FROM BEIRUT TO KHOBAR TOWERS:
IMPROVING THE COMBATING TERRORISM PROGRAM

by

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Once again the specter of terrorism was thrust to the center of attention. The 25 June 1996 terrorist attack on Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, resulting in the death of 19 airmen, shook Pentagon halls. Yet only thirteen years earlier, a suicide car bomber killed 241 US Marines Beirut, Lebanon. Can the US effectively protect its forces against terrorism? This report investigates the Beirut bombing and the Khobar Towers attack to critically examine the recommendations for the improvement of DOD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security missions in combating terrorism. Recommendations following the Beirut bombing were not universally implemented by all Services, leaving US military forces vulnerable to terrorist attacks. However, the wide-ranging recommendations emanating from the Khobar Towers incident were used as a template for enhancing the DOD combating terrorism program. Yet, there are several people who have taken exception to some Task Force recommendations. The proper use of limited intelligence and counterintelligence resources can assist in identifying terrorist threats to US forces and comprehensive terrorist threat assessments must guide the implementation of appropriate security measures to defend against the identified threats. While DOD intelligence and counterintelligence programs remain strong, they can be improved by examining their shortfalls prior to the Beirut bombing and Khobar Towers attack.
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Preface

Force protection and combating terrorism are the current Pentagon buzzwords. The 25 June 1996 terrorist attack on Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, which resulted in the tragic death of 19 airmen, served as the flash point for this increased attention. But why was there suddenly a strong push to “fix” all of the Department of Defense’s Force Protection problems? Hadn’t we learned our “lessons” following the catastrophic loss of 241 Marines in the 1983 Beirut bombing?

During my 1996-1997 tour on the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (DASD (I&S)) staff, I had the opportunity to be a part of the Pentagon’s fervor to improve the Defense combating terrorism program. As a member of a DASD (I&S) four-man team, I was in a unique position to review the Combatant Commands’ and Services’ programs for intelligence and counterintelligence support to combating terrorism. The nagging questions I faced throughout this period were what recommendations were internalized following the Beirut Bombing and were all of the recommendations from the Khobar Towers incident justified?

This research report is a systematic examination and evaluation of the intelligence, counterintelligence, and security recommendations presented to the Secretary of Defense following each of these terrorist attacks. The critical comments and observations in this report are intended to shed light on the critical tasks which still must be completed to protect US military forces from terrorism.
I would like to thank the DASD (I&S) staff, particularly the members of the Directorate of Counterintelligence, for having the faith in me to be their representative in many of the Pentagon forums addressing combating terrorism issues. Furthermore, I must extend my sincere appreciation to my research advisor Lieutenant Colonel Steven G. Torrence for his patience and guidance throughout this research project. Finally, I must recognize the enduring support of my wife Diane as we continue with our Air Force career.
Abstract

Once again the specter of terrorism was thrust to the center of attention. The 25 June 1996 terrorist attack on Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, resulting in the death of 19 airmen, shook Pentagon halls. Yet only thirteen years earlier, a suicide car bomber killed 241 US Marines Beirut, Lebanon. Can the US effectively protect its forces against terrorism? This report investigates the Beirut bombing and the Khobar Towers attack to critically examine the recommendations for the improvement of DOD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security missions in combating terrorism.

Recommendations following the Beirut bombing were not universally implemented by all Services, leaving US military forces vulnerable to terrorist attacks. However, the wide-ranging recommendations emanating from the Khobar Towers incident were used as a template for enhancing the DOD combating terrorism program. Yet, there are several people who have taken exception to some Task Force recommendations.

The proper use of limited intelligence and counterintelligence resources can assist in identifying terrorist threats to US forces and comprehensive terrorist threat assessments must guide the implementation of appropriate security measures to defend against the identified threats. While DOD intelligence and counterintelligence programs remain strong, they can be improved by examining their shortfalls prior to the Beirut bombing and Khobar Towers attack.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Much needs to be done, on an urgent basis, to prepare US military forces to defend against and counter terrorist warfare.

— DOD Commission on Beirut International Terrorist Act

The 25 June 1996 terrorist attack on American forces at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, which caused the death of 19 US airmen, once again thrust the specter of terrorism to the center of attention. This attack produced an eerie feeling of deja vu for many American service members. Only 13 years earlier, a suicide car bomber killed 241 US Marine peacekeepers as they slept in their Beirut, Lebanon barracks.

This report briefly investigates the Beirut bombing and the Khobar Towers attack to critically examine the recommendations for improving DOD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security missions in combating terrorism. Several critical questions must be addressed. Were the Beirut bombing recommendations implemented, or were there shortfalls still leaving US military forces vulnerable to terrorist attacks? Furthermore, are the Task Force’s wide-ranging recommendations suitable as a template for enhancing the DOD combating terrorism program? Finally, are each of these recommendations sound, and should they be implemented carte blanche?

This report proposes several improvements and identifies important initiatives to enhance DOD national-level and Service-level intelligence, counterintelligence, and
security support to combating terrorism. Continued fiscal and resource constraints demand the most effective measures be implemented immediately. Furthermore, the proper use of limited intelligence and counterintelligence resources must guide the implementation of appropriate security measures to defend against identified terrorist threats. Though DOD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security programs remain strong, they must be improved. Often an examination of the past provides the best guide to the future. A review of the Beirut bombing, the Khobar Towers incident and the resulting recommendations should guide actions to improve the DOD combating terrorism program.

Notes

Chapter 2

Tragedy in Beirut

_They gave their lives in defense of our national security every bit as much as any man who ever died fighting in a war. We must not strip every ounce of meaning and purpose from their courageous sacrifice._

— President Ronald Reagan, 1983

The US military appeared to be the most appropriate instrument of US national power to promote stability in war-torn Lebanon. Therefore, then President Ronald Reagan tasked the US Marines and Navy to conduct peacekeeping operations to help restore Lebanese civil order. The environment slowly evolved from one where the US was perceived as non-partial friendly force to that of a terrorist target.

On 23 October 1983, a suicide terrorist crashed his bomb-laden truck into a barracks killing 241 US Marines. Americans watched in horror as media broadcast the terrorist attack devastation, and the US public demanded answers as to why this tragedy was not prevented. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger established “The DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Attack.” Chaired by Admiral Robert L. J. Long, USN Ret., this Commission examined the Beirut bombing and reviewed DOD antiterrorism procedures to prevent or minimize damage of potential terrorist attacks. The Commission formulated five major recommendations to improve the DOD antiterrorism program. This chapter briefly reviews that Beirut bombing, the
Commission’s report recommendations, and significant intelligence, counterintelligence, and security issues identified.

