than they did the RCCOLA checklist. The FELLA scale required a greater number of discrete decisions to be made and it required the rater to estimate or predict the likelihood of future events based on events in the recent past. These decisions and estimates had to be made within a time limit of approximately 15 minutes, indirectly imposed by the pace with which experimental trials were run. In contrast, the RCCOLA checklist only required the rater to note how often specific behaviors occurred during the course of a mission. The FELLA scale was also more difficult to use because the wording of several of its items was found to be confusing (e.g., was it highly unlikely "this SL could be expected not to report being in a danger area or could be expected to take no action to avoid it?"). Future use of the FELLA scale should consider small wording changes to help clarify the intended meaning of these problematic items, even if the integrity of the original wording has to be compromised. While the FELLA scale was intended to be more of a research tool, for use in item analysis and factor analytic studies of the instrument's underlying content and structure, the FELLA scale could also be used in situations where raters cannot rely on real-time methods of leader evaluation.

Based on informal conversations held with squad leaders before their first trial, we knew our sample was not representative of Infantry squad leaders overall. In particular, our sample was notably inexperienced. As a result, the performance of many squad leaders was erratic over trials and the upper levels of the communication-based SA measures were rarely used. Future research with these measures should seek to broaden the squad leader sample in terms of their experience, as well as extend the sample to platoon leaders, a group for which most of our behavioral items should still apply. It should also be noted that the methods used to create the SA instruments described in the present report could be easily applied to other occupations where personnel routinely communicate via radio (e.g., police, fire, and paramedic organizations).

As squad and platoon radios become more common items of equipment within small units, the ability of our soldiers to communicate effectively with each other will become a critical factor influencing their ultimate level of combat effectiveness. In the past, when most small unit personnel did not communicate with radios, this was an issue rarely addressed in after-action reviews (AARs) of unit performance. This situation needs to change in a hurry. How squad

members contribute, or fail to contribute, to the SA of their squad and platoon leaders is an AAR topic that needs more emphasis. Similarly, we also need to understand and emphasize how the communication behaviors of small unit leaders contribute or detract from the situational understanding of their subordinates. Before the promise of better small unit communication can be realized, however, we must get trainers and observer/controllers to routinely monitor squad and platoon radios during field exercises and training center rotations. Once optimal squad and platoon radio communication procedures have been identified, they need to be formally introduced into appropriate institutional courses for the benefit of junior leaders. We believe that communication-based measures of SA, such as those explored in the present report, can serve an important role in improving the communication practices and resulting levels of situational understanding among all soldiers at the small unit level.

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Appendix A

Independent Evaluation Questionnaire

evaluate leader situation awareness (SA). Each item in the following list is a platoon or squad leader behavior that might conceivably be heard over the course of one or more radio transmissions. Your task is to rate each item according to how well it reflects a leader's as typical when you think the behavior reflects the level of SA found in most small unit leaders. Items rated as poor or outstanding seems to be indicative of poor, typical, or outstanding leader SA, by putting a check mark in the appropriate column. Rate an item items you cannot rate. However, when you see an item that appears related to SA, rate whether you think the described behavior SA. If you can't see how a particular item relates to leader SA, then skip that item. We expect each of you will encounter some The purpose of this exercise is to employ your expertise in identifying and rating audible leader behaviors that could be used to should represent a level of SA that is either well below or well above a center-of-mass rating for this group of leaders

best. Also note that we are not asking you to rate whether items reflect a leader's technical competence, tactical judgment, or overall resulting from his lack of some important troop leading skills. Finally, because our list of items is rather long, do not attempt to rate Although some items are highly similar, please consider each item carefully. An item's relationship to leader SA may be subtle, at the entire list in one sitting. Rather, try to complete a page or two whenever your mind is fresh. We welcome your comments and suggestions in any format at any time, particularly about areas of communications-based SA we may have overlooked. Thanks! effectiveness, just a leader's SA. For example, a platoon leader with outstanding SA may still be viewed as largely ineffective,

Acronym List

Avenues of approach

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
	After receiving a change in mission, the leader announces a movement formation or movement technique inconsistent with the reported likelihood of enemy contact and/or need for speed.			
7	At the request of the higher element, the leader does not report vulnerability to enemy activity in his area.			авланде сентеру гранавана нестептеру језу прогивајаја
3	In order to provide enemy information to the higher element, the leader requests information from subordinates.			***************************************
4	In providing SITREPs to the higher element while actively engaged with the enemy, the leader can usually present an accurate disposition of friendly and threat forces.			
2	In providing SITREPs to the higher element while actively engaged with the enemy, the leader presents the future likelihood of threat courses of action.	***************************************		
9	Leader acknowledges sound advice/recommendation from subordinates.			
7	Leader advises lead element of impending course change during movement.			NAMES AND THE PROPERTY OF THE
∞	Leader allows sufficient time for subordinates to accomplish assigned tasks.			enderstende en
6	Leader answers radio call after his radio operator makes initial responses during enemy contact.			Andreas des transcriptures des des des des des des des des des d
10	Leader anticipates activity and locates himself at the best position to control his unit.			
11	Leader anticipates noncombatant actions within his area and directs elements to be prepared to respond.			
12				
***************************************	inspection and mount them at last light for night operations.			- A CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY
13	Leader anticipates the need for night o		***************************************	
***************************************				MAKEN CHANCOCK CONTROL OF THE STATE OF THE S
14	i			
15	Leader approves a change in unit movement formation after subordinate notifies him that they have encountered different type of terrain.			
16	1			
17	Information. I pader assigns subordinates tasks to nerform based on their nersonnel strenoths and weaknesses		***************************************	
18				Management of the state of the
19	1		America de constitución de con	
18	-1			THE COLUMN THE PROPERTY OF THE
20				
21	Leader calls support/attached elements only when he needs support.			THE PERSONAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE COMMUNICATION OF THE PERSON OF THE PERSO
22	1			Additional and the second and the se
23	Leader changes/adjusts movement formations based on likelihood of enemy contact.			
24	Leader changes/adjusts movement formations only after enemy contact.			
25	ĺ			
	giscrepancy.			

