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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

A POST SEPTEMBER 11TH REASSESSMENT OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA

BY

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A POST SEPTEMBER 11TH REASSESSMENT OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA

by

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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During his presidential campaign, President Bush took a more confrontational stance toward China than had been followed by the Clinton administration. U.S. relations with China during the initial months of the Bush administration seemed to reflect President Bush's categorization of China as a "strategic competitor." The low point in relations between the two countries came in April 2001 when China detained the crew of a U.S. reconnaissance plane that was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island. Following September 11th, Sino-U.S. relations have taken an understandable back seat to the U.S. war on terrorists with global reach. China has been supportive of much of the U.S. response against terrorism while the broader confrontational issues defining the relationship over the last decade have been temporarily underscored. However, the basis for confrontation between the two countries remains, dictating that the U.S. cannot ignore the issues indefinitely since they pose a potential threat to U.S. Pacific and global interests.

This paper, therefore assesses China's potential to become a peer competitor to the U.S. The driving force behind everything that the Chinese leadership does is the survival of the Communist Party as the sole legitimate source of political power in the country. While the near term stability of the country is still in question, it is apparent that China views the U.S. as a threat. The strategic vision of the Chinese government is tied to its ability to challenge U.S. hegemony at least regionally and preferably globally. The communist government is currently pursuing a combination of strategies to improve China's power relative to the U.S. Combining China's latent capabilities with an intent to challenge the U.S., it is imperative that the U.S. respond. The U.S. emerged from the Cold War largely unscathed by the threat of the Soviet Union because it had a clear vision of how to counter the Russian threat and the U.S. government set aside bi-partisan interests to fulfill this vision. A similar vision and resolve must unfold relative to China while the threat is still manageable.

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A POST SEPTEMBER 11TH REASSESSMENT OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA

"Barbarian tribes with their rulers are inferior to Chinese states without them."

Confucius - The Analects

INTRODUCTION

Prior to September 11th, the new administration was struggling to establish a balance in its relationship with China. It was initially apparent the President was intent on moving away from the attempt at a "strategic partnership" that had marked the second Clinton term. However, the downward spiral in relations between the two countries following the Chinese detention of an American reconnaissance plane in April 2001 increased the potential for confrontation to a point that was unpalatable for either country. The two months prior to the horrific events of September 11th provide insights into a move by both countries to try and reestablish a sustainable balance in the relationship. While a better balance has been seen over the past six months, traditional spikes in the relationship are likely to continue providing occasional opportunities for strategic miscalculation.

Trends since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have given the impression that promised cooperation by China in a U.S. campaign against terrorism does not necessarily portend a new era in the relationship. Therefore, the question of China's long term strategic intentions and posture remain valid. In other words, given the rapid change of events since the arrival of the Bush administration, does China remain a potential peer competitor demanding significant resources be applied against containing her, or will China emerge as a responsible world player abiding by international norms on security, economic, diplomatic and social issues?

The document that should provide the template for the strategic management of issues central to U.S. national interests is the National Security Strategy (NSS). Part of the complexity of establishing a firm understanding of the current administration's vision of proper U.S. relations with China is its failure to publish a new NSS during its first year in office. Even though the last published NSS lacks any credibility, it is still referred to as a source for insights into U.S. global strategies.² In terms of establishing a firm understanding of Sino-U.S. relations, this approach is problematic. The last Clinton NSS categorizes the relationship more in terms of cooperation than of confrontation. The approach envisioned by the Clinton administration was geared toward combining strategic dialogue while leveraging China's cooperation through the country's greater integration into the world community. The distinct impression given by the

Clinton administration was that relations with China are manageable, and through prudent engagement, it could avoid the rise of China as a strategic threat.³

The recently published Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is probably more indicative of the feelings of the current administration when it comes to categorizing near and far term strategies for dealing with China.⁴ Indications are that engagement is no longer a term that is useful to describe our approach to bilateral relations with China and has been intentionally avoided by the Bush administration.⁵ Even though the QDR never actually refers directly to China, it provides several statements of intent that could have a significant impact on Sino-U.S. relations.

Primary amongst QDR requirements is the need for the U.S. to be better prepared to address contingencies in the "East Asian Littoral," to include a call for an increase in U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. Reportedly, the emphasis on increasing U.S. presence in Asia "implements President Bush's campaign rhetoric about viewing China as a competitor and not a partner." Therefore, this paper will attempt to establish whether the commitment of resources to contain China is necessary at the same time DOD is looking to simultaneously execute a widespread transformation and fight a war against terrorists with global reach.

FRAMEWORK

The recent historical debate on China has been polarized within academic and governmental circles. On the one hand, China is viewed as an important world power who, given time to establish institutions compatible with globalization trends, will have too much to lose by demonstrating rogue behavior and will, therefore, be co-opted to meld with the West. The opposing view is that China, as the world's last remaining socialist power, has values and strategic intentions incompatible with the U.S. view of a global framework. The U.S. position as the sole remaining superpower is a distinct threat to China's regional and global interests. As a result, China is on a course to significantly improve its power relative to the U.S. in order to threaten the ability for the U.S. to act unilaterally in either the Asia-Pacific region or, eventually, on the global stage.

The framework of this paper is intended to establish a foundation to determine which is the more likely path for China – cooperation or confrontation. The analysis that follows will consider arguments from both sides of the debate on China, but will attempt to balance the more extreme positions with a greater sense of the strategic course that China is charting for itself. In order to properly frame China's long-term strategic position relative to the U.S., a

sequential analytic framework will be utilized. The first part of the analytical process will be to outline China's grand strategy.⁸

The grand strategy assessment will serve as a baseline to apply against a model to determine the degree of China's aspirations to become a peer competitor to the U.S. and, subsequently, to assess the U.S. intent or ability to react to Chinese aspirations. The implications of the U.S. policy course vis-à-vis China under the new administration will then be considered to assess whether or not it is consistent with the outcomes of the preceding framework. Finally, extenuating factors that may exacerbate or mitigate the analytical outcomes will be considered along with a recommendation of a new policy approach toward China for the Administration.

CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY

PERSPECTIVE:

The strategy assessment methodology utilized in this section is a standard process for framing the foundation of U.S. interests around the world and establishing appropriate short and long term responses to protect those interests.¹⁰ Unfortunately, the process as applied tends to be overly U.S. centric without properly establishing the perspective of the countries or regions against which we apply the model. In this case, it is useful to follow a similar methodology to first frame China's grand strategy and then use the results to compare long term Chinese intentions and possible U.S. responses. By first looking at China absent the overarching shadow of U.S. policy biases toward current trends in the country, it is more likely that the peer competitor assessment in the follow-on section will not be formed solely to meet a preconceived expectation of how China will act on the geopolitical stage.

Working through the grand strategy assessment, it is difficult to precisely establish the intentions of the leaders of a country that remains as bureaucratically opaque as China. However, expert analysis conducted over the past decade has increasingly penetrated the complex dynamics of China's ruling elite and that work will be leveraged to try and determine China's strategic intentions. In addition, China has gradually responded to international pressure to increase governmental transparency, including within the security arena. China's recent accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is another type of wedgethat can be used to penetrate or mold the intentions of the socialist bureaucracy.