**The Attack**

On 23 October 1983, the US Multi-National Forces (USMNF) contingent of Marines in Beirut, Lebanon were subject to the most serious terrorist attack ever conducted against US military forces. The USMNF deployed to Western Lebanon to conduct peacekeeping operations and stabilize it. According to General Colin Powell, then serving as the senior Secretary of Defense military assistant, the Marine “presence” mission in Lebanon was “to remain between two powder kegs, the Lebanese army and the Syrian backed Shiite units.”² Prior to US force deployment to Beirut, the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces agreed to ensure protection of the Multinational Force (MNF), including securing assurances from Lebanese armed factions to refrain from hostilities and not interfere with MNF activities.³ On 29 September 1982, 1,200 US Marines landed in Lebanon to conduct their expected 60-day peacekeeping mission. The “benign” Lebanese environment evolved from one in which the US was perceived as a friendly force to that of another Shiite factions’ enemy.

The threat to the USMNF drastically changed with the 18 April 1983 terrorist bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, resulting in the death of 17 Americans and 40 other individuals.⁴ In the opinion of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) explosive experts investigating the incident, the magnitude of the car bomb used in the Embassy attack was unprecedented.⁵ The US Marine barracks attack set yet another precedent.

The DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Attack succinctly described the terrorist attack as follows:
At approximately 0622 on Sunday, 23 Oct. 1983, a terrorist bomb destroyed the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) headquarters building in the Marine Amphibious Unit compound at Beirut International Airport. The catastrophic attack took the lives of 241 Marines, sailors and soldiers and wounded more than 100 others. The bombing was carried out by one lone terrorist driving a yellow Mercedes Benz stake-bed truck that accelerated through the public parking lot south of the BLT headquarters building, where it exploded. The truck drove over the barbed and concertina wire obstacle, passed between two Marine guard posts without being engaged by fire, entered an open gate, passed around one sewer pipe barrier and between two others, flattened the Sergeant of the Guard’s sandbagged booth at the building’s entrance, penetrated the lobby of the building and detonated while the majority of the occupants slept. The force of the explosion [12,000 pounds] ripped the building from its foundation. The building then imploded upon itself. Almost all the occupants were crushed or trapped inside the wreckage.  

FBI forensics experts again investigated this terrorist bombing. They stated the Marine barracks bombing was the largest non-nuclear blast they ever examined, on the order of six to nine times the magnitude of the Embassy bombing they investigated six months earlier.  

The Commission reported the bomb’s explosive equivalent was of such magnitude that major damage to the Marine barracks and significant casualties would probably have resulted even if the terrorist truck bomb had not penetrated the USMNF defensive perimeter, but had detonated in the roadway some 330 feet from the building.  

In early February 1984, the Lebanese Army was severely routed. Syrian backed Shiite units stormed Beirut and occupied the western portion of the city. Shiite members of the Lebanese army answered their opponent’s call to desert and the Lebanese Army disintegrated.  

On 18 February 1984, the USMNF was evacuated from Beirut.  

The Commission set forth several recommendations for the improvement of DOD antiterrorism activities. These recommendations included:
• Establish an all-source fusion center, which would tailor and focus all-source intelligence support to US military commanders involved in military operations in areas of high threat, conflict or crisis.
• Establish a joint DOD/CIA examination of policy and resource alternatives to immediately improve HUMINT support to US military operating forces in areas of potential conflict.
• Develop a broad range of appropriate military responses to terrorism for review, along with political and diplomatic actions, for the National Security Council.
• Direct the development of doctrine, planning, organization, force structure, education and training necessary to defend against and counter terrorism.¹⁰

Intelligence & Counterintelligence

When the USMNF initially deployed to Lebanon, the threat to US forces was considered benign. But as the deployment progressed, the threat evolved incrementally due to the violent political competition among a number of Lebanese religious groups, some of which no longer viewed the USMNF as nonpartisan peacekeepers. The Commission determined the Marine commander did not lack threat information, but rather he may have had information overload on potential conventional and terrorist threats. In fact, at the weekly military coordination meeting on 19 October 1983, a list of suspected vehicles loaded with explosives, complete with a description of the vehicles and their license plates, was disseminated to Marine Corps personnel.¹¹ Intelligence reports provided over 100 warnings of car bombings between May and 23 October 1983, but like most warnings, these reports provided no specific threat information.¹² Although general terrorist threat information existed, the Commission determined there was “no specific intelligence on the where, how, and when of the 23 October bombing.”¹³

One potentially important piece of threat information was not provided to the USMNF. The FBI forensics team dispatched to examine the effects of the terrorist bomb used in the April 18 attack on the US Embassy conducted an extensive investigation into the materials used to construct the bomb. The team determined the bomb was of a
relatively simple design that could be easily built with materials readily available throughout Lebanon. The completed FBI report was provided to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of State, but was not disseminated to DOD or the USMNF who were guarding State Department facilities at the time.  

Two of the most critical Commission recommendations involved the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) and the conduct of all-source intelligence analysis. HUMINT support to the USMNF was determined to be ineffective, being neither precise nor tailored to the commander’s needs. The commander received a wide range of raw intelligence reports from the US intelligence community, but no refined analytical products. The Commission determined there was no institutionalized process for the fusion of all-source intelligence data into a single product for the commander.

**Security Issues**

The USMNF was originally deployed as a “Peace Keeping” force and received JCS guidance not to engage in combat and to apply peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE). Furthermore, force was to be used only when required for self-defense against a hostile threat or in response to a hostile act. Following the attack on the US Embassy, US Marine forces were dispatched to provide additional security protection for the relocated embassy and the ambassador’s residence. These units requested, and were granted, an expanded ROE which defined a hostile act to encompass attempts by personnel or vehicles to breach barriers or roadblocks erected to protect these State Department facilities. This expanded ROE was not provided to the forces providing security for the Marine Barracks. This dichotomy created two sets of ROE for the USMNF.
Additional ROE restrictions further inhibited the Marine security response. Several interior Marine security posts were not permitted to insert magazines in their rifles. The Commission determined the marine amphibious unit commander made a conscious decision not to permit insertion of magazines in weapons on interior security posts to preclude accidental discharge and possible injury to civilians.\textsuperscript{19}

The Commission noted a variety of valid political and military considerations supported the selection of the building used to house the Marine BLT Headquarters and troops. Unfortunately, the BLT commander failed to observe the basic security precaution of dispersion (the spreading or separating of troops, material activities, or establishments) to reduce their vulnerability to enemy action.\textsuperscript{20} Approximately one fourth of the BLT personnel were located in this relatively confined location.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, the BLT commander failed to erect barriers to reduce the USMNF vulnerability to the demonstrated terrorist car bomb threat.

