THE ACCESSION OF THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND PERSPECTIVES FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS CRISIS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL IOANNIS GILIAS
Hellenic Army

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THE ACCESSION OF THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND PERSPECTIVES FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS CRISIS

by

LTC Ioannis Gilias
Hellenic Army

Dr. Craig Nation
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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The ongoing crisis in the island Republic of Cyprus that is caused by the continuing Turkish military occupation since 1974 must be resolved in accordance with established principles of international law, and in view of the forthcoming accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union (EU). The resolution of the Cyprus crisis can and should proceed independently from the negotiations concerning the EU accession and the broader geopolitical concerns that involve the Middle East region.

The independent island Republic of Cyprus is a credible candidate for accession to the EU community of nation-states, in accordance with its established criteria. However, the prospects of peace, security and prosperity for the Cypriots are clouded by the continuing illegitimate Turkish military occupation of approximately 40 percent of the Island's territory since 1974. Indeed, Turkey has threatened the use of military force and outright annexation of the occupied sector should the EU grant Cyprus' accession application.

This SRP will analyze the Cyprus crisis and will show that its resolution can be based on existing principles of international law as they have been manifested in various UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions regarding this crisis. Furthermore, the analysis will show that the resolution of the Cyprus crisis can be based on Cyprus' accession to the EU which will benefit all ethnic and religious segments of the Cypriot population. In addition to those, the resolution of the Cyprus crisis will lead to improved prospects for Turkey's accession to the EU, the permanent improvement of Greek-Turkish relations and the consequent strengthening of NATO's flank in the Southeastern Mediterranean.
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PREFACE

Cyprus is a small but strategic country with little control over its destiny. Its recent history has been filled with intrigue, misperceptions, betrayal, stupidity, irony and tragedy. While drastic changes have been taking place in the world, in particular during the last 10-15 years, the situation in Cyprus has remained the same. Although many efforts have been made to reach a settlement, no progress has been achieved. The island is still a de facto divided country in a state of no peace, no war.

Hopes for a settlement are reviving again as the prospects for Cyprus’ accession to the EU are creating new opportunities and challenges. The people of Cyprus and the other parties involved are presented with a unique opportunity to overcome their differences and reach a long-term and viable settlement.

I have tried in this SRP to approach the Cyprus question in the view of both Cyprus and Turkey entering the EU.

I wish to express my appreciation to the following individuals, without whose support this SRP could not have been completed: (1) Dr. Craig Nation, Elihu Root Professor of Military Studies, USAWC, who was my project advisor for this SRP, and (2) Mr. Labros E. Pilalis, JD, who advised me on the legal aspects of the Cyprus issue.
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THE ACCESSION OF THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC TO THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AND PERSPECTIVES FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS CRISIS

The island of Cyprus (Figure 1) has been greatly influenced by the historical developments that have taken place in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean. The settlement of ancient Greeks in Cyprus during the second half of the second millennium B.C provided the initial foundation for the ethnic and sociopolitical development of the island. The strategic position of Cyprus virtually at the crossroads of the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, subjected the island and its inhabitants to the historic conflicts between powers that sought to assert their dominance in the region. Various powers sought and used the territory of the island as the geopolitical “gateway” for exerting military, political and economic influence or control within the neighboring regions and countries of the ancient and modern Middle East. Consequently, the island and its inhabitants were subjected to numerous military invasions and transitional or more permanent foreign occupations.

This paper analyzes the prospects of a solution to the ongoing Cyprus crisis in view of the forthcoming accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union (EU), and Turkey's pending application for membership in the EU community of nations. The recent resumption of the bicommunal talks between Glafkos Klerides, President of the Cyprus Republic, and Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community in the occupied sector of Cyprus, have provided some hope that there will be some concrete movement toward a timely resolution of the festering crisis, and that Cyprus' accession to the EU will translate to concrete political and
economic benefits for all of the inhabitants of the island. Naturally, a resolution of the crisis must follow existing UN resolutions and the applicable legal framework of the EU.

Although any solution of the Cyprus crisis on the basis of a federal structure is not an easy task, it nevertheless constitutes perhaps the only way, which may promote long-lasting stability in the island and in the broader region. On the contrary, any attempts at legitimization of the de facto division of the island would generate greater instability in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.

BACKGROUND OF THE CYPRUS ISSUE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND – THE GENESIS OF THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC

The initial victories of the ancient Greek city-states over the Persian Empire and the successful campaigns of Alexander the Great into Asia firmly established Cyprus as part of the Hellenic world in the Eastern Mediterranean. The advent of Christianity while the island was part of the Roman Empire, solidified into the dominant position of the Eastern Greek Orthodox Church and the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus when the island was an integral part of the Eastern Roman Byzantine Empire. The Greek language, culture and Orthodox religion and church of the indigenous population survived despite the fall of the island initially to the Western Frankish-Venetian “crusaders” in 1191 A.D, and the subsequent capture of Cyprus by the Ottoman Turks from the Venetians in 1571 A.D.

The island’s occupation by the Turkish Ottoman Empire altered the ethnic, religious, cultural and sociopolitical demographics of Cyprus. However, according to customary practice, the Ottoman Turkish island administrators provided a great degree of self-governance for the Greek Cypriot community under the ethnic and religious leadership of the Orthodox Church. Turkey ceded Cyprus to Great Britain at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 in exchange for British support in the tensions and conflicts between the dwindling Ottoman Turkish Empire and Imperial Russia. Following the defeat of the Central Powers in World War I, Britain formally annexed Cyprus as a crown colony in 1925.

Despite the long presence of the British administration on the island and the peaceful coexistence of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the two communities maintained strong and separate lines of political, ethnic, religious, educational and cultural affiliation with Greece and Turkey respectively. These divisions dominated the respective political aims of the two communities or were adroitly exploited by third parties that traditionally pursued wider regional goals. The political goals of the Greek Cypriot community solidified around the concept of enosis or union with Greece. This concept was pursued through peaceful means more
vigorously during the interwar years and immediately following the end of World War II. However, as in the time of the Crusades, British policy increasingly viewed Cyprus as the indispensable “gateway” for the protection of its “vital interests” and the continuous exercise of its influence in countries and oil-rich regions of the Middle East.5

The advent of the Cold War and the Israeli-Arab conflict that preceded and followed the establishment of the State of Israel soon affected U.S. foreign policy goals in the region. Naturally, the ethnopolitical aspirations of the Greek Cypriots for self-determination and union with Greece were ignored.6 The Greek Cypriots, with the support of a politically and economically weakened Greece that was just emerging from almost eight years of conflict including the Axis occupation (1940-1944) and a Civil War (1946-1949), commenced a campaign of armed struggle against British colonial rule in 1955-1959.

The British political and military response to this anti-colonial revolt implicated both the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey who adopted the “separate union” of a divided island (taksim) as their political goal7. Correspondingly, this heightened tensions between Greece and Turkey who had become NATO members in 1952.8 Eventually, under U.S. pressure and the process of decolonization that was favored by the UN in the 1950s, British-led negotiations involving Greece and Turkey led to the 1959 London and Zürich Accords that created the independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960 under the separate Tripartite Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaties of Alliance and Establishment.9

The communal dualism that governed the constitutional and administrative functions of the Cyprus Republic soon proved unworkable. The various Treaties and the constitution did not provide for the smooth functioning of government because of the communally-based veto powers that could be and were frequently exercised by the Turkish Cypriot minority. This legal framework had also been drafted in order to accommodate the external interests of Britain, Greece and Turkey, rather than correspond to the governmental needs of Cyprus and demographic realities. In November 1963, Archbishop Makarios, President of the Cyprus Republic, proposed changes to the constitution following repeated deadlocks over questions of foreign and defense policy and domestic administration. Makarios aimed for the establishment of a unitary state governed by majority rule. Vice President Fazil Kutchuk rejected this proposal since it would have led to the degradation of the political power that the Turkish Cypriot minority enjoyed. Armed conflict broke out in the capital city of Nicosia in December 1963, and the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from all governmental institutions, setting up armed enclaves and their own governmental administration.
The ensuing Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 further polarized the two communifices on the island and caused the active and direct involvement of both Greece and Turkey in the ensuing conflict. The conflict was internationalized with UN involvement and the undertaking of a peace keeping operation by the UN Force In Cyprus (UNFICYP) that is present on the island to this date. The crisis also necessitated the more active involvement of the U.S. who sought to prevent the fragmentation of NATO's southeastern flank when Greece and Turkey reached the brink of war during the crisis. Finally, the situation in Cyprus had serious and lasting implications for the democratic politics and the functioning of democratic institutions both in Greece and Turkey.

**THE CYPRUS CRISIS IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT**

The fate of the Cyprus Republic was inextricably linked with the Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the broader region of the Middle East. The U.S. committed early to the creation and the national survival of Israel. Correspondingly, Great Britain utilized its Cyprus bases for interventions in the Middle East, e.g., during the 1956 Anglo-French landings at the Suez Canal (the operation was coordinated with the Israeli attack against the Egyptian forces in the Sinai peninsula); and during 1958 U.S. and British forces intervened in Lebanon and Jordan in support of moderate Arab regimes.

By the time that the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 was subsiding, Israel was surrounded by hostile Arab regimes that were generously equipped with weapons systems from the U.S.S.R. and other Warsaw Pact nations. British bases on Cyprus provided the premier means of electronic intelligence gathering that was directed at various states among the Arab world, and for monitoring Soviet maritime activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Naturally, these activities and their political goals were in complete contrast with the foreign and defense policies that were pursued by Archbishop Makarios and the majority of the Cypriot electorate.

Despite the Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from the Cyprus government, the island had survived as a unified state notwithstanding certain U.S. foreign policy initiatives to the contrary. Cyprus solidified its position as a member of the Third World non-aligned movement. Furthermore, the Cyprus National Guard managed to receive limited quantities of arms from Warsaw Pact sources. Cyprus maintained friendly relations with Nasser's Egypt and other Arab countries. Naturally, the attitude of Archbishop Makarios supported by a more independently minded Greek government of Prime Minister George Papandreou, continued to disturb the U.S. Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. U.S. policymakers were repeatedly unsuccessful in convincing Cyprus and Greece to accept certain solutions to the crisis that were tantamount to
the implementation of taksim on the island and even the ceding of Greek national territory to Turkey!\textsuperscript{12}

The conduct of an independent foreign policy by both Greece and Cyprus was also "unacceptable" to those conservative political elements in Greece that traditionally benefited from unwavering and unquestioning support for U.S. Cold War policies. The Papandreou government fell in 1965 following a dispute with the Greek royal family over the exercise of civilian government control over the Greek military. In April 1967, a coup that was condoned if not outright supported by certain circles within the U.S. government, established a military junta in Greece.

The Greek junta that governed Greece during the 1967-1974 period was an infinitely more consistent follower of U.S. Cold War policies and immediately sought to undermine the elected Cyprus government of Archbishop Makarios.\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, by the early-1970s the Greek junta became an advocate of U.S. and Turkish positions favoring taksim. The Makarios government once again resisted these attempts by exploiting its non-aligned status and the active involvement of the UN in ongoing intercommunal talks on the island. The 1972 U.S.-Soviet rapprochement, however, substantially undermined one of the sources of support for Makarios' policies and provided the green light for the Greek junta's efforts to violently overthrow Makarios with tacit U.S. approval.\textsuperscript{14}

The Greek junta actively supported a conservative Greek Cypriot political minority that sought to overthrow Makarios' elected governments through the use of violence that included a number of failed assassination attempts against Makarios himself under the guise of enosis. The short-sighted policies of the Greek junta went as far as preventing modern infantry weapons of Warsaw Pact origin from reaching Cypriot security forces, and covertly involving the Hellenic Army officers that commanded the Cypriot National Guard in the anti-Makarios campaign.\textsuperscript{15}

The strategic significance of Cyprus for U.S.-Israeli defense cooperation had been underlined during the 1967 Israeli-Arab conflict of the Six-Day War, the 1969-1970 War of Attrition, and the October 1973 Yom Kippur War.\textsuperscript{16} In November 1973 domestic political pressures and deteriorating economic conditions in Greece led to a change in the leadership of the Greek junta, bringing to the fore ultra-conservative elements that were unequivocally dedicated to the violent overthrow of Makarios.\textsuperscript{17} U.S. policies at the time either remained passive or implicitly condoned the Greek junta initiatives. Neither the Greek junta nor U.S. foreign policy makers under the leadership of Dr. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State and
National Security Adviser, considered or seriously cared about the progress that the intercommunal talks in Cyprus had achieved by 1974 under UN auspices.

Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot constitutional scholars and their respective political leaderships had almost reached an agreement in principle regarding the unitary nature of the Cyprus Republic with "adequate protection of communal rights" (Greek Cypriot position), or "communal autonomy" (Turkish Cypriot position). This agreement appears to have been reached on July 13, 1974, or 36 hours before the Greek junta launched its military coup on Cyprus against the Makarios government.\textsuperscript{18}

**THE 1974 CRISIS AND THE TURKISH INVASION**

The ceaseless plotting and the violent campaign of the Greek junta under Brigadier Ioannides against the elected Cyprus government obliged Archbishop Makarios to launch his own political response. His government had uncovered the connections between the illicit activities of the Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard, and the junta in Athens. In a published letter dated July 2, 1974, addressed to General Ghizikes, the figurehead president of Greece, Makarios formally denounced the subversive activities of the Greek junta in Cyprus and demanded the return of the Greek officers serving with the Cyprus National Guard to Greece.\textsuperscript{19} The publication of Makarios' letter and his subsequent interviews as much as warned the Greek junta that the implementation of their coup plans against his government in Cyprus were certain to elicit a forceful response from Turkey. Furthermore, Makarios believed that a renewed risk of conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus would not be welcomed by the U.S. Unbeknown to Makarios, the Greek junta was operating under the assumption (reinforced by those U.S. circles that supported its subversive activities on the island), that Turkey would remain "neutral" following the coup against Makarios or, alternatively, that some accommodation could be found with the weak but democratically elected Turkish government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit.\textsuperscript{20}

The Greek junta consciously chose to disregard both Makarios' warnings and intelligence that was being passed from the Greek diplomatic missions in Turkey that the Turkish Armed Forces had been put in a state of alert in June-July 1974 both in Turkey and on Cyprus, and that the Turkish Cypriot irregular forces had followed suit. The professional Greek military leadership was keenly aware of existing Turkish operational plans to invade Cyprus and of the fact that Turkey had implemented a far-reaching program that had dramatically increased its seaborne and airborne landing capabilities.\textsuperscript{21} However, the coup plans did not incorporate the contingency of Turkish military intervention.
On July 15, 1974 the Greek junta launched the coup that overthrew the Makarios government. However, despite the expectations of the coup plotters, Makarios survived the National Guard attack against the Presidential Palace in Nicosia, and left the island through the good offices of the British bases on the island. There was international condemnation of the Greek junta and its puppet government in Cyprus.

Turkey immediately exploited the situation. The preexisting Turkish military invasion plans were immediately activated while Prime Minister Ecevit sought a joint British-Turkish intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. The British Labor government of Prime Minister Wilson declined the invitation. A lukewarm attempt at mediation by U.S. Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisko was rejected by the Ecevit government. Indeed, the U.S. State Department was besieged by unexplained or self-imposed political inactivity and bureaucratic inertia during the critical period following the coup.

On July 20, 1974, Turkey launched its military invasion against the Cyprus Republic with shipborne landings near the port of Kyrenia and airborne/heliborne landings designed to reinforce the armed Turkish Cypriot enclave in the Old City of Nicosia. The Turkish Air Force (THK), having complete command of the air and opposed only by the WW II vintage anti-aircraft artillery of the Cyprus National Guard, struck military and civilian targets throughout the island.

Despite the diplomatic and tactical intelligence that existed indicating that the Turkish invasion was under way, both the Greek junta and the Greek and Cypriot National Guard forces on the island were dispersed after the coup and slow to react (in a repetition of the U.S. WW II experience at Pearl Harbor, radar warnings about the approaching Turkish invasion fleet were initially dismissed as “Turkish exercises” or “a show of force”). Turkish mistakes and indecision combined with ferocious resistance by the National Guard initially limited the Turkish bridgehead in and around Kyrenia until the UN imposed cease fire resolutions took hold on July 30, 2001 (Attilas I phase).

National Guard and ELDYK (Elliniki Dynamis Kyprou – the Hellenic [Army] Force on Cyprus) counterattacks were unsuccessful in seriously threatening the Turkish hold on the island and much effort was expended in attacking armed Turkish Cypriot enclaves with various degrees of success. These counterattacks were hampered by continuous THK attacks, the naval gunfire support that the invasion forces enjoyed, and the increasing number of Turkish tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery that were put ashore.

The political impact of the Turkish invasion was dramatic for both Greece and Cyprus. For all intents and purposes, the Greek junta ceased to function and its puppet regime in Cyprus surrendered power to Glafkos Clerides, Vice President in Makarios' government. In Greece,
former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis returned from self-imposed exile and formed a
government of national salvation. Subsequent negotiations in Geneva between the UK,
Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot political leadership, quickly reached a
deadlock. Turkey, enjoying an overwhelming military superiority in Cyprus and having complete
command of the air, insisted on a permanent solution on Cyprus based on the establishment of
a "Turkish zone" amounting to 34% of the island's territory.

The Turkish proposals were supported in principle by the UK and the U.S. Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger. Greece and Cyprus were prepared to make considerable concessions
including the bicommunal governance of the island, however, they were adamantly opposed to
the outright elimination of a unitary state for the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish military operations
resumed on August 14, 1974. Turkish numerical superiority, overwhelming firepower, and
complete command of the air overcame the resistance of the Cypriot National Guard and the
Greek Hellenic Army units in Cyprus, and led to the occupation of 36% of the island's territory
and its division (Attila Phase II). The self-exculpatory published memoirs of Dr. Kissinger state
the following with respect to the Turkish decision to invade Cyprus:

On July 28, a week after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Ecevit—now on the
verge of seizing his prize—adamantly rejected the return of Makarios [to
Cyprus] under any conditions. The last thing Ecevit had in mind was to restore
the status quo ante. Rather, Ecevit had seen an opportunity to bring about by
force or pressure the goals for which Turkey had been striving for over a decade:
a contiguous Turkish enclave with access to the sea. Nixon was on the verge of
impeachment, the Cyprus [puppet] regime was not recognized by any state, and
the Greek junta was an international pariah. Ecevit found the temptation
provided by this combination of circumstances impossible to resist.

Turkish opportunism and the broad Cold War parameters of U.S. foreign policy had
fundamental effects on the multilateral relations between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the U.S.
Greek-U.S. relations were damaged since the U.S. was seen as condoning both the Greek junta
and the subsequent national tragedy of Cyprus. Greece withdrew from the military scale of the
NATO Alliance during the 1974-1980 period and eliminated the Host Nation Support facilities
that had been provided to a destroyer squadron of the U.S. Navy 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean
Sea by the Greek junta.

U.S. foreign policy during the Cyprus crisis and in the Middle East engendered the active
involvement of the U.S. Congress that undermined the bi-partisan foreign policy initiatives of
Secretary of State Kissinger. The U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey after
having found that U.S. laws were violated when the Turkish forces used U.S.-made weapons for
purposes other than self-defense. This arms embargo lasted from 1974 to 1978 when it was
lifted under the Administration of President Carter. The Congressional arms embargo on Turkey curtailed U.S.-Turkish military cooperation and led to the temporary closure of a number of U.S. facilities in Turkey, including those tasked with the electronic surveillance of the U.S.S.R. However, the embargo provided a useful respite to the post-junta Greek governments of Prime Minister K. Karamanlis which reestablished a proportionate balance of military forces with Turkey and were able to successfully face up to the new Turkish policy of aggressive encroachments in the Aegean Sea.29

In the 1980s, the Greek governments of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou completely reoriented Greek defense doctrine to include the developing Turkish threat in the Aegean Sea and on Cyprus and premised Greek-U.S./NATO defense cooperation on that basis.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus was devastating for the social structure and economy of the island. Approximately 70% of the agricultural resources of the island came under Turkish occupation. The primary tourist attractions and infrastructure in the cities of Kyrenia and Famagusta came under Turkish control. The Nicosia international airport was in the "Green Line" buffer zone and controlled by UNFICYP. The Cyprus government had to resettle and provide care for 200,000 refugees from the occupied sector of the island while facing the burden of reconstructing the military capabilities of the Cyprus National Guard. Archbishop Makarios resumed his position as President of the Republic of Cyprus until his death in the Summer of 1977. However, Cypriot entrepreneurial aptitude and the conflict in Lebanon produced a booming economy that soon reached pre-invasion levels. By the early 1990s, the average per capital income in unoccupied Cyprus was greater than the corresponding one in Greece and far greater than that in Turkey.30 In sharp contrast, the occupied sector of Cyprus economically stagnated following the economic embargo that was imposed by the internationally recognized government of Cyprus.

The occupied sector increasingly became dependent on Turkey for economic support and on the Turkish lira as a currency. The result was that the problems of the Turkish economy (especially that of high inflation) were soon transplanted on to the occupied sector of Cyprus. Turkey also forcibly changed the population and social demographics of the island through the illegitimate transplantation of Turkish immigrants from Eastern Anatolia in mainland Turkey to the occupied sector.31 These immigrants have more conservative religious, social and cultural values than the Turkish Cypriots and possess a lower level of education and entrepreneurial aptitude. The miring of the economy in the occupied sector and the less than democratic policies of the Turkish occupation forces and of the Turkish Cypriot political leadership have led to a massive emigration of the Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus mainly to the UK32
The Turkish military occupation in Cyprus has become a severe political liability for all Turkish governments in power following the 1974 crisis. The Turkish occupation is in clear violation of a number of UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions that proclaim and seek to enforce the independence and territorial integrity of the Cyprus Republic. The maintenance of a considerable occupation force and the subsidization of the economy in the occupied sector are a constant drain on the Turkish treasury and a source of political embarrassment when issues of military equipment sales to Turkey are discussed in a number of nations, including the U.S., Germany and others. Such discussions inevitably include Turkey's less than enviable domestic human rights record and naturally expand to include the violations of the human rights of all Cypriot citizens that are caused by the Turkish military occupation in Cyprus. In turn, this has caused Turkey to pursue weapons procurement or modernization choices that may be less than optimal in terms of economic efficiency.

DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

The Cyprus crisis cannot be solely defined within the confines of a conventional “ethnic conflict.” As the historical overview of the situation amply demonstrates, the crisis on the island has been greatly influenced by the regional security concerns of Greece and Turkey, as well as by the “containment” policies that the U.S. has pursued and continues to pursue during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War environment. The most current indications are that the intercommunal “ethnic problems” may be closer to a permanent resolution now that both the Cyprus Republic is well on its way to enter the EU, and Turkey has applied to do the same.

The Cyprus Crisis and Greek-Turkish Bilateral Relations

The Cyprus crisis is first intertwined in the complexities of Greek-Turkish relations and the political and socioeconomic issues and institutions that dominate domestic affairs in Greece and Turkey respectively. In sharp contrast to the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and the seven years of junta rule, Greece has clearly defined and solidified its national security policy. This is based on the inviolability of the existing frontiers of both Greece and Cyprus and the mutual security commitments that exist between Greece and Cyprus under the Unified Defense Doctrine (or Unified Defense Area) that was formally instituted by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in 1994. These national security parameters have assumed primacy over objectives that in the past were influenced or outright directed by the Cold War priorities of the NATO Alliance and U.S. foreign policy.
Since the 1974 Cyprus crisis, Greece has attained domestic political and economic stability that has been greatly enhanced through its membership in the EU and the European Monetary Union (EMU). Greek foreign policy has become increasingly "eurocentric" and materially seeks to influence Turkish behavior towards both Greece and Turkey. Although Greece in December 1999 formally lifted its objections to Turkey's application to join the EU, Greece expects and demands that Turkish behavior conforms to the prescribed EU and international norms. This includes a resolution of the Cyprus crisis in accordance with applicable UN resolutions. Turkey must cease to be a national security threat for both Greece and Cyprus.

Turkey entered a prolonged period of domestic political and economic instability following its 1974 invasion of Cyprus. The Turkish Armed Forces carried out a coup in 1980 under the leadership of General Kenan Evren in order to stabilize the domestic political and socioeconomic situation with generous U.S. economic and military assistance. Most importantly, General Evren politically institutionalized the supremacy of the Turkish military command structure over future Turkish civilian elected governments through the creation of the military-dominated National Security Council (Tu. NSC). This supremacy was embodied in Article 118 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution. Although the 2001 Turkish constitutional reforms in response to the EU admission criteria have changed the composition of the Tu. NSC, the Turkish military command structure exercises considerable influence that amounts to a virtual veto power in matters of national security and foreign policy.

Since the Turkish military command structure often defines Turkey's national security and foreign policy goals, the flexibility of the elected civilian governments is often limited. The Turkish Armed Forces consider themselves to be the guarantors of preserving a unified and secular Turkey, often in an absolutist manner. Thus, courses of domestic political liberalism and compromise have often become a distant "second choice" to the use of force. For example, Turkey avoided the course of an acceptable political compromise while handling the issue of its ethnic Kurdish minority, preferring instead to wage a long, costly and divisive domestic anti-guerilla campaign against the outlawed leftist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Similarly, the Turkish military command structure effectively ousted the elected government of Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in June 1997.

