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**THE ARMY TRANSFORMATION:
GAINING AND SUSTAINING MOMENTUM**

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**THE ARMY TRANSFORMATION:
Gaining and Sustaining Momentum**

by

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April 2001

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Executive Summary

In the Fall of 1999, the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army initiated a process to profoundly change the United States Army – changes they believe are vital to the Army's relevance to the nation and to meet the demands of warfare in the twenty-first century. The process, known as Army Transformation, will take twenty to thirty years and impact all systems, processes, equipment, people, and infrastructure within or supporting the Army. Through review of the professional literature and personal interviews, this study addresses the momentum of Army Transformation. The specific focus is to identify lessons from corporate experiences that the Army can apply to develop and sustain sufficient momentum for the transformation to succeed. The target audience is the next and successive generations of senior leadership as they stay the course toward the objective force of the future transformed Army.

Long-term, profound change cannot occur without building and sustaining momentum. Momentum will be particularly crucial in enabling the Army to adapt to changing circumstances and to overcome obstacles during the next twenty to thirty years. To assist in building the framework for this effort, the Army must seriously review and apply ideas other organizations have used to successfully transform. One important source for lessons is corporate industry, to include the academic study of such efforts.

Accordingly, to probe the many factors of momentum and to identify lessons of value for the Army's senior leadership, we explore corporate transformation efforts and the academic literature on organizational change and leadership. Cognizant of the significant differences between industry and the military, we focus our attention on deriving lessons about momentum from important similarities between the two. The major themes in this regard are the critical role of bold leadership, the value of a powerful vision, the significance of consistent corporate

communications and interactions, the positive impact of a guiding coalition, and the flexibility for mid-course adjustments while maintaining the continuity of the main effort.

The most significant factor in organizational transformation is a visionary leader who has a firm grasp of building coalitions to guide and shape the institution's strategic transformation roadmap. The Army's senior leadership will change numerous times during the life of the transformation. With each change comes the potential for a major course shift – shifts that could potentially take the Army off the existing roadmap with which Congress and others are now familiar. We conclude that it is essential for sustaining transformational momentum that future Secretaries of the Army and Army Chiefs of Staff be committed to the Army Vision. Inevitably during such a long-term effort there will be mid-course adjustments or personal imprints on the process. Continuity can still be provided through understanding and relating to the continuum of the Army's past, present, and future. It is dangerous to momentum to not make these linkages.

In addition, every organization operates and transforms in an environment that includes influential actors that can significantly impact momentum. Corporate industries transform themselves in a complex environment that includes influential actors such as stockholders, competitors, consumers, and internal groups. Similarly, the Army must contend with an array of external and internal actors. Although any of these might disagree on the content of the Army Transformation, there is a pervasive consensus that the Army needs to adapt to changed demands. A concerted effort is required to market the effort and build relationships that can assist in transformational momentum.

After a detailed look at these various factors, the study concludes with specific recommendations for the senior Army leadership with regards to transformational momentum in the areas of vision, education and communication, and continuity.

Chapter One: Army Transformation

Today, our heavy forces are too heavy and our light forces lack staying power. We will address those mismatches ... we will change these paradigms.¹

-- General Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff

You can't reinvent a company like Ford overnight; we have too much tradition.²

-- Jacques Nasser, CEO of Ford Motor Company, 1995

On June 22, 1999, General Eric K. Shinseki became the US Army's 34th Chief of Staff, the most senior officer in the Army. During his remarks at his arrival ceremony, General Shinseki gave us the words cited in the epitaph above. His comments, and the actions stemming from them, are having a profound effect on the Army. In one sentence, he encapsulated the vision of the Secretary of the Army and himself—a shared vision pointing the Army toward a more responsive, more capable future. His words kick-started and give direction to a process that, like the transformation of Ford Motor Company in the 1990s, cannot happen overnight.

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, corporations throughout the business world have been and continue to transform themselves in response to changes in their strategic environment—the world of consumers and stockholders. Similarly, the US Army faces changes in the strategic environment in which it operates—the arena of national and international security. Companies change to gain, regain, or keep their competitive edge in the marketplace. Sometimes their efforts were successful; sometimes they failed. The business literature is filled with accounts of these ventures, and how the gain or loss of momentum contributed to the end result.

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND ORGANIZATION

The purpose of this research is framed by the question: What over-arching lessons about the importance of momentum during transformation can the Army learn from the corporate world's

significant experience with major change programs? In examining this question, this study coins the term “transformational momentum” to refer to the momentum acquired by an organization en route to its change goals.

The authors do not revisit the decision whether the Army should transform, nor do we directly address related topics such as military doctrine or tactics, unit and individual training, force structure, military equipment, stationing, installations, logistics, and funding. While these issues are important and relevant aspects of the Army’s transformation, they are outside the scope of this research.

This document is organized into five chapters. The remainder of Chapter 1 provides a summary of our conclusions. And, for the benefit of readers unfamiliar with the Army’s transformation, Chapter 1 also provides a cursory review of the effort. Chapter 2 presents two complementary frameworks for considering transformational momentum and yields eight general lessons on momentum useful to the US Army. In Chapter 3 the authors review the critical role of the leader during a transformation. Next, Chapter 4 examines how various “influential actors” within and outside the Army can impact transformational momentum. Chapter 5 summarizes the most significant conclusions and provides recommendations to the Army.

CONCLUSIONS

This work’s review of corporate transformation experiences offers conclusions in three areas that the Army can use to gain and sustain the momentum of its transformation.

1. Vision. In corporate industry, the most successful organizational transformation efforts are characterized by visions which:

- Are simple, powerful, and shared

- Permeate the entire organization and provide focus
 - Include numerous short-term wins en route to the longer-term objective
 - Can survive periodic changes in leadership
2. Education, Communications, and Marketing. Corporate transformations also sustain momentum by doing a superior job of:
- Addressing personal fears of the work force by educating and reeducating their people so that every person knows how he/she fits into the larger plan
 - Building a thorough, well-conceived plan for corporate communications
 - Marketing their transformation program within and outside the organization
 - Addressing the concerns of "naysayers" willing to engage in substantive discussions
3. Continuity. To maintain long-term momentum during a transformation, corporations:
- Create and cultivate a strong guiding coalition of leaders from within and outside the organization
 - Have a flexible transformation plan that absorbs the shocks of the inevitable mid-course adjustments
 - Place significant emphasis on grooming and selecting future leaders that clearly support the effort

ARMY TRANSFORMATION--A PRIMER

In the four months after General Shinseki became the Army Chief of Staff, the Army staff worked diligently to breathe life and detail into the ideas of transformation put forth by him and the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Louis Caldera. In October 1999, the Army published the results of its work ... *The Army Vision*. The pamphlet provides a narrative explanation of the vision and emphasizes its three-fold focus:

- 1) People: The Army is not tanks or helicopters. The Army is quality soldiers, veterans, civilians, and our families.
- 2) Readiness: The Army has a non-negotiable contract with the people of America to fight and win our Nation's wars. We must maintain our near-term training and readiness to ensure we are prepared at all times to carry out our obligations.

- 3) Transformation: The Army is transforming now to meet the needs of an uncertain future national security environment.³

The goal is to change the entire Army into a force that is responsive and dominant in any scenario in which US Army forces could participate during the first third of the 21st Century, from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping to major warfare. Army leaders frequently refer to this wide range of land power capabilities as “the full-spectrum force.”




Fig. 1. The Army Transformation. US Army, online posting, 17 October 2000, "The Army Transformation," 11 March 2001, <[http://www.army.mil/usa/AUSA Web/Short Transformation_files/frame.htm](http://www.army.mil/usa/AUSA%20Web/Short%20Transformation_files/frame.htm)>.

The Army's transformation—as one of the three thrusts of the Army Vision—also has three major paths that lead to the future and to the characteristics of the full-spectrum force (see Figure 1). First, the “Legacy Force,” shown by the upper-most arrow in Figure 1, refers to the Army in its present form. Because it is this Legacy Force that will deploy to meet contingencies until the transformed Army takes shape, the Army will invest significant capital into maintaining and rejuvenating key Legacy Force programs.

The “Interim Force,” portrayed by the bottom arrow in Figure 1, bridges the capabilities gap between the Legacy Force and the “Objective Force”—the completely transformed Army. Using currently available technologies, the lighter and more agile Interim Force will help the US Army fulfill crucial land combat missions currently being filled using less flexible and responsive Legacy Forces. The Interim Force, which has already begun to form, has another significant purpose—to flesh-out through hard work the organizational and operational models for the Objective Force.

The “Objective Force” will grow over the course of twenty to thirty years to include the entire Army, which includes both the active and reserve forces. Details about the Objective Force will take shape over the next decade from a combination of lessons learned in the Interim Force and the application of relevant advancements in science and technology. The seven adjectives at the bottom of Figure 1 describe the capabilities the Army intends to be inherent in its Objective Force.

Chapter Two: Lessons on Momentum from Corporate Industry

*Every object will remain at rest or in uniform motion in a straight line unless compelled to change its state by the action of an external force.*⁴

— Sir Isaac Newton, First Law of Motion, 1686

*Many companies limit real participation in strategic decision making to senior managers. The best companies ... get more people involved.*⁵

— John Sawhill, CEO, the Nature Conservancy, 1995

Momentum in the Literature of Organizational Transformation

This chapter examines the role of momentum during the transformation of organizations in the corporate world as expressed in the literature of organizational transformation. It aims to uncover lessons that the US Army can apply to its own transformation effort.

Consider how many times you recall someone saying, “we’ve got momentum.” Or, “we’ve lost momentum.” Because the word momentum is used so frequently, it is easy to assume that the scholarly literature of transformation would have numerous works, or significant portions within them, dedicated to the subject. This research reveals that such an assumption is presently incorrect because there is a paradoxical lack of material devoted to the specific topic. The paradox is that it is very easy to find uses of the word *momentum* in many books and articles about corporate transformation processes, especially in vignettes or anecdotes. For example, the writings of John Kotter, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, and Michael Tushman of the Harvard Business School, Charles O’Reilly of Stanford’s Graduate School of Business, Peter Senge of MIT, and Jon Katzenbach of Katzenbach Partners—renowned scholars and private consultants whose expertise with organizational change processes is frequently sought by corporations worldwide—frequently mention momentum but seldom address the topic as a stand-alone issue.⁶

Does this lack of dedicated material suggest that writers have overlooked the subject?

