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A STUDY OF JOINT TRANSFORMATION AT UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND

BY

COLONEL LORRAINE E. TYACKE United States Army

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Professor Douglas Johnson Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

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One of the biggest challenges to the Services as they begin the twenty-first century is to undergo transformation. Congress and the nation are demanding the Services prove their relevance. This requires each Service to review its role and ability to perform the missions assigned, and to look at efficiencies that would allow them to perform better. As this race for relevance continues, United States Joint Forces Command faces the unique challenge of looking at its role of joint trainer, integrator, experimenter and provider.

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PREFACE

I am extremely grateful to several people who took time from their busy schedules to assist me with this paper. First, to COL Cortez Dial who started with me down a particular path on this SRP, and when the road changed, assisted me in getting on track painlessly. Even after he was no longer my advisor, he still insisted on reviewing my work and was always helpful in giving me ideas on where to go for additional information and research. Next, to Professor Patricia Pond and Ms. Lisa Bsales of the Communicative Arts Program for their expertise with a few tenuous parts of this paper. Also to Mr. Shawn Mosholder whose patience was greatly appreciated as he helped this computer challenged officer work through formatting the SRP. To my project advisor, Professor Douglas Johnson for his guidance and depth of knowledge, I offer my gratitude. My most sincere and eternal thanks go to Colonel Dan Bolger of U.S. Joint Forces Command for his sage advice, counsel and mentorship. Dan is a great friend and his help on this project will be forever cherished. His technical expertise, his hands-on knowledge of U.S. JFCOM's journey with transformation, his depth of understanding of systems, his valuable suggestions and his untiring efforts cannot be understated. Thanks also goes to another great officer, formerly of Joint Forces Command, who gave me assistance from time to time, LCDR Eddie Breault. And finally, I have to thank my husband, Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army Retired) Emery Tyacke, for whom I could count on when I needed it most.

A STUDY OF JOINT TRANSFORMATION AT UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND

A FRAMEWORK FOR JOINT TRANSFORMATION

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinsheki said, "to get a "GO" in Army Transformation one needs to know the Army Vision, Why the Army Needs to Change and The Army is People."¹ He asked all his senior leaders to support his effort towards transformation of the Army as a service. In this chapter I will discuss how United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has used a similar approach to joint transformation.

United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) was established in 1998 by the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for experimentation design, preparation, execution and assessment. Its mission was to ensure unity of effort and continuity for joint concept development and experimentation. At the end of 1998, USACOM drafted a Joint Vision Master Implementation Plan charting a way ahead. In October 1999, U.S. Atlantic Command was officially designated United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). By 2000, JFCOM had completed its Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan, built around the ideas identified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in *Joint Vision 2020* (JV2020).

In General Shinseki's formula, the vision comes first. *JV2020* supplied that. Built on the older *JV2010*, *JV2020* recognizes "the importance of technology and technical innovation of further experimentation, exercises, analysis and conceptual thought. *JV2020*'s focus is in the areas of information operations, joint command and control and multinational and interagency operations."²

With the Chairman's vision in hand, the Commander in Chief Joint Forces Command (CINC, JFCOM), General William F. "Buck" Kernan, clearly identified the need for change. There were many reasons, but the interaction of the world situation (even before 11 September 2001) and advances in technology encouraged a thorough reconsideration of traditional joint warfighting measures. This was the same kind of logic that drove General Shinseki's thinking in Army Transformation.

Such considerations were not unique to the year 2000 or to General Kernan. A reformer of the 1970s military, Army General (Ret) Donn Starry wrote, "change is a constant for Today's Armed Forces. With frequently shifting requirements as well as advancing technology, it is imperative that any reforms contribute to a force's ability to operate on the battlefield."³ Kernan acknowledged Starry's wisdom. In fact, Kernan stated time and time again that JFCOM's main focus would always remain on warfighting. The command and the U.S. Armed Forces would change if that change improved warfighting, however neither would change just for the sake of change.

General Kernan headed his command down a path to transformation. Like the generalized requirements outlined in General Donn Starry's article "To Change an Army," JFCOM would need to change itself. The CINC chose to do it from within.

