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**TRANSFORMING MILITARY OVERSEAS PRESENCE
TO DETER AND PREVENT ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The end of the cold war has brought many changes to the geopolitical landscape of the world. Advances in information technology have revolutionized global communications and commerce. These advances have enhanced terrorist networks command and control and financing of their operations. Combined with covert operations, these technological advances have contributed to the world witnessing a rise in terrorism on a scale never before imagined; as demonstrated on 11 September 2001. One of the most dangerous terrorist organizations, Al Qaeda, was established in 1990 and has been growing and evolving ever since. This paper argues that the military presence overseas must transform, and integrate better with the interagency, to deter and defeat terrorist networks. As the military contemplates transformation, it is critical to establish a joint operational concept before deciding how to restructure forces and design equipment. The war on terrorism is unlike any war the United States has experienced. U.S. success in this war will depend on all of the elements of national power being synchronized by the interagency. The United States cannot allow failed nation states to become safe harbors for terrorist organizations of global reach. Nation states that provide nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or technology to terrorists are an even greater threat that must be deterred, or defeated if deterrence fails. A strong military presence overseas, along with an engaging foreign and economic policy, will enable the United States to effectively demonstrate its commitment to regional stability and defeating terrorist networks. Moreover, the U.S. will need a seamless intelligence network, stronger interagency collaboration, and greater international cooperation to prevent asymmetric attacks. Additionally, a forward military presence will provide critical military-to-military (mil-to-mil) relationships and a base of operations to rapidly respond to a crisis or prevent a terrorist attack. As the National Security Strategy is developed for the war on terrorism and beyond, the analysis of ends, ways, and means will determine the regional priority for the type and quantity of military forces overseas.

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TRANSFORMING MILITARY OVERSEAS PRESENCE TO DETER AND PREVENT ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

INTRODUCTION

The geopolitical landscape of the world has been changing rapidly since the end of the cold war. The structure, roles, and missions of U.S. military forces and the interagency process have not kept pace with this change. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have given the armed services and Department of Defense a renewed sense of urgency towards transforming the military. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated: "Transformation cannot wait. New threats have arrived, quite literally at our doorstep – and other, more dangerous, threats are rapidly emerging. We must act now to prepare for the next war, even as we wage the current war against terrorism."¹ A RAND study on *Future Directions for U.S. Military Overseas Presence*, presents a good discussion on the nature of this geopolitical change and the uncertainty of its outcome:

The likelihood of great, continuing change in world affairs is due to the expectation that the individual building blocks of the international system all seem destined for major upheavals. For example, political values are changing in response to the discrediting of communism and to the emerging tug-of-war among democracy, nationalism, ethnicity, and Islamic theocracy. The global security system is changing as bipolarity gives way to a new but murky multipolarity in all three regions. Old powers are fading, but new ones are rising. A new, fluid geopolitics may be emerging that changes how the big powers, the medium powers, and the small powers relate to each other. The world economy is also changing in response to new technologies and market dynamics, but its destination is very unclear because prosperity is likely to be distributed unevenly. Military affairs are changing in response to new technologies, doctrines, and force structures. Global communications are changing in ways that allow for the instantaneous dissemination of information almost everywhere. Underlying these trends are even more fundamental changes. The nation-state is changing: Its authority appears to be eroding and transnational dynamics are becoming more prevalent. Equally important, society and culture are also changing in both the developed world and the underdeveloped world.²

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001, highlights a more disturbing and growing geopolitical trend of a diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors. "The attacks against the U.S. Homeland in September 2001 demonstrate that terrorist groups possess both the motivations and capabilities to conduct devastating attacks on U.S. territory, citizens, and infrastructure. Often these groups have the support of state sponsors or enjoy sanctuary and protection of states, but some have the resources and capabilities to operate without state sponsorship. In addition, the rapid proliferation of chemical biological, radiological,

nuclear, and enhanced high explosive (CBRNE) technology gives rise to the danger that future terrorist attacks might involve such weapons.”³

Comprehending these geopolitical changes and their implications for the future structure and missions of the forward deployed military is one the greatest challenges facing the U.S. today. To an even greater extent, it is important for strategic leaders to be cognizant of the improved capabilities of the threat and develop a strategy to defeat it.

This paper will first discuss the changing geopolitical landscape of the world and the implications for the overseas military. It will then provide a background on the evolving terrorist threat. Nation states that provide nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to terrorists are an even greater threat that must be deterred or defeated. This paper argues that the military presence overseas must transform, and integrate better with the interagency, to deter and defeat terrorist networks. It is important to note that this author believes the entire military should transform, however, this paper will focus on the overseas military. The war on terrorism is unlike any war the United States has experienced. A strong military presence overseas, along with an engaging foreign and economic policy, will enable the United States to effectively demonstrate its commitment to regional stability and defeating terrorist networks. Moreover, the U.S. will need a seamless intelligence network, stronger interagency collaboration, and greater international cooperation to prevent asymmetric attacks. U.S. success in this war will depend on all of the elements of national power being synchronized by the interagency.

