STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

IMAGING THE FUTURE: INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING POSTWAR OCCUPATION OPERATIONS IN AUSTRIA, 1943-1945

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines through a case study the occupation of Austria, how institutional habits influenced preparation for the conduct of peacekeeping and post-conflict operations after World War II. The U.S. Army had a long history of conducting post-conflict occupation duties going back to the American Revolution. This knowledge, however, was never incorporated into doctrine, military education, and professional development programs or reinforced in the Army's memory through its honors and traditions. The service's hectic wartime preparations reflected this powerful habit of forgetting and applying as few resources as possible to thinking and preparing for occupation duties until these tasks were at hand. When American forces did undertake postwar missions they tried, as much as possible, to make them mirror traditional military activities.

This paper concludes that experiences, memory, traditions, warfighting doctrine, common perceptions, and the routine practices that the American Army carried into battle were the principle influences guiding the U.S. approach to occupation.

RESEARCH PAPER

Imaging the Future: Institutional Factors Affecting Postwar Occupation Operations in Austria, 1943-1945

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One method of gaining an appreciation for the U.S. Army's capacity to innovate is to analyze the institutional factors that affected past attempts at adapting to new mission areas. This study examines the institutional factors that affected preparations for the conduct of peacekeeping and post-conflict operations in Austria after World War II. To prepare for post-conflict tasks soldiers relied on what they knew, the *habits* of military operations. The paper concludes that experiences, memory, traditions, warfighting doctrine, common preconceptions, and the routine practices that the American Army carried into battle were the principal influences guiding the U.S. approach to postwar occupation.

Traditions of Service

One powerful force of habit shaping the U.S. effort was a tradition of forgetting. The Army had a long history of conducting post-conflict occupation duties. U.S. troops also had considerable experience performing constabulary duties on the frontier.[1] Unfortunately, this knowledge was never incorporated into doctrine, military education and professional development programs, or reinforced in the military's memory through its honors and traditions.[2]

The Army taught its leaders nothing about their legacy as peacekeepers. The official report on the Rhineland occupation after World War I noted that the:

> history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil government functions. Despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere, the lesson seemingly has not been learned.[3]

Army leaders had to rediscover the skills for postwar missions on each occasion.

When U.S. occupation forces withdrew from Europe, interest in such operations again lapsed. Even after the outbreak of a second global conflict the War Department Staff fiercely debated whether the Army needed official guidance or special training and formal staffs. Not until 1940 did the service produce a field manual on administering occupied areas. The first military government school was not established until 1942.[4] Major General John Hilldring's Civil Affairs Division, responsible for planning and supervising post-conflict

preparations, was not created until 1943, the same year the Army expanded its general staffs (division and higher) to add a civil affairs G-5 section.[5]

The War Department was not only late in organizing, but slow to apply any resources to occupation duties until these tasks were at hand. Hilldring summed up the military view when he wrote to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson on November 9, 1943:

> The Army is not a welfare organization. It is a military machine whose mission is to defeat the enemy on the field of battle. Its interest and activities in military government and civil affairs administration are incidental to the accomplishment of the military mission.[6]

The military's extensive and protracted history as an occupation force carried no weight with the general.[7]

Doctrine

Reluctance to engage in post-conflict missions was reinforced by a doctrinal approach to military affairs that ignored the role of peace operations. Despite the Army's mission in the Rhineland the 1923 *Field Service Regulations*, rewritten to codify the lessons of World War I ignored the occupation period. The manual directed that

"the ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces by battle."[8] The Army overwhelming emphasized focusing effort on decisive wartime objectives. Secondary missions, like peacekeeping, detracted from the military's real purpose.

The Army's mode of thinking derived from a rich tradition of Western military theory, derived in some part from Carl von Clausewitz, which emphasized the primacy of winning battles and campaigns and destroying the enemy's conventional troops.[9] The iron imperative of decisive victory was thoroughly engrained in service directives. *Field Manual 100-5* the Army's capstone doctrine for World War II, which replaced the Field Service Regulations, did not even address post-conflict missions.[10] Doctrine reinforced the Army's predilection to refrain from applying resources to any endeavor that did not contribute directly to winning the war as quickly and decisively as possible.