A VISION FOR TRANSFORMATION

Following several of the processes identified in the book *Leading Change* by author John P. Kotter, the CINC first created a "guiding coalition." He decided that a single directorate should manage transformation strategy for the command. The CINC directed a split of the J8, Strategy, Requirements and Integration Directorate. He created a separate Strategy Directorate, the J5. Until 1999, the J5 had done traditional war planning for the Atlantic region. With the conversion to JFCOM, that role became very limited, and had been absorbed into the J3. Now, with a new area of responsibility known as transformation, Kernan chose to reestablish the J5. He himself had been the J5 at U.S. Special Operations Command, so he knew the power and advantages of the position. The J5 would provide the core of the guiding coalition described by Kotter.

Kernan hand-selected Colonel Dan Bolger, a former Infantry Brigade Commander with recent experience in a forward deployed environment. This officer had previously served as a speechwriter for the Army Chief of Staff. He was a published, author who had written several books on Army Systems, and he also served previously with the CINC as his Division G3, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. In addition to understanding the CINC's thinking, Bolger had almost a year of experience in JFCOM J8. He knew the command and the joint world.

The CINC allowed his new Director to review the records of joint officers who had advanced degrees in planning, doctrine writing, information management, operational research and systems analysis, and law of land warfare expertise. The CINC directed his Deputy, Navy Vice Admiral Marty Mayer, Chief of Staff Air Force Major General Jack Holbein, and the new J5 to approve each assignment. Each officer selected was known to be an accomplished planner and strategic thinker, who had demonstrated intellectual prowess and staff brilliance. They were all graduates of specialty schools like the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the Advanced Strategic Air Mobility Course (ASAMC), and the Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP), or their respective senior service school. The CINC's charter to this team was simple: infuse joint forces with new ideas, and change the way JFCOM will fight.

The collective experience of the new Directorate at the tactical, operational, and strategic level set the foundation for the new Directorate. The CINC knew he needed to change the culture of JFCOM, and there was a sense of urgency to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To do this, the CINC built consensus by calling in his senior leaders and briefing them on his intent. He encouraged everyone to look at what we were currently doing, and focus on changing where required in order to bring about a successful JFCOM transformation. He encouraged innovative thinking and made it clear that it needed to occur at all levels. Working from the J5 core, Kernan had begun to build a guiding coalition on the Kotter model.

Like General Shinseki in Army Transformation, General Kernan thought that it was important to know why change is necessary. Even though it has been over 10 years since the end of the Cold War and the United States no longer faces a Communist Bloc enemy, the country continues to face new threats. On 1-2 November, 2000, in a speech given to a USJFCOM flag/general officer session, Kernan said,

"Think of the endless succession of wars and rumors of war which have kept us in harm's way. The roll call is long: Aden, the Adriatic Sea, Albania, Bosnia, Colombia, Haiti, Iraq, Korea, Kosovo, Liberia, the Persian Gulf, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, the Sinai, the Taiwan Straits, East Timor. Any way you cut it, the world remains a very dangerous place. So we have to keep a watchful eye. Like they say in the old Oriental curse, we do indeed live in interesting times."⁴

With this challenge in sight, drawing on the Chairman's *JV2020*, the CINC established his vision for JFCOM. The vision process consists of "examining the organizational environment, projecting likely future states of the organization and developing a desired end state."⁵ Kernan weighed these factors and shared ideas with his senior leaders to formulate the JFCOM vision.

JFCOM's vision statement, reads, "JFCOM leads the transformation of the United States Armed Forces to achieve full spectrum dominance as described in Joint Vision 2020."⁶ As advocate for the unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs), and in partnership with the Services, JFCOM intended to develop concepts, experiment with them, educate joint leaders and train joint forces in these concepts, and make integrated joint recommendations on how to improve. If JFCOM did the job well, they would do their part in transformation.

A TRANSFORMATIONAL MISSION

To meet the requirements of *JV2020*, JFCOM had to find ways to integrate the joint aspects of doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development, personnel and facilities. In achieving full spectrum dominance, a joint team has to go in to a fight and win against any enemy, and in any kind of mission. There are four aspects to the range of "full

spectrum" dominance: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimension protection. Influential factors like innovation and information superiority would speed evolution.⁷ The joint warfighters and JFCOM's service partners would measure success. JROC would be the forum and they would use the standards in the Universal Joint Task List as the metrics. They would keep JFCOM on track and on pace while moving in the right direction. With the command's vision in place, JFCOM needed a new mission statement. The CINC approved this one:

"JFCOM maximizes the Nation's future and present military capabilities through joint concept development and experimentation, recommending joint requirements, advancing interoperability, conducting joint training, and providing ready CONUS-based forces and capabilities to support other CINCs, the Atlantic theater, and domestic requirements."⁸

Some of the key words in the mission statement were derived from the tasks given by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1999 Unified Command Plan. Other ideas came from tasks that General Kernan derived himself, such as the thought that the "future" deserved first billing over the "present."