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
26	Leader continues an operation regardless of the chances of success or failure.			and the second constraint of the second seco
27			- Annual Property of the Prope	
78				
59	Leader continues with an operation un		- Andrews - Andr	embleren beteteteteteteteten met etteteteteten en en ettetetetetetetet
30	Leader controls his unit based only on suggestions and observations of subordinates because he is unable to			
3.1	Leader conveys a complete picture of the current situation to his subordinates.	-		and decreasions constituted in wever over the part of the determines in ward as determines
5 6				
33	Leader conveys an accurate picture of			PARAMETRIAL PROPERTY PARAMETRIAL PROPERTY PROPER
34			***************************************	
35	1			
36	į.			AAAA Terrif (Officestra aaaa terrif (Office) (Office of Office)
37	1			
38	Leader correctly identifies weakest enemy point.			AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY OF THE
39	Leader directs a "be prepared" order to subordinates, after receiving planning directions from higher element.			the second secon
40	1	***************************************		
	terrain.			неменяльным верементереней верементереней верементереней
41	Leader directs a change in MOPP based on a change of threat.			Personal de la composition della composition del
42	Leader directs a change in MOPP based on commander's guidance, orders, or the SOP.			
43	Leader directs a change in planned ongoing operations to respond to an unanticipated, but apparent noncombatant	••••••		
-	Situation in the area.			
4	Leader directs a change in unit movement formation based on knowledge that the terrain they are approaching is	***************************************		
45	Leader directs a change in unit movement formation because the terrain they just encountered has changed.			
46	1			
47	Leader directs a subordinate element to move to a new position from their present one, without ever previously	***************************************		
	asking tiem to report their location.		***************************************	THE RESERVE THE PROPERTY OF TH
48	Leader directs a unit to continue a mission when the unit has become ineffective.			vanos er safehaldeleleleles en en en en en elektrick de bet even de elektrick pomas som
49	Leader directs allocation of critical resources to the element that should have priority for the resources.			
50	Leader directs continued movement of his force in same manner and direction even while receiving enemy fires.		***************************************	
51	Leader directs cross leveling of critical resources among all elements when one element should have priority for	***************************************	***************************************	
52	Tooday disage on anamy locations outside his assigned sector without coordination with his higher or			
25	reduct unexis incs on enemy recailous enisine ins assigned seem without coordinated with me included adjacent units.			

irects his subordinates to vacate or move away from an area or terrain that allows enemy to gain an irects his subordinates to vacate or move away from a area or terrain that allows enemy to gain an irects movement of his force away from incoming enemy fires. irects periodic halts during movement to adjust equipment/change socks. irects subordinate of a critical individual who has become a casualty. irects subordinate to far a critical individual who has become a casualty. irects subordinate to establish LP/OP at most likely enemy avenue of approach. (Defense) irects subordinate to establish LP/OP in his sector, without specifying locations. (Defense) irects subordinate to take an action that distracts the enemy from the friendly unit main effort or action. irects subordinate to take an action that distracts the enemy from the friendly unit main effort or action. irects subordinate to break enemy contact because cost of fighting the enemy is higher than the benefit irects subordinates to break enemy contact because cost of fighting the enemy is higher than the benefit irects subordinates to conduct communication checks before mission begins. irects subordinates to conduct communication checks during the planning phase of the mission. irects subordinates to conduct communication checks during the planning phase of the mission. irects subordinates to continue fight with enemy even when costs outweigh benefit. irects subordinates to continue fight with enemy even when costs outweigh benefit. irects subordinates to to take a route that provides cover and concealment from the enemy. irects subordinates to take control of or capture an area or terrain that will provide his unit an advantage erects subordinates to take control of or capture an area or terrain that will provide his unit an advantage erects that no subordinates element to a subordinate element to a subordinate element to a subordinate element to a critical individual who has become a casualty after prompting by a recess the replacement of	#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
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	49	Leader directs subordinates to conduct communication checks before mission begins.			
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	99	Leader directs subordinates to continue actions because the mission is not yet fully accomplished/complete.			
	29	Leader directs subordinates to continue fight with enemy even when costs outweigh benefit.			
	89	Leader directs subordinates to evacuate casualties and prisoners without specifying a route.			
	69	Leader directs subordinates to follow a route that provides cover and concealment from the enemy.			diskumanin ne eersessa saasun va assa saasisissa kiidiska kankan kankan ka
	70	Leader directs subordinates to halt actions before the mission is accomplished/complete even though sufficient resources are available to continue the mission.	Acceptance of the Acceptance o		
	71	Leader directs subordinates to take control of or capture an area or terrain that will provide his unit an advantage			
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	72	Leader directs that no subordinates relocate even when a subordinate element notifies him that assistance or reinforcement is needed to accomplish the mission.			
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	74	assistance. I eader directs the relocation of a subordinate element to be prepared to assist or reinforce an expected weakness			
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	76	Leader directs the replacement of a critical individual who has become a casualty only after prompting by a superior.			
	77	Leader directs use of a security element, but does not specify a location/area based on likely enemy location/area. (Offense)			