In addition, the extreme poverty of the interwar Army, and then, the tremendous resources demanded to build up an operational force to fight World War II, reinforced the War Department's aversion to investing time or effort in preparing for peace. Military leaders assiduously followed their warfighting doctrine, even writing the president to

complain about diverting shipping to ferry civil affairs personnel into the European theater. The soundest and quickest way to prepare for post-conflict operations, their memorandum concluded, "is to end the war quickly."[11] In the case of Austria the Army only reluctantly and belatedly applied any resources to the task.[12]

U.S. military leaders recognized that some measure of occupation duty was unavoidable, but they saw the task as ancillary to the warfighting mission. The proper course of a campaign was to allow a commander to impose his will upon the enemy. The need for troops after the battle was only to ensure the completeness of the conquest. Hilldring tried to explain this to Acheson when he acknowledged that though postwar operations were a secondary concern, they were important, "as any lack of condition of social stability in an occupied area would be prejudicial to the success of the military effort."[13] The purpose of post-conflict tasks was to create order and stability, thus allowing the troops freedom to finish their mission of completely defeating the enemy.

Experience and Education

The professional development of U.S. military leaders reinforced their doctrinal beliefs in the proper scope and

purpose of occupation activities. The First World War was a particularly seminal event in shaping professional attitudes. Many of the Second World War's senior officers had served on active duty during the first global conflict and their views were instructed by its outcome and the shaky peace that followed.[14] Officers who came on active duty after the war were taught and mentored by the veterans and steeped in the conflict's lessons learned. During the interwar years Marshall, who had served on Pershing's staff in the Allied Expeditionary Force, ordered the writing of the influential *Infantry in Battle*.[15] Comprising twenty-seven vignettes from the war and corresponding lessons on everything from "rules" to "miracles," the text was meant to impart on junior officers an appreciation of the character of modern military operations. *Infantry in Battle* was the kind of book young officers read to learn about their profession, but in its pages they would find nothing about the challenges of the fight for peace.

Officers had little reason to critique official writings and doctrinal formulas that ignored the importance of non-warfighting tasks, since the military's intellectual effort did not extend to post-conflict missions or their impact on foreign affairs. The senior officers and staff

assigned to plan the occupation of Austria, for example, had virtually no training or experience in international relations or any of the tasks related to occupation duties. This was unexceptional. Military leaders received scant education on the affairs of other states. Though West Point's traditional curriculum had been expanded after World War I to include a modicum of coursework on history, international relations, and comparative government, this instruction had little impact on its graduates. Walter T. Kerwin, a veteran of World War II who eventually rose to the position of the Army Vice Chief of Staff, recalled his education during the interwar years at West Point. "I suppose if I had come out of there [West Point]," Kerwin remembered, "and had been asked to discuss the geopolitical strategic parts of the world, I would have been flabbergasted. We just didn't get to that sort of thing."[16] Senior schools provided little better. The General Staff College focused on teaching military campaigning. The Army War College provided only a shallow grounding in international relations, rather the school's curriculum overwhelmingly emphasized mobilization and military strategy.[17]

Some officers gained experience in foreign affairs through postings at embassies or in the War Department, but even these men received little or no training. The Army, for example, in 1935 posted Major Truman Smith to Berlin, an international "hot spot."[18] All the preparation he received was a brisk two weeks of instruction from the Military Intelligence Division.

Once overseas, the Army representatives generated thousands of reports that the General Staff promptly ignored. Narrowly concerned over issues of national defense, the War Department was only interested in data on organization, equipment, manpower, mobilization plans, and doctrine. The staff had little use for information on international affairs or the conditions in foreign countries.