This paper will discuss the interagency with a focus on intelligence and information operations. An important aspect in preventing asymmetric attacks against the U.S. is understanding the influence of culture on military operations and the value of successful cultural interaction in preventing conflict. This paper will conclude with a discussion on formulating a National Security Strategy for winning the war on terrorism and beyond.

THE TERRORIST THREAT

Understanding the current and future threat capability is imperative when developing operational concepts and capabilities for the U.S. military. As early as 1994, Ralph Peters profoundly identified the threat being faced today in the war on terrorism as “The New Warrior Class.” In his article he states:

The soldiers of the United States Army are brilliantly prepared to defeat other soldiers. Unfortunately, the enemies we are likely to face through the rest of this decade and beyond will not be “soldiers,” with the disciplined modernity that term conveys in Euro-America, but “warriors” – erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers, warriors do not play by our rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not

like. Warriors have always been around, but with the rise of professional soldiers their importance was eclipsed. Now, thanks to a unique confluence of a breaking empire, over cultivated Western consciences, and a worldwide cultural crisis, the warrior is back, as brutal as ever and distinctly better armed.⁴

As the western world evolved and advanced through the 1990s, the "Warrior Class" also evolved and advanced. (As an example of the extent of information advancement, in 1992 there were only 130 Web pages; in 2001, there were over 8 billion Web pages.⁵) Since 1994, this new threat has become more sophisticated. They have become larger, better financed, and better organized. The terrorist networks operate globally and are attempting to further unite globally.⁶ They have developed their own version of an interagency with a CIA-like covert force that operates in sleeper cells in the U.S. and Europe.⁷

Through the use of the Internet and global communications this new threat is operating globally. They have adapted to the environment, and sheltered the extent of their advanced network from the western world. The Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan have trained tens of thousands of terrorists and deployed them worldwide to execute the hostile and violent intent of their leaders.⁸ With the global proliferation of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical weapons of mass destruction, terrorist networks have increased their lethality to a point where they have arguably become the number one threat to U.S. National Security.

Asymmetric warfare is not only reserved for terrorists and countries that support terrorism. The U.S. must also consider countries that provide the technology to develop CBRNE weapons for terrorist organizations and countries that support terrorism. In a recent book written by senior colonels in the Chinese Army entitled *Unrestricted Warfare*, they posit: "Asymmetrical warfare – terrorism, computer hacking, economic sabotage, assassination of U.S. citizens – is the Chinese military's strategy to defeat the United States."⁹ Just as alarming is their suggestion for Beijing to sell technology to make weapons of mass destruction to regimes supporting terrorism as part of a strategy to degrade U.S. national power.¹⁰

The Bush administration is piecing together the policy and strategy to win this war on terrorism. In this process the administration addresses the elements of global power (financing, communications, weapons of mass destruction, and covert operators) the terrorist networks and nation states that support them, are attempting to amass. President Bush states: " We will discover and destroy sleeper cells. We will track terrorist movements, trace their communications, disrupt their funding, and take their network apart, piece-by-piece. Above all, we're acting to end the state sponsorship of terror. Rogue states are clearly the most likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons for terrorists."¹¹

The Bush Administration has determined *what* is needed to win the War on Terrorism. It is now up to military and interagency strategic leaders to determine the ways and means to defeat terrorist networks. The clear and present danger of this lethal and adaptive threat as described above is the basis for transforming the military with a greater sense of urgency. The preponderance of the U.S. military force today is designed to fight large conventional wars of the Cold War era. The U.S. and her allies need forces that are more rapid and decisive in their prosecution of the war on terrorism and beyond.

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

To win the war on terrorism and shape the military for the future, President Bush, in a speech to the cadets at the Citadel, put forth the challenge that the U.S. military must transform quickly.

