

MALAYSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN A UNITED NATIONS
STANDING FORCE: A QUESTION
OF NATIONAL SECURITY

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

MALAYSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN A UNITED NATIONS STANDING FORCE: A QUESTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY by Major Khairol Amali bin Ahmad, Malaysian Army, 76 pages

This thesis investigates whether Malaysia, as a small state, should participate in a United Nations (UN) standing force. The proposal to establish a UN standing force for conducting peacekeeping operations was introduced not long after the inception of the UN itself. However, due to the lack of consensus among the UN members, it was not established. After the Cold War, there has been a sharp increase in the number and complexity of peacekeeping operations. The idea for the UN to have a standing force once again has emerged and gained the attention of many parties. In analyzing whether Malaysia should participate in a UN standing force, this paper explores the concept of comprehensive security to identify the main security concerns for small states. In this process, Malaysia's security strategy is identified. A cost, risk and benefit analysis determines the effects of participation in a UN standing force on Malaysia's security interests. Considering all the security measures already implemented by Malaysia as its national security strategy, participation in a UN standing force would incur substantially more cost and pose greater risks to its security than the potential benefits that can be gained by the country.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangements
LIC	Low Intensity Conflicts
MAF	Malaysian Armed Forces
NAM	Nonaligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organisation of the Islamic Conference
UN	United Nations
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNSAS	United Nations Standby Arrangement System

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As a small developing country, Malaysia is actively pursuing its growth and development in an ever-challenging global situation. In charting its course, the nation's security and survivability as a sovereign nation, while interacting with the global community, are among the important goals in its strategy. As one of the several measures taken in implementing its security strategy, Malaysia has been strongly committed to the United Nations' (UN) Charter and has demonstrated its willingness to contribute to the global community by actively participating in the UN peacekeeping operations.

The end of the cold war is welcomed by many as a significant event that is hoped to be the impetus for the blooming of a greater world peace. However, the ongoing trends in the world situation indicate that humankind will be facing a world infested with countless smaller conflicts, which in one way or another affect the global community. This proliferation of global conflicts has directly led to the increase of UN peacekeeping operations. The role of the UN in security affairs has grown enormously, not only in scope but also in terms of its type and complexity. As a result, the traditional UN peacekeeping operations have encountered several challenges in the effective execution of their missions. One of which is the ability of the to UN to deploy the troops as soon as possible to the conflict locations. The desire to overcome the challenges has rejuvenated the call for a reformation of the UN peacekeeping operation. A proposal to establish a standing UN force is once again being presented in order to ensure a rapid reaction capability of the UN peacekeeping operation.

In the past, Malaysia has been rather successful in its participation in peacekeeping operations as a vehicle for its security strategy. As a small state, the possible establishment of a UN standing force poses a dilemma for Malaysia whether or not it should participate in such a force. Previously, Malaysia has gained many benefits by participating selectively in the UN peacekeeping missions. Participation in a UN standing force, however, may cost Malaysia a lot more than selective participation. For that reason, this paper seeks to analyze whether Malaysia, as a small state, should contribute its troops to a UN standing force.

States' Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations

There are many reasons why countries participate in UN peacekeeping operations. The explanations for their motives can be based generally on two schools of thought in international relations; the “idealist” and the “realist” theories. While the “idealists” believe that security can be achieved by collective efforts to pursue global peace, the “realists” argue that the world is dangerous and anarchic in nature, and each nation-state seeks to dominate another. Therefore each state is ultimately responsible for its own fate.¹ Regardless of the theories used to explain states’ motives behind their participations in UN peacekeeping operations, it is obvious that states participate in order to support or promote their national interests. In observing this fact, David W. Weinhouse states that, “participation in a peacekeeping operation is a voluntary act and if a state has no “special interest” in a situation, it will usually have a fairly high degree of “general interest.”² Even the long restricted-to-home military forces of Germany and Japan have used the UN banner to take first tentative steps outward.³

States are interested in participating in global affairs. However, they would like to be viewed as impartial in their involvement rather than meddling in other states' affairs. Since UN peacekeeping operation is perceived as impartial, it offers a good opportunity for the states to participate in the global arena. Mainly derived from the multilateral nature of the operations, this perceived impartiality allows a state to act on the global stage with positive international support.

Beside impartiality, legitimacy is a similar attractive characteristic of UN peacekeeping operations. "In the current global strategic environment, military operations gain legitimacy through the broad-based participation of members of the international community of states."⁴ In many situations, such legitimacy is difficult to achieve by unilateral or bloc intervention without the consent of the UN. Acting under a UN banner "provides a way around domestic and international political difficulties all democratic nations have with the use of raw naked power, even to protect national interests."⁵ These difficulties are particularly prominent when those interests are long-term and open to debate by political opposition.

By leveraging the legitimacy and impartiality provided by UN peacekeeping operations, states are able to pursue their national interests. One of the obvious interests is the need to contain or even solve a conflict, which has the potential to undermine or threaten the security of certain states due to the proximity of the conflict to these states, the ethnic or religious identification of the states' population to those involved in the conflict, economic interest, or the expectation to fulfill coalition responsibilities. The UN operations in the Balkans demonstrate the majority of these interests. The European community has the interest to control refugees, prevent violence from spillover to their

territories and prevent local cross-border economic disruptions.⁶ The Russian Federation has the interest to satisfy domestic political pressure and to increase its influence and political leverage in the Balkan region.⁷ The United States has a responsibility to help its NATO partners.⁸

Other reasons that encourage states' participation in UN peacekeeping operations are more indirect and longer term in nature than the containment of conflict itself. During the Cold War era, the United States supported peacekeeping operations where they could serve to insulate local conflict from superpower confrontations.⁹ With the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have normalized their relations. Therefore, "by cooperating with Russia in combined peacekeeping, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, and providing support for Russian peacekeeping efforts in its near abroad, as in Georgia, the United States has the opportunity to improve the overall strategic relationship."¹⁰ Another long-term interest is to "help new countries develop strong democracies and free market economies where rights of citizens are respected and opportunity of investment are protected."¹¹

The desire to maintain status and prestige can also inspire states to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. "Since the demise of the Soviet Union, one of Russia's primary security concerns has been to demonstrate to the rest of the international community that it remains a powerful state and plays an important role in the New World order. . . . Involvement in peacekeeping is seen as necessary if Russia is to continue to maintain significant influence and prestige in the international community."¹²

A growing reason for states' participation in UN peacekeeping operations is to provide humanitarian assistance. Technological advancement has brought images of

horror and suffering from various parts of the world to the living rooms of kind-hearted populations of developed countries. These images, far more powerful than the still pictures of magazines or newspapers, have created demand for humanitarian action.¹³ Furthermore, in the spirit of humanitarian concern, it is also in the interest of certain states to participate in peacekeeping operations to ensure that the peacekeeping mission to be carried out itself respects the human rights of the affected populations.¹⁴

UN peacekeeping operations also have special appeals to smaller states. A former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Per Hackkerup, has noted that, “small countries have vital stake in supporting the United Nations so that it becomes an effective instrument of the international rule of law.”¹⁵ For small countries, the UN itself is an important tool to ensure their sovereignty. As such, it is in their interest to promote the credibility of the UN by contributing support to ensure successful implementation of UN peacekeeping operations.

Lacking in resources, many small countries cannot afford to pursue their national interests unilaterally. Reflecting this view, Alan Ryan asserts that, “Australian security cannot be guaranteed by a unilateral approach to the defense of the country’s interest.”¹⁶ UN peacekeeping operations provide the opportunities for small countries to pursue their national security interests by getting involved with the more influential states’ actions. “Peacekeeping participation offers a world role to small and medium powers and this is not a factor to be minimized.”¹⁷

Participation in UN peacekeeping operations can also provide significant monetary benefits to small countries. Governments are reimbursed directly at a flat per-person rate for the troop units contributed to UN peacekeeping operations, such as

infantry or logistics battalions. Therefore, the contributing countries which send the lowest paid forces are reimbursed much more than their actual costs.¹⁸

As a small country, Malaysia has also participated in UN peacekeeping operations for various reasons in pursuing its national interests. Due to the voluntary nature of UN peacekeeping operations, Malaysia has been able to be selective in its participation, and hence able to leverage maximum gains from its involvement. For this reason, the proposal to establish a standing UN force made up of troops from contributing countries has definitely concerned Malaysia. If Malaysia participates, it will no longer have the flexibility to choose specific missions that provide the most benefits to its interests. On the other hand, if it does not participate, it may lose many benefits that can be gained by a higher level of participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

A UN Standing Force

The proposal for a UN standing force is not entirely new.¹⁹ Something of the kind was suggested by the first Secretary General, Trygve Lie, during the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948. During the Cold War era, the idea was periodically resurrected. However, the standoff between the superpowers paralyzed the Security Council and as such rendered the concept impossible. The debate over the notion of a UN standing force intensified once again after the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented “An Agenda for Peace” in June 1992. The presentation was his plan for resolving the post-Cold War conflicts. He proposed, among other things, to deploy troops as a preventive measure to forestall open hostilities. In order to do so, he urged the member states to consign armed forces, materials, and facilities to the Security Council on a permanent basis.

The reaction of member states to this sort of idea, with few exceptions, has been extremely cautious and predominantly negative. Of course, governments are reluctant to accept a new creation that might diminish their control over, or participation in, UN operations. They are also concerned that a readily available armed force might lead to the indiscriminate and unwise use of the force. They are also worried about the cost, and some, who are already wary of UN interventionism, believe that such a standing force would encourage the Security Council to intervene even more frequently.²⁰

Why a Standing Force?

The rationale for a UN standing force stems from the need for rapid reaction capability in conducting peacekeeping operations. The case in Rwanda was an example that indicated a blatant problem inherent in UN operations. Signed on 4 August 1993, the Arusha accords were the basis of the peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, but two months lapsed before the Security Council authorized the mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The plan for the operation established that 4,500 troops were required for the mission. Nevertheless, only 2,600 troops were ever deployed, and their deployments took place months after they were officially committed. Furthermore, the troops that arrived for the mission were either without equipment or only partially equipped, except for the Belgian contingent. However, even the Belgians were withdrawn part way through the operation.²¹

The commander of UNAMIR, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, said:

In Rwanda, the international community's inaction was, in fact, an action which contributed to the Hutu extremists' belief that they could carry out their genocide. . . . UNAMIR could have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. As evidence, with the 450 men under my command during this interim, we saved and directly protected over 25,000 people and moved tens of thousands between the

combat lines. What could a force of 5,000 personnel rapidly deployed have prevented? Perhaps the most obvious answer is that they would have prevented the massacres in the southern and western parts of the country because they didn't start until early May – nearly a month after the war had started.²²

If the UN had been able to launch the operation as soon as the Arusha accords were signed, some of the factors that contributed to the later crisis might have been avoided. Also, if sufficient and capable troops had been available sooner to conduct the UNAMIR operation, serious deterioration of the situation might have been prevented. The main point is that modest but timely measures could make the difference between a stable or strained situation or a humanitarian disaster that escalated beyond control.