In the aftermath of the attack, the Commission made several recommendations to improve security and reduce USMNF vulnerability in Lebanon. Although these recommendations were specifically directed toward this deployment and threat scenario, they were sound in principle and provided useful guidelines for future operations.

1. Dispersal of troops
2. Construction of protective structures
3. Improved security procedures
4. Key weapons employment
5. Rules of Engagement
6. Physical barriers.\textsuperscript{22}

Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, terrorists conducted numerous minor attacks on US military forces, but none of the attacks were on the order of the Beirut bombing. However, on 25 June 1996, a devastating, large-scale terrorist attack against
US forces in Saudi Arabia again demonstrated the US military’s vulnerability to terrorism.

Notes

1 Statement of the President, 27 October 1983, Televised address to the United States of America, speaking of the terrorist bombing in Lebanon and the Grenada invasion.
3 DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 39.
4 Ibid, 40.
5 Ibid, 40.
6 Ibid, 32-33.
7 Ibid, 63.
8 Ibid, 99.
10 DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 10-15.
11 Michael Petit, Peacekeepers at War: A Marine’s Account of the Beirut Catastrophe, (Boston, MA: Faber and Faber, 1986), 204.
12 DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 63.
13 Ibid, 63.
14 Ibid, 63.
15 Ibid, 66.
16 Ibid, 65.
18 DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 45.
19 Ibid, 89.
20 Ibid, 86.
22 DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 104.
Chapter 3

Khobar Towers: Terror in the Desert

This nation must never forget that the bombing of Khobar Towers was not an accident – it was a cold-blooded terrorist act of murder.

—Lieutenant General James F. Record

The 25 June 1996 terrorist attack on US Air Force members at Khobar Towers again shook Pentagon halls. Secretary of Defense William Perry quickly appointed General Wayne Downing, USA Ret., to review DOD antiterrorism procedures to prevent or minimize the damage of future terrorist attacks. Like Admiral Long, General Downing formed a group of experts to conduct his review. The Downing Task Force thoroughly examined DOD antiterrorism activities in the Gulf region and identified 26 findings and formulated 79 recommendations to improve DOD efforts to combat terrorism.

In response to the Task Force’s report, US Air Force leadership directed Lieutenant General James F. Record, Commander, 12th Air Force, to evaluate the report recommendations. The Secretary of Defense review of the “Record Report” determined several areas of the report required further examination. The Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff commissioned the US Air Force Inspector General (IG) and Judge Advocate General (JAG) to conduct an additional inquiry into the Khobar Towers attack. This chapter briefly examines the Khobar Towers terrorist attack and selected combating terrorism recommendations for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security issues.
The Attack

Prior to 1994, the terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia amounted to three isolated attacks against US military targets in early 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. Saudi Arabia’s internal security picture began to change in late 1994, and the volume and tone of terrorist threat information became more onerous.

The terrorist threat to US military forces in the Middle East became manifest with the 13 November 1995 attack on the Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG). Terrorists detonated a car bomb, containing an estimated 200 – 250 pounds of explosives, outside the OPM-SANG headquarters building killing five Americans and two Indians. This terrorist attack drastically altered the Saudi Arabia security situation. Security officials at Khobar Towers enacted several additional security measures to defend against potential terrorist attacks. The installation of fences and waist-high concrete “Jersey” barriers, increased security foot patrols, and the posting of guards atop exposed buildings were a few of the more significant security enhancements. Further security measures were enacted immediately proceeding the 31 May 1996, execution of four individuals convicted by the Saudi Government for conducting the OPM-SANG attack. These antiterrorism measures included increased terrorist threat briefings as well as mass-casualty exercises with the Saudis.

The additional security measures were not sufficient to dissuade the determined terrorists who attacked Khobar Towers. Former Secretary of Defense Perry, in his Report to the President on Khobar Towers Bombing, described the attack as follows:

Shortly before 10:00 p.m. local time on Tuesday, June 25, 1996, a fuel truck parked next to the northern perimeter fence at the Khobar Towers complex. Air Force guards posted on top of the closest building, Building 131, immediately spotted the truck and suspected a bomb as its drivers
fled the scene in a nearby car. The guards began to evacuate the building, but were unable to complete this task before a tremendous explosion occurred. The blast completely destroyed the northern face of the building, blew out windows from surrounding buildings, and was heard for miles. Nineteen American service members were killed and hundreds more were seriously injured. Many Saudis and other nationals were also injured.  

It is important to examine the intelligence, counterintelligence, and security issues which might have prevented or mitigated the Khobar Towers terrorist attack effects.

**Intelligence & Counterintelligence**

Following the OPM-SANG headquarters attack, the US Intelligence Community increased its efforts to identify potential terrorist threats to US military resources in the Central Command area. Various intelligence reports revealed general information indicating Khobar Towers might be a possible terrorist target, but the information was not sufficiently precise to predict the attack. The Task Force determined identification of terrorist threats must be improved through closer coordination with the host nation and other agencies and “a more intense emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT).”

An examination of Khobar Towers intelligence and counterintelligence activities disclosed US Air Force commanders were provided a great deal of terrorist information. The Task Force determined that while intelligence did not provide the tactical details of date, time, place, and exact method of the attack, a considerable body of information was available indicating that terrorists had the capability and intention to target US interests in Saudi Arabia, and that Khobar Towers was a potential target.

The Task Force was critical of the consistency of the counterintelligence support and analytical services Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) members provided US Air Force commanders at Khobar Towers. The Task Force stated the apparent
combination of frequent rotations, inconsistency in the professional qualifications of officers assigned to counterintelligence duties, and their lack of area expertise degraded the support provided to the wing commander.\textsuperscript{9} A significant Task Force finding was its determination the lack of US Air Force Security Police organic intelligence capability adversely affected their ability to accomplish the base defense mission. In their opinion, the Security Police commander served as his “own intelligence officer for base defense” with AFOSI assistance.\textsuperscript{9} Furthermore, the Task Force recommended the Security Police be provided their own organic intelligence units, similar to the current organizational structure of the US Marines and Army.