The mission statement reflected a systematic and disciplined approach to thinking about the command's way ahead. After days of deliberation the following were identified as key objectives, and were embedded in the mission statement:

-Chief Advocate for jointness: JFCOM would speak for the joint warfighters in partnership with the Services. To allow for the widest range of operations for the National Command Authority, joint operations needed to be as coherent and capable as possible.

-Future and present relevance: This is an important idea, because JFCOM had to balance today's demands and tomorrow's needs. Whatever JFCOM did in daily operations as a regional command and force provider, could serve as a laboratory to provide feedback and inform all transformation activities.

-Joint concept development and experimentation: JFCOM's work must strengthen Service efforts, tying them together with sound joint warfighting doctrine. Joint doctrine has to reflect the best abilities of the services through a rigorous examination of those capabilities and the most effective ways in which they may be employed to complement one another. Rigorous simulation and gaming must be pursued in response to new or emerging technologies and concepts.

-Joint requirements: JFCOM should experiment, train and work with CINC warfighters, Service components and Service partners. If the command identified joint matters that could not be resolved by updated procedures or minor hardware or software fixes, the CINC had to

identify these new mission needs into the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). JFCOM specifically targeted some high pay off joint requirements such as combat identification, theater air and missile defense, the Global Information Grid and Information Dissemination Management.

-Advancing interoperability: Interoperability allowed joint and combined operations to succeed under pressure. It can be improved with technical fixes, procedural adjustments, and shared experiences. Lessons learned from every joint training event, experiment, and actual operation had to be documented. Then, lessons were to be evaluated and practical solutions proposed.

-Joint training: Because the JFCOM CINC believed that how forces fight is more important than specific weapons, the command determined to build on the excellence that characterizes U.S. joint forces. General Kernan planned to build transformation on the strength of quality training. That idea has been seized upon by the Department of Defense in their publication *The Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training*. In it, the vision for training transformation closely mirrors General Kernan's vision, to wit: "Provide dynamic, capabilities-based training for the Department of Defense in support of national security requirements across the full spectrum of service, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations."⁹

-Providing ready CONUS-based forces and capabilities: Most of the conventional forces in the Continental United States fell under the combatant command of JFCOM. Together, forces and capabilities offered the muscles to meet the needs of our other CINCs. As JFCOM transformed, those improved organizations and capabilities can be sent to serve the other CINCs.

-Security of the Atlantic Theater: For the command and the United States, the political and economic importance of the Trans-Atlantic link demanded continued attention. Iceland, Greenland, the Azores, and Bermuda constituted vital ground, and the Atlantic sea-lanes are critical to the well being of many countries, including the U.S. The CINC's other title as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for NATO kept him interested in that area of responsibility. It also ensured a coalition aspect to transformation, and allowed an active theater to try out new ideas. This part of the mission was destined to go elsewhere at some point in the future, but in the meantime, the CINC had to use it to the advantage of JFCOM.

-Domestic requirements: In support to civil authorities, JFCOM provided forces and capabilities as directed and played limited roles – which expanded dramatically after the events of 11 September 2001 – in counter-drug operations, ground and sea defense of North America,

and specified assistance to federal, state, and local authorities. In order to help civil officials manage the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced high explosive incidents the command developed specialized expertise that proved vital in the security of the homeland.¹⁰ Like the Atlantic, this set of tasks would not remain with JFCOM in future years, but it certainly demanded its due after 11 September. Additionally, there was opportunity to use these mission areas to try out transformational ideas.

THE QUESTION OF FUNDING FOR TRANSFORMATION

In carrying out the tasks in the new mission statement, JFCOM's CINC recognized the importance that resources – including forces, money, and time – would play. Kernan had authority over most of the general purpose forces in the continental United States, and he had sufficient training time to do experiments and exercises.¹¹ But funding was not so easily addressed, and transformation surely had costs associated.

Funding was by far the toughest nut to crack. Traditional defense budgeting allocated almost all money to the Services, with only a small amount for joint headquarters. In fact, each joint headquarters like JFCOM had a Service sponsor to administer the small amount of budget actually allocated. The Navy backed up Kernan's command, and the annual budget amounted to a few hundred million.¹² Until now, all of that money had gone to routine command activity. No big cash flow arrived to energize transformation. So Kernan faced a problem: how to pay for it?