Thus far, the UN only has a UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) to implement peacekeeping operations. The UNSAS is based on conditional commitments by member states to contribute specified resources within agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations. The system consists of arrangements negotiated between the UN and individual member states. The resources agreed upon remain on “standby” in their home country, where necessary preparation, including training, is conducted to fulfill specified tasks or functions in accordance with UN guidelines. When necessary, the resources are requested by the Secretary-General with the direction of the Security Council, and if approved by the member states, are rapidly deployed.

Due to the nature of the UNSAS however, there is no guarantee that the participating member states will contribute when requested. Not one of the nineteen governments with peacekeeping standby arrangements with the UN was willing to provide troops quickly for Rwanda in 1994. Therefore, while UNSAS is useful to some extent, it does not provide the rapid response capability needed by the UN.

Despite all the concerns over the idea of a UN standing force, the problems inherent in UNSAS may favor the standing force option over the standby arrangement. The latest development, which was manifested in the recommendation for the establishment of “coherent brigade-size forces” by the Panel on Peace Operations,²³ suggested that the idea of a standing force had not been totally discounted. Should several more future UN peacekeeping operations be engulfed by the experience similar to the one encountered in Rwanda, Somalia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, coupled with the rising expectation for the UN to play a pivotal role in world security, the UN might be forced to resort to the standing force option.

Primary and Secondary Questions

The primary question that this thesis asks is, should Malaysia, as a smaller nation, participate in a UN standing force? The supporting questions for this paper are: What are Malaysia’s security interests pertaining to its threats, challenges, conflicts, vulnerabilities and aspirations? What are Malaysia’s policies in the region and the world as related to its collective security, positioning, economy and bargaining power? What is the extent of Malaysia’s relation with the UN in terms of Malaysian support, prior peacekeeping, and its impacts on Malaysian security?

Assumptions

The main assumptions in this thesis are:

1. The UN has decided to establish a UN standing and Malaysia is offered to contribute to the force.
2. The minimum size of troops to be contributed by a nation in each mission is a battalion. Smaller size forces would complicate interoperability and logistic support.

Definition

It is important to define the term *standing force* in the context of this paper. The type of a standing force that is intended to be established by the UN is one that guarantees the availability of forces to the UN. Standing forces are not the same as standby forces where the UN must request the deployment of the standby forces from member states. Should a particular member state refuse or be reluctant to provide its standby force, the UN has to request another standby force from other member states.

In this paper, the terms *small state*, *weak state* and *Third World country* are treated as interchangeable. There are many definitions available when categorizing small states. For the purpose of this paper, small states are generally those states which are not known as super powers or regional powers. Because of their limitation in size, economy and military forces, small states are not able to defend themselves independently from an external attack. Therefore, they must also rely on others in ensuring their external security.

Delimitation

The focus of this paper is whether or not Malaysia should participate in a UN standing force. This paper does not consider the ability of the UN to establish a standing force itself.

Paper Organization

This paper is organized into five chapters, namely the introduction, literature review, research methodology, main analysis and conclusion. In the introduction, a brief historical synopsis of the UN standing force proposal is included in order to provide better background awareness to the readers. This introduction further provides the

readers with the primary and supporting questions of the paper, assumptions, delimitations, and definitions relevant to this paper. Chapter Two covers the survey of available literatures which are relevant in analyzing the issue at hand. The chapter on research methodology focuses on establishing the criteria and method of analyzing whether or not a small state should participate in a UN standing force vis-à-vis the country's security interests, while in Chapter Four, these criteria and methods are applied to conduct an analysis specifically on Malaysia. Finally, the result of the analysis is presented in the conclusion.

¹Discussions on the realists and idealists views can be found in Barry Buzan. *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983) and John M. Rothgeb, Jr. *Defining Power; Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993).

²David W. Weinhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support-Experience and Prospects* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1973) 562.

³Wayne K. Maynard, "The Peace Operation Schema: Rationalizing United Nations Peacekeeping In the Post-Cold War Milieu." (Ph. D. diss., The University of Alabama, 1994), 14.

⁴Alan Ryan, "Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks," *ADF Participation in the International Force East Timor*. Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper No 304, Nov 2000. ix.

⁵Maynard, 7.

⁶*Ibid.*, 154.

⁷*Ibid.*, 155.

⁸Beth L. Makros and Jeremy C. Sanders, "Improving US-Russian Relations Through Peacekeeping Operations," *INSS Occasional Paper*, 40, Regional Security Series, June 2001. USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado., 45.

- ⁹Weinhouse, 527.
- ¹⁰Makros and Sanders, 41.
- ¹¹*Ibid.*, 46.
- ¹²*Ibid.*, 47.
- ¹³Maynard, 15.
- ¹⁴Makros and Sanders, 46.
- ¹⁵Per Hackkerup, "Scandinavia's Peace-Keeping Forces for UN," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 4. (July 1964): 675 ff.
- ¹⁶Alan Ryan, ix.
- ¹⁷Weinhouse, 563.
- ¹⁸William J. Durch, ed. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 51.
- ¹⁹Adam Roberts. "Proposal for UN Standing Forces: History, Task and Obstacles," David Cox and Albert Legault eds., *UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities: Requirement and Prospects* (Cornwallis Park: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press. 1995), 50-52.
- ²⁰*Ibid.*, 60-63.
- ²¹*Ibid.*, 55-57.
- ²²General Romeo Dallaire, speech at Haque Colloquium, 23 March 1995.
- ²³Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Panel on United Nations peace operations, Fifty-fifth session, 20 Oct 2000, A/55/502. Para 76.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this literature review is to provide a sufficient background for this paper. This review focuses on the relationships between states in the international arena, the notion of security for small states, and Malaysia's national security practice.

Small States Security

Ever-present conflict situations force states to put national security considerations as their top priority. Since security considerations permeate all aspects of national interests, in its extreme, failure to address security issues effectively could threaten the very existence of a state itself. While the importance of national security is readily recognized by states, formulation of a strategy to achieve this objective of security for any state remains a monumental challenge. A state needs to mobilize all forms of its power to the fullest of its capability in order to seek to secure its interests. For smaller states, this task is even more challenging because of their limitation in resources such as size, manpower and economy.

Post-Cold War International System

Before further explaining the challenges faced by small states in ensuring their security, it is important to understand the international system in which all states interact with each other. In *Weak States in the International System*, Michael Handel asserts that, "the position and relative security of any weak state must be gauged in terms of the specific international system in which it is operating."¹ J. E. Spencer, in his book, *Republic Under Pressure: A Study of South African Foreign Policy*, observes that, "the

most obvious fact about small powers is that their foreign policy is governed by the policy of others. It follows that the student of small power policy, even more than the student of great power policy, must concentrate on the environment in which his subject exists.’²

Despite the end of the Cold War, the world remains an insecure place. Commenting on the world situation in the post-Cold War era, John C. Garnett, in *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War*, states that, “The endless and frequently violent human struggle for scarce resources shows no sign of diminishing, and international relations remains an arena of endemic conflict.”³ Nevertheless, in *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System*, John M. Rothgeb states that, “although the international system remains anarchic and is dominated by interaction of independent states, the degree and types of conflict among nations, the types of issues that structure relation among states, the goals that state pursue, and the resources used to pursue those goals and to exercise power in international politics all have changed or in the process of changing.”⁴

In describing the complexity of the international system, Rothgeb uses the concept of *parallel international universes*.⁵ He asserts that one of these universes consists of advanced industrialized countries that conduct one type of interactions among themselves and a very different type of interactions with other members of the international system. He further elaborates that the relationships among advanced countries are concerned mainly with nonviolently handling economic and political policy matters among equals and near-equals. The interactions between advanced countries and the rest of the international arena focus on highly stratified relations that include a

military component, which at times become violent. In Rothgeb's model, the other universes consist of a very disparate set of actors that for the most part are not nearly as wealthy as those found in the first group. These actors tend to be dominated by those in the first universe, are more prone toward both international and domestic political unrest and violence, and do not play a large role as managers of international economic affairs.

In *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Buzan offers an alternative model in explaining the post-Cold War international relation by using the concept of *security complex*.⁶ He defines a security complex as a group of states whose primary security concerns are linked together sufficiently close that their national securities realistically cannot be considered apart from one another. Security complexes tend to be durable, but they are neither permanent nor internally rigid. The international system as a whole contains a large number of security complexes, some of which intersect or overlap, and some fit inside each other. Because of these complicated patterns, the boundary of any particular complex may be difficult to define with precision, and the use of the concept requires sensitivity to the situation of those states that occupy positions in more than one complex. The links, which tie a security complex together, may be of many types such as geographical, political, strategic, historical, economic, or cultural. States that are outside the complex may play a major role within it, without the complex itself being central to their security concerns.

National Security Concept

Due to these multifaceted trends and developments in world affairs, Neville Brown argues in *The Future Global Challenge: A Predictive Study of World Security*

1977-1990, that the changing character of the international environment necessitates a broader view of security.⁷ In dealing with the notion of national security in the post-Cold War era, many writers assert that a simple and narrow focus on the traditional military security against external invaders is no longer adequate. As described by Robert O'Neill in *Security Challenges for Southeast Asia after the Cold War*, "the nature of security issues has changed considerably from the more military confrontations of huge blocks to the more political, economic and social challenges."⁸

In *The Changing Face of National Security: A Conceptual Analysis*, Robert Mandel proposes a model of comprehensive national security that encompasses several components, which he grouped into three categories.⁹ The first category is *power elements*. The components of these power elements are capability, threat and alliance. Capability involves the extent to which one possesses internal capacity to achieve one's national security goals. Threat is an external negative constraint on national security, which involves the extent to which oppositions from outsiders hamper one's ability to achieve national security goals. Alliances are an external positive opportunity for national security. It involves the extent to which support from outsiders enhances one's ability to achieve national security goals.

The second category is *communication filters*. This category consists of information and perception filters. The information filter, focusing on the quality of intelligence to prevent surprise, is primarily externally oriented at elites in other societies. The perception filter, focusing on widespread confidence to promote legitimacy, is primarily internally oriented at masses within one's own society. The information and perception filters mutually complement one another in the security communication

picture. These filters serve in many ways to control to what extent any of the power elements can contribute to security.