To win this war, we have to think differently. The enemy who appeared on September 11th seeks to evade our strength and constantly searches for our weaknesses. So America is required once again to change the way our military thinks and fights. And starting on October 7th, the enemy in Afghanistan got the first glimpses of a new American military that cannot, and will not, be evaded. ...This combination -- real-time intelligence, local allied forces, Special Forces, and precision air power -- has really never been used before. The conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the future of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums. ...Preventing mass terror will be the responsibilities of Presidents far into the future. And this obligation sets three urgent and enduring priorities for America. The first priority is to speed the transformation of our military.¹²

Operational Concept: Rapid Decisive Operations

Advances in technology, the newly evolved threat capability, and the war on terrorism has taught the U.S. that the forward deployed military must transform. The force needs to be lighter and more responsive to enable a quick strike on a terrorist cell or a state sponsored site of CBRNE weapons. As the military and the interagency contemplate transformation, it is critical for them to establish a joint operational concept before deciding how to restructure forces and design capabilities. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is conducting experimentation and analytical efforts to describe the future warfighting concepts of how this force will fight. The elusive and adaptive enemy of today and in the future demands that the U.S. military move to the emerging concept known as Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). JFCOM is developing RDO as a joint operational concept for future operations. An important aspect of RDO is that the military is synchronized with the other elements of national power through the interagency in order to achieve the military/political end state. Rapid decisive operations consist of four

mutually supporting characteristics: knowledge-centric warfare, effects-based operations, coherently joint, and fully networked.¹³

Knowledge-centric operations give the U.S. military the ability to leverage the technological advantage of future information systems that provide enhanced situational knowledge of the enemy and friendly forces. This advanced knowledge capability will enable lighter forces to more rapidly and decisively respond with force when terrorist, or state actors supporting terrorism, threaten to attack.¹⁴

Effects-Based Operations (EBO) are philosophical considerations of the military and non-military strategic effects that are desired on an enemy. The desired effect could be physical or psychological. EBO is most effective when the actions of the military are coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with the interagency and international communities in both planning and execution. This teamwork will create the synergy of second and third order effects to help collapse the will and coherency of the enemy.¹⁵

Coherently joint is the concept of designing joint forces and capabilities with interoperability as a prerequisite. Currently the legacy force will require extensive retrofit to enable interoperability. In order to be successful, future joint forces must begin with integrated joint command and control systems, interoperable combat systems, and a coherence of thought and action through joint training and leader development. To achieve full coherence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, interoperability and collaboration must extend to interagency and multinational operations. Additionally, coherently joint operations will require the joint capability at the combatant command level be expanded down to the operational or Joint Task Force Level.¹⁶

Fully networked forces enable planners and operators to share knowledge, plan, decide and act collaboratively and concurrently to accomplish tasks simultaneously. Situational knowledge shared among the joint forces increases the speed and precision of planning and the application of combat power. Fully networked forces develop seamless processes that further increase the speed and effectiveness of planning and execution. A fully networked team must include the interagency and when appropriate multinational partners.¹⁷

These four concepts, when applied simultaneously, will provide the synergy for a lighter, more responsive force to attack elusive terrorist or state sponsored sites of weapons of mass destruction with greater speed and precision. Effects-Based Operations is the key concept in transforming Joint operations. The secret to rapid EBO is the ability of national political, military, economic, and information elements to achieve multiple parallel effects across the entire theater of operations simultaneously and to achieve them faster than the enemy can react. The

advances in technology such as computer-based collaborative planning capabilities, smart precision weapons, and global communications and navigation, have significantly increased the capability to be rapid and simultaneous.¹⁸

In framing the debate between threat-based versus a capabilities-based force, as a basis for transformation, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 are taken into account as having demonstrated the reality of the unimaginable. Consistent with Rapid Decisive Operations, a capabilities-based force is best equipped to adapting quickly and decisively to surprise. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld posits: "Instead of focusing on who our next adversary might be or where a war might occur, we must focus on how an adversary might fight – and develop new capabilities to deter and defeat that adversary. ...we must plan for a world of new and different adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception and asymmetric weapons to achieve their objectives."¹⁹

Transformation Recommendation

The U.S. Military should adopt the joint operational concept of Rapid Decisive Operations and then use that concept as a basis for transforming the force. Much of the experimentation for RDO (especially in the Air Force) has already taken place on the battlefields of Afghanistan. The Central Command campaign in Afghanistan has become an ad hoc testing ground for the Air Forces precision targeting, reconnaissance, and command and control technologies.²⁰ One of the more significant achievements towards Air Force transformation in the Afghan campaign has been the decreased sensor to shooter time.

Retired Vice Admiral, Arthur Cebrowski (father of network-centric warfare), the Pentagon's head of force transformation, forecasted the emergence of "sensor-based warfare": "The sensor has moved to a position of primacy. In some areas of warfare, they've always been important, now they are universally important. This is a feature of the information age, we have to start thinking in terms of sensors as elements of maneuver force."²¹ However, Cebrowski warned that reliance on sensors has created risks as well as benefits. U.S. adversaries will respond with suppressed signatures, more mobility, and deception. Cebrowski stated that the Pentagon would manage this risk by focusing research efforts on technologies that broaden the sensor base and increase the cycle time.²²