The Turkish military command structure has defined Turkey's foreign policy goals towards Greece and Cyprus within the context of a revisionist agenda that threatens the integrity of existing and internationally recognized boundaries. Thus, a number of crises have ensued in the Aegean Sea, notably in 1976, 1987 and 1996, over Turkey's refusal to accept the existing
and internationally recognized boundaries of Greece. These policy goals have led toward a head-on collision with Turkey's aspirations to join the EU.

Despite the recent thaw in Greek-Turkish relations that commenced with the 1999 "earthquake diplomacy" conducted by the Foreign Ministers George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, the Greek foreign policy of rapprochement is failing to elicit a concrete responsive compromise from Turkey on issues that affect bilateral relations between the two countries. The unwavering Turkish irredentism has now focused on warnings that a new crisis will ensue on Cyprus (or elsewhere) if Cyprus' accession to the EU proceeds without a prior solution to the Cyprus crisis that is satisfactory to Turkey. Turkey has threatened to formally annex the occupied sector of the island Republic or to "blockade" Cyprus (the latter course will invoke the operation of the Unified Defense Doctrine heightening the probability of armed conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean). Naturally, the exercise of any of these options will irreparably harm Turkey's chances of ever joining the EU.

These Turkish attitudes and related pronouncements call into question the genuineness of the intercommunal negotiations that formally commenced on Cyprus in January 2001 under UN auspices between Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, the political leader of the occupied sector. In the most recent development, Greece announced that it will hold talks with Turkey regarding the issue of the Aegean Sea seabed with the aim of referring this matter to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. On the other hand, Turkey will insist on the old formula of attempting to negotiate the acquisition of various preexisting and internationally recognized Greek territorial rights in the Aegean Sea while offering a "compromise" for a solution of the Cyprus problem, and delaying Cyprus' accession to the EU. Both Greece and Cyprus have long rejected this negotiating "package" framework. The Turkish position is further undermined by the fact that both the EU and the U.S. view Cyprus' accession to the EU as an independent issue from the resolution of the Cyprus crisis. Thus, Greece and Cyprus expect that Turkey is likely to resort to its perennial tactic of creating an environment of artificial crises and tension in the Eastern Mediterranean during the 2002-2004 time frame in its fruitless but dangerous attempts to achieve its unwarranted revisionist geopolitical goals. Hopefully, although the U.S. values Turkey's participation in the new campaign against international terrorism, U.S. foreign policy will continue to view Cyprus' accession to the EU, the solution of the Cyprus crisis, and Turkey's own accession to the EU as separate and distinct issues.
The Entangled Web of U.S. Relations With Greece, Cyprus and Turkey

As it has been previously mentioned, U.S. foreign policy in the wider region of the Eastern Mediterranean has focused on the implementation of “containment.” The “cortainment” of the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War has been largely substituted by the policies of “containment” against Middle Eastern states that generally pose a threat to the regional interests of the U.S. and to the national security of Israel in particular. These “containment” policies have emphasized the creation of the U.S.-Israel-Turkey axis in the region that initially took form in the 1980s and was more firmly implemented during the 1990s. Indeed, Turkey is the only Muslim country in the Middle East that is a member of the NATO Alliance. Furthermore, Turkey maintains considerable military and intelligence ties with Israel including defense industrial cooperation. The Israeli-Turkish strategic partnership encompasses the moderate Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This political and military cooperation has been facilitated by the mutual hostility of Israel and Turkey towards both Syria and Iraq, and Turkey’s geopolitical desires for the oil-producing region of Mosul in Iraq.

The U.S. “containment” policies utilize Turkish bases for military operations and intelligence gathering in the regions of the Middle East and Central Asia. The Incirlik air base is extensively used in the support of USAF and RAF “no flight zone” operations over Northern Iraq, and is heavily utilized by U.S. forces during their ongoing deployment into Central Asia and the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan. Both U.S. and Turkish policymakers bear in mind that political and military pressure is not a one-way street in U.S.-Turkish relations, e.g., Turkey suspended the operation of U.S. bases and electronic intelligence gathering stations during the duration of the U.S. arms embargo following the 1974 Cyprus invasion.

In addition, despite the end of the Cold War, Turkey plays an important role in the U.S. policies of keeping the Russian Federation “in check” and containing Iran. The manifestation of these policies is the “pipeline diplomacy” that seeks to route the oil supplies of the Caucasus region through Turkey rather than through the Russian Federation and/or Iran. Naturally, Turkey is not wedded to U.S. principles regarding the movement of energy supplies in the region. Certain of these oil pipelines do or will terminate at Ceyhan in Southern Turkey, near the Iskenderun Gulf (Alexandretta), and approximately 306 km northeast from Nicosia, Cyprus’ capital city. The Turkish government condones the illegal importation of oil products from Iraq, and to the chagrin of U.S. diplomats, Turkey is implementing agreements concerning the importation of natural gas from both Iran and the Russian Federation.

The U.S. “containment” policies have always acknowledged the primacy of Turkey’s role in the region. Whether Turkey’s regional policies in themselves pose the risk of aggression
The fact that Turkey has militarily occupied a sector of the Cyprus Republic for more than 27 years is viewed by various U.S. Administrations as a politically “manageable” event as long as it does not pose the risk of escalation into a war between Greece and Turkey. The U.S. simply does not view the Cyprus problem as a regional crisis that needs to be resolved through the simple application of international law principles and UN Security Council resolutions, despite occasional and eloquent public pronouncements to the contrary. Rather than acknowledging that the Turkish occupation of Cypriot territory is illegitimate and can no longer be tolerated in this 21st Century (a parallel to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990), U.S. foreign policy has at times attempted to link the Cyprus crisis to unrelated issues. For example, the Clinton Administration attempted to link Turkey’s EU membership application with a very uncertain “resolution” of the Cyprus crisis, and Cyprus’ own accession to the EU. Not only Greece but other EU members as well have opposed such U.S. initiatives since they interfere with the EU decision-making institutions and processes. It appears that the Bush Administration has firmly separated the issue of Cyprus’ accession to the EU from a permanent solution on the island Republic.

U.S. foreign policy towards Cyprus, Greece and Turkey presents the inherent contradiction of attempting to balance national security interests with the selective application of the rules of international law that govern the behavioral norms of nation-states. For example, although the U.S. has never formally recognized the occupied sector of Cyprus as an “independent state,” the U.S. maintains diplomatic representation offices in the occupied sector that are administered from the formally accredited U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, the capital of the Cyprus Republic! Similarly, although the U.S. supplies a symbolic economic aid of $10-$15 million annually to the Cyprus Republic, it has not hesitated from actively interfering with Cyprus’ legitimate self-defense rights and national defense preparedness.44

This direction in U.S. foreign policy towards Cyprus and Greece has assumed the worrisome pattern of essentially legitimizing the aggressive and revisionist geopolitical aspirations of Turkey in the region. Most recently, in a further change of U.S. policy and despite strenuous objections from Greece, the U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is proceeding with the compilation of digital military maps of the Aegean Sea that do not depict the long-established and internationally recognized boundaries between Greece and Turkey!45

U.S. approaches to a permanent solution of the Cyprus crisis have appeared to repeat antiquated proposals that have proved to be unworkable in the past, ignore the demographic and socioeconomic realities on the island, and are at variance with applicable UN Security
Council resolutions. Such proposals have ranged from repeating the bankrupt political leadership schemes under the 1960 Cypriot Constitution, to the "complete demilitarization" of the island, i.e., the complete disarmament of the Cypriot National Guard while Turkish military forces will inherently possess the capability to repeat the 1974 invasion patterns without hindrance.

Even before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack against the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the City of New York and Washington, D.C. respectively, the U.S. and Cypriot governments were cooperating in tracking down the movements and the financial transactions of international terrorist organizations. Cyprus' Central Bank has been instrumental in adhering to EU directives regarding the prevention of illegal money laundering activities through banking institutions on the island. Naturally, the Central Bank's regulatory oversight of Cyprus' banking industry does not extend to the occupied sector of the island. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, both the Turkish and the international press reported the presence of numerous bank branches from Islamic states that operated in the occupied sector of Cyprus without any oversight by the civilian or Turkish military occupation authorities.46

**CYPRUS AND THE EU**

Cyprus first achieved an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC – the predecessor of the EU) in December 1972. The Turkish invasion of 1974 delayed its substantive implementation. However, in 1987 the Cyprus Republic reached a Customs Union agreement with the EEC purporting to eliminate tariff and quantitative restrictions on all manufactured goods and a number of agricultural products that are key to the island's exports, e.g., citrus fruit and wine.47 The relationship with the EU and the post-Cold War developments in Europe prompted the Cyprus Republic to submit an application for full membership in 1990 under the Presidency of George Vassiliou. Cyprus' application was not without controversy. The Cyprus Republic submitted its application on behalf of the entire island and its population.

The occupied sector challenged this move claiming that they had the legal right to veto a major foreign policy move of the recognized Cyprus government under the 1960 Treaty of Guaranty and the constitution. The EU accepted the Cypriot membership application and dismissed the objections of the occupied sector on the basis that it did not constitute a formally recognized state.48 Initial negotiations on Cyprus' EU accession took place with the EU Commission in 1993-1995. Substantive accession negotiations commenced in November 1998. Although the Cypriot government of President Glafkos Clerides invited the Turkish Cypriot political leadership to appoint permanent representatives in the Cypriot accession negotiating
team, this invitation was rejected. This Turkish Cypriot reaction apparently sought to sustain
the notion (already rejected by the international community with the exception of Turkey), that
the occupied sector of Cyprus should be accorded international and EU “recognition” as an
“independent state” co-equal to the Cyprus Republic.

The EU firmly supports a solution of the Cyprus crisis that respects the independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Cyprus Republic. The EU’s executive and
legislative bodies have repeatedly affirmed this commitment. Although the EU has indicated its
preference for a permanent solution to the Cyprus crisis prior to Cyprus’ accession to the EU,
the EU does not deem this solution as a barrier to Cyprus’ full EU membership. Thus, in
December 1999 the EU’s “European Council” in Helsinki, Finland, emphasized that “…a
political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no
settlement has been reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the Council’s
decision on accession will be taken without the above being a precondition. In this the Council
will take into account all relevant factors.” Cyprus has made substantial progress in meeting
the EU accession criteria and it is expected to attain full EU membership in 2004.

Through the ongoing EU accession process, Cyprus already participates in the EU’s Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP) initiative. In November 2000 the EU ministers of defense decided on the formation of
the EU Rapid Reaction Force (EURF). The EURF is projected to be operational in 2003. Its
composition will be based on the contribution of designated units from EU member states, and
the total force will number approximately 60,000 personnel. Cyprus’ strategic national security
interests coincide with the existence of the EU ESDP initiatives since they tend to improve the
political deterrent capabilities of the island Republic. Cyprus will be a participant in the EURF
with a mechanized infantry company and will make available its airport and port facilities for
EURF deployments.

The implementation of the ESDP and the related European Security Defense Identity
(ESDI) initiatives have not escaped the implications of Turkey’s relations with the EU and
Greece. Because the ESDP/ESDI initiatives contemplate the use of NATO resources,
particularly in C4I assets, by the EU member states, Turkey has raised certain objections to this
approach and has sought to participate in the ESDP/ESDI initiatives as an “equal partner”
although it is not a EU member. Turkey’s objections to the ESDP/ESDI initiatives are designed
to emphasize its regional importance and strategic role and, thus, to the extent possible
circumvent the criteria and processes that are applicable for Turkey’s EU accession.
more, Turkey seeks to restrict the operational flexibility of the EURF in a manner that will not restrict Turkey's military options in the Aegean and in Cyprus.