The necessity for increased HUMINT terrorist reporting was addressed extensively in classified portions of the Task Force report. For commanders to make informed force protection decisions, the Task Force determined human intelligence is probably the only source of information that can provide the tactical details of a terrorist attack. In its only substantial unclassified critique of HUMINT, the Task Force stated “the US Intelligence Community must have the requisite authorities and invest more time, people, and funds into developing HUMINT against the terrorist threat.”\textsuperscript{10}

A Task Force finding indicated “the ability of the theater and national intelligence community to conduct in-depth, long-term analysis of trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists is deficient.”\textsuperscript{11} The Task Force recommended the allocation of sufficient analytic resources to conduct in-depth, long-term analysis to alleviate these deficiencies. Furthermore, reporting classifications and dissemination caveats hindered threat information dissemination to various agencies and deployed units.
Security Issues

The rules of engagement were fairly straightforward at Khobar Towers. The US Air Force Security elements were permitted to use deadly force as a last resort when (1) one reasonably believed they or others are in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, and (2) to prevent serious violent offenses that could result in death or critical bodily harm. The only substantial change to standing US Air Force security ROE was the Saudi Arabia law prohibiting the use of deadly force for the protection of priority resources. The ROE in place prior to the Khobar Towers attack provided the authority and flexibility for security personnel to respond to imminent threats originating outside the fence against US Air Force personnel within the Khobar Towers complex.

Saudi Arabia was responsible for all security measures outside of the Khobar Towers complex and the US Air Force Security Police and allied units, in conjunction with the Saudi Government, conducted security activities within the perimeter fence. In practice, the Security Police enjoyed a great deal of autonomy within the complex when conducting security patrols and establishing security posts and obstacles. Security Police forces were prohibited from conducting patrols outside their base area, but were permitted to patrol the route between Khobar Towers and the air base. Saudi officials conducted all other off base patrols. In response to American security concerns, the Saudis did increase their police patrols surrounding the Khobar Towers complex. The Task Force determined the Saudis were “unable to detect, deter, and prevent the truck bomb attack outside the perimeter fence at Khobar Towers.”

Lieutenant Colonel John Traister, Chief, Security Police, 4044th Wing (Provisional), provided a summation of the Security Police mission at Khobar Towers in his 21 June
1996 end of tour report. He stated the “defense of Khobar Towers is to stop and eliminate any threat (human bomber or car bomber) from getting past 12th Street and into the compound,” and “this plan is not designed to stop standoff type weapons.” The terrorist truck bomb employed was so large it could be considered a standoff weapon.

Of the Task Force findings, the more significant security issues were the lack of DOD guidance on the construction of blast walls, the need for hardening facilities, and inadequate threat-based standoff or exclusion areas around bases. The proximity of building 131, the barracks destroyed by the terrorists, to the perimeter fence was a focus of attention following the attack. Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, personally paced-off the distance from where he believed the bomb exploded to the building 131 exterior. By pacing the distance, Senator Specter felt he proved the fence was only 60 feet from the building rather than the DOD stated 80 foot distance. The central issue was why the perimeter fence was not extended and why a blast wall was not constructed. AFOSI recommended constructing a 12 foot high blast wall, but the Security Police rejected the proposal to avoid being sealed in and unable to see what was going on outside the compound. Furthermore, Explosive Ordinance Disposal personnel stated a blast wall might not be effective due to blast wave physics.

The Task Force, in its examination of US military security measures throughout the US Central Command geographic area, determined US military personnel and facilities were vulnerable to terrorist attacks, especially those facilities located within urban areas. The Task Force advised that the consolidation of US forces at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, would resolve several security vulnerabilities, but this action would create additional problems because US assets would be concentrated in fewer locations.
Notes


3 Record Report, 88.


6 Downing Memorandum.


8 Ibid, 45.

9 Ibid, 33.

10 Ibid, viii.

11 Ibid, xiii.

12 Record report, 18.

13 Ibid, 19.

14 Downing Task Force, 62.

15 Ibid, 51.

16 Ibid, 41.


18 Record Report, 57.
Chapter 4

Recommendation Implications

In its inquiry into terrorism, the Commission concluded that the most effective defense is an aggressive antiterrorism program supported by good intelligence, strong information awareness programs and good defensive measures.

—DOD Commission on Beirut International Terrorist Act

The antiterrorism recommendations set forth following the Beirut bombing and Khobar Towers attack were immediately “implemented” by Defense officials. Although officially “enacted,” the true test is the long-term institutionalization of the concepts that framed the recommendations. Deployed US Army and Marine Corps units are fundamentally in a permanent force protection mode due to their combat arms focus. Overseas US Air Force and Navy installations provide support services to forces projected from these facilities and therefore are not inherently structured for the force protection mission. In high threat environments, the US Navy can employ a Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Support Team for additional security, but the Air Force must rely upon its indigenous Security Forces. The diverse missions and force structure of each Military Service further complicates centralized management of the DOD combating terrorism program.
Organization from Chaos

A primary criticism of the Downing Task Force was the lack of a DOD focal point for combating terrorism. On the Secretary of Defense staff, oversight of the combating terrorism program is distributed between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD (C3I)), and several other Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Each of these offices promulgated DOD directives addressing their areas of responsibility. ASD (SO/LIC) wrote DOD Directive 2000.12, “Combating Terrorism,” but this directive did not provide authoritative guidance for intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The Department desperately needed a focal point for combating terrorism issues.

