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THESIS

RWANDA RECONSIDERED

by

Michael L. Artbauer

June 2001

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Letitia L. Lawson
Tjarck G. Roessler

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Michael L. Artbauer
Major, United States Marine Corps
B.S., Kent State University, 1985

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
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Author:




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
Approved by:



Letitia L. Lawson, Thesis Adviser



Mark G. Roessler, Second Reader



James J. Wirtz, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

On April 6, 1994, the airplane returning the President of Rwanda home was shot down. After appearing to have achieved a negotiated end to the country's ongoing civil war, the nation was now plunged into an ethnically motivated genocide with horrendous results. What led the extremist elements of the President's ruling elite class to view this alternative as a plausible solution to the loss of power and prestige they would incur with implementation of the peace accords? To answer this question, this thesis examines how Rwanda's two ethnic groups were manipulated to ethnically stratify the country. After independence and a reversal of ethnic control, the new regionally based elites consistently returned to an ethnically divisive strategy to unite the population and maintain their narrow base of power over other regional elites. The onset of civil war in 1990 by exiled Tutsi refugees, coupled with international pressure for democratic reforms ultimately led to the Arusha Accords. The Accords in due course failed both because of extremist fears of the loss of their power and prestige, and the failure of the international community to back the vital provisions of the accords.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying the President of Rwanda was shot down. The President was returning from a conference on implementing the provisions of a negotiated agreement, the Arusha Accords, to end that country's ongoing civil war. After appearing to have achieved a negotiated end to the war, the country was plunged into an ethnically motivated genocide with horrendous results.

What led the extremist elements within the president's ruling elite class to view this alternative as a plausible solution to the loss of power and prestige that they would incur with full implementation of the accords? To examine this question, this thesis examines the historical context of Rwanda whereby the two ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, which had lived amicably for centuries had their ethnicity manipulated. This manipulation first occurred through the extension of the centralized authority of the Tutsi king (mwami) over the predominantly Hutu country. This extension of Tutsi control began the process by which the two parties began to actively identify themselves with ethnic labels.

This authority became all pervasive with the arrival of the colonial authorities to the country. These Europeans chose to administer the country indirectly through the Tutsi mwami and intensified the ethnic stratification between the Hutu and the Tutsi by altering political structures to their advantage. The Europeans invented racist theories to support their conclusion that the Tutsi were a superior ethnic group to the Hutu and thus more capable of ruling the country.

After the achievement of independence in 1961, a reversal of power occurred with a Hutu republic established. A wave of ethnic violence against the Tutsi was unleashed

which caused a mass exodus of the Tutsi to neighboring countries. The countries new regionally based Hutu elites consistently returned to ethnic strategy in an attempt to unite the population and maintain their narrow base of power from the encroachment of other regional Hutu elites. The onset of civil war in 1990 by exiled Tutsi refugees, coupled with international pressure for democratic reforms within the government led to the Arusha Accords that failed both because of the fear of the loss of power and prestige, and the failure of the international community to adequately back the vital provisions of the accords.

Following the achievement of the Arusha Accords, the United Nations Security Council opted to not provide an adequate mandate for the peacekeeping mission. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was to deploy to the country to ensure the peace and security during the implementation phase of the accords. The end of the Cold War had altered the West's perception of their individual national security interests within Africa and placed the continent on a much lower priority. The result of this disinterest was an inadequate mandate for the UNAMIR mission that was incapable of both guaranteeing the security and stopping the violence that followed the crash of the presidential airplane.

In the wake of the Cold War, there have been calls for reform of the United Nations Security Council to be more responsive to the needs of the underdeveloped nations. The movements towards reform of the Security Council have made no real progress. The other option for a reasonable solution to African security problems has come from western initiatives to build African capacities for peacekeeping operations.

The P3 initiative between the United States, France and the United Kingdom, offers a comprehensive training program for various African nations to build this capacity.

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I. INTRODUCTION

During the months of April-June 1994, the tiny central African nation of Rwanda experienced one of the most tragic occurrences of modern genocide. According to Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch:

In the thirteen weeks after April 6, 1994, at least half a million people perished in the Rwandan genocide, perhaps as many as three quarters of the Tutsi population. At the same time, thousands of Hutu were slain because they opposed the killing campaign and the forces directing it.¹

The dominant ethnic group of the nation, the Hutu, committed the genocide. These Hutu, mostly connected with President Juvenal Habyarimana and his northwestern region clan network, and they targeted members of the minority ethnic group, the Tutsi.

The civil war had begun in Rwanda in 1990 with the invasion of the country by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels who were predominantly Tutsi. The attack originated from their haven in Uganda and the conflict continued into 1993. Growing domestic and even international pressures forced the Habyarimana ruling elite to grudgingly allow the growth of a multiparty system and eventually a coalition government that in turn led to peace discussions.

The opposition factions of the Rwandan government conducted these peace discussions with the RPF officials in Arusha, Tanzania. These discussions led to a signed peace agreement in August 1993 between the warring parties that arranged for a power sharing government and a return of exiled Tutsi to Rwanda. It was during this period of

¹ Alison Des Forges, *Leave None To Tell The Story*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), pp. 1.

renewed hope and potential for reconciliation that the extremist groups within the Habyarimana government unleashed the genocide campaign against their enemies.

A. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF FAILURE

On March 25, 1998, President Bill Clinton of the United States made a symbolic visit to Rwanda. He stated his purpose for making this short stop at the airport of the Rwandan capital:

I have come today to pay the respects of my nation to all who suffered and all who perished in the Rwandan genocide. It is my hope that through this trip, in every corner of the world today and tomorrow, their story will be told; that four years ago in this beautiful, green, lovely land, a clear and conscious decision was made by those then in power that the peoples of this country would not live side by side in peace. During the 90 days that began on April 6 in 1994, Rwanda experienced the most intensive slaughter in this blood-filled century we are about to leave. Families murdered in their home, people hunted down as they fled by soldiers and militia, through farmland and woods as if they were animals.²

President Clinton as the leader of the lone superpower acknowledged that:

The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe haven for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide. We cannot change the past. But we can and must do everything in our power to help you build a future without fear, and full of hope.³

² President William J. Clinton, "Kigali Airport Remarks" Kigali, Rwanda 25 March 1998, Available online at: <http://www.usinfo.state/regional/af/prestrip/w980325a.htm> [2 April 2001].

³ Ibid.

The President's visit to Rwanda was termed "very symbolic" by Press Spokesman Mike McCurry. McCurry characterized that the visit as a "dramatic way to underscore the importance the United States attaches to efforts to resolve the conflicts there that have led to genocide, have led to the brutality that have cost so many innocent civilians their lives."⁴

President Clinton was not alone among international figures and bodies in publicly proclaiming the failure of the international community and regional organizations to recognize the development of the conditions for and the conduct of the genocide campaign in Rwanda. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) commissioned an International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) in 1998 with a mandate to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events in the Great Lakes Region as part of the efforts aimed at averting and preventing further wide-scale conflicts in the region.⁵ The panel released its report in May 2000 with a stinging rebuke of the actions of the governments of the United States, France, Britain, and Belgium as well as for the United Nations and the OAU.

The United Nations conducted its own independent introspective panel, that faulted the UN Secretariat, the Security Council, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)

⁴ Charles W. Corey, "Clinton Africa Trip to include stop in Rwanda," USIA, 11 March 1998, Available Online at: <http://www.usinfo.state/regional/af/prestrip/w980311a.htm> [11 April 2001].

⁵ OAU, "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide," submitted by the International Panel of Eminent Personalities, 29 May 2000, E.S.1, Available online: <http://www.oau-oua.org/Document/ipep/report/Rwanda-e/EN-III-T.htm> [17 September 2000].

Chapter VI peacekeeping force, for a series of political missteps, muddled mission mandate, and a flagrant lack of political will to stop the genocide. The UN and its offices missed clear signals that the peace accords were not holding, including the explicit exchange of cables between General Dallaire and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in which he advised of intelligence information of a pending genocide campaign. He asked permission to act vigorously but was denied this permission because it was considered to be inconsistent with his mandate.

In retrospect, the international community failed the people of Rwanda during the April-June 1994 period. A panel of international senior military officers met at Georgetown University in 1997 "to review the outbreak of violence in Rwanda and to reconsider what could have been done to stop it."⁶ Among the panel's conclusions, according to Colonel Scott Feil, was to send an international peace enforcement force numbering around 5,000 personnel "armed with all the weapons, equipment and capabilities necessary to employ and sustain a brigade in combat." If deployed within the window of opportunity that existed from April 7-24, 1994, it could have made a significant difference in the outcome of the genocide.⁷

The Commander of the UNAMIR force, General Romeo Dallaire of Canada, submitted for approval to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) a draft Rules of Engagement (ROE) in November 1993. This draft document, as noted in

⁶ Col. Scott R. Feil, "Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered," ISD Report Vol. III, No. 2, April 1997, Available [Online] <http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/files/rwanda.htm> [April 11, 2001.]

⁷ Ibid. pp. 6.

the UN Investigation of the events, contained a rule in paragraph 17 that would specifically allow the UNAMIR mission:

to act, and even to use force, in response to crimes against humanity and other abuses ("There may also be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them. Examples are executions, attacks on displaced persons or refugees.")⁸

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations never responded to the draft ROE. Although the draft ROE was eventually provided to the UNAMIR contingent, the force sat paralyzed while political and ethnically motivated violence increased from August 1993 until July 1994.

B. FAILURE OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS

The tragedy of Rwanda needs to be examined within the context of the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The Accords were the culmination of over a year of negotiations between the RPF and the government of Rwanda, represented by the opposition elements of the coalition government. Negotiations took place in Arusha, Tanzania facilitated by the OAU and the Tanzanian President.

Why did the accords collapse? The collapse occurred in part due to the extreme reluctance of the ruling party elites and extremists to share any power. While the coalition government arrangement of 1992 had weakened the grip on the government of President Habyarimana, his faction maintained the lion's share of the power. Implementation of the accords would have ended their stranglehold on the Rwandan

⁸ United Nations Secretariat, *Report Of The Independent Inquiry Into The Actions of the United Nations During The 1994 Genocide In Rwanda*, December 15, 1999.

populace and organs of power, granting power to the hated Tutsi and the Hutu from other regions within the country. Full implementation of the accords would have unmistakably ended the control of the Hutu from the northwestern part of the country on the government.

The accords also were a true victory for the RPF. They were not only returning as a legitimate political force within the country, but in a sense their share of power could be construed as disproportionate to their percentage of the population. The opposition Hutu Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), also stood to gain from the full implementation of the accords. The party had succeeded in potentially ending the grip of control by the northwestern Hutu of Habyarimana and in turning the powers of the presidency over to a Prime Minister in the new government.

Did the negotiators at Arusha know that the accords contained provisions that would be untenable. The OAU tends to conduct conflict resolution but to leave the actual implementation of a peace accord to the United Nations. This reflects a core tenet of the OAU, to not intervene in the internal affairs of its members.

The implementation of the Arusha Accords were predicated on the execution of a robust international peace keeping mandate that, in the post cold war era of western withdrawal from Africa, was a questionable assumption. The OAU itself did not have the capacity to act as the guarantor of the accords. This inability is itself a reflection of the lack of moral and physical authority that this organization can project given its elevation of the sovereign rights of the member nations above the basic human rights of the inhabitants.

C. METHODOLOGY

An survey of the available primary and secondary sources of information with regard to the genocide in Rwanda, conflict resolution, and the international aspects of humanitarian intervention was undertaken for this thesis. Where it was possible, actual participants in the events and leading academics were consulted both for their expertise in the various areas and for their recollections of the events.

D. THESIS ORGANIZATION

The second chapter of this thesis examines the historical context of Rwanda to include the so-called "ethnic myth," the effects of ethnic stratification imposed on the country by the colonial powers and the later perversion of this process by post-colonial regional elites. Chapter III will examine those aspects internal to Rwandan politics that presented insurmountable obstacles to the full and successful implementation of the Arusha Accords, and that was hindered by the international communities lack of interest in a humanitarian intervention into the country on the heels of Somalia. Chapter IV will examine the roles of various international actors in precluding the establishment of an effective mandate for the UNAMIR mission. Key issues within this area were:

- The role of the OAU within the region;
- the role of the current make-up and powers of the United Nations Security Council;
- the United States experience in Somalia and the subsequent publishing of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) "Reforming Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations."

Chapter V offers conclusions and recommendations for the future in the hope of avoiding a reoccurrence of the conditions that would foster the ethnically charged environment that promoted genocide. It also offers ways that Sub-Saharan Africa, as a region, could act on its own behalf to prevent genocide.

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II. THE ETHNIC MYTH

A. STARTING UP

On the evening of April 6, 1994, a spotless Falcon Mystere 50 business jet flown by a French Air Force crew, carrying Rwanda's President Juvenal Habyarimana, and neighboring Burundi's President Cyprien Ntaryamira, made its final approach to the airport in the Rwandan capital city of Kigali. President Habyarimana was returning from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania where he had been taken to task by various leaders of the Great Lakes region for his failure to implement the provisions of the Arusha Accords.

The accords had been a hopeful sign, signaling the end of the nearly three year long civil war. They had been concluded largely between members of the newly formed opposition parties, negotiating on behalf of the coalition government that was, in itself, an uneasy alliance of President Habyarimana's Mouvement Révolutionnaire National Pour le Développement et la Démocratie MRND (D) party, the opposition parties, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF was an exiled Tutsi ethnic group seeking the repatriation of thousands of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda.

At approximately 8:30 PM a surface-to-air missile, launched from an area near the capital that was ostensibly under the control of the elite Presidential Guard unit loyal to President Habyarimana, destroyed the plane killing all on board.⁹ In the hours

⁹ The truth about the Presidential aircraft's downing may never be known. Some theories have been raised blaming various parties such as the Belgian government, the French government, and the RPF. The French government concluded a detailed investigation of their role in the genocide in 2000, devoting more than 50 pages to the shoot down without resolving the issue. The French military and Security Services refused to answer questions before the National Assembly Investigating Panel.

immediately following the death of President Habyarimana, a calculated, systematic campaign was unleashed to eliminate both the Tutsi and moderate Hutu who were viewed as enemies of the right wing.¹⁰

What led the Hutu extremists to abandon the Arusha process so completely? The evidence suggests that some one or some group planned the campaign for several years following the invasion of Rwanda by the RPF in 1990. If the suggestion of right wing complicity is true, why, when confronted with increasing international pressures to open the Habyarimana government to democratic reforms, did the right wing take a course of action that would oust them from Rwanda and lead to the institution of a Tutsi government? How did the extremist elements within the Habyarimana government miscalculate their ability to maintain power, co-opt the opposition Hutu political parties, and yet resolve the thorny Tutsi refugee issue?