No, it does not. Rather, because the role of momentum is so deeply integral to the process of corporate transformation, it has not proven valuable for authors to separate the issue and give it independent treatment.

Conceptual Frameworks

To establish a better understanding of momentum during transformation, it is worthwhile to consider a conceptual framework or two. There are at least two good schemes. One idea put forth by Katzenbach in 1996 borrows concepts of momentum from physics as worked out by Sir Isaac Newton in the seventeenth century.⁷ Another method designed by Kotter in 1995 addresses the steps through which an organization proceeds as it transforms itself.⁸




Fig. 2. A Physical Concept of Momentum during Transformation. Modified from Jon R. Katzenbach, *Real Change Leaders*, (New York: Random House, 1996) 391.

Figure 2 depicts Katzenbach's framework. It portrays the mass of an organization as the "number of people committed to working to improve results," and the velocity as the "speed at which results are realized and new initiatives ramp-up."⁹ The idea behind Katzenbach's model is

powerful because of its simplicity and clarity: to transform, an organization must create new momentum if it is to overcome old inertia. New momentum can be created in only three ways: change the mass of the organization, change its velocity, or change both. The Army's transformation plan (see Chapter 1) adopts the latter of these three options—change the mass and the velocity.

While instructive, there are inherent difficulties in applying Katzenbach's model to the Army's transformation once one realizes that Newton's concepts of momentum deal with instantaneous changes that occur when one object strikes another. The Army's transformation plan is not instantaneous, but will occur over twenty to thirty years.¹⁰ Over this long period of time how does the Army develop and sustain transformational momentum? General Shinseki will be the Army's Chief of Staff for only four years and can establish momentum, but future Chiefs of Staff may have other priorities. Similarly, the Army cannot consider budgeting trends on Capitol Hill as a constant—Congress does not guarantee that it will allocate the Army money to fund all planned aspects of its transformation. These concerns about periodic leadership changes and shifting congressional priorities were common among persons the authors interviewed.¹¹ Clearly, another framework more adept at handling the issue of time is needed.

Studies by Kotter provide one solution. In his seminal 1995 Harvard Business Review article "Why Transformation Efforts Fail," Kotter lays out a conceptual framework based on the stages through which an organization will progress during transformation.¹² His scheme is shown in Figure 3, below. Not only does Kotter's model cope with the "time" issue better than Katzenbach's, but also it is a framework familiar to Army planners who are all well-schooled and disciplined in the methods of planning military operations in successive phases. Most

importantly, Kotter's treatment presents fruitful grounds for the Army to identify and learn from the most significant and common errors organizations make as they try to transform.




Fig. 3. Phases of the Transformation Process. Adapted from John P. Kotter, "Why Transformation Efforts Fail," *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1995: 61.

Before examining detailed lessons and errors, it is important to highlight one overarching observation about momentum made by Kotter and Katzenbach. Katzenbach notes, "Momentum is lost any time people start pulling or pushing in a wrong direction, and any time they forget or lose conviction about why they are working so hard."¹³ Kotter echoes this concern, saying "that critical mistakes in any of the phases [of transformation] can have a devastating impact, slowing momentum and negating hard-won gains."¹⁴

Lesson 1: Establish a Sense of Urgency.

Kotter tells us that the first major mistake frequently made by transforming organizations is that "they fail to establish a great enough sense of urgency."¹⁵ Noted—but, how does this apply to the Army? When is the urgency rate high enough? Kotter's answers, "... when about

75% of the company's management is honestly convinced that business-as-usual is totally unacceptable. Anything less can produce very serious problems later on in the process."¹⁶ The Army's "company management" is its General Officer Corps and Senior Executive Services. As a first measure of the understanding of the transformation program, this study recommends the Army survey its company managers.

Kotter establishes a clear linkage between urgency and momentum by noting that when a CEO starts a corporation down the transformation path, the CEO must "make the status quo seem more dangerous than launching into the unknown."¹⁷ So, how is the Army establishing a sense of urgency in its transformation? The Army Chief of Staff's words are an indicator:

Our Nation is at peace. We have strategic perspective and technological potential. This window of historic opportunity will grow narrower We can transform today Or we can try to change tomorrow on the eve of the next war, when the window has closed, our perspective has narrowed, and our potential limited by the press of time and the constraints of resources.¹⁸

In addition to creating urgency, Kotter suggests that corporate leadership must be willing to undertake frank discussions about potentially unpleasant circumstances that directly affect transformational momentum.¹⁹ The Army must also do this. Some issues will be largely internal—issues of culture, structure, training, personnel management, and infrastructure. Other matters will involve the Army's relations with external organizations—the other uniformed services, private industry, the militaries of allied/friendly nations, Capitol Hill, etc. Examples of the kind of questions with which the Army leadership must grapple, but lie beyond the scope of this research, are:

- How should the Army change its own culture so that it is best aligned with the vision?
- How can the Army maintain transformational momentum despite inevitable leadership changes in the Army, Congress, and each Administration?

- How can the Army minimize uncertainties associated with Congress, especially its allocation of funds to cover transformation costs?
- How do the other uniformed services perceive the Army transformation? How might their perceptions change during the life of the transformation?
- How could the transformation affect the militaries of allied and friendly nations, many of whom view American military capabilities as increasingly outpacing their own systems and jeopardizing inter-operability?

This investigation, particularly the views obtained during interviews of people on the Army staff, indicates that the Army recognizes the importance of these types of topics and has begun to address them. For example, bi-lateral corporate-level meetings held between the Army and each of the uniformed services in 2000 and 2001—known as “Warfighter Conferences”—are helping the Army better understand how the other services see its transformation.

Of concern, however, were the comments of several people who felt that persons or organizations opposed to the transformation—the naysayers—are relatively unimportant because of the positive support the Army has from Congress. While that viewpoint may have present merit, attitudes can change tomorrow for unforeseeable reasons—many of which easily could fall outside the Army’s span of control. To avoid unwelcome surprises, the authors recommend the Army have a program to engage potentially influential persons, groups, or organizations that oppose the transformation program, especially when those groups will discuss matters in a professional and substantive manner.

Depending on the importance of a particular naysayer, the Army can decide who should engage each opposing entity. It may not need to be the Army Chief of Staff or the Secretary of the Army. Oftentimes, formal or informal contacts at much lower levels, even below the general officer or senior executive service level, are quite possible. A well-conceived, multi-level approach might offer the Army opportunities to:

- Stay tuned-in to the particular objections/interests of various groups

- Identify the types of naysayers—uninformed, misinformed, anti-change zealots, doubters, and resisters with bona fide issues
- Turn around some naysayers and develop potential partners of future strategic value

These possibilities have strong overtones of the importance of communications and communications planning, topics this research covers in greater detail later, in Lesson 3 and Lesson 4.

Lesson 2: Build and Cultivate a Guiding Coalition.

The second major error Kotter believes is made often by transforming organizations is that they fail to “create a powerful enough guiding coalition.”²⁰ He notes that such a guiding group of individuals “... may consist of only three to five people during the first year ... but in big companies [that] coalition needs to grow to the 20 to 50 range before much progress can be made in Phase 3 and beyond.”²¹

To maintain momentum, Kotter’s observations of corporate industry strongly suggest the Army would do well to include in its guiding coalition people “who are not part of senior management.”²² John Sawhill, CEO of the Nature Conservancy gets to the point:

Many companies limit real participation in strategic decision making to senior managers. Their top-level managers get the most powerful people in the company together, convince them of something, and then assume that everyone else will follow. The best companies, in contrast, make an effort to get more people involved.²³

At this writing, the Army’s guiding coalition clearly achieves Kotter’s “three to five people” prescription, with its four-star commanding generals comprising the core of the group. Membership also reaches outside the Army, as it includes several supportive Members of Congress and several influential retired general officers. This is healthy, but is it enough?

Several questions this study recommends the Army consider to judge the strength of its guiding coalition:

- How do the Army's lower-ranking general officers contribute to the plan?
- How are the Army's noncommissioned officers involved? Is the Sergeant Major of the Army directly involved in the decisions and important meetings?
- What allies from corporate industry are actively helping the Army develop the strategic aspects of its transformation?
- How is the Army leveraging the considerable expertise in academia?
- Does the core cell of planners responsible for developing the transformation plan contain people from across the depth and breadth of the Army (e.g. reserve components, civilian service, noncommissioned officer corps)?

Because everyone in an organization cannot be part of the strategic decision making process, it is at least important for people to feel they have a voice in the plan. Ford Motor Company handled this in an innovative way during its transformation. Jacques Nasser, Ford's CEO, implemented a series of "Let's Chat about the Business" e-mails. Every Friday, he sends an e-mail out to the more than 100,000 employees. Nasser describes these messages as a way "to share as much information—unfiltered—as broadly as possible ... and to encourage dialogue at all levels."²⁴ He places tremendous value in the process, claiming: "People take me on. They ask questions. They make suggestions about how we can do better. They push my thinking."²⁵ The Army should consider this type of program or something akin to it.

Lesson 3: Tell the Transformation Story in Five Minutes or Less.

The third significant error highlighted by Kotter is that corporations often do not "develop a picture of the future that is easy to communicate and appeals to customers, stockholders, and employees."²⁶ So just who are the Army's customers, stockholders, and employees? They are the American people, Congress, and the civilians and military members of the Army's active and reserve components.