To quickly implement the Downing Task Force’s 79 recommendations, the Secretary of Defense revitalized the DOD Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee (ATCC) to serve as the nucleus for improving the Department’s antiterrorism posture. The ATCC had served as the central mechanism for a DOD-wide antiterrorism review following the OPM-SANG bombing. The Secretary of Defense’s designation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal advisor and the single DOD-wide focal point for force protection activities immediately fulfilled a Task Force recommendation and breathed new life into the ATCC. The Chairman reorganized his staff to form the Directorate for Combating Terrorism, J-34, to perform this mission. The Director of J-34 joined another OASD (SO/LIC) Brigadier General to serve as the co-chairmen of the ATCC. Thus, the ATCC evolved from an infrequent gathering of low-level staffers to a weekly meeting of generals and other senior officers.
The first task of the reconstituted ATCC was to track the implementation of Task Force recommendations. Each issue was assigned to a subcommittee responsible for evaluating the recommendations and ensuring validated recommendations were implemented. Weekly progress reports were briefed to the ATCC Chairmen on the status of each issue and their expected completion date. It was during my participation in the ATCC that I noticed a checklist mentality had unfortunately developed as each subcommittee attempted to “complete” its recommendations. The politically charged environment fostered this checklist mentality as the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense sought to dispel congressional charges that the DOD inadequately protected deployed US servicemen. However, now having accomplished the checklist, the true test will be institutionalizing DOD combating terrorism program enhancements.

A major US Air Force initiative to institutionalize enhancements to its combating terrorism capabilities was the re-designation of “Security Police” to “Security Forces” to emphasize its primary force protection mission. Furthermore, establishment of the 820th Security Forces Group (SFG) at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, provided a composite unit focused solely on security and Force Protection. The unit is comprised of US Air Force members from the Security Forces, AFOSI, Civil Engineering, Logistics, Supply, Communications, Intelligence, Administration, Personnel, and Medical career fields. A significant 820th SFG component is the Force Protection Battlelab, established to identify innovative concepts for the protection of US Air Force resources.

The 820th SFG is designed for immediate deployment to any operating location to provide instant force protection services. In addition to the AFOSI special agents assigned to the 820th SFG, AFOSI created an Antiterrorism Specialty Team at Lackland
Air Force Base to render enhanced antiterrorism assistance to US Air Force elements deployed around the world.

The 820th SFG is examining a potential combating terrorism shortfall identified in the aftermath of the Khobar Towers incident. The Record Report determined the Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD) doctrine developed during the Cold War gave responsibility for external defense of US Air Force installations to the US Army. As a result of post Cold War force reductions, the Army has modified its response to this doctrine to say that it would not provide “continuous external base defense, but would respond if required, and if their forces were not involved in higher priority missions.”

The 820th SFG has been accused of attempting to create its own army to protect US Air Force installations. In fact, a representative of the Force Protection Battlelab stated the unit is examining the feasibility of obtaining air defense missiles for protection against airborne threats. This expanded mission would require additional Security Forces personnel, equipment and a training program parallel to those of the US Army and Marines to teach Security Forces personnel to use their new weapon systems.

As the Secretary of Defense’s principal advisor and the single DOD-wide focal point for force protection activities, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the Combatant Commands must examine this carefully. If a shortfall exists in the external defense of US Air Force installations, the Chairman and the Combatant Commanders should task the US Army or Marines to accomplish this mission. As the US military continues to downsize, it must further integrate its joint Service capabilities and assign tasks to the military elements best suited to perform the mission.
Improving Intelligence & Counterintelligence

Both the Long Commission and the Downing Task Force were critical of commander’s intelligence and counterintelligence support. Both reports clearly recognized a wide range of intelligence information was available, but lacking was specific information on the tactical details of date, time, place and exact method of attack. The Chief of the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, stated the following concerning the specificity of intelligence data,

Everybody wants more [information]…that’s just unfortunate…part of the life of terrorist reporting. But I never got the feeling that anyone was taking any of the reporting lightly. It was more of a feeling that they tried to do whatever they could … but weren’t sure of what special steps it would take because we didn’t have a specific [threat]…whether it would be…truck bomb…kidnapping, assassination.7

Terrorist information is often extremely difficult to obtain and may require in-depth analysis. Therefore, method and time of a terrorist attack data is only available in very rare instances. HUMINT, counterintelligence and intelligence collections and analysis improvements are required to enhance DOD combating terrorism capabilities.

Human Intelligence

The Task Force’s assertion that HUMINT is probably the only source of information that can provide the tactical details of a terrorist attack may overlook other intelligence capabilities, such as counterintelligence and signals intelligence. In 1993, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the military Services to consolidate their HUMINT elements into a single, joint field operating agency, the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), which is subordinate to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).8 With the transfer of these assets, the US Air Force and Navy no longer possess an organic
capability to collect information using HUMINT sources and methods, and must rely upon DHS’s response to their strategic and operational intelligence requirements.

The Task Force and Record Report recognized the requirement for tailored HUMINT was not satisfied by existing capabilities in Southwest Asia. While the DHS has undertaken many initiatives to improve its capabilities to collect information on terrorist groups, it is far too early to evaluate these measures’ effectiveness. Military intelligence has collected information from human sources throughout American history, but the clandestine recruitment of human sources knowledgeable of terrorist activities is complicated. The essence of HUMINT is the identification and recruitment of people with access to important information who are willing to share that information with officers of your intelligence service. Identifying and recruiting individuals with access to the inner decision-making circles of terrorist groups is a very difficult task. Terrorists form very tight groups based upon family, tribal, religious, or ideological ties. Therefore, they are suspicious of individuals attempting to join their group and may mandate a potential member perform an illegal act, such as an assassination, to prove their loyalty.

Counterintelligence

The Task Force criticized the counterintelligence support provided to the wing commander; stating “the apparent combination of frequent rotations, inconsistency in the professional qualifications of officers assigned to counterintelligence duties, and their lack of area expertise” degraded their support. The majority of these accusations were valid and the Air Force implemented measures to remedy these criticisms.

At the time of the Khobar Towers attack, the AFOSI Detachment Commander was serving a six-month temporary duty assignment and the majority of his personnel were
assigned to 90-day tours. These tour lengths were originally established in deference to Saudi Arabian concerns over the perception that one year assignments would signify a “permanent” US military presence in the region.12 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia was considered a harsh environment and limiting the assignments to 90 days was viewed as a means of reducing the impact on the Air Force members tasked to support the operation. Following the Khobar Towers attack, US Central Command (CENTCOM) granted the Air Force’s request to extend the tours of AFOSI Detachment commanders from six-months to one year. This tour extension provides continuity in AFOSI counterintelligence support to US commanders and stabilizes the liaison relationship with host nation security officials.

The Task Force’s assertion that officers assigned to counterintelligence duties had inconsistent professional qualifications had merit. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) are tasked to accomplish three basic Air Force and Navy missions: criminal investigations, fraud investigations, and counterintelligence activities. Each AFOSI and NCIS special agent receives training in these three mission areas during their entry-level basic course of instruction and may attend advanced training to develop specialized skills.