CHINESE NATIONAL VALUES:

There is a complex reality underlying China's system of national values. Several foundations exist for this value system that sustain the current Chinese social and political infrastructure. At its core remains the basic philosophy of Confucianism. Even with the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to power in 1949, threads of Confucian values have endured in the thought process of both the leadership and the populace.¹³

Confucian ideology stresses above all else the adherence of each individual in society to his particular social role. The balance achieved by this adherence theoretically leads to peace and tranquility throughout society. The philosophy, therefore, tends to be backward looking to an idealized period in China's pre-history where all elements of society were in proper balance. Traditional order in Chinese society is based upon four levels of society – the family, the upper class or gentry, bureaucrats who obtained their positions through a series of civil-service examinations, and the emperor. Primary among these relationships is order within the family, particularly between father and son. The son must obey and respect thefather at all times, but the father has equal responsibility to provide a model to which his son should strive. "The Chinese have taken relationships within the family as paradigms for relationships within society and, indeed, for China's relationships with the world beyond its borders."

In addition to the ideological continuity provided by Confucianism, fundamental precepts of China's imperial past align reasonably well with the Party's contemporary political philosophies. To some, the perpetuation of imperial or traditional ideals have prevented China from emerging as a world power. "The imperial system has left a legacy of strong personal rule at the top, unbounded by formal law or regulation. This system was rife with tensions between the emperor and the governing bureaucracies . . . This contradiction became a crisis when the leader became highly erratic and/or unusually willful." This structural weakness has continued to plague China's political infrastructure even though it appears that the patern of Chinese leadership in the post-Deng Xiaoping era will be more by consensus than by imperial mandate.

In addition to the Confucian philosophical base, the Communist Party has struggled to sustain itself as the only legitimate legal authority in the country. The values the Party has propagated are outlined in China's Constitution. Foremost among the principles outlined in the Constitution is that China is fundamentally a socialist state and no individual or organization is allowed to undermine or challenge the socialist system. Keeper of the values of the socialist system is the Communist Party.¹⁷ The ideological foundation of the Party as it assumed control of the country was Marxist-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Mao stated "Political power

grows out of the barrel of a gun, but our principle is that the Party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party."¹⁸

After the passing of the first generation of communist leadership and the rise of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, economic reform moved to the forefront of Party priorities. Deng proceeded under the assumption that control of the country could be ensured as long as the relative standard of living continued to improve. He formulated a policy of Four Modernizations – the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense, in that order. As Deng passed from the scene, the third generation of leadership, led by Jiang Zemin, has struggled to sustain some semblance of Party legitimacy. Socialism is no longer a credible ideological underpinning for the Party, and the current leadership has experimented with the potentially volatile concept of nationalism to sustain its credibility. However, the common thread throughout modern Chinese history is the unquestioned control of the Chinese Communist Party of all organs of the state consistent with the traditional imperial mandate.

CHINESE NATIONAL INTERESTS:

Based on the values discussion above, the foremost interest of the Party is the preservation of Communist Party rule and this interest underpins all other actions on the part of the Chinese government. Closely tied to rule of the Party are

- Maintaining territorial integrity, to include achieving eventual complete national reunification.
- Sustaining economic prosperity, achieved by establishing non-hostile borders and social stability.
- Molding a favorable regional and world balance of power.²¹

These four interests, as the core interests of the country, can all be deemed as vital to China's current well-being. Communist Party rule is central to all of the governing institutions of the country, and it can be argued that the political and economic infrastructure of the country would collapse at least temporarily with the fall of the Party. The other three interests are tied to the legitimacy of the Party. A perceived degradation in any of them will undermine confidence in the Party's ability to lead the country.

The scope of this paper will only focus on vital interests, since these are the ones principally influencing China's interaction with the outside world. Territorial integrity, especially the issue of Taiwan, remains central to Party credibility. The loss of any of what the Party has categorized as traditional Chinese homeland could set off a cascading erosion of the country.

Compromise on any territorial issue will add credence and hope to other areas that are looking for independence or greater autonomy from China, to include Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. The Party's ability to hold the country together is increasingly tied to its right to rule the people. A sense of nationalism has been used numerous times over the last decade to rally the people behind the government.²²

As previously mentioned, economic modernization was the primary mechanism utilized by Deng Xiaoping to recover support of the people for the Chinese government after the abuses of the Mao era. Deng intended to provide sustenance – clothing, food, and shelter – for all of the Chinese people. After largely achieving this goal by 1990, the challenge has been to sustain an upward path in the standard of living across Chinese society. Rapid increases in the standard of living in the agricultural sector have gradually flattened out since 1990, leading to increased dissatisfaction and turmoil in the countryside. In industry, the private sector has continued to expand, but the incremental collapse of the state sector has been difficult to stop. The challenges of sustaining economic prosperity as the leadership of the country gets ready to transition later in the year cannot be overstated.²³

A regional and world balance of power favorable to China is essential for the present ruling elite to stay in power. From Mao to Jiang Zemin, China's leaders have pointed to a hundred years of humiliation from early in the 19th Century until 1949 when Western powers took advantage of the weakness of the Chinese state. The mantra of "never again" rings out in dialogues with foreign leaders as well as in propaganda preserved for the Chinese populace. Any perception that the Chinese leadership is either unwilling or unable to stand up to outside threats will add to the erosion of its credibility.²⁴

STRATEGIC APPRAISAL:

At the present time it is difficult to establish with any affinity the grand vision that the current Chinese leadership has for the future of the country. It can be argued that the loss of legitimacy of the Communist Party has forced the current third generation of leaders, as well as the incoming fourth generation, to spend a majority of its time preserving its own power at the expense of the future of the country.²⁵ However, as a vital interest, preservation of power should in itself provide some insights into the challenges the Chinese perceive to this interest and the three other vital interests associated with it. The fundamental assumption is that the leadership will do whatever it takes to stay in power. The brutal suppression of Falun Gong

practitioners over the last several years in the same mode that democracy protesters were suppressed in 1989 gives strong credence to this assumption.²⁶

Paths to preserving Chinese vital interests are best summarized within a framework where the interest is categorized as an enduring desired end state. A process and the resources to support the process are subsequently outlined for each vital interest.

End – Preservation of Power

<u>Ways</u> – The Chinese leadership's obsession with regime survival is centered around three primary methods: 1) a pervasive application of the security organs of the state; 2) absolute control of the political bureaucracy with no effective mechanism for opposition or dissent; and 3) control of the media and other sources of information.

Means- China's internal security structure is pervasive in every segment of society. While the government in theory downsized the military by over 500,000 during the 1990s, it in reality shifted a majority of these personnel under the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). In addition, the communist party controls all levels of the political infrastructure even though there has been a well publicized campaign to allow elections at the grass roots level. To date these elections have been a good mechanism for the party to demonstrate a degree of political liberalization without allowing any true inroads into their absolute control of the country. One should also note that, in China, television access, all major news publications and access to the world wide web, are controlled by the government. While the information revolution has caused some chinks in the government's ability to dominate access to information by the Chinese populace, the party has maintained an ability to suppress anyone who tries to use access to knowledge against it.

