



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

## **Readiness Implications of Selected Aspects of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti**

John R. Brinkerhoff

June 2000

Approved for public release;  
distribution unlimited.

IDA Document D-2459

Log: H 00-001402

This work was conducted under contract DASW01 98 C 0067, Task BE-6-1851, for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency.

© 2000, 2001 Institute for Defense Analyses, 1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1772 • (703) 845-2000.

This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (NOV 95).

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

IDA Document D-2459

**Readiness Implications of Selected Aspects  
of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti**

John R. Brinkerhoff

## **PREFACE**

This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in partial fulfillment of a task entitled “Dynamic Readiness.” This portion of the task dealt with the concept of readiness as a time-schedule of events from initial state to the state in which the unit or force is employed in a military operation. This case study examines the actions taken by the two major organizations that participated in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994 to get ready for that operation. The focus is on the dynamic aspects of the preparedness process once the units were designated to participate. This document is one of a series of readiness case studies that will be published from time to time to illustrate various operational applications of readiness.

The author is indebted to MG David C. Meade, USA Retired, LTC Charles R. Taylor, USA, and Dr. David Crist, USMC Historical Center, who reviewed an earlier draft of this paper and provided helpful comments. This document was also reviewed for accuracy by the other interviewees cited in the notes.

## CONTENTS

Preface .....	iii
Summary .....	S-1
A. Operation Uphold Democracy.....	1
B. 10th Mountain Division .....	4
1. Planning.....	5
2. Resource Fill .....	6
3. Training .....	8
4. Movement to Port.....	10
5. Movement to Haiti .....	12
6. Garrison Support .....	13
7. Company B, 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry (Mechanized).....	16
C. SPMAGTF-C .....	17
1. 2 <sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Marines .....	18
2. HMM-264.....	22
D. Tentative Insights from the Haiti Operation.....	23
Glossary.....	A-1

## **SUMMARY**

In April 1994, the United States landed military forces in Haiti to support the restoration to power of President Aristide and pave the way for democratic government and economic growth. Two primary components of the Joint Task Force engaged in Operation Uphold Democracy were the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division of the Army and the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, Caribbean, of the Marine Corps.

To preserve operational security, this operation was planned secretly by the Joint Staff, Atlantic Command Headquarters, and Headquarters 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps. Accordingly, the Army and Marine units to perform the operation were notified just before their impending mission, with little time to optimize people, resources, and training. For the most part, they had to go as they were when they were alerted. Both of the units examined in this case study were able to meet the challenge. Although Operation Uphold Democracy was small in size (20,000 troops) and had the advantage of occurring close to the United States, it is almost a textbook example of how these kinds of operations should be done. The major lesson from this case study is that a high state of peacetime readiness pays off for short-notice rapid reaction operations.

## **READINESS IMPLICATIONS OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY IN HAITI**

On 19 September 1994, United States forces landed peacefully in Haiti to restore President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power and begin a process of assisting Haiti on a road to democracy and economic development. This was a classic smaller-scale contingency, and the way that it was planned, prepared, and executed has some interesting insights for military planners and resource providers.

### **A. OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY**

Operation Uphold Democracy was a complicated operation that required joint planning and execution to fit many political and military constraints. It involved moving 20,000 troops to an operational area about 1,000 miles from US bases in the Southeast United States. The situation in Haiti was fluid, and the nature of the operation kept changing. The uncertainties required clever planning and a flexible plan with options for possible contingencies. This was done. A last minute change from an opposed entry by one force to an unopposed entry by a different force was carried out well. The process by which the headquarters and forces prepared and deployed to the area of operations provides some insights into the nature of operational readiness.<sup>1</sup>

This joint operation was conducted under the aegis of the newly re-designated Atlantic Command and commanded by two Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)—one from Headquarters, 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps; the other from Headquarters, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division. The major elements were the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps troops, a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean (SPMAGTF-C), Navy Task Force 140, and an Air Force task force.

---

<sup>1</sup> This section is based primarily on John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). See also Walter L. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1998 (hereafter *Concise History*).

Planning for a potential operation in Haiti started in earnest in October 1993 when, by coincidence, Headquarters, US Atlantic Command, had just been converted from a naval command primarily concerned with waging the NATO war in the Atlantic and Caribbean to the command responsible for the training and readiness of all Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force elements in the continental United States. Headquarters, Atlantic Command (ACOM), as it was now called, was augmented by Army and Air Force officers, and became the major force provider to other commanders-in-chief (CINCs). This new orientation for ACOM occurred just when events in Haiti were boiling after President Aristide was removed from office and supplanted by a military junta headed by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras. US and UN diplomatic efforts to coax General Cedras into leaving office voluntarily were unsuccessful. In October 1993, an effort to introduce a small contingent of US troops into Haiti as nation-builders under UN auspices was aborted when Haitian paramilitary forces demonstrated at the Port-au-Prince harbor, where the troops were supposed to land. The failure of this operation, which had been planned by ACOM, caused many US officials to believe that the Haiti situation would have to be resolved ultimately by US military intervention.

In November 1993, a special planning group was formed in ACOM Headquarters to develop a plan for a military operation in Haiti. Operational security was tight. The results of the planning process were restricted to few senior officers at ACOM. The planning group was kept small, but representatives from the ACOM staff sections and supporting components participated as necessary. The initial ACOM plan called for a forcible entry.

Only a few people in the Pentagon were aware of the ACOM planning effort. Six or seven officers on the Joint Staff knew the details of the plan, including the Chairman, the Director of Operations (J-3), two officers from the J-3 operations division, and one each from the plans and intelligence divisions. The tight operational security had some drawbacks:

*Even several key general officers, some of whom were intimately involved in the diplomatic and support actions for Haiti, were not informed of the work taking place in Norfolk. When the plan was finally executed, these officers were notified of the details only days before the major forces were scheduled to land.<sup>2</sup>*

---

<sup>2</sup> Ballard, *Upholding Democracy*, p. 65.



When the ACOM concept plan was briefed to J-3 and Joint Staff representatives in November 1994, the ACOM team recommended that planning be continued by a Joint Task Force headed by the officer to be the operational commander. This recommendation was not approved at that time for security reasons. A follow-up briefing on 6 January 1994, however, resulted in Joint Staff approval for expanded compartmentalized planning and the designation of Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton, Commander, 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps, as Commander, CJTF 180.

