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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TRANSFORMING THE OFFICER EVALUATION SYSTEM: USING A 360-DEGREE FEEDBACK MODEL

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TIMOTHY R. REESE United States Army

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by

LTC Timothy R. Reese U.S. Army

COL Glenn Cunningham Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:

LTC Timothy R. Reese

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Since 1996 the Army has come to recognize that it has an officer leadership problem, particularly at its field grade and general officer levels. Too many officers run their units, their people (and sometimes themselves) into the ground in the pursuit of short-term mission successes. The Army has an excess of transactional leaders and a deficit of transformational leaders. The effects are many and varied: low morale among the force, rampant cynicism and mistrust, a retention crisis among mid-grade NCOs, captains and lieutenant colonels, officers declining command, and less effective, less ready units. This realization has come about at the same time that the Army is attempting to transform not only its equipment and tactical / operational doctrine, but also the way in which units operate and are led in the information age. The Army should take a cue from civilian practice in broadening its understanding of successful leadership from one that currently focuses almost entirely upon mission accomplishment, to one that includes long term organizational health of the unit and its personnel alongside of mission accomplishment. Army leadership doctrine emphasizes transformational leadership and the need to sustain units and individuals over long periods of stress. Army practices, however, ignore this aspect of leadership when it rates officer performance and in how it selects officers for schooling, promotion and command. A 360-degree leadership assessment of officer effectiveness, using peer and subordinate input, should be used as a formal part of the officer evaluation system.

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TRANSFORMING THE OFFICER EVALUATION SYSTEM: USING A 360 DEGREE FEEDBACK MODEL

Top down loyalty [in the Army] does not exist according to the summary of an Army leadership survey. Senior leaders will throw subordinates under a bus in a heartbeat to protect or advance their own careers.¹

Anonymous Army Major at USACGSC, 2000
The existing leadership model is inadequate.
2000 Army Leader Development Panel

The Army officer corps greets the release of every promotion list from major to general, and every command selection list with a collective, exasperated sigh, "How did that SOB get selected!?" "I'd never want to work for that jerk again," Soldiers of all ranks routinely and informally rate senior officers based on the officer's degree of abusiveness towards his or her subordinates and many do their best to avoid serving in units led by one of these well known "abusers." Of course these anecdotal findings are not enough on their own to indict the current system. After all, there are always disgruntled followers and there are always effective leaders who don't engender lots of love from their subordinates. Numerous studies and surveys in the last 3-6 years, however, have now provided convincing proof that these old adages are in fact true.²

The two startling judgments noted above are just two of the many indicators that the Army's current officer evaluation system is not generating and promoting the kind of "bold, innovative leaders of character" called for by the Chief of Staff of the Army in his Transformation plans. Admittedly, any soldier who ever served in any army could have made the first statement. The second statement, however, is official recognition by the U.S. Army that something is seriously amiss and needs to be fixed. The issue is made more urgent by the generally accepted idea that the world, and military forces in particular, are on the edge of a revolution in military affairs that will place even greater demands on soldiers and leaders at every level.

It is the thesis of this paper that the U.S. Army could improve the effectiveness of its officers and their leadership by changing the officer evaluation system to include input from a leader's peers and subordinates. In the late 1970s Leadership theorists developed a leadership model that they called the 360-degree feedback or multi-rater assessment model.⁴ In light of

this model this paper will first highlight the shortcomings of the current officer evaluation system. It will then examine the basic precepts of 360-degree feedback theory. Finally, it will propose a way in which 360-degree feedback theory could be incorporated into the Army officer evaluation system to improve its efficacy as a leadership-measuring instrument.

LEADERSHIP IN A TRANSFORMED ARMY

The essence of leadership is timeless. The application of this essence, however, evolves continuously throughout history. Except at the smallest unit levels leaders no longer use the brute physical strength and bravery of Alexander the Great to lead their soldiers. Technology has dispersed soldiers in battle, and in large part leaders must now rely on the ability of their subordinates to exercise their own judgment in performing their role on the battlefield. The harsh discipline of 18th century armies that trained soldiers to follow orders out of fear of punishment has been largely replaced with a system that achieves results through motivation and shared goals. At the beginning of the so-called information age many theorists focus upon technology to locate the source of the next revolution in military affairs. But as General George S. Patton so famously stated, "Wars may be fought with weapons, but it is the spirit of the man who leads and the men who follow that determines victory." Technological advantages have tended in the past to be short-lived and less decisive that its admirers predict.

Marine Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Corbett takes a different view of the future revolution in military affairs and focuses instead on the human dimension. "The next RMA will initially be dominated by the nation to first capture the essence of the free market dynamic, i.e., the proliferation of trusted and empowered decision makers, and to incorporate that dynamic into its military institutions. That nation's forces will develop an entrepreneurial battlefield ethos that values initiative and trust over order and inspection." Later he adds, "The organizational values of such a force are trust, initiative, intuition, risk and adaptability."

Most of the attention devoted to the Army Transformation effort is focused on the challenge of creating the Interim and Objective Forces. An equally if not more daunting task will be developing leaders who can employ the new technology in those forces. In the Army Transformation Campaign Plan, General Shinseki calls for leaders who are "bold and innovative," who are "agents of change," and who have "a greater degree of agility." Lieutenant General Steele, head of the Army's Leader Development Panel, has stated that Army leadership doctrine "does not suffice for the objective force." How well is the current officer

leadership evaluation system doing in creating the kind of leaders called for by the transformation effort?

SOME SHORTFALLS WITH CURRENT ARMY LEADERSHIP

A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report (2000) concludes, "Present leader development and promotion systems are not up to the task of consistently identifying and advancing highly competent leaders." The CSIS study goes on to point out that many officers perceive an increasing conflict between their loyalty to authority and the need for candor and honest dissent. In the words of some junior officers, "The largest problem affecting retention of junior officers is the perception that the senior leadership is completely out of touch with soldiers and their needs."

Junior offices are leaving the Army at alarming rates. ¹² The attrition rate for Army captains is often cited as the leading indicator of the problem; it is up along with the retirement rate for lieutenants and colonels. The number of officers declining battalion and brigade command went from 3 in FY95 to 55 in FY99. ¹³ One study by the Army Research Institute found that among captains leaving the service who cited job dissatisfaction as the primary reason for leaving, they specifically cited poor leadership and micromanagement as the cause of their dissatisfaction. ¹⁴ Clearly the time for change is now.