End - Maintaining Territorial Integrity

Ways – China has used its military repeatedly over time to counter any perceived threat to its historical territory claims. High profile responses to border disputes took place against India in 1962, Russia in 1969 and Vietnam in 1979. Shortly after assuming control of the country in 1949, the CCP invaded Tibet to reassert control over the region and was prepared to invade Taiwan in 1950 when the Korean War derailed the operation. More recently the Chinese government has conducted operations in the South China Sea, incrementally establishing control over territory that has multiple claimants. China's leadership also continues to insist that it will invade Taiwan if there is any move toward independence.³¹

Means – While China's military continues to be several generations behind the U.S. across the services and in most key technologies, the sheer size of the combined services at over 3 million strong makes it a force with which to be reckoned. In addition, there are clear

indicators that China's military leaders intend to contend with the U.S. both regionally and globally through a combination of symmetric and asymmetric strategies. There is a good deal of debate concerning the total amount China spends on its military, but there is no argument that the military budget has increased substantially over the past decade and there is a clear strategy for continued, rapid modernization.³²

End – Economic Prosperity

Ways – China's economic focus over the past decade has been primarily on World Trade Organization (WTO) accession. She successfully achieved this goal in December 2001. On the one hand, entry into WTO provides China an ability to expand her exports in areas where she has a comparative advantage. There are, however, many aspects of the Chinese economy that may be threatened or exposed by other countries using WTO mechanisms to pry open traditionally closed domestic markets and service industries.³³

Means – China has a large economy that has been growing at 8-10 percent for the past two decades and is expected to sustain close to 8 percent growth for at least the next five years. In real terms, China's economy will be larger than the U.S. economy by 2006. Whether or not these figures are realized and lead to a satisfied population who continues to support the government is the more difficult question.³⁴

End – Favorable regional and world balance of power

<u>Ways</u>- China has become more astute in diplomatic maneuvering to achieve regional and global security goals. Naturally, the military lever remains a way to influence issues that are vital to China's interests, especially where diplomacy fails.

Means- China is a member of an increasing number of international organizations and regimes that provide them the means to pursue their interests and balance regional and global playing fields in their favor. Some of the most important are the United Nations Security Council, the World Trade Organization, Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank and some aspects of ASEAN functions.³⁵

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:

China's national security strategy is probably best framed by the "New Concept of Security" that was outlined in her 1998 defense white paper, "China's National Defense." In dealing with other countries, China's formula is based on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:

Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty

- Mutual non-aggression
- Non-interference in each other's internal affairs
- Equality and mutual benefit
- Peaceful coexistence

The report asserts that the above principles are "the political basis and premise of global and regional security. Each country has the right to choose its own social system, development strategy, and way of life, and no other country should interfere in the internal affairs of any other country in any way or under any pretext, much less resort to military threats or aggression." In reality, this formulation remains very consistent with the foreign policy formulation that has been promoted by the CCP since the mid-1950s.³⁷

What is important to note about China's reassertion of old principles is the fact that the government feels compelled to address them at all. On the one hand, it would appear that China's security vision is stuck in a time warp. The foundation of the formula argues for a world where the internal issues of a nation should be largely separated from external relations. As China becomes more embroiled in globalization, represented by its recent accession to the World Trade Organization, the chance of separating internal issues from external scrutiny is increasingly unlikely. A close look at the principles reflects a new push on the part of China to preserve a world order and antiquated vision of sovereignty where she can act with impunity to maintain stability within her own borders, while not paying a price in external relations.

The other aspect of China's security strategy is her apparent need to work to attenuate the perceived influence on her security interests by the U.S. posture as the world's sole superpower. David Finkelstein has captured this angst in his assessment of the prospects for China's security policy. He asserts that "China's much-hoped-for multi-polar world has not come about with the end of the Cold War as Chinese international relations theorists had been predicting." While the principles themselves are not objectionable and could eventually evolve into actionable security concepts, "the anti-U.S. packaging that the new concept is often wrapped in detracts from it." 39

China is probably using the New Security Concept on one level as a tool to influence the regional and global security environment. She is intent on being regarded as a credible leader and responsible player on security issues. However, tied back to her vital interest of preserving the power of the CCP, the principles in the concept are also a hedge to preserve the ability to act unconstrained if internal control of the country is threatened. There is little doubt that the leadership fears a multitude of future threats to its control, ranging from further

succession efforts to economic chaos, and feels compelled to reinforce its right to deal with these issues without the threat of external interference in its sovereign rights.

MILITARY STRATEGY:

In this context, China's military strategy will be defined as the way it organizes and employs its military forces to protect or pursue its interests in the existing international security environment.⁴⁰ From this definition, it can be assumed that the forces are primarily postured to deal with external threats. It must be noted, however, that a threat to China's vital interest(s) is as likely to come from internal sources as from external sources.

China's military strategy has evolved significantly over the last ffty years. The initial strategy was oriented around Mao's formulation of People's War. People's War is essentially a strategy of recognizing weakness in the early stages of a conflict and of initially being in a defensive posture. A fundamental assumption is that, if there is a threat to China from an external enemy, China could trade space for time in a defensive war of attrition. Once the enemy culminates by overextending in the depths of China's interior, Mao intended to go on the offensive at points where he could establish overwhelming superiority and sequentially destroy the invader.⁴¹

As China's border regions developed economically, it became increasingly costly to rely solely on a concept of People's War. Mao's death permitted China's military leadership to modify their military strategy to meet modern conditions. The new formulation was called "people's war under modern conditions." China's military was reoriented to prevent penetration of the heartland and to deter any attempts at limited land incursions along its periphery. The primary focus of the new strategy was the Soviet Union, but it served equally well in dealing with other threats along the border. "It placed much greater emphasis on positional warfare, combined arms tactics, and the use of regular and mechanized forces to blunt an enemy's invasion before it could penetrate deep into Chinese territory and implied a much greater emphasis on logistic support." "42"

In 1985, the Central Military Commission declared that China's military strategy would no longer focus on a major conventional or nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. The new strategy was geared toward fighting a small scale war on China's periphery and was designated "local war under high-tech conditions." Chinese strategists identified five types of local war on which the PLA should focus: (1) small-scale conflicts restricted to contested border territory; (2) conflicts over territorial seas and islands; (3) surprise air attacks; (4) defense against

deliberately limited attacks into Chinese territory; and (5) "punitive counterattacks" launched into enemy territory to oppose invasion, protect sovereignty, or to uphold justice and dispel threats. The shift in strategy required both a significant reorientation of Chinese forces and rapid military modernization.

The Gulf War and succeeding conflicts involving the U.S. employment of precision munitions have forced the Chinese to continue to evolve its military strategy and the composition of its forces. There has been a tremendous amount of material published on high profile weapons purchased by the Chinese military, primarily from Russia. These purchases include advanced Russian air frames, several high-tech destroyers and an aircraft carrier, and supporting technology, to include air-to-air refueling, improved logistic support and advanced C4ISR.

Michael Pillsbury put together a good collection of essays from Chinese military strategists who outline their intent to continue to evolve China's military strategy and to modernize the People's Liberation Army in order to support China's national interests. It is important to point out, however, that the last time the military was operationally deployed was in 1989 against its own people. Not inconsistently, one of the Chinese analysts translated by Pillsbury commenting on the conversion of national interests and military strategy points out, "we (China) should resolutely safeguard the socialist system and the basic line of the Party. Chinese history tells us that apart from the socialist road we have no other choices. We should resolutely safeguard the social and political situation of national stability and unity."

