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ABSTRACT

This monograph evaluates the security issues in the Middle East. The paper supports the position that regional security is essential, and plays a pivotal role on the road to the real peace between Arabs and Israelis.

Since early last decade, the Middle East region has witnessed a state of significant dynamic changes. These changes are expected to leave major impacts on shaping the political, social, and economic future of the countries in the region and to influence the intellectual structure. These changes are exhibited in the decisive strategic transformation process regarding the Arab- Israeli conflict, moving from the state of direct confrontation to the philosophy of peace and peaceful co-existence.

There is no doubt that security has been recognized as one of the main causes to the conflict over the last five decades between Israel and its Arab neighboring countries. Security concepts before the 1967 war were varied. The existence of Israel as a state was a first priority; however, security in this case is included. Just after 1967 and 1973 wars, the United Nations resolutions 242 and 338 were issued accordingly as land for peace. Security will serve as the acceptable and useful basis for the stability, prosperity, and development of societies in the region. Further more it will govern future relations in the region, politically, socially, and economically.

Security for Israel is vitally important. It is very important for neighboring countries too. Through its history, Israel used to be more aware of security issues than its Arab partners, still under the influence of the Arab Israeli wars. Furthermore, Israeli political and security thinking is still captive to the fears of potential wars that threatens Israelis existence and expose the Israeli community to psychological violence. On the

Arab side, the aftermath of war still forms vital elements in the concept of security. Therefore, hesitation, reservation, and lack of confidence are still basic aspects of the security dimension. These aspects have their influence on the peace process and transform the security problem into a critical and dangerous equation.

*REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AND THE JORDANIAN ROLE IN IT*

MONOGRAPH

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
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
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
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East has witnessed, since the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century, a series of important changes that are expected to transform the features of the political and social landscape of the region for some time to come. These changes are manifested by a decisive strategic turnabout concerning the Arab–Israeli conflict: the move from direct confrontation to a philosophy of peace and co-existence including joint and mutual benefits among the peoples of the region in all political, economical, social, and security aspects.

Security is one of the basic elements that governs the peace process and measures its success. It formed an axis in the conflict during the last five decades. It will form a solid foundation in the future concerning political relations in the area. Additionally, it is a basis for the stability and development of the region's societies. This ensures entrance into the next century with a struggle of dimensions that are fully different from the conflicts of the past.

The security includes real communication among the peoples and a mixture of cultures and coherence in interest. The more these opportunities succeed, the more genuine the chance for real peace and permanent security to be realized. In the concept of the conflict, the security equation has been complex and sensitive. It has been ruled by the remnants of the Arab–Israeli wars. Moreover, Israeli security political thought has been a prisoner of the fear of war that forms an existential threat. The Arab side also has been thinking that the effects of wars are still forming decisive elements in the current Arab security thought. Starting from this background, the hesitation, reservation and lack

of confidence are basic factors that govern the security relation, throw its shadow over the peace process, and turn security issues to a difficult, dangerous and sensitive equation.

Regional security in the Middle East will be based on the establishment and development of the psychological and physical security in all countries of the area. An atmosphere in which such interests and goals can be met in a manner that reduces the chances of war must replace the previous atmosphere of constant confrontation of national interests and goals. To reach such a state, the regional security system aims to create and develop wide areas of cooperation and partnership among member states in political, security, and economical and social fields.

This paper studies these aspects and the possibility of creating a regional security system in the Middle East in a manner that permits the achievement of the people's ambitions through time security within the frame of a just, comprehensive and permanent peace. The paper tackles the following aspects: presenting the dimensions, components and elements that could be included in such a security system; and indicating the Jordanian role and influence in formulating its bases.

CHAPTER 2

MIDDLE EAST GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY CONCERNS

The Middle East region has as its most important concern the question of security. The region, still relatively small, contained until the advent of this century four distinct major cultures: Arab, Persian, Turkish and Kurdish. These four cultures are all enveloped by the great Islamic civilization.¹ Not only are they distinct from each other in language, arts, historical experiences, customs and mores; but also each has developed within it a rich and varied subculture all adding to the wealth of the magnificent mosaic of the area. Since the forties, yet another culture, the Jewish, with yet another different background, was added.²

The ME / Far East as a term goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century when the British foreign policy used it to describe the region located east of the Mediterranean sea. The Far East term has not been used as much as the term Middle East that was used as a geopolitical term of multi-geographical connotation. This concept gained a different political and strategic dimension when Israel was created as a new political body in 1948. The term after that was connected to the concept of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in order to express the geographical dimension of the conflict. Recently, during the current period of peace, definition of the ME gains a special functional significance related to commitments of peace such as: security measures, arms control, and economic and social developments.³

The traditional ME concept, which derives from the national geographical dimension includes all Arab countries, but excludes Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Cyprus.

Most other definitions exclude North African Arab countries and consider them a different region. This term has been officially used in different economic conferences held in the Arab states.⁴ The Israeli concept excludes Turkey and Cyprus only; therefore the Israeli outlook includes more geographical and political area. The Israeli perspective is governed by their own security philosophy. ME definition has to meet their need of geographical coverage to all basic sources of threat, and should be a message to all parties involved to make them realize the nature of the security obligations required by them on a regional scale. Iraq and Iran are excluded in the definition of the working group on arms control and regional security in the ME due to their absence from the negotiations. But all measures, the two countries are a significant part of the region.

The United Nations has defined the ME region for the purposes of establishing a nuclear-free zone by dividing it into three parts. The first includes the core countries that means all countries mentioned in the definition of the International Atomic Energy Agency, including all Arab countries except Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Sudan in addition to Turkey and Cyprus. These excluded Arab countries are considered as another sub region.⁵ The third part is the neighboring countries that share borders with the countries in the region such as Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Malta, Chad, and Spain.

The Reagan administration viewed the ME as including the Gulf countries as part of a large political-strategic theater, the region bounded by Turkey, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa.⁶ The American initiative of May 1996 defines the ME for the purposes of arms control as the region that extended between Iran in the east and Morocco in the west. This definition excludes Turkey, Sudan, the African horn countries and

Afghanistan.⁷ All definitions have agreed that Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank, and Israel are core states. They also agree upon all Gulf countries membership in the region. Because of the complicated nature of the issue and the absence of some major members, the definitions concept should be flexible and should not be based on geographical limitations at first. The concept may expand by including other countries in later stages. Defining the region may start by regarding territories from inside the region and more towards the outside to expand the scope of peace. Turkey, Iraq, and Iran are considered vital elements in the region and should not be cast out from regional strategic plans.

CHAPTER 3
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SECURITY AND
STABILITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Middle East security developments and stability are important for the security of American interests in the region, the security of Israel, Europe and of their alliance member Turkey. From this perspective, western policies insist on two absolute priorities. The first is to revive the floundering peace process; both in its Israeli–Palestinian track and in its Israeli-Lebanese Syrian one. The second priority is to initiate a strategy for the launching of comprehensive negotiation on arms control in the Middle East.⁸

The ME was of direct interest to more members of the NATO Alliance, given its economic dependence on ME oil, and the fact that it was a privileged terrain of the East–West confrontation throughout the Cold War. The interests of the European powers, France and Britain, were more limited in the ME, covering primarily the Arab States, which emerged from the Ottoman Empire, and Israel. Today, rather, it is intended to convey the idea that Alliance countries should look at developments in the ME not only in terms of the relationship between Israel and the Arab states, but in conjunction with what happens in the sub–region further north, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the ME.⁹

Many national, regional, and international leaders and peace actors are looking for a stable and secure region. That might come about when we reach the point of a comprehensive, lasting, and durable peace in the ME. Security and stability of the ME are still important to the region and the world.