Two options existed. The first, and more difficult, involved working with the Chairman, the Services, and the civilian defense leadership to convince them to carve out money for joint transformation. The second, and initially more appealing idea, was to ask for a separate budget program line – basically, an independent source of money. The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) had done just that in 1989, and essentially had their own budget Major Force Program 11.¹³

Resolving these options would not be simple. All Services have been working on transformation, with Shinseki's Army Transformation a prime example. But in addition to upgrading capabilities within the Service, each must also balance its many other missions. Large as the U.S. military is, the country cannot afford to have separate forces for regional warfighting, contingency operations, domestic problems, training, and transformation.¹⁴ Allowing resources to improve the joint environment had moral support in each Service, but the Services only had so much funding. JFCOM had to get in line, and it was already a long line for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

This was not a new dilemma. In 1985, General John W. Vessey, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an article for *Defense Magazine* referred to the CINCs of the unified commands as "on the front line of deterrence. CINCs need to be able to fight our wars and to win them decisively. CINCs need a combination of authority, necessary information and resources to be able to do this."¹⁵ Since 1985, some things have changed, but not the basic disconnect.

To be blunt, the operational command line did not match the resourcing line. Operational command flowed from the President to the Secretary of Defense. Orders were passed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff even though he does not have command over the CINCs, to the CINCs of the unified commands.¹⁶ All CINCs extract their mission from external guidance, through the lens of their own peculiar circumstances. They don't create the missions, they adopt them. Transforming JFCOM was implicit in its mission statement.

Resources follows a different course. Money flows from Congress, to the President, to the Office of Management and Budget, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to the Military Departments, and in their sponsor role, to the unified commands. What is interesting is the limited role of the Chairman and the CINCs in the resource allocation process. This was very important as Kernan sought funds for transformation.

Others had thought through Kernan's problem. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act culminated several years of Congressional focus on defense reorganization issues. One of the major purposes of this legislation was to strengthen the CINCs "to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and to ensure that the authority of the unified and specified commanders is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders."¹⁷ The operational chain strengthened considerably. Resources improved, but the Service's needs clearly continued to dominate.

Under the 1986 act, the Chairman was given the role of looking at budget proposals and program recommendations of the military Services to ensure priorities of the CINCs were included. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) took this role for the Chairman formally in 1996. Led by the Vice Chairman and Service Vice Chiefs, the JROC gave strong consideration to CINC needs and met regularly with them.¹⁸

Although the JROC created progress in affording the CINCs an opportunity to strengthen their role in the defense resource decision-making processes, the military Services continue as the major players in key resource allocation decisions. The ultimate objective of PPBS is to "provide the operational commanders in chief the best mix of forces, equipment and support

attainable within fiscal constraints."¹⁹ Would the JROC and PPBS combine to meet JFCOM's needs for joint transformation?

Kernan had his staff assess his roles in seeking funding. The CINC roles have been identified as follows: during the planning phase the CINCs are to advise the Chairman during development of the Joint Strategic Planning Document (the outline of what's needed) and to submit recommendations to Secretary of Defense for major changes to the existing Defense Planning Guidance (the programming blueprint). CINCs can comment on the Defense Planning Guidance and can meet with the military JROC and the civilian-led Defense Resource Board to discuss their views and recommendations.²⁰ This had been an active collaboration for JFCOM since its redesignation in 1999, and Kernan knew that the JROC looked favorably on transformation initiatives.

During the programming phase, the interaction between the CINCs and Military Departments is through Service Component Commanders. Each CINC identifies his requirements to the Service Commands. Greater participation in the Budget Review and Execution process is realized as a CINC can *reclama* program Budget Decisions, and JFCOM had done so with some success.²¹ CINC's provide their input to the Program Objective Memorandum (POM, the long term funding plan) via their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). These lists represent a list of the highest priority needs of the CINC's.²² That was the theory.

In practice, however, the Services can still vote against CINC input, and the Navy had made it clear that they had limits to their good will as JFCOM's sponsor. And although the Chairman via his Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), reviewed the POM, he would necessarily not know what the Services might have omitted, which reduced the effectiveness of his advice. Some CINCs also believed that the timing of their IPLs was too late to have more than marginal impact on the development of Service programs.²³ For General Kernan, trusting in the JROC meant trusting in the Services.