EXTENUATING FACTORS

The assessment of China's Grand Strategy is framed in the context of a favorable world environment. Over the past two decades, internal and external circumstances have allowed China's leadership to pursue a strategy consistent with the "four modernizations" with relatively little interference. The primary bump in its road to modernization and an increase in its regional and global power posture was the 1989 Tiananmen crisis. While Tiananmen temporarily marred the reputation of China's leaders in the eyes of the world, it only marginally slowed its march toward modernization.

As the corner has turned into the 21st Century, China, by all appearances, is still solidly on pace to becoming a regional and world leader. There are, however, some who see chinks in China's armor and predict a shift in the country's fate. Increasingly, the nay sayers are forecasting not just a down turn in China's fortunes, but a collapse of the current government

and the potential for widespread turmoil.⁴⁵ A change in China's future is tied to an increased impact from several key accelerants outlined below.

CHINA'S LEADERSHIP TRANSITION:

The process of transitioning to China's "Fourth Generation" leaders has already begun and will be formally solidified later in 2002 during the 16th Chinese Communist Party Congress. The next generation of leaders, led by Hu Jintao, will be faced with a wide range of pressing issues as they assume control. The first two generation of leaders maintained control of the country through the weight of their contributions of standing up the CCP and establishing the country. Mao's authority was unquestioned as was Deng's. In 1992, as China's economy began to wane in the shadow of Tiananmen, Deng personally revitalized the process through his famous trip to the south and exhortations of "to get rich is glorious." ⁴⁶

The hand-off of power from Deng to Jiang Zemin went relatively smoothly, but Jiang has only recently been seen as being in charge of the country without the heavy hand of second generation leaders hanging over Jiang's rule. However, it is doubtful that either the third or fourth generation have sufficient authority with the military to compel it to restore internal order if turmoil breaks out again. No military is comfortable turning its guns against its own people, and China is no different.

GLOBALIZATION CONCERNS:

China's move to become better integrated into the world economy took a big step forward on 11 December 2001 when it became a full member of the World Trade Organization. With opportunity, however, comes substantial risk. Membership in WTO for China is essential for the country to be able to further expand trade and for the economy to continue to grow at the levels seen over the past two decades. While most studies suggest dramatic increases in China's trade prospects, WTO requirements to open protected sectors of the economy to competition will also lead to potential turbulence.⁴⁷

Sectors already competitive in the international economy, such as textiles and toys, will benefit significantly from WTO. Sectors that have remained largely state supported will feel considerable pressure from foreign competition. Employees of state owned enterprises, who have come to expect cradle-to-grave benefits from the State, will likely have this security blanket pulled from under them. WTO will lead to heavy competition for China's inefficient agricultural sector, especially from the U.S. China's nascent service sector will also be overwhelmed by an

influx of proficient foreign businesses. Careful, flexible management on the part of China's leaders might be able to leverage the challenges of WTO entry into long term benefits for the country. History indicates that entry is more likely to be a vehicle for the disaffection of large segments of society who could eventually challenge the government.⁴⁸

INTERNAL STABILITY:

Transcending the potential negative fallout of joining WTO are other socioeconomic issues that are eroding the fabric of Chinese society and undermining the authority of the CCP. Foremost among these is pervasive corruption. Nobody in China is left untouched by either the benefits or the costs of corruption. The gains achieved by senior leaders and their families from corruption have naturally led to disillusionment on the part of the masses. When the economy is healthy and the lives of most people are improving, it is overlooked as a way of doing business. With a recent rapid increase in unemployment and a slowing of the economy, both urban and rural masses are much less forgiving of the corrupt lifestyles of China's leaders. The responses are becoming increasingly severe, to include terrorist acts, and are increasingly oriented toward disrupting society. The

China's rapid economic development over the past two decades has also been purchased at the cost of severe environmental degradation. Nine of the world's ten most polluted cities are resident in China. The negative impact of environmental degradation is reflected in severe droughts, significant desertification, widespread deforestation, and limited access to safe drinking water. It is estimated that 4 to 8 percent of GDP is lost through destruction of the environment each year. ⁵¹

Health care has traditionally been provided by the work unit (State Owned Enterprise) for the Chinese laborer and his family. As the economy has begun large scale restructuring, large segments of society have fallen out from under the umbrella of guaranteed health care. The average Chinese family is ill-equipped to deal with the overwhelming costs of a catastrophic illness in its family.

These trends intersect with several serious health crises within Chinese society.

Foremost among them is an escalation in respiratory illnesses, to include lung cancer. Over 85% of Chinese males smoke. Combined with 90% of Chinese cities not meeting environmental air quality standards, it is not surprising that there has been an explosion of respiratory disease across China.

In addition, China has seen a rapid rise in HIV cases at a rate previously seen only in sub-Saharan Africa or Southeast Asia. Part of the increase can be attributed to a rise in intravenous drug use and prostitution. Most of the crisis, however, can be attributed to lack of quality control and screening of the China's blood supply. Serious mismanagement of blood contamination cases has routinely been covered up by the government, exacerbating the crisis. ⁵²

TERRORISM:


China has been dealing with increasing acts of terrorism within its own border for the past several years. Part of the problem has been tied with separatist activities on its periphery. In the far west region of Xinjiang, China has fundamentalist Islamic influences among her Uighur population. The Uighurs would prefer, at a minimum, greater autonomy in the administration of the region. China's response has been to crack down on any dissent and move large numbers of Han Chinese into Xinjiang to establish a better balance of power in the region. These tactics have played into the hands of the fundamentalists who have used the Chinese repression to ferment further unrest amongst the indigenous population.⁵³

China has also experienced terrorist acts associated with turbulence in the work force. There have been several instances over the past several months where unemployed workers have conducted bombings of government facilities. The worst incident was in the city of Shijiazhuang where a disaffected worked killed over 100 people when he blew up several buildings simultaneously.⁵⁴ Predictions that membership in WTO will lead to a significant increase in unemployment over the short term may lead to further terrorist issues for the Chinese government.

CHINA'S PEER COMPETITOR ASPIRATIONS

Within the framework of China's Grand Strategy, it is now useful to assess the potential for it to emerge as a peer competitor to the U.S. It has already been demonstrated that the Chinese government's primary current struggle is perpetuating its control over the country. Part of the calculus of staying in power is the leadership's ability to continue to expand China's relative regional and global standing across the instruments of power. Economic growth remains vital to addressing the expanding expectations of the Chinese populace. Military modernization is tied to China's ability to preclude interference in the country's internal or external affairs. Political or diplomatic authority is tied to the government's credibility and associated ability to influence the geo-political environment in its favor.

The first challenge is to establish an accurate definition of what a peer competitor is. In the context of this discussion, it is a "challenger (state) with the power and the motivation to confront the United States on a global scale in a sustained way and to a sufficient level where the ultimate outcome of the conflict is in doubt even if the U.S. marshals its resources in a timely manner." The important part of the definition is motivation. If you take China's stated foreign policy principles at face value, they seem rather benign. However, when you consider her vital interests and the fact that the fundamental interest of regime survival is under duress, it is important to look a little closer at China's actions as well as her words. The mechanism for making this analysis is tied to the assessment of several strategies that peer competitors have followed in the past and see to what degree they apply to China's recent policy initiatives (Table 1).