AMERICAN POLICY AND INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Active US government involvement in the Middle East began as a result of World War II.¹⁰ Since then, US strategists have pursued a variety of options in order to promote modernization and to prevent any expansion of Soviet influence in the ME. These options have included the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower–Dulles policy of promoting regional security treaties, John F. Kennedy’s push for political and economic reforms, the Nixon, Kissinger reliance on regional powers, Jimmy Carter’s promise of human rights and Ronald Reagan’s reliance on the threat of force to stabilize the ME.¹¹

During the recent past, the ME is one of the most important regions to the United States of America. Within the policymaking establishment, the definition of American interests in the ME has been the subject of intense debate. The definition put forward at the start of Reagan administration by Richard Burt¹² identified four basic interests:

- Demonstrate the ability to counter the Soviet and their allies.
- Ensure continued Western access to the oil of the Gulf in adequate and reasonable price.
- Ensure the continued existence and strength of US friends in the region.
- Continue to work toward peace between Israel and its neighbors.

Because the United States is the only nation capable of influencing Israeli policies, the reduction of American credibility can only prolong the vicious circle of violence in the ME. The principal obstacle toward peace in the region lies in the insecurity of Middle East countries. Only when local states feel confident of United States reliability and secure against external threats, will they be willing to take the necessary risks for peace. Just before the end of the last decade, Arab nations viewed the

United States as an accomplice in the shifts of Israeli policies. Whatever the logic of American policy toward Israel, the negative attitudes created in the Arab World militate against building a coalition of moderate Arab states responsive to US interests. More credibility has been gained after American strategists found their crucial task, which lies not so much in finding a cure for the international problems of the region as in seeking to cope with them in ways that will not sacrifice long-term interest for short-term, marginal gain.

Recently United States interests in the ME region are derived from different factors such as: the new world order, the economy, defense and ideological factors. Therefore, the United States Security Strategy for the ME could be summarized as follows: access to oil, Arab- Israeli peace, security, freedom of navigation, access to regional markets, protection of US citizens and property, and human rights and democratic development; and successful reform in the former USSR. ¹³

CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The current security situation in the ME has two main formulas:

The first is no peace, no war. This one is simply an unofficial agreement between the countries in the region where the parties involved believe that war is useless. Such a formula falls short from solving other fundamentals of the conflict in the region.

The second formula is strategic balance. This formula has been the main cause of the armament race in the region. It gave Israel superiority in terms of military power and facilitated the emergence of an effective Israeli deterrent theory. One-sided strategic balance, as in this formula, led to an unstable security situation. This formula also falls short from preventing wars to break out. Even though it has played an important deterrent

role, it is extremely important to note that this formula should not be viewed as a basis for a future security regime.¹⁴

FACTORS AFFECTING SECURITY IN THE ME

Security in the ME is a multi-dimensional problem. It is related completely to the complexity of the issue in the countries concerned and peripheral states¹⁵. The significance of security to the survivability and stability of the nations in the region, especially Israel, puts the question of security as one of their higher priorities, and characterizes it as one of the most sensitive issues in peoples lives. Therefore, the relations between nation's security and defense issues should be strengthened and geared accordingly. In general, countries look at security and threat from different angles. This results, some times, in the acceptance of threatening others by force in order to save their security. So, what might be considered the "security" of a nation is considered a "threat" to another. Interest in the ME on different levels internationally, regionally and nationally is considered constant factors affecting this problem. In this context I could summarize the existing problem in four different shapes. These are **political and security thought structure, the nature of the standing force structure, strategic balance, and geopolitical unbalance.**¹⁶

Political and security thought structure. The Arab-Israeli conflict is the core of the security problem. It has much affected all aspects of political and military thought of the countries involved as well as social dimensions. It has also left deep impacts on the political thought of the parties involved. The concept that Israel's existence is too apt to collapse has become a concrete fact in the Israeli security and political understanding. Subsequently, the only way to confront this

threat is by establishing strong and superior military institutions capable of unconventional deterrence abilities keeping at the same time all Israeli political military options open to communication and integration. On the other hand, Arab political and security thinking has developed over the years, as an aftermath of several wars with Israel. Their political theories have developed from the complete rejection of Israeli existence to attempts to alter the strategic balance. Later this has led to initial and provisional acceptance of Israel as a political entity, and to recent negotiations. In spite of the decisive development on the Arab side, it has never minimized Israel's fear of being threatened; thus the security problem still exists and becomes deeper and more serious.

The nature of the standing force structure. The standing force structure forms a basic aspect of the security problem. Whereas Israel has been able to introduce nuclear power, strategic delivery means, and space technology for military purposes to the ME, Israel also has succeeded in developing an advanced conventional military system capable of expanding in all direction. On the Arab side, Iraq tried to introduce nuclear weapons.¹⁷ In spite of the Arab failure in this field, they succeeded in building huge conventional military power along with launching capabilities that can strike anywhere in Israel. In addition to more development in the size of the conventional forces, their mobilization and deployment system reflect a critical escalation. Regardless of how and where the ongoing peace process will lead the region, the current huge force structure is regarded as a potential threat to security and stability in the ME.

Strategic Balance. It is important to point out that Israel is superior to its neighbors by all strategic and scientific standards. Since Israel is a full partner in establishing any security system in the region, such an imbalance in military power should be viewed as the most sensitive element of security in the ME. Practically, this part will be the most complicated issue in case of establishing any regional security system; however, passing it over will turn such a system into a symbolic and unstable one.

Geopolitical Imbalances. Issues such as refugees, environment, water, borders, populations, and economy form the fundamentals for tension in this region, and they may cause undesirable security escalation. Such problems are not primary since they have an indirect relation with the security issue; however, they are still believed to be major aspects of the security problem in the ME.

CHAPTER 4

SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Security, as one of the basic factors that regulates the rhythm of Arab–Israeli peace process and measures its success, receives special and increased importance. Security has been the axis of the conflict over the last five decades and it will serve as an acceptable and useful basis for the future of stable political relations in the area. It will also serve as a basis for the stability, prosperity, and development of societies in the region, a state that will facilitate a smooth access into the new century.

It is necessary to draw a distinction between peace and security, since they are closely related. Peace can be contractually concluded, and it will not succeed unless the concerns of the individuals are met, because only individuals have the power to make true peace. Meanwhile, security must be earned by building trust and confidence and, above all, by sharing common interests. Therefore, efforts of the parties concerned should be directed towards a change from the culture of war to the culture of peace.¹⁸

Real security entails real communications, mingling of cultures, and harmony of interests among the nations. The people of the area realize the more this experience persists, the more true opportunities for real peace and permanent security will be established. Despite the fact that the peace process has caused substantial changes in the concepts of the conflict and transferred the region from state of direct confrontation to a philosophy of peaceful co–existence, the security issue is still characterized as having a sensitive and complex nature, and is still under the influence of the past Arab – Israeli wars.¹⁹

Despite the political successes achieved during the early stages of the peace process, it has not found a comprehensive and integral solution to the security problem in the ME. The peace process in general offered partial and incomplete solutions to some secondary aspects of the security issue.

ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS

Israeli's national security strategy has been affected by a number of historical and strategic factors, most of which can be summarized as follows:

- Arab hostility to the establishment of the Jewish state.
- A small country, with no depth protecting it from outside attacks²⁰.
- High population density and industrial concentration that makes the country vulnerable to attack.
- Its dependence on outside sources of energy.
- A relatively small pool of manpower, and a domestic political inability to sustain drawn-out conflicts and take high-level casualties.
- Isolated country, far from its alliance partners and, surrounded by hostile countries.

However, Israel's national security strategy has tried to compensate for drawbacks by developing a qualitative edge over regional powers, relying on universal alliance, deterring attack with conventional and unconventional threats, and adopting an offensive military doctrine and force structure.²¹

Israel's security perceptions have affected its approach to peace negotiations with its Arab partners. Israel's peace treaty with Egypt includes strong security components covering military holdings, troop movements and aerial surveillance of Sinai.²² Its peace

treaty with Jordan commits both countries to refrain from military attack and terrorism against one another.²³ It also affected its negotiations with the Palestinians, from Israel's perspective its security should not be jeopardized by the development of Palestinian autonomy, so, Barak's peace plans were circumscribed by four so-called red lines: Jerusalem would remain Israel's "united, eternal capital"; no return would occur to Israel's 1967 borders, expanded after the 1967 war to include the west bank and Gaza; no Palestinian or other foreign army would be permitted west of the Jordan River; and Jewish settlements established since 1967 would be kept in the occupied territories. Barak firmly believed in separation between Israel and Palestinian authority, proposing a physical barrier-a wall or fence-to maintain separation. Gaza would be linked with Palestinian controlled areas in the west bank by a bypass highway preventing Palestinian trespass on Israeli soil.²⁴ However, Barak moved beyond any previous Israeli prime minister in agreeing to eventually withdraw from 90 percent of the west bank and in offering Palestinian control of some east Jerusalem neighborhoods. Therefore, the phased withdrawal of Israel's Defense Force from Palestinian Territories did not correspond with the Palestinian's assumption of administrative control over some designated area, as mentioned in their agreements. Whereas over the past seven years Israel has only handed back 13.1 percent of the west bank, and the transitional period agreed under Oslo came to an end on the 5th May 1999.²⁵ However the security of Israel will be, in any case, a major issue on the agenda of the final status negotiation with the Palestinians.

Israel has two other security concerns, the Golan and south Lebanon. The two are largely inter-related since they both involve Israeli-Syrian relations. Peace negotiations between the two countries only became possible after the Gulf War, during which Syria

aligned with the international coalition against Iraq. For security reasons, Golan is important to both Syria and Israel.²⁶ After six years of sporadic negotiations, Israel and Syria seemed, by January 2000, close to a peace agreement that could return the Golan Heights to Syria. However, Israel was unwilling to return Syria's waterfront property fronting on lake Tiberius, Israel's most important watershed, supplying 40 percent of Israel's water²⁷. The Israeli offer to return all occupied territory except for that adjacent to the lake, was rejected by Syrian President Hafiz AL- Assad. Israel not only sought to make peace with Syria, but also wanted to get out of Lebanon. In 1982 Israel had invaded Lebanon with the grand ambition of defeating the Palestine Liberation Organization- which had established itself in the country after being expelled from Jordan- and installing a pliant government in Beirut. In stead, the invasion transmogrified into a self-perpetuating occupation zone in southern Lebanon. Since the 1980s, Syria had encouraged and supported attacks on Israel's forces in southern Lebanon-especially by Hezbollah, "Party of God" which carried out most of the resistance attacks, often with deadly effectiveness. Israel's role in southern Lebanon grew unpopular domestically as the toll in young soldiers increased. Israel wanted to cut its losses and pull out, preferably in conjunction with a peace treaty between Israel and Syria. Although unilateral Israeli withdrawal without an agreement was the less desirable default option, Barak committed Israel to leaving Lebanon by July 7, 2000, with or without an agreement.²⁸ Syria badly misread the situation, specifically Israel's willingness to leave Lebanon without an agreement. Lebanon and Syria saw it as a trick to decouple Lebanon's security situation from that of Syria. Therefore, that proposal was rejected. Moreover, Syria's implicit position is that Israel should not be allowed to get rid of its self-inflicted troubles in

southern Lebanon without a full peace agreement both with Lebanon and Syria, southern Lebanon and Golan cannot be decoupled. So, a “Lebanon first” option, in whatever form, is bound to fail.

Israel is also concerned about the new threats stemming from the potential acquisition of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in Iran and Iraq. Israelis never forgot the Scud attacks against Tel Aviv in 1991. Most analysts stress that proliferation of ballistic missile technology in the region does not constitute an existential threat to the country. However, Israel is cooperating actively with the United States to modernize its anti-missile defense systems.²⁹

PALESTINIAN SECURITY CONCERNS

In 1967 Israel occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, which was then held by Jordan. Israel declared the city to be the eternal and unified capital of Israel and has consistently refused to discuss relinquishing its sovereign control of it. Simultaneously, the Palestinian claim East Jerusalem as their capital. Under international law, East Jerusalem is and remains occupied territory according to the terms of resolutions 242 and 338, which is precisely why all major governments maintain their embassies in Tel Aviv and not in Jerusalem. The Church of the Holy Sepulcher, the Dome of the Rock Mosque, and the Wailing Wall-places central to Christians, Muslims, and Jews- are part of the old city, but Jerusalem is now a massive municipality. The symbol-rich old city accounts for only about 2 percent of the total land area of the municipality.³⁰

The original goals of United Nations Security Council resolution 242, the 1967 document stating the principles for achieving Middle East peace: the acknowledgment of

the right of all states to a secure and recognized existence, and the exchange of occupied territory for peace. The resolution clearly presumed minor territorial adjustments rather than the wholesale incorporation of occupied territory into Israel.³¹

One success of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in the past decade has been the framing of the conflict in nationalist terms. The most important accomplishment of the Oslo accords was the mutual recognition expressed in letters exchanged by Prime Minister Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir Arafat. The idea that the dispute is between Jewish states accepted by the Palestinian and a Palestinian national movement seeking a state of its own opened the door for territorial compromise. All negotiations have since been premised on this understanding.³²

The nationalist framing of the conflict meant that, through territorial compromise, an outcome could be envisioned that would result in a Palestinian state manifesting Palestinian nationalism, next to Israel as a Jewish state with a Jewish majority.

Palestinian anger “Aqsa Intifada” in September 2000 could be seen at three different levels³³.

First, long simmering discontent with the Oslo peace process had been growing. Seven years after the famous 1993 handshake on the White House lawn between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian authority President Yaser Arafat, most Palestinians have seen few tangible benefits of “peace”. After all those years and so many agreements {Oslo I, Gaze-Jericho, OsloII, Hebron, and Wye}, Palestinian still controlled only 13.1 percent of the West Bank and none of east Jerusalem. For the benefit of 400 Jewish settlers living in downtown Hebron, 120,000 civilians in nearby neighborhoods were kept under a constant and harsh military occupation. For the benefit of the 5,000

Jewish settlers, Israel still controlled one-third of Gaza strip at the expense of more than 1 million Palestinians living there. Settlement expansion and new construction have continued every year since the declaration of principles was signed in 1993. New settlements have been built in the West Bank and Gaza under both Labor and Likud party governments in Israel. Today, some 200,000 Jewish settlers live in nearly 200 settlements in the west bank and Gaza [an additional 130,000 Jewish Israelis also reside in east Jerusalem]. Not one settler or settlement has been removed in seven years of the peace process.