The source of these troubles lies not in ancient hatred between the two ethnic groups, but in the process of ethnic stratification that occurred first under the Tutsi kingdoms of the nineteenth century and was later institutionalized by the colonial authorities. This process placed the Tutsi above the more prevalent Hutu and subjugated them to the lower status of Rwandan society. It emplaced and reinforced a ranked ethnic society that carried over into the Hutu republics in a reverse fashion following independence. During his twenty-year reign, President Habyarimana used this process to

¹⁰ The crash of the presidential aircraft has been in fact theorized to have actually been a planned shoot down of the aircraft by members of the inner circle of the president, the *Akazu*, who were concerned that he "was finally going to comply with the provisions of the Arusha agreement" and thereby threaten their power bases and lifestyles. Whether or not President Habyarimana's death unleashed the ensuing genocide campaign against the Tutsis is unclear (Prunier)

enjoy the privileges of power and to maintain control over the country by using the Tutsi as a convenient scapegoat. According to Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama,

Ethnicity, which the colonial masters had used to suit their convenience, was also used by the post-colonial leaders, who politicized and later militarized an ethnic ideology. Extremism was a deliberate measure to suit one section of the Rwandan society. The massacres were not a result of the spontaneous response by the people who so loved Habyarimana, and were pained by his death, and therefore acted to eliminate his killers...The genocide was planned and implemented.¹¹

B. PRE-COLONIAL RWANDAN SOCIETY

Rwanda's ethnic composition is the same today as it has been for centuries; that is, approximately 85 percent Hutu, 14 percent Tutsi, and 1 percent Twa. It appears that the Twa, who occupy Rwanda's lowest socioeconomic position and inhabit the lowest levels of standing in Rwanda society, are probably the descendants of the area's original aboriginal hunter-gatherers. Unlike the aboriginal Twa, the Hutu were part of the greater Bantu expansion that migrated into Rwanda from West Africa a millennium ago.

A major point of contention between the Hutu and Tutsi, has been the speed with which the pastoralist Tutsi settled in Rwanda. Did the Tutsi settle into Rwanda after a relatively rapid military conquest or did they arrive gradually, peacefully assimilate into the country, and eventually come to dominate certain sectors of Rwandan society? This

¹¹ Joan Kakwenzire, and Dixon Kamukama, "The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994," in *The Path of a Genocide*, ed. Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), pp. 90.

question would later be used as a propaganda point with the extremists making the pointed portrayal of the Tutsi as “foreign invaders.”

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA) noted in its report on the international response to the genocide that the “establishment of direct Tutsi military rule and administration” followed their arrival.¹² This establishment of Tutsi predominance occurred slowly and appears to have been the most aggressive with respect to the Tutsi Nyiginya clan that originated in the eastern portion of Rwanda. This movement displaced many autonomous pre-existing Hutu kingdoms in its march toward dominance. Still, the Hutu and the Tutsi lived amicably for centuries, cohabitating on the same hilltops, intermarrying, and even moving from one ethnic classification to another depending on their economic and marital status.¹³

By most standard indicators, Des Forges notes that Rwandans were one “ethnic” group:

Originally organized in small groups based on lineage or on loyalty to an outstanding leader, they joined in building the complex state of Rwanda. They developed a single and highly sophisticated language, Kinyarwanda, crafted a common set of religious and philosophical beliefs, and created a culture which valued song, dance, poetry, and rhetoric.¹⁴

¹² Danida, *The International response to Conflict and Genocide; Lessons from the Rwanda experience, Study 1- Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors*, accessed September 18th 2000, available at http://www.um.dk.danida/evalueringsrapporter/1997_rwanda/book1.asp.

¹³ It is estimated by the historians David and Catherine Newberry in a paper presented to the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities, that “at least 25 per cent of Rwandans have both Hutu and Tutsi among their eight great grandparents. Looking back even further, the percentage with mixed ancestry would most likely exceed 50 per cent.”

¹⁴ Des Forges, pp. 31.

The mwami, as the central ruler of Rwanda, owned all the land and cattle in the country. He ruled the country through a complex layer of officials or chiefs that served to strengthen the grip of Tutsi domination at the highest/elite levels with Hutu participation only at the middle or lower levels. The bottom unit of these officials occurred at the hilltop level. The hill as the base unit of a district had three different chiefs:

- The chief of the pastures, a Tutsi who ruled over the grazing lands that were a primary concern of cattle and thus the Tutsi position.
- The chief of landholdings, generally a Hutu, who took care of land matters and agricultural issues, (hence the choice of a Hutu as the cultivators.)
- The chief of men, who served as the ruler of men and as the primary military recruiter for the mwami, normally a Tutsi.

A particular aspect of Rwandan society that provided a sort of bonding of the unequal status between Hutu and Tutsi but also between Tutsi was the *ubuhake*. The Danida study found the *ubuhake* was a patron/client relationship that “involved reciprocal bonds of loyalty and exchange of goods and services. It provided a place, a status, within a hierarchal system. The patron was mostly a Tutsi, but the client could be Hutu or Tutsi of inferior social status.”¹⁵ As such, the only Tutsi that theoretically could not also be a client of the system was the mwami, but generally the system involved a Tutsi at the top and the Hutu at the bottom.

The *ubuhake* highlighted the economic differences between the pastoralist cattle owning Tutsi and the agricultural farming Hutu, with cattle owning viewed as the higher level of status. French professor Gérard Prunier noted in his book that “for the Tutsi ideologues it was a mild practice amicably linking different lineages into a kind of

¹⁵ Danida, Study 1, Chapter 2, Patron/client relationships.

friendly mutual help contract. For the Hutu ideologues it was an ironclad form of quasi-slavery enabling the Tutsi masters to exploit the poor downtrodden Hutu.”¹⁶ This feeling of quasi-slavery status to the Tutsi would continue to be amplified under the colonial system of indirect rule and would foster the growth of resentment towards the Tutsi that would explode at independence.

Centralized Tutsi rule over a united Rwanda reached its climax during the reign of mwami (King) Kigeli IV Rwabugiri (1860-1895), and was the most active and conscious embodiment of the conquest/centralization/social standardization process.¹⁷ Under Rwabugiri, the mwami became the source and symbol of all authority in the politically-centralized state.¹⁸ From the time of mwami Rwabugiri until the monarchy was eventually abolished in 1961, the kingdom of Rwanda was a highly organized and stratified state.¹⁹

This is not to say that all Rwanda was united under the mwami. Several autonomous Hutu kingdoms, primarily in the north and southwestern parts of the country, remained independent until their complete domination was enabled by colonial military expeditions between 1910 and 1920. This armed domination of the north generated strong animosities between the previous autonomous kingdoms and the central kingdom and fundamentally altered the political makeup of the country.

¹⁶ Gérard Prunier, “The Rwanda Crisis History of a Genocide,” (New York, Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 13.

¹⁷ Prunier, pp. 23.

¹⁸ Danida, Study 1, Chapter 2, Pre-Colonial Period.

¹⁹ Danida, Study 1, Chapter 3, Colonial Period and Independence.

In consolidating his power base, Rwabugiri made efforts to undermine the power of elite Tutsi families by removing them from positions of authority and replacing them with his chosen personnel. The new political appointees were then beholden to him directly. This occurred, as noted in the Danida study, "notably in regions that previously had been relatively independent, thereby increasing the material resources available to the monarchy."²⁰

An important result of the reign of Rwabugiri was the heightening of awareness of ethnic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi. As Catherine Newberry explains:

with the arrival of central authorities, lines of distinction were altered and sharpened, as the categories of Hutu and Tutsi assumed new hierarchical overtones associated with proximity to the central court and proximity to power. Later, when the political arena widened and the intensity of political activity increased, these classifications became increasingly stratified and rigidified. More than simply conveying the connotation of cultural difference from Tutsi, Hutu identity came to be associated with and eventually defined by inferior status.²¹

C. COLONIAL INFLUENCE ON THE ETHNIC MYTH

When the Germans arrived in 1895, they found the pre-existing structures of the mwami Rutalindwa, the heir to the recently departed mwami Rwabugiri, and the structures of the autonomous kingdoms. This encouraged the colonial officials to utilize the existing native institutions through which to administer the territory, a policy of indirect rule. It also served their interests to have the mwami continue to enlarge the central kingdom and subjugate the remaining autonomous kingdoms and bring them

²⁰ Danida, Study 1, Chapter 2, Pre-Colonial Period.

²¹ Catherine Newberry, "The cohesion of oppression. Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960", New York, Columbia University Press, quoted in Danida, Study 1.

within the central kingdom. The premise from the eyes of the colonial authorities was to rule the colony at the least cost and generate the most profit.²² Using the administrative structures of the mwami served this purpose well, by reliving the need for a large number of colonial administrators.

The Germans and the Belgians would further elevate Tutsi elites more rigid and self serving to serve their needs and the needs of the elite Tutsi class of the mwami. By the middle of the 20th Century, the Hutu were aware of the effects of the sharpened stratification, the ranked ethnic system, and the injustices inflicted upon them by both the Tutsi and the colonial authorities. Prunier stated that “the result of this heavy bombardment with highly value-laden stereotypes for some sixty years ended by inflating the Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and crushing Hutu feelings until they coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex.”²³ With the arrival of independence in the second half of the Twentieth Century, the Hutu, upon assuming political control of the country were not quick to forget the injustices brought about by this process.

In the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations mandated Belgium to administer Rwanda. The Belgian authorities choose to administer the possession in the same indirect manner as the German authorities maintaining the system that had elevated the Tutsi elite above the more numerous Hutu.

The colonial powers were unaware of the complexity and palace intrigue that existed within the circles of the Rwandan Tutsi elites/clans at the highest levels of the

²² Des Forges pp. 34.

²³ Prunier, pp. 9.

Rwandan society. The actions of the Germans and Belgians authorities only served to heighten the distinctions between the Hutu and Tutsi and elite Tutsi classes. This practice played into the hands of the Tutsi elites that were seeking to consolidate power.

A second source of ethnic tension to arise due to colonial practices dealt with the perception of physical differences between the two ethnic groups. The colonial powers, both Germany and Belgium, embraced these supposed differences and utilized them as the basis for institutionalizing the ethnic stratification between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) noted that this policy provided both sides with material to exploit: "The two groups themselves disagree profoundly on this issue, and each can find certain authorities to support their position."²⁴

Significant propaganda efforts by both Hutu and Tutsi have been directed at this issue, most prominently by the Hutu in the years following independence, and considerably accelerated in the final years of the Habyarimana regime.²⁵ The Habyarimana regime would consistently portrayed the Tutsi as a form of evil invader to their Hutu lands, and sought every opportunity to vilify them as the cause of all national ills.

²⁴ OAU, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide *The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events*, accessed July 21st. 2000; available at <http://www.oau-oua.org/Document/ipep/report/Rwanda-e/EN-02-CH.htm>.

²⁵ This theme was featured notably as a element of the programming that was broadcast by the right wing radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLHC) immediately before and during the 1994 genocide.

Another factor that influenced the colonial decision to work with the Tutsi elites was the European racist belief that the Tutsi were a superior and alien "race" in Rwanda. The complexity and advanced nature of the Tutsi society convinced the Europeans that they must have come from another region, probably Ethiopia. They suspected that the Tutsi must have conquered the lesser races in the country. These theories were backed up by the fact that the Tutsi were generally taller than the Hutu and had finer features, more characteristic of Europeans. To the European colonial authorities and missionaries, this placed the Tutsi higher on the evolutionary scale than the Hutu, making them a closer relation to the Europeans and thus more civilized.

This sentiment was voiced by Pierre Ryckmans, a Belgian Administrator in the 1920s:

The Batutsi were meant to reign. Their fine presence is in itself enough to give them a great prestige *vis-à-vis* the inferior races which surround ...It is not surprising that those good Bahutu, less intelligent, more simple, more spontaneous, more trusting, have let themselves be enslaved without ever daring to revolt.²⁶

The Belgian authorities did not understand the society they governed, and distorted indigenous practices to their serve own interests. In the process they furthered the animosity between groups and classes. A prime example of this occurred in the area of *ubuletwa*. In the pre-colonial period, the *ubuletwa* was a work/taxation obligation assigned by the mwami to individual communities. The individual communities could then choose an individual to fill their obligation as a whole. The Belgian authorities made

²⁶ Prunier, pp. 11.

this obligation an individual responsibility thereby increasing the requirement for forced labor. The new obligation was resented because it benefited only the elites and the colonial authorities rather than the commune as it previously had done.

Another illustration of the distortion of indigenous societal practices was the alteration of the local chiefly functions. The Belgian authorities decreed that the previous system of three chiefs was to be abolished in favor of a single chief system. This chief obviously tended to be a Tutsi. This further concentrated power in the hands of the Tutsi elites and accentuated the growing sense of ethnic division between the Hutu and the Tutsi.

The Catholic Church further sharpened ethnic differences in the country. Because missionaries comprised a high percentage of the limited number of colonial authorities within the country, their voice and opinions carried considerable weight. The missionaries controlled the western educational process and heavily favored Tutsi youth at the expense of Hutu students. Many Hutu became Theology students. Theology was not viewed as a path to a civil service job. But it was a method to gain access to post-secondary education that they would otherwise be denied.

Christianity also played a central part in Belgian machinations to control the mwami. In 1931, the Belgian authorities removed mwami Yuhi V Musinga, because he had sided with the Germans during the First World War and had not embraced Christianity. They replaced him with one of his sons. The son, who ruled as Muter III Rudahigwa, was much more amenable ruler to the Belgians. He was a mission educated, westernized, monogamous man, who converted to Christianity and consecrated his

country to the Catholic Church in 1946.²⁷ With his ascension to the throne and conversion to Christianity, the road to power within the country now lay with those who embraced the church.

The most notorious of Belgian colonial measures that institutionalized ethnic differences was the introduction of the identification card in 1933. The card carried a declaration of ethnicity that forever denoted the ethnic status of the individual. This ethnic declaration also was passed down through bloodlines, and perpetuated ethnic stratification. It gave the genocidaires of 1994 an easy method of identifying individuals for extermination.²⁸

Beginning first in the 1930s, the Catholic Church began to re-evaluate its support for the Tutsi elite. This process reflects changes occurring within the Rwandan Catholic Church hierarchy. This change was due to the large number of Hutu students that had studied theology and then entered the church. This served to add more indigenous Hutu priests to the local church. This practice altered the political nature of the local church. The church also began to recognize the inevitability of independence for the country following the close of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations system.

²⁷ Prunier, pp. 31.

²⁸ Some accounts regarding the ID card claim that the basis for determining ethnicity lay solely with the ownership of cattle, ownership of 10 or more cattle meant assignment as a Tutsi. A different account of the ethnic assignment process attributes the identification of ethnicity solely as a matter of individual preference when asked to state such for the record. (Des Forges, pp. 37)

D. INDEPENDENCE

As political consciousness and "nationalist" sentiments grew in the 1950s, political demands were forming in terms of ethnicity. An important manifestation of this awareness of political ethnicity occurred in 1957 when a group of Hutu intellectuals, among them the future first President of independent Rwanda, Grégoire Kayibanda, published a document entitled, *Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda*. This document was drafted with the aim of influencing a visiting UN Trusteeship Mission but the DANIDA study found that it "attacked the whole concept of Belgian administration and maintained that the basic problem of Rwanda was a conflict between Hutu and Hamitic Tutsi."²⁹ The document also was noted by the OAU IPEP, "was directed quite accurately against the "dual colonialism" of the Belgians and the Tutsi, expressed particular resentment toward the "political monopoly" of the Tutsi that had expanded into "an economic and social monopoly."³⁰

The use of the concept of race as a consideration of political concerns is significant in this document. Given that the entire colonial experience had been devoted to the elevation of one ethnic group over another as a superior race, it could only serve to stimulate animosity. It was clear that emerging political parties would be created along these cleavage lines, further institutionalizing the gulf between the two groups.

