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Partnership for Peace:

Guaranteeing Success

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Note

Summary

Conclusions

About this Conference

Background

On January 10-11, 1994 the NATO Brussels Summit inaugurated the Partnership for Peace Program. Within the past 18 months, PFP has been remarkably successful and developed far beyond its architects' expectations. There are now 26 partners in the program, and 14 have representatives in the Partnership Coordination Center (PCC) at Mons. Enthusiasm for PFP has reached a plateau, some confusion still exists, and significant differentiation has developed in partners' perceptions, objectives, activities, and expectations. Clarifying existing asymmetries among partners and between NATO and partners remains a serious challenge. Indeed, NATO's response may well determine whether PFP's initial success can be guaranteed!

Partner Differentiation and New Forms of Neutrality

Since the PFP program was inaugurated, differentiation among the 26 partners has become pronounced. Most partners *perceive* PFP as the path toward full NATO membership (e.g., Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia); some partners wish to remain "neutral" and do not intend to seek full membership (e.g., Ukraine); some partners who had been neutral now seek modified integration with the Alliance (e.g., Austria).

For those partners who see PFP as the path to full membership, self-differentiation has been most significant. They want NATO to define the criteria and time-lines more precisely.

For those partners who wish to remain "neutral," PFP has other purposes. For example:

For **Ukraine**, neutrality means seeking partner relations with NATO and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Government is greatly constrained in its ability to move West. Public opinion polls in 1991 indicated that 21 percent wanted Russification; in 1993 support had risen to 30

percent; and in 1994, 48 percent. Ukrainian public opinion, though, is divided. In 1994, in eastern Ukraine 73 percent wanted to be in the CIS; in Kiev, 30 percent; and in western Ukraine, only 20 percent. At the same time Ukraine is under pressure from Russia to join the CIS air defense system. The Government cannot move West! This limits Ukraine's PFP participation and explains its desire to have the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) become a pan-European organization that links the Atlantic with Russia. Ukraine seeks a "special partnership" with NATO and sees PFP as having particular importance for Ukrainian officers to seek a "common language" with NATO counterparts.

For **Austria**, neutrality in the post-Cold War era no longer makes sense. In the Cold War, one could remain neutral from military blocs and conflicts. Today, most threats are not military in nature (e.g., ethnic minority problems, refugees, nuclear reactor problems, etc.). Therefore, Austria seeks integration into multilateral structures (e.g., European Union and PFP).

Misperceptions and Limitations of Military Cooperation

Many partners want and expect assistance in making their armed forces interoperable--to include general defense forces--with NATO (e.g., Poland wants division-level troop exercises and corps-level staff exercises; the Czech Republic wants more experience in NATO command posts); in developing modern logistics and training methods, even though this remains a national responsibility in NATO; or in building their new armed forces (e.g., Slovakia and Slovenia).

But PFP's terms of reference state that military cooperation is confined to search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations. The asymmetry between NATO's terms of reference and partner expectations needs to be reconciled if PFP's initial success is to be guaranteed. This can be achieved through: (1) a "critical review" of IPPs to tailor partners' activities to NATO objectives; (2) coordinating the Partnership Coordination Cell's 1996 and 1997 exercise program which is presently being developed; and (3) making it clear that the PFP Planning and Review Process is only for peacekeeping.

PFP's emphasis on military interoperability has strengthened the hand of the military and inadvertently undermined the ability of many partners to establish democratic control over their armed forces. Participants from Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary emphasized the difficulty of establishing democratic control of the military and need for assistance.

Participants recognized the need to establish a clear division of authority between the president and government, to gain parliamentary oversight of the military and defense ministry control of the armed forces, and to restore prestige to the military. Participants also noted that there was a need to establish a Legal Framework and Code of Conduct for professional soldiers and conscript citizens which would allow soldiers to disobey orders if they are illegal (e.g., Germany's *Innere Führung*).