The Camp David summit in July 2,000 created a second level of discontent for Palestinians. Most Palestinians believed the peace would lead to the removal of illegal Israeli settlements, recognition of the right of return for millions of Palestinian refugees, and a complete withdrawal by Israel to the 1967 borders. The Camp David summit showed clearly that the peace envisioned by the Palestinians was not the peace Israel was prepared to offer.

The Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon's visit to a religious site in Jerusalem on September 28, a place known as Haram al-Sharif created the third level of discontent {al-Aqsa Intifada}, more than 385 Palestinians, 13 Israeli Palestinians and 30 Israelis were killed.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is clearly hegemonic in nature, accurately reflecting the broad imbalance of power between Israel and Palestine³⁴.

EGYPTIAN SECURITY CONCERNS

Despite the fact that the 1977 visit to Israel by president Anwar AL-Sadat of Egypt was crucial to breaking down psychological walls, Egypt suffered isolation from

the Arab world as a result of signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1979. However, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Second Gulf War enabled the Egyptian government to break out of that isolation, while remaining committed to peace with Israel. The subsequent Israeli-Palestinian Oslo accords, and the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan strengthened Egypt's stand. But on the other hand, as more and more Arab countries were proving ready to normalize their relations with Israel, Egypt's position might become less special to such influential outsiders as the United States³⁵.

After its contribution with the international coalition in the Gulf War, Egypt tried to re-emerge as the leading power among Arabs, and hoped to play a significant role in the Palestinian question. Egypt's ability to influence Middle Eastern developments is hampered by a series of factors. The most important is the weakness of its economy. Despite its attempts to transform its formerly planned economy into a market one and its respectable rate of economic growth³⁶, Egypt is unable to provide its rapidly increasing population, half of which is under 20, with the education, job prospects, social services, medical care, etc, to which it aspires. Egypt depends on four uncommon assets: a work force employed in wealthier Arab countries, oil, tourism and the Suez Canal. During the last two years Egypt faced one challenge after another, violent extremist, frightened tourists, low oil prices, and stagnant world trade³⁷.

The other related factor is the fragility of its political order. The immediate impact of economic weaknesses is to cause important social dislocations, which can easily be exploited by dissenting groups to upset the political order. The government also has vowed to eradicate political Islam, refusing to differentiate more moderate forms of Islamism as represented by Islamic groups. Islamic parties are forbidden. Since the

middle of the last decade the government has moved against the Muslim Brotherhood, accusing the Islamic groups of being the secular wing of the violent groups. As a result, six Islamism insurgents killed 58 tourists and 3 Egyptians at Luxor on 17 November 1997³⁸. However, despite the fact that Egypt is the largest Arab country, its domestic weaknesses hampered its ability to act decisively in the foreign policy arena.

Egypt signed for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, but it blamed Israel for contributing to the arms race and weapons proliferation in the region by sustaining an accelerated pace of modernization of its armed forces and maintaining a secret arsenal of some 100-200 nuclear weapons. So Egypt remains wary of any Israeli attempt to beef up its fighting ability³⁹.

Egypt also has reacted very disapprovingly to the Israeli-Turkish axis, stressing that it was unhelpful to the region stability in the context of growing Arab discontent with Israel. Egypt tries to maintain its water resources in a co-operative manner with the two countries that control the Nile upper streams. Following the improvement of its relations with Ethiopia in 1995, it has improved its security situation with Sudan also.

Before signing the Camp David accord, Egypt and Israel had their own experience on bilateral security issues. Soon after the 1973 war, bilateral negotiations started in order to reach a sort of agreement and develop the operational and political solution to prevent any potential wars between the two parties.

The first agreement in this regard was the first Sinai Accord. The United Nations Emergency Force [UNEFII] emerged accordingly, UN forces deployed in a buffer zone east of the Suez Canal in order to monitor and control the implementation of Sinai⁴⁰.

The second Sinai agreement was signed right after the deployment of UNEFII in 1975. In order to help the gradual Israeli withdrawal to the mid- Sinai, a buffer zone will be established in the middle between Egyptian and Israeli forces.

Egyptian and Israelis agreed to invite the American field mission to establish an improved reconnaissance system and promote trust-building measures between the two parties⁴¹.

In the concern of the Camp David Accord, security measures are based on two main principles, land for peace and security for security. The two parties agreed to protect the freedom of navigation through the Sues Canal, establish demilitarized zones and develop confidence-building measures between them. The occupied area has been divided into four parts, three of which are in Sinai and the fourth part in Israel. The level of forces to be stationed in each part should be limited to the size mentioned in the agreement. Multi-national forces and observers would control the designated area⁴².

REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

The Middle East represents both historical disparities and contemporary international interest. The international interest in regional security in the ME is more obvious than the regional and local interests. This includes the security of oil, the Arab gulf, Israel, freedom of navigation of the Sues Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba, the Red Sea, and the strategic straits and waterways. In this concept, international security in the ME prevails over regional security.

Although the ME is currently undergoing a very critical transitional period, a comprehensive approach to the issues of peace and security at the global, regional, and national levels is essential in order to enable an integrated approach to the complex multi-

dimensional military and non-military challenges to security in the future. Regional security concerns may be divided into two substantial issues, hard security concerns, which include direct strategic military issues, and soft security concerns, which also include non-military dimensions.

HARD SECURITY CONCERN

Threats against regional security are not limited to the Arab- Israeli conflict, but they might extend to include conflicts between other countries in the ME. For example, there is a possibility of Arab -Arab political differences or conflicts⁴³. The restarting of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, the conflict between Iran and the Gulf States, and the Syrian-Turkish conflict are examples. There is also a possibility of ethnic as well as religious conflict. In addition, there are potential regional conflicts in peripheral countries, which may affect the security of the region such as the conflict between Turkey and Greece, India and Pakistan, and that between warring factions in Afghanistan.

Strategic balance and deterrent theory. Since a direct relationship has been established between these two concepts during the conflict stage in such a way as to affect aspects of the conflict, it is logical that these two issues are taken into consideration. Their capability to play a deterrent role for the advantage of any member in the region no longer exists, specifically the conventional and non-conventional Israeli deterrent system.

The relation between national security and regional security fore each country. A general agreement about legitimate national needs for legitimate defense purposes is vital matter. This relationship is connected to the threat perspective for each state in the region and is also connected to the international guarantees offered to any member or to the entire region.

Strategic and military doctrine. Offensive were adopted in the conflict stages, and the doctrine of the preemptive strikes as well as the doctrine of deterrence by uncertainty should be reconsidered in a way that threats can be solved through a co-operative collective security approach. Such an approach might allow a change from the philosophy of running the conflict on the basis of military strategies or offensive doctrines to a philosophy of preventing conflicts through co-operative security strategies within a regional security system.

Defense budgets and levels of military expenditure. Whereas high budgets allow the sustainment of qualitative supremacy, and place the doctrines of the defensive and the offensive in an operational form, the proper way to secure an acceptable security status lies in the making noticeable reductions in expenditures. Such reductions should go together with the general objectives to achieve the security of the region, and match with the philosophy of directing the people's potentialities towards development.

The future of the current powers structures. It is widely known that the current power structures represent the state of war, and any attempt to reduce them will certainly express the regional cooperative state and achieve some of its objectives.

Terrorism. Terrorism has transformed from a singular phenomenon into a collective one with regional and international dimensions⁴⁴. Therefore, political and social outcomes, in any country in the region, will greatly affect the current security situation, especially the fact that some countries in the region have at various times played a destabilizing role through the sponsorship of terrorism⁴⁵.

