

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

JOINT DOCTRINE TO INTEGRATE THEATER STRATEGIC
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL:
SEARCHING FOR NEEDLES IN A HAYSTACK.

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

13 May 2002

Professor James Fitzsimonds

Abstract of

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): (Unclassified) Joint Doctrine to Integrate Theater Strategic Psychological Operations at the National Level: Searching for Needles in a Haystack			
9. Personal Authors: Christopher L. Leyda			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 13 May 2002	
12. Page Count: 26 12A Paper Advisor (if any): Professor James Fitzsimonds			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: interagency, psychological operations, information operations, joint doctrine, ASD(SO/LIC), Desert Storm, Allied Force, JP 3-08, JP 3-53, JP 3-13			
15. Abstract: Current joint doctrine clearly defines how a combatant commander can develop plans, organize forces, and conduct psychological operations within operational and tactical realms. However, joint doctrine stops short of providing solid mechanisms and procedures to integrate theater strategic psychological operations at the national level and with other governmental agencies responsible for information activities. A revision of joint publications: <u>Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations</u> (JP 3-08); <u>Joint Information Operations</u> (JP 3-13); and <u>Psychological Operations</u> (JP 3-53) must occur to clearly define a coordination mechanism to integrate theater strategic psychological operations initiatives at the national level. More important, the revision of these joint publications will provide a common, complementary, and consistent body of guidance and procedures that designate a central agency to affect interagency coordination between theater and national levels as well as ensure combatant and joint task force commanders receive responsive interagency support.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-3556		20. Office Symbol: C	

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Current joint doctrine clearly defines how a combatant commander can develop plans, organize forces, and conduct psychological operations within operational and tactical realms. However, joint doctrine stops short of providing solid mechanisms and procedures to integrate theater strategic psychological operations at the national level and with other governmental agencies responsible for information activities.

A revision of joint publications: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (JP 3-08); Joint Information Operations (JP 3-13); and Psychological Operations (JP 3-53) must occur to clearly define a coordination mechanism to integrate theater strategic psychological operations initiatives at the national level. More important, the revision of these joint publications will provide a common, complementary, and consistent body of guidance and procedures that designate a central agency to affect interagency coordination between theater and national levels as well as ensure combatant and joint task force commanders receive responsive interagency support.

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Introduction

To support the achievement of theater strategic objectives and fully realize the ability to shape the psychological and information environment, combatant commanders must have a formalized doctrine, responsive coordination mechanisms, and a dedicated organization to integrate theater and interagency information activities at the national level. Current joint doctrine clearly defines how a combatant commander can develop plans, organize forces, and conduct psychological operations within operational and tactical realms. However, joint doctrine stops short of providing solid mechanisms and procedures to integrate theater psychological operations at the national level and with other governmental agencies responsible for information activities.

Information operations, specifically psychological operations (PSYOP), are fully recognized and embraced by geographic Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) as key tools to shape and control the information battlespace. Using allocated PSYOP forces, the CINCs and their joint task force (JTF) commanders have been generally successful employing psychological operations at the operational and tactical levels, but integrating the theater plan with national level information activities and the ability to harness interagency information capabilities have historically proven difficult. This difficulty reduces the responsiveness and scope of theater strategic PSYOP initiatives and can ultimately degrade the effectiveness of operational and tactical information activities.

This paper defines information operations and strategic psychological operations, examines current doctrine to integrate and conduct theater strategic psychological operations, and provides case study examples of deficiencies in executing and integrating information activities. To improve integration of theater and national level information activities, this paper recommends refining joint doctrine to clearly designate coordination mechanisms and responsible organizations to ensure timely and responsive interagency support for theater strategic psychological operations. In the scope of this paper, I narrow the focus of information operations to what is commonly called influence operations or PSYOP. The terms psychological operations, influence operations, and information activities are used interchangeably throughout this paper. In addition, interagency and U.S. Government (USG) agencies are used synonymously.