There were exceptions. Some military officers not only had extensive training in foreign affairs, but also played a significant role in shaping U.S. policy.[19] These men were the exception rather than the rule. More typical were men such as those training for the occupation of Austria at the military government school in Caserta. "The group," one observer recalled, "could not be considered particularly international in outlook."[20]

The Army's conception of international relations was fairly conventional, reflecting popular notions of what Michael Hunt describes as an American ideology that colored interpretations of wartime experiences and common attitudes towards foreign policy.[21] Thus, World War I represented the welcome death-knell of undemocratic and destructive regional political elites like the old Habsburg emperors. Equally evil was the threat of virulent nationalism such as the ethnic agitation that precipitated the outbreak of the First World War, or the pan-Germanism that had exploded into Nazi aggression. Regional hegemons and unconstrained nationalism were the principal hazards to a stable international order. Peace could only be maintained by cohesive, independent, democratic nation-states sharing common goals and objectives.

If war returned to Europe again it would be because the victory had not been sufficiently decisive and postwar efforts had failed to eliminate the remnants of the enemy threat. A history of World War II drafted specifically for Army veterans captured this spirit well. The war was the "unfinished' phase of the First World War - the inevitable result of the failure to crush the military power of the exponents of world conquest which, between the two wars,

developed into a 'super race mania."[22] This mistake was not to be repeated.

Potential hegemons and dangerous nationalist movements had to be identified and destroyed to ensure the success of post-conflict operations. This required the minimum investment necessary to ameliorate social conditions, so that the military could turn its full effort to ensuring that the enemy's physical and ideological resources were destroyed and quickly replaced with a more pliant political order. It was this line of thinking that led the Army to develop a singular approach to post-conflict operations called *disease and unrest formula*, a prescription that called for eliminating obstacles to rapidly establishing a docile, postwar state out of an intractable enemy.[23]

Operational Practice

As for determining how to implement these operations, the Army's rhythm of habits played a powerful role here as well. While the service routinely neglected its peacekeeping history, when such tasks could not be avoided there was remarkable consistency in how the Army conducted these operations, a uniformity that persisted during World War II.

The reason for this pattern of behavior was that the military always gravitated toward what it did best -- fight wars. U.S. forces, as much as possible, made post-conflict duties mirror the organization and routine practices of traditional warfighting activities.[24] This pattern of behavior was demonstrated after World War I during the occupation of the Rhineland and with smaller contingents of U.S. ground forces in Poland and Russia. The Rhineland operation in particular thoroughly retained its military character.[25] Most of the energy and resources of the occupation force were dedicated to demobilizing and disarming enemy forces and planning to counter civil unrest or armed uprisings.

When World War II broke out, still lacking a fully developed formal doctrine, the official report on the Rhineland occupation was used as a guide in planning and training for post-conflict operations.[26] During the war, the Army gained additional expertise, conducting civil-military operations in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and France.[27] These efforts remained true to the military's conventional approach to unconventional operations.

The U.S. experience in two world wars only served to reinforce the tendency to organize peacekeeping activities

in the same manner as combat missions. The Army's major postwar peacekeeping operations (Trieste, Germany, Austria, Korea, Okinawa, and Japan) exhibited many common characteristics.[28] In addition, U.S. and British operations were in many ways similar. This is not surprising, since their militaries shared many traditions and operational practices.[29]

One important characteristic of the Army's approach was that the Army tried as much as possible to divest itself of non-military responsibilities. Traditionally, the services preferred establishing a "firewall" between civilian and military activities to prevent civilian tasks from becoming an overwhelming drain on military resources.[30] But distancing itself from non-warfighting missions limited the interaction between the Army and other agencies involved in post-conflict planning. As a result, cooperation on postwar policy was generally poor.