Ford's Jacques Nasser elaborates further on the importance of being able to tell your story in a simple manner. He describes his company's vision as the picture of tomorrow that inspires other people to action. It "turns leaders into teachers, and their students into leaders, and so on."²⁷ Nasser also emphasizes that it is not just about "how-to ... it's [about] why as well."²⁸

A simple story also has another important ability that impacts the human dimension of major change efforts—it can allay the fears and anxieties of people. The "who moved my cheese" effect must be overcome to establish and maintain momentum.²⁹ Senge et al remind us that people who do not understand the reasons for transformation and do not believe the message can negatively impact momentum. Human nature will cause some people to be defensive, to resist change. They will ask themselves questions "... held so deeply that they may not come to the surface easily: Am I safe? Am I adequate? Can I trust myself? Can I trust others?"³⁰ These questions describe people who resist change because they are afraid of it. But the Army has many very experienced people, especially in its civilian service ranks, who have seen lots of "Army ideas" come and go. They are far more likely to be skeptical rather than afraid, asking intellectual questions like: Why should I follow this plan? What ever happened to the last plan we had? Why do we need to fix things when I have not been convinced about what is broken? Such people would not be, by definition, naysayers; rather, they just need to be convinced that the latest effort is the best way to go. That is done by involving them in the process, not by isolating them.

Kotter provides a simple test the Army can use to assess whether its vision has the potential to develop transformational momentum. An effective vision, he says, "results in a direction for the future that is desirable, feasible, focused, flexible, and is conveyable in five minutes or less."³¹ His last point—conveyable in five minutes or less—is the critical element.

Kotter asks, does the vision get “a reaction of both understanding and interest” from the people that hear it?³²

Does the Army’s transformation message meet Kotter’s criteria? A recent survey by the Army Research Institute (ARI) of colonels and lieutenant colonels provides insight. When queried as to their level of comfort with the Army transformation, one-half (50%) of the respondents said they were either “uncomfortable” or “very uncomfortable.”³³ These data offer an indication that communications about the transformation with the Army-at-large need work.

To complement the ARI study and further gauge the simplicity and degree of understanding of the Army’s transformation message throughout the Army, the authors recommend the Army conduct an Army-wide survey as soon as practicable. At a minimum, the study should be designed to identify:

- What is understood or not understood.
- At what levels in the Army (e.g. junior officers, field grade officers, middle-grade noncommissioned offers, etc.) is the understanding strongest and weakest.
- At what geographic locations is the understanding best or worst.

Simplicity of the message is, therefore, crucial. However, knowing that the Army’s transformation plan could span twenty to thirty years, there is one other important factor to consider—the consistency of the message over time. Katzenbach provides sage advice when offering, “It is important to avoid confusion as new initiatives and buzzwords come along, by showing their link to your original themes or principles.”³⁴

Lesson 4: Relate the Transformation to Me.

A fourth error Kotter raises is: “Under-communicating the vision by a factor of ten.”³⁵ It is an error closely related to the error covered in Lesson 3. Kotter explains under-communicating the message as meaning:

Mangers under-communicate, and often not by a small amount. Or they inadvertently send inconsistent messages. In either case, the net result is the same: a stalled transformation.³⁶

He stresses that communiqués, meetings, newsletters, and speeches are grossly insufficient. “The net result is that cynicism among the troops goes up, while belief in the [transformation] goes down.”³⁷ If the vast majority of the Army’s people don’t get it, then the vision has either not been communicated and explained enough, is too impersonal, or is too complex for people to understand. While survey results can help the Army measure how well people grasp the transformation message, the key is not whether the Army conducts a survey, but rather how the Army address the communications gaps it discovers.

To overcome the inertia of “why fix what’s not broken” and establish transformational momentum, the Army’s vision must inspire people to want to be part of the future Army because they see how life in it will be better. This will be a difficult task, as people looking for “how this affects me” are likely to have difficulty relating to a vision that looks twenty to thirty years ahead. Therefore, the process of realizing the vision must be broken up into tangible pieces and sold throughout the Army—pieces with a common theme to which everyone can relate in some way. Effective communications is the answer. The Army’s transformation plan already provides these pieces in the form of short-range goals and objectives (see Lesson 6). And, the Army’s vision also provides the linking theme:

We will develop the capability to put combat force anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff—in brigade combat teams for both stability and support operations and for warfighting. We will build that capability into a momentum that generates a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.³⁸

The task of effectively communicating the transformation message to people cannot rest solely with the Army Chief of Staff. It also is the responsibility of leaders at many levels. It is

both a short-term and long-term task requiring both serious analysis and creativity. Senge et al warn, "blindness to the issues ... is often the Achilles heel of otherwise brilliant ..." change initiatives.³⁹

So what should the Army do? As a starting point, the Army should take stock in the premise that leaders are the key to spreading the word about transformation. Chain-teach briefings, scripted Power Point presentations, pamphlets, and TV commercials have their place in a strategic plan of communications, but paramount is the employee-supervisor personal interaction. For leaders to effectively pass the word, they have to be educated about the transformation. One way to teach people how to talk about transformation is to get substantive information into the schools at multiple levels in the Army, wherever civilians, officers and noncommissioned officers in the lower and middle grades are concentrated.⁴⁰ The teaching method has to be interactive so that students can, as Jacques Nasser of Ford recommends, "ask questions ... [and] ... make suggestions about how we can do better."⁴¹ By raising the volume of communications in this manner, the Army will plant seeds of understanding in the short-term that promise to yield fertile crops of willing followers later.

Lesson 5: Remove Obstacles to Progress.

According to Kotter, "in the first half of a transformation, no organization has the momentum, power, or time to get rid of all obstacles. But the big ones must be confronted and removed."⁴² Katzenbach adds that tearing down barriers to change often requires "bold courageous action ... [not] ... for the faint of heart."⁴³ If corporate industry sees obstacle removal as crucial to creating and sustaining the momentum of transformation, what has it learned that can be of value to the Army? What are the most likely sources of obstacles the

Army will face as it attempts to empower its people? Figure 4 below highlights four areas Kotter believes are of greatest concern during corporate transformation.




Fig 4. Barriers to Empowerment. Modified from John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996) 102.

Like corporate industry, the Army needs to identify supervisors that do not support the plan. In corporate industry, people in supervisory positions that do not see the light of day eventually are told to find another job. In the Army, the process is not so cut-and-dry, nor should it be. The reasons why someone does not support the transformation need to be vetted in a deliberate manner. Perhaps, as was pointed out under Lesson 1, the problem is a simple misunderstanding, fear of the unknown, or well-founded skepticism. Regardless, it is again the importance of interpersonal communications between a leader and his subordinate leaders that rises to the top.

Structural obstacles are also a likely source of resistance to change. The highly-structured, even rigid mechanisms for decision-making and resource allocation within the Army and in outside organizations like Congress, the Department of Defense (DoD), the other

uniformed services, and the warfighting Commanders in Chief (CINC) all have an ability to positively or negatively influence transformational momentum. As the Army works to gain and retain the support of these actors, miscues along the transformation path can create obstacles that impact momentum by undermining confidence. We will further address the role of external and internal influential actors in Chapter 4.

Lesson 6: Create Short-term Wins.

Kotter is clear on the value of short-term wins to the momentum of a corporate transformation effort. He notes that, “real transformation takes time, and ... risks losing momentum if there are no short-term goals to meet and celebrate. Without [them], too many people give up or actively join ... those people who have been resisting change.”⁴⁴ In the framework of Katzenbach’s view of momentum, corporate leaders leverage short-term wins to “increase mass and velocity over time.”⁴⁵

If Kotter is unambiguous on the value of short-term wins, he is equally lucid in observing that they don’t just happen. “Creating short-term wins is different from hoping for [them].”⁴⁶ He continues, “they aren’t merely possibilities. The point is to make sure that visible results lend sufficient credibility to the transformation effort.”⁴⁷

So what is a good short-term win? What does one look like? Kotter explains that it has three primary characteristics:

- It’s visible; large numbers of people can see for themselves whether the result is real or just hype.
- It’s unambiguous; there can be little argument over the call.
- It’s clearly related to the [transformation] effort.⁴⁸

Table 2 highlights a few of the short-term objectives the Army has engineered into its transformation plan. Each objective has its own intended purpose and target audiences, each

designed to enhance the momentum of the transformation. It is interesting to note how the target audience for each objective varies. In particular, “big dollar, high-visibility” objectives such as the selection of the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) in the summer of 2000 and the “initial operational capability” of the first two Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) in the summer of 2002 are aimed squarely at Congress—the bill payer.

Table 2. Selected Short Term Wins in the Army Transformation

Short-Term Win	Purpose	Target Audience	Observations
Summer 2000: Army selects its Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) after a 7-month period of competition in private industry to build the IAV	Generate initial interest in and momentum for the transformation; stimulate competition in industry; ensure industry understands what the Army is looking for in its IAV.	Private Defense Industry; Congress; Acquisition Program Managers in DoD and the Army	Met intended purpose; many companies—US and foreign—demonstrated their latest technologies in late 1999 at a “capabilities demonstration.” Choice of IAV proves the Army truly intends to be a lighter force.
Summer 2000: Army unveils the Black Beret and “Army of One” advertisement campaign	Symbolize the Army’s excellence as soldiers, unity as a force, and values as an institution ⁴⁹	Army rank and file	Announcement of the black beret had a mixed reception, as some outside groups rejected it; beret was negatively criticized by some Members of Congress and in the media; a major distraction for the Army.
Spring 2003: First Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) attain initial operational capability	Provides America with a lighter, more deployable and versatile ground combat capability; generate momentum for more change; ensure Army’s plan to transform other military formations remains on track; sustain sense of urgency that changes are necessary.	Congress; warfighting CINCs	Full contribution to momentum will not be realized until an IBCT demonstrates its capabilities in a real-world operational setting. After creating the first two IBCTs, the Army intends to convert 1 brigade per year until as many as 8 brigades exist in IBCT configuration.
2005: First IBCT achieves goal of deploying in 96-hours	Provides America with a rapidly deployable and robust force able to meet a wide range of threats worldwide.	Warfighting CINCs; Congress	Dependent on the ability of the Air Force and/or Navy to transport transformed Army units. The Army’s plan suggests it will be 2014 before the first combat division is ready to meet the “division on the ground in 120 hours” statement of the Army’s vision.
2008: Private Industry delivers first equipment meeting Future Combat System (FCS) specifications	Provides the Army with the core warfighting vehicles to fulfill its vision	Congress; Army rank and file	2008 target is aggressive and entirely dependent on advances in science and technology. Objective could easily slip 2 or more years and negatively impact momentum.