The third category is *substantive dimensions*. There are four substantive dimensions to national security; military, economic, resource-environmental and political-cultural. In many ways, these dimensions are intertwined. The impact of each dimension on the total national security rests heavily on the condition of both the *power elements* and the *communication filters*.

In his book, *Man, the State and War*, Kenneth N. Waltz proposes a different approach to studying the concept of security. He provides an idea of three levels of national security analysis centered on individuals, states and the international system.¹⁰ Building on the concept provided by Waltz, Buzan concludes that security might be best served at all levels by a multi-layered approach.¹¹ This could start with territorial defense strategies, which would ensure individual and local participation in national security. On top of this could come a national security policy based on devising self-help solutions to conspicuous vulnerabilities in the social, political, economic, or military sectors of the state. Beyond the national self-help solutions, a variety of security arrangements among a group of states could exist. These might include alliances and defense communities, formalized security communities and zones of peace, arms control agreements, dispute settlement procedures and arms production and purchase agreements, for example. The top layer at the global level would be centered on an organization like the United Nations, which could provide permanent forums for discussion and negotiation, and a mechanism for generating international law.

Role of Military in National Security

The military is traditionally considered the most prominent instrument of power. Rothgeb comments that “as time went on, however, it became increasingly evident that military capabilities did not provide the same degree of strength and influence that they had during the Second World War.”¹² Nevertheless, he also stresses that this does not mean the military no longer has a major role or that war is a thing of the past.

In *Security Studies for the 1990s*, Ted Greenwood highlights that, apart from the *military functions*, the military also has *political functions*, which he identifies as “signaling,” “image projection,” “armed suasion,” and “crisis avoidance and crisis management.”¹³ By signaling, he refers to the use of the military to signal states’ interests and intentions. The military can also be used to project a desired image within the international community. In the armed suasion function, the military is used for coercion, compellence, or deterrence. Although the crisis avoidance and crisis management function could be treated as a separate category, it often involves employing forces for armed suasion or image projection.

Challenges and Options for Small State Security

Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat asserts in *National Security in the Third World* that for nations of the Third World, national security poses serious dilemmas.¹⁴ Unlike developed nations, less developed countries must balance the complex and often contradictory requirements of socioeconomic and political development with problems of internal stability and the requirements of national defense. For these countries, a concept of national security that focuses primarily on the international threat system and its overt

manifestations of wars and violence, ignoring domestic well-being, is inadequate on theoretical and pragmatic grounds.

He stresses that both domestic cohesion and international cooperation form the basic prerequisites for national security in the developing countries. He highlights that different types and different levels of cooperation exist and oscillate between coordination, collaboration, and amalgamation. Each type and each level indicate different dynamics and serves different objectives. Al-Mashat states that domestic cohesion is the inevitable basis for the consensus formation process and national integration. Associated with this domestic consensus is the concept of legitimacy. In order for the government to ensure and secure its legitimacy, it has to initiate policies that satisfy the needs and aspirations of its people, socially and politically. In a hierarchical society, however, the chances for domestic cohesion through democratic means are very limited. Hence, the governing elite usually resorts to the state's repressive apparatus in order to achieve such a "consensus."

Mohamad Ayoob, in his book *The Third World Security Predicament*, stresses that the Third World's security can be described in three main layers: domestic, regional, and global dimensions of security.¹⁵ Although these three dimensions have influenced each other, the primary one is the domestic dimension. He asserts that the internal vulnerabilities of Third World states are primarily responsible for the high level of conflict in many parts of the Third World. These internal fissures have helped many domestic conflicts mutate into interstate conflicts by providing the opportunity for neighboring countries to intervene in internal disputes. If the internal sources of conflict

had been absent, or present on a much-reduced scale, Third World states would have been more immune to external meddling by regional and global powers.

In their book, *Strategic Planning and Forecasting*, William Asher and William H. Overholt state that a standard approach for strategic planning is to take a set of fixed interests, juxtapose them with a fixed environment, and then invent a strategy for attaining one's interests given the constraints imposed by the environment.¹⁶ They assert that listing such interests is only the first step in analysis because, while most planners will agree on the items listed, few will agree on the weight given to each, and there are complicated tradeoffs among the interests. In constructing a strategy, the weight of each interest must be fully understood.

In his book, *Strategies for Small-State Survival*, Hans H. Indorf stresses that for small states, the philosophical foundations for security must be viewed in total context. The ultimate aim of policy for a small state is survival.¹⁷ A small state cannot afford to get involved in conflict. Securing national objectives requires the use and development of all available powers of the state. For a smaller state that is lacking in its sources of power, strategic insights are indispensable to outwit an aggressor. He proposes that five strategic clusters are available to small states in formulating their security strategy.

The first strategic cluster is based on the sovereign rights of a state, which he calls *strategies in equities*. The concept of sovereignty is one of the main tools for guaranteeing the sanctity of a state's existence. This international respect for the principle of sovereignty constitutes the greatest nominal protection for the weak. For this reason, smaller states are likely to engage in any activity that seeks to uphold and

strengthen respect for sovereignty whether in international forum, bilateral treaty obligations or in interstate mediation.

The second strategic cluster is *strategies in cooperation*. This cluster of strategies proposes that there is a virtue in maximizing national assets through fortuitous international combinations. Small states can achieve safety in the plurality of international linkages such as through regional movements, economic interdependence, and foreign assistance.

The third strategic cluster is *strategies for defense*, which focuses on the military dimension of security. The very nature of small states renders total reliance on the military dimension of security to be unrealistic, because in most instances small states lack sufficient manpower, an in-depth defense capability, as well as resources for prolonged conflict. Ideally, a small power defense would emphasize high technology, minimizing manpower and territorial requirements. Small states may also form military alliance in order to strengthen their defense.

The fourth strategic cluster is *strategies in leverage*. In leveraging for national security, all externally directed mechanisms for defense, whether of a legal, economic, or military dimension, depend upon a cohesive home base that is well motivated through charismatic leadership. Strategies of leverage also include dissuasion, which aims at keeping an opponent at peace without fear on his mind.

The final strategic cluster available according to Indorf is *strategies in transnationalism*. In this strategy, there will have to be a judicious mix of various aspects of all strategies previously mentioned with a concurrent application. He concludes that

comprehensive security must be given the highest priority in state planning. The means used to achieve security must be multifaceted, avoiding a single factor emphasis.

Robert Purnell asserts that, “small states, in short, are great powers writ small. They behave as much like great powers as they can. . . . They belong to an international order which requires them to exercise what power they have.”¹⁸ Handel however, states that, “unlike the great powers, much of the strength of weak states is derivative rather than intrinsic. The diplomatic art of weak states is to obtain, commit, and manipulate, as far as possible the power of other, more powerful states in their own interest.”¹⁹ He explains that the total power of a state consists of internal power and external power. Since weak states have limited resources, on most occasions, the external sources of strength available are more crucial for the weak states. In essence, the goal for the weak states when fighting with superior states is not to achieve total victory, but to deter successfully or to evade war, to survive, and to inflict costly damage on the attacker.

Malaysia's Security Strategy

Even though the formulation of Malaysia's strategy is not based on any specific threat scenario, Malaysia is conscious of the threats that it is facing. In his speeches to the Armed Forces Defence College and during a key note address at the National Security Conference, Malaysian Defense Minister, Dato' Najib Tun Razak, mentioned that most of these threats are non-conventional rather than conventional.²⁰ One of these threats is the existence of religious extremist groups in the country. Piracy on the high seas and regional waters, together with kidnapping for ransom activities by disgruntled groups residing in Malaysia's neighboring countries, pose yet another security threat to Malaysia. The presence of a large number of illegal immigrants in Malaysia is already

causing social problems and has the potential to become a security threat if left unchecked. While Malaysia does not foresee any conventional threat in the near future, it recognizes that the security environment can change in a short span of time. The overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea, of which Malaysia is a party, remain unsolved. The situation on the Korean Peninsula and the China-Taiwan issues are also of concern to Malaysia.

Malaysian foreign policy stresses that with the emerging effect of globalization, Malaysia begins to see its security extended from national boundaries to the global arena. Malaysian's experience with regard to both the political and economic dimensions of globalization has been less than happy. On the political front, Malaysia's concerns include the persistence of old conflicts between states and the emergence of new ones. Additionally, the issue of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are also threatening global security. The economic dimension of globalization has been even more disappointing for Malaysia. The financial crisis that descended on East Asia in 1997 brought about not only social misery and economic disaster but political instability as well. Not surprisingly, Malaysia feels more vulnerable today in terms of the global effect on its national security.

In *Asian Security Practice*, K. S. Nathan traces how Malaysia, through its history and experience, has formulated its security strategy.²¹ In devising its security strategy, Malaysia is committed to the notion of comprehensive security and pursuing a multi-layered approach. Malaysia's post-Cold War national security strategy comprises the following eight principles:

1. Comprehensive security through domestic social cohesion and a stable regional environment.
2. Diplomacy as the first line of defense.
3. Commitment to the UN and its instruments for promoting peace, security, and development.
4. Encouragement of regional security dialogues with the aim of promoting cooperative strategy.
5. Promotion of confidence-building measures especially in the area of crisis management.
6. Emphasis on military diplomacy through contacts, exchanges, training, and joint exercises.
7. Promotion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
8. Modernization of the Malaysian Armed Forces to defend national sovereignty and enhance national security.

Vision 2020

In its aspiration to achieve a developed nation status, Malaysia began in the 1990s to orchestrate a dynamic balance between domestic capacity and external performance. On 28 February 1991, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed unfolded his vision of Malaysia in his speech entitled “Malaysia: The Way Forward.” Ultimately, the vision set forth a target for the country to achieve a developed nation status by the year 2020.

According to K. S. Nathan, *Vision 2020*, as both the conception and strategy of Malaysian national security, espouses the following agenda: to create a unified Malaysian nation; to promote an outward looking Malaysian society; to infuse society

with strong moral and ethical values; to ensure that the state is democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable, progressive and prosperous; and to develop an economy that is competitive, dynamic, robust, and resilient.

Malaysia's Defense Strategy

Malaysia's strategic interests can be structured and grouped into three tiers: national, regional and global. Based on the strategic interests and coupled with the comprehensive and multi-layered approach to Malaysia's security strategy, Malaysia's defense is built on the levels of self-reliance, regional cooperation and external assistance, and global relations. Each of these levels includes military, political, economic, and informational aspects. The multi-layered effect of defense described in the text by K. S. Nathan is portrayed in Figure 1. Self-reliance is the first and highest priority while global relations is the lowest.