While Washington bureaucrats generally eschewed interagency cooperation, admittedly there were a few attempts to link military strategy with post-conflict planning. For example, the State Department made some efforts at coordinating postwar policy and a civil affairs committee composed of various federal agencies attempted to

develop a coherent U.S. occupation program for Austria.[31] The Office of Strategic Services and the Foreign Economic Administration, a division of the Executive Office of the President, proposed various civil affairs guides for the occupation. The committee generated a wealth of material, much of it used by the overseas commands as background and source material for developing plans.[32]

Although the efforts of civilian agencies within the government did not go entirely to waste, the ad hoc nature of their activities reflected a significant shortfall in the Army's approach to post-conflict activities. Leaders lacked adequate institutional mechanisms to harmonize their operations with other agencies. In particular, the Army's links to the State Department in terms of formulating policy guidance and vetting plans were tenuous at best. While the department participated in the civil affairs committee, it did not have any involvement in the day-to-day administration of occupied areas. The State Department did not establish an assistant secretary for occupied areas until Hilldring retired and assumed the job in 1946. No State Department representative joined the Austrian planning team until two months before the occupation began. One military analysis concluded, "the Army, in lieu of

timely policy guidance, has tended to make its own policy."[33] The lack of integration was glaringly apparent.

No government agency was satisfied with the wartime arrangements. Everyone recognized that the scope of postwar reconstruction would dwarf any operation that the United States had conducted since the Civil War. The military simply could not do everything nor was it clear that it was appropriate for the Army to undertake all the tasks associated with postwar reconstruction. But, in keeping with traditional practices, the Army assumed it would perform the warfighting missions and simply relegate the rest to other agencies. For example, the military expected the newly established United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) would undertake the most problematic civilian tasks such as handling refugees and providing emergency economic aid for Austria.

Even though responsibilities might be divided, as one senior State Department official involved in postwar preparations pointed out, strategy could not be divorced from policy and the Army had to become "more politically conscious."[34] In the case of preparations for the occupation of Austria there was a modest exchange of personnel between the State Department team and the Army.

Overall, however, the civilian presence and influence on the Army's planning, even in theater, was limited.

Coalition Operations

The military's tendency to bifurcate postwar missions also extended to how the Americans planned to integrate their forces with troops from allied nations. Again, the rhythm of habits played a powerful role. The Army only grudgingly shared command over its forces with other countries. Initially during the First World War, the French and British wanted to integrate U.S. troops into their divisions, rather than letting the doughboys fight in separate formations. The United States, however, insisted on obtaining its own distinct area of responsibility. Coalition operations became in effect *parallel* operations.[35] While the overall direction of the war might be coordinated and integrated at the highest levels, in the field each national Army had its own zone of responsibility, lines of communication, and means of logistical support.

During World War II, the United States continued the practice of maintaining distinct areas of responsibility during operations in Africa and Europe. In fact, major campaigns were designed to ensure the cohesion of national forces by assigning each its own geographical area. Cross-

attaching units between national commands was the exception rather than the rule.

Dividing forces geographically ensured that countries never had to sacrifice sovereign control over their armies. There were also practical considerations for keeping national forces separated. Different languages, military terminology, customs, equipment, logistics, and doctrines all complicated the efficient conduct of combined military operations. While these obstacles could be overcome, it was far simpler and politically expedient for each country to supply and command its own forces. On the other hand, lack of full integration limited the extent of trust, confidence and cohesion that could be built up between the Allies. Nevertheless, in two world wars the U.S. commanders had seen that cooperation rather than full integration had worked, if imperfectly, at least adequately to secure victory on the battlefield.

Integrity of forces remained the operative principle for planning postwar occupations as well. After World War I, the Rhineland was divided into areas of national responsibility. Following World War II, the United States insisted on positioning its forces in Austria adjacent to the area occupied by U.S. troops in Germany to simplify

logistical operations and command control. In addition, the Allied occupation commands were not integrated into a single unit, but consulted through liaisons and only coordinated at the highest level, a command arrangement similar to that used for the Rhineland occupation.

While the U.S. approach to coalition operations insisted on autonomy over the command of its troops in the field, it also recognized that strategic decisions had to be a product of negotiation and compromise. For unity of effort, there had to be agreement on the overall objectives and general direction for the conduct of an operation. During both World War I and World War II, the U.S. military proved reluctant to plan or undertake major operations without consulting and coordinating with Allied forces. Military leaders assumed the principles of cooperation, negotiation, and coordination would carry into post-conflict activities. The division of Austria into zones, however, mitigated the requirement for trust and confidence building measures between the occupation powers and in the end helped fuel the cycle of Cold War mistrust.[36]

Planning

In determining how to conduct operations, perhaps the most important habit was the Army's penchant for formal,

standardized planning. Americans were nothing if not methodical planners. *Infantry in Battle* concluded that it was:

> axiomatic that in war there will always be a plan ....in every operation there must run from the highest to the lowest unit the sturdy life-line of a guiding idea; from this will be spun the intricate web that binds an army into an invincible unit embodying a single thought and a single goal.[37]

For a combat leader planning was the essence of decision.