Source: Times and objectives listed under the column Short-term Wins are from the U.S. Army, online posting, 17 October 2000, “Transformation Timeline: Brigade Conversion to Objective Force,” 11 March 2001, <[http://www.army.mil/usa/AUSA Web/Short Transformation_files/frame.htm](http://www.army.mil/usa/AUSA%20Web/Short%20Transformation_files/frame.htm)>.

In view of their visibility and impact on the Army’s credibility, successfully achieving the objectives in Table 2 objectives is important. Unexpected events that negatively impact any

short-term objective can damage transformational momentum. For example, in November 2000 the Army announced that General Motor's General Dynamics Land Systems Defense Group had been selected as the prime contractor to build the Army's Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV).⁵⁰ The Army appeared to have achieved a short-term win. However, within days, the plan hit a snag when United Defense filed a formal protest with the General Accounting Office (GAO) to the \$4-billion contract.⁵¹ "The Army did what is required under the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984: It suspended the contract, pending a review by the GAO."⁵²

Much more visible was the Army's decision in November 2000 to issue black berets to all soldiers, a plan which caused a ruckus among some groups of former Rangers who rose up in protest against the Army's choice.⁵³ Although the contract to produce the black beret amounts to only \$23-million—small compared to the \$4-billion for the IAV contract—the Army's decision had struck a sour chord. Some former Rangers were very vocal that the Army would issue the black beret to soldiers they felt had not earned them. Stories about the black beret filled the national newspapers and television media in November and December. Media fervor continued into early March 2001 when some disgruntled Rangers organized a protest march to Washington seeking to overturn the decision. Although the Army Chief of Staff approved the Rangers' request to adopt a tan-colored beret in late March 2001, the negative (even cynical) media coverage had distracted attention from progressive aspects of the ongoing Army transformation.

Together, the black beret incident and the IAV contract did not help momentum, as the disputes brought unwelcome attention to the Army and its transformation process. Short-term wins gone awry, regardless of the reason, allow the naysayers to fan the embers of negativism.

Lesson 7: Be proud of Short-term Wins, but Don't Declare Victory Too Soon.

The Army's plan for transformation is envisioned to take twenty to thirty years and many short-term wins will be built into the plan. Some of these milestones, such as those shown in Table 2, have already occurred or are works in progress. Others, such as selection and production of the Future Combat System (FCS), are either "marks on the wall" or have not yet even hit the drawing board. The nature and timing of which objectives can be cast in the role of short-term wins is not always foreseeable. Undoubtedly, some of tomorrow's objectives will depend on circumstances beyond the Army's control, like breakthroughs in science and technology. Other achievements may depend on lessons the Army learns from the formation and employment of its initial and interim force units.

Because major change efforts in big organizations do take many years, Kotter and other experts strongly caution against declaring total victory after producing a few short-term wins:

Many forces can stall the process far short of the finish line: turnover of key change agents, sheer exhaustion on the part of leaders, bad luck. Short-term wins are essential to keep momentum going, but the celebration of those wins can be lethal if urgency is lost.⁵⁴

The authors do not believe the Army's current senior leadership would make this error. However, particularly visible milestones—such as 2003's planned initial operational capability of the first Interim Brigade Combat Team—could present tempting opportunities. Kotter urges organizations to be careful, noting that wins may present openings for naysayers to deal a negative blow to momentum with words like: "The sacrifices were significant, but we did accomplish something. Now let's all take a deserved breather."⁵⁵ His point is that even if people know there is much more work to be done to transform the organization, the naysayers will often try to convince people that "a little rest and stability won't hurt."⁵⁶ Transformational momentum and leadership credibility become the victims.

This study recommends the Army take note of Kotter's advice and carefully plan how and when it celebrates its short-term wins. In the aftermath of any celebration, the long-term theme—a more responsive and capable Army—must be the walk-away message.

Lesson 8: Anchor Changes in the Army's Culture.

Tushman and O'Reilly write that "... cultural inertia [is a] powerful determinant of short-term success, yet [it] can hold the organization hostage to its past."⁵⁷ Senge et al are even more cautionary, writing, "the fundamental flaw in most innovators' strategies is that they focus on their innovation, on what they are trying to do—rather on understanding how the larger culture ... will react to their efforts."⁵⁸

There are several significant questions this study recommends the Army give consideration:

- What changes in the Army's culture, if any, are essential to the transformation? Alternatively, what aspects of the Army's culture are not compatible with the transformation?
- If changes are needed, can the Army identify them now?
- What would indicate to the Army that particular changes in culture are necessary?
- When and how should cultural changes be initiated?

While detailed answers to these issues are not pursued in this research, we do offer a few initial thoughts. First, does the Army's culture need to change? Yes, some of it does have to change. For instance, there is probably no place in the transformed Army for today's cultural distinction between "Light and Heavy" forces. On the other hand, some aspects of the present culture—the importance of history and respect for the individual—are unlikely to change as they are core values of the Army and American psyche.

Next, can required changes be identified now? The authors believe some changes will be easier to uncover than others, like the aforementioned light/heavy issue. Others issues need to be

mined, and still more will arise as the transformation progresses. Perhaps a cultural distinction might grow between units that have transformed and those that have not. Therefore, it is important for the Army to sensitize leaders throughout the Army to the tensions brought upon individuals and units undergoing transformation. This will help identify areas where resistance to cultural change is impeding momentum.

Last, the timing of cultural change needs to be considered. Does the Army's culture have to adjust before other aspects of the transformation can proceed? Kotter, Senge et al, and Tushman and O'Reilly strongly argue against this once prevailing belief in corporate industry.⁵⁹ Edgar Schein, a professor of management at MIT and an expert on organizational culture, provides excellent advice the Army should follow:

You cannot create a new culture. You can immerse yourself in studying a culture until you understand it. Then you can propose new values, introduce new ways of doing things, and articulate new governing ideas. Over time, these actions will set the stage for new behavior. Even then, you haven't changed the culture; you've set the stage for the culture to evolve.⁶⁰

Chapter 3: Visionary and Transformational Leadership

This chapter will focus on the internal leadership challenges and relationships associated with developing/integrating the transformational vision, coalition/team building, shaping the force, and creating a passion for change. Organizations and institutions lose transformational momentum too often because they lack a coherent vision and subsequently miss the first step in providing direction for their changing organization. Senior leaders must get the vision right in order to first, steer the organization in the shared strategic direction, and second, to build coalitions that move systematically toward future common goals so that at each level senior leaders understand their obligations.

The senior Army leadership has introduced a clear and focused vision that permeates the senior ranks. More importantly, key leaders (Colonel and above), civilians, active and reserve components, embrace the concept of Army Transformation. Consistent with other large private sector companies, if there is angst among the ranks, it is due to a lack of information or inclusion.

The idea of change is nothing new for our Army senior leaders and has become the “flavor of the day” in private industry. Because of the dynamic security challenges confronting our nation, it has become more apparent to the Army that we must go beyond the simplistic idea of gradual change and totally transform. The idea of Army transformation did not begin with this current Army senior leadership. Early stages of transformation were introduced immediately after the cold war and to a greater degree, after the Gulf War. Although some front-end transformational dialogue/work was set into motion by previous Army leaders approximately ten years ago, stagnation and other competing demands vied for time and energy which resulted in a

loss of momentum. What exists now is a transformation plan that is moving at a much faster pace in an effort to quickly support the full spectrum of possible threats.

Chief Executive Officers, Boards of Directors, and Vice Presidents in corporate America are facing competition and environmental changes which challenge their status quo. Similarly, this Army's senior leadership has recognized the world's changing environment and has embarked on what some call the second-order of change⁶¹ or what we are calling Army Transformation. Similar to the Army's development of branches and sequels as part of an operations plan, high performing organizations also prepare themselves for the "next hill."

Grasping the true scope of the battle is as important as fighting it . . . it is the responsibility of each leader to keep his or her troops moving forward, to overcome the natural human desire to declare victory and rest on the day's laurels. Great leaders see beyond individual battles . . . Robert E. Lee saved Richmond in 1862 by seeing beyond individual defeats and pushing for the larger strategic goal, the figurative next hill. The outcome of the greatest battle ever fought in America, Gettysburg, was determined in large measure on its first day, when a Confederate General failed to exploit his victory and pressed on to secure the next hill in front of him. The ultimate victory belongs to the leader who is able to continually reassess the scope of the conflict and keep pushing on to the next hill.⁶²

Because of the dynamic security challenges, increased threats from asymmetric attacks, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and terrorism; the Army and its leaders must move forward and prepare for the "next hill."

In preparing for the "next hill," organizational leaders and members must understand the stages associated with change and how this applies to the transformation efforts. Organizational transformation involves a paradigmatic change which challenges leaders to undergo what David Nicoll calls the paradigmatic stages (Table 3): (1) Fertilization, (2) Crisis, (3) Incubation, (4) Diffusion, (5) The Struggle for Legitimacy, (6) The Politics of Acceptance, and (7)

Legitimization.⁶³ In Table 3, right column, the Army's transformation was applied to Nicoll's model and as indicated, there are significant applications of this model for the Army.

Table 3. Paradigmatic Change Model Applied to Army Transformation.

Fertilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invasion occurs with new ideas • New technology, new modes • Creativity, relaxed thinking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Army 2020 • Army 2010 • New Mission/Paradigm
Crisis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paradigm shift needs a catalyst to begin – usually a crisis • Disruptive event threatens the system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Strategic Situation • Global Spectrum Challenge
Incubation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disruption does not immediately overturn an organizations established paradigm • Substantial time lag occurs between perception of a crisis and reorganization • Higher level paradigm changes need support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Chiefs' Elements • Congressional Initiatives • DoD Strategy • Joint Staff/Army and Reorganization
Diffusion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Widespread acceptance • Ideas move from periphery to center • Scattered ideas become familiar palpable and coherent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Congressional Staff/Army • Congressional Committees • Joint Staff/Army
The Struggle for Legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purpose or policy, explain events, attract funding, paradigmatic ideas compete with older ways of seeing things • Conflict and resistance emerge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Congressional Support • Congressional Staff/Army • Joint Staff/Army
The Politics of Acceptance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paradigm shift involves political struggle, the establishment of parties, the management of open complex, and networking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Congressional Staff/Army • Congressional Staff/Army • Joint Staff/Army
Legitimation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Must become habitual and implicit in the thought processes and work routines of managers and workers • Ideas must be used consistently before they are perceived as producing desired results 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JBC/Process/Structure • JBC/Deployment/Structure • JBC/Deployment/Structure • JBC/Deployment/Structure

Source: Adapted from Levy, Amir and Uri Merry. Organizational Transformation: Approaches, Strategies, Theories. (New York: Praeger, 1986) 16-7.

GETTING THE VISION RIGHT

There are three key components of a powerful vision that must be included and will greatly assist with transformational momentum. First, the vision must maintain and preserve the core values, second, it must be shared, and third, is what James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras call “vivid description” or “painting a picture with your words.”⁶⁴ We must anchor our vision with our core values and further design it to include vivid, inspiring, shared, and meaningful context. And if done right, is easily understood at every level with a common envisioned picture that is imprinted in everyone's mind about our future and the road that will get us there. Stephen Covey, A. Roger and Rebecca Merrill assert that: “Vision is the best manifestation of creative imagination and the primary motivation of human action. It's the ability to see beyond our

present reality, to create, to invent what does not yet exist, to become what we not yet are. It gives us capacity to live out of our imagination instead of our memory.”⁶⁵

In the book Hope is Not a Method, General (Retired) Gordon Sullivan and Michael Harper indicate that the Army leadership must understand that yesterday, today, and tomorrow are part of a continuum and they must operate today with a focus on the vision of tomorrow. Likewise, they postulate that you must not just ask about what the next organization will look like, but rather what the organization after next will look like.⁶⁶ One of Covey's seven habits is “begin with the end in mind;” in essence, he suggests that we must have the picture painted in our mind before we begin. He further states, “To begin with the end in mind means to start with a clear understanding of your destination. It means to know where you're going so that you better understand where you are now and so that the steps you take are always in the right direction.”⁶⁷

The leader must structure the roadmap, first by developing a good plan. The leader must then select objectives that will help build momentum, sustain the initiative, and demonstrate the strength of the transformation campaign to all its constituents. Once the leader is able to paint this envisioned future and articulate it at each level, then and only then will they have achieved the first step, a powerful vision! In the Book of Proverbs, one of the basic leadership tenets is “where there is no vision, the people perish.”

THE CHANGE AGENT

The adage, “the only thing constant is change,” applies to numerous organizations of the past that were comfortable with the incremental and gradual changes that were easily digestible. Obviously there is some truth to the old adage, but in today's dynamic changing environment, the real challenge is how to develop, manage, lead, synchronize, align, develop, and incorporate

this change or transformation. Tom Wheeler discusses in Leadership Lessons From the Civil War, the idea of embracing change.

Today's leaders confront change at a faster pace than their Civil War counterparts, making it necessary to be even more receptive to change and agile in response. Continuing to fight the next battle the same way, as the last one is as much an invitation to defeat in the executive suite as it is in war. Leaders who failed to recognize and embrace innovation lose their battles as surely as those who adapt overwhelm their competition.⁶⁸

The idea of transforming often deals with the condition in which an organization cannot continue to function as it has in the past. Therefore, in order for the Army to continue to meet the emerging threats, it must embark on rebuilding and reinvigorating its Army team.

If leaders of today are not prepared to address the voluminous issues associated with transformation and the rapidity that goes with it, then they will be doing their organization a disservice and find the institution woefully inadequate to compete or counter environmental threats. What is needed at the top is a transformational leader who identifies himself/herself as the "change agent" or better-put, the "transforming leader." This transforming leader must train and build a coalition of leaders who will become the transforming agents at the lower levels. Covey indicates that without a clear picture of what kind of transformation is needed, executives and their managers will tend to operate on social and political agendas and timetables. He further asserts that the goal of the transformational leader is, "... to transform people and organizations in literal sense – to change them in mind and heart; enlarge vision, insight, and understanding; clarity and purpose; make behavior congruent with beliefs, principles, or values; and bring about changes that are permanent, self-perpetuating, and momentum building."⁶⁹

Maintaining momentum is a crucial part of transformation. Therefore, it is imperative that the leader at the top inserts transforming leaders/change agents at the middle management levels who have balanced capabilities/talents with an emphasis on team building and

interpersonal skills. Moreover, these selected mid-level leaders must have the commitment, stability, and continuity to carry the transformation momentum well past the senior leader or CEO's tenure.

The importance of human relation and dimension aspects of transformation cannot be overlooked or underestimated by the senior leader. Emotions run extremely high during uncertain times and the Army's transformational efforts will cause anxiety among its members. Members of the organization want to know with some sense of predictability, what the Army will look like and how they will fit into the envisioned/transformed Army. Analogous to the stock market, people who invest in the institution want to see a substantial return, while simultaneously reaping the benefits and dividends. These returns, benefits, and dividends cover many issues from soldier/family security, to improved training, to the reliability and lethality of state-of-the-art weaponry/equipment. Therefore, the way the leader communicates change, is an essential element to building organizational confidence in the transformation process.

Having confidence means people trust their senior leaders. If communications efforts are left unchecked, some people will gravitate toward other sources of information they perceive as being more meaningful. Other people will slip into the ranks of the disbelievers and cite past failures to reinforce their displeasures and disagreements with change. Therefore, leaders must actively communicate up and down the chain of command and utilize various platforms to publicize the vision, future, and how the institution will take care of its people. Most people want to know how they will fit in the transformed Army, and therefore, the leader must connect and build on relationships to effectively guide constituents and organizational members. One of the Army's senior defense contractors put it like this, "once you have the idea right, it is then time to attract the right people and possibly develop your crusade. Some say crusades are fun

and therefore, could be the impetus to retain and recruit the right people to remain or join the transforming Army.”⁷⁰

Organizational leadership courses and scholars of psychology often relate behavioral patterns of dying patients to people in transforming organizations. Individuals confronted with death go through stages that include shock, denial, anger, accommodation, depression, and finally a quiet acceptance of the reality that death will come.⁷¹ This is not to suggest that change or transformation is death-like, but the reality is many members will be unable to “let it go” and accept the legacy force passing. Taking on organizational transformation is no easy task and it is certainly not smooth. Leaders must understand this significant human dimension associated with change and be prepared to address the anguish among its members.

BUILDING THE TEAM

A significant danger in coalition building is falling into the trap of surrounding the senior leader with “yes men.” Doing so could inhibit the team’s ability to think freely and venture “outside of the box,” as well as stifling legitimate input from key players who might otherwise counter or challenge strategies. Therefore, it is fundamentally important that senior leaders affecting transformation have the ability to operate with different leadership styles. This research suggests that both transactional and transformational approaches to leading the organization through the transformational process are necessary. The Army defines the transactional style as motivating subordinates to work by offering rewards; outlining the conditions of task completion, the applicable rules and regulations, the benefits of success, and the consequences.⁷² Whereas the transformational leadership style focuses on challenging subordinates to rise above their immediate needs and self-interest - - this style is most effective

during periods that call for change or present new opportunities. Also, it works well when organizations face crisis instability, mediocrity, or disenchantment.⁷³

However, Daniel Goleman, the author of "Emotional Intelligence" suggests there are six leadership styles (both transactional and transformational) and successful leaders who can master them, have the very best climate and performance.⁷⁴

Table 3. The Six Leadership Styles.

	Coercive		Affiliative	Democratic	Pacesetting	Coaching
The leaders modus operandi	Demand immediate compliance	Mobilizes people toward the vision	Creates harmony and build emotional bonds	Forges consensus through participation	Sets high standards for performance	Develops people for the future
The style in a phrase	"Do what I tell you."	"Come with me."	"People come first."	"What do you think?"	"Do as I do, now."	"Try this."
Underlying emotional intelligence competencies	Drive to achieve, initiative, self-control	Self-confidence, empathy, change catalyst	Empathy, building relationships, communication	Collaboration, team leadership, communication	Conscientiousness, drive to achieve, initiative	Developing others, empathy, self awareness
When the style works best	In a crisis, to kick start a turnaround, or with problem employees	When changes require a new vision, or when a clear direction is needed	To heal rifts in a team, work to motivate people during stressful circumstances	To build buy-in or consensus, or to get input from valuable employees	To get quick results from a highly motivated and competent team	To help an employee improve performance or develop long-term strengths
Overall impact on climate	Negative	Most strongly positive	Positive	Positive	Negative	Positive

Source: Goleman, Daniel. "Leadership That Gets Results," Harvard Business Review. March-April 2000: 82-3.

In the chart above, four of the six styles have positive effects on the climate and two are negative. This does not mean a leader's use of the coercive or pacesetting style is ill advised, as in some cases they are effective. Rather, it suggests that four of the six styles usually produce positive results. During a transformation effort, the most significant style that is needed is an authoritative style. An authoritative leader is a visionary. He/she motivates people by clarifying how their work fits into a larger vision for the organization. Furthermore, an authoritative leader charts a new course and sells his people on a fresh long-term vision.⁷⁵

In Leading Change, Kotter argues that about 70 to 90 percent of organizational change is leadership and the other 10 to 30 percent is management. This might suggest that Army senior leaders and commanders will get the "transformation process" right. Therefore, one can surmise that the Army's leadership has the 70 to 90 percent solution to transformation. Right? Not totally – by the virtue of their training and experience, most successful unit leaders could handle the routine changes of day-to-day activities; it is something totally different dealing with transformation and the momentum associated with it. From a theoretical perspective, Levy and Merry suggest that, "... the main components of the transformation are neither forms nor structures; rather, they are abstract, fluid, and dynamic elements that are hard to define and deal with. These elements are the organization unconsciousness, energy, spirit, spirituality, mission, purpose, vision, belief systems, world view, myths, symbols, paradigm, and a state of being."⁷⁶

Too often organizations become complacent with gradual changes such as new equipment fielding, policies revisions, and training devices. Because the Army faces and must respond to a wide range of threats, transformation will challenge our leaders at the macro and micro levels; especially with the integration of revised leader training, doctrine, tactics, and state-of-the-art technologies. Too many short-term wins and quick solutions could give the leadership a false sense of success and hamper the sustainability and momentum of transformation.