Information Operations and Strategic Psychological Operations

Doctrine for joint information operations (IO), contained in Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, describes information operations as actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own. These actions apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at every level of war.ⁱ

Joint doctrine divides information operations into six distinct functional capabilities and two IO related activities (Figure 1.). JP 3-13 further delineates information operations into offensive and defensive information operations. Offensive operations include operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare (EW), physical attack/destruction, and special information operations (SIO), and may include computer network attack (CNA). Defensive operations include information assurance, physical security, operations security, counter-deception, counter-psychological operations, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and special information operations.

As opposed to other information operations capabilities designed to protect information or destroy/disrupt information systems, psychological operations provide




Figure 1.ⁱⁱ

combatant commanders the capability to communicate with and influence the full range of target audiences from government leaders to the “man on the street”. Psychological operations, as a key element of information operations, become an integral and viable means to influence friendly and belligerent states, competitors, and other actors in and out of the international state system.

Doctrine for joint operations, contained in JP 3-0, defines psychological operations as:

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objective.ⁱⁱⁱ

To maximize its effectiveness, the theater commander conducts psychological operations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of U.S. political, military, economic, and informational activities.^{iv}

At the strategic level, doctrine for joint psychological operations, contained in JP 3-53, defines strategic PSYOP as:

International information activities conducted by U.S. Government agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of U.S. goals and objectives. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize Department of Defense assets and supported by military PSYOP. Military PSYOP with potential strategic impact must be coordinated with national efforts.^v

The non-lethal quality and versatility to reach state and non-state audiences make psychological operations a relatively low risk, effective means to either explain or achieve theater and national objectives.

Joint doctrine and its concept of centralized planning and decentralized operations afford the geographic CINCs considerable latitude to plan strategic information activities to enhance theater engagement and support the full range of military operations. However, it is in harnessing interagency support and integrating theater information activities with national policy where current doctrine falls short. A review of interagency coordination, information operations, and PSYOP joint doctrine reveals inadequacies in procedures that integrate theater strategic PSYOP activities at the national level.

Doctrine to Plan and Integrate Information Activities

Three joint publications: JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations VOL I/II; JP 3-13, Information Operations; and JP 3-53, Psychological Operations provide the basis for planning and integrating theater strategic information activities. These publications provide CINC and JTF staffs with generic guidance to plan strategic level psychological operations, integrate IO functional capabilities at theater level, and offer a rudimentary understanding of interagency operations.

JP 3-08 would seem to be a logical start point for the theater IO or PSYOP planner to learn how the interagency coordination and integration process works. Although this joint publication goes to great lengths to explain why interagency coordination is important, it falls dramatically short in defining actual procedures. JP 3-08 does not identify how information activities or military psychological operations are integrated at the national level nor does it describe what type interagency information capabilities are available or how to request interagency support. The best advice given to theater planners is that depending on the circumstances, many activities require interagency coordination, which the Joint Staff routinely accomplishes with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of State (DOS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Council (NSC) Staff, Department of Justice, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other agencies.^{vi}

JP 3-08 does provide some guidance for interagency coordination during foreign operations. It identifies the geographic combatant commander as the focal point for planning and implementing theater and regional military strategies that require interagency coordination.^{vii} The publication then explains how a combatant commander can coordinate military actions with the country team.

JP 3-08 states that the JTF public affairs officer should coordinate with PSYOP and other agencies to develop and package themes, mission, and endstate. It then vaguely states, “Various agencies involved in campaign planning do not necessarily send the same messages and must not contradict each other. Agencies and organizations must determine and coordinate the best methods to communicate these messages.”^{viii} Clear and defined doctrine should provide an explanation of how this coordination is effected. Lacking direction and a defined coordination mechanism, theater and interagency organizations could develop information activities that at best do not complement each other and in the worst case, send conflicting messages to the same target audience.