Pace of China's Potential Growth as a Peer Competitor

TABLE 1

REFORM STRATEGY:

The military capabilities needed for any power to compete with the U.S. as a global power generally will require an economy at least close to the U.S. in size, productivity, and per-capita-GDP. The smaller the economy, proportionately more resources will have to be extracted to

fuel its military capabilities. For China to reach the average per-capita GDP of the high-income countries would require 106 years of 6 percent per annum real growth and 42 years to reach \$10,000 per-capita GDP in constant dollars.⁵⁶

A successful reform strategy increases the money and industrial base that can produce military power. However, given the extreme time frame required for an emerging economy like China to compete with the resources of the U.S., it is an unrealistic mindset for China to adopt. For China to become a peer competitor employing a reform strategy, expenditures on the military would have to be comparable to what the USSR spent during the Cold War with the risk of the same relative drain on economic stability the Soviets experienced.

While expenditures on the military have increased over the past decade to molify senior military leaders, military modernization has not transcended the government's focus on domestic economic challenges or on expanding China's global trade posture. ⁵⁷ If China continues to increase expenditures on its military as its economy grows, the U.S. as the sole superpower should be concerned and watchful, but should not become alarmed. The U.S. should be alert, however, if reforms start to fail and the government needs to place a sudden, dramatic emphasis on the military to stay in power.

REVOLUTION STRATEGY:

There are two paths to revolutionary change — political and military. Political revolution produces a dramatic shift in the methods by which a country is governed and usually introduces a new group of governing elites and institutions. Political revolutions, however, often hinder rather than help economic growth. While there are less resources available to the military, the dynamics behind the revolution often translate well into the ability to mobilize the populace behind conflict.

The revolutionary fervor of the early communist period in China sustained by Mao faded away long ago.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the people are disaffected with the current political process and leadership sufficiently to eventually want to push the government aside. The major hurdle for China to use this approach as a path to challenge the U.S. on the world stage is that it is very hard to harness in a predictable direction and to ensure that the military goals remain aligned with a newly established political leadership.

A military revolution is characterized by a combination of exploiting a technological breakthrough along with changes in military organization, doctrine, and strategy that compliment

the new technology. Access to technology and a willingness to pay the costs both dictate whether a state can proceed with a military revolution.⁵⁹

The conservative side of the "China Threat" debate espouses China's intent and capability to apply massive resources in the quick overhaul of its military. China aids the dire predictions by persisting in providing little transparency in their defense expenditures. Therefore, it is difficult to assess where the true median expenditures lie between China's understated defense budget and the inflated estimates of China's critics. What is apparent is that, even if China was spending as much as their critics claim, they still are not spending enough to build a force comparable to the capabilities of the U.S. If China is intent on being able to challenge the U.S. militarily, she is probably better served by pursuing an asymmetric strategy. The U.S. should watch Chinese weapons development and procurement strategies carefully, but there is nothing that currently indicates the ability to threaten U.S. overmatch capabilities.

ALLIANCE STRATEGY:

Given the current and future resource disparity between the United States and China, an alliance seems like the most viable near term strategy to challenge U.S. hegemony. The functions of an alliance in this context are defined as aggregating power resources, enhancing power resources and denying the U.S. access to key strategic regions.⁶²

China has, in fact, worked diligently in the recent past to establish alliances primarily aimed at countering U.S. regional and global hegemony. Foremost among these efforts has been China's courting of Russia to form a "strategic partnership." China's primary push for closer Sino-Russian ties came during the midst of the standoff with the U.S. over the status of the reconnaissance plane that made an emergency landing on Hainan Island.

At the time, some Russian leaders were "arguing strongly that Russia should take the opportunity to restore Russian eminence in the world." While President Putin did lean toward China in an apparent attempt to remind Washington of the potential for a Russia-China anti-U.S. alliance, he was restrained in his embrace. Putin was clearly trying to preserve his options and is caught partially by a need to avoid the appearance of becoming servile to any one entity as he tries to rebuild Russian power.

After September 11, Putin's preferences have become much clearer as he has distinctly leaned toward a long term partnership with the U.S. in its fight against terrorism. At the same time, latent distrust between China and Russia is more visible than the potential for a long term strategic partnership. The cooperation treaty the two countries finally agreed to in July 2001

was at best a compromise effort. China seemed intent on emphasizing that the treaty "guarantees neither side will target the other as an enemy, highlighting Beijing's fear that Moscow might join with the United States to counter China's rising power. Moscow, on the other hand, emphasized the new agreement's flexibility." The bottom line is that Russia can benefit more in both the short and long term by cooperating with the U.S. as opposed to forming an alliance with China. Historical Sino-Russian enmity is just another impediment to China's ability to change the course of Russian intentions.

Another alliance strategy being pursued by China is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This alliance was originally called the Shanghai Five and was an effort on the part of China to work border demarcation and political issues with Central Asian countries. The SCO was formerly stood up in June 2001 and took on the new mandate of being a regional mechanism to combat terrorism, separatism and religious extremism in Central Asia. September 11 provided a great opportunity for the SCO to demonstrate its merit, but "the lack of strategic cooperation among the member states reveals the self-interests that will keep the group from making headway." In addition, the U.S. push into Central Asia in its war on terrorists has done exactly the opposite of what China intended – the U.S. now has a strategic hold in the region and China's position has been weakened.

Even though China has an Islamic fundamentalist threat of its own in Xinjiang, she has not made enemies in Muslim countries the way the U.S. has. Samuel Huntington, in his essay "Clash of Civilizations," predicted a disturbing grand Confucian-Islamic alliance against the West. While there are no overt indications of a grand strategy on the part of China to align with Islamic countries against the U.S., China has persisted against U.S. wishes in selling WMD technology to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Pakistan and even Saudi Arabia.

To counter U.S. concerns, China has pointed to American arms sales to Taiwan and invoked her sovereign right to also market weapons. The bigger payoff for China and its customers has been the ability to put the U.S. on the strategic defensive with the sales. Chinese intransigence was reinforced during a February 2002 visit to Beijing by President Bush where he "didn't get an agreement on limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—his top priority with China and a central tenet of his foreign policy worldwide."

Over the past decade China has also consistently pursued a strategy of eroding U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. China, in a two-prong approach, has first worked to improve ties with key regional players, such as Korea and Japan. Instead of trying to supplant the U.S. as the primary force for stability, China has painted a picture of a post-Cold War East Asia with

the U.S. security footprint significantly scaled down. This is a message that, over the past several years, has not fallen completely on deaf ears within the region.

The second prong has been an aggressive effort on the part of China to further their regional posture, often at the expense of the U.S., within regional multi-lateral forums. A primary example is the ASEAN + 3 summit. This is a "summit that brings the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations together with China, South Korea and Japan. The forum has emerged as the only venue for meetings among the latter three countries that do not involve the United States, and it presents an opportunity for East Asian nations to discuss issues of common regional interest from an "Asian" perspective."

CONQUEST STRATEGY:

In a conquest strategy, a rising power such as China can try to increase its power by conquering territory. A necessary precondition for successful conquest is sufficient military power. In the case of China, its military power relative to the U.S. is insufficient to broadly challenge the U.S. In addition, the PRC does not have a culture of conquest with the exception of reoccupying territories that it feels are part of a historical greater China. Part of the pattern of reoccupation includes Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hainan Island.