Leadership crises are not new to the Army. They have arisen and been skillfully repaired in the past. The landmark work by Gabriel and Savage, <u>Crisis in Command</u>: <u>Mismanagement in the Army</u>, was a clarion call about the depths of the officer leadership problem in the Army after the Vietnam War. In one case they cite a 1970 Army War College study that found "widespread and significant differences between the ideal moral/ethical/professional values of the Army and the prevailing standards." The report goes on to list the major reasons for this gap:

selfish, promotion oriented behavior; inadequate communication between junior and senior; distorted or dishonest reporting of status, statistics, or officer efficiency; disregard for principles but total respect for accomplishing even the most trivial mission with zero defects; and disloyalty to subordinates.¹⁵

Numerous historians cite the measures taken by the Army in the late 1970s and 1980s to fix these specific problems as the major reason for the astonishing success of the Army during the final years of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War, and into the 1990s. Senior Army

leaders completely overhauled the officer promotion system and the training management system to create what will likely be called one of the greatest armies the world have ever seen.

But once again history repeats itself. In 1996 the Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer, felt compelled to cite a 1995 Army study that concluded the following:

The state of ethical conduct is abysmal. Few battalion commanders can afford integrity in a zero defects environment. Telling the truth ends careers quicker than making stupid mistakes or getting caught doing something wrong. There is a return to the "zero defects" and ticket punching mentality of the 1960's and 1970s' that nearly destroyed the officer corps. ¹⁶

Lieutenant General Stoup, then the Army's senior personnel manager, wrote in the same 1996 issue of Military Review, "We hear anecdotal accounts of careerism, stifled initiative, lack of trust of subordinates and a growing zero defects [italics in the original] mentality. In 2000 the Army Training and Leader Development Panel report to the Army confirmed the 1995 study and years of anecdotal reports. The report concluded that:

They [interviewed soldiers] see Army practices as being out of balance with Army beliefs. There is an undisciplined operational pace that affects every facet of Army life. A perception that micromanagement is pervasive [exists]. There is diminishing direct contact between seniors and subordinates ... evidenced by leaders that are focused up rather than down. The OER [Officer Efficiency Report] is a source of mistrust and anxiety.¹⁸

Army researcher Leonard Wong found, in his landmark 2000 study of the generational differences among Army officers, that the so-called Generation X has very different ideas about what constitutes a good leader and a healthy organization that they would want to serve. Many of the traditional attributes of the baby boomer generation do not resonate with succeeding generations. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the study, considers Generation X a flawed generation or not, clearly the human material that makes up the Army is different today than it was 25 years ago.

THE ONE DIMENSIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON LEADERSHIP

What is remarkable about these examples is the tremendous consistency among them. Clearly the Army has not found a long-term solution to the officer leadership issue. Why is it that this crisis has re-appeared in almost exactly the same manifestation twenty years after it was believed to have been "fixed?" The answer lies in the Army's culture of mission accomplishment and in the way it measures officer effectiveness. In the Army, the natural tension between centralized control and local initiative, between immediately measurable results and long-term institutional goals, is far too often resolved in favor of the former.

First, Army culture rightly prizes and rewards those who can get the job done in the most difficult circumstances. "Duty, Honor, Country" permeates the Army ethic –and doing one's duty no matter what the cost is first. "No mission too difficult, No sacrifice to great, Duty First" is the motto of the Army's 1st Infantry Division. One cannot argue with the proposition that war is no place for second place results. Unfortunately, this ethos is often misapplied in peacetime with deleterious results.

Second, in an organization that stresses the need for adaptive, innovative and people-centered leaders, the Army evaluates its officer leaders using a system that only "looks down" at its leaders. This system includes leadership doctrine, the officer evaluation report, and officer promotion, schooling, and command selection boards. In each of these areas the effectiveness of an officer, and hence his or her eligibility for promotion, is measured solely or almost exclusively by that officer's chain of command. The professional judgment of an officer's peers and subordinates have no formal role in promotion, schooling, or selection for command. OERs rate an officer's performance using the evaluation of the officer's immediate leader and that leader's boss. An officer is evaluated in a wide variety of positions throughout a career, but always with the same top-down perspective.

Third, personnel turbulence and time conspire to make it very difficult for leaders to evaluate the long-term effects of their subordinates' leadership style on their units and soldiers. Most, though not all, units average thirty three percent personnel turnover in a given year and change commanders every 12 to 24 months. In this kind of an ever-changing situation it is quite difficult for a senior leader to understand how well a subordinate leader is doing in relation to his peers and subordinates. The cross currents of personnel changes ameliorate the effects of poor leadership – the body of soldiers disheartened by a poor leader is itself in such a state of flux, and the leader himself changes so often – that even the best senior leaders find it hard to spot trends of any kind.

Senior leaders usually discover only the most egregious cases of poor leadership and its effects on unit performance. As Gen Ulmer has stated, "The Army does not enforce guidelines about leadership style except at the extreme edge of the acceptable behavior envelope." Such discoveries usually take place long after the harm has been done. He goes on to note that the Army lacks any practical guidelines and uses no systematic monitoring that would enable leaders to identify arrogant, abusive leaders harmful to the long-term health of their units. ²¹

This combination of a top-down evaluation system, with a culture that necessarily values job completion, has produced an Army whose leadership is seriously unbalanced and is

harming the organization's effectiveness. The current Army officer evaluation system rewards short-term mission accomplishment using quantifiable measures of effectiveness at the expense of the long-term health of the organization and its people. Subordinates who are abused, ignored and over-worked do not function well in situations of stress, uncertainty and violent death. In peacetime abusive officers breed passivity, resistance to change, poor unit performance, and early departure by their subordinates from an all volunteer Army. In war, these leaders breed high casualties and defeat.

ARMY LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE

The U.S. Army does not teach or advocate this type of leadership. Army leadership doctrine is sound; it is just not followed. Field Manual (FM) 22-100, the Army's leadership manual, defines leadership in two parts. Leadership is defined as "influencing people by providing purpose direction, and motivation" and doing so "while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization."²² A popular translation among soldiers is "Mission first, people always" and another is "Take care of your people and they will take care of you." Others have described these two aspects as operating and building or performing and learning. The vast majority of the Army's manual, however, stresses mission accomplishment and improving one's organizational output/performance. The manual does not place as much stress on leading and improving the unit in such a way that its people are indeed motivated to perform well under stress in your absence, to innovate, to continue to serve after your time as leader has come and gone – to say nothing of performance under fire. In short, creating a "healthy" unit is lost in the emphasis on performance.