A final section on media operations is offered in Chapter III. This chapter suggests that the joint force commander (JFC) establish a civil information program to coordinate activity among, PSYOP, civil affairs, United States Information Service (USIS)^{ix} officer, host country, and other appropriate agencies.^x Although this concept mentions coordination with the PSYOP element, this program is designed primarily for operational and tactical applications “in country” and leaves the impression that the JTF should establish this mechanism after deployment.

Armed with this information, the theater planner would next look at JP 3-13, Information Operations, for guidance to access interagency support or to integrate theater strategic information activities with national level information programs. JP 3-13 stresses that to ensure success and produce synergy of action, the theater or JTF must integrate IO capabilities and that during the conduct of an operation, information activities may be planned or executed by non-Department of Defense (DOD) forces, agencies, or organizations. In addition, it states that these activities must be thoroughly integrated, coordinated, and deconflicted with all other aspects and elements of the supported campaign or operation.^{xi}

In terms of IO planning fundamentals, JP 3-13 states that synchronization and integration of IO requires clear national strategic guidance. Several paragraphs later, JP 3-13 thoroughly describes how a theater or JTF should organize its IO Cell to plan and support operations. It delineates responsibilities for IO integration within CINC and JFC staffs.

Explaining the organization of an IO Cell, doctrine calls for the inclusion of representatives from all IO functional capabilities and additional related activities (Figure 2.). In this section, however, it does not mention the requirement or consideration for interagency coordination or integration. Within the IO Cell, JP 3-13 places the responsibility to integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize the use of PSYOP in the JFC's area of responsibility, to include multinational information activities, with the PSYOP representative.^{xii} This section also stops short of including interagency considerations.




Figure 2.^{xiii}

JP 3-13 recommends that as necessary to accomplish the mission, the JFC should tailor the composition of the IO Cell to include other representatives and liaison officers.^{xiv} In providing examples of additional members, JP 3-13 only suggests DOD organizations. To ensure responsive interagency integration, this publication should recommend inclusion of other USG agencies responsible for information activities such as the DOS.

Although stating the need for IO planners to identify Service, joint, and interagency IO capabilities available to the JFC for planning purposes to achieve effective “capability-to-target” match, JP 3-13 does not provide guidance as to who is responsible for requesting or integrating these capabilities.^{xv} The closest JP 3-13 comes to defining integration responsibility is explaining that, “The CJCS validates joint IO as appropriate.”^{xvi} In a later section, this publication loosely links this responsibility at the theater level by stating that, “The combatant commander submits appropriate mission need statements to the CJCS for validation.”^{xvii} To avoid confusion, this section must delineate an agency for coordination beyond validation and explain in clear terms how integration is conducted among theater, JCS, and other interagency organizations.

The third joint publication to assist the IO and PSYOP planner to integrate theater strategic PSYOP

activities is JP 3-53, Psychological Operations. JP 3-53 provides the best guidance to identify responsibilities for interagency integration and theater strategic PSYOP program approval. However, it does not provide the clarity needed for the theater planner to seamlessly forward plans or requests to affect timely national level integration or receive responsive interagency support.

As opposed to other joint publications, JP 3-53 defines the Department of Defense to include the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) or his designee, the DOD General Counsel, and CJCS as responsible for establishing national objectives, developing policies, and approving strategic plans for PSYOP.^{xviii} At DOD level, the USDP and his designee, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD [SO/LIC]), act as the principal adviser to the SECDEF on PSYOP matters and coordinates PSYOP policies, plans, and programs with the National Security Council and other USG agencies.^{xix}

The CJCS responsibility is framed as preparing strategic plans and issuing policy for the use of military PSYOP in peacetime or conflict and supporting the overall conduct of war. JP 3-53 states that CJCS will review theater PSYOP plans for feasibility during times of conflict/war and coordinate or direct preparation of combined PSYOP plans.^{xx}

Geographic combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs are responsible for designating staff responsibilities, ensuring that plans and programs are coordinated and sufficiently represented, and monitoring and reviewing PSYOP.^{xxi} This includes advance contingency planning for the use of non-DOD informational and related capabilities in DOD PSYOP. Although JP 3-53 does not state how the combatant commander or JFC requests this non-DOD/interagency support, it does mention that as appropriate, the theater can ask for liaison officers from other USG agencies.^{xxii}