In 1957, Kayibanda created the first political party, the Mouvement Social Muhutu (Hutu Social Movement or MSM), which in 1959 became the Parti du

²⁹ Danida, Study 1, Chapter 3, Colonial Period and Independence, The colonial era.

³⁰ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 3.5.

Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu (Party of the Movement and of the Hutu Emancipation or PARMEHUTU). This formation of the first political party was followed by the creation of multiple Tutsi parties ranging from the monarchist, anti-Belgian Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) to the more moderate Rwandese Democratic Union (RADER).

Interethnic violence along party lines soon broke out. The Belgian authorities along with the Catholic church fully supported the new Hutu movements.

This ethnic based violence saw the first mass exodus of Tutsi refugees into neighboring countries of the Great Lakes region, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda. Some of the Tutsi refugees immediately set up guerilla organizations, called the *inyenzi* or cockroaches by the Hutu, and conducted periodic attacks across the borders against the Hutu. These raids accomplished little but led to massive reprisals against those Tutsi still living within Rwanda.

Belgium supported the idea of a referendum on self-government in late 1959. During the summer of 1960, the colonial authorities organized communal elections. These elections reversed the Tutsi control of government; placing 210 of 229 newly formed communes, controlled by *Burgomestres*, in the control of Hutu parties. The Kayibanda PARMEHUTU party won the largest percentage share of the elections. These new *Burgomestres* quickly picked up the habits of the old feudal rule and created their own Hutu clienteles.³¹

³¹ Prunier, pp. 52.

The Belgian colonial authorities and Kayibanda, in an effort to forestall possible UN action from the Trusteeship Committee, called an emergency meeting of the *Burgomestres* on January 28, 1961. At this meeting, the Democratic Republic of Rwanda was declared. Later, Parliamentary elections established a Hutu majority legislature along demographic lines. A referendum soon after rejected a return to a monarchy and endorsed the establishment of a republic, which was formally recognized in July 1962.

Kayibanda became the first president of the new republic. His regime, which lasted until July 1973, was secretive, elitist, and authoritarian. The concept of a unified Hutu republic was a myth. Like those before and after him, Kayibanda's regime rested upon rule by a small elitist clan under the guise of the larger ethnic grouping. Effective Tutsi leadership was eliminated within the country during his regime through intimidation, arrest, physical violence, and extra-judicial killings.³² A strict quota system, affecting jobs and the educational system, was implemented to ensure that Tutsi were blocked from regaining the power they once held.

Rwanda under Kayibanda became a de-facto one party state with PARMEHUTU. By 1972., growing divisions among Hutu sub-regional factions forced President Kayibanda to return to an emphasis on ethnic division to shore up his now shaky presidency. This practice had united the country at independence, drove out thousands of Tutsi, and firmly established his stature as president.

³² Danida, Study 1, Chapter 3, Colonial Period and Independence, The events of 1959-62:reversal and confrontation.

The methods employed failed and a new wave of inter-ethnic violence erupted in 1973. This violence appeared linked to an explosion of Hutu/Tutsi fighting in neighboring Burundi. The violence was not contained to Hutu against Tutsi and it soon began to threaten the other elements of the Hutu elites, each vying for the rewards that power brings in the patrimonial system. In response to fears for their survival and sensing an opportunity to grab power, northern Hutu led by the National Defense Minister, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew Kayibanda in a bloodless military coup on July 5, 1973.

E. THE HABYARIMANA REGIME

When General Habyarimana seized power in his July 1973 coup, the people of Rwanda generally welcomed the shift in power. Prunier noted the change, "General Habyarimana had brought peace and stability to Rwanda. Like anything else, this had its price."³³ The new president quickly moved to outlaw all political parties within the country and establish a totalitarian state. Within a year he relented only on the issue of political parties, forming his own party the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND).

The Habyarimana regime was an authoritarian de jure one party system. The MRND was enshrined in the constitution as the only legally recognized political party. MRND control of the state was total and dissent was not tolerated, with threats and intimidation used as a control mechanism. This single party system was legitimized with

³³ Prunier, pp. 76.

a constitutional article in 1978, mandating it as the party of the state, a core value of the country.³⁴

Every Rwandan citizen was required to be a member of the party, every political appointee, down to the lowest level to included the *Burgomestres* of every commune, was personally approved by President Habyarimana. This gave him an all-pervasive level of power over the country. It was the *Burgomestres* after all, who exercised immediate control over the population on a day-to-day basis. Through them, Habyarimana truly extended his control to the lowest levels of the populace. Thus the Rwandan state under Habyarimana was an uncharacteristically strong state, at least on some measures of capacity.

The Habyarimana regime presided over a period of stable growth and peace for the next twelve years until 1985. A form of equilibrium existed between the Hutu elites and the Tutsi of the country and the inter-ethnic violence diminished greatly. Tutsi businessmen flourished in the private sector. They accepted the clear limits placed on their position within the Hutu dominated Rwandan society. Not a single Tutsi was a prefecture head or *Burgomestres*. Hutu officers dominated the military and they were even banned from marrying Tutsi women.

The Rwanda of Habyarimana was initially a more economically open, mainstream African nation. Its growth and development were the envy of the Great Lakes region. It was during this period that Rwanda was nicknamed the "Switzerland of Africa" due in

³⁴ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 4.7.

part to its peaceful, stable, hardworking, reliable reputation. Habyarimana was a modernizing leader, well traveled and close with other members of the Francophonie. France supplanted Belgium as Rwanda's state patron. France and Rwanda signed a military and cooperation agreement in 1975.³⁵

Rwandan political tradition (going back to the old *abami* tradition) of having a small group of followers outside official structures to act as the sensory organs of the ruler, seeing and hearing at a level unavailable within official circles, were embraced by the northern Hutu with the presidency of Habyarimana. This practice cemented the patrimonial nature of the Habyarimana state. It relied heavily on narrow marital practices, within the commune level, to maintain clan loyalties and favor. Habyarimana's ascent to power after all was a revolt against the power and regional prestige of the south under Kayibanda that had seen the Hutu of the north diminished.

President Habyarimana's inner circle was heavily weighted towards those who shared his northwestern regional roots. This concentration of power within a small regional patrimonial system took place over a number of years and eventually narrowed to two prefectures in the late 1980s.³⁶ Prunier found that within this regional patrimonial system, would also take place a further refining of the regional interests where within each "*regional mafia* there was a tendency to create sub-units according to precise, more

³⁵ Prunier, pp. 89.

³⁶ Danida, Study 1, Chapter 3, The Second Republic.

narrowly defined geographical origin.”³⁷ The *akazu* was an example of a smaller clan based structure within a larger regional clan.

President Habyarimana and his wife Mme Agathe were both from the northwestern prefecture of Gisenyi. Further patrimonial favors were broken down from within the prefecture to the communal level. President Habyarimana suffered from a lack of a respectable communal lineage. He was rumored to have been born in Uganda. His familial line within the commune was not very respected. He lacked a true core of loyal followers and did not have the backing of a clan.

Mme Agathe, on the other hand was a member of an important northern clan that had been one of the last autonomous Hutu kingdoms subjugated by the Belgians. There was considerable power and prestige associated with her family. It was her clan that provided much of the “loyal” base for the president. The President relied heavily on her and her familial connections and essentially became their prisoner.³⁸

It was from the patrimonial relationship surrounding Mme Agathe that *le Clan de Madame*, also known as the *akazu* or “little house” would arise, one of the most notorious of the right wing organizations. The *akazu* was comprised of three of Mme Agathe’s brothers, a cousin, other close associates, and lesser associates including military officers. Members of this organization filled positions of authority at the center of power within Rwanda, and many of the excesses of the regime can be traced to it. The OAU IPEP found the group was central in “various kinds of illicit and corrupt activities, including

³⁷ Prunier, pp. 85.

³⁸ Prunier, pp. 86.

currency transactions and generous commissions on government contracts. Much development aid actually ended up in their [its] deep pocket.”³⁹ Members of the *akazu* were even rumored to have murdered a powerful potential successor to the presidency who was not one of their own, thus eliminating a threat to their power base.

The Catholic Church was closely aligned with the state during the Habyarimana era. The church provided additional symbolic legitimacy to the state, especially in a state that was 60 percent Catholic. Church leaders were active on all levels of the state and political parties. Separation between church and state did not exist. This in turn facilitated church activities.⁴⁰ Having the church on his side provided President Habyarimana with an extra level of control over the populace.

The fragility of the Habyarimana regime was exposed by the economic crisis that began after 1985. The OAU IPEP report noted that the countries “dependence on commodity markets controlled by powerful interests in rich countries took its toll in these years, when coffee, tea, and tin prices plummeted.”⁴¹ Suffering, caused by the drop in commodity prices, effected every level of Rwandan society, and the dependence on cash crops meant that the ability to feed the populace was greatly affected:

³⁹ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 5.18.

⁴⁰ Ibid. para. 4.14-4.15.

⁴¹ Ibid. para. 5.3.

After decades of strict control and careful manipulation by one of Africa's most highly-centralized and well-organized states, the Rwandan people had earned a reputation for docility and deference to authority. Now, however, this considerably exaggerated submissiveness gave way to anger and protest.⁴²

Alison Des Forges found that when "confronted by the dramatic economic decline and the evidence of increasing corruption and favoritism on the part of Habyarimana and his inner circle, political leaders, intellectuals, and journalists began demanding reforms."⁴³

Pressure began to mount for President Habyarimana to open up the single party state to democratic reforms. Habyarimana agreed to discuss change in the summer of 1990, appointing a commission that he envisioned would take two years to conduct its work, to study reform. The commission actually released its results within eleven months, in the summer of 1991. The commission advocated amending the constitution to allow a multi-party state, which Habyarimana reluctantly accepted. It was during this period that the RPF invaded the country.

The ruling regime found itself caught in the trap of reliance on international financial assistance. A Structural Adjustment Program offered to the state under strict terms, by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in September 1990, did not achieve the desired effects. The assistance in fact, achieved the reverse effects. Inflation rose immediately and the government was forced to cut programs drastically,

⁴² Ibid. para. 5.4.

⁴³ Des Forges, pp. 47.

while fees for services were raised. With the advent of the economic crisis, intra-elite fissures were exposed in the Habyarimana government.

As cronyism and favoritism of the Habyarimana regime towards the north grew more blatant, pressure began to mount from the southern Hutu of PARMEHUTU orientation, for a more representative government. This pressure also came from outside the country, led by the French which had maintained close ties with the President.⁴⁴ Any move towards multi-party democracy would not suit the *akazu* and they quickly resorted to the policy of ethnic division, vilifying the Tutsi within the country as evil. Timing made this ploy more effective when in October 1990; the RPF, a Tutsi expatriate group from Uganda, invaded Rwanda.

The first opposition political party in Rwanda formed within a month of the RPF invasion. President Habyarimana quickly renamed his ruling party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National Pour le Développement et la Démocratie (MRND (D)), to reflect the new openness. On June 10, 1991, the constitution was officially changed to allow multiple political parties.

Within months there was a flourish of political parties created, including the revival of the Hutu anti-Tutsi, Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) which was a reformation of the Kayibanda regional party PARMEHUTU. Another party to form was the Hutu, virulent anti-Tutsi, extremist party, the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR). The CDR was nominally separate of Habyarimana's MNRD (D) but

⁴⁴ Prunier notes on pp. 89n that President Mitterrand was then on political liberalization course, seeking to link aid to political democratization.

appears more likely to be a vehicle for the MNRD (D) to espouse a harder, extremist line, too radical to support openly.

The CDR was linked to the *akazu* and other various right wing organizations that were all to play key roles in the planning and conduct of the genocide to come. It was also responsible for the creation of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC), the radical anti-Tutsi radio station that continually broadcast a message of hate and genocide in the months before and during the genocide.

The reality of the new political system in Rwanda was noted by the OAU IPEP report. "The other new parties consisted largely of Hutu from outside the northwestern regions who had been cut out of the inner circles. Few observers failed to note that what distinguished the MRND from most of the new parties was that it had power, while the others wanted it."⁴⁵ Multi party politics within Rwanda was just another way to compete for the benefits of power rather than a true search for solutions to the problems facing the country, such as the Tutsi refugee issue and the economic crisis.

With the advent of opposition political parties, the next logical step for reform was to pressure Habyarimana for a true coalition government. The growing power of the opposition parties, demonstrated in their ability to mount massive street demonstrations. Protests placed the president under great pressure to accede to the demands.

On March 14, 1992, following several politically motivated massacres, international pressure forced President Habyarimana to accept the formation of a multi-party government. A genuine coalition cabinet was formed, with premiership of the

⁴⁵ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 5.23.

government going to the opposition party, Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), which was the largest, most active opponent of the ruling party.

The ruling MRND (D) maintained nine cabinet positions but eleven others went to the opposition parties. Habyarimana maintained his position and presidential powers. This new cabinet was sworn in on April 7, 1992. The new opposition cabinet members immediately set about to exercise their new independent power in the government.

The new government, with opposition members now in positions of authority, aggressively tried to reform the excesses and inequalities of the past and gain spoils for their regions. Attempts were made to minimize the influence of the powerful security force, the Service Central de Renseignements (SCR) by cutting up its various functions into different components and placing them under the control of various ministries.

The consequence of these actions to reform the SCR, was however a restructuring of the SCR as an underground alliance with the Zero Network death squads. The Zero Network was a secret extremist organization and was comprised of both off duty FAR soldiers and militiamen of the MRND (D), and was highly linked to the *akazu*.

The next step for the opposition parties was to aim at separating the MRND (D) from the state. Under Habyarimana's control, the state, and the MRND (D) were essentially the same. With this access, the MRND (D) had complete right to use all state owned properties and equipment, a valuable source of infrastructure for the party. Ending this access forced the party to compete on a level playing field with the other parties but

also brought home the message to the extremist factions within the government that control was being lost.

In an effort to maintain control of the country, Habyarimana returned to a tried and true method to divert attention away from the country's domestic problems and unite the Hutu. He began to attack the Tutsi as the enemy of the country and the party. This led to a dramatic increase in anti-Tutsi violence. The OAU IPEP report made note of this strategy in its investigation; "It is clear that Habyarimana and his advisers immediately understood what the RPF and Uganda had just handed them—an opportunity to consolidate their eroding support and to mobilize international backing for the war the invaders had begun."⁴⁶

MRND officials had feared the development of the opposition parties from the start. Because they threatened the potential loss of control of the reigns of power.⁴⁷ The MRND viewed the development of these opposition parties more along the lines of a defeat by an enemy rather than a political loss. The leaders of the party gave their tacit approval to use any means to combat the opposition. This led to increased violence against opposition party officials that forced the opposition parties to adopt violence themselves.