To be sure FM 22-100 clearly holds that this other aspect of leadership is important. It states, "The highest form of discipline is the willing obedience of subordinates who trust their leaders, understand and believe in the mission's purpose, value the team and their place in it, and have the will to see the mission through. The manual talks about the need for mutual respect, trust between leaders and the led, and the need for cohesive teams to withstand the stress of combat. These intangible factors of discipline, cohesion, and teamwork, called command climate, have been historically proven over centuries to be decisive in the outcome of battles and wars. In fact, FM 22-100 uses a large number of historical vignettes to demonstrate/prove their value in successful leadership. In the same article in which he decried the current state of Army officer leadership, General Reimer stated:

The Army *is* people. An officer's primary responsibility is to develop people and enable them to reach their full potential.²⁴

Interestingly enough, the Army uses peer feedback to train its leaders before commissioning. The Reserve Officer Training Program and the United States Military Academy, using different systems, both use peer feedback to develop prospective officers. Why should we assume that this kind of feedback would not be useful to an officer as he or she develops their leadership ability over time? Cleary we know the doctrine and understand the lessons of history. The rub becomes, "how do you measure this stuff" in peacetime?

FINDING GOOD LEADERS IN PEACETIME

The focus on mission accomplishment is absolutely necessary in an organization whose mission entails the killing of human beings in the most efficient and effective manner possible. The Army, however, spends very little time performing its killing mission and the vast majority of its time preparing itself to do so. Successful leadership in battle is fairly easy to measure. After all, one either wins or loses battles and wars, but history has shown that it is frighteningly difficult to predict how leaders and their units will perform in battle ahead of time. This explains the all too natural tendency to find easily quantifiable measures of leadership in peacetime by focusing on outcomes. We can't know if Colonel X will be an effective leader in battle until one comes along, so for now we will measure his leadership while in command of a unit using such things as readiness reports, maintenance rates, training evaluations and other such quantitative aspects of his unit's performance on peacetime operations.

The recent surge of interest in the American GI's experience of World War II has provided many examples of leaders whose peacetime performance, leadership and unit climate were not up to the task of war. Entire swaths of the Army officer corps were weeded out after 1941. Stephen Ambrose's recent blockbuster book, <u>Band of Brothers</u>, recounts the experiences of an airborne infantry company. "Easy Company" was raised and trained by a commander who was a martinet; a leader who personified the officer whose unit always earned top ratings for performance but who was detested by his soldiers as unethical, incompetent, and cowardly. It took a crisis of leadership and the initiative of disgruntled and fearful NCOs to bring the problem to the attention of the regimental commander who relieved the captain almost literally on the eve of the D-Day invasion.

Post Vietnam surveys and studies have not indicated that poor leadership among sergeants and junior officers is a significant problem. One cannot prove a negative, but this is

probably so because the connection between the leader and the led is very strong at this level. Day to day and hour-to-hour small unit leaders are intimately connected to their subordinates. Their every move is done in the presence of their followers and the work they perform is largely in direct contact with their subordinates. This is what FM 22-100 calls direct leadership or "face to face, first line leadership." At this level the performance of leaders and the organizational climate they create are more or less easily observed. Ineptness, abusiveness and unethical behavior are immediately obvious to all and are not tolerated. Company and battalion commanders, first sergeants and command sergeants major can easily monitor the behavior of their subordinate leaders. If they don't observe this kind of negative leadership one can be certain that other subordinate leaders, and perhaps even the lowest ranking soldier in the organization, will point it out to them in various forums.

Beginning at the rank of lieutenant colonel and the level of battalion command, however, the physical and conceptual distance between leaders and led widens significantly. Leaders at these levels must necessarily lead units and organizations through many levels of subordinate leaders. As these leaders progress in rank they are less and less likely to see their subordinates' performance "on the ground" and often must lead using policy, systems, resource allocation, and strategic vision. This is what FM 22-100 calls organizational leadership and strategic leadership.²⁶ At these levels leadership practices that are easily discernable in smaller organizations become quite difficult to observe even when the senior leader consciously looks for them. Organizational issues tend to overshadow the direct leadership practices of senior officers.

Raters and senior raters often see their subordinate leaders only at formations, inspections, and other formal events when leadership and organizational climates cannot be so readily observed. The situation is made worse when the senior leader is himself a one-dimensional leader and part of the problem.²⁷ General Stroup makes note of how easy it is to say that the Army's values drive the way we lead soldiers, but how maddeningly difficult it is to measure what values are really being applied in a given unit. He compares the process of measuring a leader's skill and determining a unit's command climate to an iceberg – it is easy to see what floats above the water and to miss the true scope of what lies below.²⁸ The manner by which the Army measures officer leadership is akin to measuring an iceberg by looking only at what portion floats above the water.

THE OFFICER EVALUTION REPORT

Army doctrine has the right ideas about mission accomplishment and taking care of one's subordinates, even if the emphasis could use a little re-prioritizing, but the most recent version of the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) does not. The OER exacerbates the problem of over emphasis on mission accomplishment at the cost of one's subordinates' morale and performance. The current OER, in effect since 1997, denotes some space to specifically evaluating an officer's character, leadership abilities, and unit climate. It measures traits such as integrity, selfless service and technical / tactical skill. Part IV of the OER, however, provides space only for checking either "yes" or "no" to indicate whether or not an officer displays these traits. A single "no" check is perceived as the end of an officer's career and hence is only used in the most glaring situations. There is no room for judgment, nuance, for or commentary by the rater about the rated officer's unit climate. The effect of this shriveled section of the OER is that it has almost zero effect – one is either a failure (an infinitesimal percentage of officers) or a complete success. Part V of the OER, by far more important, and asks both the rater and senior rater to evaluate only "the rated officer's performance during the rating period and his/her potential for promotion."

The OER measures individual performance and does so only from the perspective of the rated officers' two superior officers. The OER simply does not provide the Army an evaluation of an officer's ability to lead a unit or organization in a way that fosters cohesion, teamwork and long-term health of the unit. And furthermore, the OER is the only system the Army uses to measure an officer's leadership ability in peacetime.