In a subsequent section that covers Overt Peacetime PSYOP Plans (OP³), JP 3-53 goes into considerable length explaining that PSYOP planners should request initial policy coordination to ASD(SO/LIC) through the CJCS to facilitate coordination with USG agencies.^{xxiii} It also suggests that planners should have a command arrangement agreement or memorandums of agreement/letters of understanding with DOD and non-DOD agencies to effectively implement and accomplish operational missions.

JP 3-53 explains that during peacetime, the Department of State provides overall direction, coordination,

and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas.^{xxiv} In the same section, this publication identifies the CIA, United States Information Agency, Board of International Broadcasting, Department of Treasury, and Justice Department as agencies that must review PSYOP plans to ensure consistency of effort.

JP 3-53, provides the most in-depth explanation of interagency coordination; however, this coordination is specifically tailored for peacetime PSYOP activities. Although the authors may have intended that this section apply also to contingency operations and war, it does not state such—leading to uncertainty at theater and higher levels. This omission leaves considerable room for confusion in deciding how to forward requests that do not fit neatly into peacetime engagement or a SECDEF approved OPLAN. I personally experienced this specific problem when attempting to coordinate military and interagency information activities in support of JTF Southwest Asia operations targeting Iraq.^{xxv}

JP 3-53 appears to include the elements required to determine responsibilities for coordination and integration of strategic PSYOP programs with interagency activities. However, the publication does not provide a section that brings all elements together in a coherent fashion—a planner would need to spend considerable effort putting the coordination and responsible agency pieces together. Even then, it would take a very experienced PSYOP planner to “read between the lines” or “fill in the missing parts”. Most theaters do not have senior PSYOP planners, in the grade of O5/O6 with prior joint, JCS, or interagency coordination experience.

Current Procedures to Request and Integrate Strategic Level Information Activities

Current procedures to request and integrate theater strategic PSYOP initiatives are in place but are not defined in joint doctrine. Discussions with a representative at ASD(SO/LIC) confirm the following procedures for theater PSYOP plan approval, integration, and interagency support requests.^{xxvi}

Plans or requests for support are forwarded by the theater CINC to CJCS, J3 Deputy Director for IO (J3 DDIO). The plan or request is reviewed and staffed at JCS for validation and feasibility. Once approved by CJCS, the staff action is forwarded to ASD(SO/LIC) for USDP approval. ASD(SO/LIC) then staffs the action with appropriate interagency organizations. Upon interagency consensus at the action officer level, the plan or request is forwarded to USDP for approval. The action is then approved by the USDP or, if required, forwarded to the SECDEF for approval. When the program or request has gained SECDEF or USDP approval, the

validated action is formally staffed to an interagency working group for coordination and execution by the appropriate interagency organization capable of providing support or complementary activity.

Although seemingly simple, the number of agencies required to fully integrate and coordinate a theater plan or request can slow the procedure. The number of agencies required to fully coordinate an action coupled with the small number of personnel at ASD(SO/LIC) available to service the theater request adds to the challenge of providing responsive support to the combatant commander or JFC.

Prior to September 11, 2001, it took approximately 45 days to staff, validate, receive support from, or integrate theater programs with interagency organizations.^{xxvii} Although this timeline might support deliberate planning, the dynamic nature of information activities in a contingency setting could render the interagency support ineffective or out of date.

After September 11, 2001, the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) was established as an organization under ASD(SO/LIC). One of its primary objectives was to enhance DOD relationships with interagency organizations responsible for information activities and streamline the interagency coordination process. Providing a formalized organization, headed by a flag officer and adequate staff, many theater actions and plans were approved in 48 hours.^{xxviii}

The demise of OSI in the spring of 2002 eliminated the general officer, many staff officers, and returned the coordination process back to a pre-September timeframe.^{xxix} Measuring timeliness alone, it appears that OSI, during its short existence, tied together the myriad of agencies and gained increased levels of DOD and interagency unity of effort.