At this point, the responsibility for planning the Haiti operation in detail shifted to Headquarters, 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps. This headquarters was familiar with Haiti and, as the Army's rapid response corps, had for several years prepared plans to conduct non-combatant evacuations there. Operational security considerations continued to hinder the planning effort. Soon after the Airborne Corps started planning, the classification of the planning effort was raised from SECRET to TOP SECRET. This caused problems at Fort Bragg because all personnel had to be cleared for access to TOP SECRET information and the work had to be done in a special facility with special equipment. Later, key personnel from the 82nd Airborne Division were brought into the planning effort. By mid-February 1994 an initial draft of a campaign plan and a time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) schedule were prepared and sent to ACOM. After the plan was completed, there was a lull of several weeks as events unfolded in Haiti. However, the draft plan for a forcible entry operation in Haiti was "on the shelf" ready to be executed.

As a result of political developments in Haiti, preparations for the Haiti operation resumed in earnest in April and May 1994. Key units conducted rehearsals under the cover of training exercises, and the plan was briefed to key personnel and refined. After much guidance and revision, the plan was briefed on 20 June 1994 to CINACOM and on 21 June 1994 to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The plan was then transferred from ACOM J-5 to ACOM J-3 for transformation into the operational order format. This was a combat plan that involved an opposed entry by CJTF 180, with the entire 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division conducting a parachute assault to seize key targets, including the Port-au-Prince airport and seaport to facilitate the entry of follow-on elements. In order to accomplish coordination with many of the DOD and non-DOD agencies that would have to be involved in the follow-on phase of the operation, a second plan (with a lower security classification) was prepared involving an unopposed entry. Many elements were common to the two plans, and the general idea was that after the

opposed landing, another Army element would land and take over the mission from the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division. The combat entry plan called for a Marine task force to seize and occupy Cap-Haitien, in the North. The unopposed plan called for an Army brigade to do this, but in the execution, the Marine Task Force (which was in the vicinity) was used to land at Cap-Haitien.

In the execution phase, the opposed entry plan was underway, with the airborne troops just a few hours from their parachute assault, when a negotiating team headed by former President Jimmy Carter persuaded General Cedras to leave office and to allow US forces into Haiti unopposed. The plan was changed in mid-stream, and the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division landed instead of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division. The SPMAGTF-C also converted from an opposed assault to a peaceful entry at Cap-Haitien.

Because of the relevance of the two major ground force elements of CJTF 190—the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division and the SPMAGTF-C—for force readiness assessments, this paper focuses on the steps they took to plan and prepare for their roles in the operation. Preparations to provide a mechanized infantry company for CJTF 190 are also discussed.

## **B. 10<sup>TH</sup> MOUNTAIN DIVISION**

On 26 July 1994, Major General David C. Meade, Commander, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, received a warning order from General Dennis Reimer, Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), that the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division should start planning to participate in a possible Haiti operation and that General Meade would be the Commander, CJTF 190.<sup>3</sup> As such, he would be responsible for planning and executing the unopposed entry option and conducting peacekeeping operations in Haiti. On 29 July 1999, General Meade and some of the division staff officers went to Fort Bragg and were briefed on the operation by the Commander, 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps, and by the ACOM J-5. On 19 September 1994, CJTF 190 landed and initiated operations.<sup>4</sup>

General Meade already had an inkling that the division might have a role in a possible Haiti operation. A few weeks before the official notification, a senior officer at

---

<sup>3</sup> Interview, Major General David C. Meade, Retired, 22 September 1999. General Reimer was visiting Fort Drum on 26 July 1994 to observe National Guard training.

<sup>4</sup> Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Operation Uphold Democracy Written After-Action Report, undated (hereafter 10th Division AAR).

ACOM had called and inquired about the readiness of the division for another operation, such as Haiti. General Meade did not say anything about this seemingly casual inquiry, but he did pay even closer attention to the readiness and training status of his division.

The division was in good shape.<sup>5</sup> Although the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division had been the major Army element in the Somalia operation of 1993–1994, most of the division had returned to Fort Drum early in 1994. By April 1994, there was only a brigade task force of two battalions amounting to about 1,100 personnel in Somalia.<sup>6</sup> This residual element returned to Fort Drum in June 1994, in time to go to Haiti. From January to July 1994, most of the division was at Fort Drum, engaged in training and operational events. General Meade considered his division ready for another major operation.<sup>7</sup>

During the 51-day period between the alert and landing in Haiti, the division formed a CJTF headquarters, planned the operation, prepared the division units, identified and marshaled the non-divisional units of the CJTF, moved the division and task force elements to ports, landed in Haiti, and commenced operations. The preparation may be considered for analytical purposes to have taken place in five overlapping phases: planning, resource fill, training, movement to port, and movement to Haiti.

## **1. Planning**

As soon as the mission was assigned formally on 29 July 1994, the division staff went into high gear on the planning effort. Their work had to be done rapidly so that the units to be in the task force could be alerted in time to perform their own planning and prepare to deploy for the operation. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division staff had to develop a plan, coordinate it, get it approved, and transmit it to major subordinate commanders while expanding to become a joint task force.

The division staff was too small and too inexperienced to serve as the command and control element for a joint task force of 20,000 troops.<sup>8</sup> Yet, the job had to be done for Haiti. The division staff expanded quickly in strength from 300 to 800 by adding personnel from other services and from other functions, such as psychological operations

---

<sup>5</sup> The 10th Mountain Division has only two brigades.

<sup>6</sup> Combat Studies Institute, Case Studies in U.S. Peace Operations and Interventions Since World War II, "Somalia," March 1999.

<sup>7</sup> Meade interview, 22 September 1999.

<sup>8</sup> Meade interview, 22 September 1999, and oral histories support this view.

and civil affairs, not usually represented at division. The intelligence section, for example, expanded from 71 personnel to 162 and began working with national assets and other intelligence support activities to perform the intelligence assessment and preparation of the theater.<sup>9</sup>

The planning process proceeded urgently but orderly. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division's task was to develop an alternate OPLAN for an unopposed entry. The first step was to develop a concept of operations. This was done, and General Meade and some of the staff went to ACOM on 3 August and briefed the CINC on the concept of operations. The concept was approved and served as the basis for the rest of the planning effort.

By 10 August 1994, the draft CJTF 190 operations plan was completed and distributed. In the next few days, the CINACOM, Commander, FORSCOM, and the Chief of Staff of the Army visited Fort Drum and were briefed on the latest developments in the plan. On 18 August 1999, the plan was briefed to the subordinate commanders in detail. The following day, the forces for CJTF 190 were designated. The following week was spent refining the plan, and on 29 August 1999, the major subordinate commanders assembled and briefed their own plans to the task force commander. The following day, 30 August 1994, was devoted to a complete rehearsal of the operations planned for D-Day. Finally, on 1 September 1994 OPLAN 2380 was complete, approved, and ready to go, and the division and CJTF 190 settled down to wait for the execution order.