Again the January-February issue of Military Review points out the dilemma. LTC Tim Challans wrote:

Ironically, current leadership assessment and evaluation tools select those who have mastered direct leadership skills to be our senior leaders, while it is becoming more accepted that senior leaders must exercise more organizational and conceptual skills. ... the Army might be picking the wrong people to be senior leaders.²⁹

We have seen that the Army periodically struggles with identifying officers who will be successful at what the Army does; fight wars. History has shown that an officer's ability to create mutual respect, teamwork, and unit cohesion in his unit are critical to successful performance in combat. The Army's current officer evaluation system, however, measures only the former dimension of leader effectiveness, mission accomplishment. It ignores the second and equally vital dimension, molding and motivating soldiers and units for long-term success. In the words of one observer, "the Army spends too much time 'operating' and not enough time

'building' units." The ability to produce results in a short time is the hallmark of a successful Army officer in peacetime. It is essentially the peacetime substitute method for measuring an officer's effectiveness in combat. It is not necessarily a poor one, just an incomplete one. It is time now to turn to the civilian world for a possible solution to this dilemma.

360 DEGREE FEEDBACK THEORY

The underlying premise of 360-degree feedback or multi-rater assessment is that leader effectiveness should be assessed not only by the leader's boss but also by his or her coworkers - peers and subordinates. Traditional evaluation models for leadership stress task accomplishment, organizational efficiency and compliance with organizational goals –from the perspective of the boss, from top down. What is usually not measured using the traditional approach are how well the leader creates and sustains employee motivation, inspires teamwork, fosters innovation, builds trust between employees and employers, and is open to new ideas. These are the kinds of leadership traits that seem to be in greater and greater demand at the dawn of the information age. 360-degree feedback is a way in which traditional leadership evaluation can be supplanted to provide a more rounded and broader view of a leader's skills.

Multi-rater assessment theory has evolved out of organizational and industrial psychology, and performance appraisals. Employee surveys (oral and/or written questionnaires) are used to determine the level of satisfaction with any number of factors in an organization – compensation, workplace rules, immediate supervisors and corporate executives.³⁰ These surveys have a nearly infinite variety but all rely on obtaining honest feedback from a bottoms-up perspective. In terms of using it to assess leadership, the question might be phrased as, "How do the led feel about the leaders?" They can be focused on the entire organization or on portions – from the entry-level workers' view of job foremen, middle management's view of the CEO. When used to assess leadership satisfaction 360-degree feedback is also used to look at relations among peers and co-workers to determine such things as trust and teamwork.

It is useful at this point to briefly describe the terms transactional and transformational leadership for the value of 360-degree feedback is that it is a way to assess the later. Transactional leadership stresses managing workers by employing rewards and punishments, setting precisely defined goals and measuring incremental progress, keeping workers tightly focused on their individual contribution, and using the approach that the boss or the firm already knows best how to accomplish a task. This approach can work in the short run, in stressful

situations, where tasks are simple and repetitive, or with unskilled and unmotivated workers. It is the classic leadership model for everything from assembly lines to military regulation and discipline.

Transactional leadership is the type of leadership most often and most easily measured by traditional, top-down styles of rating subordinates. After all, organizations have goals to be met and it is not difficult for the boss to measure who accomplishes them and who does not. The disadvantage is that this approach to measuring leaders is not well suited to long-term organizational success in a changing world, attracting and keeping talented employees, or in situations of great uncertainty and change.

Transformational leadership, as its name indicates, stresses transforming subordinates by challenging them to see beyond their own self-interest and look to the interest of the organization. This type of leadership is not often measured. How does a boss determine whether or not the employees of one of his key subordinates are challenged and motivated, are operating as a team, are generating new ideas for the company, or will be able to deal well with a change in goals? Despite the acknowledged importance of these traits it takes time and effort and non-traditional searching to find them. They do not easily jump off the pages of production schedules, cost effectiveness studies or unit readiness reports.

The Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) has been one of the principal proponents of 360-degree theory. 360-degree feedback systems give a more comprehensive and useful perspective of a leader's effectiveness because today's organizations tend to be broader and larger, they reduce the potential for bias, bosses often have a narrow view of their subordinates' leadership skill, and because leaders often act differently in relations with peers, subordinates and leaders. As the CCL has found, "there is no way to verify the presence or absence of some crucial leader behaviors other than to query the followers." This last statement is intuitively obvious, but often neglected in leadership evaluations. Bosses are often fooled by the sycophant or by the bully – peers and subordinates are not so easily taken in.

Experience has shown that about one third of managers rate themselves about the same way as do their co-workers. Another third, the "high self-raters," have an inflated view of themselves as leaders. The final third rate themselves lower than their co-workers. This normal distribution is not that revealing; it is the rating of effectiveness at work for each of these groups that is most compelling. There is some ambiguity about the effectiveness of the later two groups from the perspective of their co-workers. Some leaders with low self-images are seen as wasting effort and as not being the most effective leaders. The most effective leaders are usually among the group with an accurate view of their own abilities for they know their own

strengths and weaknesses and work accordingly. Almost invariably, however, managers with a high self-view of themselves are rated as the least effective by their co-workers. Furthermore, high self-raters are more common in senior leadership positions in major corporations.³⁴ These individuals form the core of the problem. Leaders who have inflated views of their own effectiveness are not seen as effective by their co-workers and yet rise to the top of their organization. This illustrates the tendency of organizations to select its senior managers on criteria that do not include co-worker views of their effectiveness as leaders.

Researcher Robert Kaplan has studied corporate executives in Fortune 500 companies and concludes that most managers are more concerned with mastering and controlling their environment than in fostering productive relationships among their organizations. He calls these types of leaders "expansive personalities." He also illustrates the negative effect these expansive leaders have on their organizations, especially upon the productivity and moral of their work forces.³⁵ These are precisely the type of leaders whose downsides are not observed, or if they are observed are ignored in the name of expediency and short-term results. All too often the negative consequences of their leadership are not seen until disaster looms. And, all too often that disaster has its origins in the very leadership that has been rewarded for short-term results.

In the corporate world, 360-degree feedback is provided to the participant in a formal, but neutral setting by an expert trained in the use of this feedback who is not part of the participant's organization. Observers note that 360 degree assessments are effective because they offer a well rounded assessment of leadership, often challenge the leader's self-concept and because it is offered in a supportive, non-threatening manner. These three factors taken together increase the likelihood of change by the assessed leader.³⁶

In business practice 360-degree feedback is used for three related purposes: as part of the developmental process for individual managers and leaders, to determine group strengths and development needs, and to broaden employee awareness of expected behaviors. In the first instance feedback is used to help develop individual leaders and increase their effectiveness. 360-degree feedback can be used to determine organization wide trends that top management can address in a broad way. Thirdly, 360-degree feedback is often used as a way to inculcate institutional values and expected norms among employees and mangers alike.³⁷

When used to measure individual leaders, 360-degree feedback can be employed as a self-development tool for the individual leader, it can be used as an administrative tool by the organization in hiring and promotion, or both. The difference essentially comes down to who owns the data - the rated individual or the organization.³⁸ One type of 360-degree feedback

already used by the Army, command climate surveys, illustrates both of these uses. In some units these surveys are directed by higher headquarters as part of annual inspections and conducted by the Inspector General. Commanders and leaders can also use a number of self-directed surveys that are administered by themselves or by an outside agency and the results are only seen by the leader initiating the survey.