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
78	Leader displays evidence of a change in enemy or friendly situation by modifying weapons control status.			de major proposicio de de la compansión de
65	Leader displays evidence of a change in enemy or friendly situation or a hazard presented by a situation by reminding subordinate units of conditions under which the "rules of engagement" may be modified.			
80	Leader displays evidence of a change in enemy or friendly situation or a hazard presented by a situation by reminding subordinate units of the "rules of engagement".			
81	Leader displays evidence of a change in enemy or friendly situation or a hazard presented by a situation by requesting a modification to the "rules of engagement".			,
82	Leader displays evidence of a change in enemy threat by issuing a FRAGO to modify a subordinate unit's mission or task during the operation.			
83	Leader displays evidence of a change in enemy threat or the friendly situation by assigning a "be prepared" mission to a subordinate unit or a crew served weapon.			
84	Leader displays evidence of a change in enemy threat or the friendly situation directing a change in sectors of fire for a subordinate unit or a crew served weapon.			
85	Leader displays evidence of a change in threat or danger to his unit by directing the lifting or shifting of supporting indirect fires.			Andrewsky and the property of
98	Leader displays evidence of a change in threat or danger to his units by directing the lifting or shifting of supporting direct fires.			
87	Leader displays evidence of a potential fratricide hazard by warning units of a friendly aircraft moving through the area.			
88	Leader displays evidence of a potential fratricide hazard by warning units of a friendly ground unit moving through the area.			And the complete for the complete compl
68	Leader displays evidence of fire control measures and a change in threat or danger to his unit by recommending the lifting or shifting of supporting fires in an adjacent sector.			
06	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of how the current weather conditions will impact the operation.			
91	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy capabilities and terrain appreciation by failing to inform subordinate units of enemy activities in an area capable of observing or bringing direct fire on unit positions or activities.		THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O	
92	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy capabilities and terrain appreciation by informing subordinate units of enemy activities in an area from which they are capable of bringing direct fire on unit positions or activities.	·		
93	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy capabilities and terrain appreciation by informing subordinate units of enemy activities in an area from which they are capable of observing unit positions or activities.			
8	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy capabilities and terrain appreciation by informing subordinate units of nearby enemy activities.			

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
95	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation by directing relocation of a supporting weapon system or unit once it is unable to perform its mission.			
96	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation by directing relocation of a supporting weapon system or unit that is unable to perform its mission when prompted by a subordinate.		,	
26	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation by failing to direct relocation of a supporting weapon system or unit that is reported as unable to perform its mission.			
86	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation by relieving or replacing a unit or element before it has become ineffective.			
66	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation or hazards present by directing surveillance of a specific area or location.	***************************************		
100	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation or hazards present by directing units to modify current positions or locations to provide for surveillance of a specific area or location.			
101	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation or hazards present by recommending an avenue of approach or route to his location.			
102	ř			
103	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation or hazards present by verifying the protective status or precautions taken during civilian movement in or near the unit area.			
104	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation or hazards present by warning units of civilian movement in the area.	7		
105	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the friendly situation by providing an update on the status of injured soldiers or victims of an accident or combat action.			
106	Leader displays evidence of his knowledge of the terrain by requesting additional support for preparing positions.			
107	Leader displays evidence of his lack of knowledge of the enemy's superior capabilities by exposing his unit to enemy fires to recover wounded.			
108	Leader displays evidence of his lack of knowledge of the terrain by not requesting additional support for preparing positions, even when support is needed to accomplish the mission.	700 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H		
109	Leader displays evidence of his lack of knowledge of the terrain by rejecting a higher element offer for additional support for preparing positions.			
110	Leader displays evidence of his lack of understanding of the time constraints on subordinates by failing to prioritize specific tasks.			
111	Leader displays evidence of his lack of understanding of the time needed for completing the assigned movement.			
112	Leader displays evidence of his lack of understanding of the time needed to accomplish assigned tasks during actions on the objective.			

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
113	Leader displays evidence of his understanding of the time constraints on subordinate units by prioritizing the effort to be expended on specific tasks.			
114	7			
115	Leader displays evidence of his understanding of the time needed for subordinate unit preparation by providing subordinate units with 2/3 of the available time.			
116				
117	Leader displays extreme stress during an extremely tense situation and must be prompted to respond.			
118	Leader displays signs of frustration when subordinates fail to accomplish assigned tasks in the time allowed.			
119	Leader displays signs of stress during an extremely tense situation and responds appropriately.			
120	Leader disseminates mission-essential information or factors impacting current mission, as well as other non-essential information to subordinates.			
121	Leader disseminates only mission-essential information or factors impacting current mission to subordinates.			
122	Leader does not allow sufficient time for subordinates to accomplish assigned tasks.			
123	Leader does not ask for further information from a subordinate who provides an incomplete SITREP.			
124	Leader does not convey a complete picture of the situation even after answering questions.			
125	Leader does not convey an accurate picture of the situation even after answering questions.			
126	Leader does not convey the commander's intent to subordinates during a change of mission order.			
127	Leader does not direct a "be prepared" order to subordinates, even after receiving planning directions from higher element that mandate an order.			
128	Leader does not direct subordinates to conduct a communication check prior to an operation.			
129	Leader does not issue "be prepared" orders after receiving guidance from higher to do so.			
130	Leader does not notify appropriate personnel of the meaning of signals that are being used during an operation.			
131	Leader does not notify subordinates of a friendly aircraft moving through the area, which could lead to fratricide.	·	,	A PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PROPERTY ADDRESS OF THE PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PROPERTY ADDRESS OF THE PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PROPERTY
132	Leader does not notify subordinates of a friendly ground unit moving through the area, which could lead to fratricide.	***************************************		
133	Leader does not recognize subordinate physical and/or mental exhaustion until a soldier needs medical attention.			
134	Leader does not report that his unit is at a danger area or takes no action to avoid it.			malaaareere érre repropriésable esté entre présédébble balekelebble
135	Leader does not take action to establish alternate means of communication when the primary means of communications is lost with a subordinate.			
136				

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
137	Leader ensures that all appropriate personnel know the signals that are about to be used during an operation.			
138	Leader establishes lateral coordination with peers or adjacent units.			
139	Leader explains how to execute a task or drill that his unit knows and subordinates must remind him that they are already trained.	43		
140	Leader fails to anticipate the need for night observation devices and begins night operations without them.			
141	Leader fails to assign subordinates tasks to perform because no one is capable of performing them to standard.			
142	Leader fails to change/adjust movement formations even with evidence of likely enemy contact.			
143	Leader fails to designate a new element leader when one of them becomes a casualty.			
144	Leader fails to direct any reallocation of critical resources.			
145	Leader fails to direct the replacement of a critical individual who has become a casualty.			
146	Leader fails to disseminate or inadequately disseminates mission-critical change of mission information or factors impacting current mission to subordinates.	S		
147	·			
148	Leader fails to establish lateral coordination with peers or adjacent units jeopardizing his time/space relationship to his mission.	ata re aja suven autostošes		
149				
150	Leader fails to keep support/attached elements informed of his location until movement is completed.			
151	Leader fails to maintain friendly battle tracking of subordinate combat forces.			
152	Leader fails to or inadequately applies his mission's operational graphics control measures to refer to his current tactical situation.			
153				
154			***************************************	
155	Leader fails to provide subordinates with sufficient time to accomplish assigned tasks during actions on the objective.	*******************************		
156				
157				**************************************
158	Leader fails to provide subordinates with sufficient time to accomplish assigned tasks during planning and preparation.			