Global Relations
Regional Cooperation/External Assistance
Self –Reliance

Figure 1: Malaysia's Multi-Layer Security Concept

Self Reliance

Malaysia aims to achieve self-reliance as much as possible. Due to Malaysia's limited capability however, it is worth highlighting that Malaysia's self-reliance capability is geared toward matters concerning internal security and protecting territorial integrity and security interests from low and medium level threats within the immediate vicinity.

Regional Cooperation/External Assistance

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was inaugurated in 1967. Today, it comprises of ten countries in the South East Asian region: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Support for ASEAN has long been a high priority for Malaysia as a means to enhance both the nation's security and economic objectives. Prime Minister Mahathir asserts that ASEAN is vital as a stabilizing influence and as a catalyst in developing the economic resilience of the region. ASEAN has also become an important platform for development of closer relations with advanced countries as well as with international organizations.

The Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), which was formed in 1971, is viewed by Malaysia as augmenting national and regional security and serves as a defense mechanism in the event of external aggression. The agreement was established among United Kingdom, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand. This notion of regional defense precludes the concept of alliance formation, which can be especially counter-productive in a depolarized global environment. The defense agreement provides Malaysia with security links to countries outside of the region.

Global Relations

In accordance with its strategy of a multi-dimensional approach to security, Malaysia's activities in the international arena enable the country to exercise some influence in gaining international support and cooperation. The focus of Malaysia's international relations includes a commitment to the role of the UN in managing international security, forging South-South cooperation based on the conviction that development is the best source of security for nations of the South, promoting Islamic solidarity and international trade.

Malaysian Armed Forces and Peacekeeping

The Malaysian Armed Force (MAF) is one of the principal agencies responsible for ensuring the success of Malaysia's comprehensive and multi-layered security strategy. The MAF role is to defend the nation and its strategic interest against all forms of aggression and to support the civil authorities in maintaining internal security. The MAF is also responsible for assisting the civil authorities in the maintenance of public order, to provide assistance during national disasters, and to contribute to the national development. The MAF will also continue to maintain its capability in the international arena in support of the national foreign policy by involving itself in various peacekeeping missions under the UN.

Malaysia's commitment to the role of the UN is evidenced by an early involvement in providing troops for the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo in the early 1960s. Since then Malaysia has been actively participating in UN peacekeeping operations. Despite some casualties incurred during the conduct of these peacekeeping operations, Malaysia continues to provide strong support to the UN. The trust placed in

the capability of the Malaysian forces was perhaps best exemplified when General Datuk Aboo Samah bin Aboo Bakar was appointed as the UNOSOM II Commander.

Malaysia's continuing commitment to peacekeeping operations can be illustrated by Malaysia's development of the Southeast Asia's first peacekeeping training center. The MAF also contributes to the present UNSAS in the form of one fully equipped infantry battalion battle group, with military observers, logistics, and military staff as part of the overall Malaysia standby team.

In an interview with *Asian Defence Journal*, the Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces, General Tan Sri Dato' Seri Mohd Zahidi bin Haji Zainuddin states that, "I do not see any negative impact at all from our involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations."²² He said that the participation has improved the inter-operability with other nations' military forces and that the MAF is also able to develop and incorporate some doctrinal changes. Additionally, this involvement has provided an impetus to further improve MAF professionalism in these kinds of operations. He also observes that the involvement has enabled the MAF to contribute as a "second track" to the foreign relations effort of the government through its "defense diplomacy" while stationed abroad.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the process that will be used to analyze whether or not Malaysia should participate in a UN standing force. The research methodology for this paper is based on small states' security concerns and practices.

Analysis Concept

David A. Baldwin states that “actors will seek to exercise influence over targets only when they believe they will receive some benefits from doing so. Otherwise they will not bother, for the wielding of power always costs the actor something, whether it be money, lives, the opportunity to pursue an alternative course of action, or something else.”¹ Therefore, a small state will only adopt a policy to participate in a UN standing force if it gains more benefits than the costs and risks it incurs from the participation.

For small states, Mohammad Ayoob asserts that, “it is not possible to construct a paradigm that has sufficient power to explain Third World behavior internally or externally without the concept of security at its center.”² For that reason, a decision whether a small state should participate in a UN standing force must be based on the costs, risks and benefits of the participation to the small state's security. Therefore, in conducting a cost, risk and benefit analysis, small states' security goals must be identified first.

Merely knowing a nation's goals or interests is not sufficient to formulate policy or make national strategy decisions. Asher and Overholt state that policy makers must consider the relative weight of the interests and comprehend the ways in which the

different goals complement and contradict one another.³ Depending on situations unique to a small state, some of its interests or goals are of greater priority than others.

Therefore, a cost, risk, and benefit analysis in this paper will follow these steps:

1. Identify national security goals.
2. Prioritize the security goals.
3. Assess cost, risk, and benefit.

Step One: Identification of National Security Goals

While there is some wisdom in declaring one's national security goals publicly, not every nation does so. Especially for small states, certain circumstances may prevent them from publishing their national security goals. For example, a small state may not want to be provocative by declaring openly that its neighboring state is a potential threat to its security. Therefore, more often than not, small states' security goals have to be identified based on the states' various national policies and official statements by their leaders and by observing their national decisions and actions.

In identifying small states' security goals, it is imperative to understand small states' security concerns. As many writers have pointed out, considerations for small state security must cover a broad concept of security rather than mere military protection against an external aggressor. Buzan asserts that "all states are to some degree vulnerable to military and economic threats and many also suffer from a fundamental political insecurity. The different components of the state appear vulnerable to different kinds of threat, which makes national security a problem in many dimensions rather than just a matter of military defense."⁴ In explaining the comprehensive notion of national security, Mandel proposes that national security consists of four major dimensions: *military*,

*economic, political-cultural and resource-environment.*⁵ These dimensions are intertwined in many ways and they are difficult to separate conceptually. Doing so, however, is crucial to understand the differing concerns each raises about security.

The military is needed to protect and defend a country from both internal and external threats. The military also ensures security by providing deterrence to potential threats. Economic security aims to achieve industrial competitiveness and success in the international marketplace. A strong economy is required to provide for the security needs of states and their populations. In the political-cultural dimension of security, states' interests are to preserve the government and its ideology as well as the distinctive identity of the society. States also want to ensure unity and cohesiveness of the populations. In term of resource-environment security, states strive to maintain and increase access to vital natural resources and needs. Additionally, states are also concerned with the management of transnational threats to environmental preservation. Such threats are global warming, destruction of the ozone layer, acid rain, international deforestation, and toxic waste.

When identifying the national security goals of a particular state, the analyst must understand how each of the goals fit into each of these four security dimensions. Ultimately, these dimensions of national security are also interrelated. As such, significant tradeoffs will emerge from any attempt to pursue them all simultaneously. A policy may represent a cost to a security goal in one dimension but may be a benefit to another goal in other security dimensions. In other words, a policy to participate in a UN standing force may improve national security in certain dimensions but at the same time may reduce security in other dimensions.

Step Two: Prioritization of Security Goals

While all small states have multiple goals in various dimensions of security, some goals are more important than are the others. Therefore, it is essential to prioritize the identified goals because the cost that nations are willing to pay “depends on the value that nations attach to the goals they seek to attain . . . the higher this value, the greater the incentive to bear higher cost.”⁶

The priority of each goal for a particular state depends on many factors. Small states generally focus on factors that affect their internal security as the main concern.⁷ AS such, their internal security is their primary security layer. This does not mean that small states can neglect external threats to their security, but internal security is crucial for small states. Without internal security, these states cannot possibly grow to maturity and consequently they probably will remain as weak states indefinitely. There are many weak states today, which are not able to pursue development and growth effectively due to their internal security problems. Therefore, the top priority for small states’ security goals are those that directly provide for their internal security.

Small states must be self-reliant in maintaining their internal security and try as well as they can to meet any external threats. The development of military power enables them, under certain conditions, to deter an attack by another small state and successfully defend against aggression. When faced with a significantly greater power, a small state may be able to defend until external assistance arrives.⁸ External military support is usually critical for smaller states.

Economic security is important for many reasons. A classic contribution of economic strength to national security is the ability to afford a modern and capable

military. Money is not only required for the procurement of modern weapons systems but also to sustain a credible military force and its operations. Additionally, small states want to be economically viable to support the needs of their populations.

Small states' concerns to preserve their political and cultural identities are mainly internally driven rather than externally oriented. The ways and means for small states to achieve these interests depend on the unique character of each state. One way of protecting their interests is by having a strong control over the population. It is common for some states to employ its military in implementing this control.

Another approach to securing these interests is strengthening the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state's social-political framework in the eyes of its population. National leaders must strive to achieve economic growth and development so that the country continues to prosper. This way, the population will not develop any major dissatisfaction with the capability of the country's social-political system to provide peace and prosperity to the nation. In a multi-ethnic country, the government must also ensure that social justice prevails in the system in order to prevent ethnic tensions among the population, which can threaten the country's security.

Small states also need to maintain their access to vital resources and needs. For small states with limited resources, the exploitation of these resources must be managed well in order to avoid destruction to the environment. In pursuing development, a state also needs to avoid any potential negative impacts that the development process may have on its environment.

Nevertheless, due to their limitations, small states need to obtain support from other countries. In order to ensure security from a stronger external threat, small states

ultimately need to have a linkage to outside support. Therefore, for small states, ensuring such support from others becomes the next in priority. These external supports provide their next security layer after self-reliance.

Small states can establish several of these linkages in many ways. Small states may be interested in maintaining effective military alliances. On the other hand, there are also drawbacks to forming military alliances. While acquiring protection against an immediate or local danger by forming an alliance, the weak state may find itself facing new and unexpected threats. For example, it may itself become involved in the conflicts of the great powers in an alliance. If the great power has acquired bases on the weak state's territory, it may find itself on the target list of another power with which it has no direct conflict.⁹ In addition, alliance membership constitutes some loss of freedom of national action when responding to emerging crisis, challenges to distinctive senses of national identity, and increased competition and friction across alliances. Furthermore, "securing a formal treaty with a great power is not an easy task, especially if the weak state faces imminent danger. Moreover, treaties and declarations of support do not necessarily guarantee that such support will be forthcoming. It is, therefore, in the interest of the weak states to use additional means to buttress the great power's written and formal commitments."¹⁰

Entering a formal alliance is not the only way in which a weak state can recruit the support of other countries. Weak states "may reach an informal, though not necessarily less helpful, understanding with partners sharing common interest."¹¹ This kind of support is normally known as a security arrangement. Participation in exercises,

personnel exchanges, and arms transfers may provide increased external support in security arrangements.