The advantage of the later method is that leader is free to seek honest feedback without fear of retribution from the boss and use it for his or her own self-improvement. A leader who uses formal 360-degree surveys is likely to already be a transformational leader who desires to improve his skills. At the same time this is the method's main disadvantage – there is no real pressure to change. A leader not disposed to subordinate input in daily operations is unlikely to change his style based on subordinate ratings of his skill. He is not likely to use the self-directed method, and if he is directed to do so will resist its input that much more strongly. Studies have shown that 360-degree feedback has no long-lasting effect and leads to few changes in leadership behaviors when used by individual leaders without a strong organizational support and follow-up.³⁹

Few organizations place as much institutional emphasis on developing leaders as does the Army. The Army in FM 22-100 stresses that both transactional and transformational leadership are important depending on the situation and type of unit being led. Transformational leadership is clearly the preferred approach. As has already been shown, however, the Army tends to measure leaders from a transactional view. The culture of mission accomplishment (totally appropriate) combined with the officer evaluation system that focuses on transactional leadership (as measured by an officer's seniors) does not encourage the development or promotion of transformational leaders. Despite the rigors of military discipline it has long been known that soldiers are long motivated by money or rewards and punishments. Thus FM 22-100 quotes Napoleon:

A man does not have himself killed for a few halpence a day or for a petty distinction. You must speak to the soul in order to electrify the man.⁴¹

It has already been shown that in the future the Army plans to rely even more on transformational leadership as it transforms itself into the Interim and Objective Forces. What follows is a way in which the Army could use 360-degree feedback mechanisms to develop and promote the kind of transformational leaders needed in a transformed Army.

THREE STEPS TO IMPLEMENTING CHANGE

As the first step, the Army must admit it has a problem. In his book, <u>Leading Change</u>, John Kotter notes that strategic leaders can use a visible crisis to increase the urgency level and fight the natural complacency of an established organization. Clearly there is substantial evidence of a leadership problem in the Army. For an organization to remain effective, its members must believe that its stated, operating, and institutional values are aligned. Today many Army officers do not believe this is true and especially so with regards to the current evaluation and promotion system. The Army needs public acknowledgements by its most senior leaders that "we hear you; we have a problem." The 2000 Army Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) report would be the logical place to start. As has already been shown, this very recent report documents thoroughly the problem. In fact it repeatedly and explicitly calls for the use of 360-degree feedback in officer development. What follows are four significant ways in which the Army could implement the ATLDP report's call for change.

First, change the culture. John Kotter claims that culture "comes last, not first" in the process of strategic organizational change. Without changing the organizational culture a strategic change effort will wither and die. The U.S. Army is unlike corporate America in many ways; in particular the Army is a doctrine-based organization. Far more than any civilian organization, the Army runs on a shared set of values and common operating principles. Unlike the case of a major corporation, culture will have to change concurrently with the process in the Army, for the Army is culture. The Army's senior leadership will have to articulate a changed vision of leadership in its doctrine early on in the process of implementing changes to its management practices. Transforming the officer evaluation and promotion systems will be quite difficult to do and even more difficult to "anchor in the culture." In an Army whose officers have a high degree of cynicism about the current evaluation system, merely communicating a sensible vision will not resonate well with the officer corps. The Army will need to expand its officer leadership doctrine, revise its training programs and make this new vision part of the Army Transformation Campaign Plan.

The vision should stress that a transformed force needs transformed leaders who are selected and promoted due to their technical skills, mental flexibility, war fighting prowess and who can work well with rank, branch and service diversity to accomplish their missions. ⁴⁶ Most importantly, these leaders must develop organizational and command climates that encourage loyalty, initiative, and risk-taking. ⁴⁷ Gen Shinseki has made a good initial effort to bring about this change in culture. It needs more - it needs visible action.

The heart of the vision should include the adoption of a 360-degree assessment model to supplement the senior-only evaluation system now used. It must be established that leaders should be evaluated not only by their seniors, but also by their peers and subordinates, to present a more complete vision of that officer's accomplishments, character and leadership ability. Multi-rater feedback from peers and subordinates should take its place along side the traditional OER in the overall process of developing, selecting, and promoting officers. As a basis for this vision the coalition should use the CSIS recommendation "to enhance the reliability of the selection process peer and subordinate input collected in a manner not to compromise the chain of command could be provided ..." This kind of rating system will help to foster leaders who are life-long learners, who can develop "learning organizations," who are open to new ideas, and who can manage the complex systems of the future. It would replace a system that, in the eyes of many junior officers and NCOs, places far too much emphasis on short-term accomplishments at the expense of subordinates and long-term unit effectiveness.

Specifically, this change must include periodic and formal 360-degree feedback assessments of leaders. As an officer reaches captain and commands his or her first unit it is time to begin providing 360-degree feedback for use by that officer. At this level the assessments would be provided only to the individual being assessed as a self-development tool. This would be an officer's introduction to the practice of 360-degree feedback and to an Army culture that values transformational leadership. Additionally, at the direct leadership level feedback is already direct and frequent; there are plenty of sergeants and some privates who make sure "their LT" knows what they think!

The Army currently uses a variety of unit command climate surveys to provide officers good 360-degree feedback in a non-threatening way. Various major commands around the Army, the Army Inspector General's Office and the Army Research Institute all provide user-friendly unit climate surveys that provide roughly the same kind of information to the ratee as do more formal 360-degree feedback models. The emphasis at this level should be on self-development and for setting the conditions for the acceptance of formal 360-degree feedback later in one's career. Officers will thus acclimatize to having their leadership evaluated in this way and subordinates will grow used to providing this feedback.

Beginning with the rank of major these assessments should be conducted by professionals from outside the unit chain of command who are trained in 360-degree feedback. Quality feedback instruments and professional explanation and personal debriefings are needed in order for individuals to make the best use of the information presented.⁵⁰ The frequency of

sampling will have to be based on the type of unit to which an individual is assigned, the position he or she is in, and the length of time.