The service's procedures for carrying out warfighting missions were codified during World War I.[38] After the war the so-called *staff estimate* became the centerpiece of the General Staff School's curriculum. During World War II, use of the estimate was standard practice in every theater. In addition, the process was not just used for preparing for battle. The civil affairs training school taught an identical planning method for military government operations.[39]

The most important aspect of the Army process was that it was mission-oriented, in other words, the first planning task was to articulate the mission in terms of a clearly identifiable and obtainable objective. For the war in

Europe the mission of the armed forces was to unconditionally defeat Germany and destroy its capacity to make war. If postwar peace operations were to be considered relevant they had to be thought of as an extension of this objective and planned accordingly. In short, the habits of military practice required Army commanders to map out the occupation like a military campaign.

Planning was also threat-focused. Once a mission had been assigned the staff's first task was to evaluate the threat. Threat analysis would then drive the remaining steps of planning and execution as all effort was directed toward the enemy's decisive defeat. Since the wartime planning process remained central to military practices throughout the occupation, threat-focused intelligence collection and analysis proved to be another of powerful rhythm of habit in the early postwar years as U.S. commanders in Austria continually sought to identify and orient operations on appropriate threats, a practice that further strained relations with the Soviet occupation forces.[40]

Influence of Institutional Pressures

The cumulative affect of the Army's rhythm of habits was to ensure that the force looked at its postwar duties from a warfighter's viewpoint that articulated objectives in military terms and placed the destruction of the enemy at the forefront of all operational planning. This limited perspective made all other issues related to the post-conflict mission a secondary concern, and important only as they related to the means to achieving a decisive victory. The focus remained on prevailing in war, not reconstruction and rehabilitation -- winning the peace. These habits made U.S. forces prone to take a confrontational approach with troublesome occupation allies as well as the local citizenry. Initial operations were characterized by an obsession with identifying and defeating threats rather than reestablishing civil society and the rule of law, and laying the groundwork for post-conflict reconstruction.[41]

Habits also ensured that the Army would be generally unprepared for the enormous tasks of postwar operations by applying too few resources, too late. Without question the military faced an intractable problem in equitably sorting out priorities to prosecute a global conflict. Inevitably, requirements for peace operations would not be placed at the forefront, and with some justification. It would have

done little good to invest heavily in preparing for post-conflict tasks, if in the process it lost the war.

Still, even with the few resources available the Army's effort could have been greatly improved. The tradition of forgetting, lack of experience, inadequate skills in interagency operations, unimaginative doctrine, poor training, and shallow professional education thoroughly exacerbated the Army's limitations in men and equipment. A better prepared corps of leaders, staff officers, and trainers could have gone a long way to offsetting the Army's shortfalls and speeding its capacity for rapidly adapting to diverse mission areas, but the service waited too long before seriously turning its attention to the fight for peace. In the end, responsibility for overcoming the Army's liabilities would fall on the troops in the field tasked with the challenges of occupation and reconstruction.

[1] R.H. Gabriel, "American Experiences with Military Government," *American Historical Review*, XLIX (1944): 630-44; Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Washington: Center of Military History, 1998). Of related interest are Robert W. Coakley, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders 1789-1878* (Washington: Center of Military History, 1988); Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders* (Washington: Center of Military History, 1997); Lawrence A. Yates, "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes," *Military Review* 77(July-August 1997): 51-61. For an introduction to the history of peace operations in general see, Erwin Schmidl, "The Evolution of Peace Operations in the Nineteenth Century," *Peace Operations Between War and Peace*, ed. Erwin Schmidl (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 4-20. One of the most important operations, in terms of setting precedence for operations in Europe was the Allied occupation of France after the Napoleonic Wars. See, Thomas Dwight Veve, *The Duke of Wellington and the British*

Army of Occupation in France, 1815-1818 (Westport: Greenwood, 1992).