The Predator is a good example of what is needed in the forward deployed, transformed military, to give it the capability to be more rapid and decisive. This unmanned aerial vehicle is able to circle over enemy forces, gather intelligence, transmit information instantly back to commanders, then fire on targets with extreme accuracy. In the Afghan campaign, the Predator

provided live video feeds to AC-130 gunship crews for immediate target engagements.²³ The use of unmanned vehicles to achieve rapid decisive operations is receiving emphasis from the highest levels. President Bush stated in a defense-oriented speech: "Before the war, the Predator had skeptics, because it did not fit the old ways. Now it is clear the military does not have enough unmanned vehicles. We're entering an era in which unmanned vehicles of all kinds will take on greater importance – in space, on land, in the air, and at sea."²⁴

The U.S. should increase the number of Special Operations forces working with U.S. coalition partners and allies. They can provide coalition partners the synergy of Rapid Decisive Operations as demonstrated in the Afghanistan campaign during the war on terrorism. Accordingly, contingency plans in the Pentagon are being re-examined and senior officers are declaring that relatively small but highly proficient units, operating secretly and equipped with an arsenal all their own (air power), can quickly change the balance of power.²⁵ With the war on terrorism there is an even greater need for Special Operations forces to continue to go to countries and help train their military and work with their Special Operations forces. Moreover, Special Forces are there to gather intelligence, learn the terrain, language, politics and culture of that particular country as a force multiplier for future operations. Additionally, Special Forces establishing mil-to-mil relations enhance future coalition war fighting.

Culturally aware, skilled in the language of the local population, mature and self-reliant, and low profile when needed, the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of the U.S. Special Operations Command and the regional Special Operations Commands supporting each geographical theater are uniquely qualified to make a significant contribution to U.S. ambassadors and their country teams as they seek to enhance the stature of the United States and further U.S. national security interests around the globe.²⁶

Today's friend could be tomorrow's adversary. The U.S. military needs to know the inter-relatedness of their culture and what effects it has on the way they fight. With an elusive enemy, it has become more imperative for the CIA, law enforcement, and Special Forces to work together as a team. Special Operations forces, working with the interagency, will be able to obtain more accurate targeting information on terrorists who have acquired or are planning to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

There will always be a need for conventional forces to combat current and emerging conventional threats. However, conventional forces overseas future responsibility may be more of a supporting role to Special Operations forces to provide logistics, quick reaction forces, search and rescue, medical support, and a base of operations for such things as weapons maintenance and the transfer of intelligence.

Command and Control Challenges

As military doctrine evolves during the war on terrorism and beyond, the lessons of history must not be forgotten. During United Nations Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in Somalia, the tragic events of 3 October 1993, involving Task Force Ranger and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) from the 10th Mountain Division, provide a good case study for the criticality of developing seamless command structures. Special Operations forces, operating under a separate chain of command, were conducting small daylight raids to capture warlord Mohammed Aideed and his lieutenants. The QRF, under the command of U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM), was not aware of Task Force Ranger's mission and consequently was unprepared to conduct extraction operations. This contributed to the tragic deaths of 18 rangers on 3 October 1993. The principle of Unity of Command was violated for Operational Security (OPSEC) and a number of other reasons.²⁷ The pentagon has historically struggled to blend Special Operations forces into joint campaigns. Their distinctive training, peculiar weaponry, unorthodox tactics and culture of secrecy have typically led to complicated chain of command structures as noted above in the Somalia scenario.²⁸ With a renewed emphasis on Special Operations forces in the war on terrorism and beyond, it becomes critical that special and conventional forces are more coordinated and synchronized to achieve success with minimal casualties.

In summary, the elusive and adaptive nature of current and future enemies makes implementing RDO and a corresponding force structure even more urgent. Through the enemy's use of asymmetric tactics the entire world becomes both the rear area and the main battle area. The lines between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war have become blurred. Transforming the military to provide rapidly deployable, lighter, and more lethal forces with a greater emphasis on Special Operations forces, precision guided munitions, UAVs, and a command and control structure that achieves synergy through effects based operations is the right direction for the future military. However, the military will not work in isolation. The effectiveness of U.S. policy will be maximized when the elements of National Power are synchronized by the interagency.

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

The war on terrorism is unlike any war the United States has experienced. This war will rely more on the use of all the elements of national power, and possibly less on the military, than any previous war. President Bush described how America will fight and win the war against terror in a speech to Congress only nine days following the terrorist attacks on

September 11, 2001: "How will we fight and win this war?" We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network."²⁹ Success in this war will depend on all of the elements of national power being synchronized by the interagency.