For example, for officers in the grade of major through lieutenant colonel, 360-degree feedback might be used only when he or she is commanding or leading in a unit/organization with more than one level of subordinates. In this case the officer would receive feedback once a year concurrent with his OER. Officers in student detachments or who lead only a small work group would not receive formal 360-degree feedback; they would rely upon informal, self-directed tools. Colonels and general officers, who are by definition organizational and strategic leaders, should receive yearly 360-degree feedback. Army studies have shown, and common sense indicates, that the biggest problem with officer leadership resides in large, complex organizations, not in platoons.

Second, these assessments should be made part of the officer's personnel file or OMPF. It has been shown that without a formal process linking individual self-development to organizational structure, 360-degree feedback usually does not achieve a high degree of effectiveness for the organization.⁵¹ This would be a major cultural shift for Army officers.

These results should not be provided directly to the officer's current chain of command. Leaders must not be absolved from the responsibility of making their own evaluation of their subordinate leaders using their own personal observation skills. Officers should not fear that their boss might use the formal 360-degree feedback results unfairly and penalize them in the current rating cycle. This will lessen the likelihood that subordinates and peers will bias their input to either positively or negatively affect the boss in the short run. These assessments could be put into an officer's OMPF after he departs the organization for example. They would be in that officer's file when he or she is considered for the next career step (more about that later). Over time and as the officer increases in rank and responsibility the reports will provide a picture of his or her ability to inspire subordinates and to sustain healthy units.

Third and finally, Army selection boards for promotion and for command of units / organizations must be instructed to include those 360-degree assessments in an officer's OMPF in their deliberations. In addition to OERs and awards reflecting individual performance and short-term mission success, boards would also have a way to evaluate an officer's ability to build and sustain healthy organizational climates. The full range of leadership abilities would thus be available for evaluation. Perhaps some officers would even be selected for particular assignments based upon their individual balance of leadership characteristics and the perceived need of the organization or unit that they would lead. Majors being selected for battalion

command would have two or three 360-degree reports in their OPMF (from their two years in branch qualifying leadership positions). Colonels being looked at for general officer would have at least six (the previous two plus four more for their years of battalion and brigade command), and probably more.

POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR CONCERN

Multi-rater feedback is not without its limitations. At first glance this seems overly complex and burdensome to manage but it need not be so. This is not to say that there will be no administrative cost; the Army will have to train 360-degree specialists and develop procedures to manage the process. The results of the feedback will have to be managed and recorded in the same way that is now done for OERs. The Army already has an institutional base of agencies that administers 360-degree feedback that would have to be expanded. The Inspector General's office should only be used for the self-development portion of 360-feedback to preserve its independence and impartiality. The cost of the administrative burden should be weighed against the benefits of improved leadership, Army morale and retention, and success on the battlefield.

Another fear is that some subordinates and/or peers will not be able to resist the urge to "stick it" to a disliked boss or a rival. It would be easy, however, to put in place systems to reject individual scores in a 360-degree feedback survey with multiple providers that are outside of statistical norms. A simplistic analogy would be that of Olympic scoring of gymnastics and other sporting events where the clock is not the judge of success. Once this process becomes institutionalized and part of the Army culture it will not be seen as a novel way to embarrass the boss but part of the essence of military duty.

Some leaders will be unable to resist the urge to "fatten up" their subordinate ratings by taking steps to make their people "like" them. This will not be hard for that leader's boss to observe and to keep in mind when evaluating that leader's effectiveness. Savvy NCOs and junior officers will likely not fall for the trick in the first place. The balance of perspectives in the 360-degree model (subordinates, peers and seniors) will prohibit any leader from successfully "gaming" the system.

Traditional OERs, with their mission focus, must remain the key determiner of success and the existing OER system should remain in effect. The continued presence of these reports will only be supplemented, not replaced, by 360-degree reports. An officer's fiche will contain both reports thus providing a complete view of his or her leadership skills. Senior officers sitting

on promotion or selection boards will decide how much emphasis to place on any single report or type of report.

Another common criticism of 360-degree feedback is that "any good leader will know how his subordinate leaders are treating their people." Perhaps true in some idyllic world – evidently not true in today's Army given the vast number of indicators to the contrary. Critics also take issue with "empowerment theories" as being opposed to the essence of military leadership. These critics miss the point about the kind of leadership that inspires, motivates and sustains subordinates under the difficult conditions in peace and war.

Some criticize younger officers for being selfish. As Leonard Wong's famous Generation X study of young officers found, however, they are not selfish but their loyalty to the Army "is based on a bond of trust – not on the promise of lifelong employment." Generation X expects the Army to live up to its rhetoric; they want the Army to be precisely what their critics contend it already is. There is no disconnect, loss of discipline or erosion of values between generations. Younger soldiers leave the Army when they find it does not live up to its ideas – hardly a self-serving motivation. The Army will continue to loose good leaders if the practice of leadership fails to measure up to its professed ideal.

Field Manual 22-100 clearly encourages officers to become transformational leaders develop the ability to motivate subordinates to innovate and to take risks – in short, to empower them. Every officer is taught from the beginning of his or her training to "listen to your sergeant." The advice is usually given to encourage young officers to acquire technical, tactical and practical advice about leading a unit. No sergeant questions an officer's authority because he asks for advice. Why not "listen to your sergeant" about your leadership style?

"Leading the Army is not like running a business" is the refrain of another group of opponents. True enough; that is why the best support for transformational leadership and 360-degree feedback can be found among history's greatest generals. Soldiers, NCOs and officers are not minimum wage employees; they are highly skilled and dedicated professionals who will respond with a sense of sacred duty to this new initiative. The officers most fearful of feedback from their peers and subordinates are exactly the type of officers (arrogant, abusive, inflexible) that this system would address.

Others may fear that one poor 360-degree evaluation will forever taint an officer's career prospects. There is little reason to believe that a board of officers will rely too heavily on one negative 360-degree survey in view of other more positive reports any more than they do now with the current OER. Multiple 360-degree reports over time and in different types of units will provide a subordinate & peer perspective as broad as the current system provides with its top-

down focused OERs. Taken together 360-degree feedback evaluations and traditional OERs will provide a broader view of an officer's leadership ability, thus preventing any one report or type of report from overwhelming another.

Finally, 360-degree should not be seen as reducing the influence or authority of senior leaders over their subordinate leaders. Senior leaders will not somehow "surrender" their ability to select and promote officers and turn it over to soldier surveys. When the Army as an institution and senior leaders as a collective body make it clear that transformational leadership is crucial to success, their position will be enhanced. They will be demanding new skills alongside old ones; requiring transformational leadership as a part of effective leadership. In simplistic terms, the "ticket to success" will no longer be "punching the ticket."