Smuggling activities. There is an ever-present threat to the sovereignty of some regional states from smuggling of narcotics and weapons, whether intended for the local market or

en route to other countries. Allied to this is the threat from infiltrators who might try to enter other states for economic reasons, or to promote terrorism against bordering countries as in the case of Jordan and Israel.

Anti-peace forces. A number of political groups have publicly declared opposition to the peace treaty. To date, they have been unable to generate enough support. However lack of progress on other tracks, particularly on the Israeli-Palestinian track, might gradually convert public indifference into supporting these groups. In the process, acts of sabotage, assassinations, and border infiltrations can be expected causing, therefore, threats to the security of the region. Furthermore, some regional countries would be ready to support such groups with money, weapons and ideology.

Radicals and extremists. Some regional states complain of radicals and extremists who pose threats to their existing governments as evidenced in Algeria, Egypt, and other countries. Some others have been successful in implementing a policy of inclusion, such as the case of Jordan. Added to this, are the threats posed by radicals and extremists to the security of other regional states.

Confidence building measures. These measures are considered the cornerstone in developing regional security. Unlike other issues, confidence-building measures have great chances of success. Some of these measures are the exchange of military information; military visits between commanders, staff officers and different military academies, the reciprocal participation in military activities and exercises, and the establishment of hot lines at high levels. Undoubtedly, these measures greatly help build trust; yet, they do not address the genuine elements of security.

SOFT SECURITY CONCERN

Security in its broad sense includes the military dimension, [which was vitally important in the Arab-Israeli case], but also includes the political, social, and economic dimensions. Issues such as food, water, poverty, energy, unemployment, development, population, natural resources, inflation, foreign debts, standard of living, and many others form political, social, and economic tension spots that might explode at any time.

An expansion of the security concept is required in the ME today, to include” human resources, natural resources including water and land, and economic as well as military factors. Security covers a matrix of inter-connected issues such as food, water, energy, technology, finance, transport and communications, and includes the question of domestic structure as well as questions of foreign policy”⁴⁶.

The genuine ME problem is not the shortage of human or natural resources, rather than the mechanisms adopted in investment and development schemes. Such mechanisms have not so far successfully addressed the genuine element of security for the countries in the region; nor have they truly dealt with the principal discrepancies between the peoples of this region. Therefore, the discrepancies between the neighboring countries such as Jordan/Israel, Yemen/Saudi Arabia, Libya/Algeria, and morocco/Mauritania should be seriously taken into consideration.

Food security. This problem addresses the discrepancy between the economic resources available to produce food, and the real demand for the foodstuffs and their international prices. As a result, food security, for all countries, becomes a vital cause that takes priority⁴⁷.

Population. From the concept of the security dimension, population is the substance of war and its objective. Therefore, the comprehensive management of population issues is considered a prerequisite to improve the concept of regional security. It is widely known that no country, regardless of its GNP [gross national product], can achieve high standards of social development. Some countries have made some national breakthroughs. But this is not considered a success as far as regional security is concerned; rather it is a source of tension that might be exported⁴⁸. Finally, any genuine population developments should be directed into two dimensions: the first national, and the second regional.

Human rights and freedom. It is a fact that who enjoys all his political and social rights is a productive citizen, and so is his society. Therefore, the confiscation of freedoms, lack of democracy, and oppression will create a volatile, tense environment that might explode at any time. At the regional level, democracy based on public satisfaction is the best barrier against extremism.

Water. Water has been considered a serious and on-going threat to countries of the region; that is what makes some writers predict that the future conflicts in the region will be over water. Arab rivers originate outside Arab territories. Turkey nowadays exercises pressure through its new philosophy of “ water for oil”; this policy might provoke the countries of the region to search for water resources outside their national soil. Undoubtedly, such a concept might be the spark that ignites serious outbreaks in the region⁴⁹.

Economic development. It is not necessary to elaborate on the Arab- Israeli conflict which, over the last five decades, has had a dominant influence on the structure of the

region's security, and has shattered the economies of the ME. Therefore, instability has stood in the way of genuine development. The principal aspect of economic development in the region lies in the full participation of the relevant countries in joint ventures in a variety of fields such as agriculture, industry, commerce, telecommunication, infrastructures and water. Such ventures will lead to economic development among the countries of the region, a concept that makes war a threat not only to one country but also to all countries concerned⁵⁰.

Social factors. The massive waves of migration coupled with reduction in foreign aid have exerted enormous pressure on affected states. These combined factors have contributed to a rise in the level of un-employment and created disparities of income. In addition, the annual growth of the economy in many of the regional states is insufficient to provide jobs for all those seeking employment. Therefore, energies should be directed towards solving problems in this sector to thwart potential security threats.

CHAPTER 5

ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Arms control is one of the important issues in the ME. It has become more and more important since the beginning of the last settlement between Israel and the Arab states on October 1991. Arms control is essential for regional security, and both of them are intimately linked. Unlike arms control, regional security is a broader concept, encompassing not only the military but also economics and politics. Of course, security depends greatly on arms control. Successes and progress in arms control negotiations in the ME will help shape the acceptability of security measures needed to achieve bilateral peace. In light of the Gulf War and long-standing historical rivalries in the ME, there is widespread concern about the past and future importation of sophisticated conventional and unconventional weapons into this already heavily armed region.

ARMS COMPETITION IN THE ME

For different reasons the ME countries have pursued a noticeable armaments race, in both fields, conventional and unconventional. The most important of these reasons, in addition to the fact of competition between the two superpowers, is that the regional countries have pursued their national security interests by expanding and modernizing their military forces rather than by reaching political compromises. Such a phenomenon has two forms: the first implies the development, production, procurement, transportation, and accumulation of armament. The other implies the regular build up of armed forces. However, the experience of more than four decades of conflict, instability, and wars has led the regional states to focus on procuring military equipment, thus opening the door to a regional arms race.

During the beginning of the last decade, five of the world's ten largest recipients have been in the ME. The largest suppliers of conventional arms to the ME as well as worldwide have been for a long time and are likely to continue to be the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. They accounted from 1974 to 1989 for more than 75 % of the estimated total of \$220 to \$250 billion in arms trade in the ME. The two largest suppliers were the two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union. The United States has significantly increased its arms exports to the region after 1978, a fact reflected by the more than \$14.5 billion in US arms sales to Saudi Arabia in 1990⁵¹.

In the field of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Middle East and North Africa have the highest concentration of these types of weapons and missiles programs of any region in the world. They have been acquired through direct purchase, domestic development, or a combination of the two. This trend is dangerous because as states become self-sufficient, they become less susceptible to outside pressure.

The US has concluded that Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, are aggressively seeking NBC weapons and increased missile capabilities. From the Arab side, Arabs believe that the Israeli nuclear arsenal poses a threat to their security, so they have to acquire a strategic balance. Therefore, they have sought WMD capabilities in the form of the "poor man's weapons" such as chemical and biological capability.

In the old world order, America provided considerable support to Israel to guarantee its qualitative edge over the Arabs, while the Soviet Union supported the major Arab projectionist states. The Arabs accepted that, as it was undertaken in the context of

the east-west conflict. The US tried through Israel and some Arab countries to stop and limit communist expansion in the region.

There is a delicate relation between the comprehensive and regional trends. The international projects on arms control offer comprehensive international initiatives not limited to the ME countries, which find themselves obliged to adhere to such efforts simply because they are members in the international society. Such projects include limits on nuclear tests and compliance with the biological, chemical and ballistic missile treaties. The Arab countries find themselves committed to joining such agreements; Israel finds itself an alibi on the nuclear issue.