The amount of time required for completing a transformation depends on a number of factors. One of the more significant factors is size; specifically, the larger organizations will take a greater amount of time. Therefore, people who have adopted a short-term, firefighting mentality and who want immediate results may find this unacceptable.⁷⁷ From an empirical perspective, it could take up to 20 years to complete a transformation process. As indicated by Eric G. Flamholz and Yvonne Randle in Changing the Game,

The longer the period an organization has experienced success, the more likely it is to be vulnerable to future difficulties. And further, after an extended period of success, which can be measured in years or even decades, there is a definite tendency for the expectation of continued success. As a result, there is also a tendency to avoid or ignore the warning signs that the organization is in need of making a transformation.⁷⁸

Transformation is multi-dimensional, multi-level, multi-component, political, and remarkably different than simple change. The visionary leader sees through this fog of success. He sees that change is necessary when most others would say otherwise.

Before the Army's senior leaders can empower the force they must first ensure the vision is understood and the strategy to get to the Objective Force is communicated laterally, up, and down the chain. For the most part, general officers are well informed about the Army Transformation and its strategies. However, as we interviewed people of lower rank, it was less known. Supporting this fact is the recent survey conducted by the U.S. Army Research Office which found that one-half of the Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel's responding to the surveys were uncomfortable with the forthcoming necessary changes as the Army moves to the Objective Force. Moreover, three-fifths want additional information on the Army transformation efforts and only one-half rated the efforts to communicate to the officer corps as good with three-percent indicating an excellent rating.⁷⁹ Therefore, the implied task for senior leaders is to determine the best method to communicate with the field.

The challenge is always how to communicate the leader's intent several levels down with consistency and accuracy. A critical aspect of organizational transformation is not only a competent leader at the top, but it extends to the other key senior leaders within the organization. Not only should the senior leader develop key staff groups to carry the message, but must also develop forums that will facilitate clear guidance on transformation execution. Additionally, the

senior leaders must invest in proper debriefing and presentation techniques for subordinate leaders to ensure the message is right, synchronized, and more importantly, have a synergistic effect on the operational force. By debriefing and presentation, we mean that leaders who mentor, coach, and teach must get the transformation message right and not rely on chain-teaching methods or outside agencies to carry the message. Therefore, it is critical that the senior leader ensures that the existing chain of command is used as much as possible. First, to reinforce to the organizational leadership that the institutional bureaucracy is functional and trusted; and second, to ensure that the subordinate and supporting agencies have a voice so the checks and balances are included in the transformation processes.

These mid-level leaders and commanders have a profound effect on the transformational efforts and they must be "tucked in" early to ensure their voices are heard. The senior leader must recognize the power of team building. By doing so, the institution continues to learn and grow; it also opens the lines of communications so the feedback mechanism is constant and continual. This team building approach exists at several levels, higher and mid-level staffs and the operational forces. It is incumbent upon the senior leader, to reach out at every opportunity to articulate to the operational force the vision for the future and how they fit into the transformed Army. Moreover, he must build and gain support by recognizing resistance to the transformation and making efforts to break down barriers that are slowing momentum. Creating the proper balance between today and tomorrow's missions is a challenge for all leaders at every level. The success of the transformation campaign could very well hinge on the leaders ability to aggressively promote information sharing. A leader fosters this communication by using conferences, speeches, newsletters, and posters, computer bulletin boards – the entire communications spectrum – to create an awareness of the transformation and to nurture faith in

the leadership.⁸⁰ As indicated above, the leader at the top establishes the vision so that mid-level organizational leaders and teams can align their strategies to ensure focused direction. If an organization is to “pull on the rope together,” they must be inspired to change, properly aligned, synchronized, given a clear direction/roadmap, and resourced for current operations and the envisioned future.

TRANSFORMATION FERVOR

The responsibility of being the change agent or transformation agent cannot rest solely on the shoulders of the senior leader. Although he must bear the brunt of this task, he must also build a leadership team that will assist with the daunting transformation efforts. It is every leader's responsibility, both military and civilian, to understand the Army's vision, transformation, and the strategy on how we will get to the objective force. The senior leader should commit to a daily regimen that includes a transformational task(s) he will personally accomplish each day. Covey states that leaders should always “begin with an end in mind.” He uses the analogy of home construction “blueprints” and the carpenter's rule, “measure twice, cut once.” Just as blueprints are definitive guides to actual construction, the transformation plan must be the blueprint for tomorrow's Army. The leader must further ensure that the institution has the resources and the strategic building plans to move it beyond just the shell. Just like the construction site, each day the leader must go to the “transformation closet” and pull out the “blueprints” to determine the transformation task of the day.⁸¹ He must lead the transformation momentum efforts every day and ensure something positive is accomplished so as not to become stagnant. Yet, to succeed at this unwieldy task, the CEO's and the senior leaders must have a full time staff and leaders at various levels whose duties are transformation initiatives. Companies that have successfully transformed relied heavily on their strategic planning offices

to assist the leader and in some cases, spearhead the training efforts to energize change agents within the organizations. General Electric, Ford, and General Dynamics are a few companies that rely on their strategic planning offices to guide the organizational changes.

The Army staff group must be properly resourced with committed personnel who have the appropriate power to energize various agencies. This group must further drive the transformational momentum by engaging both internal and external players. For the higher-level staff and field senior leaders' part, they must embrace transformation, remain synchronized, and mentor their subordinate team so they become part of the "Army Transformation" process.

Paul O'Neill who was the Deputy Director for Office for Management and Budget (OMB) in 1974, President of International Paper in 1985, CEO of Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) in 1986, and recently selected as Secretary of Treasury, introduced profound changes in each of these organizations. However, the most significant change was at ALCOA where he had a united board behind him that gave him a strong advantage; in other words, he did not have to win approval from anyone above him before trying to change the corporate culture. But his real challenge was the 63,000 people below, "I could order people to do [something] – you can cause our organization to dance a lot, with a command and control mentality . . . but I don't think you can really create an institution with the right kind of value-structure, life-of-its-own that will outlive the dictator. You get a mechanical response if you haven't won their minds, and even better than that, if you haven't won their passion."⁸² Having a passion to transform is significant.

As one of our most senior Army leaders said, "the senior leader has just so much energy," and therefore, must divide his time between current operations and future operations.⁸³ This

balancing act requires trust and the empowerment of subordinate leaders to also strike the same balanced approach and not tip the scales one way or the other.

THE LEADER'S OBLIGATION TO SUSTAIN MOMENTUM

Sustaining momentum in a broad-based change effort is a tough job that gets tougher as the effort continues and to address this challenge real change leaders must: (1) Build a diverse tool kit and develop a variety of approaches--to increase their options for addressing different performance challenges; (2) Rebalance the mix as they go--to exploit different combinations, as well as new ideas and approaches to both deliver results and rejuvenate the effort; and, (3) Increase the mass and velocity over time--to obtain better and better performance results.⁸⁴

To keep the transformation moving in the right direction, the senior leader must remain focused on ways to generate and sustain momentum efforts. Katzenbach indicates that major change efforts are seldom self-sustaining, even when they get off to a good start.⁸⁵ During interviews, some senior Army leaders believe the Army can achieve transformational momentum if it has the "funds/resources" and viable "teamwork." On the other hand, others senior leaders felt sufficient momentum has already been achieved because funds have been earmarked for the transformation program. However, experts in the area of change warn against this false sense of short-term wins as a measure of momentum achievement. Momentum is not achieved until the leader can honestly assess the transformation process as being in an irreversible state.

Remaining focused, revisiting the transformational "blueprints," acting on "show stoppers" in a timely manner, and engaging key influential actors are essential to building momentum. In essence, it is vitally important that the leader engages a wide range of interested parties and integrates supporting/purposeful ideas.

The leader is obligated to create and develop conditions so that transformation within an organization is institutionalized. The leader must transform the vision into reality, the missions into actions, and philosophies into practice. At a deeper level, institutionalization requires shaping and revisiting a culture that fits the new system.⁸⁶ The number one priority must be transformation/change and the senior leader must rely on his senior commanders in the field to contend with the day-to-day challenges of today's current operations. We are not suggesting that the total focus is transformation, but merely suggesting that daily decision-making and prudent energies are geared toward transformation efforts. According to Charles Farkas and Suzy Wetlaufer in their article, "The Ways Chief Executive Officers Lead," they suggest that, "Executives are guided by the belief that the CEO's most critical role is to create an environment of continual reinvention, even if such an environment produces anxiety and confusion and leads to some strategic mistakes . . . furthermore, CEO's spend as much as 75% of their time using speeches, meetings, and other forms of communication to motivate members of their organization to embrace the gestalt change."⁸⁷ Regardless, it would be pure conjecture to determine the percentage of time the Army senior leaders should spend on current operations vis-à-vis transformation, however, focusing energy on transformation and momentum must be done daily.

Because the pace of the Army's transformation will increase in the short term, all agencies and senior leaders must get on board quickly or miss an opportunity to contribute and be heard. The responsibility to disseminate transformation strategies consistently must rest with the senior leader, but more importantly, he must routinely educate and reeducate subordinate senior leaders/commanders. He must consider developing guidebooks and/or playbooks to

synchronize the force on how the organization will transform to meet the challenges of today and the future.