Trusting the Services was risky. True, fiscal pressures would ensure some kind of change, but would the Services defend their own major weapon systems and force structure at the expense of each other and the joint community?²⁴ With each Service concentrating on their own transformation efforts, not to mention all their other roles, CINC JFCOM had reason for concern.

So, the CINC, a former SOCOM J5, asked the question: should JFCOM ask for special compensation like Special Operations Command? Should Kernan's organization operate its own budget for joint transformation?

SOCOM offered an interesting alternative to the frustrating JROC drill. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act set the stage for special operations forces to reorganize starting with its inception in 1986. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 (sometimes called the Nunn-Cohen Act) amended GNA and added Section 167 to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which mandated creation of a unified command for special operations forces, now known as SOCOM. The legislation called for a new major force program category within the DOD Five Year Defense Program. This force program reflected a DOD force mission and contained the resources needed to achieve it.²⁵ Additional legislation was added into the Defense Authorization Act for 1988 that required the Secretary of Defense to provide sufficient resources to USCINCSOC to carry out the duties and responsibilities assigned to him.²⁶

SOCOM continued to press for its own program and budget authority with much opposition from the Pentagon. The Services did not want SOCOM to erode the PPBS process. It took almost an additional two years before the Acting Secretary of Defense finally issued a memorandum on January 24, 1989 assigning the responsibilities for programming, budgeting and execution of Major Force Program 11 to CINC SOCOM.²⁷ After a long fight and significant help from Congress, the authority was finally in place for SOCOM to assume full control of its own budget.

SOCOM had to set up programming and budget procedures and systems, establish databases; revalidated the elements of the program, obtain support agreements from other Department of Defense activities; and finally had to develop and submit their first POM. They met with resistance from the Services who didn't want to provide required information.²⁸ Having lived through it in SOCOM, General Kernan knew that story very well. Even with Congress and Secretary of Defense authority, SOCOM had a tough time carving out their own budget lane.

Other CINCs, to include Kernan's predecessors, had been queried previously as to whether they wanted separate budgets to be established. The majority came back stating they did not have the requisite expertise or the manpower to manage their own budget. As they were already taxed with critical personnel shortfalls, they would have to increase or shift personnel from areas that supported their primary mission of warfighting and most were unwilling to do this. Previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also stated that separate budgets should not be established. The Chairman that General Kernan served, General Hugh Shelton, who had been the SOCOM CINC, definitely did not support a CINC budget for Kernan or any other CINC.²⁹ He preferred to use the JROC approach to get resources to the CINCs, to include funds for transformation.

Another proposal offered to give each CINC a small discretionary fund. One of the main reasons for proposing this was to ensure the availability of operations and maintenance funds for required joint exercises. Too often it was found that CINCs were forced to reduce planned joint exercises because the Services had used programmed funds to cover unexpected Service exercise costs.³⁰ This proposal did not gain any consensus among the CINCs. For Kernan at JFCOM, the failure of this proposal meant that the choices remained to either work through the JROC or try to use the SOCOM model of a separate budget.

Kernan weighed the evidence and recommendations. With a few exceptions, and none at the senior level, his staff recommended the JROC option.³¹ The JFCOM directors pointed out that by having the Services endorse and fund each JFCOM joint transformation initiative, this ensured the Service participation needed to increase jointness. Kernan determined that JFCOM would not press trying to "break out" of the JROC under PPBS.

This difficult decision favored teamwork over guaranteed funding, but in the end, it was the right strategic choice. Joint warfare and joint transformation depend on Service teamwork. By going with the JROC, the CINC effectively added the Services to his guiding coalition for joint transformation.

ORGANIZING FOR TRANSFORMATION

Within JFCOM, Kernan took action to institutionalize a Kotter-type guiding coalition. The CINC initiated a two-tier strategic planning forum consisting of a Strategic Planning Board and Strategic Planning Council. The board gathered captains and colonels under the oversight of the JFCOM chief of staff, with the J5 as secretary and agenda driver. The board developed options. The higher council featured the CINC himself and the flag-level directors – it actually made decisions. Modeled on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Requirements Board (JRB) and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) that Kernan had chosen to use to get resources for joint transformation, these organizations allowed for free and full exchange of ideas related to the command's changing roles.