Turkey has succeeded in reaching a preliminary agreement ("Istanbul Text") with the UK and the U.S. under which the EU's ESDP/ESDI initiatives will not be used against Turkey under any occasion and during a crisis. Similarly, Turkey will have the right to block ESDP/ESDI military operations that may take place in its geographic proximity or because of its national security interests. Greece has reacted strongly to this arrangement on the basis that it does not constitute a formal EU agreement and contradicts the relevant EU decisions on ESDP/ESDI and the formation of EURF. Greece has threatened to veto the formal activation of the EURF if the "Istanbul Text" becomes a formal EU arrangement in its present unmodified form.\(^{53}\) It is obvious that Turkey seeks to influence the EU decisions on ESDP/ESDI despite its lack of EU membership, and does not hesitate to exploit the inherent tensions that exist between the EU and the U.S. over the implementation of the ESDP/ESDI initiatives.\(^{54}\)

**TURKEY AND THE EU**

Turkey has maintained a complex relationship with the EU and its member states. In the 1950s and early-1960s, Turkey (along with Greece and Yugoslavia), was one of the primary suppliers of "guest workers" that contributed to the reconstruction and the "economic miracle" of post-WW II Germany. Turkish workers in Europe climbed from 13,000 in 1962 to more than 800,000 in 1974, and during that period the ratio of emigrant Turkish workers reached five percent of the total labor force in Turkey.\(^{55}\) Under the principles of secularism that were established by Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s, Turkey has striven to achieve and be recognized as a member of the European "community of nations" rather than as a nation-state of the Middle East in the geographic continent of Asia. Turkey's membership in NATO, its political and economic association with the EU, and its participation in numerous other European bodies and organizations provide sufficient indicators for the European goals of Turkey's foreign and economic policies. The execution of these goals however, has invariably come into conflict both with Turkey's domestic politics and socioeconomic problems, as well as with its revisionist policies that are aggressively pursued against neighboring nation-states. Furthermore, Turkey's desired identification with the "West" in general and Europe in particular, has brought about inevitable domestic social and cultural friction that relates to defining Turkey's precise identity.

The domestic barriers to Turkey's "road to Europe" have included the slow progress of fully democratizing its governmental institutions and according the requisite respect demanded by both international conventions and domestic law to the rights of all Turkish citizens. The role
that the command structure of the Turkish Armed Forces plays in Turkish national security policies and domestic politics has been recounted already. The periodic Turkish military interventions in Turkish domestic politics definitely retarded Turkey’s relations with the EU and its member states (Greece’s process of accession to the EEC/EU was interrupted while a military junta governed Greece in 1967-1974). Although Turkey commenced its accession process in 1963 (two years after Greece did the same), Turkey failed to submit a formal accession application in 1975, and the whole process was effectively halted with the Turkish military coup in 1980 (Greece became a full EEC/EU member in 1981). After the domestic political and socioeconomic situation stabilized, Turkey’s visionary Premier Turgut Özal submitted a full membership application in 1987. However, Turkey’s application met a negative response by the EEC/EU. This negative reaction was based not only on Turkey’s less than stellar human rights record and the structural deficiencies of its economy, but was also attributable to Turkey’s ongoing hostility towards Greece, an EEC/EU member, and the continuing Turkish military occupation of Cypriot territory.\(^{56}\)

Following the lifting of Greek objections Turkey was recognized as a EU accession candidate during the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. Turkey has initiated certain legislative reforms in order to harmonize its constitution, laws and administrative regulations with the corresponding legal framework of the EU. As part of Turkey’s 2001 constitutional reforms, Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution has been amended. The civilian membership at the Turkish NSC has been increased from five members to nine, while the Turkish government now has the freedom to “evaluate” rather than give “priority consideration” to the Turkish NSC recommendations.\(^{57}\) Naturally, these amendments have not dissuaded the Turkish military command structure from actively participating and independently voicing its opinions on matters of Turkish foreign and national security policy, including Turkey’s course towards EU accession.

On March 7, 2002, THK General Tuncer Killinc, the Secretary General of the Turkish NSC, characterized Turkey’s efforts to join the EU as “doomed to fail” and urged a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy with a stronger emphasis on the ties with the U.S. and the bilateral relations with neighboring countries including Iran and Russia.\(^{58}\) Although Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit responded that General Killinc stated his “personal views” and that Turkish-EU relations “were progressing,” this incident underlines the deeper divisions among various Turkish political and military leadership circles with respect to the goal of EU accession.

These divisions essentially emanate from the views held by the more conservative elements among Turkey’s political and military leadership that essentially Turkey’s EU accession will irreparably damage Turkey’s *domestic* security and internal sociopolitical stability.
In summary, these conservative political and military elements assume that by following the traditional and well-tried but rather "heavy-handed" policies of stifling domestic political and social dissent or debate of a "threatening" nature, the "Kemalist" principles of maintaining a secular and unified Turkish state will be preserved, albeit in the current "semi-democratic" manner. Interestingly, although these members of the Turkish political and military elite are staunch supporters of the secular Turkish state, their anti-EU stance may be aligned with the positions of more extreme Islamic elements within Turkey that traditionally view with suspicion the Christian-dominated member states of the EU. The anti-EU sentiment in Turkey also manifested itself when it was disclosed that unclassified electronic mail of the EU envoy in Turkey was unlawfully intercepted and its contents disclosed to the press. As Professor Ziya Önis states:

While minority rights and the Cyprus issue are indeed the two major issues in relation to Turkey's [EU] accession, one should also draw attention to other aspects of the Copenhagen political criteria, namely stability of institutions, guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In Turkey's case, this clearly relates to the role of the military, also a crucial player in the Cyprus and Kurdish problems. If one examines the political agendas of the major, nationally-based political parties in Turkey, both on the left and the right of the political spectrum, it is possible to identify only one, social democratic, political party, namely the Republican People's Party (CHP), that has been willing to give serious attention to the issue of cultural pluralism and 'minority rights,' at least as an extension of individual rights and democratic deepening.

It is beyond doubt that Turkey is emerging from a long, costly and painful counter-guerilla campaign against the armed movement of the PKK. Similarly, the Turkish authorities are faced with violent activities from various groups with extreme political ideologies. This situation justified or has been used as a justification for the imposition of harsh internal security measures that curtailed fundamental political freedoms of Turkish citizens, and condoned the use of extra judicial methods and means. These measures have especially impacted the human rights of the ethnic Kurdish minority in Turkey. For example, despite the constitutional and legal reforms occasioned by the EU accession process during the 2000-2001 time frame, there still are severe restrictions on press freedoms. Thus, certain journalistic criticisms of governmental institutions or of the Turkish Republic in general, often cause unjustifiable prosecutions, trials by special security courts, and the imposition of stiff jail sentences. Approximately 9,000 prisoners are held in Turkish jails for crimes related to freedom of expression. It is not surprising that the EU Commission's 2001 report on Turkey's progress towards accession has concluded that a "number of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms have remained."
The overall climate that restricts fundamental human rights and freedoms in Turkey also impacts the country's economic conditions. Currently, Turkey is in the midst of a severe economic crisis that is characterized by a high inflation rate, increased unemployment and severe devaluation of the Turkish Lira against international hard currencies since February 2001. Since 1999, the Turkish economy has been supported with infusions of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans that have reached approximately $33 billion. The decline of the Turkish economy is attributable not only to its structural weaknesses and lack of timely liberalization reforms, but it has also been partially caused by an approximate $40 billion loss in trade revenues since the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Naturally, the current Turkish political and military leadership remains very apprehensive about the potential renewal of hostilities against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in the context of the U.S. international anti-terrorism campaign. Turkey has expressed the view that the renewal of hostilities against Iraq will further damage its economy (thus retarding any progress in meeting EU accession criteria), and will exacerbate the "Kurdish problem."64

Economic reform, respect for human rights, and adherence to international law and norms of behavior are fundamental and interrelated requirements for any country that seeks to join the EU community of nations. Turkey faces the challenge of whether its institutions will be able to undergo a maturation process that reconciles the "Kemalist" principles of a secular and unified state with the acceptance and implementation of a free and pluralistic democracy. This does not necessarily mean that the external and domestic threats to Turkish national security, or the perception of such threats, will appreciably change for the near future. However, with a truly functioning democracy within Turkey, the methods and mechanisms for facing up to such real or perceived threats may change in a more constructive fashion. For example, the free exercise of fundamental human rights by the Kurdish minority does not necessarily and automatically translate to a "separatist" movement that may lead to a repeat of the Kosovo experience in Southeastern Turkey. Correspondingly, if a strong institutional framework is able to protect the fundamental human rights of ethnic minorities in Turkey, a similar solution can also be followed for the Turkish Cypriot minority on a unified Cyprus. Similarly, when ethnic minorities have a meaningful and equal opportunity to participate in the economic development and progress of a unified and democratic nation-state, they tend to divorce themselves from separatist politics. The economic development of Southeastern Turkey will provide a strong disincentive for any political tendencies at Kurdish "separatism." In the same vein, a unified Cyprus with full EU membership will be able to rapidly rebuild the shattered economy of the occupied sector. The following comparative statistics reveal the stark economic realities that Turkey currently faces:65
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Parameter</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Occupied Cyprus</th>
<th>Cyprus</th>
<th>Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP(^1)</td>
<td>€ 6,400</td>
<td>€ 5,000</td>
<td>€ 18,500</td>
<td>€ 15,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($ 5,504)</td>
<td>($ 4,300)</td>
<td>($ 15,910)</td>
<td>($ 13,609)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of EU Average</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth (%)(^2)</td>
<td>- 6.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate CPI (%)(^3)</td>
<td>47.8 - 61.8</td>
<td>2.2 - 3.7</td>
<td>2.5 - 3.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
(1) Figures for year 2000.  
(2) Year 2000 figures (Cyprus & Occupied Cyprus), Jan-Jun 2001 for Turkey.  
(3) 2000-2001 figures.

The timely resolution of the Cyprus crisis and the unification of the island under its full EU membership will produce not only political but direct economic benefits for Turkey. Turkey has been obliged to subsidize the economy of the occupied sector in Cyprus with €100-200 ($86-172) million annually under various forms of fiscal assistance.\(^6\) The recent Turkish economic crisis has reduced this annual amount by at least 40 percent for the 2001-2003 period. In addition, the continuous Turkish military occupation of Cypriot territory wastes precious budgetary resources that the Turkish economy can ill-afford. Already, the proportional defense expenditures of Greece and Turkey are at the unsustainable level of approximately five percent of the respective gross domestic product (GDP) for both countries, and were the highest among all NATO members prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S.

Turkey's choice to actively pursue accession to the EU presents numerous challenges for both the EU member states and Turkey. The EU member states have made the conscious choice that may lead to the enlargement of the EU through the admission of a country that for a long time has been "at the gate" of the EU. Turkey is now being considered as the first "gate" of the EU community of nation-states in Asia. Turkey, predominantly a Muslim nation and a secular state, faces the dilemma that its future EU membership will prescribe both its domestic and international norms of behavior in a number of areas that range from foreign policy to domestic economic regulation. Indeed, membership in the EU entails the acceptance to a large extent of a centrally mandated regime of transnational governance. Correspondingly, the EU for the first time is faced with the admission of a Muslim nation-state. Naturally, Turkey's admission process to the EU challenges commonly held perceptions of EU's identity that usually coincides with the "established" nation-states in the European continent. Furthermore, Turkey's entry into the EU will test the definitions, limits and issues of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity that the EU and its member states will be willing to accept and will have to resolve within the boundaries
of the individual EU member states. If we are to look at the workable and acceptable ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of societies in certain fully functioning democracies, Turkey's potential admission to the EU does not present insurmountable challenges in this regard.

CURRENT SITUATION

The January – March 2002 direct intercommunal talks in Cyprus under UN auspices between Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, the political leader of the Turkish Cypriot community are reaching a new stage. The optimistic view of this round of the intercommunal talks is that the Cyprus government and the Turkish Cypriot side have simply restated their respective positions on substantive issues. The pessimistic view is that the intercommunal talks have simply stalled for the time being. It has been reported that the UN Special Representative Alvaro De Soto is in the process of seeking the assistance of the U.S. and the UK special representatives on Cyprus so that the intercommunal talks can continue with a settlement of the Cyprus crisis as the ultimate goal.67

The main issues of a settlement of the Cyprus crisis revolve around the constitutional and governmental structure that will apply on the island, the national security framework, territorial alignment, and the repatriation of the refugees. The Cyprus government has put forward proposals that are based on the adoption of a unitary but bicomunal federal republic with a strong central government where the Turkish minority will enjoy substantial powers and protections under a new constitution. For example, judging from prior Cyprus government submissions, the proposed structure guarantees substantive Turkish Cypriot participation in the executive and judiciary branches of government, adopts a bicameral legislature where the Turkish Cypriots will occupy fifty percent of the Upper House; and provides for substantive self-governance for one of the contemplated federal provinces. Furthermore, these proposals have focused on the demilitarization of the island that could lead to disbanding the Cypriot National Guard, the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from the island, and the presence of a significant peacekeeping force under UN auspices.68 These proposals also preclude unilateral intervention rights by any outside party. The Cypriot government has also proposed that the territorial area allotted for the Turkish Cypriot federal province will exceed the population portion of the Turkish Cypriot minority. This will permit partial resettlement of Greek Cypriot refugees to areas from which they fled during the 1974 Turkish invasion. The Cypriot government also insists on the return of the Turkish mainland emigrants.