[2]The staff school at Fort Leavenworth, for example, had a course of instruction on military support to government for domestic disturbances, but no instruction on peacekeeping or occupation duties. See, Cassius M. Dowell, Military Aid to Civilian Power (1925), Combined Arms Research Library. See also, Timothy K. Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps in the United States Army* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978).

[3] *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920. Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs and Armed Forces in Germany* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 64. See also, Harry Alexander Smith, *Military Government* (Fort Leavenworth: General Service School Press, 1920). During World War II Civil Affairs training was initially held at civilian universities including Northwestern, Harvard, Yale Stanford, Boston, Michigan, Pittsburgh, and Wisconsin. This curriculum did include a historical review of the Army's past occupation efforts including examples and lessons learned from the

Civil War, Spanish-American War and World War I. See, Ralph E. Pearson Papers, Military History Institute.

[4]War Department, Basic Field Manual 27-5, Military Government (1940). See also, Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964), p. 7. The Army's first military government school was at the University of Virginia. For an outline of the school's curriculum see, Letter to John Hartigan, August 14, 1946, box 7, John Doane Hartigan Papers, Hoover Institution; War Department, Adjutant General's Office, School Directive, 25 June 1942, School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia, RG 389, National Archives.

[5]Before the establishment of the Civil Affairs Division, the Army's executive agent for civil affairs was the Military Government Division of the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

[6]Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs,* p. 153. See also, Edward N. Peterson, *The American Occupation of Germany, Retreat into Victory* (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1977), pp. 33.

[7] Even a postwar Army analysis noted "the historic reluctance of the military" to undertake civil affairs and military government. See, Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations, and Analysis Concerning U.S. Civil Affairs/Military Government Organization, February 1951, National Defense University Library.

[8] War Department, Field Service Regulations (1924), p. 77.

[9] Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

[10] For the evolution of Army doctrine during the interwar years and the influences that shaped doctrinal developments see, William O. Odom, *After the Trenches* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999).

[11] *FRUS, Diplomatic Papers Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 536.

[12] See, for example, SHAEF, Memo, Subject: Interim Directive to AFHQ to Initiate Planning of Civil Affairs subject to confirmation by the CCS, April, 1944, Frank J. McSherry Papers, Military History Institute. The most recent treatments of Allied and U.S. planning are Manfried Rauchensteiner, *Der Sonderfall, Die Besatzungszeit in*

Österreich 1945 bis 1955 (Vienna: Styria, 1995), pp. 15-62; Donald R. Donald R. Whitnah and Edgar L. Erickson, *The Occupation of Austria: Planning and Early Years* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 21-64; Milton Colvin, "Principal Issues in the U.S. Occupation of Austria, 1945-1948" *U.S. Occupation in Europe After World War II*, ed. Hans A. Schmidt (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1976); Fritz Fellner, "*Die aussenpolitische und völkerrechtliche Situation Österreichs 1938-Österreichs Wiederherstellung als Kriegsziel der Alliierten*," *Österreich, Die Zweite Republik*, vol. 1, eds. Erika Weinzierl-Fischer and Kurt Skalnik (Graz: Styria, 1972).

[13] Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*(Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964) p. 153. See also, Comment by Colonel Jesse I. Miller, Director of the Military Government Division, Provost Marshal General's Office before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Inquiry into Army and Navy Educational Programs, 78th Congress, 2d session, 1944, part 1, p. 53.

[14] For example, all the Army's thirty-four combat corps commanders had been on active service in the First World

War, twenty-three in the American Expeditionary Forces. See, Robert H. Berlin, *U.S. World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1989), p. 7.

[15] *Infantry in Battle* (Richmond: Garret & Massie, 1939). This text was written at the direction of Marshall when he served as commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. See, Paul F. Gorman, *The Secret of Future Victories*, reprint edition (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994) pp. I-27-II-33.