The Military and the CIA

The military and the CIA have collaborated in many conflicts throughout U.S. history. There were many operations that went well but there were others that did not get beyond either the culture of secrecy prevalent in the CIA or military expediency in conducting combat operations. A good example CIA and military cooperation is Somalia.³⁰ CIA case officers and assets were attempting to locate Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed. The CIA assets were often located in the vicinity of Aideed's forces. The warlord's forces would often conduct mortar attacks against U.S. and UN forces. The U.S. commander supporting the UN mission, understandably often responded to these attacks with counter-battery fire. This put the CIA assets at great risk. Through a close working relationship, the military commander and the case officer were able to develop a system where the CIA asset's position was not compromised and a quiet heads up could be communicated to assets when counter-fire was authorized. This allowed agents to safely depart an area, while still retaining for the military commander the flexibility of responding as he saw fit to individual threats.³¹ There will always be a need to protect sensitive information and agents but the war on terrorism demands greater collaboration and dissemination of information. There are mixed results from the war in Afghanistan.

The CIA operatives are being heavy-handed and very secretive in sharing reconnaissance and intelligence with the military. According to an aerospace industry reconnaissance specialist, "They have forged a working relationship with the special forces teams on the ground. As far as they're concerned, that's it. That's the end of their need for operational coordination." CIA operators are not just gathering information in Afghanistan, they are pulling triggers either directly or through the Special Forces. This is causing problems in coordination with Central Command and there is an appearance of competition in chasing Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorist.³²

The CIA is recovering from a tarnished image after the September 11, 2001 attacks, but the friction as noted above needs to be worked through to realize the full potential of Rapid Decisive Operations in defeating terrorist networks.

Seamless Intelligence

The key to success for the interagency and the transformed military overseas in defeating terrorist organizations is a seamless intelligence network. Prior to September 11, 2001, the Bush administration had been planning in-depth reviews of the U.S. intelligence system that constituted thirteen departments or agencies that provided intelligence. The terrorist attacks brought into sharp focus the nation's intelligence deficiencies: few contacts with foreign nationals who could infiltrate terrorist groups, a failure to communicate between government agencies, and a lack of linguists to decipher intercepted clues.³³ The culture of secrecy that exists in the U.S. intelligence community needs to be reduced to ensure that the operator who needs the intelligence can get it in a timely manner. There are signs of this improving in the Afghan campaign where a Special Forces commander said that his captains and A Teams were getting a lot more information from the CIA than they had ever been given before.³⁴ A rapid and decisive force will only be effective if the intelligence professionals can give them the time and location of this elusive enemy.

The newly emerged enemy does not easily present themselves as targets for conventional or unconventional forces. There are minimal "observables" in this new war on terrorism where imagery and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) become less valuable, and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) becomes the intelligence of choice. Unfortunately, "After the Cold War, the CIA substantially cut back on the number of overseas spies in its directorate of operations, according to lawmakers and intelligence experts. Those who remained often have had to assist U.S. military operations instead of focusing preemptively on areas where terrorism has flourished."³⁵ Establishing positive mil-to-mil relations and conducting combined military exercises (with interagency involvement), can set the conditions for seamless foreign intelligence and military cooperation.

The global war on terrorism dictates the need for greater international intelligence cooperation. However, as important as it is to break down the seams in the U.S. intelligence community, it is equally important to identify and understand where the seams are in the international intelligence community and establishing ways to work around them. Understanding the history and culture of a country can help identify where these seams may occur. As an example:

In Germany, where the 9-11 plots were hatched, law enforcement is a loose patchwork. Fearful of creating another Gestapo, Hitler's secret state police, the Germans after World War II sharply restricted information sharing between local investigators and national prosecutors. These well intentioned safeguards may have stopped the Germans from connecting the dots: Marienstrasse 54, the

apartment shared by chief hijacker Mohamed Atta and several other plotters, was actually under surveillance by German authorities. But the investigation went nowhere, and the investigation was dropped.³⁶

The above example demonstrates that the U.S. needs to have as much emphasis on working with foreign intelligence services as it does on reforming U.S. intelligence services to deter and defeat terrorist networks. The new global threat is more elusive and adaptive than ever before and in order for U.S. forces to be effective in defeating or destroying terrorist networks they will need a seamless intelligence network. This seamless intelligence network must include the interagency, foreign intelligence services and above all else, human intelligence.

Information Campaign

During the Cold War the U.S. interagency had a very active Information Campaign (Office) to help control and broadcast the message of democracy and capitalism to the world.³⁷ This office closed down after the Cold War but has now found new life with the War on Terrorism. In the Eisenhower Executive Office building next to the White House, a Coalition Information Center has been formed.³⁸ Their emphasis has been on starting or creating the story instead of reacting to it. This is consistent with the trend throughout the interagency of becoming more proactive, more preemptive, as opposed to reactive. One of their primary missions and messages is to make the case that the war on terrorism is not a battle of Christianity vs. Islam or West vs. East.³⁹ The Information Campaign must be synchronized with the other elements of national power. From the White House to the State Department, to our allies, to our commanders in mil-to-mil contact with the Afghans, the message must be consistent and easily communicated to be effective. Clearly communicating U.S. policy and intentions through the media, and diplomatic and mil-to-mil channels, is essential to reducing international enmity and possibly terrorist attacks against the United States.