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
159	Leader fails to react immediately to recommendations/advice from subordinates.			
	<u> </u>			
161	Leader fails to react to an enemy attack or counterattack.			
162	Leader fails to recognize evidence of a change in threat or danger to his unit by failing to direct the lifting or shifting of supporting direct fires until lower element submits request.			
163	Leader fails to recognize evidence of a shifting of supporting indirect fires un			
164	·			
165	·····			
166	Leader fails to request additional time or assets when an unrealistic task is assigned.			
167	Leader fails to rotate assigned tasks to subordinate units to avoid burnout.			
168	Leader fails to spot-check subordinates to insure that his instructions are being carried out even after finding a discrepancy.			
169				A THE OWNER OF THE OWNER OWN
170	Leader follows reporting requirements as specified in the OPORD.		The state of the s	rendendestabliska kateladeterniski er i çirin er
171	Leader halts unit for a face to face discussion with lead element during movement.			
172	Leader has casualties and prisoners evacuated along a route to can be interrupted by enemy activity.			
173	Leader has periodic halts during movement to adjust equipment/change socks at the request of subordinates.			
174	Leader identifies friendly force locations and most enemy force locations.			
175	Leader informs higher that his unit is nearing a status of non-combat effective early enough so higher can react appropriately.			
176	1	***************************************	,	
177	T			
178	Leader is unable to locate enemy and noncombatant elements within his area.			
179	Leader issues "be prepared" orders only after receiving guidance from higher.			
180	Leader issues "be prepared" orders without guidance from higher.			
181	Leader keeps support/attached elements informed of his location during movement by ensuring that support elements report phase lines or position location to their parent units.			

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
182	Leader maintains friendly battle tracking of subordinate combat forces.			
183	Leader modifies his current plan/activity in order to accommodate a situation that is evolving by an adjacent friendly unit after receiving directions to do so from a higher element.			
184				
185	Leader moves forces to respond to an enemy attack or counterattack.			
186	Leader moves to the best position to control the unit after an activity has occurred.			
187	Leader must be prompted to follow reporting requirements specified in the OPORD.			
188	Leader must frequently ask subordinates to report their current positions.			
189	Leader must provide medical treatment to personnel because of insufficient halts during movement.			
190	Leader must repeatedly contact adjacent unit to determine situation so he can modify his current plan/activity to accommodate the friendly situation.			
191	Leader never requests adjacent unit information update when not provided by higher element.			
192	Leader notifies appropriate personnel of the meaning of signals that are currently being used during an operation.			
193	Leader notifies higher element that engineer support is needed to improve trafficability along a movement route.			
194	Leader notifies higher element that he is modifying his unit movement rate, either slower or faster, in order to keep the unit progress on the correct schedule.			
195				
196	Leader notifies higher element that his unit failed to meet the required movement schedule.			
197	Leader notifies higher element that his unit is "lightening" load to be carried based on mission.			
198	198 Leader notifies higher element that his unit will most likely not be able to meet the prescribed movement schedule because the movement rate will not allow it.			
199	199 Leader notifies higher element that the enemy is defeated and then later changes his report.			
200	200 Leader obtains a complete SITREP from a subordinate, even if he must ask questions to obtain all needed information.		~	
201	Leader occasionally must ask subordinates to report their current positions.			
202	Leader orders a shift of indirect fires to facilitate friendly force action.			
203	Leader periodically requests adjacent unit information update if not provided by higher element.			vystyty property operators and an analysis and
204	204 Leader plans for the effective use of time given the situation and circumstances.			www.efenites.jajajajajajajajajajajajajajajajajajaja
205	205 Leader plans personnel rotation to have best personnel at the appropriate location to complete critical tasks.			

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
206	206 Leader presents a plan that acknowledges and accommodates the time constraints imposed.			
207	Leader presents a plan that will not accomplish the task in the time required.		***************************************	Laboration improprieta de la principal de la companya de la companya de la companya de la companya de la compa
208	208 Leader projects future possible mission for his unit and directs a "be prepared" order to subordinates, without direction from higher element.			
209	Leader provides a change of mission warning to subordinate leaders upon notification from his higher headquarters.			Practice and the state of the s
210	·····			Address in the property of the second
211	Leader provides or recommends a visual reference or cue to supporting aviation units.			on mort stabilistick the development of the following and the stabilistic of the following
212	Leader provides responses to subordinates' questions after a lengthy research time.			reservational designations and the second se
213	Leader provides subordinates with sufficient time to accomplish assigned movement.			Prince a constant and the second seco
214	Leader provides timely responses to subordinates' questions after minimal research time.			NY SPROFESSOR LINN LINN LINN LINN LINN LINN LINN LIN
215	Leader reacts immediately to recommendations/advice from subordinates.			office trees where the desired the construction of the constructio
216	Leader reacts to additional mission-related intelligence.		40-)-c-121-22-22-22-22-22-22-22-22-22-22-22-22	eries de la companyation de la c
217	Leader reacts to noncombatant actions in his area.			
218	Leader recognizes and reacts to sound advice/recommendation from subordinates.			
219	219 Leader recognizes and reports his unit's arrival at a danger area, then avoids it or takes appropriate action.			
	Leader recognizes subordinate physical and/or mental exhaustion and provides adequate breaks.			
		restriction of the second		restaurinterpretassionistatatatatatatatatatatatatatatatatatata
223	Leader recognizes that his unit has moved into a danger area, he reports this, and then takes action to move through or out of the danger area.	***************************************		
224	Leader recommends change/adjustment of plan to higher because of personal/reported observations.			
225	Leader relays a change of his company command post location to subordinates.			
226	226 Leader relays an enemy situation update complete as received from his higher headquarters.			
227	227 Leader relays only the elements of an enemy situation update which are in his unit's area of interest or that could impact his unit's mission or situation.			
228				
229	Leader relies too heavily on the advice of others for decision making.			
230	230 Leader relocates forces to block anticipated enemy attack or counterattack.			SERVICE TO THE PROPERTY OF THE
231	Leader remains calm during an extremely tense situation and responds in a timely manner.			
232	232 Leader reminds subordinates at the last minute of approaching time or location for a critical event.			