Due to limited capability and resources, small states cannot be self-sufficient in their economic development. They need outside resources and markets. Therefore, small states are also interested in developing economic cooperation to achieve economic security.

Economic cooperation also creates interdependence among the nations involved. As such, the arrangements are considered to enhance national security, because they provide more benefits for the countries if they remain peaceful with each other rather than to attack one another. Additionally, it increases access to resources, markets, and investment with other nations.

Such cooperation also provides a platform for regular interaction and discussion among its participants so that emerging disputes can be tackled, diffused, or at least contained from escalating to armed conflict. Another potential benefit to be gained is that the members can promote their collective interest in the international arena more effectively than if each state pursues its interest unilaterally.

Small states also need to increase their access to vital resources. Therefore, external trade relations with other nations to secure resources and markets are important aspects that contribute to small states' security.

Generally, in prioritizing their security goals, it can be seen that small states must focus first on their internal elements to ensure security. This provides their first layer of security. Meanwhile, due to their limited capability and resources, small states must also rely on others. External assistance and cooperation provide the next layer of security to

small states. Depending on a small state's geopolitical situation, the external security layer may be further broken down to emphasize its regional focus on external cooperation and support. Small states, however, must be very careful in their reliance and interaction with others so that the effects will enhance their security rather than increase their vulnerability. A final layer, global relations, seeks to secure broad, positive recognition and support for the sovereignty of the small state.

Step Three: Cost, Risk, and Benefit Assessment.

The final step in the analysis is the cost, risk and benefit assessment itself. The purpose of this assessment is to identify and evaluate the cost, risk and benefit of participation in a UN standing force to the national security of small states.

Costs of Small States' Participation

Securing national objectives prescribes the use and development of all available powers. Small states inherently have limited internal capabilities or sources of power. For that reason, they must use these limited assets as efficiently and effectively as possible. Rothgeb states that, "the actor that uses resources efficiently obtains more per unit of resource than can the less efficient actor."¹²

One source of power that contributes to states' security is its human resources. Small countries need to have an efficient and effective human resource distribution. While a strong armed forces is desirable to meet any consequences and threats to its security, too big of a force can be wasteful especially in a situation where there is no real perceived threat. The excess manpower can be employed and can contribute to other needs of the nation.

Participating in a UN standing force will incur a greater human resources cost in military personnel to contributing states. Therefore, small states need to consider whether they have the military capacity to provide part of their force to a UN standing force while at the same time retaining sufficient military to defend the country.

“Within the area of military capability, intangibles such as training and command-and-control capacity have proven recently to be at least as important as the tangibles of force size and weapon sophistication.”¹³ For that reason, in considering their military capability to contribute to a UN standing force, small states must also consider the capability of the military to train and prepare their personnel to meet the expected requirements of a UN standing force. These requirements include interoperability and rapid deployment.

Another source of power is a nation’s economy. Therefore, when small states consider the cost of participating in a UN standing force, they must consider their economic capacity to support and sustain a military force designated as part of a UN standing force. This consideration must be made with the realization that states’ economies are not solely dedicated to military force. Other areas, such as national development, also need financial allocations.

Another cost of participating in a UN standing force is the loss of the ability to selectively participate in a UN peacekeeping operation. In this sense, participation in a UN standing force constitutes some loss of freedom of national action. As such, a small state may find itself entangled in a conflict in which it has no desire to be involved. Moreover, there may be additional economic, diplomatic, or even military costs to a small nation because of the opposition of some countries to a specific UN operation.

Risks of Small States' Participation

The participation in a UN standing force also poses several risks to small states' security. A UN standing force is expected to be deployed rapidly to any global location to confront situations which may still be volatile and highly unstable. As such, deployed soldiers may face dangerous situations that might even cause the loss of their lives. If a large number of troops are killed or wounded, the morale of the military and the support of the population at home may be affected. This may lead to opposition to the government's policy and damage the political integrity of the nation. The risk is especially high if the government cannot satisfactorily justify the troops' involvement to the people.

Perception has a strong impact on small state security. Robert Jervis, in *Logic of Image in International Relations*, stresses that, "The image of a state can be a major factor in determining whether and how easily the state can reach its goal."¹⁴ Therefore, small states can project a suitable image to further enhance their security. An "important tactic of the weak states in their effort to win a great power to their side is their appeal to public opinion in the strong state. . . . The weak states could try to cultivate public opinion in the countries whose support they want to secure."¹⁵

Participating in a UN standing force poses several potential risks for a state's image. The media will have worldwide coverage on peacekeeping operations. A standing UN force will be deployed as early as possible once the belligerents agree to a peaceful settlement. At this early stage, the situation is highly unstable and the peace agreement is relatively fragile. Due to these conditions, the rapidly deployed standing UN force will most likely encounter severe challenges in keeping the peace and the

potential for the soldiers to inadvertently make mistakes is relatively high. Therefore, a state risks a negative image if any of its soldiers makes a publicized mistake in the operation.

Another situation that will tarnish a small state's reputation is if it is not able to provide its troops for an operation within the agreed time. This will cause the state to be scorned in the international community as incompetent and unreliable.

A more subtle yet costly risk in small states' participation has to do with their ability to leverage their reputation from their participation. It is understood that small states will not benefit directly by their participation in a UN standing force because the UN is not necessarily capable of defending them if they come under attack. Therefore, small states need to leverage their reputation in the international arena in order to gain benefits from the participation. If they are not able to leverage their reputation for benefits, their involvement in a UN standing force will mainly incur cost to them.

Benefits of Small States' Participation

Participation in a UN standing force will provide an opportunity for interaction at various levels such as government-to-government, troops-to-troops and troops-to-public. A small state's participation will bring credit and prestige to a country. Such participation indicates the state's willingness and capability to contribute significantly to the world community. As such, both local and foreign populations will have a positive opinion of the country. This positive perception encourages others to favor the country diplomatically and economically. Additionally, other countries will be more likely to provide support if the country is threatened or attacked by an external aggressor.

Small states are concerned about their sovereignties. Participation in a UN standing force will elevate their status and enhance their visibility in the global arena. Such status and visibility will gain increased support among the international community. Small states can also leverage this status to strengthen domestic cohesion and rally their populations' support to their governments.

The interaction among the troops will foster better relations between the nations involved. In conducting real operations together, the troops will be able to develop further understanding of each other and improve the capability for interoperability better than would have been achieved by merely conducting training with each other. The cooperation among troops will also provide opportunities among the leaders of the nations to interact further. All of these can add value and further strengthen the existing military, economic or political ties among states.

Jervis stresses that "a desired image can often be of greater use than a significant increment of military power or economic power."¹⁶ However, in order "to get others to believe an image a state must fully act out that image."¹⁷ Therefore, participation in a UN standing force can be used by small states to establish a desired reputation for "a target may perceive an actor is strong, first because of the actor's resource base and second because of the actor's reputation."¹⁸ The participation can serve as a tool to validate the capability of the military in conducting operations and providing credibility to a small state's military and thus enhancing its deterrence capability.

The military can also leverage other benefits from participation. Participation will allow the military to develop and improve its doctrine for operations pertaining to peacekeeping. Military personnel at various levels will be further developed in their

profession from their experience gained in the conduct of the operations. Such participation can also boost the morale of military personnel who see themselves as professional and capable of performing their task hand-in-hand with different forces from other countries.

Conclusion

In order to decide whether a small state should participate in a UN standing force, the costs, risks, and benefits of participation to the small state's security must be evaluated. The effects of participation must be considered in all the military, economic, political-cultural and resource-environment considerations of security. While small states have several security goals that can involve all of these security dimensions, small states normally place the greatest priority on the goals that are related to their internal security. Since small states inherently have limited capability and resources, they must also rely on other states to ensure their external security. As a whole, a small state should only participate in a UN standing force if the overall benefits to its security that can be gained from the participation exceed the costs and potential risks that it has to undertake.

¹Baldwin, 145.

²Ayoob, 4.

³Asher and Overholt, 24.

⁴Buzan, 65

⁵Mandel, 26-42.

⁶Arnold Wolfer, *Discord and Collaboration*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 1962), 106.

⁷Ayoob, 8-12, 165-185.

⁸Handel, 258.

⁹Ibid., 129.

¹⁰Ibid., 122.

¹¹Ibid., 120.

¹²Rothgeb, 42.

¹³Mandel, 28-29.

¹⁴Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Image in International Relations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 6.

¹⁵Handel, 124.

¹⁶Jervis, 6.

¹⁷Ibid., 8.

¹⁸Rothgeb, 29.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

As a small state, Malaysia has formulated a comprehensive and multi-layered strategy to ensure its national security. In order to decide whether Malaysia should participate in a UN standing force, it is imperative to understand how such participation affects Malaysia's overall strategy and thus its security. For that reason, the analysis in this paper is conducted in the following steps:

1. Identification of Malaysia's national security goals.
2. Prioritization of the identified goals in accordance with the three security layers.
3. Evaluation of the costs, risks, and benefits of participation in a UN standing force.

Identification of Malaysia's Security Goals

The first step in analyzing whether Malaysia should participate in a UN standing force is to identify Malaysia's security goals. Malaysia does not publish or declare its security goals in the form of a specific official document. Its goals generally can be extracted and deduced from its various domestic and foreign policies. In identifying Malaysia's security goals, it is worthwhile to consider Malaysia's security concerns in the three layers of its security strategy.