Diplomatic and Foreign Policy Efforts

Military strategy alone will not prevent terrorist attacks against the United States. The Bush administration, using diplomatic and foreign policy efforts, can address the prevention of developing countries from becoming failed states. These efforts need to be synchronized with military operations in the war on terrorism. One of the more challenging aspects of a future National Security Strategy will be how to deal with failed states and reduce their probability of becoming safe harbors for terrorist organizations. If there is not a coherent political-military plan

to prevent states from failing, the military element of power may be used more than desired. In Robert Kaplan's book, *The Coming Anarchy*, he describes the concept of "Proportionalism" as a method to apply foreign policy and foreign aid to prevent developing countries from becoming failed states.

"(Foreign Aid) would be targeted at bread-and-butter region wide programs that seek to slow societal deterioration gradually, in order to create an environment for the emergence of healthier politics. It would not be targeted at making a particular country democratic in the face of a low literacy rate, the absence of a middle class, and a history of ethnic or regional strife. The Washington establishment chants that democracies don't go to war, but what are emerging in many places are pseudodemocracies, societies teetering on ungovernability which hold elections out of desperation rather than as the final step in a process of economic and political development. Reduced emphasis on "democratic elections" would mean a new emphasis instead on population control, women's literacy, and resource-renewal projects. ... Moreover, it has been shown that increased literacy among women reduces the birth rate: literate women exert more power in their relationships with men, control their own lives and those of their children better, and use financial and natural resources more intelligently. Nothing promotes positive social evolution in the Third World more speedily than women's education.⁴⁰

A democracy at all costs approach, has not worked and a new way of thinking is needed in this new global age.⁴¹ A monitored, international, building block approach, is required to minimize the possibility of a state failing. A proportional approach may be part of a policy in establishing a movement away from radical Islamism to reduce the possibility of continued terrorist attacks. In addition to an integrated political-military plan, the military must have a better understanding of the influence of culture in resolving conflict.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CULTURE

It is not enough to transform the military, establish a seamless intelligence network, and improve the collaboration and synchronization of the interagency in defeating terrorist networks. An important aspect in preventing asymmetric attacks against the U.S. is understanding the influence of culture on operations and the value of successful cultural interaction in preventing conflict. The U.S. can continue to learn from historical examples of where conflicts between cultures were mitigated through the military displaying respect and understanding of different cultures.

Understanding the culture will also help military leaders to determine how the enemy will fight, to what extent he will maintain his will to fight, and what tactics are best to defeat him. Military leaders that do not understand the influence of culture are often counter productive to

achieving stability in a region and when conflict develops, are often defeated. The American defeat in Viet Nam is a case in point.

The issue of culture, and certainly its relationship to the American military establishment, has not been a topic for serious study until very recently. But the American defeat in Viet Nam, and the confusions which that engendered, raised widely for the first time the possibility that more than technical power and expertise, or efficacy in personnel recruitment and management, or even the more long-standing issues of strategy and tactics, might influence the outcome of war. Vietnamese history and tradition, religion and worldview, even family relationships, farm practices, and village politics, some how helped in the Vietnamese victory.⁴²

Philippines Case Study

The American military in the Philippines is an excellent case study on how GEN John "Black Jack" Pershing's leadership style led to successful cultural interaction and consequently reduced tensions in the Philippines.⁴³ The Philipinos had many internal cultural differences and the ones most noted for their brutality and violence were the Moros (Islamic Malays) of the southern Philippine islands. The Spanish prior to 1899 never conquered the Moros, and afterwards their religion, of which encouraged death in battle as a means of salvation, presented an enormous challenge for the U.S. military.⁴⁴ GEN Pershing had learned early in his career, working on the Great Plains in the American West, that American Indians responded positively to using their language and respecting their values and customs. In the Philippines, GEN Pershing had only two regiments of Infantry and 36,000 square miles of territory to pacify. He decided to use the same strategy that brought him success working with the American Indians. He found out who the most influential head Moro (*datto*) was and sent him a letter in Arabic requesting an interview. He studied the Moro dialect and would later have meetings with the dattos negotiating without an interpreter in their native tongue. Pershing would visit Moro markets and engage in their eating habits by eating with his fingers from a communal pot. When the dattos would visit his camp he would be careful not to serve food that conflicted with dietary laws. There were times when Pershing did have to fight with the Moros, but having established a baseline of respect he was able to restore a more lasting peace. Pershing's success in both fighting and cooperating with the Moros, as well as his administrative and social successes, promoted his career and national recognition.⁴⁵ The practices of Pershing with the Moros would have a long-lasting effect on the way the military dealt with people of differing cultures. His successful cultural interaction was not unique in the American military experience in the Philippines, but his later fame and high position in the U.S. military establishment makes

its wisdom more significant.⁴⁶ It is clear that cultural interaction can be a force multiplier, especially when we train and fight with our coalition partners.