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
233	Leader reminds subordinates of approaching time or location for a critical event.			
234	234 Leader renders all reports required by the current operation, on time, unsolicited.			
235	Leader renders all reports required by the unit SOP, on time, unsolicited.			ALTERNATION OF THE PROPERTY OF
236	Leader renders most reports required by the current operation usually when solicited.			
237	237 Leader renders most reports required by the current operation, on time, unsolicited.		***************************************	
238			And the second s	
239	Leader renders most reports required by the unit SOP, on time, unsolicited.			
240	Leader repeatedly makes radio calls to subordinate without seeking other means to establish communication.			
241	Leader replaces a unit or element after it reports that it has become ineffective.			THE PURPOSE STORES STOR
	Leader replaces a unit or element when			manecerer or proposate debete description de la company
243				
244	Leader reports a change of his command post location.			
245	Leader reports a disruptive or criminal act by a soldier, before taking corrective action to settle the situation.			
246	Leader reports a position or avenue of approach that provides some protection from anticipated enemy activity.			
247	247 Leader reports a position or some aspect of OCOKA that creates vulnerability of his unit to enemy activity.			**************************************
248	Leader reports encountering mines or obstacles along his unit route of movement and presents the operational			
	impact or possible courses of action to overcome the impediment.		***************************************	ensessa di montenso constante de carte se esperándo de la consesse escere
249				
	transmissions or provides incorrect information.		***************************************	bestelle the second second second by the second second the second
250	Leader reports encountering mines or obstacles along his unit route of movement.			
	Leader reports enemy activity in his area to the higher element.			ingen en men en men en men en e
252				
730	dance of the daily report.			denomination were not elaborate to the converse to the convers
255	Leader reports incorrect information co			
256				antes que se
				north de processaries de la company de la co
259				
260				
261	Leader reports unit movements and locations using the graphic references from the current operation.			
262	***************************************			
	subordinate element.			

#	Behavior	Poor T	Typical	Outstanding
263	Leader requests additional assets to augment his unit to assist with mission accomplishment when his unit strength is inadequate to accomplish the mission.			
264	1			144: PARTE LA COLOR DE LA COLO
265	Leader requests an explanation or clarification from higher element concerning signals that are being used or were recently used.			
266	·[
267	ļii	***************************************		
	prompting from external sources.			ARTERIAL PROPERTY OF THE PROPE
268	Leader requests assets to augment his unit to assist with mission accomplishment before his unit strength becomes inadequate to accomplish the mission.			
269				
270	Leader requests change in control measures or sectors of fire to help prevent fratricide, after receiving incoming friendly fire.	***************************************	***************************************	
271	Leader requests change in control measures or sectors of fire to help prevent fratricide.			erera errareshibatekarrararariarakarrararararararararararar
272				
273	•			ALL THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER
274	Leader requests immediate artillery or close air support against enemy forces threatening his unit or mission.			Add de editorra de completa con construción por propertion de la participa de la construción de la con
275	Leader requests medical evacuation for an injured soldier, but requires multiple transmissions to provide all			
	necessary information.			Trever til före et entre fredstedstedstedstedstedstedstedstedstedst
276	Leader requests medical evacuation for an injured soldier.			THE PERSON NAMED IN THE PE
277		***************************************		
010	Orders, or tile SOLF. I and a second to see collision from the meaning traction late not in accordance with commander's			
0/4				
279	1			
280				
	guidance, orders, or the SOP.	Management of the Control of the Con		
281	Leader requests the retransmission of unit status information by subordinate units during a period when no activity of note would have exhausted supplies or degraded status.			
282	Leader requests unplanned smoke or obscurants to provide protection for his unit while in unexpected enemy			
283	Leader requests unplanned smoke or obscurants to provide protection for his unit while in unexpected enemy	***************************************		Market and common recovered in the common co
284	284 I eader retransmits to subordinates almost all of the messages he receives from above verbatim.			ppip programment commence de caracteristique de car
285	285 Leader rotates tasks among subordinate units to avoid burnout.			statement of the second consistency of the second s

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
286	Leader selects egress route for casualty and prisoner evacuation that avoids enemy interference.			
287	1			
288	·			
289	·			
290	Leader submits his periodic unit status report in accordance with the SOP.			
291	Leader submits his unit status report in accordance with the SOP after contact.			
292	Leader subordinates to follow a route that allows suspected enemy locations to have observation and fields of fire	***************************************		
293				
294	Leader takes action, but fails to report			And other contents of the state
295	295 Leader takes action, then reports a disruptive or criminal act by a soldier.			
296	Leader treats sound advice/recommendation from subordinates as an interruption and takes no action.			
297	Leader uses a FRAGO to change an existing order, restating all five paragraphs of the OPORD format.			