All political parties began to organize youth wings that became increasingly involved in political violence. The MRND went the extra step in forming its youth wing, the *Interahamwe* into an actual militia. The MRND provided access to military training

⁴⁶ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 7.6.

⁴⁷ Des Forges, pp. 55.

for the *Interahamwe* beginning in 1992. The extremist CDR also formed a youth gang, the *Impuzamugambi* that worked with the *Interahamwe* in politically motivated attacks against their opposition. Violence against Tutsi and members of the opposition Hutu escalated through June 1994.

In 1992 in Brussels, Belgian Professor Filip Reyntjens revealed the existence of and the political connections of the MRND (D) to the Zero Network. The leadership of the Zero Network, as previously noted, had a strong connection to the *akazu*. They included many of the names that played key roles during the genocide, to include Colonel Bagosora director of the defense ministry, the head of the military intelligence, as well as Mme Agathe's brothers. Another secret organization, the *Amasasu* (Bullets), was comprised of FAR officers that did not believe that the fight against the RPF was being carried out with sufficient energy. This group began to hand out weapons to the *Interahamwe* and the *Impuzamugambi*.⁴⁸

In August 1993, Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTMLC) went on the air. It was created by extremists who believed the national radio station, Radio Rwanda, was too liberal. The founders of the station came from within the inner circles of the president. Certain advantages were provided RTMLC, which suggested links to the government. Among these were the ability to broadcast on the same frequency as Radio Rwanda during that station's off air period and access to an emergency back-up power

⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch believes that the leader of the *Amasasu* to be Colonel Bagosora a key member of the *akazu*, acting under the pseudonym of Commandant Mike. Colonel Bagosora appears to have been actively involved in the planning, and arming of civilian militias.

source. Personnel from the national station also were moved to fill positions at the new station.

RTMLC quickly became a popular station because of its lively interactive format, which was a departure from the formal Radio Rwanda. The station became the mouthpiece of the extremists espousing an anti-Tutsi propaganda line devised by leading Hutu intellectuals. During the genocide, the station was essentially the sole source of news for most of the nation, and the sole interpreter of events. This was a valuable tool for spreading propaganda to the rural populace.

The most important example of this new initiative by the coalition opposition members occurred in May 1992, when the new Foreign Minister met with the RPF in Uganda. This meeting resulted in direct negotiations that began in Paris during June. When the news of this first contact became public, it caused concern within the extremist ranks. These discussions would lead to the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993.

F. THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT

The RPF was a rebel organization started in Uganda by Rwandan Tutsi who had fled the 1959 Hutu persecution. Some of the rebels had been born in Rwanda, others had never been inside the country having been born in exile. With the political situation of Uganda unsettled in the late 1980s, the fledgling government of Milton Obote chose to make the Rwandan refugees a scapegoat for Ugandan problems. This drove many of the refugees to join Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) to fight Obote.

The Rwandans proved to be avid fighters. Several Tutsi rose to hold high positions in Museveni's NRA, which threw out the Obote regime in 1986. Unfortunately, internal pressures within Uganda caused Museveni to cast his Rwandan compatriots aside to maintain his hold on the fragile Ugandan society. When Tutsi members of the Ugandan Army realized that they were not welcome in their adopted home, they formed the RPF in 1987 and began to contemplate returning to their own homeland. On October 1, 1990, they invaded Rwanda from Uganda.

The timing of the RPF invasion played into the hands of the Habyarimana regime and the right wing factions. It allowed the president to play again the ethnic card, portraying the RPF as the returning foreign invader intent upon stealing Hutu lands. The effect stifled the advances made by the opposition political parties and enhanced the standing of those on the right wing. According to the OAU IPEP:

The timing of the RPF invasion lent credence to their divisive strategy. Habyarimana was demonstrating, however reluctantly, a new openness towards both multiparty democracy and the exiles. This bolstered his sagging popularity and undermined the RPF's credibility as a more attractive alternative.⁴⁹

The RPF struck with a relatively large and well-organized force, made up of veterans of the Ugandan civil war and later conflicts with rebel movements in Northern Uganda. Their leaders were well trained and highly respected. The invasion, was not officially supported by the Museveni Ugandan government, although it certainly enjoyed its tacit approval and support.

⁴⁹ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 6.14.

The initial RPF foray failed to produce the desired results. On the second day of the invasion Major General Fred Rwigyema, the highly respected leader of the RPF, was killed. The Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) offered effective resistance that stalled the military advance. The expected mass support by the populace never materialized. On the contrary, the invasion hardened support for the Hutu hardliners giving increased credibility to their ethnic strategy. Massive internal displacement of Hutu peasants away from the war zones, provided further support to the anti-Tutsi sentiments. These internal displacements proved to be a fertile breeding ground for anti Tutsi extremists and for the Hutu militias in the 1990s.

France provided military support to the Habyarimana regime immediately following the invasion and continued to provide support through the first months of the genocide and reportedly into June 1994. Direct support was not supposed to be part of the assistance, but circumstantial evidence suggests that the French military forces and security services played more than a passive role at times. Motivations for French support are murky, among them was a purported desire to halt the spread of an "Anglophone" sphere of influence within central Africa represented by Museveni and Paul Kagame, the new leader of the RPF, who did not speak French.

The RPF was nearly defeated by November 1990. Kagame, who had been outside the region attending a US Army school at Fort Leavenworth, returned and rallied the remnants of the RPF fighting forces. He led a successful retreat across the Ugandan border, with the complicit approval of President Museveni. The retreat provided Major Kagame the time needed to escape with the remnants of the original force, recruit, re-

equip, and train for further operations. The civil war settled into a protracted conflict, broken by multiple cease-fire agreements over the next three and half years.

G. THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS

Efforts to resolve the war began almost immediately after the RPF invasion of 1990. Within days, the Belgian government made the initial overtures to facilitate discussions of the refugee issue, which had been a long-standing matter of contention between President Habyarimana and Uganda. The French government, noted Howard Adelman in a paper for the OAU IPEP report, placed the most pressure on the Habyarimana regime to negotiate concluding that, "the RPF might win militarily but [could not win] politically. The government could not win militarily, though it might command the numbers to win politically. A negotiated settlement was the best way for France to salvage its interests in Rwanda."⁵⁰

The French remained committed to the Habyarimana regime and the role that it represented as part of the Francophone sphere of influence in Africa. French military forces deployed to Rwanda immediately after the October invasion personally supported the Habyarimana regime. In the opinion of many in the French military establishment, any attempt by the French government to abandon the Habyarimana regime was equivalent to high treason.⁵¹

Negotiations between the government and RPF went nowhere during 1991. Opposition members of the new coalition government boldly decided in June 1992, to act

⁵⁰ Howard Adelman, "The Arusha Peace Process and the Rwanda Genocide," paper prepared for the IPEP, 1999, cited in the IPEP report.

⁵¹ Prunier, pp. 149.

without the participation of Habyarimana's ruling MRND (D) and meet directly with the RPF in Brussels. An agreement reached there on the technical modalities of the peace process led to comprehensive talks in Arusha, Tanzania. The members of the Rwandan opposition party delegation and the RPF, acting without the participation of the Habyarimana MRND (D) faction of the government, signed an initial cease-fire on July 14, 1992.

The announcement of the cease-fire agreement did not sit well with the Habyarimana hard liners. The fact that the future peace negotiations in Arusha were going to be conducted by members of the opposition Hutu elements, meant that the Habyarimana faction would not be able to dominate the agenda or terms.

At Arusha, a pattern quickly emerged. The Habyarimana regime, represented by the MRND (D), and closely monitored by Colonel Théoneste Bagosora a high ranking member of the *akazu*, would make concessions at the negotiating table. President Habyarimana, under pressure from his hard line factions, would later publicly retract these concessions.

The feeling among the MRND (D) was that their opinion was not being heard at the negotiating table. The opposition factions, flexing their newly gained sense of independence and power, were pursuing their own path toward peace. This led the hard liners to search for a final solution. During this period, plans for the eventual genocide campaign were formulated by the loose coalition of the extreme right based in the CDR, and the emergent umbrella organization, Hutu Power.⁵²

⁵² Prunier, pp. 168-169.

It increasingly appeared as if President Habyarimana was actually considering conciliation with the RPF at the negotiations. Prunier noted:

In the short term, the extremist's main preoccupation was how to stop the growing dynamics of peace both in the country and at Arusha. The MRND (D) kept protesting against the lack of consultation concerning the negotiations while the CDR, in a more aggressive style, was demonstrating in the streets and fighting it out with the MDR and PSD militants.⁵³

Actual negotiations in Arusha, facilitated by the OAU and the President of Tanzania, made remarkable headway over time given the obstacles presented by the Habyarimana regime. In rapid succession, agreements were reached on:

- The principle, and creation of the rule of law;
- the creation of a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG);
- the reintegration of refugees into Rwanda.
- The final issue necessary to resolve pertained to the restructuring of the armed forces and integration of the Tutsi soldiers of the RPF. The RPF demanded 50 percent of the officer billets while the FAR, unwilling to forfeit its dominance of the officer corps and the attendant prerogatives of power, was not willing to give more than 20 percent. The final agreement saw the RPF demands for 50 percent of the officer billets, supported by the Tanzanians in a break from their neutral position, win out.⁵⁴

It was a reflection of the confusion and lack of consensus on the part of the government negotiators that they were prepared to make such a concession, and it was at the least imprudent for the RPF to have insisted on these terms despite much friendly advice to the contrary.⁵⁵

On August 4, 1993, President Habyarimana reluctantly signed the Arusha Accords, as the documents were now aptly called.

⁵³ Ibid. pp. 170.

⁵⁴ Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process," pp. 143.

⁵⁵ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 8.12.

In retrospect, the Arusha Accords achieved the opposite of their intended purposes. The OAU IPEP believes that the search “for ethnic equity and democracy, the negotiations succeeded in persuading the *akazu* that unless it acted soon, its days of power were numbered.”⁵⁶ They would be the losers in the BBTG arrangement that would minimize the grip of a limited regionally based elite. This made them all the more desperate and dangerous.

The successes of the Arusha Accords were predicated on, as one expert explained to the OAU IPEP, “a tri-polar landscape: the Habyarimana party, the new parties, and the RPF,”⁵⁷ This left the hard line factions out of the new government. Perhaps this was naïve. Other factors also would conspire to ensure the failure of the accords. The limited mandate and the delay in the arrival and of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) force until December undermined the accords. The October assassination in Burundi of the democratically elected Hutu President by the Tutsi dominated army also hurt the prospects for peace. The inability to deal with Hutu Power and the increasing polarization of the country doomed the accords to failure.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 8.14.

⁵⁷ Ibid. para.. 8.16.

⁵⁸ Ibid. para.. 8.18.

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III. RWANDAN OBSTACLES TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION

Following the signing of the Arusha Accords, the RPF and the Hutu opposition parties had made significant gains with the agreement. The Habyarimana ruling circle and the members of the FAR, however, would have suffered a loss of power and prestige if the provisions of the accords had been implemented fully.

This chapter, explores two developments that spoiled the accords. The first was the Habyarimana regime, specifically, the President, and his inner circle, and the political parties associated with them, including the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR). The other spoiler were the FAR officers and the Hutu enlisted soldiers that stood to lose their secure positions with demobilization brought by the accords. The political elites and the military stood to lose prerogatives and power at the expense of the peace.

In retrospect, according to the OAU IPEP, the Arusha Accords achieved the opposite of their intended objectives. "Searching for ethnic equity and democracy, the negotiations succeeded in persuading the *akazu* that unless it acted soon, its days of power were numbered."⁵⁹ The *akazu* would be the losers in the BBTG arrangement that would minimize the power of a limited, regionally based elite. This fact made them all the more desperate and dangerous.

A. RWANDAN ELITES

What led the Hutu extremist factions to abandon the Arusha process? The evidence strongly suggests that someone or some group planned the campaign for several years following the invasion of Rwanda by the RPF in 1990. If the suggestion of right wing complicity is indeed true, then why, when confronted with increasing international

⁵⁹ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 8.14.

pressures to open the Habyarimana government to opposition parties, did the right wing take a course of action that would oust them from Rwanda and lead to the institution of a Tutsi led government in Kigali? How did the extremist elements within the Habyarimana government miscalculate their ability to maintain power, co-opt the opposition Hutu political parties, and yet resolve the thorny Tutsi refugee issue?

The achievement of the Arusha Accords presented the ultimate challenge to the power of the Hutu extremists within the Habyarimana circle. The accords appeared to have achieved a comprehensive agreement on all the major issues. A major component was the establishment of a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) where power was to be shared amongst three forces: Habyarimana's MRND (D), the RPF, and a block of opposition parties. Notably excluded from the BBTG was the CDR. The RPF refused to allow their inclusion viewing them as too extreme and largely responsible for the anti-Tutsi violence and propaganda since the October 1990 invasion. President Habyarimana was to remain as the President of the nation, but the real power would reside with the Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers.

While Arusha appeared to be a very comprehensive peace agreement, from the perspective of the hardliners:

they were the big losers at Arusha. The agreement would seal their fate unless they took drastic action to re-establish their supremacy. The more it appeared that power and the limited spoils of office would have to be shared not only with other Hutu parties, but also with the RPF itself, the more determined were the *akazu* insiders to share nothing with anyone. The *akazu* occupied key positions in the Presidential Guard, FAR and both MRND and CDR political parties, and they controlled the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* militias as well as the radio station RTLMC. They were set to play their spoiler role with a vengeance, and now moved to accelerate their plans.⁶⁰

Between August 1993 and April 1994, the world of Rwandan politics increasingly split into two camps, those for peace and compromise, and those that progressively more viewed the entire process as a threat to their existence. During this period, a comprehensive propaganda campaign was mounted both through extremist controlled newspapers, and through the infamous RTMLC. The object of the campaign was to both psychologically undermine the position of the Tutsi within the country and to increase the animosity of the general Hutu population against the Tutsi.

The extremist elements worked hard through the media and through personal speeches to rally their forces. Their intent was to demonize any parties that were not either a member of the MRND (D) or the CDR. If one was not a member or supporter of these organizations, then one was obviously a supporter of the enemy was the message consistently delivered.

Another important phase in the consolidation of the extremists was the militarization of ethnicity. The youth wings, the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*, were provided paramilitary training by the army and were then used in political assassinations

⁶⁰ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 8.15.

and intimidations. Large numbers of internally displaced Hutu were recruited out of the refugee camps for militia training with little attention paid to any sort of screening criteria.

President Habyarimana came under intense international pressure to implement the provisions of the accords, while facing the clear internal pressure of his inner circle to not compromise lest they lose their power. With the events of April-June 1994, it is clear that the extremists within the government felt as if they had nothing to lose by their actions.