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

Although organizations have a variety of problems associated with change, one common cause pointed out by Strebel is: many private and public sector organizational leaders and subordinates view change differently. Often times senior leaders and managers see change as an opportunity to align operations with strategy and to accept reasonable risk while maintaining profit levels or operational readiness. However, for the mid-level managers and leaders, change is not necessarily pursued nor welcomed. It is disruptive and intrusive. It upsets the balance.⁸⁸

Most people will not only be slow to change, but some will resist because they are uncomfortable with change, threatened by it, or simply do not want to be bothered. So, what is the best way for a leader to deal with those who resist? This research suggests senior leaders must be persistent and continue a dialogue with them without getting into a fray. Nancy Bekavac suggests that leaders should "show people that you value them – and that you value what brought the organization to this point."⁸⁹ Although that is a very simplistic and preferred way of addressing the resister, it may be somewhat naïve to think staunch resisters will go quietly. The senior leader must retain the offensive spirit and pick the encounters and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of engaging in the dispute. More importantly, the leader must possess the persistent passion for transformation and be driven by a strong conviction to demonstrate courage during difficult challenges. On the leader's courage and conviction, Wheeler writes:

Football coaches call it a gut check. At a crucial moment, leaders must rely on something beyond their intellect, beyond their factual analysis of the situation. That something has to come from within. Civil War generals taught us that at the heart of leadership lies conviction. The

leaders in the war had to call upon a reserve of courage. Physical courage, quite certainly, but also personal courage built upon a deep conviction . . . and it is conviction that separates leaders from pretenders.⁹⁰

This strong conviction coupled with a clear vision can build the transformation coalition into a crusade that will not falter under the toughest attacks.

There are times when you can nurse the change resisters along. There are times when you can convince them that change is inevitable. And there are times when you simply have to lay down the law: The game is changing, and they can either play within the new rules or play somewhere else.⁹¹ Albeit a little harsh, the leadership must keep in mind that the average person within the organization just wants to "keep hope alive."⁹² In other words, leaders must show people that there is something within this institution that makes it worth remaining on the team. These investors in the organization want job satisfaction and security; therefore, it is important that the leadership continues to establish an atmosphere where members' well-being and enrichment can continue to grow. More importantly, people must see themselves having a role in the transformation picture. Similar to the unfortunate experience of surviving POWs, most POWs have indicated that a compelling envisioned future, and vision of tomorrow were the driving forces that kept them sane and alive.

ACCEPTING RISKS . . . DO WE HAVE TO?

The magnitude of the Army's Transformation process makes it susceptible to numerous challenges, setbacks, and unavoidable risks such as: unavoidable changes in senior leadership, uncertainty of future funding, lack of breakthrough in science and technology, out break of war or lesser contingency, and security issues. To minimize some of these risks, the Army must continue to take full advantage of the lessons learned from our recent deployments to the Gulf War, Haiti, and the Balkans; the need for rapid deployment, mobility, and lethality to name a

few. Moreover, the Army has been ruthless in its approach to quickly transform its forces into units with a much wider range of mission capabilities beyond conventional warfare. Some say the Army does not have time or the resources to conduct business similar to the large corporations. Specifically, some corporations deliberately proceed on a path that simultaneously includes both clear and unambiguous goals; Collins and Porras puts it like this, "By trying lots of different approaches we're bound to stumble onto something that works; we just don't know ahead of time what it will be."⁹³ In Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman's book In Search of Excellence, they introduce the idea of "Do it. Fix it. Try it."⁹⁴ This approach is also espoused by Wal-Mart executives: "We live by the motto, 'Do it. Fix it. Try it.' If you try something and it works, you keep it. If it doesn't work, you fix it or try something else."⁹⁵

Efforts to avoid risk by the Army should not be construed as the organization's unwillingness to take risk. In fact, the Army continues to do a tremendous job by incorporating lessons learned and taking full advantage of after-action reviews. Therefore, to suggest that visionary private companies have it right and the Army has an aversion to risk or constrained by its bureaucracy is wrong. Rather, the Army is a strategic instrument of national policy and should not be compromised by imprudent acquisitions, policies, doctrine, training, and thinking. The difference between the for-profit visionary organizations and the Army is the former can often rebound from failed ventures, whereas the Army cannot risk any parts of national security. The Army's commitment is to safeguard the national interest and when required, to fight and win our nation's wars – it is the Army's nonnegotiable contract with the American people. Are the Army's Transformation efforts risky? Some think so and therefore, it comes under scrutiny.

As indicated above, Paul O'Neill has spent 22 years in private sector and 15 years in public sector. He contends that the frequently-postulated differences between private and public sectors

are out-of-date. Moreover, he argues, "some contend that life is easier in the private sector because it is not subject to the glare of public scrutiny suffered by the public sector, but this argument is rapidly dwindling . . . there are legions of examples of private companies and individuals in private companies now being held to a different standard by media, investigative reporters, and courts."⁹⁶ Regardless of the arguments about the differences in risk among private, public, and military, none of these organizations are risk-free when change permeates the entire organization.

A future risk the Army must take is placing their first Interim Brigade Combat Team on the training (proving) grounds of the Combat Training Center and, eventually into a real-world deployment. Senior Army leaders must be willing to accept the risk of acquisition shortfalls and numerous other problems associated with training, doctrine, and personnel. Leaders must accept these challenges as "the cost of doing business" and not be concerned about risking the health of transformational momentum. Interviews with key leaders and congressional constituents suggest that challenges to any organizational "road to transform" are numerous and unavoidable. Therefore, it is important that leaders are prepared to endure the arduous journey and remain engaged in open communications so the Army can persevere and not lose valuable momentum.

Most visionary companies set goals and develop strategic plans, but they simultaneously pursue audacious goals and objectives like aggressive R & D efforts. Jack Welch at General Electric calls this "planful opportunism,"⁹⁷ What this means is that the Army can confidently pursue bold strategic ventures while concomitantly, focusing energy on the transformation plan. Senior leaders must balance the tough commitment among the legacy, interim and objectives forces. Although this is challenging, it is not necessarily risky. But the single most important

issue, is the Army must use the lessons learned from past force transformation and ensure that some of the failures are not repeated.

Chapter Four – The Army Must Engage Influential Actors

Every organization operates and transforms in an environment that includes influential actors, both internal and external, that can significantly impact transformational momentum. The previous chapter highlights the role of the visionary leader as the catalyst for initiating transformation and gaining momentum. Regardless of the size of an organization, the vision, focus, and will to change emanate from the leader. The leadership coalition helps sell the vision, instill the urgency, and guide the transformation process. Intellectually honest discussions, thoughtful consideration of competing ideas, and open communications build credibility for both the content and process of transformation. Yet it is equally obvious that change does not occur in a sterile, laboratory setting with rigorously controlled variables. It cannot be isolated to guarantee ideal conditions with minimum friction. Change occurs within the real world while companies continue to produce and market their patented widgets. This chapter addresses some of the considerations in dealing with the “real world” and their potential impact on momentum.

The Real World: Widgets and Wall Street

It is easy to recognize that corporate industries transform themselves in a complex environment that includes boards of directors, stockholders, labor unions, competitors, and consumers. What might be overlooked is that similar circumstances apply to the military. Even though they do not roll off an assembly line, the Army has its own widgets: the military duties that soldiers perform every day. The Army must continue to execute its current missions – it is not unusual to have over 25,000 soldiers deployed in 60 or 70 locations around the world – and simultaneously remain ready to fight and win a major war. Also parallel to corporate industry is that the Army must transform itself in a complex environment with an array of influential actors not unlike the directors, stockholders, unions, competitors, and consumers. As in the civilian

sector, these actors can affect the institution's ability to gain and sustain momentum for the ongoing changes of a dramatic transformation.

The Army Transformation began and will continue under intense scrutiny from the Department of Defense, Congress, and the defense industry. Even though the involvement of these key stakeholders will be fairly constant, there will be a vast array of potentially influential actors throughout the course of the transformation. It ranges from the White House to Capitol Hill, from the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Council, from other uniformed services to defense contractors, from commanders to soldiers, and from the national media to the general public. The interest and impact of these actors is hard to judge in many cases, largely because they will change depending on time and circumstances. What can also change is whether the impact is positive, negative, or neutral with regards to transformational momentum. As discussed in chapter 2, support, skepticism, or disinterest today can change with tomorrow's headlines.

To the Army's advantage, there seems to be consensus that the Army needs to adapt to the realities of the post-Cold War world. Although some of the influential actors might disagree with specific aspects of Army Transformation, they agree change is necessary. At a minimum, this agreement provides a common basis for engaging influential actors. At the same time, there can be strong disagreement over what, when, and how to change. It should not be surprising that such an all-encompassing transformation generates significantly different opinions and interests for legitimate reasons. To sustain momentum as the Army promotes and facilitates change, the rest of the real world must be involved. That involvement should not happen by chance or in reaction to events, but as a planned part of the process.

THE REAL WORLD: WHO'S PAYING ATTENTION?

There is no doubt that engaging certain parties can earn their support and ignoring others can introduce risk. There is also no doubt that there will be interested parties who remain largely irrelevant through most or all of the transformation process. It is important to recognize, however, that productive relationships are cultivated over time to the benefit of both sides. One retired general officer referred to building relationships as "planting a thousand seeds to get the blooms in the right places." The key is to understand which people and events can be to the Army's advantage or disadvantage over the course of the transformation. Who can provide a momentum boost and who can build a roadblock? Table 5 lists the basic categories of interested parties that the Army should consider as potentially important players in transformational momentum.

Table 5. Who Can Affect Momentum?

<u>Internal to the Army</u>	<u>External to the Army</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Department of the Army Leadership & Staff - Major Commands (MACOMs) - Branch Proponents - Commanders - Reserve Components - Officer Corps - NCO Corps - Soldiers - Civilian Work Force - Family Members - Support Contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - White House / Administration Officials - Members of Congress & Staffers - Department of Defense Leadership & Staff - Joint Staff & Joint Commands - Other Military Services - Governors & State Adjutants General - Retired General Officers - Professional Military Associations - Veterans Groups - Defense Industry - Media (general and technical) - American Public - Academia & Think Tanks - NATO & Other Militaries

Source: The authors.