299			A STATE OF THE STA	The state of the s
300	Leader uses the same subordinate unit for all critical tasks.			
	1			
302				
	The leader never provides ammo, casualty, and equipment reports unless they are requested, and even then he must ask subordinates for input before providing reports.	***************************************		
304				
305	When asked for a SITREP while actively engaged with the enemy, the leader can immediately respond with accurate information.		,	
306		-		MANAGEMENT CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY OF THE P
307	·····			•
308				
309	When providing subordinates a change of mission order, the leader fails to relay mission-essential implied tasks to subordinates.			

#	Behavior	Poor	Typical	Outstanding
310	When providing subordinates a change of mission order, the leader omits 3 or more portions of the restated mission in terms of who, what, where, when, how, and why.		A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR	THE LANGUAGE PARTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY AND ADDRESS.
311	When providing subordinates a change of mission order, the leader provides subordinates priorities of work/planning necessary to support the mission.			
312	When providing subordinates a change of mission order, the leader relays only portions of the restated mission in terms of who, what, where, when, how, and why.	***************************************		
313	***************************************			
314	When the leader requests information from subordinates an immediate response is provided at least 80% of the time.			
315				
316				
317	Whenever asked, the leader can immediately provide a detailed and accurate platoon ammo, casualty, and equipment report.			
318				
			-	

Appendix B

Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness (RCCOLA)

Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness

Date		
Time		
Squad		
Rater		
PLANNING / PREPARING		
OUTSTANDING		
requests additional time or assets when an unrealistic task is assigned. anticipates noncombatant actions within his area and directs elements to be prepared to respond.		
TYPICAL		
 directs subordinates to conduct communication checks before mission begins. conveys an accurate picture of the situation after answering some questions from subordinates. provides warning to subordinate leaders of a change in mission upon notification from higher headquarters. directs a "be prepared" order to subordinates, after receiving planning directions from higher. 		
POOR		
fails to disseminate or inadequately disseminates critical change-of-mission information or factors impacting current mission to subordinates. fails to anticipate the need for night observation devices and begins night operations without them. does not notify appropriate personnel of the meaning of signals that are being used during an operation. does not issue "be prepared" orders after receiving guidance from higher to do so. does not convey an accurate picture of the situation even after answering questions. does not convey a complete picture of the situation even after answering questions. does not convey the commander's intent to subordinates during a change of mission order. presents a plan that will not accomplish the task in the time required.		
OUTSTANDING		
OUTSTANDING anticipates activity and locates himself at the best position to control unit. reports encountering mines or obstacles along unit route of movement and presents the operational impact or possible COAs to overcome the impediment.		
TYPICAL		
 occasionally must ask subordinates to report their current positions. directs a change in unit movement formation because terrain just encountered has changed. recognizes that his unit has moved into a danger area, he reports this, and then takes action to move 		
through or out of the danger area.		
reports encountering mines or obstacles along his unit route of movement.		
modifies plan or activity to accommodate a situation evolving in an adjacent friendly unit, after receiving		
directions to do so from a higher.		
does not report that his unit is at a danger area or takes no action to avoid it. displays little knowledge of the enemy capabilities or terrain, failing to inform subordinate of enemy activities in an area capable of observing or bringing direct fire on unit positions or activities.		

ACTIONS ON ENEMY CONTACT

OUTSTANDING		
when asked for a SITREP while actively engaged with the enemy, can immediately respond with accurate information.		
correctly identifies weakest enemy point.		
directs the relocation of a subordinate element to be prepared to assist/reinforce an expected weakness by another		
friendly element.		
requests assets to augment unit to assist with mission accomplishment before unit strength becomes inadequate to accomplish mission.		
displays evidence of fire control measures and a change in threat or danger to the unit by recommending the lifting		
or shifting of supporting fires in an adjacent sector.		
plans personnel rotation to have best people at appropriate locations to complete critical tasks.		
directs subordinates to break enemy contact because cost of fighting the enemy is higher than the benefit.		
displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation by relieving or replacing a unit or element before it has become ineffective.		
directs subordinate to take an action that distracts the enemy from the friendly unit main effort or action.		
requests ammunition resupply, projecting that current supplies will be exhausted in 30 minutes given the present		
rate of expenditure.		
informs higher that the unit is nearing a status of non-combat effective early enough so higher can react.		
presents the future likelihood of threat COAs in providing SITREPs to the higher element while actively engaged with the enemy.		
TYPICAL		
reports enemy activity in his area to the higher element.		
moves forces to respond to an enemy attack or counterattack.		
directs a soldier to take charge of an element when he is informed that the element leader is a casualty.		
directs subordinates to continue actions because the mission is not yet fully accomplished or complete.		
displays evidence of his knowledge about enemy capabilities and terrain by informing subordinate units of nearby		
enemy activities.		
POOR		
fails to designate a new element leader when one of them becomes a casualty.		
fails to direct the replacement of a critical individual who has become a casualty.		
directs that no subordinates relocate even when a subordinate element notifies him that assistance or		
reinforcement is needed to accomplish the mission.		
directs subordinates to halt actions before the mission is accomplished/complete even though sufficient resources		
are available to continue the mission.		
continues the operation "to the last man" and does not inform higher.		
MISCELLANEOUS		
OUTSTANDING		
whenever asked, the leader can immediately provide a detailed and accurate platoon ACE report.		
modifies his current plan/activity to accommodate a situation evolving in an adjacent friendly unit.		
conveys a complete picture of the current situation to his subordinates.		
takes action that is beneficial to civilian population without hindering operations.		
TYPICAL		
requests medical evacuation for an injured soldier.		
reacts to noncombatant actions in the area.		
uses an alternate frequency when primary frequency fails to make contact with intended station.		
reports a change of command post location.		
notifies appropriate personnel of the meaning of signals being used during an operation.		
directs a change in MOPP based on commander's guidance, orders, or the SOP.		
POOR		
does not notify subordinates of a friendly ground unit moving through the area, which could lead to fratricide.		
does not warn subordinates of civilian movement in the area.		
treats a sound recommendation or advice from subordinates as an interruption and takes no action.		
does not notify subordinates of a friendly aircraft moving through the area, which could lead to fratricide.		
fails to direct any reallocation of critical resources		