The deployment order was issued to the division at 1800 hours on 9 September 1994. Movement of equipment started the next day. On the 11<sup>th</sup>, the staff participated in an ACOM rehearsal and rock drill, and on the 15<sup>th</sup> the final CJTF 190 rock drill for all subordinate elements was conducted at Fort Drum. On 17 September, General Meade and the task force J3, Colonel Thomas Miller, departed Fort Drum en route to the USS Mount Whitney. At 0930 on 19 September 1994, the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade conducted an air assault into Port-au-Prince from the aircraft carrier, USS EISENHOWER.

## **2. Resource Fill**

On 30 June 1994, the division was in very good shape in personnel strength and equipment fill. The division did not need and did not receive a large number of fillers from other units or the personnel system. Personnel strength was high. The division had all of the 11B infantrymen to fill its squads and platoons; there were enough NCOs; and

---

<sup>9</sup> 10th Mountain Division AAR, op. cit.

captains commanded all of the companies. Although there may have been a few changes of personnel within the battalions, there was no need to cross-level among the battalions.<sup>10</sup>

The division deployed about 8,600 of its 10,000 troops to Haiti. The policy was to “take everyone but the lame and lazy.”<sup>11</sup> Those that did not deploy constituted the rear detachment. The troops that stayed at Fort Drum provided support to the deployed elements, ran the family support program, and carried out other division missions.

With one exception, the division had no major equipment shortages or maintenance problems. The Directorate of Logistics (DOL) of the Fort Drum Garrison provided support in preparing the division units for deployment by taking action on due-outs and filling minor shortages. The Force Modernization Office in the Garrison’s Readiness Business Center, which takes care of new items, issued 7,000 GPS sets (Magellans) 2 days before the troops departed. These items were already scheduled to be issued, and they were speeded up so that the division would have this capability in Haiti. The Support Maintenance Activity at Fort Drum provided maintenance support to get division equipment ready to go.<sup>12</sup>

The one major problem that division had was with its UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. Helicopter OPTEMPO experienced in real operations is four times that allowed during routine training at Fort Drum. This not only causes greater wear but also means that scheduled phase maintenance is sometimes postponed because of operational demands. When the Haiti operation started, many of the division’s helicopters were still in the process of recovering from the Somalia operation. Because of the harsh operating conditions and length of deployment in Somalia, 23 helicopters had been put into depot maintenance for a complete rebuild. While the division was able to sustain a 75 percent or better operations readiness rate in both Somalia and Haiti, the rate went down to about 40 percent immediately after the end of these operations. When preparations began for

---

<sup>10</sup> Meade interview, 22 September 1999.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Dave Hughes and Jerry Grosjean of the Emergency Operations Center, 25 September 1999.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

Haiti, the division still had several helicopters undergoing depot maintenance, and it was necessary to make extra efforts to ready enough helicopters to support the Haiti operation.<sup>13</sup>

### **3. Training**

Pre-deployment training started in late July right after the division received notice that it would participate in a Haiti operation.<sup>14</sup> The division master training plan was revised to take into account the mission, and the division staff prepared a multi-echelon training plan with mission specific tasks. Brigade Task Forces were formed so that the units and sub-units trained with the other units with which they would operate.<sup>15</sup>

The commander's intent was to train for the specific challenges the division would face in Haiti. The first step was for each commander to analyze with his or her staff the mission and the characteristics of the area of operations. Then the projected time schedule for deployment was consulted to see how much training time would be available. This process allowed the unit commanders to formulate mission-specific training programs making best use of available time. Three general kinds of training were conducted: command and staff training, pre-deployment training, and infantry training.

The division commander's training guidance identified the following mission-specific tasks for which the troops would have to be prepared: convoy procedures, convoy security, security for non-governmental organizations and private volunteer organizations, cordon and search of areas, security of the US Embassy, non-combatant evacuation, air assault, strike force operations, port security, military operations in urban terrain, rules of engagement, and aircraft carrier deck qualification for helicopter pilots.

Command and staff training was focused on the CJTF operations plan and was conducted primarily by means of rehearsals and rock drills (full resolution map exercises). Once the plan was formulated, it was rehearsed several times in detail to make certain each soldier knew what to do. Each rehearsal included full representation from higher and subordinate commands. The division participated in two rehearsals conducted by ACOM and the Department of State. Full dress rehearsals of the division air assault into Port-au-Prince were conducted. Division rock drills allowed brigade, battalion, and

---

<sup>13</sup> 10th Mountain Division AAR slides, p. 24–25.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp.57–58

<sup>15</sup> Meade interview and 10th Mountain Division AAR, Pre-Deployment Activities section.

company commanders and their staffs to visualize the area of operations, brief their plans and actions to the commanders, and receive additional guidance from their commanders.<sup>16</sup>

Although the plan called for unopposed entry, the division commander specified that there would also be combat refresher training in case there was opposition from the Haitian forces. Prior to D-Day, no one knew exactly whether the operation would be a forcible entry or a peaceful entry, or what the reaction of the Haitian armed forces would be to the introduction of US military forces. It was entirely possible that the Haitian armed forces and paramilitary elements would continue to put up a fight after the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division had landed. Based on the division's previous experience in Somalia, General Meade thought it was prudent to consider having to fight in Haiti. Although the 10<sup>th</sup> was assigned the unopposed entry plan [while the 82<sup>nd</sup> was to do the opposed entry], the division conducted infantry training and devoted one weekend to practicing a forcible entry. Infantry training also reflected the belief that "infantry doctrine still provides the appropriate foundation for the tasks and individual skills required to perform peace operations."<sup>17</sup> Combat training was conducted on reconnaissance, movement to contact, attack, defend, and day and night operations.

The pre-deployment training program included the following elements:

- Weapons firing, which took place while the staffs were preparing the plans)
- Squad and platoon patrolling, both dismounted and mobile
- Company attacks or raids on hostile groups or facilities
- Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) training so the infantry platoons and companies would know how to defend and attack in cities and villages (This training paid off for operations in Port-au-Prince.)
- Defense of fixed sites, such as bases and military compounds
- Air assault training and exercise for each infantry battalion
- Both day and night live-fire exercises with air support for each of the 18 rifle companies in the division<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> 10th Mountain Division AAR, pp. 39–40.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>18</sup> Interview with General Meade, 5 January 2000.