With 360-degree feedback results selection boards will be able to discern more easily an officer's true skill and potential. It will not be hard to find the apparently successful officer who in traditional terms "meets or exceeds" all current standards but who is consistently rated by his peers as a "back-stabber" and by his subordinates as selfish, unethical and incompetent. At the same time it will remain easy to spot the officer who may be well liked but is ineffective and failures to accomplish the mission. The judgment of senior officers will continue to be the key determinant in selection and promotion, but it will be judgment that is far better informed.

PRECEDENT FOR THE USE OF FEEDBACK

These three changes (forming a vision of leadership that more clearly includes transformational leadership, using formal 360-degree feedback processes, and using 360-degree feedback in promotion and selections) are admittedly going to require a large culture change. There is precedent, however, for such a change in the Army today. The Army already uses a variety of feedback mechanisms to measure its effectiveness in other aspects of its duties. In the late 1970s the Army began to assess unit performance with feedback from the members of the units instead of relying solely on the evaluation of the unit leader and chain of command. The after action review or AAR is a self-critique of a unit's performance in a training event. Soldiers are encouraged to "tell it how they saw it" and leaders are made to listen to their own and their unit's shortcomings. An AAR after a mock battle at one of the Army's combat training centers is often a humbling experience for leaders. The Army's entire training management system is built on this foundation of self-critiques, immediate feedback and retraining. It is the envy of the world.

As an institution the Army also measures its own climate with numerous surveys and studies. Surveys and questionnaires are used in great numbers to measure all kinds of systems

within the Army, particularly with regard to quality of life issues. In fact this paper has taken note of multiple studies commissioned by the Army itself to specifically address leadership and training. Cleary this use of feedback tools is accepted by soldiers of every rank as a valid means to get to the bottom of entire Army's organizational health.

These feedback models, using input from within and below, on the Army's overall climate and on unit performance in training are a large part of the "cure" that revived the Army between the end of the Vietnam War and the stunning success of the Persian Gulf War. They are widely accepted by the Army and the officer corps and are rightfully trumpeted as one of the Army's great success stories. The precedent and principle of using feedback from the followers are well institutionalized in the Army. The notion that leaders can learn and improve by listening to their subordinates is not revolutionary. Why not use the same logic for officer performance?

Despite precedent, these changes will be very difficult to implement. As Kotter notes, changing human resources practices in any large bureaucracy is an imposing hurdle; the Army will have to change its personnel system and align it with its new vision of officer leadership development and promotion. When the Army officer corps sees these kinds of concrete and significant changes being put into place, they will be less tempted to brand it "another good idea" and to truly embrace the change. The culture of the Army will take time and great effort to change, particularly this core aspect of the culture. But a strong emphasis on expanding the Army's concept of leadership doctrine will go a long way to shortening the normal rate of change in a large organization.

Once the vision is created, communicated and changes are made to the officer management system, Army leaders must generate what Kotter calls short-term "wins." These wins will be needed to demonstrate the superiority of a new system. These wins will undermine the cynics, reward those who are leading the way in making change, and provide evidence that the painful change process is "worth it." Senior leaders must have the fortitude to confront leaders who refuse to make needed changes to their leadership skills and techniques. The general officer corps must be visibly up front leading the transformation and those who are not must be removed. Non-selection for command or promotion of senior officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel and higher when they earn consistent and sub-standard marks on their 360-degree assessments will be a dramatic statement that the Army is serious about demanding a new leadership paradigm.

CONCLUSION

At the dawn of the Army Transformation Campaign Plan it is time to broaden the Army's officer evaluation system. Specifically, it is time to evaluate officer leadership not only by looking "down" at an officer's performance from the perspective of his or her seniors, but also by looking "up and around" from the perspective of one's followers and peers. The Army is stuck in a leadership culture that celebrates performance at the expense of building healthy units. Its evaluation system exacerbates this trend with its single top-down perspective. All indications are that this culture is having very real and negative effects on morale and retention. It is past time for the Army to adopt a 360-degree leadership model to bring the reality of officer leadership in line with what both history and doctrine have shown to be effective.

As successful as the current top-down perspective has been in the past, times have changed. The information age and Army Transformation will put huge new demands on leaders and on the led. Leaders will have to inspire new levels of initiative, innovation, trust and commitment on the part of their subordinates to win on the 2ft century battlefield. Current Army officer development, evaluation and promotion systems are not capable of developing the type of culture needed by the Army of the future. They are in fact obstacles to the overall transformation effort. A thorough overhaul is needed to eliminate poor leadership practices and create a learning organization that can adapt to and create its own future. Without a fundamental change in officer evaluation, promotion, and selection systems the roots of the CSA's transformation will not take hold in the leadership culture of the Army and it may well fail.

In Anton Myrer's classic book of Army service and leadership, <u>Once an Eagle</u>, the hero Sam Damon comments on what is lacking in the character of Courtney Massengale – the novel's anti-hero. In response to the challenge that Massengale has all the qualities that it takes to be successful in the Army, Damon replies:

"All but one.' Sam tapped his heart with two fingers. 'He doesn't care enough. About people. There's something lacking there, some funny little — lack. He doesn't think people are important. Not desperately important, I mean. More important than thrones and symphonies and triumphal arches." 55

Sadly, there are far too many Massengales in today's officer corps. Yet there is reason for hope. In a story out of <u>Army Times</u>, during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2002, a young Army captain illustrated why the Army should be hopeful.

After expertly directing mortar fire on enemy fighters, who had been eluding repeated air strikes, and killing them, one of the soldiers in his company [A Company, 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment] commented, "We've got the

best mortarmen in the battalion." Another soldier exclaimed, "And the best company commander." ⁵⁶

The feeling expressed by that second soldier in the story above should warm the hearts of the most jaded and pessimistic observers. That young captain's leadership is the kind that the Army needs to foster and grow.

It is time to evaluate, promote and select officers for command using a 360-degree evaluation system that includes peer and subordinate ratings of their effectiveness as leaders. Leaders will still be selected for getting the job done and will be selected by their chain of command. 360-degree feedback will make it possible for senior leaders to know more about the leaders they are selecting to get those jobs done. Specifically, boards will know more about an officer's ability to motivate teams of innovative and dedicated soldiers to accomplish their duties over a lifetime of service in an uncertain and changing state of military affairs. The adoption of this principle will not undermine the necessary focus on mission accomplishment, but will actually increase the chances of victory. If the Army adopts an enlarged leadership assessment model that specifically demanded and rewarded a broader set of leadership skills, the bold and innovative leaders of learning organizations deemed necessary for the Objective Force will be ready for tomorrow's conflicts.