Due to the frequent 90-day tour rotations to the CENTCOM region, several AFOSI agents did not have advanced counterintelligence skills. AFOSI addressed this concern by establishing a mandatory three-week Counterintelligence Force Protection Operations Course for all deploying agents to ensure a well-trained reserve of personnel eligible to deploy to contingency operations. This trained reserve ensures AFOSI can perform its
top priority, “providing counterintelligence that proactively identifies, engages, and prevents intelligence and terrorist threats to Air Force resources.”

The NCIS also provides advanced counterintelligence training to its special agents to enhance their force protection skills. Specially trained NCIS personnel deploy in task oriented Special Contingency Groups at the operational and tactical levels in support of Combatant Commands, Joint Task Forces, and Fleet Staffs. Furthermore, NCIS assigned special agents to joint and fleet intelligence staff to ensure counterintelligence is an integral part of the intelligence and operational planning processes.

Both Counterintelligence and HUMINT elements suffer from the same limitations, a lack of personnel who have studied foreign languages, cultures, religions, and histories. To overcome these limitations and respond to the Task Force’s recommendation to improve language capabilities, counterintelligence and HUMINT elements have actively contracted Arabic linguists and cultural experts. The development of military linguists and area specialists normally requires one to two years of intensive training and the maintenance of a wide base of skilled personnel prepared to deployed wherever the US military is needed. Contracting linguists and area specialists has been expensive, but it provides the flexibility to respond to various contingency operations.

A significant and erroneous finding of the Task Force was its determination the lack of an Air Force Security Police organic intelligence capability adversely affected their ability to accomplish the base defense mission. In the Task Force’s opinion, the Security Police commander served as his “own intelligence officer for base defense” with the assistance of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Furthermore, the Task Force recommended the Security Police establish organic intelligence units, similar to the
current US Army organizational structure. From General Downing’s perspective as a very successful US Army general officer, the establishment of an organization similar to the Army’s Military Intelligence would be a logical Air Force measure.

However, the Record Report and US Air Force IG/JAG report rejected the recommendation to establish an organic Security Police intelligence capability. The Record Report clearly determined the lack of a Security Police organic intelligence capability did not inhibit the Khobar Towers internal base defense mission. The Record Report furthermore stated,

After an extensive review of documents and additional interviews, this Review Team found that AFOSI, Intelligence and Security Police operations were in very close and constant contact on force protection issues. Unlike the US Army structure, in the US Air Force and the US Navy the responsibility for intelligence and counterintelligence is lodged in separate organizations because the two missions, while related, are distinctly different.17

While rejecting the establishment of an organic Security Police intelligence capability, the Record report did recommend the assignment of counterintelligence and intelligence personnel to assist Security Police units in the performance of force protection operations during contingencies. AFOSI and Air Force Intelligence acted upon this recommendation by integrating their personnel into Security Police units deploying with Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF). This action ensures Air Force Security Forces receive the detailed intelligence required to effectively defend Air Force assets without radically realigning Air Force core missions.

**Intelligence Analysis**

The Long Commission and Downing Task Force identified significant intelligence analysis deficiencies. The Commission determined there was no institutionalized process
for the fusion of all-source intelligence data into a single product for the commander.\textsuperscript{18} A Task Force finding also indicated “the ability of the theater and national intelligence community to conduct in-depth, long-term analysis of trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists is deficient.”\textsuperscript{19} Responding to the Task Force’s recommendations, DIA established a new Counterterrorism Center to serve as the DOD focal point for fusion and dissemination of all-source intelligence and counterintelligence information pertaining to terrorist threats against DOD interests.\textsuperscript{20} In theory, this center will analyze intelligence reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Department of State, Defense HUMINT Service and the Services to produce an all-source intelligence product.

However, several obstacles must be overcome if this Counterterrorism Center is to perform its intended function. The Defense Intelligence Agency has historically viewed its primary customer to be the Joint Staff and the J-2 Director of Intelligence. Therefore, Joint Staff requirements have taken precedence over the needs and requirements of the Combatant Commanders and their Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs). The new Center’s director is striving to focus more clearly upon the needs of the Combatant Commands and deployed US commanders, but this will require institutional change.

The Center must also ensure it can provide timely products to its customers. In 1994, the Joint Security Commission in its report \textit{Redefining Security} was very critical of the timeliness of DIA’s analytical products. The Security Commission related an incident in which a DOD program manager requested a counterintelligence threat assessment of the foreign intelligence threat in a particular city and the DIA product, which he received 18 months later, stated the threat was low.\textsuperscript{21} Not only was this report
extremely late, but it also failed to report the well established foreign intelligence presence in that city and its specific targeting of the program manager’s technologies. The Joint Security Commission stated this incident was representative of other delays in DIA’s responsiveness to product requests. The Counterterrorism Center is aggressively leveraging new technologies such as the classified Intelink wide-area network information system, which permits the rapid distribution of DIA and other intelligence agency products. Furthermore, Intelink facilitates the “pull” concept of information sharing by permitting customers to search the network for completed intelligence products that meet their requirements.

The Counterterrorism Center must also overcome administrative impediments. The increased manning requirements of establishing this new Center have created a drain on the intelligence community’s experienced terrorism analysts. It is imperative that manning the Center does not degrade the critical terrorism analysis capabilities required at the Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Centers and the Services.

With increased access to other agency intelligence reports, the Center must also improve its ability to disseminate sensitive reports to deployed commanders. Intelink and other associated networks such as the Defense Counterintelligence Information System (DCIIS) should provide the means to quickly disseminate important intelligence products. However, the Center will also need to streamline its process for downgrading and “sanitizing” some intelligence reports to ensure that products can be disseminated to those who have a demonstrated need for information. The “sanitizing” process will also need to address the difficulties associated with the “ORCON” (dissemination and
extraction controlled by originator) caveat which can prohibit immediate sharing of intelligence reports without originating agency approval.

**Security Enhancements**

Improved intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination are vital to protecting deployed US forces, but they solve only half of the problem. The effective use and application of the information provided through intelligence is primarily the responsibility of the security forces commander. Upon deployment, the US Army and Marine Corps are usually in an enhanced force protection mode. The US Air Force and Navy components providing support services to combat elements must also sustain vigilant antiterrorism programs. The Beirut Commission and the Downing Task Force each examined the security measures enforced prior to the terrorist attacks and made several recommendations to improve DOD force protection activities.