The Turkish Cypriot proposals, endorsed or guided by the Turkish government, call for a separate and equal governmental status for the Turkish Cypriot minority in a federated Cyprus,
the maintenance of unilateral intervention rights by outside parties (i.e., Turkey), and the continuous presence of substantial numbers of Turkish troops on the island. Denktash’s hardened positions during the January-March 2002 bicomunal talks included the demand of a territorial allotment far in excess of the Turkish Cypriot minority proportion to the total population, and the lack of recognition that a refugee repatriation issue exists. The Turkish Cypriot side also called for a lifting of the economic embargo that applies for the occupied areas. A preliminary and rather optimistic timetable for the current negotiations calls for substantive progress or even outright resolution of the Cyprus crisis by June 2002.69

The Turkish Cypriot proposals undermine applicable principles for a unitary federal state in Cyprus and seek international recognition for the occupied sector as a separate and “equal” state to that of the Cyprus Republic. The international community (except Turkey) has already refused to accord such recognition. The presence of Turkish troops on the island is designed to reinforce the proposed de jure “recognition” of the occupied sector as a “separate and equal state” and clearly contravenes applicable UN Security Council resolutions that have mandated the withdrawal of the Turkish invasion and occupation troops from the island. These Turkish Cypriot proposals do not advance the discussions for a permanent solution of the Cyprus crisis, and simply provide a very thin veil for Turkey’s potential hostile annexation of the occupied sector. The Turkish Cypriot stance on the issue of the 1974 invasion refugees has already been superceded by the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the landmark case of Loizidou v. Turkey. The ECHR decided in July 1998 that Mrs. Titina Loizidou, a Cypriot citizen, was deprived of the use of her property in the occupied sector of Cyprus because of the 1974 Turkish military invasion and continuous occupation. The Court adjudged that Turkey is obliged to pay compensation to Mrs. Loizidou for the unlawful interference with her property rights. Turkey has refused to comply with the ECHR decision.70 The rulings of the ECHR in the cases of Loizidou v. Turkey and Cyprus v. Turkey, effectively confirm the fundamental human and legal rights of the 1974 Turkish invasion refugees to return to their homes and possessions in the occupied sector. Naturally, this cannot be accomplished with the ongoing Turkish military occupation and under the Turkish Cypriot negotiating proposals that purposely ignore the “refugee issue.”71

There are those who have argued that the upcoming accession of Cyprus to the EU has effectively removed any incentives for the Cyprus government to “negotiate” and “make concessions” for the permanent settlement of the Cyprus crisis. These analyses ignore the obvious reality of the Turkish military occupation on the island that the Cyprus government seeks to remove through the process of negotiations, and they fail to put forward any realistic
and workable settlement alternatives that comply with applicable parameters of international law. In short, these analyses tend to advocate the continuation of the existing but unacceptable status quo. For these reasons, the potential active involvement of the U.S. and the UK in the ongoing Cyprus intercommunal talks is receiving mixed reviews. For example, Lord David Hannay, the UK Special Representative, appears to favor a “rotational form” of presidency for the Cyprus Republic that will periodically pass between a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot. However, it has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt that such “power sharing arrangements” at the central government level of the Cyprus Republic are unworkable when such arrangements clearly ignore the island’s demographics. A “rotational presidency” will simply ignore the principle of majority rule and will not provide for the necessary institutional continuity that is essential for the smooth functioning of Cyprus’ central government. Simply put, a coloration of the de facto partition as a de jure settlement by some other name will not produce a substantive resolution in the Cyprus crisis.

It is obvious that Turkey and its client Turkish Cypriot leadership need to make some threshold choices that will irrevocably affect the future of the island Republic. Professor Onis concisely describes these choices in the following statement:

Progress will only be possible if Ankara accepts the case for the creation of a genuinely independent and united Cyprus. At the same time, what Ankara should strive for is a type of independent Cyprus in which the Turkish minority would enjoy considerable but not complete autonomy in government as part of a broad confederal structure. The degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Turkish minority would be the subject of a bargaining process.

Certainly, the continuing Cyprus crisis is an obstacle to Turkey’s accession to the EU. The core issue is whether the timely resolution of the crisis provides a sufficient and, perhaps, the only incentive for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to engage in meaningful negotiations for the substantive settlement of the crisis. It is widely accepted that in the midst of the U.S. international anti-terrorism campaign and strategy in which Turkey plays a crucial regional role, the U.S. will not apply any pressure on Turkey with respect to the Cyprus issue. The U.S. regional national security interests seek to maintain Turkey as a “stable ally” and will not endanger this relationship over matters that concern Cyprus for the near future.

Thus, Turkey’s willingness to negotiate for a resolution of the Cyprus crisis directly depends on if and how soon Turkey wishes to gain full EU membership, and the EU’s own commitment to keep the resolution of the Cyprus crisis as a fundamental criterion for Turkey’s EU accession. It is possible that Turkish calculations seek to overshadow and supercede this
EU accession requirement with Turkey's strategic importance for the EU as a whole and for distinct EU member states (Turkey's interrelationship with the ESDP/ESDI concepts has been previously examined). Naturally, Turkey can count on both the U.S. and EU members that are close U.S. allies, such as the UK, to sway the EU in that direction or, alternatively, delay Cyprus' own accession process to the EU.

However, there is a distinct difference with the parallel strategic relationship between Turkey and the U.S. Greece continues to influence EU policies and accession processes for new EU members. Furthermore, for the EU the Cyprus crisis is no longer a persistent but abstract problem of “ethnic conflict” that can be easily subsumed in the overarching context of regional “strategic relationships” where the EU and its member states do not have national security interests that are directly affected. Instead, the Cyprus crisis has assumed a legal and institutional dimension that is closely connected to the founding and operative principles and criteria of the EU community of nations. In all likelihood, these principles and criteria will assure Cyprus' accession to the EU by 2004 and will similarly judge Turkey's admission to the EU community of nations.

SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

The Risks of Renewed Conflict

The security dimensions of the Cyprus conflict are currently characterized by the continuously present probability of the resumption of hostilities on the island and in the wider region of the Eastern Mediterranean in the absence of a political settlement. The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the Cyprus crisis continues to be a barrier to Turkey's geopolitical goals and that Turkey will not refrain from selective or massive use of violent means to achieve them. Furthermore, this Turkish approach has served and can continue to serve as a distraction from Turkey's lingering domestic socioeconomic problems. Turkish action can be activated at any time that the international community in general and the U.S. in particular are either distracted by other issues and/or appear unwilling to intervene. Turkish adventurism in Cyprus and/or the Aegean Sea can and will manifest itself if Turkey is faced with a domestic political and/or socioeconomic crisis, or a similar and unmanageable crisis has ensued within the occupied sector of Cyprus, e.g., the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish mainland migrants reach a point of political and socioeconomic desperation.
The Balance of Forces and Existing Defense Doctrine

The structure, strength, organization and disposition of the Cypriot and Greek forces in Cyprus are designed to provide a credible defensive deterrent to any future aggression by the Turkish forces. Turkish forces on the island number 36,000-45,000 men and possess approximately 386 M-48A5T1/T2 main battle tanks (MBTs) of U.S. origin. The armored forces include 476 FMC-Nurol armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) and M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs). They are supported by 210 pieces of 203 mm, 155 mm and 105 mm self-propelled and towed artillery, heavy mortars and anti-aircraft guns. The Turkish Army units in Cyprus possess precision guided munitions (PGMs) including TOW, MILAN, and Konkurs-M anti-tank missiles, and U.S. Stinger and CIS SA-18 Igla man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Indigenous Turkish Cypriot combatants number approximately 5,000 and are organized in 7-9 infantry battalions under the command of Turkish Army officers. The Turkish forces in Cyprus enjoy the timely combat and logistical support of the THK from the Turkish mainland. THK combat aircraft can transit into Cypriot air space in approximately 10 minutes following their departure from their air bases in Southeastern Turkey.

The Cypriot National Guard numbers approximately 10,000 men. This force is backed by the Hellenic Army (ELDYK) mechanized brigade group in Cyprus with a strength of approximately 1,250 men. The National Guard and the ELDYK forces have approximately 206 French-made AMX-30B2, Russian-made T-80U, and modified U.S.-supplied M-48A5 MOLF MBTs. The same forces operate 43 Russian-made BMP-3 AIFVs, and 157 Steyer-ELVO/Leonidas I&II APCs. Wheeled armored reconnaissance vehicles and APCs of various types number approximately 295. These forces are supported by 136, 203 mm, 155 mm, and 100 mm, pieces of self-propelled and towed artillery. The National Guard and ELDYK forces also operate multiple rocket launchers, heavy mortars, MILAN and HOT-2 anti-tank PGMs, and French Mistral MANPADS.

A quick comparison reveals that the Turkish ground forces on Cyprus possess at least a 3.2:1 numerical superiority in personnel, a 1.87:1 advantage in MBTs, a 0.96:1 parity in AIFVs/APCs, and a 1.54:1 superiority in artillery tubes. Furthermore, these forces can be rapidly reinforced from the Turkish mainland with troops, weapons systems, and supplies that can arrive undisturbed in transport aircraft, helicopters and ships before the advent of any planned hostilities.

A new Turkish conventional offensive in Cyprus will seek to establish complete command of the air and sea approaches to the island and will rely on the offensive thrust of heavy armor and mechanized forces on the ground across the existing buffer zone. Depending on the avail-
ability of forces, this conventional ground thrust can be supported by airborne and/or landing operations in the interior and coastline of the Cyprus Republic. Alternatively, if we are to rely on the Turkish pronouncements that have been published since September 2001, Turkey may artificially create a crisis by instituting a naval and air blockade of the island Republic. This blockade can be combined with Turkey’s threatened formal annexation of the occupied sector, and the flow of genuine or “generated” political and economic Turkish Cypriot civilian refugees across the buffer zone into the areas controlled by the Cypriot government.

Cyprus’ defenses are hampered by Turkey’s close geographic proximity and the air and naval forces that the latter can rapidly deploy in the area. Cyprus does not possess an air force or naval units that can directly counter the Turkish naval threat. Under the Unified Defense Doctrine, Cyprus will rely on the assets of the Hellenic Air Forces (HAF) and the Hellenic Navy for that purpose, as well as on its anti-aircraft and coastal defenses. Despite Cyprus’ best efforts to increase the deterrence factor and quality of its ground-based air-defenses, intense but unwarranted political pressure by Turkey, the U.S., and other NATO countries essentially nullified the 1997 Cypriot purchase of the Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missile system.

In view of Turkish air superiority over the island and the 1995-1996 U.S. transfer to Turkey of the Loral Vought Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block I, the Cyprus government signed a contract in January 1997 for the purchase of the Russian S-300PMU-1 (NATO designation SA-10b Grumble), anti-aircraft and theater missile defense (TMD) system. The S-300PMU-1 missile system purchased by the Cyprus Republic was a purely defensive measure that was designed to partially offset the Turkish air and ATACMS threat. ATACMS missiles equipped with a variety of submunitions can be launched from the highly mobile and air transportable multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). The S-300PMU-1 missiles can engage enemy aircraft at distances of up to 150 km, and theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) and low-flying targets at a distance of 40 km.77 Turkey threatened military action in order to prevent the arrival and the installation of the S-300 missile system in Cyprus.

Although the U.S. recognized the legitimate rights of self-defense of the Cyprus Republic and the defensive character of the S-300 missile system, it also characterized the Cypriot purchase as “destabilizing” and exerted political pressure on both Cyprus and Greece to prevent the arrival of the missiles on the island. The UK adopted a similar attitude.78 By December 1998, the Cypriot and Greek governments decided to divert the purchased missile system units to Crete island of Greece and to integrate them into the air-defense system of the HAF. Ironically, the U.S. at one time proposed the purchase of the S-300 TMD system in an effort to placate Russian resistance to the U.S. national missile defense (NMD) plans.79
Subsequently, the National Guard has received through Greece six (6) Russian-made Antey TOR-M1 mobile anti-aircraft missile systems that also equip mechanized forces of the Hellenic Army in the Greek mainland. The National Guard also operates 12 Skyguard systems with 24 Alenia Aspide anti-aircraft missile launchers of Italian origin. It is easy to discern that the TOR-M1 and Aspide systems do not possess the necessary range in order to effectively counter the air-launched PGMs operated by the THK. For example, the THK McDonnell Douglas/Boeing F-4E Phantom aircraft that have been modernized by the Israeli Aircraft Industries can launch Rafael Popeye I and II air-to-surface PGMs with respective ranges of 80.45+ and 150 km. In contrast, the maximum range of the TOR-M1 and Aspide anti-aircraft missiles is a maximum of 12 km and 10 km respectively. Thus, the National Guard is in the process of seeking to acquire anti-aircraft missile systems with a range of at least 45 km. Conventional anti-aircraft artillery systems operated by the National Guard and ELDYK forces include weapons that are radar-controlled and possess modern electro-optic aiming devices.