The Strategic Planning Board had to devise, and the Strategic Planning Council had to approve short and long-term goals and objectives. As this effort commenced, it became obvious that the command needed a resource scheduling method that matched well with PPBS.

To provide a predictable pattern for planning and execution (much like PPBS at the Joint Chiefs of Staff JRB/JROC echelon), the command formulated a regular schedule of transformational activities that tied together ongoing exercises with proposed experiments. This two-year model was known as the Concept/Experimentation/Training/Assessment (CETA)

cycle. This CETA cycle consists of major exercises like *Millennium Challenge/Olympic Challenge*, scoping Limited Objective Experiments like *Unified Vision* and folding the *Unified Endeavor* Joint Task Force command post exercise into the field experimentation effort.³²

Concepts acted to start the CETA cycle. While the *JV2020* construct offered the four ideas of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimension protection, that group of four did not in itself constitute a joint operational concept of war. Two principle aspects were found to be missing from full spectrum dominance: rapidity and decisiveness. To unite the *JV2020* ideas with an overarching joint concept for combat, the command developed the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). Rapid meant getting to the battle in a week and decisive meant the U.S. had to break the coherence of the enemy.

Defining RDO is an on-going effort. RDO results in nonlinear operations, both kinetic and nonkinetic effects, spread across the width and depth of the battlefield. Rather than massing forces in space, RDO masses effects at the right time. Against today's networked, dangerous, and unconventional threats, that promises better results than traditional World War II-style joint operations.

Four tenets of RDO have been identified: Simultaneity, Adaptivity, Initiative, and Cohesion.³³ Simultaneity means that operations will impact on the enemy in a single pulse, not a sequence of slowly developing phases. Adaptivity refers to the ability to stay ahead of the enemy by anticipating and preempting the opposition's efforts. Initiative reminds all that in RDO, the U.S. will set the conditions for combat at its own preferred time and place. Finally, cohesion states the force will be truly joint, trained and equipped to work together, rather than a loose, ad-hoc collection of deconflicted single-service outfits.

As a joint concept for operations RDO will be used as the integrating construct for JFCOM's first set of major transformational experiments and exercises. In other words, RDO started the CETA cycle.³⁴ In this, General Kernan built on known Army experience. As General Donn Starry learned in changing the 1970s Army, "changes proposed must be subjected to trials. Their relevance must be convincingly demonstrated to a wide audience by experimentation and experience and necessary modifications must be made as a result."³⁵ Those trials have begun, both at JFCOM on actual battlefields in Central Asia and the Philippines.

MOVING OUT TOWARD TRANSFORMATION

It is clear that from a leadership perspective, JFCOM earned a "GO" in Transformation. Much like the Army under General Shinseki, JFCOM under General Kernan followed a sound

approach. The command understood the Vision. They knew the reason why change was required and they knew that JFCOM and joint transformation was about people. The Chairman's *JV2020* Plan was the catalyst that guided JFCOM's efforts. But actions within the command translated that first push into real momentum.

General Kernan, as a strategic leader of the organization, exhibited and encouraged conceptual competencies such as critical thinking, systems thinking, managing change, and a need to be aware of the organizational culture. The CINC provided his vision. He reminded all that not only must they deal in the present, but also they had to look to the future. Kernan used group processes effectively, like his Strategic Planning Board and Council. He personally led the change to include the tough decision to embrace the JROC rather than seek a separate budget. Those decisions made a difference.

Kernan also added the right personal touch. He challenged JFCOM members to be professionals, to use moral reasoning in their approach to warfighting and to embed proven practices and concepts into the culture. Paul Kotter said, "vision clarifies direction for change, motivates people to take action in the right direction and helps coordinate efforts which all lead to successful transformation."³⁶ By Kotter's standards, JFCOM under General Kernan appears to be headed for success.

TRANSFORMATION AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

"On September the eleventh, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars – but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war – but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks – but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day – and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack."³⁷

The transformational concept of rapid decisive operations made an unexpectedly quick transition from laboratory to battlefield as a result of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In the aftermath of the Al-Qaeda airliner strikes that devastated the World Trade Centers in New York and blew out one side of the Pentagon, combatant CINCs needed new answers for a new kind of war. In his address of 20 September 2001, President George W. Bush promised a war unlike any other...

"This war will not look like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with its decisive liberation of territory and its swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on television, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime."³⁸

U.S. Joint Forces Command was ready to help deliver on that promise.