Historical Case Studies: Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and ALLIED FORCE

Although acknowledging that psychological operations are a powerful tool, the U.S. has grappled with its use—never realizing the full potential. Disparate integration and the lack of dedicated support organizations as well as doctrine, at the strategic level, have been the root causes for this deficiency. The U.S. approach has historically been one of ad hoc groups forming to address PSYOP, informational issues, and public diplomacy during periods of crisis. The very nature of ad hoc groups, working without defined procedures or organization, degrades the ability to integrate interagency assets and lengthens the time from planning to execution.

Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Timeliness constrained the execution of strategic and

operational PSYOP during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Ignoring the temptation to suggest that a standing organization chartered to integrate information activities at the national level and formalized joint doctrine would have deterred Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait, the ad hoc manner of planning did affect the timing of information activities.

A group of PSYOP planners was formed on August 11, 1990 to develop a strategic and theater PSYOP plan.^{xxx} The resulting USCENTCOM plan, BURNING HAWK, was completed on September 20th and hand carried to Washington D.C.. Numerous components of the plan required interagency assistance, specifically the CIA, to disseminate messages and products—capabilities DOD believed were resident in the CIA.^{xxxi}

Approved at the JCS level on September 24th, the plan recommended employment of interagency assets. Without plans flowing through the Department of Defense to a national level committee that could integrate actions across interagency lines, USCENTCOM and joint planners could only speculate on the full spectrum and capability of interagency capabilities. It was not until January 12, 1991 that USCENTCOM's plan was approved—five days before the beginning of Operation DESERT STORM.^{xxxii} Put succinctly by one Pentagon official, "... in DESERT STORM we wanted to conduct a strategic psychological operations campaign to influence the Iraqi people. But there was no central agency to manage information."^{xxxiii} If Saddam Hussein had continued a fall offensive push into Saudi Arabia, the U.S. would not have had an approved national information or theater PSYOP plan.

A standing working group or organization could have quickly requested interagency planners to review or assist USCENTCOM in developing its plan. Prepared to staff this plan at the interagency level, theater planners using defined joint doctrine and a permanent organization could have streamlined its approval. As we have seen from recent events, we no longer can wait six months to develop an integrated information strategy and plan.

Operation ALLIED FORCE. Operations in Kosovo were hampered by not leveraging sophisticated means and the integrated capabilities of interagency assets. The U.S. and its NATO partners had difficulty employing the appropriate level of information products and activities to support U.S. and NATO policies and lines of persuasion targeting the Serbian population. During this operation, U.S. and NATO were never able to "get ahead" of Milosevic in terms of information quality or sophistication. While Milosevic turned to the

Internet and plied the international media, the best the U.S. and NATO could muster were leaflet drops of questionable accuracy and aerial broadcasts—broadcasts that a recent Defense Science Board assessment termed less relevant and effective.^{xxxiv} The Defense Science Board study noted that during Operation ALLIED FORCE effectiveness was degraded as aerial broadcast platforms could not provide quality television broadcasts due to stand-off transmission orbits.^{xxxv} In addition, these aerial broadcasts may become less relevant considering the growing use of satellite television and the internet to receive news and information.^{xxxvi}

In harnessing appropriate information assets, Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander of Operation ALLIED FORCE, stated succinctly, “All the tools are in place [but] only a few were used.”^{xxxvii} He noted that those in charge of information operations were “too junior and from the wrong communities to have the required impact on planning and execution.”^{xxxviii} It took two weeks to start delivering products and some 30 days to develop a campaign plan.^{xxxix}

Although most probably addressing tactical and operational support, Admiral Ellis described PSYOP as a force multiplier.^{xl} However, he also noted that a properly executed information operations campaign could have halved the length of the conflict.^{xli}

Bruce George, Chairman, British House of Commons Defense Select Committee, made a similar observation relating to information integration by stating:

Military doctrine needs to shift away from a focus on physical destruction as the primary tool of coercion to a more integrated view incorporating a range of tools chosen according to the desired outcome. This conflict was a conflict of perceptions. A critical deficiency for the Alliance was the lack of an integrated information strategy.^{xlii}

As illustrated in the case studies, incomplete doctrine contributes to and fosters ad hoc working groups as well as confused integration mechanisms. Ultimately, this degraded the timeliness of PSYOP support and did not allow the full use of DOD and interagency information capabilities. Providing resolution for this deficiency can only come from well defined joint doctrine that coordinates and integrates theater, interagency, and coalition efforts planned at national levels. Despite lessons learned, establishment of OSI has been the only visible effort made to enhance strategic PSYOP coordination or improve mechanisms that link the theater plan to interagency support and national level information activities.

Recommendations for Change

While current joint doctrine identifies the need for close theater and interagency coordination, it does not clearly define or explain the procedures for integrating theater strategic PSYOP initiatives and activities at the national level. More important, the three relevant joint publications do not provide a common, complementary, or consistent body of guidance and procedures that designate a central agency to conduct interagency coordination for information activities or interagency support. Although this author does not envision major changes, all three joint publications discussed earlier require additions in relation to IO and PSYOP.

In terms of operations conducted and lessons learned, the joint publications reviewed in this paper are in need of updating—JP 3-08 and 3-53 were published in 1996 with JP 3-13 written in 1998. Taking into account the growing importance of information activities as well as the increased integration of DOD and interagency organizations in current operations combating global terrorism, agencies responsible for these joint publications need to conduct an integrated review. The endstate of this review would provide each joint publication with new or updated sections on PSYOP/IO and a tiered or “top down” approach to ensure planners are provided clear, unambiguous integration and request mechanisms.

Tiered Development of Joint Doctrine. JP 3-08 represents the top the top tier and would provide an overview or a small section mentioning the importance of integrating IO and PSYOP with interagency organizations. Moving one tier down, JP 3-13 then provides a more focused discussion of PSYOP within the IO realm and defines the integration mechanism as well as responsible agencies within DOD. Finally, the third tier, JP 3-53, would clearly define and provide concrete, illustrative guidance on how theater strategic PSYOP initiatives and interagency support requests are forwarded for coordination, integration, and deconfliction with USG agencies. In addition, the new Annex V^{xliii} to theater OPLANs, which provides a vehicle for CINCs to coordinate interagency activities, must also include IO and PSYOP considerations.^{xliv} This annex should be addressed in all tiers.

The result of this update will be a set of complementary documents that explains the need for interagency information activity coordination at the highest tier and focused integration procedures at the lowest. Moreover, corresponding and mutually supportive joint publications will remove confusion at the combatant commander and JFC level allowing the development of responsive, complementary theater and national information activities.

JP 3-08 Revisions. JP 3-08 requires modification that adds a section discussing the requirement to integrate IO—specifically between PSYOP and interagency organizations. Although JP 3-08, for security reasons, may not be able to discuss interagency information capabilities, it could define how theater or JTF planners can integrate plans and access interagency assets by using the appropriate joint staff and ASD organizations.

Representing the highest tier of integration, this joint publication would not only assist DOD PSYOP planners but also interagency organizations that desire the use of DOD military PSYOP capability. DOS is only one agency that stands to benefit from this doctrine update. For example, after military operations in Afghanistan conclude, DOS may require DOD PSYOP support to enhance the success of country team operations or activities.

JP 3-13 Revisions. JP 3-13 must complement JP 3-08 and provide better resolution of organizations responsible to integrate strategic PSYOP programs with interagency activities. It must define a mechanism to request interagency support for theater PSYOP programs. JP 3-13 needs to specifically mention that interagency support/liaison can be an important part of the commander's IO cell. The PSYOP plan format, provided in JP 3-13, also requires a section for considering interagency support and integration. Finally, this publication must expand its overall section on PSYOP to explain that interagency coordination and integration are critical to conduct effective and timely strategic psychological operations in support of theater or JTF operations.