President Bush emphasized in a speech to the Citadel cadets on the war effort in Afghanistan the importance of culture and adapting old and new technologies together in order to be successful on the modern battlefield.

Our intelligence professionals and Special Forces have cooperated with battle-friendly Afghan forces -- fighters who know the terrain, who know the Taliban, and who understand the local culture. And our special forces have the technology to call in precision air strikes -- along with the flexibility to direct those strikes from horseback, in the first cavalry charge of the 21st century.⁴⁷

Combatant Command Commander in Chiefs have always had the responsibility of being statesmen as well as warriors. Their diplomatic skills are often more important than their military skills in achieving national objectives. Moreover, military relations may be the only avenue of cooperation or open channel of communication when tensions arise between countries. The skilled military-diplomat who establishes relations based on shared military values may be able to minimize conflict between cultures through negotiation. An example of a successful military-diplomat is Marine General Anthony Zinni (prior Central Command commander), who has been given the arduous task by President Bush to be the peace envoy to the Middle East to help solve the Israeli/Palestine crisis.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Every presidential administration will analyze the ends, ways and means in developing a National Security Strategy and the President will attempt to balance overseas presence (ways), with the resources available (means), to achieve the appropriate level of national security. There will be a measure of judgment used to determine where the interests of national security are the greatest and prioritize accordingly. The Clinton administration's National Security Strategy for a Global Age outlines some of the benefits of overseas military presence that will become even more critical in the continuing war on terrorism:

Maintaining our overseas presence enhances our understanding of the military developments within various regions of the world. Relevant observations add to our larger geo-political understanding of potential areas for instability or threats to our national interests and help select our optimal avenue of response; diplomatic, economic, or military. It reassures our allies and promotes regional stability. It gives substance to our security commitments; helps prevent the development of power vacuums and instability, and contributes to deterrence by demonstrating our determination to defend U.S. allied, and friendly interests in critical regions. Having credible forces forward deployed in peacetime also better positions the United States to respond rapidly to crises, permitting them to be first on the scene.⁴⁸

As the Bush administration fights the war on terrorism and formulates a National Security Strategy for the future, it appears that military presence overseas will increase.⁴⁹ The war on terrorism has caused the United States to rapidly increase its military ties with nations such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgystan, Pakistan, Philippines and many others throughout the world.

...the (Bush) administration is now giving the armed forces the ability to conduct anti-terrorist operations on a near-permanent basis across much of the Muslim world. It also is establishing a broader political and security relationship with the republics of Central Asia, a strategic region rich in oil and gas reserves. "America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind that we could not have dreamed of before," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told the House International Relations Committee.⁵⁰

An increase in military presence is a way to assure our allies and is the means to conduct surveillance and quick strikes on terrorist cells or sites containing CBRNE weapons.

As the National Security Strategy is developed for the war on terrorism and beyond, the analysis of ends, ways, and means will determine the regional priority for military forces overseas. The new threat is transnational and operates asymmetrically. Previous international relationships need to be stronger and new ones need to be established. There is a greater need for all CINCs to collaborate as the U.S. wages this global war. The intelligence communities will have to become more seamless and cooperate with law enforcement where appropriate. The informational element of national power will take on a greater role in the national security than in the past to influence not only the U.S. public will but the "global will" as well. The information campaign needs to include a message of respect for diverse cultures to help diminish the root causes of terrorism. Cultural diversity is a primary strength of the United States and must be emphasized globally. The world is watching with great interest how the U.S. conducts the war on terrorism and its lasting effects on global security.

It is clear to see how an overseas presence can communicate to U.S. allies and adversaries its vital and important national interests. Committing the military overseas sends a very strong message of where the U.S. intends to fight to protect its interests. Additionally, the corresponding mil-to-mil relationships and combined exercises will enhance international seamless intelligence and form a basis for coalitions in the future.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. will have to determine the best strategy to deter and dissuade adversaries who use terrorism or other forms of asymmetric warfare. A forward military and interagency presence that is more rapid and decisive will play a key role in this effort. Transforming the military and improving the interagency process will be essential in achieving rapid decisive

operations. The intelligence community will have to reduce their culture of secrecy and develop ways of providing seamless intelligence support to the President, Secretary of Defense, and commanders in the field. Special Operations forces and the intelligence community will have to take the lead if the U.S. is to engage terrorists where they live and hide. The U.S. challenge will be how to transform and restructure forces and simultaneously continue the war on terrorism. President Bush made reference to this as: "It's like overhauling an engine while you're going at 80 miles an hour. Yet we have no other choice."⁵¹

It is not enough to transform the military, establish a seamless intelligence network, and improve the collaboration and synchronization of the interagency in defeating terrorist networks. An important aspect in preventing asymmetric attacks against the U.S. is understanding the cultural and ideological root causes of terrorism and the military's role in promoting peace through military-diplomatic engagement.