However, international policies will have a direct impact on the ME region regardless of the outcomes of the multilateral negotiations. Since Israel can over-come these impacts either through its nuclear option or through its alliance with the US, the Arab side of the conflict is the most probable to suffer from this issue. Consequently, the Arab countries will lose the necessary negotiating power to express their opinion on the arms control question. It is important to say that these impacts correspond to the United States perspective regarding the strategic balance in the region.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES COVERING SECURITY RELATIONS AMONG PARTICIPANTS IN THE ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY

In their pursuit of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, the regional participants will be governed in their security policies by the following fundamental principles, among others⁵²:

- The participants reaffirm their commitment to the principles of the charter of the United Nations.

- Participants must refrain from the threat or use of force and from acts of terrorism and subversion.
- Security requires that participant's fulfill in good faith obligations under international law.
- Security must be based on respect for and acknowledgement of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, non-interference in internal affairs, and reconciliation and cooperation among participants.
- Arms control should be aimed at achieving equal security for all at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.
- Military means, while needed to fulfill the inherent right of self-defense, and to discourage aggression, cannot by themselves provide security.
- Enduring security requires the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region and the promotion of good neighborly relations and common interests.

GUIDELINES FOR THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY PROCESS

The regional participants recognize the following as guidelines for the arms control and regional security process⁵³:

- The arms control and regional security process, as an integral part of the ME peace process, should create a favorable climate for progress in the bilateral negotiations and complement them by developing tangible measures in parallel with progress in the bilateral talks.
- The arms control and regional security process should strive to enhance security and general stability on a region-wide basis, even beyond the scope of

Arab- Israeli conflict, by pursuing regional security and arms control measures that reduce tension or risk of war.

- The scope of the process must be comprehensive, covering a broad range of regional security; confidence and security building and arms control measures that address all threats to security and all categories of arms and weapons systems.
- The arms control and regional security process should not at any stage diminish the security of any individual state or give a state a military advantage over any other.
- The basic framework of the process is to pursue a determined, step-by-step approach, which sets ambitious goals and proceeds toward them in a realistic way.
- The basis for decision-making on each issue in the arms control and regional security process should be consensus by the regional participants directly concerned.
- Each regional arrangement adopted in the arms control and regional security process should be the result of direct regional negotiations and should be implemented by all those regional parties relevant to the arrangement.
- Strict compliance with arms control and disarmament measures adopted within the framework of the arms control and regional security process is essential to the integrity of that process and for building confidence among the regional participants.

- All arms control and disarmament measures adopted by regional participants within the framework of the arms control and regional security process will be effectively verifiable by the regional parties themselves and should include, where appropriate mutual on-site inspection and other rigorous monitoring techniques and mechanisms, and such verification could be complementary with verification measures in international arrangements.

OBJECTIVES FOR THE ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY PROCESS

In the context of achieving a just, secure, comprehensive and lasting peace and reconciliation, the regional participants agree to pursue, inter alia, the following arms control and regional security objectives⁵⁴.

- Preventing conflict from occurring through misunderstanding or miscalculation by adopting confidence and security building measures that increase transparency and openness and reduce the risk of surprise attack and by developing regional institutional arrangements that enhance security and the process of arms control.
- Limiting military spending in the region so that additional resources can be made available to other areas such as economic and social development.
- Reducing stockpiles of conventional arms and preventing a conventional arms race in the region as a part of an effort to provide enhanced security at lower levels of armaments and militarization, to reduce the threat of large-scale destruction posed by such weapons, and to move towards force structures that do not exceed legitimate defense requirements.

- Promoting cooperation among regional participants in the peaceful uses of outer space, including the pursuit of appropriate means of sharing the benefits from satellite systems, of ensuring that outer space and other environments will not be used for acts of aggression by regional participants, and of enhancing the security of regional participants.
- Establishing the ME as a mutually verifiable zone free of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and ballistic missiles in view of their high destructive capacity and their potential to promote instability in the region.
- All parties of the region will adhere the NPT in the near future.

CURRENT TRENDS TO CONTROL ARMAMENT IN THE ME

The absence of some regional states such as Syria, Iran, Iraq and Libya, from the multilateral negotiations is considered a primary reason for not commencing serious negotiations regarding arms control; the following are visions of some participating countries.

ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE: the elements required for arms control are clearly expressed in two areas⁵⁵:

First: the necessity to create a political environment that includes an overall diplomatic exchange, termination of belligerency, avoidance of cease fire violations, the atmosphere of confidence, compliance with the agreements, reconciliation and normalization between the people in the region, and participation of all regional parties.

Second: is related to negotiations for a new ME free from nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, which are to start not later than two years after achieving the political environment mentioned above. Negotiations should address the reduction of the number

of arms and their war machines. Endorsing such measures will be considered obligatory for all the countries in the region.

EGYPTIAN PERSPECTIVE: the central consideration is that, it is necessary to define the types of weapons required to be addressed, as well as the role of weapon supplying countries in supporting and meeting such procedures⁵⁶:

Special interest should be paid to conventional weapons such as smart ammunition, laser equipment, and long-range bombers.

For weapons of mass destruction, all concerned parties should adhere to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and accept verification systems to check and assess nuclear facilities on a regional basis. All parties concerned should also sign and comply with the biological and chemical conventions.

It is quit necessary to define what ballistic missiles cause instability in the region, and the number of the missiles locally produced or the ones produced outside the region. This entails the middle-range surface to surface, sea-land or land-sea, and anti-ballistic missile systems.

JORDANIAN PERSPECTIVE: The regional countries should endorse all international agreements regarding non-conventional weapons in order to conceive a new ME free from all forms of mass destruction weapons. Meanwhile, the possession or production of nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles should be frozen. A regional commission to pursue such aims would be of paramount importance. Arms control negotiations should not be carried out in favor of one country over the other. There are two mechanisms through which the assessment of the military balance can be addressed: first by comparing numbers, and second by analyzing/comparing combat performance. Additionally,

relevant rules and regulations should be set up to regulate the reduction of weaponry between regional parties⁵⁷.

Arms control must be addressed by phases: weapons of mass destruction systems immediately; followed by surface to surface missiles, and finally transfer of conventional weapons and weapons production technology.⁵⁸

After perusing the three above-mentioned visions, one notices the unmistakable similarity between the Jordanian and Egyptian visions. The two sides demand all countries in the region to endorse and abide by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, along with the chemical and biological treaties or conventions. Where Jordan demands a ME free from all forms of weapons of mass destruction, Egypt refers only to nuclear weapons. Furthermore, while Egypt required a special verification system, Jordan requires the establishment of a regional commission to carry out such verification. Also, the Egyptian vision gives special importance to highly technical non-conventional weapons, where Jordan's vision tackles the political and strategic dimensions.

The Israeli vision implies many ambiguous terms. Hence the question of continual compliance of other parties refers to no definite timetable, and this simply means that such compliance might run over the years without a concrete commitment on the Israeli side to commence arms control negotiations. This concept applies also to the normalization issue, which may take years to settle.