JP 3-53 Revisions. A revised JP 3-53 will provide greater depth and understanding of psychological operations by adding sections that provide the IO or PSYOP planner with guidance to coordinate and integrate theater strategic PSYOP activities. In its current configuration, JP 3-53 is confusing and leads the reader to believe that interagency support, deconfliction, and integration are primary concerns only during peacetime operations. JP 3-53 must stress that interagency coordination is a critical process throughout the entire conflict spectrum. To this end, a diagram needs to be added that clearly defines responsible organizations and the interagency integration/request mechanism.

ASD(SO/LIC) Involvement. ASD(SO/LIC) and select interagency participants must play an integral role in refining joint interagency coordination, IO, and PSYOP doctrine. Described earlier, the current staffing

and integration mechanism used by ASD(SO/LIC) should be adopted as doctrine and added, as appropriate, into the tiered doctrine concept. The agencies responsible for PSYOP planning, integration, and coordination, described in the present JP 3-53, correspond with the procedures currently used by ASD(SO/LIC).

To complement these updated documents, ASD(SO/LIC) must be adequately manned to ensure timely PSYOP coordination and interagency support. OSI, deactivated due to an alleged “turf battle” with DOD’s existing public affairs office, must be renamed and reestablished.^{xlv} The formation of an OSI-type organization was one of the recommendations on a recent Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) Defense Science Board Report on managed information dissemination. This report identified the requirement for this organization to coordinate all DOD information programs. The report also envisioned the organization to increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staffs, strengthen PSYOP capability to support U.S. strategic information programs, and effectively integrate these programs into activities with other USG agencies through a NSC Policy Coordinating Committee.^{xlvi}

Conclusion

The proposal for a reinvigorated effort to refine joint doctrine that coordinates theater and national level information activities is not grandiose, nor does it represent large outlays in equipment and personnel. It does, however, offer reasonable enhancements at a time when national security requires maximum involvement with limited resources to provide the information tools needed to accomplish theater and national information objectives.

Doctrine writing has never been flashy and many senior leaders, both military and civilian, are fixated on equipment procurement or providing funding increases to solve integration challenges. Although equipment and funding remain important to improve theater strategic PSYOP capabilities, it is only through consistent joint doctrine that organizations will be able to formalize relationships, streamline coordination, and when necessary, grow in required strength to provide timely and responsive support to commanders operating at operational and strategic levels.

NOTES

ⁱ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13 (Washington, DC: 9 October 1998), vii.

ⁱⁱ Erik Dahl, Kosovo/Information Operations PowerPoint Briefing, Instructional Period: OPS II-5, U.S. Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department, (Newport, RI: April 2002).

ⁱⁱⁱ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), GL-15.

^{iv} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53 (Washington, DC: 10 July 1996), vi.

^v *Ibid.*, I-2.

^{vi} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-08 Volume I (Washington, DC: 9 October 1996), II-5.

^{vii} *Ibid.*, II-13.

^{viii} *Ibid.*, II-14

^{ix} In U.S. Embassies abroad, USIS functions fall under embassy public affairs. USIS is commonly referred to as the Press and Cultural Section. In the U.S. State Department, USIA functions are the responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. The USIS transformation and reorganization started in 1997 and was completed in 1999.

^x Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-08 Volume I (Washington, DC: 9 October 1996), III-24.

^{xi} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13 (Washington, DC: 9 October 1998), II-1.

^{xii} *Ibid.*, IV-5

^{xiii} *Ibid.*, IV-3.

^{xiv} *Ibid.*, IV-6.

^{xv} *Ibid.*, V-3.

^{xvi} *Ibid.*, I-6.

^{xvii} *Ibid.*, I-6.

^{xviii} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53 (Washington, DC: 10 July 1996), vi.

^{xix} *Ibid.*, II-1.

^{xx} *Ibid.*, II-1.

^{xxi} Ibid., vi.