**Facility Defense**

Both the Commission and the Task Force criticized the facilities and the locations used to house US troops. Where the Commission noted the Marine commander failed to disperse his forces appropriately, the Task Force found the Air Force negligent in the billeting of airmen close to the base perimeter fence. Following the Khobar Towers attack, the Secretary of Defense ordered the establishment of a tent city at Prince Sultan Air Base, located deep in the Saudi desert, to house the vast majority of the US Air Force service members in Saudi Arabia.

In an attempt to greatly improve the living conditions at Prince Sultan Air Base, the “Friendly Forces Housing Complex” is currently under construction. This two-story
structure will house 4,750 US, British and French troops. While the consolidation of US Air Force assets within the desert may simplify perimeter security operations and provide a substantial standoff distance from external terrorist threats, are the same Beirut mistakes being made again? A single structure housing 4,750 military personnel provides a very tempting target for terrorists who penetrate the base or employ standoff weapons to conduct an attack. In the Beirut Commission’s judgement, too much faith is placed in physical defenses since terrorists continuously devise measures to penetrate defenses in order to conduct an attack. The extensive security measures currently in effect at Prince Sultan Air Base certainly will dissuade many potential terrorists, but the key is sustaining this vigilance. Furthermore, since the US Air Force has enhanced its security posture, the US Marines and NCIS agents assigned to protect Naval forces in Bahrain must also maintain their vigilance to deter terrorist seeking a “softer” target.

Rules of Engagement

The Commission and the Task Force closely examined both operations’ Rules of Engagement (ROE). The USMNF in Beirut was hampered by two sets of conflicting ROE concerning the use of force against potential suicide car bombers. The Marines tasked with defending US Embassy facilities in Beirut were specifically authorized to use deadly force to prevent vehicles from approaching these buildings. The Marines employed to defend the BLT headquarters and barracks were authorized to use deadly force in self-defense, but were not provided specific guidance on how to respond to suicide car bombers. This discrepancy between the two sets of ROE substantiated the Marine guards’ perception that they were specifically “not permitted” to fire upon unauthorized vehicles entering the compound. Although this perception was based on a
narrow view of what constituted self-defense, it delayed the Marine Corps response to the suicide car bomber who tragically killed 241 US service members.

The ROE at Khobar Towers was more clear and concise than the ROE for the Beirut Marines. The host nation was responsible for all security measures outside of the Khobar Towers complex and the US Air Force Security Police and allied units, in conjunction with the Saudi forces, conducted security activities within the perimeter fence. The Air Force security elements could use deadly force as a last resort when (1) one reasonably believes they or others were in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, (2) to prevent serious violent offenses that could result in death or critical bodily harm.24

Although the ROE at Khobar Towers did not prevent the terrorist attack, it provided clear and concise mission guidance to US Air Force security personnel. Furthermore, if the security personnel had fired upon the terrorists fleeing the scene, they would not have prevented the bomb from exploding. Instead, the Security Policemen immediately notified several barracks residents of the terrorist threat and are credited with saving numerous lives and preventing further injuries.

A main point of contention was the Saudi Arabian security force’s inability to provide for Khobar Towers external defense. US Air Force security forces were prohibited from conducting patrols outside the perimeter of the compound, but were permitted to patrol the route between Khobar Towers and the air base. The Saudis did increase their police patrols surrounding the Khobar Towers complex in response to American security concerns, but ultimately, the Saudis were “unable to detect, deter, and prevent the truck bomb attack outside the perimeter fence at Khobar Towers.”25
The separation of security responsibilities for internal and external security at Khobar Towers was not unique. In numerous US-host nation Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), the host nation assumes sole responsibility for external security measures. In these situations, the US military forces must maximize their physical security measures within their base confines.

**Physical Security Measures**

The Commission and Task Force determined physical security measures could have been improved to prevent or mitigate the effects of the Beirut Bombing and Khobar Towers terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the Task Force examined physical security measures throughout the CENTCOM area and determined that each of the Military Services must take a range of actions to deter, prevent, or mitigate the effects of future terrorist attacks on US servicemen and women overseas.\(^{26}\) Much information supports the conclusion that US security personnel did learn one valuable lesson from the Beirut bombing—the need to defend against suicide car bombers.

In Beirut, the BLT commander failed to erect substantial barriers to reduce the USMNF vulnerability to the demonstrated terrorist car bomb threat. The suicide bomber drove over the barbed and concertina wire obstacle, passed between two guard posts, entered an open gate, passed around one sewer pipe barrier and between two others in order to drive his bomb laden truck into the Marine barracks.\(^{27}\) Sufficient obstacles and barriers were not employed to prevent the bomber from a relatively unfettered barracks attack. The Commission’s determination that significant casualties would have resulted even if the terrorist truck bomb had detonated in the roadway some 330 feet from the USMNF building appears to be a lesson that was not learned.
At Khobar Towers, extensive measures were taken to prevent another suicide bomber from gaining access to the US military installation. Numerous Jersey barriers were placed around the perimeter of the installation to impede vehicles from driving through the perimeter fence. A serpentine approach to the gate was erected to ensure vehicles approaching the complex slowed sufficiently to permit security forces to respond to attempts to penetrate the complex. Because these security measures significantly deterred terrorists from attempting to penetrate the installation, the terrorists attacked using a standoff weapon in the form of a very large car bomb.

The close proximity of the barracks to the perimeter fence increased vulnerability to standoff terrorist attacks. This was recognized and attempts were made to extend the fence to increase the distance between the barracks and perimeter, but the Saudis were reluctant to extend the fence line. Brigadier General Schwalier, Commander, 4044 Wing (Provisional), assumed a calculated risk when he elected to continue to house Air Force personnel in building 131 in order to maintain their quality of life. As a commander, he was forced to weigh the potential terrorist threat against the effects of reduced moral caused by moving airmen out of building 131 and forcing them to share rooms in another barracks. Unfortunately, he made the wrong decision by continuing to house airmen in building 131 where they were subjected to a 24 June 1996 terrorist attack. His fateful decision ultimately cost the lives of 19 US service members and his own career.