[16] Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., Oral History, vol. 1, Military History Institute, 1980. Charles W. Thayer, who later joined the foreign service and served in Austria as part of the OSS, expressed similar views about his West Point education. See, Charles W. Thayer, *Bears in the Caviar* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1950), p. 17. For an overview of the academy's curriculum development see, William E. Simons, *Liberal Education in the Service Academies* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1965), pp. 62-80.

[17] Charles E. Kirkpatrick, "Orthodox Soldiers: U.S. Army Formal Schools and Junior Officers between the Wars," *Forging the Sword. Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World*, ed. Elliott V. Converse III (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1998), pp. 99-116.

[18] Scott A. Koch, "The Role of US Army Attaches Between the World Wars," *Studies in Intelligence* 38(1995): 111. See also, 112-115.

[19] See, for example, A.J. Bacevich, *Diplomat in Khaki, Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1949* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989).

[20] George C.S. Benson, "American Military Government in Austria May 1945-February 1946," *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*, pp. 171-2.

[21] Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 151. Hunt describes U.S. foreign policy ideology as containing three salient features; 1) an aversion to revolution, 2) the vigorous promotion of liberty as a national mission, 3) classifying foreign groups in a racial hierarchy reflecting the class and ethnic preferences of Americans. The Army's

conception of post-conflict operations appears to exhibit these characteristics. See, for example, Carl J. Friedrich, "Military Government and Democratization: A Central Issue of American Foreign Policy," *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*, pp. 12-13, 21-2. Friedrich was a director of the Civil Affairs training school at Harvard and an advisor to the military government in Germany.

[22] Francis Trevelyan Miller, *The Complete History of World War II, Armed Services Memorial Edition* (Chicago: Progress Research Cooperation, 1947), p. 4. This text came complete with an overleaf for veterans to fill-out their service record.

[23] History of U.S. Forces in Austria, Thomas F. Hickey Papers, Military History Institute, p. 2.

[24] The American occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934 was a case in point. Despite its small size and mostly administrative duties, the Americans retained the form of a traditional military-style operation. See, Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995), p. 14. See also, Emily Greene Balch, ed., *Occupied Haiti* (New York:

Negro Universities Press, 1969). The Haitian occupation was primarily conducted by Marines, though it resembled in character Army operations as well. See, for example, Army operations in the Philippines and China as described in, Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: the U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Dennis L. Noble, *The Eagle and the Dragon: the United States Military in China, 1901*-1937 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). It should be noted the military character of these operations is somewhat more understandable given that the troops often faced real security threats in the form of banditry and insurrection.

[25] *American Military Government of Occupied Germany; The U.S. Army in the World War, 1917-1919,* vol. 11, *American Occupation of Germany,* reprint edition (Washington: Center of Military History, 1991); Joseph W.A. Whitehorne, *The Inspector General of the United States Army* (Washington: Office of the Inspector General and the Center of Military History, 1998), pp. 271-77, 293-300. See also, Keith L. Nelson, *Victory Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Henry T. Allen, *The Rhineland Occupation*

(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1927); Alfred E. Cornebise, *Typhus and Doughboys: The American Polish Typhus Expedition, 1919-1921* (Newark: University of Delaware, 1982); John Bradley, *Allied Intervention in Russia* (New York: Basic Books, 1968); Sylvian G. Kendall, *America Soldiers in Siberia* (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1945); John A. White, *The Siberian Intervention* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950); John Silverlight, *The Victors' Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970).

[26] Letter, Russell Snook to John D. Hartigan, August 14, 1946, box 7, John Doane Hartigan Papers, Hoover Institution. See also, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920. Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs and Armed Forces in Germany.* This report was popularly called the Hunt Report.

[27] Eric James Bohman, "Rehearsals for Victory: The War Department and the Planning and Direction of Civil Affairs, 1940-1943," Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1984. See also, Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, pp. 21-156.