AMERICAN PRSPECTIVE: Dr. Martin Indyk Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs stated that the Middle East faces two possible versions of the twenty first century. One is a new beginning of progress and prosperity; the other is a return to the destructive patterns of past interaction. Dr. Indyk noted that while conventional arms

transfers to the region have been in decline for a number of years, the risk of a destabilizing arms race involving weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles is significant. He called for steps, or "four pillars" to reverse this trend, including improvement of the defense and deterrent capacity of moderate states, efforts to slow the acquisition of such weapons by radical Middle Eastern states, and efforts to moderate the behavior of traditionally hostile countries. He further noted that there was an urgent need for a regional security structure in the Middle East.⁵⁹

CHAPTER 6

JORDAN IN REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Jordan is small state in terms of area, population, and public resources compared to neighboring countries. All these countries are superior in two crucial elements of national power: economic and military power. Despite its disadvantages, Jordan was able to attain a pivotal role in all political, social and economical interaction in the region, and did not stand aside watching events or follow, but took a central role in formulating and affecting policies to serve the supreme Jordanian national interest, stability and prosperity of all neighboring people and society.

Jordan has always been committed to peaceful means for the resolution of conflicts. Its policies have been predicated on an unwavering belief in dialogue and political options as the best mechanism for insuring lasting security and stability. Jordan believes that regional and international cooperation is essential for bringing about and consolidating peace and stability. Accordingly, Jordan has supported all efforts for achieving peace in the region and beyond. Since 1989, Jordan's Armed Forces have actively participated in the collective security arrangements sponsored by the United Nations in different parts of the world.⁶⁰

Jordan political leadership has been capable of understanding the general trends of the development of political and security circumstances in the ME. It has defined the major landmarks of the existing political reality; and presented its own vision of the future in the ME in the frame of a unique and creative political initiative that calls for the establishment of a comprehensive and regional system based on cooperation rather than confrontation or competition. Consequently, Jordan's security policy has been carefully

devised throughout its extensive international friendly network based on a non-alliance strategy, moderation, flexibility, liability, and cooperation.⁶¹

JORDANIAN POSITION IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

When discussing the peace achievements and the Jordanian view in developing a more stable and secure Middle East environment, it is necessary to remember that events never develop in a vacuum. The Jordanian efforts in this track will never be political welfare, but come from facts that never need proof. Jordan is located in the heart of the Israeli-Arab conflict and is considered one of the crucial axes of it and is affected by its intermix in proportion to its own influence. Jordan might be the only country that bears great responsibility during the conflict period.

Jordan is one of the key players in the region before and after the peace settlement with Israel. The reasons regarding both direct and indirect security concerns, could be summarized as follows:

- Jordan has the longest and most dangerous border with Israel, [about 480 KMs, most of them rough terrain].
- Hosting the majority of the Palestinian refugees.
- Acting as a buffer zone between Israel on one side and Iraq and Iran on the other side. It also acts as the depth and the buffer zone to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries especially before the peace settlement with Israel.
- Controlling the north borders with Syria, which prevents any Syrian use of Jordanian soil for any offensive operations against Israel.

- Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty saved the continuation of peace in the region; the reality became harder after that. Jordan has been put under pressure, and therefore, has had to deploy more troops along its borders in order to thwart illegal crossing that may eventually harm the peace partners and the entire peace process.
- Being neutral during the Gulf War, which calmed the Palestinian population whether in Jordan or in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. That absorbed any terrorism operations on Jordanian soil, or even against Israel.

JORDANIAN POSITION IN ME GEOGRAPHY

Many international and regional organizations, whether political, economic, or academic, have presented their understanding of the ME geographic concept. All definitions without exception, agree that Jordan lies in the core of the region and that it is one of the region's basic components.⁶² Hence, Jordan is a basic element in any regional arrangement of any kind in any context. Ignorance of this fact is not only going to diminish the actual value of these arrangements, but it also poses a frank direct threat to security and stability in the region.

Jordan has no coastline on the Mediterranean; in this sense Jordan is not a Mediterranean country. However, all countries participated in the Barcelona conference approved full Jordanian participation in the conference. This means that Jordan is eligible for the privileges and commitments of Euro-Med partnership. Europe does not see Jordan as a demographic threat as in the case with North African countries, nor has it ambitions to open the Jordanian market for its products. So, to answer the question why did Europe

approve Jordan's participation? Europe is doing that to state frankly a central Jordanian role in the region security arrangements whether in the ME or in the Mediterranean region.

JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY

Regional security became more decisive after both parties, Jordan and Israel, signed the peace treaty. The treaty included the following texts regarding regional security.⁶³

Both parties aim towards a regional framework of partnership in peace. Towards that goal the parties recognize the achievement of the European Community and European Union in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and commit themselves to the creation, in the ME, of a CSCME (Conference on Security and Co-operation in the ME). The commitment entails the adoption of regional models of security successfully implemented in the post-world war era (along the lines of the Helsinki process) culminating in a regional zone of security and stability.

To work as a matter of priority and as soon as possible in the context of the multilateral working group on arms control and regional security, and jointly, towards the creation in the ME of a region free from hostile alliances and coalitions. To create of a ME free of weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace, characterized by the renunciation of the use of force, reconciliation and goodwill.

In addition to what has been mentioned in this text, all of which deal with the direct side of security, the treaty includes other provisions regarding non-military aspects of security (water, regional economic relations, and population problems).

Jordan's commitment to a peace solution to the Arab- Israeli conflict has at times put the country on a collision course with an anti-western coalition forces. By so doing, Jordan contributes significantly to stabilizing the region and creating an environment that strengthens the willing forces in the region to make peace an attainable objective.

Despite serious opposition both inside and outside, Jordan has concluded a historic peace treaty with Israel. The risk to Jordan in taking such a decision far exceeds that to both Egypt and Israel when they signed the Camp David Accord. However, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty has brought into effect new realities in the region and given a new momentum to the peace process. In practical terms the peace treaty with Israel reasserts Jordan's traditional role as a key player and leader in the ME.

On a broader level, the treaty has also prevented the total collapse of the entire peace process. Indeed, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty has become an anchor of a regional peace, especially when faced with stagnation on the Syrian-Israeli track and the current upsurge of violence and problems on the Palestinian front.

From regional security aspects, Jordan looks at security aspects from several angles within an integrated form and believes that national, regional, and global security should be considered as well. Jordan has committed to a regional security system, which should be comprehensive in scope and incremental in implementation. Jordan's objectives for such a system include: enhancing stability in the region; promoting economic cooperation, reducing the probability of war, minimizing military roles, regulating the arms race by rules and procedures, reducing military expenditures, and promoting political development, democracy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law in the region⁶⁴.

THE GENERAL THEORY FOR THE REGIONAL SECURITY FROM THE JORDANIAN STRATEGIC PROSPECTIVE

The final objective of any regional security system must be to remove the threat of lasting military and political conflict. That requires reaching intermediate objectives, which are being agreed upon. The first priority for security building must be political settlement, arms control and confidence-building procedures.

A comprehensive approach to issues of peace and security at the global, regional and national levels is essential in order to enable an integrated approach to the complex multi-dimensional, military and non-military challenges to security in the times ahead. In these endeavors, Jordan recognizes the achievement of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and commits itself to the creation of a regional security system where the states of the Middle East adapt to each other's interests through cooperative interaction.

Establishing a Middle East Security and Cooperation forum would provide the growing number of participants inside the Middle East region, as well as the peripheral and extra-regional parties, with a platform for the discussion of a wide range of military and non-military issues. The non-military, security related issues could typically include: socio-economics, energy, water, environment, demography and human rights.

Nevertheless, Jordan fully appreciates the problem of a definable Middle East region. The problem, as Jordan sees it, is not so much whether the region constitutes a distinctive area in terms of geography, history, religion and culture, but rather it arises from the different interests of parties inside the region as well as outside countries, impacting on their definition of the Middle East region.⁶⁵

In Jordan's view, a country's identity as a part of a region rests on its interests and the means it follows in pursuing its goals. Hence, Jordan believes that certain efforts should be directed towards a cultural change "from a culture of war to a culture of peace" through education and a process of confidence building.

JORDANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Political, historical and geographical considerations interlock in any accurate formulation of the strategic problem of Jordanian national security. Analysis of the problem provokes a number of questions such as is Jordan in an aggressive security environment? Is it necessary to engage in an arms race that would aggravate Jordanian resource limitations? Can Jordan hope to achieve absolute national security? Since Jordan depends on overseas fund sources and armaments, how independently can it act? Finally, which of the threats (conventional Israeli threat, Syrian or Iraqi) Jordan confronts most is a national security strategy issue? If it cannot face these threats simultaneously, can it successfully do so on a phased basis? These are but the most obvious of the strategic issues, which Jordan must address regarding its national security.

For Jordan, the most important objectives of a security system include:⁶⁶

- Enhancing stability and promoting economic cooperation and integration in the region.
- Reducing the probability of war by addressing unwarranted fears and optimistic miscalculation.
- Minimizing military risks.
- Reducing threat of surprise attack.

- Regulating the arms race by rules and procedures.
- Reducing military expenditures.
- Promoting political development, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in the region.

HOW THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CAN CONTRIBUTE IN HANDLING THE PROBLEM

Acting alone, Jordan has limited military power and can deter potential aggressors only to a limited degree. Adherence to a regional security system would enable Jordan to confront potential aggressors with the collective might of the system's members.

The regional security system would handle the main issues of the strategic problem of Jordanian national security: which is the neighboring aggressive environment: Israel, Syria and Iraq. The regional security system would also contribute by developing a friendly environment. This transformation of the hostile environment into a peaceful and secure one is the real core of the problem.

The regional security system would permit reduced levels of armament. Reducing its armed force would allow Jordan to direct more economic resources toward development tracks. Integrated social development contributes in raising the living standard of Jordanians, which, in turn, promotes social stability in Jordan and thus contributes to internal security.

The regional security system would address all the political, geographical, historical and geopolitical concepts that form serious threats to the Jordanian national security such as the "alternative homeland" for the Palestinians and "Great Syria".

In addition to the central role that Jordan plays as the essential driving force in pushing for adoption of the security system and formulating its objectives and directives, it has offered to host the system headquarters and its main mechanism, which is the regional security center. Although an agreed general concept of the regional security system has not emerged, and its initial objectives, organization and main responsibility remain undefined, all are agreed that Amman could serve as a center of political activity. Such an arrangement would have political advantages expressing the political value that Amman enjoys and the Jordanian leadership particularly. However, Jordan would not enjoy greater security, social or economical advantages than the other regional countries. The regional security system would not allow any member to enjoy an exclusive leadership role as such an arrangement would be inconsistent with the basic philosophy of equal rights in security and development.

Jordanian commitment to the regional security order is considered a crucial strategic national interest, which is considered a decisive issue according to the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty.

CONCLUSION

The peace process is based on international precedents represented by the legal and political contexts of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (242, 338). While the United States plays a leadership role in sponsoring the peace process, the European countries and the UN practice marginal roles. At the regional level, to succeed the peace process will have to serve the national interests for all Middle East countries.

The strategic problem for the security of the Middle East is represented by a number of concepts that were developed through the conflict phases. The high level of military preparations among regional states and mistrust of one another threatens the national security of all states in the region. The regional security aims to handle this problem and promote a peaceful and secure environment for all and to foster social and economic development.

For any regional security order to succeed, it is necessary to deal with the real roots of conflicts. This can be accomplished by creating comprehensive development conditions that reduce the differences among peoples. The regional security system, as proposed by Jordan, can effectively address these issues in three primary arenas: hard security concerns, soft security concerns, and arms control arrangements.

Jordan is considered one of the main members in any security system in the Middle East, regardless of its forms and its mechanisms. That relates to the crucial Jordanian role as a central force pushing toward establishing a regional security system and initiating political change.

Implementing the regional security system will create new strategic situations in the Middle East at the political, security, economic, and social levels. These variations

may require the Jordanian military leadership to rethink its security strategy, and to analyze the impact on Jordanian national security of the new strategic environment in the Middle East. Every aspect of the Jordanian security strategy: the external threat, the JAF mission, preparing JAF, strategic directions, strategic planning considerations, and employment doctrine of the JAF will have to be reexamined in the light of the new security environment.

ENDNOTES

1. Dr. Kamel Abu Jabber, "Jordanian minister of foreign affairs during Oslo talks", opening remarks, conference on "challenges of peace support: into 21 century", 18-20 October 1993, Amman, Jordan.
2. Ibid.
3. Research paper presented at Helsinki workshop on arms control and regional security, 29th of may 1995.
4. Four conferences were held, the first in Casablanca, morocco 1994; the second in Amman, Jordan 1995; the third in Cairo, Egypt 1996; the fourth in Doha, Qatar 1997.
5. From Arab states perspective, the participant countries in the peace settlement especially on multilateral track is required.
6. Samuel Wells and Mark Bruzonsky, security in the Middle East, regional change and great power strategies, p 7 and 234.
7. Israeli research paper presented at Arms Control and Regional Security Conference, Doha, Qatar 1994.
8. Dr. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, lecture on "Security in the Mediterranean region", NATO War College, 21 April 1999.
9. Ibid.
10. The American troops were sent to Iran to establish the Persian Gulf Command in 1943.
11. Samuel Wells and Mark Bruzonsky, *ibid*, p 6.

26. Current History, January 2001, America's Middle East Peace Crisis, by Augustus Richard Norton, p 7.
27. Ibid.
28. Dr. Phebe MAAR (U.S), security in the Mediterranean region (panel), ibid.
29. Richard Norton, ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Shibley Telhami, ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Current History, January 2001, Israel and the Palestinians: the Bitter Fruits of Hegemonic Peace, by Glenn E. Robinson, p 15-17.
34. Ibid.
35. Dr. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, ibid.
36. For example, it was 4.9% in 1996.
37. Dr. Alvaro de Vasconcelose, ibid.
38. That policy has effectively brought the movement into disarray. It has also the effect of pushing small fugitive groups into the underground, beefing up the ranks of those determined to take violent revenge.
39. Sami Hajjar, ibid. PP 17-19
40. Steven L. Spiegel, the Arab Israeli searches for peace, Lynne Rienner publisher, London 1992, PP 152-153
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41. Ibid.
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43. That may cause by border disputes in more than 20 places within the Arab countries.
44. Such as Osama Bin Laden. See Sami Hajjar, *ibid* p19-20.
45. Such as Syria, Iraq, Iran and Algeria.
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47. Salah Zaki, some Arab strategic issues.
48. *Ibid*.
49. Dr. Hassan Fakhro, what is After Oil? What is Before Development?.
50. *Ibid*.
51. Tala't Ahmad Musalam, Arab Military Cooperation.
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53. *Ibid*.
54. *Ibid*.
55. Elements required for beginning negotiations on Middle East arms control, Israeli delegation to the ACRS Working group, may 29-31, 1995.
56. Sixth workshop on arms control and security improvement in the Middle East, Nicosia, Cyprus July 24-27, 2000.
57. *Ibid*.
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60. Jordan's largest participation was during 1992-1994 in former Yugoslavia. Jordan Armed Forces participated with three battalions at one time. The total number of participants exceeds 15000.
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