In the first layer of security, Malaysia intends to achieve self-reliance as much as possible. In order to do so, it aims to increase the MAF's readiness and capability to deter any internal and external threats and if necessary to fight any aggression in order to

uphold its national sovereignty. As the primary bastion of defense, the MAF has undertaken a modernization program, which began in earnest in the late 1980s. The main objective of the program is to transform the MAF into a conventional fighting force, which provides a self-reliance capability to Malaysia. Nevertheless, Malaysia recognizes its limitations as a small country. Therefore, it aims to achieve self-reliance by having the capability to act independently without the need for foreign assistance in matters concerning internal security. Within the immediate vicinity, Malaysia also protects its territorial integrity and security interests from low and medium level external threats.¹

For small states, the main threat to security is mainly domestic in nature. Internal fissures that have caused many domestic conflicts sometimes also mutate into interstate conflicts.² With the end of the Cold War, Malaysia is no longer facing an internal threat to its sovereignty from communist insurgency, which officially ended in December 1989 when a peace accord was signed. Threats from low intensity conflicts (LIC) however, have reappeared in different forms. While the quest for a conventionally structured force continues, the MAF has to deal with the emerging trend of LIC, such as pirate incursions into Malaysian waters and the seizing of hostages in vacation resorts in Malaysia. Commenting on the pirate activities, the Defense Minister stated that “It is becoming abundantly clear that such attacks are a direct challenge to our sovereignty and therefore, they should be treated as public enemies and should be dealt with severely.”³

Even though Malaysia has formulated its defense strategy without focusing on specific external threat scenarios, the country realizes that since it is surrounded by many other small states, any neighboring domestic problems has the potential to escalate and produce external threats to Malaysia. Issues such as illegal immigrant unrest,

overlapping territorial claims, and accessibility to natural resources are always in the background, threatening the stability of regional relationships. Therefore, a credible and capable military is a necessity for protecting the nation's sovereignty.

The nation's economy is also important in protecting Malaysia's security. For example, the economic turmoil that struck the region in 1997 has forced Malaysia "to slash its defense budget by 21 percent. To implement this cut, the Ministry of Defense cut the armed service's operating budgets, capped salaries, downgraded the operational readiness of military units, scaled back joint exercises with other countries and deferred big-ticket defense purchases."⁴ Without a strong and stable economy, Malaysia will not be able to modernize and sustain a credible military force.

A healthy economy also promotes political legitimacy by gaining the population's confidence in the government and its ability to provide prosperity and development for the society. This condition will further enhance the domestic social cohesiveness that strengthens the integrity and sovereignty of the nation.

In order to achieve economic strength, Malaysia must be politically stable. Without internal stability, development will be hampered and foreign investment will not likely be attracted to the country. Based on its past experiences, Malaysia believes that the preservation of a constitutional monarchy, Islam, and the special rights of Malays are essential in maintaining the stability and internal security of the nation.

Vision 2020 defines Malaysia's goal to achieve a developed nation status by the year 2020. While the focus on status provides a clear direction and instills motivation among the society, the value of the vision to national security rests on the capability and the capacity of Malaysia to succeed as a developed nation. By attaining the level of a

developed nation, Malaysia will enhance its national security by reducing its vulnerability. World trends indicate that developed nations are less vulnerable than less developed nations. Additionally, the current pattern suggests that developed nations are less likely to get involved in armed conflicts with each other.⁵ Malaysia also realizes that with an increase in status, there is also an increase in the challenges and responsibility towards a global society. The aims delineated in *Vision 2020* not only provide the end states for the country but also pave the way for Malaysia to gradually assume this responsibility and cope with future challenges so that Malaysia will continue to exist and sustain itself as a developed nation.

As a multiracial nation, the Malaysian government must promote social justice in order to ensure the country's security. Failure to do so will also create dissatisfaction among the people, which can threaten the peace and stability of the nation.

The protection of national sovereignty is also related to the resource-environment dimension of security. By having a territorial unity, Malaysia will be able to maintain access to all the available national resources within its boundary for consumption and utilization in achieving further economic growth. In pursuing national development, Malaysia also needs to preserve its environment so as not to destroy its already limited resources.

In the second layer of its strategic interest, Malaysia has become a member of ASEAN, which is a regional organization for economic cooperation. As a small state, Malaysia has limited resources. Therefore, external trade relations with other nations to secure resources and markets are among the important aspects that contribute to Malaysia's national security. Malaysia considers ASEAN not only as a platform to

promote its economic dimension of security but also to strengthen the political relationship among member states, ensure resources and market accessibility, and promote respect of each other's sovereignty. Commitment to ASEAN and other economic cooperation agreements serve to enhance Malaysia's national security in various dimensions of national security.

To further strengthen its defense and deterrence capabilities, Malaysia continues to participate in the FPDA. The Defense Minister asserts that the FPDA "provides us with a further military option that is critical to us when the balloon goes up."⁶ While ASEAN provides a platform for regional interactions to promote regional security, the FPDA provides Malaysia with a security link to nations outside of the region. Through FPDA, Malaysia established a security link to United Kingdom. United Kingdom, however, is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security alliance, a nuclear power, and has a special relationship with the United States. Therefore, indirectly through FPDA, Malaysia has created security connections with other NATO countries and the United States.

In its third layer of security strategy, Malaysia focuses on its global relations. The Malaysian concept of international security corresponds closely to the expanded and multi-dimensional role of the United Nations in promoting a peaceful, just, and equitable world order. In line with its positive contribution to UN activities for peace, security, and development, Malaysia has assumed several leadership roles such as leadership of G-77, president of the 25th UNESCO General Conference, alternating UN Security Council member from 1988 to 1990, chairman of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking and chairman of the International Conference on Refugees. In

1996, Malaysia's representative was elected president of the UN General Assembly. In other words, in the support of the UN's role, Malaysia has obtained recognition, trust, and respect, which are significant in the pursuit of its national security.

The South-South cooperation took many forms including organizing high-level international meetings in Malaysia and proposing specific projects to augment South-South cooperation. These strategies enlist the cooperation of North and South to promote socioeconomic development. These activities underscore Malaysia's security conceptions of small nations in particular and world politics in general while charting new directions for Malaysia's foreign policy and for the developing world.

Given that most of the Muslim world was subjected to Western colonial domination, South-South cooperation and Islamic solidarity are complementary strategies for promoting national security and advancement. This is one of Malaysia's strategies to publicize the compatibility of Islam with modernization and development, thereby promoting Malaysia's national security and economic progress.

Malaysia's commitment to human rights and social justice worldwide will also increase the political status of Malaysia. Such efforts will confer prestige to the nation, which may elevate its status among the international community.

Economic foreign policy is strongly emphasized by the Malaysian government. As the industrialization process accelerates and Malaysia becomes more integrated into the world economy, international trade is becoming an important strategy of national security and survival. Malaysia is also interested in fostering a healthy international climate in order to gain more potential trading partners, which in turn is beneficial for its economic dimension of security.

Based on Malaysia's security concerns and interests expressed in its various national policies, Dr. K S. Nathan concludes that Malaysia's security goals are:⁷

1. Protection of national sovereignty with emphasis on political integrity and territorial unity.
2. Economic development and social justice in the context of a multiracial society.
3. Preservation of constitutional monarchy, Islam, and the special rights of the Malays.
4. A firm commitment to ASEAN and promotion of other forms of economic regionalism that advances national interest.
5. Promotion of regional stability and security via FPDA.
6. Participation in UN peacekeeping operations, international agreements and relations, commitment to promote South-South cooperation aimed at enhancing the economic welfare of the less-developed world and supporting human rights and social justice worldwide.
7. The achievement of *Vision 2020*.

Since Malaysia pursues a comprehensive and multi-layer strategy to ensure its national security, each individual goal not only serves to achieve security in one specific dimension of security. Table 1 shows how each of these goals is related to the four major dimensions of security.

Table 1: Malaysia's Security Concerns in Four Dimensions of Security

Security Goals	Military	Economic	Political/ Cultural	Resource/ Environment
1. Protection of national sovereignty with emphasis on political integrity and territorial unity.	a. Modernization of Armed Forces. b. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation.	a. Economic strength provides resources for credible and capable armed forces.	a. Domestic social cohesiveness ensures integrity. b. Diplomacy as the first line of defense.	a. Territorial unity allows optimum use of natural resources.
2. Economic development and social justice in the context of a multiracial society.	a. Peace and stability facilitate development.	a. Continued economic growth.	a. Social justice promotes peace and stability.	a. Economic success requires resource and market accessibility. b. Prevent uncontrolled development.
3. Preservation of constitutional monarchy, Islam, and the special rights of the Malays.	a. Military subservient to political leaders reduces threat to democracy.	a. Economic growth provides credibility to existing system.	a. Social justice must exist to preserve the current system.	-
4. A firm commitment to ASEAN and promotion of other forms of economic regionalism that advances national interest.	a. Cooperation promotes respect of each other's sovereignty.	a. Encourages economic activities among states.	a. Provides stable platform to diffuse conflicts and promote further cooperation among members. b. Use as a platform to project national interest at international level.	a. Ensure resources and market accessibility.
5. Promotion of regional stability and security via FPDA	a. Security from external aggressors.	a. Encourages economic activities among member states through interactions.	a. Encourage interactions among member states.	a. Political and military interactions encourage economic activities that provide resources.

Security Goals	Military	Economic	Political/ Cultural	Resource/ Environment
6. Participation in UN peacekeeping operations, international agreements and relations, commitment to promote South-South cooperation aimed at enhancing the economic welfare of the less developed world and supporting human rights and social justice worldwide.	a. Respect, cooperation, and interdependence promote confidence and trust in each other and reduce military threats.	a. Potential trading partners.	a. Prestige, status and visibility to nation.	a. Access to market and natural resources.
7. Achieve <i>Vision 2020</i> .	a. Maintain peaceful situations that are conducive to development.	a. Competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient economy. b. Progressive and prosperous state.	a. Creates unified Malaysian nation and society with strong moral and ethical values. b. Ensure state is democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable.	a. Promote outward looking Malaysian society.

Malaysia's Security Goals Priority

The second step of this analysis is to prioritize Malaysia's security goals. Figure 2 shows the relative priority of Malaysia's security goals, from highest to lowest.

The first and highest priority is the protection of national sovereignty because a country is defined by its ability to exercise preminent direction over the people and policies within its territorial boundaries. A sovereign state must demonstrate to its own

population and its neighbors that it can provide for its people without undue interference from external forces such as other states.

<u>Malaysia's Security Goals</u>	<u>Security Focus</u>	<u>Security Layer</u>
Participation in UN peacekeeping operations, international agreements and relations, commitment to promote South-South cooperation aimed at enhancing the economic welfare of the less developed world and supporting human rights and social justice worldwide	Global	Third Level
Achieve <i>Vision 2020</i>	Internal (requires regional security for achievement)	
Promotion of regional stability and security via FPDA	Regional	Second Level
A firm commitment to ASEAN and promotion of other forms of economic regionalism that advances national interest	Regional	
Economic development and social justice in the context of a multiracial society	Internal	Primary Level
Preservation of constitutional monarchy, Islam and the special rights of the Malays	Internal	
Protection of national sovereignty with emphasis on political integrity and territorial unity	Internal	

Figure 2: Malaysia's Security Goals Priority

The second priority is the preservation of constitutional monarchy, Islam, and the special rights of the Malays. In Malaysian experience, preservation of constitutional monarchy, Islam, and the special rights of Malays has provided the foundation for peace

and stability for the country. Only when the foundation for peace and stability is strong, is Malaysia able to further develop the unity and cohesiveness of its multiracial population. For that reason, this goal is determined to be second in priority only to the protection of national sovereignty.