B. FORCES ARMÉES RWANDAISE (FAR)

In an ethnically polarized environment such as Rwanda, according to Donald Horowitz in his book on ethnic conflict, "the military is both a resource and an object of ethnic conflict."⁶¹ The ethnic composition of the military becomes an important issue due to its relationship with the actual societal make-up. The FAR had by 1990, at least at the elite ends of the officer corps, become a reflection of the regional interests that had come to dominate the government. It had not served as an integrating institution for the country.

The FAR played a key role in the process of vilifying the Tutsi within Rwanda. In this task the FAR functioned as a rallying tool within the Hutu ranks, helping to exclude the Tutsi or Twa portion of the population from participating in the Rwandan political society.

⁶¹ Donald L. Horowitz,, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (London; University of California Press, 1985), pp. 443.

The military reinforced the ethnically divisive politics of the Habyarimana regime:

The skewed composition of regimes and officer corps reinforces the apparent importance of ethnicity, facilitates the interactions of officers (including conspiratorial interactions) on an ethnic basis, and may also increase the tendency for politicians and officers to view each others actions as ethnically motivated.⁶²

The officer corps sought ties with the regimes elites and flourished under the racially divisive environment of the Habyarimana reign of power.

In 1973, President Habyarimana was Major General Habyarimana, the highest-ranking officer in the Rwandan Army of the Kayibanda republic. In July of that year, he seized control of the government during a coup and proceeded to rule for the next 21 years. As President, Habyarimana maintained the role as the Commander in Chief of the FAR. In this capacity, he ensured that officers in elite billets, such as the Presidential Guard, the Para-Commandos, and the Reconnaissance Battalions, were loyal to him. He achieved this by selecting officers, with regional loyalties to his wife and to himself, for promotion and command. Under the Arusha Accords, the president would retain his position as the Commander in Chief, but the function would largely become a ceremonial billet, with the real power provided to the new Prime Minister.

The future prospects of the FAR of the Habyarimana regime were closely allied with that of the president. Officers in command of the elite units or who held important billets in the Defense Ministry had ties with the *akazu*. An individual's advancement

⁶² Ibid. pp. 471.

within the army depended on ties with the northwestern regional. This patronage system extended the reach of the President.

Initially, the officer corps appeared to be relatively competent and in control of the military. Professional military links with France helped to foster this level of competency. France had long sought links between itself and the armies of the Francophone zone. Many officers' received staff training at French military schools. The 1975 Technical Military Assistance Agreements (TMAA) provided for French military training to army units. Later, this assistance would take a more ominous turn.

Immediately after the 1990 invasion by the RPF, the FAR began to undergo a massive expansion. The expansion saw the relatively small professional army increase from a number around 5,200 in October 1990, to over 15,000 by mid 1991, and 30,000 by the end of 1991. The size of the FAR peaked around 50,000 by the time the Arusha negotiations began.⁶³ France was more than happy to help solve the issue of equipping the vastly increased army.⁶⁴

Expansion of the FAR created an obvious need for a source of manpower. The burgeoning population of the country, coupled with both a lack of job prospects or opportunity to own land and the cumulative effect of the anti-Tutsi propaganda efforts, led sufficient numbers of young men into the army. Des Forges made note of this in the Human Rights Watch report. "If some idealists enlisted to 'fight the feudalists', most of

⁶³ Prunier, pp. 113.

⁶⁴ The French managed this supply issue both directly through providing French arms and financing indirect arms sales through third party nations such as Egypt and South Africa. (Des Forges pp. 97, 660-662)

those who joined did so in order to have an opportunity to eat, drink and loot since pay was minimal and irregular.”⁶⁵

Economic factors led to a minor mutiny of the army in 1992. This occurred after initial hints at the upcoming peace discussions in Arusha became public. The mutiny was based on fears that the army would be demobilized once peace emerged. The MRND (D) and the CDR fed the rumors of less than desirable, alternative jobs to be provided the demobilized forces, such as the clearing of swamps. This practice served a purpose in its own right as a component of the anti Tutsi propaganda, giving the soldiers an incentive to fight the rebels.

The Arusha Accords agreement, on the structure of the new Rwandan National Army, failed to anticipate the impact of the proposed restructuring. This aspect of the peace discussions proved to be the last area in which an agreement was reached.

In negotiating the military aspects of the accords, it was in the interests of the Habyarimana government to maintain both a large army that retained a larger percentage of FAR troops than RPF forces. The FAR's obvious desire was to maintain the higher-ranking positions within the new force. The structure of a large army meant a corresponding need for a large officer corps.

For the RPF, a smaller force structure for the new national army would allow, via achieving a force balance of 40 percent of the enlisted ranks allotment to RPF soldiers, to maintain a sense of security with regard to survival should the peace process fail. During the negotiations, the RPF used an economics argument that the country would not require

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 113.

a large standing army, to negotiate a smaller force size that was more favorable to their needs. Given the state of the Rwandan economy at the time and the true lack of an external threat, the argument was accepted. To justify a larger standing army would require an external threat that did not exist.

The composition of the officer corps proved to be difficult area to achieve a negotiated settlement. Given the level of power, access, and prestige that the elite levels of the FAR had enjoyed within the Habyarimana government, and the *akazu*, the FAR officers stood to lose the most from the accords. The ultimate acceptance of a 50/50 ratio of FAR to RPF officers in the new army greatly favored the RPF. This ratio meant the level of power that Hutu officers enjoyed would be reduced.

The Arusha negotiations settled on a ratio of 60 percent of the total of the new armies enlisted ranks were to be comprised of FAR forces, with the remaining 40 percent from the RPF forces. This ratio presented the FAR forces with the unpleasant prospect of demobilizing forces, and allowed the RPF to bring over its entire force into the new army with no need for demobilization. The issue of demobilizing a significant portion of the FAR forces was an unpleasant proposition given the lack of desirable job opportunities available.

The FAR would lose power with a peaceful settlement to the civil war. For the leaders of the army, their access and prerogatives of power would diminish under the Broad Based Transitional Government. The leaders would confront a smaller chain of command and have to share military authority with RPF. The enlisted ranks of the FAR would also suffer greatly. They would be required to demobilize a great number of troops

who were just happy to be employed. The release of these soldiers who held extremist views from active duty, only created problems for the peace process and undermined the chances that it would succeed.

C. THE GENOCIDE CAMPAIGN BEGINS IN EARNEST

On April 6, 1994, the entire Arusha process was burned in the ashes of the presidential jet near Kigali. The hard liners were free to initiate their plan to dominate the local political scene.

Prior coordination and planning was evident. Within hours of the downing of the president's plane Prunier notes, "there were already *Interahamwe* roadblocks everywhere in town (Kigali) and houses were being searched."⁶⁶ The extremist owned radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLHC), began to broadcast messages inciting the Hutu populace to avenge the death of our President and provided instructions and directions to locate victims.⁶⁷ The Presidential Guard began methodically killing. The death lists had been distributed to the future killers, who acted in coordinated and systematic ways to catch their victims.⁶⁸ In a move calculated to force the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent in UNAMIR, FAR forces killed and mutilated ten Belgian paratroopers assigned to guard the Prime Minister.

On April 8, the RPF launched an offensive from the northeast, reaching Kigali by the 10th. General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of the UNAMIR force, attempted to

⁶⁶ Prunier, pp. 223.

⁶⁷ Ibid. pp. 224.

⁶⁸ Ibid. pp. 224.

negotiate a cease-fire between the warring parties, but the message from the RPF was clear. According to Prunier:

There will be no negotiations with these criminals. The war was now on, but it was not the war which was killing most of the people. It was the enormous wave of civilian massacres now gathering momentum and sweeping right across the country. It was in fact a genocide.⁶⁹

TV coverage of the horror was not being reported outside of Rwanda. Prunier found that members of the print media were liberally documenting the disaster, but “in Western society events not seen on a TV screen do not exist.”⁷⁰ Among western governments, the events were known and in fact, had been foretold previously by the UNAMIR mission. The Western governments chose to ignore the human rights abuses in hopes of forcing a return to the Arusha Accords, and thereby avoiding the necessity of intervention to stop the violence.

The successes of the Arusha Accords had been predicated on, as one expert explained for the OAU IPEP, “a tri-polar landscape: the Habyarimana party, the new parties, and the RPF,” leaving the hard line factions out of the new government.⁷¹ Perhaps this was naïve. Other factors would conspire to ensure the failure of the accords. The delay in the arrival until December and limited mandate of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) force, and the October assassination in Burundi of the

⁶⁹ Ibid. pp. 237.

⁷⁰ Ibid. pp. 274.

⁷¹ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 8.16.

democratically elected Hutu President by the Tutsi dominated army helped end the accords.

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IV. INTERNATIONAL OBSTACLES TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION

In his article on "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," Steven John Stedman notes the limitations of custodians for the peace process that are completely fitting to the case of Rwanda. Stedman notes:

a strategy that may be the best from a perspective of solely managing a conflict may not be the best for a policy maker considering a range of interests. This is certainly true for U.S. policy makers when it comes to conflict resolution in small, unimportant (to U.S. national interests), and faraway countries. Even the UN considers its actions in light of its organizational interests and the need to protect the reputation and institution of peacekeeping.⁷²

Stedman lays out the rationale for the inactions of both the United States and the UN with regard to Rwanda, which led to the collapse of international will in confronting the actions of extremists within Rwanda. This chapter discusses the reasons behind this failure to acknowledge the responsibility that each party held in dealing with the Rwandan civil war.

Another limitation that Stedman discusses, is the potential liability that a patron of a spoiler brings to the process. Again, with regard to Rwanda, there is no greater illustration of the liabilities that a patron can bring to the peace process than French actions with regard to their support of Rwanda. France and her representatives unfailingly supported President Habyarimana both against the RPF with soldiers, arms and money. The French wanted to continue to influence the region and maintain a Francophone zone within Africa.

⁷² Stedman, pp. 187.

A. ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

The Organization of African Unity has been the premier intergovernmental organization in Africa. The OAU is an organization that must answer to the individual heads of its member states: the supreme organ of the OAU is the Assembly of the Heads of States and Government (AHG). When the OAU was formed in 1963, one of the principal bedrocks of the organization was the recognition of state. The acceptance of the inviolability of postcolonial borders was viewed as an entrenchment of the new African states. Monde Muyangwa and Margaret A. Vogt note this point in their assessment of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. "African countries had chosen to create an organization based on political and economic cooperation rather than on supranationalism."⁷³

This bedrock principle hampered the ability of the organization to act effectively in matters of conflict resolution. The record of the organization, stated Amare Tekle, "in conflict resolution has been largely dismal. This is a reflection of the structural weaknesses of the organization."⁷⁴ From its inception, the organization concentrated its limited efforts in conflict management on interstate conflicts. No provisions for a true conflict prevention capacity within the organization were included. It would be difficult to view the OAU's overall performance at securing the peace and security of Africa in

⁷³ Monde Muyangwa and Margaret A. Vogt, "An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1993-2000," International Peace Academy Report, available at: www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriAssessPrint.htm

⁷⁴ Amare Tekle, "The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Prevention," in *The Path of a Genocide*, ed. Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), pp. 111

the thirty-year period culminating in the 1993 creation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution with any level of enthusiasm. Several factors account for this:

- The limitations of the OAU's mandate.
- Lack of political will of the member states.
- Limitations of the OAU conflict management institutions.
- Lack of experience and capacity in conflict management areas.
- Lack of sufficient financial resources.
- International politics.

Following the RPF invasion in October 1990, the OAU was incapable of intervening successfully. Having failed to address the long-standing problem of the Rwandan refugees in the neighboring Great Lakes nations, the OAU was unable to act from a base of moral authority. In addition, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was the acting chair of the OAU at the time. Museveni was viewed by the Habyarimana regime as the true backer of the RPF and thus the de-facto invader of the Rwanda. Any involvement of President Museveni was accordingly viewed as less than neutral by Habyarimana and his regime. Correspondingly, the de facto leader of the Great Lakes region Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, was a supporter of the Habyarimana regime and his involvement in the process also was suspect.

The tendency of the OAU was to fall back on mediation as its primary method of dealing with the crisis. This was essentially the limit of its conflict resolution capabilities. The refugee problem was recognized in early discussions but its initiatives went nowhere. The OAU Secretary-General did manage to facilitate a cease fire agreement in March 1991, that was to be monitored by a neutral military observer team under the supervision of the OAU Secretary-General, as a prelude to the deployment of the a full-blown

African peacekeeping force.⁷⁵ This initiative immediately ran into problems with the composition of the team and mutual suspicions about the motivations of the members. Another problem was the Habyarimana regime's tendency to renege on commitments, specifically in this case to allow the RPF members of the neutral observer team free access to the country.

In July 1992, the OAU and the President of Tanzania orchestrated a meeting in Arusha, which would lead to the Arusha Accords. The priority of OAU negotiators at Arusha was to arrange an agreement that would halt the civil war. It was believed that a halt to the fighting would enable progress to be facilitated on other key issues such as power sharing, refugee return, integration of the armed forces, democracy and transitional government. Focusing on these narrow immediate goals blinded the negotiators to the reality that the Habyarimana regime, and the political parties associated with the regime, would not adhere to an agreement that challenged their control and power over the country. The result of this focus the OAU IPEP found, was as "a result, no direct action was taken against those conducting the anti-Tutsi pogroms with the support of the inner circle around President Habyarimana."⁷⁶

Achieving an agreement that would halt the civil war also was viewed as the prelude to the involvement of the UN. Although it had been agreed that during the initial 1992 cease fire agreement that a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG), acting under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the OAU, would verify and control the cease

⁷⁵ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 11.24

⁷⁶ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 11.28

fire, the OAU deferred to the UN to act as the principle guarantor of regional peace and security. Given the clear evidence already available of western withdrawal from African peacekeeping missions and the marginalization of Africa within the Security Council, this appears to have been a presumptuous and unwise decision. This grave miscalculation was fulfilled by the insufficient mandate and backing that the UNAMIR force received.

B. THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nation's Independent Inquiry into the actions of that body in Rwanda found that "the overriding failure in the response of the United Nations before and during the genocide in Rwanda can be summarized as a lack of resources and a lack of will to take on the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide."⁷⁷ The UN failed in its responsibility to the Rwandan people. The failure of the organization to act appropriately exposes the structural weaknesses of the organization in the post Cold War international society.

The breakdown of the organization in this crisis is a failure of the Secretariat and the Security Council functions of the UN. The Independent Inquiry placed great emphasis on the inadequate mandate provided to the UNAMIR mission, but the Security Council was the body that set the mandate. The Secretary General, through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which falls under the Secretariat, controls the day-to-day functioning of a peacekeeping mission. This is where the breakdown of the mission occurred.

⁷⁷ United Nations Secretariat, *Report Of The Independent Inquiry Into The Actions of the United Nations During The 1994 Genocide In Rwanda*, December 15, 1999, III. Conclusions 1.