Notes

1 DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 132-133.
2 DOD Report to the President on Khobar Towers Bombing, 10.
Notes

5 Record Report, 16.
7 Record Report, 55.
10 Abram N. Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1993), 11.
11 Downing Task Force, 45.
16 Ibid, 33.
17 Record Report, 12.
18 Ibid, 65.
19 Downing Task Force, xiii.
20 Record Report, 11.
23 DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 133.
24 Record report, 18.
27 DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 32-33.
28 Downing Task Force, 52.
Chapter 5

Conclusions

Every security measure ultimately can be defeated. If today it was new security against truck bombs, tomorrow it would be a rocket-propelled, a recoilless rifle or a portable surface-to-air missile.

—Anthony Cordesman, Co-Director of Middle East Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies

Commanders will continuously be second-guessed following a terrorist attack on their forces, and there will always be security measures that were not implemented and which might have prevented or mitigated the attack. The Commission and Task Force provided valuable recommendations for enhancing the DOD combating terrorism program. DOD must implement these recommendations and internalize force protection procedures to ensure the security of its military forces. As Secretary of Defense Perry stated in his report to the President, “the attack on US forces at Khobar Towers has drastically underscored that for US forces deployed overseas, terrorism is a fact of life.”

The designation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the DOD focal point for combating terrorism and the creation of the Joint Staff Directorate for Combating Terrorism provide important mechanisms to guide the DOD antiterrorism program. Through the revitalized Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee, the Military Services and Defense agencies have a valuable forum to address the Task Force recommendations and other initiatives to enhance DOD personnel security.
The Task Force highlighted the need to enhance DOD intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities to assist in identifying terrorist threats to US forces. Comprehensive, all-source terrorist threat assessments must guide the implementation of appropriate security measures to defend against the identified threats. The DOD intelligence and counterintelligence programs remain strong, but institutionalizing the valuable recommendations and current initiatives examined in this report will further increase their important contributions to the DOD combating terrorism program.

Improved intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are vital to protecting US forces, but they are only half of the problem. Effective security measures must be implemented to defend against identified terrorist threats. Upon deployment, the US Army and Marine Corps are in an enhanced force protection mode, but the US Air Force and Navy must also sustain vigilant antiterrorism programs. The Task Force’s examination of physical security measures in the CENTCOM area disclosed each Service must take action to deter, prevent, or mitigate future terrorist attacks. The consolidation of US forces at Prince Sultan Air Base simplifies perimeter security, but it presents a tempting target for terrorists. The security measures at this installation will dissuade many terrorists, but this vigilance must be sustained. Furthermore, the Navy and Marines in Bahrain must maintain their vigilance to deter terrorists seeking “softer” targets.

Secretary of Defense Perry provided a vision for the DOD combating terrorism program, stating “the attack on Khobar Towers should be seen as a watershed event pointing the way to a radically new mind-set and dramatic changes in the way we protect our forces deployed overseas.” By learning from the past, DOD must implement and institutionalize the recommendations in this report to ensure protection of US forces.
Notes

1 Patrick Pexton, “Attack at Dhahran: Can We Protect Our People?” *Air Force Times*, 8 July 1996.
2 DOD Report to the President on Khobar Towers Bombing, 1.
**Glossary**

ABGD  
Air Base Ground Defense

AFOSI  
Air Force Office of Special Investigations

BLT  
Battalion Landing Team

CENTCOM  
US Central Command

CIA  
Central Intelligence Agency

CIFPOC  
Counterintelligence Force Protection Operations Course

DCIIS  
Defense Counterintelligence Information System

DHS  
Defense HUMINT Service

DIA  
Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD  
Department of Defense

DOS  
Department of State

FBI  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

HUMINT  
Human Intelligence

IG  
Inspector General

JAG  
Judge Advocate General

JIC  
Joint Intelligence Center

MNF  
Multinational Forces

NCIS  
Naval Criminal Investigative Service

OPM-SANG  
Office of the Program Manager - Saudi Arabian National Guard

ROE  
Rules of Engagement

SOFA  
Status of Forces Agreement

The following definitions were obtained from Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary*, March 23, 1994, updated April 1997. These definitions are provided in an
attempt to reduce the repeated misuse of key DOD terminology and to accurately focus
operational and academic discussions of antiterrorism and counterterrorism.

**All-source intelligence.** Intelligence produced using all available sources and agencies.

**Antiterrorism (AT).** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals
and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local
military forces.

**Antiterrorism awareness.** Fundamental knowledge of the terrorist threat and measures
to reduce personal vulnerability to terrorism.

**Combating terrorism.** Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to
reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken
to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the
entire threat spectrum.

**Counterterrorism (CT).** Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to
terrorism.

**Counterguerrilla warfare.** Operations and activities conducted by armed forces,
paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas.

**Counterinsurgency.** Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological,
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

**Counterintelligence (CI).** Information gathered and activities conducted to protect
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted
by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.

**Counterintelligence activities.** The four functions of counterintelligence: operations;
investigations; collection and reporting; and analysis, production, and dissemination.

**Counterintelligence collection.** The systematic acquisition of information (through
investigations, operations, or liaison) concerning espionage, sabotage, terrorism,
other intelligence activities or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons which are
directed against or threaten Department of Defense interests.

**Counterintelligence investigations.** Counterintelligence investigations establish the
elements of proof for prosecution or administrative action. Counterintelligence
investigations can provide a basis for or be developed from conducting
counterintelligence operations. Counterintelligence investigations are conducted
against individuals or groups suspected of committing acts of espionage, sabotage,
sedition, subversion, terrorism, and other major security violations as well as failure
to follow Defense agency and military Service directives governing reporting of
contacts with foreign citizens and “out-of-channel” requests for defense information.
Counterintelligence investigations provide military commanders and policymakers
with information used to eliminate security vulnerabilities and to otherwise improve
the security posture of threatened interests.

**Counterintelligence production.** The process of analyzing all-source information
concerning espionage, or other multidiscipline intelligence collection threats,
sabotage, terrorism, and other related threats to US military commanders, the
Department of Defense, and the US Intelligence Community and developing it into a
final product which is disseminated. Counterintelligence production is used in formulating security policy, plans, and operations.

**Counterintelligence support.** Conducting counterintelligence activities to protect against espionage and other foreign intelligence activities, sabotage, international terrorist activities, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons.

**Human intelligence (HUMINT).** A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

**Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

**Security.** 1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security.

**Security intelligence.** Intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile organizations or individuals who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

**Terrorism.** The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological goals.
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