The third priority of Malaysia's security goals is the economic development and social justice in the context of a multiracial society. Economic development is vital in providing the sense of security among individuals and groups in the population. The efforts to bridge the economic gap among different racial groups serve to reduce the potential inter-racial conflicts such as the one that Malaysia experienced on the 13th May, 1969. Social justice is important to balance the privilege given to the Malays. In order to build unity and cohesiveness among the population, the government must ensure that, while the Malays have special rights, the rights of other race groups must not be suppressed. As such, this goal also complements and supports the success of preserving the constitutional monarchy, Islam, and special rights of the Malays. Without the existence of peace and stable foundation that was realized by preserving constitutional monarchy, Islam, and special right of Malays in the first place, Malaysia will not be able to pursue economic development or social justice. Therefore, this goal is considered to have the third priority.

The second level is Malaysia's effort to seek regional cooperation and receive direct external assistance. This includes Malaysia's commitment to ASEAN and promotion of other forms of economic regionalism that advance national interest. Regional security is important to Malaysia's own security, because any conflict in the region will most likely affect Malaysia's security. ASEAN and other economic

regionalism reduce the potential threat by creating interdependence, encouraging mutual respect, and promoting economic growth among the member states. For Malaysia, regional interests come immediately after its internal interests.

While ASEAN is a regional security arrangement, the FPDA provides Malaysia with a security link to more than just regional countries. A security link with United Kingdom essentially provides further link to NATO countries, one of which is the United States. Since United Kingdom has special relationship with the United States, Malaysia's security link with United Kingdom, in a sense, connects it with the United States. Any effort towards achieving regional peace and stability should be considered to be at the same priority level. Therefore, the goal of promotion of regional stability and security via FPDA must be seen at the same priority level with the commitment towards ASEAN.

Once the internal and regional conditions are stable and pose no serious security threats, Malaysia can focus its effort toward achieving its *Vision 2020*. The vision encapsulates Malaysia's aspiration to achieve a next level of growth, which is to become a developed nation. This does not mean that Malaysia has to achieve absolute internal and regional security before embarking on its quest to achieve *Vision 2020*. However, the ability to pursue such an aspiration has to be based on certain levels of initial success, which cannot be obtained without achieving certain levels of internal and regional security. For that reason, this goal is next in priority after the regional security goals.

The last priority for Malaysia's security goal is the participation in UN peacekeeping operations, international agreements and relations, commitment to promote South-South cooperation aimed at enhancing the economic welfare of the less developed world and supporting human rights and social justice worldwide. Arguably, this goal

mainly supports the other goals, which have more direct bearings toward Malaysia's security. Even though this goal is considered to have the lowest priority, it does not mean that it is not important. In the era of globalization, geographic distance does not necessarily have the same effects it once had. As it strives to achieve its aspirations, Malaysia realizes that its security is being affected more and more by the global condition rather than just by the immediate region.

The consideration of relative priority for each security goal provides insights on how one goal supports the others and how they are built upon one another to form a comprehensive and multi-layered approach. It can be seen that Malaysia focuses first on its internally-oriented goals and then expands to reinforce these goals by securing regional and international support. As such, the priority of its goals is in accordance with its three-tier security strategy, which focuses on self-reliance as the first layer, regional cooperation/external assistance as the second layer and global relation as the third layer. The only exception to this pattern is its *Vision 2020* because the goal is not achievable without first achieving internal and regional security.

Cost, Risk and Benefit Evaluation

The third step in the analysis is to identify and evaluate the costs, risks and benefits of Malaysia's participation in a UN standing force. First, the costs, risks and benefits of participation to Malaysia's security are identified. Then, the overall effect of these costs, risks and benefits will be evaluated in order to determine whether Malaysia should participate in a UN standing force.

Costs of Participation

One of the costs of participation is the cost of human resources. Malaysia has an armed force with an authorized strength of 80,000 Army, 12,500 Navy and 12,500 Air Force.⁸ These numbers have included Malaysia's possible participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Such consideration, however, did not include having MAF units permanently participate in a UN standing force.

The Brahimi Report suggests that a UN peacekeeping force should be made up of several brigade-size units. Malaysia can therefore expect a participation of a battalion size unit. Normal deployment duration of UN peacekeeping troops is about six months. Replacement units then must be deployed. As a result, Malaysia will most likely need to have three battalions committed to a UN standing force: one battalion in implementation, one battalion in preparation for the replacement and one battalion in post-implementation process. Therefore, it will cost Malaysia almost a brigade-strength of troops to contribute a battalion to the UN standing force.

In order to provide this force, Malaysia can either employ the existing troops or add additional number of troops to the MAF. If a part of the existing troops are designated to be a UN standing force, the MAF will lose about a brigade-strength force from performing the roles to defend the country and assist the civil authorities. If Malaysia decides to raise additional numbers of troops, it will lose some of the workforce needed in other job sectors.

Regardless of the selected method to raise the force, Malaysia will incur financial cost in training and equipping these standby troops. Currently, Malaysian troops are trained and equipped to operate mainly in a local environment. As a UN standing force,

these troops must be trained to operate in conditions and climates not familiar to them. Based on the history of MAF's participation in UN peacekeeping operations, it is clear that Malaysian troops are capable of conducting missions under the auspices of UN peacekeeping operations. The establishment of a peacekeeping school in Malaysia provides further training and prepares the MAF to conduct peacekeeping operations. A UN standing force, however, requires the troops to deploy rapidly to locations anywhere in the world. Equipment requirements for greatly expanded situations and climates will also incur additional procurement and maintenance costs.

Risks of Participation

The participation in a UN standing force also poses several risks to Malaysia's security. One obvious risk is military casualties. Since Malaysia's participation in a UN peacekeeping operation is not necessarily perceived as defending the home country, a high casualty rate sustained by soldiers may affect the troops' morale and the support of the Malaysian population in general. This may further lead to opposition to the government's policy and damage Malaysian internal political integrity.

The participation is also risky to the military if it increases the MAF operations tempo to the level that it causes too much stress on its personnel. This stress may further deteriorate the morale and effectiveness of the MAF. Consequently, the profession becomes unpopular among the citizens and may then negatively affect recruitment. If this happens, the government may have to incur further financial cost in order to provide enough incentives to try and recruit and retain sufficient personnel in the service.

In Malaysia's previous involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, it has had the flexibility to consider the potential effects of its involvement and was able to be

selective in its decision to participate. Such flexibility is not available to Malaysia if it participates in a UN standing force. Due to the complex nature of peacekeeping operations today, the UN intervention may not be totally welcomed by all of the conflicting parties or even agreed upon by all nations. If some of the countries with which Malaysia has strong ties disagree with the UN intervention in certain conflicts, they will disapprove of Malaysia's participation in those missions, and relations will be strained.

This loss of flexibility also subjects Malaysia to the possibility of becoming entangled in a conflict in which it really has no desire to be involved. Possible hatred against Malaysia may even be developed if its participation is considered as an outside intervention in internal conflicts of other nations. Therefore, by participating in a UN standing force, Malaysia may find itself facing new and increased external or internal threats to its security.

There are also potential risks towards Malaysia's image in participating in a UN standing force. First of all, Malaysia risks a consequence of negative image if its soldiers make any grievous mistakes in the operation. Secondly, Malaysia's reputation will be affected if it fails to provide troops or must withdraw its troops prematurely once it commits itself to participate in a UN the standing force.

Benefits of Participation

Malaysia's participation will bring credit and prestige to the country, thus elevate its status. As such, it develops a stronger sense of pride and confidence among the Malaysian population. Such pride and confidence will further motivate the Malaysian people to achieve their country's aspiration to become a developed nation. The

participation also helps Malaysia to project a positive image as a peace-loving nation and a willing contributor to the world community. Such positive perceptions of Malaysia may encourage other nations to favor Malaysia, enhancing many areas of interaction.

The participation also enhances visibility and international awareness to the country. This visibility, coupled with positive image, will further strengthen Malaysia's sovereignty and increase the international community's concern of the country.

Therefore, Malaysia has a better chance to receive support from others if its sovereignty is threatened by an external aggressor.

The MAF can also leverage some benefits in participation. The MAF will gain more experience in conducting peacekeeping operations. The participation can also serve as a tool to validate the capability of the MAF in conducting operations and subsequently provides a basis for further improvements. The prestige resulting from participation in a UN standing force, the opportunities to conduct operations abroad, and additional financial benefits gained by the soldiers may also boost the MAF morale and attract better recruits to join the service. This will further improve the professionalism of the MAF. As a whole, the quality of the military as a source of national power will be enhanced.

Participation in a UN standing force may be used as a justification for Malaysia to further modernize and improve its military capability. Such modernization by itself may instigate neighboring countries and regional powers to perceive Malaysia as an emerging threat to their own security. By being involved in a UN standing force, Malaysia may be able to increase its defense capability without increasing the sense of insecurity of its neighbors.

In the world today, transnational threats such as terrorism are also becoming a major global concern. By having Malaysian troops engaging in peacekeeping operations in troubled spots, Malaysia is able to promote and demonstrate its good intentions to the population and its victims. Such engagement may allay any sense of jealousy and hatred that might be developed against Malaysia.

Malaysia's participation in a UN standing force may also further strengthen its security arrangements, such as the FPDA. By participating in UN peacekeeping operations, Malaysian troops will conduct operations with troops from other countries that are part of the security arrangement. The interaction among the troops will foster better relations among the nations involved.

Cost, Risk and Benefit Evaluation

The decision whether or not Malaysia should participate in a UN standing force is based on weighing the costs, risks, and benefit of participation to the country's security. In the case of Malaysia, its security end state can be represented by its comprehensive national security goals in each of the three layers. Therefore, the evaluation of the overall cost, risk and benefit of participation to Malaysia's security can be based on their effects on Malaysia's security goals.

First Security Layer: Effects on the protection of Malaysia's sovereignty.