[28] The major difference in U.S. postwar operations was preparation. U.S. operations in Austria and Korea were

late in organizing, and hence, more hectic and disorganized in execution. Organizational and operational practices, however, were very similar. See, for example studies on Japan, Robert E. Howard and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1987); Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1998).

[29] The British military also exhibited a tradition of forgetting. For a review of Great Britain's peacekeeping operations before the Second World War see, F. S. V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization and Planning* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), pp. 3-20.

[30] This notion dovetailed well with contemporaneous administrative theory, which envisioned a clear delineation between the civilian and military functions of government. James A. Stever, "The glass firewall between military and civil administration," *Administration and Society* 31(March 1999): 28-49.

[31] For the scope of the State Department program see, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949). In June 1943, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee was established to coordinate inter-allied policy. It was composed of members of the War, Navy and State Departments and members of the British Staff Mission and Embassy in Washington. In addition to the work of the committee, the Army also cooperated closely with the Navy's Office for Occupied Areas in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The government also drew heavily on non-governmental organizations to facilitate postwar planning. The most influential group was the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1940 to the end of the war, the council's War and Peace Studies generated 682 memoranda that were forwarded to the Department of State. The best analysis of the Council's role is, Michael Wala, *The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy the Early Cold War* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1994).

[32] The Research and Analysis Branch, OSS, for example, produced at least eight substantive studies on Austrian affairs including; The Implementation under Military Occupation of the Moscow Declaration on Austria, Revival of

Austrian Political Life, The Catholic Church in Austrian Politics, Labor Movements in Austrian Politics, Changes in Austrian Social Structure, Welfare Problem in Austria, Elimination of Totalitarian Laws from Austria, and Administrative Separation of Austria from Germany. See, box 16C, OSS Files, Military History Institute. Administrate Separation of Austria from Germany, R&A Study 2110 was reprinted almost word for word as War Department Pamphlet No. 31-229, Civil Affairs Guide: The Administrative Separation of Austria from Germany, March 1945. See, box 16C, OSS Files, Military History Institute. The historical interpretations of the roots of World War II, views on denazification and policy recommendations in these documents is very similar to the contents of the Austrian Military Government Handbooks produced by SHAEF and AFHQ to guide the conduct of the occupation. See also, The Treatment of Austria: Policy Recommendation, The Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany, PWC-217(CAC-219), June 8, 1944, box 1, David Harris Papers, Hoover Institution. For the problems and challenges of planning see, Memorandum to James Riddleberger from Francis Williamson, subject: Meeting of Civil Affairs Committee on December 26, dated

December 27, 1944, box 2, Records of the Office of Western European Affairs, 1941-1954, Subject Files, Austria, RG 59, National Archives.

[33] Fahey, Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations, and Analysis.

[34] Letter, Erhardt to Matthews, June 28, 1945, box 2, Records of the Office of Western European Affairs, 1941-1954, Subject Files, 1941-1954, Austria, RG 59, National Archives.

[35] David F. Trask, *The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1993). The allied post World War I occupation was nominally under the unified command of the French, but in practice each national army ran its zone of occupation independently and enforced occupation policies as it saw fit. For a discussion on the administration of U.S. military government in World War I see, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920*, pp. 63-81.

[36] The cycle of mistrust is described well in Günter Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55, The Leverage of the Weak*. New York: St. Martin Press, 1999.

[37] *Infantry in Battle*, pp. 138-9.

[38] Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools*, pp. 134-44.

[39] Ralph E. Pearson Papers, Military History Institute.

[40] See, for example, James Jay Carafano, "Waltzing into the Cold War' US Army Intelligence Operations in Postwar Austria, 1944-1948," *The Vranitzky Era in Austria*, eds. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Ferdinand Karlhofer (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), pp. 165-168.

[41] See, for example, James Jay Carafano, "Deconstructing US Army Intelligence Operations in Postwar Austria: The Early Years 1945-1948," *Österreich im frühen Kalten Krieg 1945-1958: Spione, Partisanen, Kriegs* Plane, ed. Erwin A. Schmidl (Vienna: Böhlau, 2000), pp. 55-72.