The cultural inclination not to aggressively conquer territory does not mean China has not frequently and broadly used its military power to achieve limited objectives. China has been characterized as displaying "suddenly violent, preemptive behavior designed to shape the outcome of disputes. China exercised this aggressive, violent behavior toward other states more than 16 times in the period between 1949 and 1993. In each case, China couched its own action in terms of some form of self-defense against a state that allegedly threatened its territorial integrity or sovereignty." However, none of China's exercises of military power were broad land grabs that significantly expanded the country's power relative to its neighbors.

Historically, the ability to employ a conquest strategy has declined over the past fifty years. Conquest is increasingly difficult to justify on the modern world stage and often has both political and economic costs. One interesting sub-conquest strategy that China has employed over the past two decades to attenuate these costs has been a gradual inhalation of areas to which they purport to have a historical claim to. Most remarkable has been their expansion into the South China Sea. Their occupation of Mischief Reef off the coast of the Philippines under the cover of establishing a fishing research station was the defining moment of this strategy. However, to date, none of the regional players have made China pay a price for their boldness.

From the U.S. perspective, China's aggressive acts need to be monitored, but have never passed a threshold to threaten U.S. interests or freedom of action in the region.

RECENT U.S. POLICY TRENDS TOWARD CHINA

As mentioned in the introduction, the last published National Security Strategy establishes a philosophy of engagement with the PRC and stipulates "as we strengthen our alliances, we must build principled, constructive, clear-eyed relations with our former adversaries Russia and China." Key security objectives of the engagement process are outlined later in the NSS and include "sustaining the strategic dialogue of recent summits and other high-level exchanges and achieving greater openness and transparency in China's military."

Early in the Bush administration, there was a clear indication that changes in the approach to security relations with China were being considered. On 15 March 2001 the Pentagon confirmed that it was reviewing the program of mlitary exchanges. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directed that the current program of exchanges be limited to three months. During this period, the program would be reviewed to assess the value to the U.S. The announcement was seen as a signal of a cooling in the relationship with China by the new administration.⁷⁴

The fiscal 2001 defense-authorization act provided that the Pentagon submit to Congress a blueprint of the program of mil-to-mil exchanges with China by 31 March 2001. The Department of Defense did not meet this suspense, but did continue to actively address the issue. In addition to the on-going internal review, Secretary Rumsfeld addressed the issue with the PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen during a visit to the Pentagon on 22 March. In a news conference following the visit, Rear Admiral Craig Quigley stated

of all the topics discussed, the most time spent on any one of them was the importance to both countries of the mil-to-mil exchange program. Secretary Rumsfeld stressed that from the U.S. perspective that it is very important that these be mutually beneficial to both nations; reciprocity should be kind of a watchword and a guidepost as we design these things in the months ahead. And transparency of the process is also important, from our perspective.⁷⁶

Arguably, the review process was complicated and negatively influenced by the 1 April collision between a U.S. reconnaissance plane and a Chinese jet fighter. Prior to the collision, exchanges were being looked at on a case-by-case basis, but most were still being approved. Subsequent to the collision, the official policy was to continue a case-by-case review; however, Secretary Rumsfeld "issued specific guidance that U.S. officials were to minimize contact with their Chinese counterparts."

The official report on mil-to-mil exchanges with the People's Liberation Army was finally forwarded to Congress by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on 8 June. The report provided an assessment of the calendar year 2000 exchange program, but did not include a schedule of activities for calendar year 2001. The cover letter asserts

the 2001 program of mil-to-mil exchanges is under review at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. We, therefore, do not have a schedule of activities for this year. Until this review is complete, we will conduct military exchanges with the PLA selectively and on a case-by-case basis. ⁷⁸

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs reaffirmed on 21 August that mil-to-mil contacts with the PLA are still on a case-by-case basis. During his remarks to the press, Mr. Rodman seemed to link normalization of the review process to the President's October visit to China to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC). However, after the subsequent appointment of a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs (DASD AP) In September 2001, there has been little progress toward stepping beyond the case-by-case review of exchanges between the two militaries. The DASD AP, Peter Brookes, stated September 7 that he was tasked to develop a criteria to evaluate the mil-to-mil relationship with China, but to date there has been no significant progress.

In remarks at the conclusion of an October 2001 APEC conference by both President Bush and President Jiang, there seemed to be an opportunity for closer security cooperation as President Bush commended the Chinese response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, the characterization that "America wants a constructive relationship with China, "I was not a true endorsement for a dramatic change in bilateral security cooperation.

President Bush's discomfort with the Chinese leadership and political ideology and a new willingness to challenge them were highlighted during a recent trip to North Asia. During his stop in Beijing, President Bush used a speech to students at Qinghua University to delivery a pointed critique of the dictatorship of the Communist Party and called on the Chinese people to demand change.

In the words of one reporter covering the visit, "September 11 really did change everything. President Bush grasped that our response to the attacks must go beyond simply destroying some terrorist groups, he also understood that there's no substitute for American leadership—a leadership that is willing not just to use our military strength, but also to defend and advance liberal democratic principles." The Bush administration's distaste for working too closely with a country that it sees as possibly aspiring to challenge U.S. regional and global predominance would seem to remain unabated. The difference from past administrations is that

this one seems inclined to confront China where appropriate. However, to date, it has not outlined a consistent, sustainable policy line to support its actions.

CONCLUSION

China, as a rising power, is challenged by U.S. hegemony. The U.S. power has grown to the point that it is now being referred to not only as a superpower, but in some circles as a hyperpower. What is particularly disturbing about U.S. power to the Chinese is the U.S. ability and tendency to intervene, unilaterally if necessary, in areas that previously would have been considered sovereign issues. A recent example is the U.S. efforts to push Serbian forces out of Kosovo. The Chinese see possible parallels for each intervention to their interests in Taiwan or Tibet. As a result, it is unmistakable that the Chinese are intent on increasing their power relative to the U.S. to ensure that they can roll back U.S. hegemony where necessary.

The road to greater power for the Chinese is filled with some danger. It has been seen that their vital interests are tied inextricably to the CCP staying power. Some of the domestic frailties associated with the current regime can seem fairly daunting. If they can overcome these hazards and sustain China on its current path of economic growth, it is not unreasonable for them to expect to be in a position to challenge the U.S. militarily over the next generation (2025).

China's road to being a peer competitor to the U.S. would seem to be tied to a combination of two strategies. The primary path is an alliance strategy. There are several alliance options that China could pursue to threaten U.S. hegemony, to include continued courting Russia and/or Central Asian countries rich in resources. However, traditional animosities between Russia and China seem to make this avenue unlikely to produce a strategic partnership strong enough to be used as leverage against U.S. power.

More of a threat to the U.S. and more conceptually feasible would be an eventual alliance counter to U.S. regional and global interests between China and several Asian partners, primarily Japan and South Korea. The perception that the U.S. has withdrawn somewhat from the Pacific over the past decade, if properly pursued by the Chinese, may eventually find resonance with China's East Asian neighbors. There are some significant historical hurdles that China would also have to overcome in regional relations between it and its East Asian neighbors, but cultural and regional identity should eventually help them overcome these. An Asian security bloc posed to assert/protect its interests relative to the U.S. or other regional blocs would pose a significant threat to U.S. interests.