Any new Turkish offensive in Cyprus will inevitably involve the outbreak of hostilities between Greece and Turkey since the "Unified Defense Doctrine" will be invoked and activated. Assuming that these hostilities will involve parallel Turkish attempts to seize one or two of the Greek islands in the Aegean, the Greek forces will face a challenging but not insurmountable task in reinforcing the Cyprus defenses. The annual Nikiforos-Toxotis exercises that are held between the Hellenic Armed Forces and the Cyprus National Guard have demonstrated that HAF and Hellenic Navy units can successfully reach Cyprus despite hostile interference.

It is obvious that major reinforcement of the island's defenses with ground troops, weapons systems and supplies from Greece after the outbreak of hostilities can be accomplished only through the use of fast convoys that may have to rely on their integral air-defense capabilities for part of their route. HAF fighter aircraft operate at the extreme limits of their combat radii while executing sorties from their air bases on the Greek mainland and Crete with Cyprus as a destination. Thus, their loitering time over Cyprus while executing air combat or strike missions is very limited. On the contrary, the endurance of THK combat aircraft in Cypriot air space is much longer due to the proximity of air bases both on the Turkish mainland and in the occupied sector, and in the presence of THK Boeing KC-135 aerial refueling assets. Protecting and maintaining the available air base infrastructure in functional condition on Cyprus in the face of the Turkish air threat will be of crucial importance.

In facing up to the armored and mechanized threat of the Turkish ground forces, the Cypriot National Guard and ELDYK deploy multiple platforms equipped with guided and unguided anti-tank weapons systems. These include the recent purchase of twelve (12) Mi-35M
attack helicopters from the Russian Federation that supplement the existing inventory of four (4) SA-342L1 Gazelle combat helicopters of French origin equipped with HOT anti-tank PGMs.\textsuperscript{83} Furthermore, all of the National Guard, ELDYK and Cypriot home defense infantry units are liberally equipped with man portable anti-tank rocket launchers.\textsuperscript{84} Cypriot coastal defenses rely on three (3) mobile anti-shipping missile batteries equipped with 24 MM40 Exocet PGMs.\textsuperscript{85}

Timely strategic and tactical intelligence collection and assessment are crucial for the successful defense of the island Republic. In times of tension, both sides will seek to improve the level and the quality of their tactical intelligence from a variety of sources including the use of commercial satellite imagery.\textsuperscript{86} Similarly, sufficient C4I assets are fundamental to the effective coordination of the Greek and Cypriot forces that will be involved in the implementation of the Unified Defense Doctrine in a hostile electronic warfare environment. As the 1974 hostilities conclusively proved for both sides, any armed conflict in the area will involve significant risks of casualties due to fratricidal fires in the event of C1 failures. Greece, Cyprus and Turkey are developing independent capabilities for secure satellite communications.\textsuperscript{87}

The concentration of modern weapons systems, especially PGMs, by all of the potential adversaries in a renewed conflict on Cyprus, will transform the outbreak of all-out hostilities on the island into a very risky and extremely costly military and political venture. Certain assessments that are based on the existing balance of forces on Cyprus have indicated that the Turkish forces would be able to militarily occupy the remainder of the island within three (3) days with an all-out offensive. However, these assessments are dated and are influenced by a number of factors. Such factors include advance warning, readiness of forces and mobilization of reserves, capabilities to conduct joint operations, international political reaction, etc.\textsuperscript{88} If the Turkish Armed Forces had indeed ascertained that such an operation was feasible within a short time horizon, thus effectively precluding the impact of international political reaction and limiting the duration of an armed conflict with Greece, most likely such an operation would have already been undertaken.

The threat scenarios to the national security of Cyprus that have been recently enunciated by Turkish officials involve a more complex set of political and military parameters and risks.\textsuperscript{89} The implementation of Turkey's threat to formally annex the occupied sector of Cyprus with or without the initiation of a sea and air blockade of the island Republic poses its own set of military and political risks. The formal annexation of the occupied sector before Cyprus' formal accession to the EU will clearly contravene existing UN Security Council resolutions and will unequivocally violate the UN Charter. Thus, Turkey will cause an international political condemnation of its actions while irreparably damaging its prospects for accession to the EU.
Similarly, the initiation of a Turkish sea and air blockade of Cyprus that will have as purpose a delay of Cyprus' EU accession, will invoke the Unified Defense Doctrine and will engender the risk of direct confrontation between Greece and Turkey. In addition, a Turkish sea and air blockade of Cyprus may and can involve other nation-states into the crisis. A Turkish blockade is certain to be formally rebuked by the UN and the EU, and Cyprus is entitled to seek and accept the assistance to its self-defense from any other nation-state.

A temporary but politically powerful solution to a Turkish air and sea blockade of the island that can substantially degrade its effects and reduce the risks of direct confrontation between Greek and Turkish air and naval forces can involve the use of the UK bases in Cyprus. The UK continues to be one of Cyprus' "Guarantor Powers," and is both a NATO and EU member. Its bases on the island provide support for UNFICYP's peace operations. These bases can be used for the movement of supplies and travel that are essential to the functioning of the island's economy. For example, the UK bases can become the temporary "origination" and "destination" points for Cyprus' trade and travel. Similarly, commercial vessels can temporarily hoist the flag of the British merchant marine, civilian aircraft can temporarily obtain UK civilian registrations, etc. The rapid political response of the international community that can include a military sea and air peace operation component under UN auspices, can effectively defuse a crisis that will be artificially caused if and when Turkey decides to impose a sea and air blockade on Cyprus in order to challenge Cyprus' course to full EU membership.  

A more complicated crisis situation can develop if the political and socioeconomic conditions in the occupied sector of Cyprus deteriorate to an untenable level with or without a Turkish move at formal annexation and before Cyprus reaches full EU membership. Domestic dissatisfaction with the policies of the Denktash regime and the Turkish government and rapidly deteriorating economic conditions may result in domestic unrest within the occupied sector. If this unrest intentionally or unintentionally escalates beyond the control of the Turkish forces, it could lead to unauthorized but potentially unilaterally condoned attempts of massive migration to the areas that are effectively controlled by the Cyprus Republic. The Cyprus government will then be faced with a political, economic and humanitarian crisis of potentially large proportions. Turkey almost certainly will seek to exploit such a crisis in order to force a "permanent settlement" of the Cyprus problem. Rapid international reaction and the active involvement of UNFICYP will be essential in timely defusing this type of crisis situation. For example, UNFICYP troops and UN police units will have to be rapidly reinforced and actively cooperate with the government of Cyprus in controlling the potential flows of political and/or economic refugees from the occupied sector. Effective policing of the UN buffer zone by the
UNFICYP contingent will be crucial in managing a massive political and economic refugee influx from the occupied sector and will deprive Turkish policymakers from spurious justifications to escalate this type of a crisis scenario. Although this type of crisis scenario will effectively certify the political bankruptcy of the Turkish military occupation, it will nonetheless pose significant challenges for the Cyprus government. The Cyprus government will face the immediate problem of providing humanitarian relief to an influx of political and economic refugees that are of a different ethnic, religious and cultural background. Similarly, the Cyprus government will be faced with the thorny question of providing temporary or more permanent asylum and settlement to political and economic refugees that are likely to include non-Cypriot emigrants from the Turkish mainland.

Naturally, the probabilities of a crisis significantly diminish with Cyprus’ final accession to the EU. Cyprus’ full membership in the EU will provide a totally new dimension for the international posture of the island Republic. Cyprus’ EU membership will be a powerful political deterrent factor to any Turkish geopolitical designs that would somehow seek to create a new crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean.

NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS

The multiple influence of national security interests and policies of many nation-states are at the roots of the crisis that still keeps Cyprus as the last divided country in post-WW II Europe for a period that is approaching 28 years. A solution of the crisis that will satisfy these many national security interests and policies that do not directly concern the independence, unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus itself is unattainable. Furthermore, many of these national security interests and policies that are foreign to Cyprus itself have been superceded by events. For example, the formulation of the U.S.-Israel-Turkey axis has strengthened the already existing Israeli military superiority in the Middle East. Similarly, the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf War has seen the establishment of a permanent U.S. military presence in the Gulf region.

The dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and the current status of U.S. and NATO relations with the Russian Federation have effectively removed the Great Power rivalry that existed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, Cyprus’ significance as a forward-based “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and electronic intelligence gathering station has considerably diminished. Furthermore, the presence of the UK sovereign bases on Cyprus, Cypriot cooperation with U.S. military operations in the Middle East region, and Cyprus’ participation in the ESDP/ESDI initiatives of
the EU virtually guarantee that Cyprus' infrastructure will continue to be used for NATO and EU operations.

Cyprus has long abandoned any notions of a formal union with Greece.\(^92\) In this respect, Cyprus itself does not represent a threat to Turkish national security interests. Turkey possesses overall military superiority in Cyprus' immediate vicinity, and would easily be able to maintain this superiority even if its occupation troops were to depart from the island. Indeed, both Cyprus and Greece have traditionally focused on a defensive posture of "asymmetrical deterrence" to Turkey's irredentism in the Eastern Mediterranean.\(^93\) Similarly, although Greece is committed to the independence, unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus through the Unified Defense Doctrine, Greek foreign policy towards Turkey has recently developed independently from the lack of progress on a permanent settlement of the Cyprus crisis.\(^94\)

Cyprus' accession to the EU automatically guarantees equality of rights for the Turkish Cypriot minority that will be protected not only because of Cyprus' democratic institutions, but also because of the EU's transnational governance that applies to all of its member states. Thus, Cyprus' accession to the EU as a unified state automatically undermines Turkey's national security concerns regarding the "protection" of the Turkish Cypriot minority on the island. In contrast, as the ECtHR has established in its landmark decision of Cyprus v. Turkey, the Turkish military occupation violates the fundamental human rights of all Cypriots, including those of the Turkish Cypriot minority. Indeed, if Turkey is to focus on its long-term strategic interests for accession to the EU community of nations, it is clear that its military occupation on Cyprus is an unsustainable political and economic detriment.

When the multiple national security concerns of many state actors that have directly or indirectly contributed by act or omission to the Cyprus crisis are substantially removed, then we are left with the concrete possibility of a permanent settlement on the island. Although this settlement must be political in nature, it must follow an acceptable framework. This framework has already been prescribed through the promulgation of numerous UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and the EU's accession mechanisms and processes. Essentially, this framework is governed more by the application of international law principles rather than by the application of political compromises that must address interwoven and often conflicting national security concerns of multiple actors.

The application of these well recognized principles of international law call for a unified, independent and sovereign Cyprus. The political aspects of a potential permanent settlement will incorporate a federal governing structure with substantial rights of self-governance for the Turkish Cypriot minority. Effective governance of the island Republic cannot be affected in the
absence of a strong central government. A cursory review of federal systems of governance quickly reveals that strong central governments are essential, especially in the areas of foreign policy and defense. The functioning of a federal system of governance on Cyprus calls for the application of majority rule with strong protections for the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority, e.g., the French-speaking Province of Quebec enjoys a “special status” but is still part of Canada’s federal structure. To the extent that “power sharing” arrangements are implemented, these cannot interfere with the normal functioning of the central government, e.g., a return to the veto powers of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President enshrined in the 1960 constitution will be catastrophic.

The political settlement negotiation process will have to settle a number of thorny issues for the transition to a fully functional federal Republic of Cyprus. The geographic area that will encompass the more autonomous Turkish Cypriot region will need to be allocated and defined. The issues relating to the repatriation of the 1974 Cypriot refugees of both communities and the disposition of their properties will also need to be addressed. Although the ECtHR decision in Loizidou v. Turkey provides the overarching guidance on this issue, the implementation realities will have to cope with the passage of 28 years since the 1974 Turkish invasion. Similarly, the repatriation of the emigrants from the Turkish mainland must be accommodated, e.g., both the Cypriot government can offer economic incentives for such repatriation and the Turkish government can reroute related economic support to its domestic economy with more productive multiplier effects.

The issue of national security for the Cyprus Republic calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the island. Although current proposals call for disbanding the National Guard and for the introduction of a larger peacekeeping force in Cyprus, these are not long-term solutions that will adequately address Cyprus’ legitimate self-defense needs, i.e., the UN will be called to sustain one more long-term peace operation when UNFICYP has been active on Cyprus for 38 years already. The long-term solution will involve the transformation of the National Guard to a truly multiethnic force that is entrusted to fulfill Cyprus’ defense needs and is divorced from the national security interests of other nation-states. If the Republic of South Africa was able to successfully integrate racially and politically diverse military forces, the same can be accomplished in Cyprus under UN auspices.