The early stages of the war on terrorism and operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated the adaptability of the U.S. military. However, it is not the model for every military campaign in the future. As the force continues transformation it is imperative to maintain a focus on the operational concept of Rapid Decisive Operations. A capabilities-based force will be able to maintain the flexibility to defeat the ever-adapting threat of the 21st century. The interagency must maintain an international engagement policy using all the elements of national power to preempt terrorist attacks. The U.S. military must maintain the asymmetric advantage and remain forward deployed to best meet the four key goals of the new defense strategy outlined in Quadrennial Defense Review 2001: assuring U.S. friends and allies of America's steadiness of purpose and capability to fulfill its security commitments; dissuading potential adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends; deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression; and decisively defeat any adversary if dissuasion and deterrence fails.⁵²

WORD COUNT = 6,909

ENDNOTES

¹ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Beyond This War On Terrorism," Washington Post, 1 November 2001, 35.

² RAND, Changes Ahead: Future Directions for U.S. Military Overseas Presence, 1998; available from <<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR956/MR956.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2002.

³ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, September, 2001), 5.

⁴ Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," Parameters, 24 (Summer 1994) 16.

⁵ Digital Design Works, <http://www.ddwinc.com/docs/pages.html>

⁶ Paul R. Pillar "Terrorism Goes Global," Brookings Review, Fall 2001, 34.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁸ George W. Bush, "The President's State of the Union Address," 29 January 2002; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>>; Internet; accessed 6 February 2002.

⁹ J. Michael Waller, "PLA Revises Art of War," Insight on the News, 4 March 2001, Available from <<http://insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=125043>>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2002.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ George W. Bush, "President Speaks on War Effort to Citadel Cadets" 11 December 2001; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html>>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2002.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ U.S. Joint Forces Command, A Concept For Rapid Decisive Operations, White Paper 2002, 7.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁸ Gene Myers, "Effects Based Operations: The Heart of Rapid Decisive Operations" A Common Perspective, October 2001, 15.

¹⁹ Rumsfeld, 35.

²⁰ Bruce Rolfsen, "On-The-Job Testing," Air Force Times, 21 January 2002, 12.

²¹ Nathan Hodge, "Transformation Boss sees Sensor-Based Warfare Era," Defense Week Daily Update; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb2002/s20020206trans.htm>>; Internet accessed, 5 February 2002.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Bush.

²⁵ Tom Shanker, "Conduct of War is Redefined by Success of Special Forces," New York Times, 21 January 2002, 1.

²⁶ General Peter J. Shoomaker, "Special Operations Forces in Peacetime: A Powerful Tool in Shaping the Security Environment," U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, December 1999; available from; <<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1299/iipe/schoom.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2002.

²⁷ Kenneth Allard, "Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned," (National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 1995), 55-61.

²⁸ Shanker, 1.

²⁹ George W. Bush, "President Bush's Speech Before a Joint Session of Congress" Sept. 20, 2001.

³⁰ Garrett Jones, "Working with the CIA," Parameters, Winter 2001-02, 28.

³¹ Ibid., 32-33.

³² David Fulgham, "CIA Men Trouble Military," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November, 2001.

³³ McCutcheon, 1.

³⁴ Shanker, 4.

³⁵ Chuck McCutcheon and Pat Towell, "Fixing U.S Intelligence: A Cultural Revolution" Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 6 October 2001, 2304

³⁶ Evan Thomas and Mark Hosenball, "How He'll Haunt Us," Newsweek, 7 January 2002, 19.

³⁷ The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series.

³⁸ Judy Keen "Information 'War Room' Deploys Its Own Troops," USA Today, 19 December 2001, p 14.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, (New York, New York, Random House, 2000) 122.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² James C. Bradford, The Military and Conflict between Cultures (College Station Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1997) 183-211.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Bush, 1.

⁴⁸ William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000), 16-17.

⁴⁹ Sally Buzbee, "U.S. Expands Military Ties Worldwide," Associated Press, 15 January 2002.

⁵⁰ Vernon Loeb, "Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia," Washington Post, 9 February 2002, A01.

⁵¹ George W. Bush, "President Speaks on War Effort to Citadel Cadets" 11 December 2001; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html>>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2002.

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