In combination with alliances that the U.S. would find threatening, China is likely to continue to pursue a limited military revolution strategy. While conventional military spending will remain fairly significant for China, development of asymmetric capabilities aimed at undermining U.S. military dominance will remain a priority. The most probable asymmetric path will be the development of an electronic warfare capability that can penetrate and threaten the network necessary for future U.S. forces to sustain full spectrum dominance of the battlefield.⁸⁴

It would therefore seem prudent for the U.S. to not lose sight of China as an enduring strategic threat as the U.S. deals with the short-term demands of the struggle against terrorists with global reach. A strategy to constrain China's emergence as a peer competitor, or threat, is necessary as the Bush Administration formulates its first National Security Strategy.

Attenuating China's ability to improve its power relative to the U.S. would seem to demand a broad and creative application of U.S. instruments of power.

RECOMMENDATION

China is the only country with both the latent potential (capability) and the intent to broadly challenge the U.S. role as the world's sole superpower over the next generation. An aggressive and confrontational strategy to counter her peer-competitor aspirations is not necessarily the best approach. A "strategy," however, is essential. At the height of the Cold War when it was easy to identify "the threat" and there were fewer complicating factors, such as a war on terrorism, there was a broad national consensus for establishing and following a long-term vision for dealing with the pervasive Soviet threat. The foundation of the vision, NSC 68, provided a sustainable roadmap for fighting the Cold War. This roadmap was supplemented by NSDD 75 during the Reagan Administration which reinforced the broad principles outlined in NSC 68.

Two important aspects of the U.S. ability to effectively counter the threats of the Cold War were non-partisan consensus to sustain the strategy regardless of shifts in administrations and the ability to apply an effective combination of all instruments of national power. The Bush Administration has the opportunity to establish a similar baseline strategy for molding a long-term relationship with China and ensuring that the regional and/or global role that China fills in 2025 is consistent with our vital interests. The challenge for establishing the strategy is to first look beyond the current terrorist threat and not disregard the possibly more compelling threat to our long-term interests China poses as a peer competitor.

It is also important to develop a degree of consensus on what is the appropriate longterm approach to dealing with China. A sustainable approach would be best served by not relying too heavily on the tendency of the China watchers in one camp to placate the Chinese leadership at every turn nor is it necessarily useful to assume a widespread containment strategy that fails to recognize that China, properly engaged, could become a responsible world power working in concert with the U.S.

The proper balance of U.S. instruments of power will not be easy, but is feasible. The key is that, once the strategy is established, consistent application of the strategy must be sustained. A comprehensive policy formulation should not shift with the arrival of each new administration. Historical success for U.S. foreign policy has been based on a foundation of broad political consensus largely immune from domestic differences. Diplomatic and economic instruments should be transcendent in the U.S. China strategy with the ability to respond across the spectrum of military conflict where necessary.

WORD COUNT = 9,684

ENDNOTES

- ¹ A good synopsis of the Bush Administration's struggle to find a balance in relations with China is provided by Harry Harding in a speech he gave to the Asia Society in Hong Kong. "The Bush Administration's Approach to Asia: Before and After September 11," 12 November 2001; available from http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/harding2.html; Internet; accessed 17 December 2001.
- ² Students in my seminar at the USAWC were told to the use the old NSS as the basis for regional security assessments in the spring of 2002, more than a year in to the new administration. While there are other indicators of the current administration's policy, this trend demonstrates that there is a level of uncertainty regarding the Administration's approach to national security issues beyond the on-going war against terrorists with global reach.
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- ⁵ Bonnie S. Glaser, "Face to Face in Shanghai: New Amity Amid Perennial Differences," <u>Comparative Connections (Pacific Forum CSIS)</u> 4th QTR 2001; available from http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0104Qus china.html Internet; accessed 18 January 2002.
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- ⁷ The split between those in favor of engagement with China and those who support a policy of containment is addressed by Zalmay Khalilzad, "Congage China," <u>RAND Issue Paper</u>, 1999, 2. Khalilzad prescribes a middle of the road policy approach that creates a proper balance between containment and engagement a difficult fence to balance on. The tendency of the Bush Administration to look at China as a potential strategic competitor as opposed to a strategic partner, especially prior to 11 September 2001, has been clearly articulated in multiple sources see especially June Teufel Dryer, "U.S. Policy Toward China: Judge China by its Deeds, Not Its Words," <u>Foreign Policy Research Institute Bulletin</u> 6 April 2001; available from http://www.fpri.org/enotes/asia.20010406.dreyer.judgechina.html; Internet; accessed 17 December 2001.
- ⁸ The model used to assess China's grand strategy is outlined in Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr., eds., <u>U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy</u> (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2001), 221-228.
- ⁹ Thomas S. Szayna et al., <u>The Emergence of a Peer Competitor: A Framework for Analysis</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).
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- ¹¹ An excellent analysis of the complexities and nuances of China's bureaucracy is found in Kenneth Lieberthal, <u>Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform</u>(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995).
- ¹² Since 1996 China has tried to portray an air of increasing transparency in their security infrastructure. An example is a 1998 defense white paper, "China's National Defense." The Department of Defense remains concerned with the lack of Chinese transparency relative to what the U.S. provides them during military-to-military exchanges see Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, "DOD News Briefing," 22 March 2001; available from www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2001/t03222001_t322asda.html; Internet; accessed 14 September 2001.
 - ¹³ Lieberthal, 4.
- ¹⁴ Lucian W. Pye, <u>The Spirit of Chinese Politics</u> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 14.
- ¹⁵ John Bryan Starr, <u>Understanding China: A Guide to China's Economy</u>, <u>History and Political Structure</u> (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997), 45.
 - ¹⁶ Lieberthal, 11.
- ¹⁷ Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1990), 11.
- ¹⁸ Mao Tse-Tung, <u>Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung</u> (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 39.
 - ¹⁹ Lieberthal, 131.
 - ²⁰ Starr, 58-77.
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- ²⁴ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, <u>The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's</u> Search for Identity (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), 33-35.
- ²⁵ See John Depres, "American Interests in and Concerns with China," in Chen Shuxun and Charles Wolf, Jr., eds., <u>China, the United States and the Global Economy</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 230.
- ²⁶ Gordon G. Chang, <u>The Coming Collapse of China</u> (New York: Random House, 2001), 17-20.
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- ²⁹ "Village Elections in China: A Taste of Democracy," <u>The Economis</u>t (September 29th-October 5th, 2001): 49.
- ³⁰ See for example Henry Chu, "Chinese censor transcript, cut Bush push for freedom," <u>The Patriot News</u>, 23 February 2002, A4.
- ³¹ Mark Burles and Abram M. Shulsky, <u>Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000).
- ³² A good source of information on the modernization intentions of China's military is found in Michael Pillsbury, ed., <u>Chinese Views of Future Warfare</u> (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997).
- ³³ See James A. Dorn, "The Tao of Trade," Mark A. Groombridge, "China's Accession to the World Trade Organization: Costs and Benefits," and Barry Naughton, "China's Trade Regime at the End of the 1990s: Achievements, Limitations, and Impact on the United States," in Ted Galen Carpenter and James A. Dorn, eds., China's Future: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2000).
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- ⁴⁴ Wang Naiming, "Adhere to Active Defense and Modern People's War," in <u>Chinese Views of Future War</u>, ed. Michael Pillsbury (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), 40.
- ⁴⁵ One of the more compelling arguments for the dissolution of China was made recently by Gordon G. Chang in <u>The Coming Collapse of China</u> (New York: Random House, 2001). An excellent debate of the merits of Chang's analysis is made by Robert Sutter and June Teufel Dryer in <u>China Brief</u>, Volume 1, Issue 8, 25 October 2001; available from http://china.jamestown.org/pubs/view/cwe_001_008_002.htm, Internet; accessed 17 December 2001.
- ⁴⁶ Richard Evans, <u>Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China</u> (New York: Viking Penguin, 1993), 306.
- ⁴⁷ Bates Gill, "Chinese Leadership Transition, 2002-2003: Implications for U.S. Policy," 30 October 2001; available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/China_Center/Bgill.htm; Internet; accessed 17 December 2001.
 - ⁴⁸ Chang, 259.
- ⁴⁹ For the degree that corruption impacts on the lives of the Chinese people see Perry Link, Evening Chats in Beijing: Probing China's Predicament (New York: W.W. Norton &Co., 1992), 51. For insights into the degree that corruption is pervasive even in the upper levels of the Chinese leadership the impotence of the Party to eliminate it see "Something Rotten in the State of China," The Economist 16 February 2002, 37.
 - ⁵⁰ Chang, 17-44.
 - ⁵¹ Starr, 167-182.