The Command's transformational work to date proved helpful. In May 2001, General Kernan's experimenters had run *Unified Vision* 2001, a limited objective effort that focused on a nonlinear rapid decisive operation waged against a terrorist threat in the Middle East. The primary partner for *Unified Vision* had been United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).³⁹ Now the U.S. Central Command had a real mission, and the example of the *Unified Vision* experiment became the model for key parts of Central Command's war in Afghanistan.

In *Unified Vision*, four key insights had emerged regarding rapid decisive operations. The experiment stressed the importance of a standing joint force headquarters, the need for full integration of all Federal agencies, the value of an operational net assessment of the enemy, and the utility of effects-based operations.⁴⁰ While none of these ideas had been fully developed, they had been introduced and tested against a simulated enemy not unlike the Al-Qaeda and their Taliban Afghan sponsors. The experiment suggested that against this unusual and dangerous enemy, transformational methods were not only desired, but essential.

U.S. Central Command's role in Operation *Enduring Freedom* vindicated the experimental findings. Led by General Tommy Franks, Central Command built a very small forward command team with a lot of "reach- back" to the overall headquarters in Tampa, Florida. This exactly mirrored the *Unified Vision* experience with small standing joint force headquarters well forward tied by modern computer technology to fixed facilities safely out of theater.⁴¹

In a similar vein, the importance of trained, well-practiced Interagency links became formalized in the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). Know as "J-X" in *Unified Vision*, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group in *Enduring Freedom* became the central clearing-house for bringing to bear diplomatic, informational, military, and economic aspects of national power.⁴² The resultant unity of effort in theater allowed unprecedented cooperation between intelligence agencies, diplomats, and joint force commanders. The key was that the Joint Interagency Coordination Group worked for the CINC, not for the parent agencies in unresponsive distinct stove-pipes. This had proved crucial in defeating "Red" in the May 2001 experiment, and it worked well against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan.

Understanding the terrorist enemy did not come easy. Forces had to fight for intelligence and work to develop human and technical sources. It was not a matter of counting tanks and airplanes, although that happened. Rather, non-traditional threads like bank transactions and Internet site "hits" had to be researched and analyzed in order to see the enemy as a whole. This had been called "operational net assessment" during *Unified Vision* 2001, and U.S. Central Command adopted this transformational technique to try to identify the AI-Qaeda and Taliban strengths and weaknesses.⁴³ U.S. Central Command's operations, and indeed the wider national campaign, spent much effort confirming and developing this comprehensive intelligence pictures, so much so that news media pundits fretted over lack of measurable, traditional progress by late October of 2001. Then came the collapse of Taliban resistance at Mazer-I-Sharif and, in short order, throughout Afghanistan.⁴⁴ For JFCOM experimenters, the intelligence-based "war within the war" underlined the value of creating a holistic operational net assessment and then playing it out. U.S. Central Command leaders certainly agreed.

Intelligence gradually became clearer in Afghanistan, just as it had in the *Unified Vision* experiment. But what to do about it? The best intelligence in the world meant nothing if it did not lead to effective action—much of it not military or destructive in nature. The May 2001 experiment suggested a strong need for "effects-based operations," focused on getting results rather than gaining ground or killing enemy soldiers.⁴⁵ Once the effects were determined, any and all means of national power – diplomatic, informational, economic, and military – would be used in the most effective combination. U.S. Central Command embraced this concept whole-heartedly in Afghanistan, mixing propaganda, bribery, precision strikes, and close combat in order to disrupt and then break Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in short order.⁴⁶ Once more, a transformational idea proved to be a winner.

The successes of Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan have recently been extended to the Philippines, where selected United States advisors are backing local forces against the Abu Sayef terrorist group.⁴⁷ Not surprisingly, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is also making good use of transformational ideas like standing joint force headquarters, the interagency coordinating group, operational net assessment, and effects-based operations. The situation is surely different, and one size does not fit all. But the techniques remain valid, the first fruits of JFCOM transformation. Spurred by the ongoing war, General Kernan's vision is becoming reality.

In President Bush's memorable remarks of 20 September, he commented, "This is not however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the

world's fight. This is civilization's fight...We will rally the world to this cause, by our efforts and by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail."⁴⁸ Neither will U.S. Joint Forces Command. Through its efforts in the current war on terrorism, JFCOM has shown that concepts/ideas looked at in its transformation, have merit on today's battlefields. With continued focus, transformation can prepare us to be ever vigilant as we face even greater challenges in the future.

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