The UN Charter is the preeminent source of international law today. Paragraph 1 of article 1 Article states that the purposes of the United Nations are, “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measure for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace....”⁷⁸

The major problem that the UN, as a post Cold War organization, has had to confront is how to balance the ideals of Article 1(1) with the realities contained in Article 1(7). This paragraph lays out the primacy of the sovereign rights of individual states. “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”⁷⁹ At the time of the drafting of the Charter, conflict was largely interstate in nature. With the rise in intra-state conflicts and elevation of human rights as a major issue of international concern in the post Cold War era, the UN has had a more difficult time balancing these provisions with action.

The UN Charter assigns primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council by virtue of Article 2(4). In the discussions to create the UN, the victorious allied powers of World War II prepared and dominated the agenda. A. Leroy Bennett states in his book on international organizations,

⁷⁸ A. Leroy Bennett, *International Organizations Principles and Issues*, (Englewood Cliffs: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 467.

⁷⁹ Ibid. pp. 468.

the "big powers, it was felt, should have positions of authority on the Security Council commensurate with their responsibilities for maintaining world peace and security."⁸⁰

The advent of the Cold War soon after the birth of the UN spelled an end to the collaborative spirit among the great powers, and revealed the weakness in the Security Council's make-up and voting procedures. Superpower animosities and the role of East/West client states conflict reduced the Council to a perpetual stalemate. A United States initiative launched in the early 1950's, known as the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," enabled the western permanent members of the council to bypass the Security Council stalemate, enabling a vote for an emergency meeting of the General Assembly. This procedure well worked well for the West until the 1970's and the rise of the third world anti-west Soviet supported movement in the General Assembly.

The UN's dismal record of involvement in Rwanda can be traced in large part to the difficulties it had encountered in its Somalia operation (UNOSOM). The complexities involved with taking the Somalia mission from the initial Chapter VI humanitarian assistance operation to the later Chapter VII peace building operation proved to a far greater task than anyone had envisioned or contemplated. This soured the council on future forceful intervention into African civil wars.

With the signing in August 1993 of the Arusha Accords, the Security Council hoped that a peace operation in Rwanda would be a winner.⁸¹ In retrospect it is clear that

⁸⁰ Ibid. pp. 67.

⁸¹ Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, "Early Warning and Conflict Management," quoted in Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).

the UN's intelligence gathering capacity failed to warn the council of the extreme reluctance President Habyarimana exhibited in signing the Arusha Accords. The UN report on its actions recognized this as a critical mistake. "The United Nations mission was predicated on the success of the peace process. There was no fall-back, no contingency planning for the eventuality that the peace process did not succeed."⁸²

The UNAMIR mission was counted on by the negotiators at Arusha to be the guarantor of the fragile peace in Rwanda. The UNAMIR mission suffered from the unwieldy political workings of the Security Council and the backlash of the UNOSOM mission. The size of the UNAMIR force contingent was an immediate source of debate. A UN military expert recommended a force size of 8,000 men, General Dallaire asked for 4,500, and the United States recommended a force of 500. It was not until October 5, that a force of approximately 2,500 was approved for the mission. The UNAMIR force next suffered from a delay in funding. They arrived ill equipped to serve in their role and were undersupplied once the genocide commenced.

In another nod to the UN experience in Somalia, the Security Council decided to place clear limits on the UNAMIR mandate. As a result, the mandate plainly deviated from the role as envisioned in the actual Arusha Accords. Several key considerations had been weakened, including notably the premise that UNAMIR would guarantee overall security in Rwanda. The mandate restricted UNAMIR from assisting in the search and recovery of arms caches and the neutralization of armed gangs throughout the country as called for in the Arusha Accords. UNAMIR as established, notes Des Forges, could only

⁸² United Nations Secretariat, III. Conclusions, para.. 2.

"contribute to security, and not throughout the country, but only in the city of Kigali."⁸³

These points were to be key as the situation in Rwanda eroded.

General Dallaire, appointed as the UNAMIR force commander, arrived in Rwanda on October 22, 1993 with an advance party of twenty-one personnel. Jacques Roger Booh-Booh, former Foreign Minister of Cameroon, appointed by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as his Special Representative in Rwanda to represent the diplomatic issues, arrived on November 23. Over the next few months, these two UN officials reported widely divergent analysis of the events occurring within Rwanda.⁸⁴

General Dallaire submitted a draft set of rules of engagement (ROE) to the DPKO on November 23. He expressed concern that the UNAMIR force might be required to assist the local civil authorities in maintaining law and order. In paragraph 17 of the draft ROE the General was explicit that UNAMIR would need to act vigorously if members of the UNAMIR mission were confronted with evidence of "ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them."⁸⁵ UN Headquarters never

⁸³ Alison Des Forges, pp. 132.

⁸⁴ Human Rights Watch in its exhaustive report by Alison Des Forges notes this perceptible difference of analysis as the difference in observation between diplomat and soldier and more sinisterly in the case of Booh-Booh, as a member of his countries diplomatic elite and a former French colony, indicated a pro-French and thus pro Habyarimana bias in his view of events occurring. It is also interesting to note that the same apparent pro-French bias was visible at times in statements from the Secretary General who had long standing ties with France, when he appeared to downplay the post April 6, events as a campaign of genocide.

⁸⁵ Des Forges. pp. 133.

responded to the draft ROE and they were tacitly considered to be in effect by the UNAMIR staff.⁸⁶

As the humanitarian and political situation began to unravel within the country, evidence of a genocide campaign began to mount. Booh-Booh's dispatches back to headquarters used language that appeared to portray the RPF as the guilty party to transgressions of the accords while downplaying any appearance of impropriety by the Habyarimana regime. General Dallaire was emphatic about the need for more direct action in confronting gross violations of human rights by the Habyarimana regime. DPKO steadfastly held to the line that UNAMIR was to remain a neutral force and allow diplomacy to work with Habyarimana.

Intelligence reports received in Kigali began to make the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR uncomfortable. The reports, later collaborated by a high level *Interahamwe* informant known as Jean Pierre, indicated that Belgian UNAMIR forces were being targeted to get the country to pull out of UNAMIR. These reports were to prove extremely prophetic after April 6. On February 14, the Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes asked the Security Council for an increase in the mandate of UNAMIR. This request apparently received virtually no attention. On March 30, the Secretary-General made a progress report to the Security Council, which described the political stalemate, the deterioration of the security situation and the humanitarian situation in Rwanda.⁸⁷ He formally requested a six-month extension of the UNAMIR mandate. A reluctant Security

⁸⁶ Ibid, pp. 134.

⁸⁷ United Nations Secretariat, II.; Description of Key Events; Political deadlock and a worsening situation.

Council authorized a 4-month extension of the mandate on April 5. The next day April 6, full-blown genocide commenced within the country.

UNAMIR proved incapable of preventing the murder of various Hutu figures in the government. In a tragic event foretold by the *Interahamwe* informant, 10 Belgian peacekeepers were killed after surrendering their weapons to FAR troops who had come to murder the Prime Minister. This event precipitated a Belgian withdrawal of its forces from UNAMIR. In his notification to the UN, Foreign Minister Claes declared that the "requirements to pursue a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda were no longer met, the Arusha peace plan was dead, and there were not means for a dialogue between the parties; consequently the UN should suspend UNAMIR."⁸⁸ The Security Council's strict adherence to the limited Chapter VI mandate now became a valid issue for discussion. There was no longer a peace to keep.

Possible responses discussed by the Security Council in the weeks following the death of Habyarimana included increasing the mandate (Chapter VI to Chapter VII) and raising the force levels of UNAMIR (championed by Nigeria and the non-aligned members on the Security Council), complete withdrawal of the mission, and partial withdrawal of most of the force. The permanent members of the council believed that the only responsible decision was to reduce the presence and mandate of UNAMIR.

The United States contingent argued that the UN had a duty to protect the lives of the UNAMIR forces, whose mandate, now that the Arusha Accords had ceased to be viable, was over. Failure to protect these forces, Michael Barnett a U.S. staff officer at the

⁸⁸ Ibid. Withdrawal of the Belgian contingent.

DPKO stated, would make it harder in the future to recruit nations to supply peacekeepers: "the Security Council had a duty and obligation to protect the lives of the peacekeepers, and that failure to do so would make it harder to obtain troops for future operations."⁸⁹

The Security Council, especially the permanent members, refused to acknowledge that events in Rwanda constituted genocide. Instead they referred to the events as large scale violence and ongoing violence. U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright proposed reducing UNAMIR to a small skeletal size operation in order to show the will of the international community.⁹⁰ On April 21, Security Council Resolution 912 reduced the size of UNAMIR to 270 men with orders to secure a cease-fire.

In a ironic twist of fate, Rwanda was occupying a seat on the Security Council during this time period. Des Forges noted:

Rather than demand that the Rwandan representative resign from the council, they continued collaborating with him, thus treating his government as an honorable member of the world community. They did not insist that he absent himself from discussions about Rwanda or even that he observe the usual custom of abstaining from such discussions.⁹¹

The ability to attend Security Council meetings and be party to the council debates was invaluable to the interim government of Rwanda. It enabled them to

⁸⁹ Michael Barnett, *The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda*, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12 No. 4, 1997, pp. 551-578.

⁹⁰ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 12.42.

⁹¹ Alison Des Forges, pp. 25.

determine that an increased mandate for UNAMIR would not be forthcoming. This knowledge appears to have led to an acceleration of the killings.

It was not until the end of April that pressure began to build at the UN to both acknowledge the genocide and begin to confront it. Discussions began in the Security Council on the establishment of UNAMIR II with a Chapter VII mandate. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had himself been noticeably absent from the Security Council throughout the first weeks of the genocide, as he had been traveling on official business in Europe. The moral presence of the Secretary-General was thus absent from the council chambers at a crucial moment.

During this period, the ability of the five permanent members of the Security Council to delay council action became evident. On May 3, President Clinton signed the revised PDD-25. This new directive not only assured that the United States would not engage in peacekeeping operations that did not affect its national security, but that it would use its veto power to ensure that the UN made coherent and disciplined choices on what peace keeping operations to support. Ambassador Albright using this new directive as her guide, effectively delayed a decision on the creation of UNAMIR II until May 17.

By the time the RPF had won the civil war, stopped the genocide, and had established a new government of Rwanda on July 19, there was still according to Des Forges "about the same number of UNAMIR soldiers in Rwanda as there had been at the time of the withdrawal in April."⁹² The stalling actions in the Security Council had prevented a real increase in the mandate of UNAMIR until the crisis was virtually over.

⁹² Alison Des Forges, pp. 646.

C. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND PDD-25

The United States experience in Somalia sealed the fate of potential American intervention into Rwanda. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia had begun as a result of internal population movements. These movements were directly related to the ongoing civil war that erupted after the overthrow of the repressive dictator General Mohammed Siad Barre. Walter Clarke in his book on the Somalia intervention, noted that “with the disappearance of the state after Siad Barre’s retreat from Mogadishu in January 1991, power and leadership naturally drifted to local communities and sub clan-level leadership.”⁹³

Migration caused by the political vacuum and the war, created multiple humanitarian disasters including famine. “By mid-1992,” Clarke notes, “thanks to a media aroused by angry humanitarian groups that pointed to the starvation in central Somalia, the drastic humanitarian problems of Somalia were well known.”⁹⁴ It was this media attention and the images of the famine that brought the situation to the attention of the west. President George Bush, who had just lost the November presidential election, came under intense pressure to act in the waning days of his administration.

On December 3, 1993, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 794, authorized the dispatch of an American led humanitarian mission into Somalia, a “coalition of willing states,” known as the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) or

⁹³ Walter Clarke, *Learning From Somalia; The lesson of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1997), pp. 5.

⁹⁴ Ibid. pp. 8.

Operation Restore Hope as it was known to the American forces. Controversy immediately arose over the exact mission of the UNITAF forces. The United States Central Command, viewed the mission as a short-term operation that would be over within weeks, possibly by the inauguration of the new President. The American commander of UNITAF/Operation Restore Hope, U.S Marine LtGen. Robert Johnston thought he was given the mission to open the Mogadishu warehouses and the highways into the Somali interior for food shipments and not to disarm the clans or engage in state building.⁹⁵ Johnston stated publicly that "the deployment of his U.S. Marine Corps would be strictly humanitarian and that his soldiers would use only whatever force was necessary to protect themselves and food convoys."⁹⁶

With the success of UNITAF/Restore Hope as defined by the UNITAF Commander's standards of the mission, the Clinton administration and the Pentagon began planning for a transfer of authority from the U.S. led UNITAF to the United Nations Somalia Mission (UNOSOM) II. UNSCR 814 established UNOSOM II in March 1993. UNSCOM II widened the scope of peace-enforcement powers from protection of humanitarian relief supplies to securing the environment throughout Somalia.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Ibid. pp. 9.

⁹⁶ John Drysdale, "Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia: The Root Cause of the Shift from UN Peacekeeping to Peacemaking and Its Consequences," *Learning From Somalia; The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1997), pp. 128.

⁹⁷ Ibid. pp. 131.

The establishment of UNOSOM II with its new mandate and the contentious withdrawal of the majority of the U.S. forces from Somalia soon led to confrontation with Mohammed Farah Aidid, one of the major Somali clan leaders. The UNOSOM II forces, Aidid claimed, had crossed the "Mogadishu Line" and compromised their neutrality. Aidid now viewed their actions as counter to his interests and favoring his rival. On June 5, 1993, forces loyal to Aidid attacked and killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers.

The Security Council was rightly outraged by this heinous event and quickly drafted UNSCR 837, which authorized the Secretary-General:

to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks...to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment.⁹⁸

This resolution amounted to a declaration of war against Aidid and his clan forces.

The United States deployed a force of over 400 special operations personnel known as Task Force Ranger, to supplement UNOSOM II's Quick Reaction Forces, to assist in the efforts to locate and capture Aidid. These new U.S. forces answered directly to a U.S. chain of command instead of through the UNOSOM II commander.

In the period from August 1993 until the beginning of October, Task Force Ranger made several attempts to arrest Aidid and his lieutenants resulting in several fierce confrontations with the Somali clans. These attempts culminated on October 3rd in

⁹⁸ Drysdale, pp. 132.

a fierce battle in downtown Mogadishu. During another attempt to capture Aidid, three American helicopters were shot down with one pilot captured and held hostage by Aidid's forces, 18 American soldiers were killed with another 73 wounded. Somali casualties were estimated to be in the hundreds.

The American commander of Task Force Ranger had requested heavy armor weapons, tanks and personnel carriers, as well as special AC-130 Gunship aircraft be sent to Somalia for his use. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, denied his request for the additional equipment. Aspin feared that approving this request at a point when the United States was supposed to be drawing down its commitment in Somalia, would be perceived as a renewed involvement in the country. This it was felt would not be a palatable option on Capitol Hill.