- ⁵² "China: Official Acknowledges AIDs Epidemic," <u>World News Digest</u> 20 September 2001; Available from http://www.2facts.com/stories/index/2001227110.asp; internet; accessed 24 February 2002.
- ⁵³ Analysis of the effectiveness of a recent crackdown on the Uighurs by the Chinese government is found at "Chinese Cleanup Targets Uighurs," <u>STRATFOR</u> 16 May 01; available from http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0105162140.htm Internet, accessed 15 November 2001. For a more comprehensive look at the history of Xinjiang and development of the region under Chinese control since 1949, see A. Doak Barnett, China's Far West (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 341-408.
- ⁵⁴ For an example of increasing unrest and lawlessness see "The Wild East," <u>The Economist</u> (10 November 2001): 39.
- ⁵⁵ Thomas S. Szayna, et al., <u>The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 7.
 - ⁵⁶ Ibid., 14-15.
- ⁵⁷ An exceptional analysis of China's defense budget is found in Bates Gill, "Chinese Defense Procurement Spending," in Lilley, 195-227. The author provides a balanced look at the divergence between the stated defense budget of the PRC and what is actually expended. The analysis also provides an insight into what the expenditures have and will give the Chinese military in terms of capabilities. A more sinister look is provided by Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II who claim that the Chinese government is actually spending up to ten times the officially announced figure on national defense in Timperlake, 247-8.
 - ⁵⁸ Chang, 16.
 - ⁵⁹ Szayna, 26.
- ⁶⁰ Bill Gertz, <u>The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America</u> (Washington, D.C.: Regenery Publishing, 2000), 8-13 and Ross H. Munro and Richard Bernstein, <u>The Coming Conflict With China</u> (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 22-50.
 - ⁶¹ Timperlake, 121.
 - ⁶² Szayna, 30.
- ⁶³ "Are Russia and China Moving Toward an Anti-U.S. Alliance?" 6 April 2001; available from http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=101583; Internet; accessed 11 February 2002.
- ⁶⁴ "Russia-China Accord Reflects Ongoing Rivalry, Not Unified Front," 13 July 2001; available from http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=200273; Internet; accessed 11 February 2002.

- ⁶⁵ "China Still Odd Man Out in Central Asia," 7 January 2002; Available from http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=201401; Internet; accessed 11 February 2002.
- ⁶⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, <u>The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate</u> (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 21-24.
- ⁶⁷ "Bush's Asia Tour A Victory of Low Expectations," <u>Los Angeles Times</u> 24 February 2002; Available at http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb2002/s20020225victory.htm, Internet; accessed 25 February 2002.
- ⁶⁸ "China, Japan and Korea Take Steps Toward Closer Ties," 7 November 2001; available from http://www.stratfor.com/premium/analysis_view.php?ID=201108; Internet; accessed 11 February 2002.
- ⁶⁹ Ian Johnston, <u>Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History</u> (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 249, argues that there are two grand strategic preferences in China. The first, called the Confucian-Mencian paradigm, assumes essentially that conflict is aberrant or at least avoidable through the promotion of good government and the coopting or enculturation of external threats. When force is used, it should be applied defensively, and then only in the name of righteous restoration of the moral-political order. He claims that this model dominates scholarship on Chinese strategic thought. His other paradigm is labeled the parabellum paradigm and assumes that conflict is a constant feature of human affairs, that it is due largely to the threatening nature of the adversary, and that in this zero-sum context the application of violence is highly efficacious for dealing with the enemy. His preference for looking at Chinese strategic culture clearly leans toward the second model.
- ⁷⁰ Larry M. Wortzel, <u>Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Military History</u> (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 16.

⁷¹ Szayna, 41

⁷² Clinton, iii.

⁷³ Ibid., 51

⁷⁴ Brian Knowlton, "U.S. Reviews Its Exchanges With the Chinese Military," <u>The International Herald Tribune</u>, 15 March 2001, 1.

⁷⁵ Malia Jensen, "Rumsfeld Limits Clintonian Military Collaboration With China,"

<u>NewsMax.com</u> March 2001; available from

<u>http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/3/14/191530.shtm</u>l Internet; accessed 19

September 2001.

⁷⁶ Rear Admiral Craig R. Quigley, DASO, PA, "DOD News Brief," <u>DefenseLINK</u> March 2001; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/March2001/t03222001_t322asda.html; Internet; accessed 14 September 2001.

- ⁷⁷ "US reduces military contact with China," <u>Muzi.com</u> June 2001; available from http://lateline.muzi.net/11/english/1074690.shtml; Internet; accessed 19 September 2001.
- ⁷⁸ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, "Discussion of National Missile Defense," interview by Brit Hume, <u>Fox News Sunday</u>, 29 July 2001.
- ⁷⁹ Peter Rodman, ASD ISA, "DOD Media Roundtable," <u>DefenseLINK</u>August 2001; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2001/t08222001_t0821asd.html Internet; accessed 14 September 2001.
- ⁸⁰ Peter Brookes, DASD Asia Pacific, "DOD Media Roundtable," <u>DefenseLINK</u> September 2001; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/t09102001_t907dasd.html; Internet; accessed 14 September 2001.
- ⁸¹ "U.S., China Stand Against Terrorism," <u>The White House</u> 19 October 2001; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011019-4.html; Internet; accessed 13 February 2002.
- ⁸² Robert Kagan, "The Bush Doctrine Unfolds," <u>Weekly Standard</u> 4 March 2002 available at http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb2002/s20020225doctrine.htm; Internet; accessed 25 February 2002.
- ⁸³ The term "Hyperpower" was coined by the French to categorize U.S. unmatched strength in the post-Cold War world. For example see "Japan, France to join forces against US hperpower," <u>Asia Times OnLine</u>, available at http://www.atimes.com/global-econ/AL18Dj01.html; internet; accessed 24 February 2002.
- ⁸⁴ Toshi Yoshihara, <u>Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threa</u>t? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2001), 6.
- ⁸⁵ Ernest May, ed., <u>America Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68</u> (Bedford, MA: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 7.
- ⁸⁶ Norman A. Bailey, <u>The Strategic Plan That Won the ColdWar: National Security Directive</u> <u>75</u> (McLean, VA: The Potomac Foundation, 1999), 14-16.

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