Appendix C

Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness (FELLA) Scale

Future Expectations of Likely Leader Awareness

Date	
TimeSquad	
Rater	
D' (' D) ()	
<u>Directions</u> . Based on the squad at mission, rate the Squad I eader's (nd platoon radio communication you heard during the last SL's) likelihood of exhibiting, in most kinds of future missions,
the various behaviors listed below	y. Use the following scale to make your ratings:
	your runnings.
	1. highly unlikely
	2. unlikely
	3. somewhat doubtful4. hard to say
	5. a slight chance
	6. likely
	7. highly likely
Select the choice which best meet the blank to the left of each item.	s with your future expectation of each behavior and enter it in
This SL could be expected before future missions.	to direct squad members to conduct communication checks
When asked for a SITREP expected to immediately respond	while actively engaged with the enemy, this SL could be with accurate information.
This SL could be expected that are being used during an oper	not to notify appropriate personnel of the meaning of signals ration.
This SL could be expected mission is not yet fully accomplish	I to direct squad members to continue their actions if the hed or complete.
This SL could be expected through the area, which could lead	l not to notify squad members of a friendly aircraft moving d to fratricide.
	I to inadequately disseminate or fail to disseminate to squad of-mission information or factors impacting current mission.
This SL could be expected or reinforce an expected weakness	I to relocate a fire team or buddy team to be prepared to assist s by another friendly element.
This SL could be expected to make contact with the intended	I to use an alternate frequency when the primary frequency fails station.

This SL could be expected not to report being in a danger area or could be expected to take no action to avoid it.
This SL could be expected to report a change in his location.
This SL could be expected to continue an operation "to the last man" without informing the Platoon Leader.
This SL could be expected to request medical evacuation for an injured soldier.
This SL could be expected to display evidence of his knowledge of enemy capabilities and terrain by informing the squad of nearby enemy activities.
This SL could be expected to present a plan that will not accomplish the task in the time required.
This SL could be expected to report encountering mines or obstacles along the squad's route of movement and to present the operational impact or possible courses of action to overcome the impediment.
This SL could be expected to take action that is beneficial to the civilian population without hindering his squad operations.
This SL could be expected to fail to direct the replacement of a critical individual who has become a casualty.
This SL could be expected not to issue "be prepared" orders after receiving guidance from the platoon to do so.
This SL could be expected to inform the Platoon Leader that his squad is nearing a non-combat effective status early enough so the platoon can react appropriately.
This SL could be expected to report enemy activity in his area to the platoon.
This SL could be expected to convey an accurate picture of the situation after answering some questions from team leaders or squad members.
This SL could be expected to fail to designate a new fire team leader when one has become a casualty.
This SL could be expected to issue "be prepared" orders to the squad, after receiving planning directions from the Platoon Leader.

After receiving directions from the Platoon Leader, this SL could be expected to modify his current plan or activity in order to accommodate an evolving situation in an adjacent friendly unit.
This SL could be expected to convey a complete picture of the current situation to his squad.
This SL could be expected to recognize his unit has moved into a danger area, to report this, and to take action to move through or out of the danger area.
This SL could be expected to display evidence of fire control measures and to recognize change in threat or danger to his squad by recommending the lifting or shifting of fires in an adjacent sector.
This SL could be expected to report encountering mines or obstacles along the squad's route of movement.
This SL could be expected to correctly identify the weakest enemy point.
This SL could be expected not to convey an accurate picture of the situation, even after answering questions.
This SL could be expected not to convey the commander's intent to squad members during a change-of-mission order.
This SL could be expected to direct his squad to take an action that distracts the enemy from the friendly unit main effort or action.
This SL could be expected to request ammunition resupply, projecting that squad supplies will be exhausted in 30 minutes given the present rate of expenditure.
This SL could be expected to direct a change in MOPP based on commander's guidance, orders, or the SOP.
This SL could be expected to anticipate noncombatant actions in his area and to direct his squad to be prepared to respond.
This SL could be expected not to warn his squad of civilian movement in the area.
This SL could be expected to anticipate activity and to locate himself at the best position to control his squad.
This SL could be expected not to notify squad members of a friendly ground unit moving through the area, which could lead to fratricide.

This SL could be expected to display evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation by relieving or replacing squad members before they become ineffective.
This SL could be expected to react to noncombatant actions in his area.
This SL could be expected to direct a change in the squad's movement formation because the terrain they just encountered has changed.
This SL could be expected not to relocate personnel when one team notifies him that assistance or reinforcement is needed to accomplish the mission.
Whenever asked, this SL could be expected to immediately provide a detailed and accurate ACE report.
In providing SITREPs to the Platoon Leader while actively engaged with the enemy, this SL could be expected to present the future likelihood of threat COAs.
This SL could be expected to halt squad actions before the mission is accomplished or complete, even though sufficient resources are available to continue the mission.
This SL could be expected to move personnel to respond to an enemy attack or counterattack.
This SL could be expected to fail to anticipate the need for night observation devices and to begin night operations without them.
This SL could be expected to notify appropriate personnel of the meaning of signals currently being used during an operation.
This SL could be expected to direct a soldier to take charge of a fire team when informed its leader is a casualty.
This SL could be expected to request additional time or assets when an unrealistic task is assigned.
This SL could be expected to display little knowledge of enemy capabilities or terrain, by failing to inform his squad of enemy activities in an area where they are capable of observing or bringing direct fire upon squad positions or activities.
This SL could be expected to modify his current plan or activity in order to accommodate an evolving situation in an adjacent friendly unit.
This SL could be expected to provide a change-of-mission warning to his fire team leaders upon notification from the platoon.