Need For Public IPPs and Clarification of NATO Criteria

NATO should encourage partners to publish their IPPs and provide partners with more precise criteria and time-lines to establish more realistic expectations.

The 16+1 framework has encouraged confidentiality about partner's IPPs and PFP programs and has inadvertently undermined bilateral and regional cooperation among partners who are competing to join NATO. The 16+1 framework and IPP confidentiality means that a partner's bilateral activities are

unlikely to be included in a partner's PFP goal completion. To overcome this problem NATO should encourage partners to publish their IPPs (as Hungary has done) in order to more effectively enhance bilateral military and political cooperation among neighbors (e.g., Hungarian-Romanian military cooperation is far better than bilateral political cooperation). If partners do not publish their IPPs, partners are inhibited from factoring their common PFP goals into bilateral military activities and exercises. Transparent IPPs could facilitate good neighbor military and political cooperation.

Publication of IPPs also would disseminate public information to Central European domestic audiences to clarify misperceptions about the program and to build support for PFP. This is needed, in part, because many societies have a low opinion of PFP. They associate it with a Russian veto on NATO enlargement and have little understanding of the program which is now perceived to be a long-term process. Correspondingly, NATO needs to more effectively engage in a public information campaign to explain PFP to partner societies.

Most partners *expect* the forthcoming Fall 1995 NATO Enlargement Study to provide specific criteria and time-lines (to define the who and when) for becoming full members of the Alliance. They feel they need criteria and time-lines so they can rationalize their Individual Partnership Programs. Since the NATO Study will likely not do this (e.g., more likely it will help NATO cope with *how* and *why* NATO should enlarge), NATO needs to prepare partner expectations; and provide greater clarity in plausible goals to permit more effective IPP planning.

NATO needs to move partners away from quantitative-based IPPs (e.g., Poland fulfilled 45 projects in 1994 and 250 in 1995) to objective-based planning. NATO needs to define and guide IPPs toward the achievement of objectives that are broader than military interoperability, such as how to train civilians to be able to execute Parliamentary control of the military. For example, of the 232 activities in Hungary's 1995 Work Plan, most are geared to air defense, C3I, exercises, logistics, etc. Only 4 activities are directed to "Democratic Control of Forces" and they include three "exchange(s) of information among experts" and one conference.

How Political Cooperation Can be Strengthened

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was created by the November 1991 Rome Summit and convenes on an *ad hoc* basis after the NAC ministerial meeting, must be strengthened. Institutionalizing NACC's political structure is particularly important because NACC provides the umbrella for PFP.

First, NATO could follow the lead of the WEU's expanded Council and create a North Atlantic Council-*Plus* partners (NAC+) to meet routinely at ambassadorial and ministerial level.

Second, NATO could create a Political Council-*Plus* to more effectively coordinate the activities of the recently-enlarged Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC+).

Third, to improve partner understanding of how the NATO headquarters works, NATO could create one- to three-month civilian and military partner internships on the International Staff (IS) and International Military Staff (IMS) in non-sensitive areas. It could also more effectively coordinate many emergency planning activities of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) with PFP. (Hungary's 1995 IPP Work Plan has only 15 (of 232) activities devoted to emergency planning.) Not only will IPPs become more transparent, they can be broadened to non-provocative emergency planning (e.g. humanitarian assistance) activities and involve more partner civilians and politicians in PFP programs.

Finally, to develop broader and more in-depth understanding of NATO operations, NATO could open the NATO Defense College to partners. Space for partners can be created by Allies sending fewer students (e.g., if the U.S., U.K., and Germany cut their student allocation from eight to three, 15 slots would open for partners every six months). Also these changes would make NATO more transparent and thereby could be useful in stabilizing Russia's relations with NATO.

While NATO has the opportunity to develop new political instruments in its Eastern outreach program, one danger is that the Alliance could focus more on form, rather than substance. If it does, NATO may miss a real opportunity to strengthen political cooperation.

[|Return to Top](#) | [|Return to Strategic Forum Index](#) | [|Return to Research and Publications](#) |

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