- Flight deck operations for aviation units conducted in August on the aircraft carrier USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT at Norfolk, Virginia<sup>19</sup>
- Country orientation

Training continued through the preparation stage, during deployment as possible, and after the operation was started. A multi-purpose range complex was designed, built, and maintained in Haiti to provide units the opportunity to focus on their warfighting Mission-Essential Task List (METL).<sup>20</sup> This training facility had ranges for live firing of individual and crew-served weapons and small unit maneuver. Units could deploy to the training complex for several days to maintain the training readiness of soldiers, leaders, and staffs.

When the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division went into Haiti on 19 September 1994, it was well trained individually and collectively. Commanders, staffs, and units were trained and rehearsed in what they would do in Haiti.

#### **4. Movement to Port**

The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain division moved from Fort Drum by air, rail, commercial trucks, and military convoys. Most of the equipment was sent to the Army terminal at Bayonne, New Jersey, a distance of about 350 miles from Fort Drum. Some equipment was sent to Norfolk, Virginia, about 550 miles away. Most of the personnel were airlifted from Griffiss Air Force Base (AFB) in Rome, NY, about 85 miles away from Fort Drum.

Moving division elements from Fort Drum to airports and seaports is the responsibility of the Installation Travel Office (ITO) of the Fort Drum Garrison. The ITO works with FORSCOM, which oversees the entire move, and coordinates with MTMC and TRANSCOM, which has taken over some of the MTMC functions, about movement in CONUS. The TPFDD is the overall schedule, and the installations have to conform to that. The important data for the ITO is unit identity, the mode of movement, and the time to move.

The major constraint on movement of units is availability of assets to move the people and equipment. The ITO arranges for movement by rail, highway, and air. The

---

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> 10th Division AAR, p. 59.



division staff receives word of ship availability and schedules the arrival of units at the seaports; ITO moves the units in accordance with the schedule.

The preferred mode to transport the equipment from Fort Drum to a seaport is rail car. Flatbed rail car availability is critical to move the equipment. When notified of a deployment, the ITO contacts MTMC and the rail carrier and asks for rail cars at Fort Drum for loading and movement to port. The ITO had for years maintained cordial personal relations with the Consolidated Rail Corporation (CONRAIL) people and allowed them to store about 200 flatbed rail cars at Fort Drum. In this way, the ITO had a de facto stock of rail cars that would make it easier and faster to get the equipment of division elements loaded for movement to the ports.<sup>21</sup>

For Operation Uphold Democracy, because of the short notice, CONRAIL could not make enough flatbed cars available to move all of the equipment, so it was necessary to move some of the equipment to Bayonne by military convoy in order to meet the movement schedule.

The movement began on 10 September when a small convoy departed Fort Drum for Bayonne.<sup>22</sup> Big convoys left on the 11<sup>th</sup>, 12<sup>th</sup>, and 13<sup>th</sup> of September. The first rail shipment of 94 cars was loaded on Sunday, 11 September, and left that evening.<sup>23</sup> Additional rail shipments continued over the next 5 days. A total of 238 rail cars moved 915 pieces of equipment to Bayonne and Norfolk over a 5-day period. The equipment at Bayonne was loaded on 14 ships. The equipment and personnel at Norfolk were loaded on the aircraft carrier, USS EISENHOWER.

Personnel of the units slated for deployment on the USS EISENHOWER departed Fort Drum by air on 12 September to marry up with their equipment and board the carrier at Norfolk. Headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, two infantry battalions, and elements of the 10<sup>th</sup> Aviation Brigade, with their equipment and helicopters, boarded the USS EISENHOWER upon arrival at Norfolk. The carrier departed on 14 September 1994 for the Joint Operating Area (JOA).

The division did not do very well in the initial road convoys to Bayonne. The standing operating procedure was to move all of the equipment to the port by rail, and

---

<sup>21</sup> Interview, 26 August 1999, with Anne Coleman, Fort Drum Installation Transportation Officer. After this operation, CONRAIL was bought by the CSX Corporation.

<sup>22</sup> 10th Mountain Division AAR, pp. 65–68.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

movement by motor vehicles had not been considered. The junior officers and NCOs in charge had little experience in motor movements, and the drivers were young soldiers with little driving experience in trucks. Despite careful arrangements made with the state police and other officials, some convoys got lost and arrived at the port as much as a day late.<sup>24</sup>

The ITO at Fort Drum points out that driving through New York State to the Port at Bayonne, New Jersey, is not a simple matter under the best of conditions. There is a lot of highway traffic and a lot of room for error. For these reasons, the ITO does not favor using motor convoys to move equipment to ports, even with experienced troops. Rail is the preferred mode, and commercial trucking is the second choice. Ideally, the equipment goes 2 weeks before the soldiers leave by air. Convoys waste soldier time that could be spent better learning about the theater of operations and training for the operation.

Most of the soldiers flew directly from Griffiss AFB to Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Some went to an intermediate staging base in Puerto Rico. Another group went to Norfolk for movement to the USS EISENHOWER for sea movement to Haiti. The Fort Drum Garrison operated a Departure Airfield Control Group (DACG) at Griffiss AFB, using 40 to 50 civilian employees who had been designated and trained for this additional duty. The DACG took control of the units as they arrived, reconfigured them into packets of people and equipment loads, and then turned them over to the Air Force Aerial Port Detachment, which loaded the aircraft. These people worked two 12-hour shifts for 10 days to get the division loaded. Since there was no way of knowing which type of aircraft would show up next, flexibility was needed to tailor each load of equipment and people to fit the specs of each aircraft type.

## **5. Movement to Haiti**

The division was moved from the ports to Haiti by a combination of means.

- The CJTF Command group and staff elements were in the vicinity of Port-au-Prince on board the USS WHITNEY, the Navy Task Force flagship.
- The 2,000 troops of the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Task Force arrived near Port-au-Prince on 18 September on board the USS EISENHOWER. This arrangement provided

---

<sup>24</sup> Coleman interview, 26 August 1999.

a convenient platform for launching the air assault forces and an intermediate support base for the brigade task force. On 19 September 1994, the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Task Force moved by helicopter into Port-au-Prince, taking control of the airport and seaport.

- Troops of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Task Force and Task Force Mountain (and other elements of the CJTF) were flown directly to Port-au-Prince from Griffiss AFB after the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade had landed and secured the airport.
- Ships carrying equipment for the division and other units of the CJTF were already offshore, and they started unloading at the port as soon as the first troops landed. Fifteen minutes after the assault element landed by helicopter at the Port-au-Prince Airfield, the first cargo ship docked at the Port-au-Prince harbor, and the division staff and additional troops began disembarking.