1. The Fallout From Mogadishu: The Vietnam Syndrome

The repercussions from the October 3 battle in Mogadishu began almost immediately. The American commander of Task Force Ranger resigned from the Army the next day, accepting full responsibility for the mission. SecDef Aspin, acknowledged that he had been wrong to deny the operational commander in the field the equipment necessary to protect American soldiers and resigned from his office.⁹⁹

On October 7, President Clinton addressed the nation and announced that all U.S. forces were to be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994. Congress debated how soon the American troops were to be withdrawn from Somalia. Oddly enough, Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne write in their essay on the intervention, it was President's

⁹⁹ Mark Bowden, *Blackhawk Down An American War Story*, [CD-ROM], (Philadelphia Online, 1997)

Johnston and Ted Dagne write in their essay on the intervention, it was President's Clinton's own party that argued for a January 31 pullout date. The Republican leadership argued that this would only serve to "embarrass the President and place Congress in the position of "micromanaging" foreign policy."¹⁰⁰ A compromise, eventually reached on the March 31st withdrawal date, placed sharp limits on any further U.S. actions in Somalia. The mission would now be limited to humanitarian support, dropping the nation building aspects and the pursuit of Aidid from the U.S. role.

The most damaging consequence of all would be revealed in May 1994, with the public release of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." This directive dictated a 180-degree reversal in foreign policy with respect to United States involvement in peacekeeping operations. PDD-25 came less than a year after Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD-13), "Peacekeeping Operations," had provided for a much wider role for U.S. forces in UN peacekeeping operations, an approach dubbed, aggressive multilateralism.¹⁰¹

A draft version of PDD-25, approved on July 19, 1993 had followed this policy line of aggressive multilateralism. The draft, notes Clinton administration staffer Ivo Daalder:

¹⁰⁰ Harry Johnston & Ted Dagne, *Learning From Somalia; The lesson of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1997), pp. 201.

¹⁰¹ Presidential Review Directive 13, June 18, 1993, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd13.htm>, accessed June 3, 2000.

represented a major, albeit evolutionary, change in U.S. policy towards multilateral peace operations...which supported an enhanced use of multilateral operations, elevated the United Nations as a major actor on the world stage, and committed the United States to support such operations in all of their political, military, and financial dimensions.¹⁰²

The one-page introduction to the draft PDD was a forceful endorsement of multilateral peace operations. It suggested that peacekeeping often offered the best way for the international community to prevent, contain, and solve conflicts. The draft also supported the "rapid expansion" of UN operations, noted the greatly expanded U.S. roles in peacekeeping, and committed the United States to support these operations politically, militarily, and financially.¹⁰³ Opposition to the expanded U.S. role was centered in the Department of Defense and was voiced forcefully by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

When it was finally released in May 1994, PDD-25 had been revised dramatically. It now addressed six major areas of concern for reform and improvement with regard to U.S. policy towards multilateral peace operations. Among its key provisions was the reduction in the amount that the United States provided to the UN for peacekeeping dues, from a level of 31.7 percent of the total to 25 percent. The United States Congress took this action unilaterally. Another main goal of the directive was a drive to seek efficiency and a reduction in the total costs of peacekeeping operations.

¹⁰² Ivo H. Daalder, "The Clinton Administration and Multilateral Peace Operations," Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Case 462, Part A, Instructor Copy, pp. 6.

¹⁰³ Ibid. pp. 6.

Probably, the main point of PDD-25, and the aspect that represented the most drastic change in U.S. policy, was the choice of which peace operations to support. In voting for peace operations at the UN, the United States would support well-defined peace operations providing finite windows of opportunity, allowing combatants to resolve their differences, and failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves.¹⁰⁴ Taken at face value, this statement would appear to indicate a commitment to peace operations.

There were a list of conditions that the United States would apply during the decision making process. These conditions served as a guide to the peace operation, as well as, whether the United States would vote in favor of UN involvement:

- Factors the United States will consider when voting for UN peace operations
 1. UN involvement would advance U.S. interests, with interest from the international community regarding problems on a multilateral basis. There was a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following:
 2. International aggression, or; Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.
 3. There were clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
 4. For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire would be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force was deployed.
 5. For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security would be considered significant.
 6. The means to accomplish the mission were available, including the forces, financing and mandate appropriate to the mission.

¹⁰⁴ Presidential Decision Directive 25; Executive Summary, The Whitehouse, available at: http://www.state.gov/www/issues/un_clinton_policy.html accessed on May 22, 2001.

7. The political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community had been weighed and were considered unacceptable.
8. The operation's anticipated duration was tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

These factors aided in decision-making; they did not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions had been and were to be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.¹⁰⁵

These conditions, coupled with the influence of the semi official Weinberger/Powell doctrine make it almost unthinkable that American troops would be deployed on the African continent in a peacekeeping role in the future. The Weinberger/Powell doctrine, argues Ken Campbell, was the ultimate reaction to the Vietnam War. It forced a "rejection of the pre-Vietnam "can-do" confidence of the military, and its replacement with a post-Vietnam "No can do!" reluctance regarding the use of force in ambiguous foreign crises.¹⁰⁶ The junior officers of the Vietnam conflict were now the overly cautious leaders of the U.S. military community.

The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine outlined six conditions for the "proper" use of U.S. military force:¹⁰⁷

1. Vital interests of the nation need to be at stake.
2. A clear commitment to victory must exist.
3. Political and military objectives have to be clear.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ken Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," *Armed Forces & society*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Spring 1998, pp 363.

¹⁰⁷ Ken Campbell, *The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and The Suppression of Genocide*, *Air Force Magazine*, August 1999 Vol. 82, No. 8, available from <http://www.afa.org/magazine/0899powell.htm>, accessed on June 3, 2000.

4. The forces must be properly sized to achieve the objectives.
5. Reasonable assurance of public and congressional support must be secured before intervening.
6. Force must be used only as a last resort.

The application of the Weinberger/Powell doctrine in foreign policy was solidly affirmed in the eyes of General Powell and the Joint Chiefs by the success of the Gulf War. Campbell states that the “largely successful outcome of Operation Desert Storm demonstrated to American military leaders that the Weinberger Doctrine on the proper use of force worked exceptionally well, thereby affirming and reinforcing, rather than “kicking,” their Vietnam syndrome.”¹⁰⁸ The success of the Gulf War brought home the lesson of how to appropriately use American forces.

2. Rwanda: No Stomach For Intervention

The genocide campaign in Rwanda was the first U.S. post-Somalia experience with humanitarian intervention and the first test of PDD-25. Using this directive as guidance, the crisis in Rwanda did not measure up as a matter of U.S. national security interests.

Several officials at the State Department and the Pentagon with responsibility over Rwanda have acknowledged that the U.S. received prior intelligence of the magnitude of the events occurring in Rwanda. U.S. staff officers at both the UN and the State Department had been privy to the warnings from the UNAMIR staff and had discussed the possibility of the situation deteriorating.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense James Woods (1986-1994), recalled for a PBS *Frontline* TV episode, that he had listed Rwanda-Burundi as a potential trouble spot

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. pp. 366.

for the new Clinton administration briefings in 1992. He was directed to remove it from the list with the guidance: "Look, if something happens in Rwanda-Burundi, we don't care. Take it off the list. It's not-U.S. national interest is not involved" and, you know, "we can't put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists like important problems like the Middle East and North Korea and so on."¹⁰⁹

Later, State Department spokesperson Christine Shelley repeatedly went to great lengths to avoid characterizing the events as genocide.¹¹⁰ To do so might, in accordance with the Genocide Convention of 1948, actually require the United States and other signatory nations to intervene. In light of the perception that changing the UNAMIR mandate was a non-starter, the fear within Washington was that to label the events genocide would cast a bad light on the administration's inaction.

In Washington, the NSC worried that any involvement would be worse than Somalia, and that the domestic political environment would not allow this type of intervention to take place with American troops. Ironically, a study published in October 1997 by the University of Maryland, Center for International and Security Studies and its Program on International Policy Attitudes found that a "significant gap exists between the US foreign policy community's perceptions of public attitudes and the results of polls

¹⁰⁹ Mike Robinson and Ben Loeterman, *PBS Frontline: The Triumph of Evil*, Air Date, January 26, 1999, Transcript available online at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/etc/script.html

¹¹⁰ Mike Robinson, *The Triumph of Evil*, PBS Frontline, January 26, 1999.

that ask Americans what role the US should play in the world.”¹¹¹ While most policy practitioners believed that Americans had negative feelings towards U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, the study found the opposite that a strong majority of Americans support the idea of UN peacekeeping based partly on humanitarian concerns.

As a U.S. staff officer to the UN Department Peace Keeping Operations, Michael Barnett reported, “there was hardly a soul that argued for intervention.”¹¹² This sentiment is supported by statements from Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Marley, a U.S. Army officer with extensive experience in Africa, who was serving as a Political Military Adviser at the State Department at the time. “In late 1993/early 1994, no one asked for a human rights Chapter VII mandate. The U.S. government wanted only a low cost, traditional “observer” type peacekeeping operation with the consent of all parties concerned.”¹¹³ The caveat of this thinking is that a valid cease-fire needs to be in place, a condition that had disappeared immediately following the onset of the killings.

In the aftermath of Somalia and the battle for Mogadishu, the Clinton administration had no stomach to enter into another potential peacekeeping quagmire. The important Congressional elections of 1994 would be coming up, a factor that had not gone unnoticed during the early discussions on the situations. Lieutenant Colonel Marley

¹¹¹ Steven Kull, I.M. Destler, and Clay Ramsay, “The Foreign Policy Gap; How Policymakers Misread the Public,” The Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland and the Program on International Policy Attitudes, October 1997.

¹¹² Michael Barnett, interview by author, e-mail exchange, Monterey, CA June 5, 2000.

¹¹³ Anthony D. Marley LtCol USA (Ret), interview by author, via phone with e-mail follow-up, February 16, 2001.

recounted for *Frontline* that: "One official even asked a question as to what possible outcome there might be on the congressional elections later that year were the administration to acknowledge that this was genocide taking place in Rwanda and not be seen to do nothing about it."¹¹⁴ Another fear, given the environment in Washington following Somalia and the subsequent domestic political attacks that were leveled against the UN Secretariat, was that any United States intervention would just provide more ammunition to Senators Jesse Helms and Robert Dole. These Senators had been two of the more vocal critics of the Somalia operation and UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali.

D. FRANCE

France had long had a strong sense of attachment to its former colonial possessions and African nations, including Rwanda, that were French speaking. They maintained a special office within the president's office at the Elysée Palace, the Africa Unit (Cellule Africaine).¹¹⁵ The existence of this office at the presidential level suggests the depth to which the French held with regard to their role in Francophone Africa and their antipathy towards the perceived threat of an extended Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence. During the period before and after the invasion of the RPF, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the French president's son, headed this office. President Habyarimana's Falcon-50 jet, crewed by a French crew with links to the French Air Force, was in fact a gift from Jean Christophe Mitterrand.

¹¹⁴ Mike Robinson, *The Triumph of Evil*, PBS Frontline, January 26, 1999.

¹¹⁵ Prunier pp. 101n.

The French have not been reticent about using their military power on the continent when it suits their own national interests. The OAU IPEP investigation found that:

From the perspective of Paris, the main elements were clear enough: France's unilateral insistence that its former African colonies constituted its indivisible sphere of influence in Africa; the conviction that it had a special relationship with francophone Africa; the understanding that its role in Africa gave France much of its international status; a general attitude that France had to be permanently vigilant against a perceived "anglo-saxon," (i.e. American) conspiracy to oust France from Africa; the close links between the elites in France and francophone Africa, which in Rwanda notably included the two presidents as well as their sons; and finally, France's need to protect its economic interests in Africa, although Rwanda as such was not a great economic prize.¹¹⁶

The 1975 TMAA stipulated that military assistance of French troops in Rwanda was to be limited to that of the role of instructors, although the OAU IPEP found that this was later changed. "The main goal of the arrangement was to offer technical assistance in the development of a national police force; one clause explicitly prohibited French involvement in military and police affairs. In 1983, the agreement was revised, this key clause being removed."¹¹⁷ The removal of this clause would prove to be instrumental in France's efforts to its ally, President Habyarimana, in power after 1990.

1. Code Name Noroît

Following the October 1990 invasion by the RPF, France immediately deployed a company of the 2ème Régiment Etranger Parachutiste, from the Central African Republic

¹¹⁶ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 12.10.

¹¹⁷OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 12.13.

to Kigali, in an operation known as *Noroît* (North Wind.). The mission of the French forces was to protect French citizens and expatriates. Following an attack on the capital city, staged by the Habyarimana government to draw greater attention to the threat at hand, French troops deployed to Rwanda was increased to nearly 600. Over the next four years, the number and tactical commitment of French troops increased.

French soldiers were initially deployed in a non-combatant role. The services they provided freed the FAR forces for frontline duties and served as a morale booster. Prunier, states that the French forces "took care of the airport guard and logistics (large amounts of weapons and equipment were being flown in), looked after the government's helicopters and when necessary flew them, organised artillery positioning and ammunition supply, and ensured radio communications."¹¹⁸ The French Army would become even more directly involved until French officers were actually in control of the counterinsurgency operations for the Rwandans and Lieutenant Colonel Chollet, served as the military adviser to President Habyarimana. French soldiers also were known to have been involved with the interrogation of prisoners and were reported to be involved directly in the control of artillery firing.¹¹⁹

France was a major supplier of military equipment and weapons to the Habyarimana regime and the FAR during the period following the October 1990 RPF invasion.¹²⁰ France also acted as an intermediary for second party arms transactions. A

¹¹⁸ Prunier pp. 110-111.

¹¹⁹ Des Forges, pp. 118-119.

¹²⁰ OAU, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, para. 12.27.

deal involving South Africa in particular was a violation of UN Resolution 588 that prohibited the importation of South African arms due to the international restrictions on the apartheid government. French arms shipments continued throughout the genocide, shifting from direct shipments into Rwanda to shipments transiting on the ground from Goma, Zaire.

President François Mitterrand viewed the invasion by the Ugandan backed RPF as a clear assault on the francophone zone, since Uganda was led by the English speaking American backed President Yoweri Museveni. The RPF, who spoke English were portrayed as a foreign invader, and thus continued aid was justified to an ally under attack. Many officials of the Mitterrand government have held the position that the RPF was an American trained force; certainly, it was true that officers such as Major Paul Kagame had received American training in the past that justified the French support, even in the face of growing evidence of the Habyarimana regime's human rights abuses against the populace.¹²¹ The Mitterrand government rarely failed to champion the Habyarimana regime as the “protector of human rights” and the injured party in the ongoing conflict.

France made concerted efforts within international forums to support the Habyarimana government's claim of an invasion by outside forces and preempt any characterization of the conflict as a civil war. The French ambassador to Rwanda, Georges Martres sent a telegram home to this effect, emphasizing the necessity of portraying the RPF as an external threat.¹²² After a documented Hutu massacre of Tutsi

¹²¹ Ibid. 12.16.