^{xxii} Ibid., II-2.

^{xxiii} Ibid., II-5.

^{xxiv} Ibid., II-5.

^{xxv} As CDR, 8th PSYOP Battalion, my unit developed several plans to integrate PSYOP activities in support of JTF-Southwest Asia (SWA). PSYOP planners from the 8th PSYOP Battalion recommended interagency activities in conjunction with tactical PSYOP products to enlarge the scope and impact of JTF-SWA strike missions. Although the plans were briefed at JTF-SWA and passed to USCENCOM for interagency coordination and possible approval, tactical PSYOP activities were conducted before any interagency support could be received. It is my belief that confusion in the approval and integration process was the primary reason for not receiving timely interagency support.

^{xxvi} Thomas A. Timmes, Assistant for Psychological Operations and Public Diplomacy Policy and Programs, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict), Telephone conversation with author, 23 April 2002.

^{xxvii} Ibid.

^{xxviii} Ibid.

^{xxix} Ibid.

^{xxx} Kathy J. Perry, The Use of Psychological Operations as a Strategic Tool, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 10 April 2000), 5.

^{xxxi} Ibid., 6.

^{xxxii} Ibid., 6.

^{xxxiii} Robert Wall, "Combat-Proven Infowar Remains Underfunded," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 26 (February 2001): 52.

^{xxxiv} _____, "Infowar Improves, But Psywar Stumbles," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 (October 2000): 68.

^{xxxv} Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict, (Washington D.C.: May, 2000), 49.

^{xxxvi} Ibid, 45.

^{xxxvii} House of Commons, Defense-Fourteenth Report Session 1999-2000 (Defense Committee Publications London: 23 October 2000): section 227 <<http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/347/34702.htm>> [23 April 2002].

^{xxxviii} Ibid.

^{xxxix} Timothy L. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," Parameters, (Spring 2000): 17.

^{x1} United States Special Operations Command, SORR-SCA (Analysis Branch), Military Strategic Psychological Operations: An Assessment, (Tampa, Florida: December 2000):15.

^{xli} Ibid, 15.

^{xlii} Bruce George, “The House of Commons Defense Committee Report: Lessons of Kosovo,” Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies Journal, (December 2000):13.

^{xliii} Annex V information obtained from Joint Military Operations Department PowerPoint Briefing: Political-Military Actions and “Interagency Coordination”, Instructional Period: OPS III-3. Annex V is a CJCS initiative to improve interagency support to military operations. In August 1998, the CJCS directed USCINCSOUTH to include an interagency coordination annex in CONPLAN 6400. The Annex V concept was briefed to the National Security Advisor in August 1999. Several months later (November 1999) in a memorandum to the SECDEF, the President codified the NSC role in Annex V. Annex V provides a vehicle for CINCs to coordinate interagency activities and lay groundwork for potential coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), ensuring integration of other instruments of national power into the DOD deliberate planning process. It also articulates the CINC’s recommendations as entry and exit conditions for USG agencies during operations. Annex V is repackaged by OSD/JS working group as DOD input to USG advanced planning. Properly used, Annex V will provide theater PSYOP and information operations planners a mechanism to delineate and describe interagency assets desired to enhance theater or JTF operations. OPLANS are approved by the SECDEF prior to execution. Advanced identification of desired interagency integration in Annex V could streamline interagency support as requests for interagency involvement and related assets will not arrive at the appropriate approval organization separate from the CINC or JFC plan.

^{xliv} Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department PowerPoint Briefing, Political-Military Actions and “Interagency Coordination,” Instructional Period OPS III-3, (Newport RI: Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department, 24 January 2002), 35-36.

^{xlv} Paul M. Rodriguez, “Disinformation Dustup Shrouded in Secrecy,” Insight Magazine, 4 (April 2002), < <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/664960/posts>> [8 May 2002].

^{xlvi} Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board Report on Managed Information Dissemination, (Washington D.C.: October, 2001), Final Report Memorandum, 2.

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