Word Count: 9526

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Thomas E. Ricks, "Younger Officers Quit the Army at Fast Clip; Study Finds Little Trust in Senior Leadership," <u>The Washington Post</u>, 17 April 2000, sec. 1A, p. A1.
- ² See Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., "Military Leadership into the 2ft Century: Another Bridge Too Far?" Parameters 28 (Spring 1998): 2.
- ³ General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, "Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army, U.S. Army War College, <u>Selected Readings</u>, <u>AY 2002</u>, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2002), 146.
- ⁴ In very broad terms 360-degree feedback is a method to measure leadership effectiveness by including the views of the leader's peers and subordinates along with more traditional measures of job accomplishment by the leader's boss.
- ⁵ Arthur J. Corbett, "Proliferating Decision-makers: Root Cause of the Next Revolution in Military Affairs," <u>Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods</u> (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2000), 28.
 - ⁶ Corbett, 47-48.
 - ⁷ Shinseki, 146, 158, 166.
- ⁸ William, M. Steele, and Robert P. Walters, Jr., "21st Century Leadership Competencies," Army (August 2001): 30.
- ⁹ Walter F. Ulmer, Jr, Joseph Collins, and T.O. Jacobs, <u>American Military Culture in the Twenty First Century</u>, (Washington, DC.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2000), xxi.
 - ¹⁰ Ulmer, <u>CSIS Report</u>, 64 & 70.
- ¹¹ Leonard Wong, "Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps," U.S. Army War College, <u>Selected Readings</u>, <u>AY 2002</u>, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2002), 291.
- ¹² The increase in the attrition of Army captains in the late 1990s was the topic "de jour" of numerous articles, papers, and studies. Some have already been noted above. Gen Shinsecki formed several panels to examine the issue. For a short summary of issue See Thomas Weafer, <u>Averting the Train Wreck of Captain Attrition: A Leadership Solution</u>, Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 2001).
- ¹³ Timothy J. Maude, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, "Briefing Slides for Commander's Conference, 19 October 2000," Available from: http://www.d-n-i.net/DCSPER_10_00; Internet; accessed 15 NOV 2001.
- ¹⁴ Michael D. Matthews and John R. Hyatt, <u>Factors Affecting the Career Decisions of Army Captains</u>, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute, 2000): 5.

- ¹⁵ Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage, <u>Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army</u>, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978): 85.
- ¹⁶ Dennis J. Reimer, General, U.S. Army, "Empowerment, Environment and the Golden Rule," <u>Military Review</u> 19 (January-February 1996): 5.
- ¹⁷ Theodore G. Stroup, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, "Actions Speak Louder Than Words," Military Review 19 (January-February 1996): 44.
- ¹⁸ <u>Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army,</u> Available from: http://www.army.mil/atld; Internet; accessed 15 October 2001, OS-1.
- ¹⁹ See Leonard Wong, "Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps," U.S. Army War College, Selected Readings, AY 2002, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2002).
 - ²⁰ Ulmer, "Military Leadership: Another Bridge Too Far?", 5.
 - ²¹ Ibid., 5.
- ²² U.S. Department of the Army, <u>FM 22-100 Army Leadership</u>, (Washington, DC.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999): 1-4.
 - ²³ FM 22-100, 3-2.
 - ²⁴ Reimer, 4.
 - ²⁵ FM 22-100, 1-10.
 - ²⁶ Ibid., 1-11 1-12.
- 27 This is precisely what Leonard Wong found in his study of Generation X officers. See Wong, 289-292.
 - ²⁸ Stroup, p. 46.
- ²⁹ Tim Challans, LTC, U.S. Army, "Autonomy and Leadership," Military Review 19 (January-February 1996): 33.
- ³⁰ Walter W. Tornow, Manuel London, and Associates, <u>Maximizing the Value of 360-Degree</u> <u>Feedback</u>, (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1998): 1-8.
- ³¹ The following discussion of leadership styles is taken from Chapter 3 of FM 22-100, <u>Army</u> Leadership.
- ³² Cynthia McCauley, Russ S. Moxley, and Ellen Van Velsor, <u>The Center For Creative Leadership Handbook of Leadership Development</u>, (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-bass, 1999), 31-37.

- ³³ Ulmer, "Military Leadership," 12.
- ³⁴ Brian O'Reilly, "360 Degree Feedback Can Change Your Life," <u>Fortune</u> 17 (October 1994): 96.
- ³⁵ Robert, Kaplan, <u>Beyond Ambition: How Driven Managers Can Lead Better and Live Better</u>, (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1991). See especially Chapter 7, "The Expansive Manager, The Bottom Line, and the Human Cost."

³⁶ McCauley, et al., 37-38.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 39-40.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 41.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 56-62.

⁴⁰ FM 22-100, 3-17.

⁴¹ Ibid, 3-16.

⁴² John P. Kotter, <u>Leading Change</u>, (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 41-45.

⁴³ Magee, 31.

⁴⁴ Army Training and Leader Development Report, OS-3, 18, and 20.

⁴⁵ Kotter, 145-151

⁴⁶ Shinseki, 146.

⁴⁷ Ulmer, et al, <u>CSIS Report</u>, xxii.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 79.

⁴⁹ The Army explicitly calls for leaders who can create a learning environment in their organizations in its Transformation campaign plan. Department of the Army, <u>U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan</u>, U.S. Army War College, <u>Course 1: Strategic Leadership</u>, <u>Selected Readings, VOL II, AY 2002</u>, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2002), 166. For a discussion of learning organizations see Peter Senge, <u>The Fifth Discipline</u>, (NY: Doubleday, 1990), 12-14, and Kotter, 183.

⁵⁰ Tornow, et. al., 20-25.

⁵¹ Ibid., 68-77.

- ⁵² This kind of criticism is found in letters to the editor of <u>Army</u>Magazine in December 2001 through February 2002 issues in response to an article in the November 2001 issue calling for this kind of change. They writers are mostly senior and/or retired officers.
- ⁵³ U. S. Army Field Manual <u>FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1-6 to 1-7 and figure 1-3.

⁵⁴ Kotter, 121-123.

⁵⁵ Anton Myrer, Once an Eagle. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), 306-07.

⁵⁶ Sean D. Naylor, "The War's Bloodiest Battle: On the Ground in Afghanistan," <u>Army Times</u> (18 March 2002): 16.

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