The deployment of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division was a success. Because of excellent scheduling, all elements arrived as planned. The last-minute switch from a combat parachute assault by the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division to a peaceful helicopter entry by the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division went smoothly. Some changes had to be made to the movement schedule for the follow-on support forces, and this caused some minor problems that were resolved rapidly. The flexibility demonstrated by the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division and the other elements of CJTF 190 was remarkable.

## **6. Garrison Support**

The Fort Drum Garrison was essential to the preparation and movement to ports of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division.<sup>25</sup> The Garrison Commander is a colonel who reports to the Commander, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division. Division and garrison activities are commingled to a certain extent. The garrison Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and some other garrison operations are collocated with the division headquarters in the Post and Division Headquarters Building. (In 1994, the EOC was a garrison function. It is now a combined function.) In substance, although not formally, the two separate command elements were in many respects an integrated headquarters. The Garrison has many important responsibilities when the division is alerted and deployed for an

---

<sup>25</sup> This section is based on an the Hughes and Grosjean interview and the Fort Drum Garrison After Action Review (AAR) for Operation Uphold Democracy, undated.

operation. The support system that it provides for the division daily is also very important when the division has to prepare for an operation.

Because the garrison has been reduced in strength in recent years, soldiers on detail are borrowed to help out with some garrison activities. Except for training missed by the borrowed soldiers, this works for day-to-day operations, but when the entire division has to deploy (as for Haiti), it causes severe problems. The borrowed soldiers return to their units at the very time that the garrison workforce has to surge to enable the division to move. The Garrison reacts to a deployment by moving some garrison people into “wartime” jobs. For the Haiti operation, civilian employees went to Bayonne and Griffiss AFB to act as liaison and coordinate the loading of ships and aircraft. The Garrison EOC helped in the planning, the DOL in the resourcing, and the ITO in the movement to ports, as described above. In addition the garrison provided the following support to the division for Operation Uphold Democracy:<sup>26</sup>

- Prepared labels for units to use in marking equipment to be moved
- Obtained portable light sets to use at railheads
- Issued new requisition authorities to rear detachments after main body deployed
- Provided packing material and strapping for movement or storage of division materiel
- Provided 3 days of field rations (MREs) for the division to take along on the move
- Issued clothing and equipment to soldiers
- Issued ammunition basic loads to deploying units
- Performed extensive aviation maintenance to support helicopter deployments
- Repaired and returned to units small arms sent back from Haiti to Fort Drum
- Provided personnel and equipment to support outloading of division equipment
- Arranged to send local and national newspapers to division troops in Haiti

---

<sup>26</sup> Garrison AAR, op. cit., passim.

- Filled requisitions for supplies from division public affairs office in Haiti
- Made crates, signs, banners, map holders, and flag holders for division units to use in Haiti
- Performed maintenance on unit food service facilities during deployment
- Maintained and turned off services at vacated building at Fort Drum
- Prepared to provide casualty assistance to families of personnel killed in Haiti
- Processed civilian employees deployed to Haiti
- Provided chaplain support at Griffiss AFB and for rear detachments at Fort Drum
- Provided family support services
- Provided educational materials and correspondence course information to deploying units
- Provided MWR sports and recreation kits to deploying units
- Assisted deploying soldiers in leaving schools without penalty
- Provided official information to spouses of deploying soldiers
- Operated a Family Assistance Center at Fort Drum
- Provided child care during official pre-deployment briefings for soldiers and families
- Provided recreational activities for soldiers a waiting aircraft at Griffiss AFB
- Conducted urinalysis tests for deploying troops
- Provided emergency financial support for needy families
- Obtained and distributed “welcome home” supplies, such as banner paper, paint, brushes, balloons, and flags for families to use in ceremonies for returning troops

These tasks, some of which may appear to be trivial, nonetheless constitute in the aggregate support that deploying organizations, such as the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, need to have someone do for them when they deploy to conduct military operations.

## **7. Company B, 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry (Mechanized)**

A mechanized infantry company was sent to Haiti as part of CJTF 190 to provide some armored vehicles for the operation.<sup>27</sup> The Army Order of Battle lists Company B, 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment as part of the 2nd Brigade Task Force.<sup>28</sup> However, it took what amounted to a mechanized task force to support B Company's 14 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) in the theater. The task force consisted of an element of battalion headquarters, B Company, an engineer detachment, a medical detachment, and a forward logistical element (FSE) with fuel trucks and a direct support and general support maintenance capability. The mechanized task force had 50 vehicles and about 270 people, of whom about 140 were in the mechanized company itself.

The entire 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment was scheduled to go to Haiti as part of CJTF 180 (the opposed entry option), and just before D-Day the entire battalion was loaded on a ship to do that. When the mission changed to unopposed entry and the demand for armored vehicles diminished, it was decided to send only a company of BFVs.<sup>29</sup> The 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion had worked in Somalia with the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, and so was a logical source of the company for the operation.

The command arrangements were adjusted to fit the new situation. A major from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion served as the senior liaison officer for the Heavy Team, and the battalion executive officer and battalion operations officer took turns serving in that capacity. The commander of Company B was the commander of the company and the FSE, which was also commanded by a captain.<sup>30</sup>

When it was selected for the Haiti operation, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion was the division ready battalion and was in excellent condition. It was ready to participate as a battalion. However, sending a reinforced company/team to Haiti reduced the combat capability of the battalion and stretched the capabilities of Company B. After detaching the Heavy Team, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion (minus) was in the worst condition in the division and took several months to recover readiness.

---

<sup>27</sup> The account of Company B is based on an interview with LTC Charles L. Taylor, G-3, 10th Mountain Division, on 26 August 1999. Then Major Taylor was the S-3 of the battalion from which Company B was detached and served in Haiti as the Heavy Team liaison officer.

<sup>28</sup> Kretchirk et al., *Concise History*, Appendix B.

<sup>29</sup> In addition to the BFVs of Company B, there were also in Haiti some Sheridan armored vehicles from the 3rd Tank Battalion, 73rd Armor Regiment, of the 82nd Airborne Division.

<sup>30</sup> Comments, LTC Taylor, 4 December 1999.

Company B took a long time to retrain after it returned to Fort Stewart after 7 months in Haiti. The soldiers first had to recover from the operation and then had to be retrained in combat skills. All BFV crews were re-qualified on the combat firing range, and all platoons conducted field training exercises. The training was a graduated ramp-up. It took 6 weeks to get the platoons back in fighting shape and another 6 weeks for the companies. It took about 4 ½ months for the entire battalion to regain its training readiness for combat.<sup>31</sup>

This experience suggests that as presently constituted the Army cannot simply plug and play various elements in forming combined arms teams as part of forces. In particular, heavy and light units are hard to fit together. A light division has no capability to sustain, maintain, or repair BFVs, so Company B had to take along its own battalion-level support. Heavy engineers are equipped and trained differently from light engineers, so Company B had to take along its own kind of engineers from the 24<sup>th</sup> Division engineer battalion. This instance may have relevance for current efforts to create versatile medium combat formations.