Although the time is ripe for the formulation and implementation of a permanent peace settlement in Cyprus, the resolution of the Cyprus crisis may proceed in stages. If a permanent settlement plan is not agreed upon immediately, good faith negotiations can still proceed while both sides engage in certain good will gestures and measures. These good will gestures and
measures can initially involve matters of purely humanitarian concern. During the recent inter-
communal talks the Cyprus government and the Turkish Cypriot political leadership agreed in
expanding their cooperation in bringing to closure the cases of the military and civilian personnel
that are classified as missing in action (MIA) on the island. Cyprus and Greece list
approximately 1,600 MIAs since the 1974 Turkish invasion (some of whom are U.S. citizens),
and the Turkish Cypriots claim 500-700 MIAs since the 1963-1964 Cyprus crisis. Naturally, the
cooperation of the Turkish Armed Forces will be of paramount importance. Other measures of
good will can include increased cooperation in joint infrastructure projects, management of
natural resources, and civil defense. It should be noted that Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
municipal authorities extensively cooperated in the hallmark “underground” project for the
sewage system of the divided city of Nicosia with UN financing after the 1974 invasion.95
Similarly, Cypriot fire fighting forces have been called to enter the occupied sector in order to
help extinguish forest fires. This cooperation can easily extend to joint efforts in combating
transnational crime and in joint anti-terrorism efforts.

Additional mutual confidence building measures that have been discussed in the past but
never implemented involve the gradual withdrawal of the occupying Turkish forces from
selected areas. Even with the implementation of a permanent peace settlement, these forces
will not and cannot leave the island overnight.

Turkey has reached a crucial road junction in its decision making. One road leads to the
EU community of nations with the attendant requirements of Turkey’s own democratization and
permanent settlement of the Cyprus crisis. The other maintains the existing domestic environ-
ment of a “semi-democratic” state that still attempts to maintain the status quo on Cyprus by all
available means. Turkey’s long-term goals and domestic sociopolitical tensions will attempt to
formulate compromise solutions that will serve both of these choices. Such compromise
solutions do not exclude the possibility of creating an artificial crisis in Cyprus in order to
achieve what Turkish policymakers may perceive as a superior bargaining position prior to
Cyprus' accession to the EU.

The international community, including the UN, the EU, the U.S., the UK, etc., must stand
firm in their current commitments to keep the issue of Cyprus’ accession to the EU separate and
distinct from the permanent settlement of the Cyprus crisis. Similarly, these international actors
must accept the position that a permanent solution of the Cyprus crisis must be premised on the
currently prescribed framework of international law that governs the resolution of the crisis on
the island Republic itself. This framework will permit the promulgation of a viable and lasting
peace settlement on Cyprus that should be independent from the national security concerns and
policies of outside actors that contributed to the creation of the existing crisis in the first place. This approach will promote peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, will strengthen NATO's Southeastern flank, will assist with the implementation of the ESDP/ESDI initiatives, and will dramatically improve the prospects of Turkey's admission to the EU community of nations.

CONCLUSION

The monumental changes that took place during the post-Cold War era in Europe, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, have created an appropriate environment for reaching a permanent settlement in the long simmering Cyprus crisis. Although the island Republic still occupies a strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, most of the national security considerations that influenced the past involvement of many foreign nation-states into Cyprus' affairs have now been eclipsed. The Cyprus Republic is well on its way to becoming a full member of the EU community of nations. Thus, although the island Republic will maintain its independence and will not be a direct member of a multilateral military alliance, it will nevertheless be more closely aligned with the "West."

Cyprus' accession to the EU will provide numerous political, social and economic advantages and safeguards for all of its citizens. Fundamental human rights of both the ethnic majority and minority populations on the island would be guaranteed not only because of Cyprus' democratic governmental institutions, but also because of the EU's mechanisms and processes that provide for the transnational governance of the EU's member nation-states. The prospect of this political and economic freedom for all Cypriot citizens stands in stark contrast with the effects that the 1974 military invasion and continuous occupation has had on the island and its inhabitants. The maintenance of the present status quo on the island is unacceptable since it engenders the continued risk of armed conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean and violates accepted principles of international law.

Since the majority of national security policy considerations of multiple actors have been superceded, the focus must shift on a permanent solution of the Cyprus crisis that must take place within the already prescribed framework of applicable international law. This framework mandates an independent, sovereign and united Cyprus. This framework does not recognize and does not condone any schemes for the de jure recognition of a de facto partition that was brought about through the force of arms. Similarly, the same framework does not espouse the adoption of peace settlement plans where Cypriot national security, independence and territorial
integrity will continue to be at risk because of the unilateral intervention rights of outside parties, or because the island cannot effectively govern itself.

The Cyprus crisis currently stands as an obstacle to Turkey's aspirations for full membership in the EU community of nations. Turkey's constructive actions in permanently resolving the Cyprus crisis within the prescribed framework of international law will have immediate positive effects not only for Turkey's international posture, but for its domestic political and economic situation as well. To the extent that Turkey will decide to utilize its strategic significance for the West in order to "game" a resolution of the Cyprus crisis that contravenes the prescribed framework under international law, Turkey will risk further conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean and will irreparably damage its own prospects for EU accession.

It is only a paradox that Turkey, while aspiring to become a member of the EU herself, at the same time, purporting to act in the interests of the Turkish-Cypriots, she denies them the security and prosperity they would enjoy from Cyprus' EU membership.

The Cyprus problem will hopefully be solved at some point. There have been good and bad actions by both communities in the past, but if good will can exist through all the bad times, then there is hope for good times in the future. Therefore, the island's inhabitants should get together and talk about their own problems as Cypriots and not as Greeks or Turks and must realize that they have to create the foundations upon which to build the prosperity for their future and for the generations to come.

WORD COUNT = 17,632
ENDNOTES


3 Joseph, p. 16.


5 The British military bases on Cyprus were a critical component in the 1956 Anglo-French military intervention at the Suez Canal that was directed against the regime of Egyptian President Nasser, and coordinated with a simultaneous Israeli military campaign against the Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Brendan O’Malley, Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London, UK, 2001, pp. 1-7 & 32-51.

6 It should be noted that Israeli independence and the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 actually reinforced the enosis aspirations of the Greek Cypriot community. Greek Cypriots had assisted in the “illegal” Jewish immigration into Palestine during the immediate post-WWII years, and Britain maintained internment camps in Cyprus for the Jewish immigrants that were intercepted by the Royal Navy in the high seas.

7 Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots also advocated the maintenance of the status quo or the outright return of the island to Turkish sovereignity. Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger, Verso, London, UK, 1997, pp. 40-48.


9 Joseph, pp. 19-21. The Treaty of Guarantee was designed to avoid the division of the island either under the concept of enosis or taksim. Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, became the guarantor powers ensuring the viability of the Treaty.

10 U.S. President Lyndon Johnson warned Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus that was not condoned by NATO could deprive Turkey of U.S. and NATO protection in the event of Soviet direct intervention. Although the Turkish Air Force bombed both civilian and military targets on the island, the Turkish Armed Forces lacked the necessary sealift and airlift capabilities to mount a landing operation against Cyprus. Furthermore, Cypriot defenses had been secretly reinforced by a Hellenic Army brigade group that contained armor, artillery and anti-aircraft defense elements. This Hellenic Army group had been sent to Cyprus by the Greek government of George Papandreou that was pursuing a more independent foreign policy vis-à-vis the U.S. and NATO. Col. George P. Bozikas, Hellenic Army, FA, U.S. Security Assistance and Regional Balance of Power: Greece and Turkey, A Case Study, USAWC SRP, unpublished paper, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., April 17, 1998, pp. 13, 33-34, and n. 14, citing The Middle East Journal, “Correspondence between President
Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, June 1964, as released by the White House, January 15, 1966," Summer 1966, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 386-393. The U.S. reaction to the Turkish goals, when coupled with the removal of the U.S. Jupiter intermediate nuclear ballistic missiles (IRBMs) from Turkey in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, led to a serious reevaluation of Turkish national security policies in the late-1960s and in the 1970s. Bozikas, pp. 32-33.

11 Joseph, p. 31.


13 An artificial crisis in Cyprus that resulted from Cypriot National Guard attacks against armed Turkish Cypriot enclaves in November 1967, led to U.S. pressures and the eventual withdrawal of the Hellenic Army brigade group that had been in Cyprus since 1964. Thus, a military deterrent to Turkish invasion plans was permanently removed. Bozikas, pp. 17-18.

14 Hitchens, pp. 69-78; O'Malley and Craig, pp. 131-135. The U.S. followed a "dual track" policy towards Cyprus. On one hand it "respected" the existence of Makarios' elected government, and on the other it actively supported the repressive policies of the Greek junta in Greece and the junta's violent interventionism in Cyprus. The U.S. Administration of President Richard M. Nixon also mislabeled Archbishop Makarios of the Autocephalous Orthodox Christian Church of Cyprus a "communist sympathizer" because Cyprus was a member of the Third World non-aligned movement, and maintained trade relations with the People's Republic of Vietnam (then North Vietnam) – one of the four non-communist countries to do so at that time.

15 Ευάγγελος Κουφουδάκης, "Η Κύπρος και οι Υπερθυϊνόμενοι 1960-1979>>, Κύπρος – Ιστορία, Προβλήματα και Αγώνες του Λαού της, Γιώργος Τενεκίδης, Γιάννος Κρανιδιώτης, Βιβλιοπωλείο της Εστίας, Ι. Δ. Κολλάρος & ΣΙΑΣ Α.Ε., Αθήνα, 1981, σ. 377-385; Van Coufoudakis, "Cyprus and the Superpowers 1960-1979," Cyprus – History, Problems and Struggles of Its People, Giorgos Tenekides, Yiannos Cranidiotis, "Estia" Bookstore, I. D. Kollaros & Partners S.A., Athens, Greece, 1981, pp. 377-385. The anti-Makarios campaign was led by Georghios Grivas, a retired Hellenic Army officer from Cyprus, who had led the Cypriot guerilla campaign against the British forces in the 1950s and commanded the Cypriot National Guard in 1964-1967. Grivas was a fervent anti-communist. Despite a secret meeting between Makarios and Grivas and the doubts that Grivas held over the Greek junta and U.S. policy goals to destabilize the Makarios regime (Grivas could discern that these activities were serving Turkish interests in the longer term), the anti-Makarios campaign continued unabated even after Grivas' death from a heart condition and his public funeral in Cyprus in January 1974. Σπύρος Παπαγεωργίου, Μακάριος, Πορεία δια Πυρός και Σιδήρου, Εκδόσεις Γ. Λαδιάς & ΣΙΑ, Αθήνα, 1976, σ. 230 232; Spyros Papageorgiou, Makarios: A Course Through Fire and Iron, G. Ladias & Partners Publishing, Athens, Greece, 1976, pp. 230-232.

16 The British bases on Cyprus provided convenient refueling points for U.S.-made combat aircraft that were transferred to the Israeli Air Force, and for high-speed high altitude Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird photographic reconnaissance missions over the Middle East. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Cyprus was virtually at the crossroads of the U.S. and Soviet air bridges that

17 Following the violently suppressed Greek university student demonstrations at the Athens Polytechnic University on November 17, 1973, George Papadopoulos, the Greek junta leader since 1973, was deposed in a new coup by Brigadier General Ioannides, the commander of the Hellenic Army Military Police. Ioannides is still serving a life sentence for his role in the April 1967 coup and the violent suppression of the 1973 student revolt in Athens.


19 Ibid, Polyviou, pp. 154-155.

20 During the 1974 Cyprus crisis Ioannides made the cryptic comment “they fouled me” (<< με ξεγέλασαν>>) – “me kseghelasan”). In a July 2000 interview and while serving a sentence of life imprisonment for his role in the 1967 coup and the 1973 Polytechnic massacre, Ioannides openly admitted that he had received assurances from his CIA contacts that Turkey would not intervene following the coup against Makarios. Macedonian Press Agency, “Dimitrios Ioannidis on the Role of the United States in the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus,” July 20, 2000, Thessaloniki, Greece.

21 Since 1965, the Turkish naval shipyards at Golcuk and Taskijak had launched 32 landing crafts of 113 to 405-ton displacement and were in the process of launching 12 new ones with a 600-ton displacement. Turkey already possessed five 500-ton and four 160-ton landing crafts that had been received through U.S. military assistance. Solon Grigoriadis, *Greece – Turkey – Cyprus 1830-1979*, Rizes Publishing, Athens, Greece, 1979, pp. 298-299, 333.