This SL could be experience positions.	ected to occasionally ask squad members to report their current
This SL could be expelled locations to complete critical	ected to plan personnel rotations to have the best soldiers at the right tasks.
This SL could be expeaned to take no action on their	ected to treat sound advice from his team leaders as an interruption recommendations.
This SL could be expeored of fighting the enemy is higher	ected to direct subordinates to break enemy contact because the cost er than the benefit.
This SL could be expestrength becomes inadequate	ected to request platoon assets to augment his squad before its to accomplish the mission.
This SL could be expe	ected to fail to direct any reallocation of critical resources.
This SL could be expeanswering questions.	ected not to convey a complete picture of the situation, even after
********	*******************
Overall, how would you experelative to other SLs?	ect this SL's level of situational awareness to be in future missions,
	Outstanding
	Well above peers
	Slightly above the norm
	Center of mass
	Slightly below the norm
	Well below peers
	Poor
*******	*****************

Appendix D

Observation Frequency of RCCOLA Items by Two Raters Over 42 Experimental Trials

Radio Communications Checklist of Leader Awareness

	•
Time	-
Squad	-
Rater	-
	PLANNING / PREPARING
	s when an unrealistic task is assigned. s within his area and directs elements to be prepared to respond.
29 conveys an accurate picture of the 64 provides warning to subordinate headquarters.	communication checks before mission begins. ne situation after answering some questions from subordinates. leaders of a change in mission upon notification from higher subordinates, after receiving planning directions from higher.
DOOD	

POOR

Date

- 45 fails to disseminate or inadequately disseminates critical change-of-mission information or factors impacting current mission to subordinates.
- 3 fails to anticipate the need for night observation devices and begins night operations without them.
- 0 does not notify appropriate personnel of the meaning of signals that are being used during an operation.
- 5 does not issue "be prepared" orders after receiving guidance from higher to do so.
- 35 does not convey an accurate picture of the situation even after answering questions.
- 52 does not convey a complete picture of the situation even after answering questions.
- 14 does not convey the commander's intent to subordinates during a change of mission order.
- 0 presents a plan that will not accomplish the task in the time required.

MOVEMENT

OUTSTANDING

- 3 anticipates activity and locates himself at the best position to control unit.
- 0 reports encountering mines or obstacles along unit route of movement and presents the operational impact or possible COAs to overcome the impediment.

TYPICAL

- 20 occasionally must ask subordinates to report their current positions.
- 28 directs a change in unit movement formation because terrain just encountered has changed.
- 37 recognizes that his unit has moved into a danger area, he reports this, and then takes action to move through or out of the danger area.
- 3 reports encountering mines or obstacles along his unit route of movement.
- 9 modifies plan or activity to accommodate a situation evolving in an adjacent friendly unit, after receiving directions to do so from a higher.

POOR

- 62 does not report that his unit is at a danger area or takes no action to avoid it.
- 17 displays little knowledge of the enemy capabilities or terrain, failing to inform subordinate of enemy activities in an area capable of observing or bringing direct fire on unit positions or activities.

ACTIONS ON ENEMY CONTACT OUTSTANDING 41 when asked for a SITREP while actively engaged with the enemy, can immediately respond with accurate information. 1 correctly identifies weakest enemy point. 3 directs the relocation of a subordinate element to be prepared to assist/reinforce an expected weakness by another friendly element. 0 requests assets to augment unit to assist with mission accomplishment before unit strength becomes inadequate to accomplish mission. 0 displays evidence of fire control measures and a change in threat or danger to the unit by recommending the lifting or shifting of supporting fires in an adjacent sector. 0 plans personnel rotation to have best people at appropriate locations to complete critical tasks. 5 directs subordinates to break enemy contact because cost of fighting the enemy is higher than the benefit. 0 displays evidence of his knowledge of the enemy or friendly situation by relieving or replacing a unit or element before it has become ineffective. 0 directs subordinate to take an action that distracts the enemy from the friendly unit main effort or action. 0 requests ammunition resupply, projecting that current supplies will be exhausted in 30 minutes given the present rate of expenditure. 0 informs higher that the unit is nearing a status of non-combat effective early enough so higher can react. 0 presents the future likelihood of threat COAs in providing SITREPs to the higher element while actively engaged with the enemy. **TYPICAL** 155 reports enemy activity in his area to the higher element. 19 moves forces to respond to an enemy attack or counterattack. 0 directs a soldier to take charge of an element when he is informed that the element leader is a casualty. 13 directs subordinates to continue actions because the mission is not yet fully accomplished or complete. 215 displays evidence of his knowledge about enemy capabilities and terrain by informing subordinate units of nearby enemy activities. **POOR** 0 fails to designate a new element leader when one of them becomes a casualty. 0 fails to direct the replacement of a critical individual who has become a casualty.

- 0 directs that no subordinates relocate even when a subordinate element notifies him that assistance or reinforcement is needed to accomplish the mission.
- 1 directs subordinates to halt actions before the mission is accomplished/complete even though sufficient resources are available to continue the mission.
- 0 continues the operation "to the last man" and does not inform higher.

MISCELLANEOUS

OUTSTANDING

- 2 whenever asked, the leader can immediately provide a detailed and accurate platoon ACE report.
- 0 modifies his current plan/activity to accommodate a situation evolving in an adjacent friendly unit.
- 15 conveys a complete picture of the current situation to his subordinates.
- 0 takes action that is beneficial to civilian population without hindering operations.

TYPICAL

- 0 requests medical evacuation for an injured soldier.
- 8 reacts to noncombatant actions in the area.
- 2 uses an alternate frequency when primary frequency fails to make contact with intended station.
- 111 reports a change of command post location.
- 50 notifies appropriate personnel of the meaning of signals being used during an operation.
- 2 directs a change in MOPP based on commander's guidance, orders, or the SOP.

POOR

- 1 does not notify subordinates of a friendly ground unit moving through the area, which could lead to fratricide.
- 1 does not warn subordinates of civilian movement in the area.
- 0 treats a sound recommendation or advice from subordinates as an interruption and takes no action.
- 0 does not notify subordinates of a friendly aircraft moving through the area, which could lead to fratricide.
- o fails to direct any reallocation of critical resources