### **C. SPMAGTF-C**

The Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean (SPMAGTF-C) was formed on 20 July 1994 for the purpose of participating in a potential Haiti operation. On 10 August 1994, it arrived on station in the Caribbean on the USS NASHVILLE and USS WASP with about 2,000 troops and 53 helicopters. From 8–13 September, the SPMAGTF-C trained on landing operations at Vieques, Puerto Rico. On 20 September 1994, the SPMAGTF-C landed at Cap-Haitien and conducted peace operations. From 27 September to 2 October the SPMAGTF-C left Cap-Haitien and re-embarked on its ships. The task force went to Puerto Rico for a week of replenishment and then remained on station in the Caribbean as the reserve afloat until 17 October 1994. On 19 October 1994, the SPMAGTF-C disembarked and was disbanded at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> Taylor interview, 26 August 1999.

<sup>32</sup> Captain John T. Quinn, USMC, Marine Expedition to Haiti September–October 1994, *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1995.

The SPMAGTF-C consisted of the following elements:

- Headquarters, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines (augmented)
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines (reinforced)
- HMM-264 (reinforced)
- Combat Service Support Detachment 29

The MAGTF Headquarters was formed using Headquarters, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines, as the core and adding personnel from II MEF, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Air Wing, 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Service Support Group, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group.

This discussion of SPMAGTF-C preparations for the Haiti operation focuses on the ground combat element—2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, Second Marines—and the air combat element—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264.

### **1. 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines**

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines had a busy year in 1994.<sup>33</sup> The battalion started the year doing cold weather training and mechanized operations in Camp Fuji, Japan. In March, the battalion moved to Camp Schwab, Okinawa. During March and April the battalion conducted rifle and pistol firing, physical conditioning, and small unit training at the Northern Training Area. In May, the battalion turned in its equipment, received a logistics readiness inspection, and conducted swim training. In June the battalion moved by air to Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. From 13–17 June, the battalion was issued a new set of equipment, and from 17–30 June the troops went on block leave.

From 21 July to 26 October 1994, the battalion was augmented to become Battalion Landing Team 2/2 in the SPMAGTF-C. As BLT 2/2, it participated in Operation Uphold Democracy and remained on station afloat until 19 October, when it returned to Camp LeJeune and the Marines went on a 96-hour liberty. At Camp LeJeune the battalion continued its routine training. As 1994 ended, the battalion was designated as the primary air contingency force for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division.

---

<sup>33</sup> 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, Command Chronology for the period 01 January to 30 June 1994, 30 June 1994, and Command Chronology for the Period 1 July 1994 to 31 December 1994, 31 Dec 1994, Marine Corps Archives.



When the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was transformed into a battalion landing team, it received a number of attachments to provide a broad range of capabilities. As configured for the Haiti operation, BLT 2/2 consisted of the following units and sub-units:<sup>34</sup>

Headquarters and Service Company 2/2

E Company, 2/2

F Company, 2/2

G Company, 2/2

Weapons Company, 2/2

Battery B, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 10<sup>th</sup> Marines (reorganized as a provisional rifle company)

Company B, 2<sup>nd</sup> Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion

2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon, Company C, 2<sup>nd</sup> Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) Battalion

TOW Platoon, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines

2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon, Company B, 2<sup>nd</sup> Combat Engineer Battalion

Military Police Platoon, MP Company, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division

During all of the moves, training, exercises, and operations of 1994, the battalion stayed ready. Official reports reflect no serious equipment shortages. On 30 June 1994, the battalion was short two radios, two ambulances, and one medium mortar. Personnel strength remained stable, with a small buildup for the Haiti operation. Table 1, below, shows the monthly average strengths reported for the battalion. These compare with a required strength of 903—45 officers and 858 enlisted personnel—for this type of battalion.<sup>35</sup> The battalion was maintained at just above 95 percent of required strength for most of the year and was increased to almost required strength for the Haiti operation.

---

<sup>34</sup> 2/2 Command Chronology, 31 Dec 1994, p. 7.

<sup>35</sup> Gunnery Sergeant Parley, Hqs, USMC, 23 September 1999.

**Table 1. 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines Average Monthly Personnel Strength for 1994**

Month	USMC		Navy		Total
	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	
Jan	41	782	2	39	864
Feb	41	782	2	39	864
Mar	41	782	2	39	864
Apr	41	782	2	39	864
May	41	782	2	39	864
Jun	39	789	2	39	869
Jul	35	768	3	56	862
Aug	41	804	3	52	900
Sep	40	761	3	51	855
Oct	40	762	3	46	851
Nov	40	742	3	31	816
Dec	40	739	3	30	812

The preparations made by the 2nd Battalion for the Haiti operation can be stated no better than the words of the official report of the unit:<sup>36</sup>

With under three weeks to prepare for the deployment 2/2 shifted into high gear in order to get ready. Echo Company and Gold Company along with elements of H&S and Weapons underwent helicopter emergency training. The Battalion Aid Station updated shot records and ensured that every Marine received the proper immunizations. The S-4 shop conducted liaison with the Navy and supervised the embarkation process. Each Marine in 2/2 fam fired, zeroed, and tested his weapon. The Battalion Staff and Golf Company executed a scaled-down version of the TCAT aboard the USS Ponce de Leon. All preparations were completed by 10 August 1994.

After the battalion was formed into BLT 2/2 and embarked on the USS WASP and USS Nashville, the training continued. After SPMAGTF-C took over the mission from BLT 3/6 on 16 August, it appeared that the most likely mission in Haiti would be a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). The BLT 2/2 staff created a scenario that

---

<sup>36</sup> 2/2 Command Chronology, 31 December 1994, p. 7.

simulated a NEO at the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince, and the entire planning sequence was rehearsed. As part of SPMAGTF-C, BLT 2/2 executed a practice NEO at Guantanamo Bay on 17 August. On 18 August, Bravo 1/10 practiced its infantry skills by executing a tactical recovery of aircrew and personnel, and Golf Company practiced a night AAV splash and terminal control procedures with US Navy Seals. On 24–26 August the BLT conducted another practice NEO with a night landing. Two companies landed by helicopter, and two simulated landing by AAV.