22 Polyviou, p. 154.

23 Ibid., p. 156. See also Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, NY, 1992, pp. 8-10. Dr. Henry Kissinger, in his self-exculpatory memoirs, attributes the start of the Cyprus crisis to Makarios’ request for the withdrawal of the Greek officers from the Cyprus National Guard, and the U.S. inaction on the need to maintain the “delicate balance” between Greece and Turkey and on the initiatives undertaken by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan. Dr. Kissinger’s failure to mention the Greek junta’s subversive activities in Cyprus prior to the 1974 coup and his characterization of Archbishop Makarios as a “Machiavellian in clerical garb,” do not require
further elaboration on Dr. Kissinger’s own goals regarding the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. However, Dr. Kissinger grudgingly acknowledges in his belated eulogy for Archbishop Makarios that “Makarios was, after all, a big man in a world not blessed with an excess of them.” Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, Simon & Schuster, New York, NY, 1999, pp. 205-206, 238.

24 The Cyprus National Guard operated 20 towed Bofors L56/L60 40mm A/A guns, and 55 U.S.-made M16 half-tracks equipped with powered quad-12.7mm Browning A/A gun mounts. The National Guard also fielded a large number of 12.7mm heavy machine guns of U.S./NATO and Soviet origin in the A/A role. The majority of these A/A weapons were not radar controlled and lacked modern optico-electronic aiming devices. They nevertheless accounted for approximately 22 THK combat and transport aircraft that were brought down over the island.

25 In addition, regular Turkish Army troops permanently stationed with the Turkish Force on Cyprus, and Turkish Cypriot irregulars, occupied prepared defensive positions in mountainous terrain that dominated the avenues of approach to the Turkish beachhead from Nicosia. Ibid., pp. 254-255. The counterattacking Greek and National Guard forces had only 35 Soviet-made T-34/85 WW II vintage tanks at their disposal. Ibid., pp. 257-258. In comparison, by the end of the cease fire the Turkish forces landed on the island had reached 40,000 troops, 160-200 M-47 and M-48 tanks, 200 M-113 armored personnel carriers, and 120 105mm and 155mm towed artillery pieces. Ibid., p. 570.

26 Joseph, p. 52.

27 Polyviou, pp. 180-185. Despite their superiority, Turkish forces were unable to capture all of their intended targets. Cypriot and Greek units were able to successfully resist combined armor and infantry attacks in the area of the Nicosia international airport. The airport was occupied by the Canadian UNFICYP contingent and is part of the UN buffer zone to this date. Approximately, 200,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to abandon their homes and possessions by the advancing and occupying Turkish forces in a long practiced form of ethnic cleansing. Approximately 1,600 Greek Cypriot and Greek military personnel and civilians are listed as missing in action (MIAs) and unaccounted by the Turkish occupation forces. The Turkish Cypriots list 500-750 persons as MIAs since the 1963-1964 Cyprus crisis.

28 Kissinger, p. 214.

29 Bozikas, pp. 20-23, 35.

30 Stearns, pp. 110-111.

This phenomenon is particularly acute among the youngest generations of Turkish Cypriots whose families possessed regular passports of the Cyprus Republic by the time of the 1974 Turkish invasion. Immigrants from the Turkish mainland now outnumber the pre-invasion indigenous Turkish Cypriot population. During the intercommunal proximity talks of January-February 2002, the Cypriot government documented the presence of 115,000 Turkish mainland emigrants in Cyprus, or approximately 12 percent of the total population on the island. Φάνης Κωνσταντινίδης, «Απέκλεισε τα <<δύο κράτη>> ο Φερχόλικεν», Ελευθεροτυπία, Αθήνα, 11 Μαρτίου 2002, Fanis Constantinides, “Verheugen precludes the ‘two states’”, Eleutherotypia, Athens, Greece, March 11, 2002.

The European Court of Human Rights has conclusively established in its landmark May 10, 2001 decision in Case of Cyprus v. Turkey, Application No. 25781/94, that the Turkish occupation forces violate the fundamental human rights of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot residents on the island. For example, the Court found that there was a violation of Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in that Turkish or Turkish Cypriot military courts are authorized to try civilians for certain offenses in the occupied sector of Cyprus. Judgment, ¶¶ 358-359, p. 88.

For example, the modernization of 56 THK McDonnell Douglas/Boeing F-4E fighter aircraft by the Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) is estimated at an $11.29 million per aircraft (this figure does not exclude contract penalties on IAI when modernized THK F-4Es that were returned to operational service were found to suffer from defects in fundamental systems). The corresponding unit cost for the modernization of 39 HAF F-4Es by the EADS consortium is estimated at $8.08 million (this estimate does not include increased costs because of the delays in program implementation). Most probably, both the THK and the HAF would have achieved lower per unit modernization costs for their F-4Es if the corresponding modernization programs had been undertaken by U.S. aerospace firms. Bozikas, p. 37, and n.44, p. 50.


Pope, pp. 130-141, 151-152.


The existing EU time frame obligates Turkey to achieve certain targets for accession by 2004. Meanwhile, since the last quarter of 2001 the THK has engaged in daily violations of the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) and of Greek air space. This results in interceptions by HAF fighters that often develop in mock dogfights between armed combat aircraft. Essentially, this is a repeat experience of Turkish practices that were widely used in the 1980s and in the mid-to-late 1990s. These tactics in the 1990s led to the loss of combat aircraft and aircrews due to accidents on both sides. Bozikas, pp. 37-38.


44 This issue is examined later in more detail in the section “Security Dimensions of Cyprus Conflict” in this paper.

45 The U.S. State Department spokesman was at a loss in responding to questions whether the same digital maps would “omit” the national sea boundaries between the U.S. and Canada, and those of the U.S. and the Russian Federation. A similar U.S. initiative for the abolition of Greek-Turkish boundaries in the Aegean Sea from NATO military maps has so far been successfully resisted by the Greek military command structure. Κυρά Άδαμ, <<Πραξικοπηματικά έσβησαν οι ΗΠΑ τα σύνορα στο Αιγαίο>>, Ελευθεροτυπία, Αθήνα, 7 Ιανουαρίου 2002, Κύρια Άδαμ, “The U.S. arbitrarily erased the boundaries in the Aegean,” Eleutherotypia, Athens, Greece, January 7, 2002; Γιώργος Τσακίρης, <<Το NATO καθιέρωνε ένα εθνικό χώρο Αιγαίου!>>, Ελευθεροτυπία, Αθήνα, 9 Ιανουαρίου 2002, Giorgios Tsakiris, “NATO establishes [an] ‘Aegean airspace’!”, Eleutherotypia, Athens, Greece, January 9, 2002. NIMA also made certain changes in U.S. maps of the Aegean Sea following the 1996 Greek-Turkish crisis at the Imia islets that are within Greek territorial boundaries.


47 Joseph, p. 117.

48 Joseph, pp. 117-118.

49 Cyprus Republic Press and Information Office, The Cyprus Problem: Historical review and the latest developments, April 1999, pp. 103-104.


Ibid., Skouras, p. 8.


Skouras, European Security and Defense Identity, Greece and Peace Operations, pp. 7-8, 12-13, 27.


Essentially, this amounts to a “coincidence of opinions” by those who hold extremist Kemalist and Islamic views in Turkey. Pope, p. 184.

Leyla Boulton, “E-mail scandal spurs Turkey to introspection: European Union Entry Interception of Envoy’s Messages Prompts Debate on Human Rights and Readiness for Membership,” Financial Times, March 14, 2002. The political party that disclosed the contents of the intercepted electronic mail messages to the press was prosecuted and put on trial.

Önis, p. 40 (emphasis in italics added).

Journalistic criticisms of the Turkish Armed Forces and the publication of information that can be construed as aiding “separatist” causes are particular targets of governmental prosecu-
Turkey fears that a concerted military campaign to overthrow the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein will result in the fragmentation of Iraq in three main areas. Northern Iraq will be dominated by ethnic Kurds and will pose a renewed threat for Turkey's frontier and may lead to a renewed armed struggle by the ethnic Kurds in Southeastern Turkey. Sunni Arabs will continue to control central Iraq. Shiite Arabs will be in control of Southern Iraq and they will be aligned with the Islamic Republic of Iran with inimical results for Turkish national security. At the time of this writing (March 2002), U.S. Vice President William Cheney was visiting a number of Arab states, Israel, Turkey, and the UK, for mobilizing support in a U.S.-led campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. Jordan and Saudi Arabia have indicated their opposition to a renewed campaign against Iraq. BBC News, "US attack on Iraq 'not imminent'," March 20, 2002.
well documented destruction and looting of Cyprus’ cultural heritage in the occupied sector. Hitchens, pp. 112-116.


73 Φάνης Κωνσταντινίδης, «Πιέζει να βιαστούν ο Γουέστον», Ελευθεροτυπία, Αθήνα, 21 Μαρτίου 2002; Fanis Constantinides, “Weston is pressuring [them] to hurry,” Eleutherotypia, Athens, Greece, March 21, 2002. It also appears that Lord Haney may want to link Cyprus’ accession to the EU with a permanent settlement on the island, something that the EU has already rejected.

74 Önis, p. 41.


76 Ibid.


80 The Rafael Popey I and II air-to-surface PGMs are equivalent to the U.S. AGM-142 Have Nap and Have Lite missiles. The Antey TOR-M1 has the NATO designation SA-15b. Federation of American Scientists. The new anti-aircraft missile system under procurement consideration by the National Guard is the Russian BUK-M1-2 with a 45 Km range. Defense Bible 2001-2002, p. 101.

81 The regular harassment of these maneuvers by THK combat aircraft always provides a necessary dose of realism and permits a more objective assessment of these exercises.
The Andreas Papandreou military air base in Paphos, Cyprus, is equipped with hardened aircraft shelters. Combat aircraft of the HAF transit through this base during the annual Nikiforos-Toxotis maneuvers.

Certain information indicates that U.S. governmental sought a repeat of the S-300 missile system purchase nullification, i.e., the removal of these attack helicopters to Greece!! The Cyprus government officially denied that its eas subjected to such pressures. Фάνης Κων- 

stantinidής, "ΗΠΑ πιέζουν Κύπρο να αποσύρει ελικόπτερα, "Ελευθεροτυπία, Αθήνα, 28 Ιανω- 
uαρίου 2002, Fanis Constantinidis, "[The] USA pressure Cyprus to withdraw helicopters," Eleutherotypia, Athens, Greece, January 28, 2002; Φάνης Κωνσταντινίδης, "Παρέμ- 

βαση Κυπριάνο κατά παρέμβαση του "Ελευθεροτυπία, Αθήνα, 29 Ιανουαρίου 2002, Fanis Con- 

stantinidis, "Clerides intervention against 'pressures'," Eleutherotypia, Athens, Greece, January 29, 2002;

These include 1,000 French-made 112 mm APILAS and 1,000 RPG-7V 85 mm of CIS origin. Defense Bible 2001-2002, p. 103.

Intelligence gathering efforts involve the use of resources of other national actors. Cyprus and Israel quietly settled an incident when two Israeli nationals were arrested for espionage directed against a National Guard base (their activities included eavesdropping on National Guard tactical wireless communications). Israel assured the Cyprus government that this activity was not directed against Cypriot national security. Both Greece and Turkey are enhancing their capabilities for obtaining commercial satellite imagery feeds from systems such as Spot and IKONOS. Δρ. Κώστας Τσίπης, "Οι καρέκλες του τον τηλεπικοινωνιακό δορυ- 

φόρο από τη Ελληνική συμφωνία για τον πρώτο Ελληνικό τηλεπικοινωνιακό δορυ- 

φόρο>, Τεύχος 84, Επικοινωνιές Α.Ε., Αθήνα, Σεπτέμβριος 2001, σ. 42, Strategy, "The agreement for the first Greek telecommunications satellite was signed," Issue No. 84, Communications S.A., Athens, Greece, September 2001, p. 42.
The UK bases have been used for the support of UN peace operations since the 1963-1964 Cyprus Crisis. Although under existing treaties these bases can be used only for military activities, the bases were utilized for the evacuation of foreign nationals and indigenous refugees during the 1974 Turkish invasion. Royal Navy warships also crossed the cordon of the Turkish naval invasion forces in 1974, and assisted with the evacuation of foreign nationals from the island. Placing commercial vessels under the protection of a national flag that cannot be effectively challenged by a sea blockade will be akin to the re-flagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers with U.S. flags for transiting the Persian Gulf during the 1987-1988 stage of the Iraq-Iran conflict. Those Kuwaiti tankers were accorded considerable U.S. Navy protection.

Essentially, this may amount to a repeat experience of the Cuban refugees during the Mariel boat lift to the Florida coast, or the Germans fleeing the German Democratic Republic shortly before the collapse of the Berlin Wall.


At the height of the fighting during the 1974 crisis the Turkish Cypriot authorities in Nicosia never interrupted the flow of water from their side, while the Cypriot authorities maintained the flow of electricity to the Turkish Cypriot sector of the city.
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Weston is pressuring [them] to hurry,


The U.S. want a comprehensive solution by June,


De Soto is now calling for help,


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