Despite the non-threat specific approach of Malaysia's security strategy, Malaysia realizes that potential threats to the nation exist. Among these concerns are the pirate activities on Malaysian littorals, the existence of religious extremists in the country, the presence of illegal immigrants that cause social problems, the overlapping of territorial claims, the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the China-Taiwan issue. Participation

in a UN standing force cannot realistically reduce any of these threats. The UN is also not in a position to protect Malaysia directly. The Malaysian Defense Minister has stated that, “we obviously do not rely on this world body to provide the kinds of security framework that will safeguard our interest.”⁹

However, participation in a UN standing force makes some supporting contributions to the protection of Malaysia’s sovereignty by providing more visibility and international awareness and concern for Malaysia. Malaysia may also leverage the participation to promote its good image and further strengthen ties with its allies. The participation also provides experience to MAF and an additional justification for its modernization, and may further enhance the interoperability of troops among the FPDA nations.

On the other hand, the participation also incurs cost on the protection of Malaysia’s sovereignty. The current strength of the MAF is not designed to provide a standing force to the UN. Therefore, the participation may affect the MAF’s capability to defend the sovereignty of the nation. Involvement in certain conflicts may also expose Malaysia to new threats or strain its ties with some countries or groups.

First Security Layer: Effects on the preservation of constitutional monarchy, Islam and the special rights of the Malay.

It is difficult to relate directly how participation in a UN standing force can further enhance the preservation of constitutional monarchy, Islam, and the special right of the Malays. However, participation may cause a rift in Malaysia’s social-political system if the participation causes a high casualty rate among the troops, which would lead the people to question Malaysia’s involvement in the standing force.

First Security Layer: Effects on pursuing economic development and social justice in the context of a multiracial society.

In terms of pursuing economic development and social justice in the context of a multiracial society, participation in a UN standing force may hamper, rather than support, its achievement. Money is needed to build up and sustain the standing force. The burden on MAF may affect its attractiveness among the population, and this lead to a further increase in monetary cost to recruit and retain soldiers in the service. Therefore, less money will be available for domestic economic development. It can be argued that Malaysia's representation in a peacekeeping force can pave the way for future economic ties with the countries involved in the conflict. Such economic ties, however, can be fostered even if Malaysia has no representation in the standing force.

Realistically, it is also questionable at this stage if Malaysia's economy is strong enough to build up and sustain a brigade-size force to act as a standing force at the UN's disposal. After the economic turmoil that hit the East Asian region in 1997, Malaysia had to take drastic measures to stabilize its economy. In fact, in July 1998 the Minister of Defense announced that Malaysia would no longer engage in any peacekeeping missions at its own expense due to national austerity measures.¹⁰ Of course, Malaysia is on its way to recovering from the economic turmoil, which is evident from the resumption of the MAF modernization program when Malaysia announced its intention to purchase main battle tanks for the Army.¹¹ Without being able to achieve a growth rate of at least 8 percent, which was the rate before the economic turmoil, it seems unlikely that the economy will be strong enough to build up and sustain a standing force in the near future.

It can be argued that if the country really wants to establish such a force, it can do so. However, “there will always be limits to one’s defense spending, as the debate between ‘guns and butter’ will always be relevant.”¹²

Second Security Layer: Effects on commitment to ASEAN and other forms of economic regionalism, along with the promotion of regional stability via FPDA.

The commitment to ASEAN and other forms of economic regionalism, along with the promotion of regional stability and security via FPDA can be affected positively or negatively by such participation. The achievement of these goals relies more on Malaysia’s diplomatic capability to leverage its participation in a UN standing force. It should be noted however, that while the current diplomatic setting has been effective in ensuring the achievement of these goals, the participation in a UN standing force creates an additional link that needs to be managed so that it does not strain regional relations.

Third Security Layer: Effects on the achievement of *Vision 2020*.

The participation in a UN standing force can also have both positive and negative effects on the achievement of *Vision 2020*. While participation can be leveraged to inspire the population in moving the country toward a developed nation status, it can also backfire by discrediting the government if the participation resulted in high casualties of Malaysian troops. Furthermore, the cost to establish and sustain a standing force will reduce the available resources to develop and sustain the growth of the nation.

Third Security Layer: Effects on participation in UN peacekeeping operations, international agreements and relations, the promotion of South-South cooperation and supporting human rights and social justice worldwide.

The goal to participate in international relations, promote South-South cooperation and supporting human rights and social justice worldwide can also be

affected both positively and negatively by participating in a UN standing force. The participation in a UN standing force can be leveraged as a manifestation of Malaysia's support to human rights and social justice worldwide. On the other hand, the South-South cooperation can be soured if Malaysia's participation is perceived as Malaysia's cooperation with the North to intervene in the affairs of the South.

Conclusion

Overall, it can be seen that while Malaysia's participation in a UN standing force can support the achievements of Malaysia's security goals, it can also hamper or even jeopardize their achievements. The beneficial effects of participation mainly serve to support the already existing mechanisms of Malaysia's security strategy. This kind of benefit is not readily attained by the participation itself. Malaysia needs to have other effective and efficient mechanisms such as an information management capability and further diplomatic efforts in order to leverage benefits from participation. While the potential benefits to be gained from the participation contribute indirectly to Malaysia's security, the costs and risks of the participation affect Malaysia's security much more directly. Therefore, the benefits of participating in a UN standing force essentially remain the same as the benefits enjoyed by Malaysia in its previous engagements in the UN peacekeeping operations. In the end, the costs and risks it has to face as part of a UN standing force are significantly greater than in the previous arrangements.

In addition, participation tends to support the goals in the third or lowest layer of importance and has no significant direct contribution to the goals at the first or primary layer of priority. Meanwhile, the costs and risks of the participation affect the goals at that same primary layer of priority. In other words, participation in a UN standing force

will mainly benefit Malaysia in its third layer of security but the cost and risk of the participation will affect the first and primary layer of Malaysia's security. As a whole, Malaysia should not participate in a UN standing force in the near future because the overall cost and risk are too high for the potential benefits that can be gained from the participation.

¹"Malaysia," *Asian Defence Journal Year Book*, (1999-2000), 104.

²Ayoob, 8-12, 165-185.

³Najib's speech, "Rethinking Defence Diplomacy."

⁴Department of State, "Annual Report on Military Expenditures, 1998," 19 February 1999, submitted to the Committee on Appropriations of the U. S. Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. House of Representatives.

⁵Rothgeb, 51-52.

⁶Najib's speech, "Towards a Comprehensive National Security Strategy."

⁷Nathan, 545-546.

⁸International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1999-2000*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 197-198.

⁹Speech by Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak, "Regional Insecurity: Preparing For Low to High Intensity Conflicts." 22 March 2001. Ministry of Defence Malaysia.

¹⁰Department of State, "Annual Report on Military Expenditures, 1998."

¹¹Reuter Asia, *Malaysia goes on belated shopping spree for arms*. 8 April 2002.

¹²Najib's speech, "Rethinking Defence Diplomacy."

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The internal and external behaviors of small states revolve around the concept of national security. Consideration of national security covers a broad concept of security rather than mere military defense against external attacks. This broad and comprehensive concept of national security has been divided into four major dimensions: the military, economic, political-cultural and resource-environment dimensions of security. As such, states' security goals are also comprehensive and cover all dimensions of security.

For small states, domestic cohesion and international support and cooperation form the basic prerequisites for their security. Due to their limitation in capabilities and resources, small states must also rely on others in ensuring their security. As a small country, Malaysia has been selectively participating in the UN peacekeeping operations as one of the measures to enhance its national security in its third layer of global relations, which is the lowest priority.

After the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in the number and complexity in the conduct of the UN peacekeeping operations. Incidents such as the genocide in Rwanda, and the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina caused the UN peacekeeping operations to be criticized as inefficient and ineffective. In order to be much more effective in conducting peacekeeping operations, a proposal for the UN to have a standing force has reemerged.

The thesis in this paper addressed whether Malaysia, as a small country, should participate in a UN standing force if it is established. Since policy decisions for small states are based on the effects of the policy on the states' security, this paper conducted

an analysis on the costs, risks, and benefits of participation in a UN standing force to Malaysia's security.

Malaysia has a comprehensive and multi-layered security strategy. It is comprehensive because it integrates all dimensions of security. The strategy is multi-layered such that in the first layer, the strategy focuses on Malaysia's ability to be self-reliant as much as possible. Supporting this focus on self-reliance is the second layer of regional security links. These links also include the military, economic, political-cultural and resource-environment dimensions of security. Finally, at the third or the outermost layer are the global links that support and further enhance Malaysia's security. Malaysia's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations mainly contributes to this third layer of its overall national security strategy.

In this paper, the analysis identified and prioritized Malaysia's security goals that fit into the three layers of its security strategy. In the overall costs, risks and benefits evaluation, it was found that Malaysia's participation in a UN standing force has potential benefits to further enhance mainly its security goals in the second and the third layers of its security. Such benefits are the positive image of Malaysia in the international community, and further enhancement of troop interactions at international level that enforce cooperation and Malaysia's ties with other nations.

The participation, however, incurs costs and risks that mainly affect Malaysia's security goals that have higher priority or lie in the first layer of its security strategy. The participation in a UN standing force entails a cost of losing some troops from defending the country. The establishment, training and sustainment of a standing force for the UN employment also incurs financial costs that divert the economic resources from other uses

such as national development. The participation in a UN standing force also subjects Malaysia to possible external conflicts. The participation may also strain Malaysia's relations with some nations. Possible troop casualties can also cause a loss of popular support to the government. A weak and unstable Malaysian government, due to lack of public support, will affect the country's stability and security.

On top of that, the participation in a UN standing force does not contribute directly to Malaysia's internal security or its security against immediate and current interstate threats. Malaysia needs to leverage the participation by some other diplomatic means in order to gain the potential benefits. In other words, in addition to the participation itself, Malaysia needs to exert additional efforts in order to gain benefits from the participation. These benefits, even if achieved, are secondary to the costs of the participation, such as financial and human resources, which directly affect Malaysia's security goals at the first layer of its security.

From the perspective of national security, Malaysia should only participate if it gains more benefits than it incurs costs and risks from the participation. Essentially, the overall benefits of Malaysia's participation in a UN standing force remain the same as the benefits it had gained from its selective participation in the UN peacekeeping missions in the past. These benefits have to be leveraged and mainly support Malaysia's security goals in the third layer of its security strategy. However, the costs and risks of being in a UN standing force are significantly higher than those of voluntary peacekeeping participation because the costs and risks directly affect the first layer of Malaysia's security strategy. In conclusion, Malaysia should not participate in a UN standing force

because the participation incurs more costs and risks to Malaysia's security than the potential benefits that can be gained.

Further Research Questions

The related research questions that can be further studied include:

1. What alternative options to participation in a UN standing force can small states select in order to obtain similar benefits?
2. Apart from the existing measures, what else can Malaysia do to further strengthen its first and second layers of security?

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