As September 1994 started, the emphasis shifted from a NEO to a possible forced entry into the northern city of Cap-Haitien. Preparations started for the new mission. The Marines were given classes on peacetime and wartime rules of engagement and given intelligence briefings that focused on Cap-Haitien. The staff developed an amphibious exercise to reflect an invasion of Haiti's second largest city.

For the new mission, BLT 2/2 was organized into two task forces: Task Force IRISH under the battalion commander had G Company (w/AAVs), the LAR company, and the MP platoons. Task Force HAWG, commanded by the battalion executive officer, had F Company, B Battery, and the TOW platoon. E Company initially was to be in MAGTF reserve.

From 7–10 September, BLT 2/2 participated in the SPMAGTF-C exercise at Vieques, Puerto Rico, where the ground was similar to that at Cap-Haitien. The results are described in the Command Chronology as follows:<sup>37</sup>

H-Hour was set for 0300, 7 September. The simultaneous surface-air landing was achieved as Fox seized the Vieques Airfield and Golf secured the notional pier and (sic) port facility. The buildup of forces continued smoothly through the early morning hours. By early afternoon the task forces had secured all objectives and 2/2 linked up as a single unit again. 2/2 pursued the advance north across the island to prepare to conduct company live fire training on the island's live fire ranges. The extreme heat and humidity, as well as the inaccurate maps of Vieques made this portion of the rehearsal very difficult. Live fire and maneuver training took place 9–10 September. The decision was made to back load the MAGTF on 10 September and within 16 hours the entire unit was aboard amphibious shipping headed for the Haiti objective area.

---

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

*The payoff in preparation and training was evident when BLT 2/2 went ashore at Cap-Haitien at 0800 on 20 September. As reported by the unit:*

The simultaneous landings by TF IRISH and TF HAWG went off without a hitch. The earlier rehearsals had proven to be invaluable as elements from three ships landed at two sites with almost textbook precision.<sup>38</sup>

## **2. HMM-264**

The experience of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264 (HMM-264) was similar to that of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines, but with more emphasis on technical aspects of helicopter operations.<sup>39</sup>

On 20 July, HMM-264 was designated as the aviation combat element of the SPMAGTF-C. On 28 July 1994, the squadron “went composite” with the addition of four CH-53E Super Stallions from HMH-464 and four AH-1W Cobras and three UH-1N Hueys from HMLA-269. Together with the 12 CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters of HMM-264, there would be 23 helicopters available to the MAGTF.

In August, HMM-264 began gearing up for the deployment to the Caribbean in support of the Haiti operation. Pre-deployment training included day and night field carrier landing practice, deck landing qualifications, and gaining proficiency in low-level flight.

HMM-264 deployed on the USS WASP on 13 August. The amphibious ready group (ARG) sailed to Guantanamo and with BLT 2/2 conducted a NEO exercise and a tactical recovery of aircraft exercise. On 24 August, HMM-264 conducted a vertical assault rehearsal at Grand Iguana Island, Bahamas, in which the squadron flew 55 hours, transported 550 troops, and carried 11,700 pounds of cargo. The next day, the squadron conducted a night assault. During August, the squadron flew 414 day hours and 246 night hours and carried 3,600 troops and 431,600 pounds of cargo. During the first week of September, HMM-264 conducted a low light level insertion of an assault force into Vieques Airfield. While at Vieques, the squadron took advantage of the training area to practice terrain flight, mountain area training, and aerial gunnery. The training was interrupted by the advent of Tropical Storm Debbie, in response to which the squadron

---

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>39</sup> HMM-264, Command Chronology for 1 July 1994 – 31 December 1994, 31 Dec 1994, passim.

conducted an emergency backload to the ships in only 8 hours. By 18 September, the squadron was ready to support the invasion scheduled for early the next day.

After the change in plans, on 20 September, HMM-264 conducted a vertical assault into Cap-Haitien and the surrounding countryside. There were no problems. The squadron flew 44 hours, transported 701 troops, and carried 65,000 pounds of cargo into the port and air facilities on Haiti.

Personnel and logistical operations to support the training schedule and the operation in Haiti were reported as normal in the Command Chronology. During September the aircraft readiness rate was maintained at over 85 percent.<sup>40</sup>

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, HMM-264, and other elements of the SPMAGTF-C were attached, deployed on ships, and put through an intense and realistic training schedule. They conducted a vertical assault into Cap-Haitien, and participated in peace operations in Cap-Haitien routinely and seemingly with few problems. No serious resource problems were noted. The Marines just did it.

#### **D. TENTATIVE INSIGHTS FROM THE HAITI OPERATION**

Even this preliminary look at the activities of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division and the SPMAGTF-C yields some tentative insights on the process used to prepare for and move to Haiti.

##### *1. High readiness offsets short preparatory times allowed by operational security.*

There is a trade-off between assuring operational security to restrict knowledge of pending operations and providing enough time for units to prepare for those operations.

Operational security is important in shielding our capabilities, our intent, and our plans from enemies. It requires more than merely standard security precautions against enemy agents because the media and friends, neighbors, and families of military members may also reveal the plans and preparations underway for an operation. Operational security is mandatory to preserve both strategic and tactical surprise.

---

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

In this case, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman understandably were reluctant to let the fact that DOD was planning to intervene in Haiti become public knowledge because that would affect ongoing diplomatic and economic measures, probably for the worse.

For this particular operation, earlier designation and preparation of the forces for the operation would not have had significant effect on their ability to respond because they were in a high state of readiness. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division was in good condition when it was assigned the Haiti mission, and indeed it was picked for the mission because it was ready. This meant that the division was able without major difficulty to revise its training schedule rapidly to prepare for the assigned mission. The SPMAGTF-C was readied routinely for its deployment and was trained and ready to respond to the range of possible missions that might occur in its area of operations.

It would have been helpful, however, if the commanders and staffs at division and brigade level had been able to think ahead and take judicious preparatory actions earlier. If the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division had been unready when notified of the Haiti mission, it would have been very difficult to meet the timelines required by the CINC's plan and the political situation. Moreover, the necessity to make significant personnel transfers and material movements to get a division ready to deploy would negate the operational security that short notice is designed to guarantee.

The advantages of earlier warning have to be weighed against the increased risk of unintentional public notice. If operational security is going to be required for future pre-planned operations of this nature, the short notice that this inevitably involves can be offset only by maintaining a large number of units at a very high state of readiness.

## *2. Preparing Army units for deployment and operations depends on installation garrisons.*

The story of the deployment of the 10th Mountain Division for Haiti provides a tantalizing glimpse of just how important installation garrisons are in preparing, moving, and supporting the deployment and combat operations of military forces. (While this case study covers only one Army organization, it is quite likely that the lesson applies to other Army organizations as well as to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.)