¹²² Ibid. 12.16.

civilians in 1992, the ambassador refused to join a delegation of OECD diplomatic representatives, led by the United States and Canadian ambassadors, in protesting to President Habyarimana. Ambassador Martres was referred to by the other diplomats in Rwanda as the Rwandan Ambassador to France.¹²³

The French played a major role in backing the Habyarimana regime, were aware of the planning for the genocide, provided valuable military support roles following the 1990 invasion by the RPF and were involved in training members of *Interahamwe*. Still it took the French government until 1998 to hold investigations to examine their role in the genocide. The result was an acknowledgement that while France had played a considerable role, according to the chairman of the investigating committee Paul Quiles, "France is neither responsible nor guilty."¹²⁴ The blame for the international inaction, in the eyes of the committee, was largely in the hands of the international community, mainly the United States and the United Nations.

2. Operation Turquoise

By June 1994, internal political pressure began to mount on the French government to intervene in Rwanda to save the Habyarimana government. President Mitterrand had already received several prominent members of the *genocidaires* in France in their flight from Rwanda, and others had been sheltered in the French Embassy within Rwanda. The French almost certainly continued to supply the FAR with weapons through Goma, Zaire as late as June 1994.

¹²³ Ibid. 12.19.

¹²⁴ Ibid. 12.7.

Much speculation has been offered about the reasons for French to finally intervene in late June 1994, nearly three months into the genocide. Suspected motivations for the intervention ranged from a desire to try to save their patrons in the Habyarimana government, to a last ditch attempt to stave off an Anglophone Great Lakes region in Africa. A compromise could be forced, to combat the imposition of a Tutsi RPF government of Rwanda, through a negotiated settlement that would keep the extremists in a position of power.

On June 22, 1994, the Security Council voted UNSCR 929 which gave France the mandate to conduct a humanitarian intervention into Rwanda under Chapter VII articles. In the morning hours of 23 June, the first French elements of Operation Turquoise landed in Goma, Zaire. The RPF was concerned by the size of the firepower that the expected French deployment would bring, but were given assurances by the chief planner that the power was for contingencies only, and would remain in Goma unless needed.¹²⁵

By the time the French forces had arrived, most of the killing had occurred, the FAR and the militia forces were in disarray and retreating in front of the advancing RPF forces. French forces found little left to save. They did ensure that whatever they could save was documented by the media, in a clumsy attempt to put the best face on their efforts and to blunt the severe criticism of their overall involvement with the Habyarimana government. They created a *Zone Humanitaire Sure* (Safe Humanitarian Zone), which served to form a conduit for the escaping FAR and militia forces to elude the advancing RPF, and escape across the borders to Zaire.

¹²⁵ Ibid. pp. 285.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The international community failed as custodians of the peace process in Rwanda. Every major international body that has studied the events that occurred make strong note of the lack of will and resolve on the part of the major bodies to handle the crisis. The United Nations, as the ultimate arbiter of international security, abrogated its duties in difference to the leading nations of that organization, which viewed the Rwandan situation through the narrow realist view of national interests.

The permanent members of the Security Council were deficient in their duties to "maintain international peace and security."¹²⁶ The United States used its own national security interests as the test criteria for its support of a robust engagement in the Arusha implementation, and for strong intervention following the breakout of the genocide. It preferred to pursue legal obfuscation of the facts of the genocide occurrence to avoid a further entanglement in the situation.

It also can be said that while the international community failed as the custodians of the Arusha Peace, it does appear as if there was a case of clear disconnect on the role that was anticipated of the UN in the fulfillment of the accords, between the mediators and the UN. The mediators and the parties to Arusha, envisioned the role of the UN as that of an overall security blanket for the process, a true guarantor of the peace transition. Alan Kuperman writes, that clearly this is what the parties involved believed would occur. President Habyarimana himself relayed this thinking when he said: "I think that

¹²⁶ UN Charter, Article 1.

this force will be there to provide security to everyone.”¹²⁷In retrospect the mediators should have been aware of the growing reluctance on the part of the Security Council to engage in a full blown peace keeping mission and that assigning this role without advance engagement with the council was a serious mistake.

The UN Security Council, by contrast was not in the mood for another peacekeeping operation following on the heels of Somalia. It authorized the UNAMIR force under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) articles. This is a vital distinction because Chapter VI is traditional peacekeeping which requires a clearly established peace with a very limited rules of engagement for the UN force. Once the peace ceased to exist, as far as the Security Council was concerned, so had the mandate of UNAMIR. A Chapter VII mandate provides in Article 42, that the Security Council, “may take such action by air, sea, land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”¹²⁸

A. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

The general nature of conflict in the post Cold War world has changed from that of inter state conflict to intra state. Human rights have moved to the forefront of intranational peace and security issues. The Security Council has failed to adapt to these new security issues.

There is a need for a more representative Security Council. A council that is more democratic and transparent has been a persistent demand from UN members outside of

¹²⁷ Alan J. Kuperman, “The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes Do More Damage,” SAIS Review, Winter/Spring 1996, Volume XVI, Number One. pp. 236.

¹²⁸ UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42.

the permanent five. Predictably discussions regarding the reform of the Security Council within the "Open Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council" have split along the fault lines between the industrialized and developing nations, the permanent members versus the rest of the General Assembly, and those favoring retention of the veto power versus reforming the veto power. The end result has been an understanding of the need for Security council reform with no true progress towards a resolution of the issues.

B. AFRICAN REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES

During 1998, the growing ethnically motivated humanitarian crisis in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo garnered widespread international attention. The crisis drove the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a regional security organization, to intervene unilaterally, and forcibly inside the sovereign nation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO also acted without the formal approval, in the form of a resolution authorizing Chapter VII actions, of the United Nation's Security Council. The United Nations Charter in Article 2 Paragraph 4(1) expressly confers on the Security Council the primary role amongst signatory nations, of maintenance of international peace and security. NATO recognized the potential for Security Council paralysis regarding this issue and decided to act.

NATO's intervention was based on the perceived need for a humanitarian solution to the Kosovar Albanian crisis. The fact that NATO acted without the Security Council Chapter VII resolution authorizing the use of force, is itself a recognition that the Security Council as presently constituted, is a roadblock to handling intrastate human rights on the international level. In this case the looming fear of a Russian or Chinese

veto of any Security Council resolution authorizing force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, necessitated NATO's action without Security Council authorization.

NATO had the capacity to unilaterally intervene inside Kosovo. This is a capacity that does not exist in Africa. Additionally, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is different when it comes to responding to intrastate conflict than the United Nations Security Council. This was a deliberate decision at the time of the creation of the OAU based on total difference to the sovereignty of the signatory nations and the leaders.

NATO's humanitarian intervention in Kosovo situation based on the humanitarian imperatives that arose in the fall and winter of 1998/1999, is in itself not a new phenomenon. During the 1990s, there have been two examples of international interventions in sovereign territory under the guise of a UN mandate. The first example to consider is the continuing international involvement in the Iraqi "No-Fly" zones following the Gulf War (this is a US and British affair). The second major humanitarian involvement was the attempt to intervene in the Somali civil war, first by the United States and a coalition of willing nations and later by the UN Chapter VII mission UNOSOM, which would carry with it a major price tag with regard to the future involvement of the United States in these types of endeavors.

The critical difference between the Kosovo situation and that which existed in Rwanda from August of 1993 through June of 1994, is a matter of strong regional mandate and capacity. NATO, at the time of the Kosovo intervention, had a fifty-year history as a regional security organization with considerable military capacity. NATO had itself been forced to alter its views on the issue of human rights with the end of the

Cold War. The Bosnian crisis in the early 1990s forced the organization to confront the issue headlong and it learned valuable yet painful lessons as a member of the UNPROFOR force that had stood by impotently at places like Srebrenica where gross abuses of human rights had occurred.

The OAU was not formed as counter to a common threat such as NATO was with the Soviet Union. Instead Cedric de Coning wrote on the role of the OAU in conflict management in Africa:

Africa's colonial legacy resulted in the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states being embedded in the Charter of the OAU as one of the 'unshakeable' founding principles. This principle effectively precluded collective action to address civil wars and other internal conflicts in Africa by the OAU or other African government institutions in the past.¹²⁹

It was not until 1993, that the OAU finally established a "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution," in partial recognition of the diminished importance the continent would have with the post Cold War West. The Mechanism acknowledged that the experiences of postcolonial Africa had demonstrated that;

internal conflicts generate massive flows of displaced people and refugees, encourage the proliferation of arms which continues to fuel conflicts, spur crime and destroy the (economic/investment) credibility of the subregion and eventually that of the entire continent.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ de Coning.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

The combination of these factors it was realized, was hindering the development of the region and forced the recognition that internal conflict in Africa were increasingly becoming transnational in its effects.

The next important step for the nations of the OAU is to develop the military capacity, along the lines of smaller NATO, to be able to unilaterally intervene on the continent in the absence of Security Council interest in supporting a UN operation on the continent. "The OAU's lack of resources, especially financial," de Coning believes, "will deny it the freedom to unilaterally decide on the strategic, tactical and operational aspects of peace operations which it may wish to initiate."¹³¹ The question is then how does the OAU and the nations obtain the resources to grow this capacity?

The recognition of the disengagement of the West and the realization that the goal of complete liberation from colonial rule on the continent had been achieved has resulted in the recent announcement that the OAU would transform itself. The new organization, the African Union is designed to act along the lines of the European Union, will become operational in July 2001. While full details are still developing, one goal has been stated. The Union will have the right to intervene in member states in cases of genocide and war crimes. OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim stated, "Africa and African Union cannot afford to stand by and watch another genocide like that in Rwanda takes place and wait until intervention comes from outside of the continent."¹³²

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Reuters, "African nations form new unity pact," May 26, 2001.

Concurrent with this identification of the need to develop an organic capability to manage and deploy peace operations was the realization by the nations of the West that they no longer had the same level of national security interests on the continent. This awareness led to a desire to disengage selectively from involvement on the continent. To achieve this disengagement without totally abrogating any responsibility for crisis on the continent, it was realized that the west, mainly in the form of the former colonial powers and the United States, would need to build a peace operations capacity within the OAU and its member states.

The first of these attempts was the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). The intended purpose of the ACRF was to seek a partnership between African states, the UN, the OAU and others to build the capabilities of African militaries for responding to international crises. Its long-term objective would be to improve the international community's ability to react quickly to crises in Africa and elsewhere, as well as to develop Africans' role in responding to crises worldwide.¹³³

This response from the African nations to this proposal was overwhelmingly negative. The interpretation by the Africans was that the United Nations and the Europeans were attempting to abandon Africa. The reaction to this interpretation is somewhat surprising considering a key component of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution is the capacity building aspect for African nations, earmarking forces for peacekeeping operations and the need for financial

¹³³ Captain Derek J. Christian, "The African Crisis Response Force: A Critical Issue for Africa," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1998, available online at: www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/1998/summer/art5su98.htm.

assistance from the United States to facilitate this development. ACRF appeared to offer these aspects.

The next step in the pursuit of building an organic African peace keeping capacity has been the ongoing effort known collectively as the "P3 Initiatives." The P3 is a joint effort between the United States, France and the United Kingdom in which the three countries sought to coordinate and strengthen their individual policies. Each nation provides a portion of the project.

The U.S. portion is known as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) stresses the organization, training, assistance and advising of up to a battalion level of African nations. The training is conducted by U.S. Special Forces to establish an individual and unit capability to perform peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, classical peacekeeping training and related equipment is provided. Training is tailored to the needs and capabilities of the individual countries. ACRI provides equipment for the soldier and the battalion, more importantly with an eye for interoperability the equipment supplied meets UN specifications to the greatest extent possible.

The United Kingdom portion is known as U.K. African Peacekeeping Training Support Program. A major element of the United Kingdom program is the developing of the Army Staff Colleges of Ghana and Zimbabwe into regional peacekeeping centers. British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATT) are based in both of these countries and provide training to not only the national forces but other Africa countries. In addition to bi-lateral assistance, the U.K. has been involved in regional peacekeeping

exercises in Zimbabwe involving members of the South African Development Community (SADC).

The French portion is known as the Reinforcement of African Military Capabilities for Peacekeeping (RECAMP). The components of France's efforts include the creation of a training center for peacekeeping in the Ivory Coast, the pre-positioning of French equipment in Senegal capable of equipping a peacekeeping battalion (maintained and monitored by French soldiers), and the organization of peacekeeping exercises on the African continent. A purpose of the French initiative notes Eric G. Berman, and Katie E. Sams, RECAMP aims to develop standby force modules that can be called upon to participate in UN-and OAU-authorized operation.¹³⁴

The thinking behind the P3 initiative is that:

torn between domestic demands for a further engagement in case of humanitarian catastrophes on the African continent and diminishing will to supply own troops, the idea of "African capacities" for conflict solution under "African Ownership" became central in the intercontinental dialogue.¹³⁵

The P3 initiative was advanced in the firm belief that:¹³⁶

- There will continue to be a substantial requirement for international efforts in support of peace and stability, including on the African continent;

¹³⁴ Eric G. Berman, and Katie E. Sams, *African Peacekeepers: Partners or Proxies?*, (Toronto: Brown Book Company Ltd., 1998)

¹³⁵ Dressel.

¹³⁶ Alice Walpole, "A British Perspective on the P3 Initiative for Enhancing African Peacekeeping Capability," International Security Studies Monograph No. 21, *Resolute partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa*, February 1998, available online at: <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/MONOGRAPHS/No.%2021/Walpole.html>

- intrastate conflict (either civil war or the collapse of 'failed' states) is likely to cause the most, and the most intractable problems;
- pressure from public and political opinion, for the international community, including regional organizations, to intervene, will continue; and
- it makes good sense for African states themselves to be part of such an international response.
-

The P3 is based on four guiding principles:

- Long-term capacity enhancement particularly the capacity to mount rapid and collective responses to humanitarian and other crises, consistent with the objectives and the parameters established within the UN stand by arrangements. This goal will be achieved through coordinated and sustained efforts to increase interoperability through training, joint exercises and the development of common peace keeping doctrine. *There is no intention of creating a standing African force.*
- These activities would be carried out in consultation with the OAU or the future African Union (AU) and the United Nations.
- All African states will be eligible to participate, with the exception of those subject to UN sanctions.
- There will be full transparency of the organization with the international community to Africa.

The general response amongst African nations towards the P3 initiatives has not been one of overwhelming approval. Once again the fear is that the initiative is a prelude to complete western withdrawal from the continent. The positive side of this fear has been a growing desire on the part of the African nations to take primary responsibility for resolving their own problems. The metamorphous of the OAU into the new African Union can be viewed as a major positive effort of this process.

With the prospect for UN Security Council reform a dim reality, the only realistic prospect for the nations of Africa to handle their complex conflicts is the development of their own capacities. The P3 offers the path towards building a "regional plus" capability, whereby the nations of Africa will build their own organic capabilities but will also enjoy the support of the major western powers, in the form of logistical capacity and training.

The certainty of realist practices within the western governments makes it impractical to count on the complete engagement on the continent by these powers in the future. The P3 plan offers the most reasonable compromise to the complex security problems of the African continent.

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Monterey, CA 93943-5218

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Cleveland, OH 44109
10. Captain Jean-Philippe Peltier1
USNATO/IS
APO AE 09724
11. Captain E. N. Clough1
PSC 37 Box 4095
APO AE 09459