The 10th Mountain Division could not have prepared, trained, and moved to the ports without extensive support from the Fort Drum Garrison. Even after the division was in Haiti, Fort Drum continued to provide essential support for the troops in Haiti and for

their families at Fort Drum. Certainly, the division could not supply itself, train itself, or move itself with only its own organic resources. It is quite possible that the critical task enabling the division to deploy on time was accomplished by the 50 civilian employees at Fort Drum who trained for the task in peacetime as an additional duty, went to Griffiss Air Force Base, and worked 12-hour shifts for 10 days to operate the Departure Airfield Control Group there.

Today, according to those interviewed for this report, the Fort Drum garrison today is barely able to support 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division operations, and there are moves underway to degrade that capability even more. Garrison personnel authorizations have been reduced drastically, forcing layoffs. Since civil service rules retain senior people while forcing out younger people, Fort Drum is left with an aging work force of dedicated and experienced people who will soon retire. Their replacements will not have the experience and may not have the dedication of the older employees. The younger civilian employees who were laid off have found other work and are reluctant to rejoin the Army. Because of the economy Army jobs are not as popular as they used to be, and it would be hard to recruit good younger people.

Another threat to the garrison is the popularity at high levels for contracting out. The DOL and the ITO are now competing under the provisions of OMB Circular A-76 for contracting out. The ITO believes that it may be possible to contract out some routine functions (e.g., facilities maintenance and laundry) without impairing garrison support for deployment, but believes that it is unlikely that contractors will put in the overtime and dedicated effort needed to move units for rapid deployments. Some civil servants at Fort Drum believe that the people in the Pentagon do not understand what it takes to prepare and move a division for an operation.<sup>41</sup>

### *3. Assignment of a specific mission requires adjusting the training program.*

Units with assigned missions focus their training for those missions. Training programs are designed to cover a mission essential task list (METL). This training pays off, but for all actual operations it will have to be augmented by mission-specific training.

Even with the best possible deliberate plans, each crisis that occurs will differ in some ways from what was assumed. The assignment of a real mission in a specific area of operations on a particular time schedule will always require some adjustment to the

---

<sup>41</sup> Interviews with Dave Hughes, Jerry Grosjean, and Anne Coleman, 25 and 26 August 1999.

METL and a new training schedule to teach the revised METL. The capability of individuals and units to adapt to the needs of actual operations can be improved by a thorough grounding in combat fundamentals and each unit's role.

Provision must be made, support provided, and time allowed in crisis response plans for the joint task force headquarters, the component command headquarters, intermediate headquarters, and the ships, squadrons, and battalions to learn what has to be done, plan their own operations, and train to accomplish the mission. In particular, it is necessary—now that it is possible to deal with specifics—to allow sufficient time for rehearsal of the plans at all levels.

In this case, both the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division and the SPMAGTF-C revised their training programs to focus on the Haiti mission and conducted appropriate training. Emphasis on rehearsal for commanders, staffs, and leaders at all levels paid off in effective performance on D-Day and thereafter.

4. *Cross-leveling of personnel and equipment to fill deploying units and sub-units leaves the residual forces unready for other missions.*

As exemplified by the example of B Company, 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment, it is almost always going to be possible to produce a sub-element of a larger organization that is fully ready with all of its needed personnel, equipment, and supplies. This can be done by taking people and equipment from non-deploying elements and reserve stocks.

Cross leveling (as this practice is called) is both official policy and common practice in the Army. It works as long as the residual elements are not called on to participate in military operations. However, the larger organizations whose resources are used to fill their smaller sub-elements become unready and remain that way for a long time.

Habitual resort to cross leveling masks the general unready condition of the larger organizations and commanders. If people and materiel on hand were sufficient to meet all needs simultaneously, the detachment of units or sub-elements at full readiness would not degrade the condition of the residual elements. Even more serious, the way that this is done (by temporary change of station orders and hand receipted equipment) disguises the greatly reduced readiness of the residuals. Not only has residual force effectiveness been diminished, but high-level resource managers are seldom informed of the true state of affairs.



In this case both the SPMAGTF-C and the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division were in good shape at the outset and it was not necessary to augment them with large numbers of fillers or a lot of materiel for the operation. These ready forces were able to prepare for and conduct the Haiti operation without impairing the ability of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force and 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps to conduct other operations simultaneously.

The important lesson from Operation Uphold Democracy is that a high readiness state has its own virtue. In this case, both the Marine's MAGTF and the Army's 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division were able to respond quickly and well to accomplish a complicated operation. This required all participants—commanders, staffs, units, and supporting elements and agencies—to perform their jobs with a minimum of confusion and delay. They were able to do this in great measure because both organizations were in good condition when ordered to participate.

## **Appendix**

### **GLOSSARY**

AAR	After Action Review
AAV	Armored Amphibious Vehicle
ACOM	Atlantic Command
AFB	Air Force Base
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
BFV	Bradley Fighting Vehicle
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
CINCCOM	Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command
CINC	Commanders-in-Chief
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CONRAIL	Consolidated Rail Corporation
CONUS	Continental United States
DACG	Departure Airfield Control Group
DOD	Department of Defense
DOL	Directorate of Logistics
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FSE	Forward Support Element
GPS	Global Positioning System
HMM	Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
ITO	Installation Travel Office
JOA	Joint Operating Area

LAR	Light Armored Reconnaissance (battalion)
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
METL	Mission-Essential Task List
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MP	Military Police
MRE	Meal Ready to Eat
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MWR	Masale, Welfare, and Reeveatain
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCOs	Noncommissioned Officers
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System
SPMAGTF-C	Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean
TCAT	page 20
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (Schedule)
TRANSCOM	US Transportation Command
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USMC	United States Marine Corps

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2000		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Readiness Implications of Selected Aspects of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti			5. FUNDING NUMBERS  DASW01 98 C 0067 BE-6-1851	
6. AUTHOR(S) John R. Brinkerhoff				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  Institute for Defense Analyses 1801 N. Beauregard Street Alexandria, VA 22311			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER  IDA Document D-2459	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Pentagon Washington, DC 20301			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This case study focuses on actions taken to plan and prepare for operations in Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994 and 1995. The readiness status and pre-deployment actions of the 10 <sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, U.S. Army, and the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean are examined and put into the context of the opening phase of the overall operation. The paper tells what was done to prepare these formations for the operation.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Readiness, Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti, Army Operations, Joint Operations				15. NUMBER OF PAGES  40
				16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  UL	