The obvious parallel for thinking about these aspects of Army Transformation might be strategic level campaign planning. A tactical level analogy is instructive, however, because the

basic idea behind this discussion of interested parties should be very familiar within the entire Army. An operation order (OPORD) is the result of detailed analysis and planning that allows a tactical commander to understand force capabilities, force vulnerabilities, and design courses of action to achieve mission success. The first paragraph of any OPORD analyzes the tactical situation with particular attention to “enemy forces” and “friendly forces.” The factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time (METT-T) are considered as part of a dynamic process. The point is to analyze and understand the situation to determine how different factors can impact the mission – then to choose a course of action that maximizes the likelihood of success.⁹⁸

As the Army gains and sustains transformational momentum, the same kind of deliberate analysis needs to be applied to the set of influential actors. (Table 6 provides a framework.) They all need to be considered, and a conscious decision made as to the degree of engagement

Table 6. Analysis of Interested Parties / Influential Actors

Considerations with Regards to Transformational Momentum:

- Who are the potentially interested parties?
- What are their interests?
- How can they influence the momentum of transformation?
- If supportive, why? Could that change? How maintain their support?
- Where are the centers of opposition?
- If not supportive, why? Could that change? How gain their support?
- Is their support essential, neutral, or irrelevant to maintaining momentum?
- Do we have an established relationship? Good or bad?
- Is someone already responsible for this relationship? Formal or informal?
- What relationship do they have with other interested parties?
- What is our common ground? What are the disagreements?
- When would their interest or influence change? Why?
- What is the most effective way to communicate with them?
- How do we focus our message? How do we define ourselves and tell our story?
- Is their support worth the cost in resources (people, time, money)?

Source: The authors.

for each and who should engage them. Along these lines, some corporations develop a detailed strategic communications plan to ensure they do not overlook key contacts that can positively or

negatively influence their transformation. The plan can help identify gaps in coverage or good relationships that can assist with others. It should be updated on a regular basis to reflect the current "situational analysis of enemy and friendly forces." The Army's current attention to strategic communications begins to address this need. However, recalling Kotter's warning mentioned in the second chapter about "under-communicating by a factor of ten," the message must be powerful and spread through all existing communication channels until it is understood both within and outside the Army.⁹⁹

As former Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera said, "One of the most important things we can learn from industry is marketing. We have to think of ourselves as a marketing organization."¹⁰⁰ Industry is much more public relations and media savvy, since those are skills integral to their success. Even though the Army has a firm understanding of analyzing the situation, the next step is to "market" the transformation and build momentum through the support of influential actors. Some in the Army might think of marketing in a negative fashion, but marketing is part of the real world and is used to influence people. In business many know variations on the motto that "it's not who has the best idea, it's who can sell his idea the best." As a national institution the Army has a variety of mechanisms to effectively tell the story to a wide audience of interested parties.

THE REAL WORLD: WHO CAN INFLUENCE MOMENTUM?

It is important to start with a complete list of interested parties and narrow it to those who need to be engaged. The mere fact that someone is interested and has influence does not necessarily mean the Army needs to gain their cooperation. That is a calculated decision balancing the benefits, costs, time available, and alternatives. The Army will lose momentum if it gets overly distracted by naysayers, but also if it gets complacent listening to strong supporters.

Everyone can have an opinion, but only some of them count. A select few hold trump cards that demand attention on a regular basis.

Reviewing and updating the strategic communications plan is an ongoing effort as the transformation progresses. Some of the actors will be critical to momentum throughout the process, while others will vary with the situation. Even as specific influential actors enter or exit the scene, the Army must consistently articulate a coherent strategy. Consistency and coherence are essential to a twenty to thirty-year transformation. At the same time, the plan must have built-in flexibility and allow for reasoned, mid-course adjustments. Technology, funding, end strength, and similar factors are impossible to know for the long term. By necessity, the Army will adapt to the current reality as these factors become known. Explaining the adaptive nature of the strategy can help ease the tensions as influential actors change or as they adjust to other demands and circumstances.

Delay caused by unanticipated resistance or simple lack of understanding can put transformational momentum at risk. Some of the influential actors critical to momentum throughout the transformation are in positions where the person in charge can change. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army are presidential appointees with great influence. The Members of Congress and their staffs on the four defense authorization and appropriations committees determine resources. Elections and committee assignments can change the membership of those committees. The defense industry will compete for massive equipment contracts. What is seen as a new opportunity for one company could jeopardize a major program of another. In each of these instances there will be issues that have nothing to do with the quality of the vision for Army Transformation. Understanding the influential actors and their interrelationship is important.

A major change in influential actors is occurring as this study is concluded. President George W. Bush appointed a new Secretary of Defense (Donald H. Rumsfeld) and soon will appoint a new Secretary of the Army. Their support of Army Transformation as currently envisioned would greatly contribute to sustaining momentum within the new presidential administration. Any major changes to the strategic plan (such as skipping the interim brigade step and going direct to the objective force – see Fig. 4) could immediately slow momentum, if they in effect send a message that the transformation is wrong and must be reformulated. Changes of such a magnitude cannot be absorbed in the flexibility of mid-course corrections without affecting transformational momentum.

At this writing, wide-ranging reviews of defense policy and structure are underway that will address all the services. Early indications are that President Bush supports at least the concept and spirit of Army Transformation. During a week of visits to military bases the month after his inauguration, *CQ Weekly* described some of the President's comments:

Bush's description of future land forces could have been lifted verbatim from Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki's description of the new "medium-weight" combat forces he is trying to field. "Our heavy forces will be lighter, our light forces will be more lethal," Bush said. "All will be easier to deploy and sustain."¹⁰¹

Although it is difficult to predict what imprint the Bush administration will put on Army Transformation, it will obviously have a significant impact in the coming years. Even if not directly involved, the impact from its national security strategy, defense policies, and budget submissions will resonate throughout Army transformation.

THE REAL WORLD: MONEY MATTERS

Key to transformational momentum is securing the resources that will allow it to take place. Great leadership, a clear vision of the future, and focused teamwork are useless without the

necessary funding. As one Army general officer stated, "If we're not able to get Congress to put its money where our mouth is, then it's all hollow talk."¹⁰² Unlike private industry's budgeting, Congress provides the necessary resources and the Army must earn their support. General Shinseki was aggressive in seeking out Members of Congress, personally articulating his vision, and asking for support from Capitol Hill.

The budget for fiscal year 2001 was a success story in this regard for the Army. In a strong endorsement and greatly contributing to momentum, Congress authorized and appropriated \$1.6 billion for Army Transformation (an increase of \$866 million over the Clinton administration's budget submission).¹⁰³ Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, said the following on the Senate floor while introducing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2001¹⁰⁴:

The most significant initiative contained in the conference report is the nearly \$1 billion increase for the Army transformation effort. Last October, General Eric Shinseki, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, established a new vision for the Army – a more mobile, lethal and flexible force for the 21st century. In this bill, funding is provided to procure the first two brigade sets of equipment for the new "transformation" force. We are determined that this new force be equipped as rapidly as possible, and intend to maintain this pace of funding in fiscal years 2002 and 2003.¹⁰⁵

Three months later Senator John Warner (R-VA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the following while introducing the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001:

The conference report provides appropriate support for the Army transformation plan, the plan that was put forward by Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki. The conferees concluded that the Army needs to transform itself into a lighter, more lethal, survivable, and tactically mobile force. We approved all the funds requested by the Army for this purpose, and we actually added some research money to the amount requested to help the Army in the long-term transformation process. At the same time, we directed the Army to prepare a detailed roadmap for the

transformation initiative and to conduct appropriate testing and experimentation to ensure that the transformation effort is successful.¹⁰⁶

The requirement for the detailed roadmap due to Congress reflected some questions about the Army's transformation plan and process. In fact, the Senate Armed Services Committee considered requirements for a full-spectrum demonstration and joint experimentation that were not included in the final language of the authorization act.¹⁰⁷ In an unusual sequence, the appropriations bill had preceded the authorization bill and it is impossible to discern if the outcome might have been different with the more traditional cycle. Overall, though, the need for the Army to transform earned significant support and was funded at a level that contributed to transformational momentum.

Congress also created the National Defense Airlift Fund in the 2001 Defense Authorization Act, setting aside \$2.3 billion specifically for airlift programs. The Army has historically deployed 90 percent of its tonnage using sealift. To meet the new timelines in the Army vision, increased airlift will be needed to deploy troops and equipment.¹⁰⁸ As a result, the airlift fund impacts Army Transformation and shows how interdependent some of the major influential actors can be on certain issues:

- Money the US Air Force spends on C-17 Globemaster cargo airplanes to increase airlift capacity can be seen to compete with their programs for new fighters that are centerpieces of their modernization.
- Even with more C-17 aircraft, the Army must compete against the Marine Corps and Air Force for airlift capacity as all the services now have greater demand. None want to take a ticket and stand in line to get to the latest national security crisis.
- In the real world of constrained resources, defense contractors have a vested interest in which aircraft are selected, the quantity ordered, and the production schedule. Defense industry representatives can be great allies or formidable foes. They can easily see themselves as key stakeholders in the decisions due to the direct impact on their bottom line.
- All of these contractors and their subcontractors have varying degrees of access to and influence with their Senators and Representatives on Capitol Hill. The Senators and Representatives have varying degrees of influence with the defense authorization and appropriations committees.

This is just one example of the interdependence among influential actors and their potential interest in Army Transformation. Some might say, "But these are Air Force issues." Exactly. Air Force issues that can affect the momentum of Army Transformation. The example illustrates the point that the full range of interested parties needs to periodically be considered and analyzed to make the appropriate decision on the method and degree of engagement. Although not limited to these types of issues, particular attention is needed where parties are vying for constrained resources. Such instances create lines of tension, but can simultaneously hold opportunities to negotiate a common agreement. Resources do not equate to momentum, but you cannot keep momentum without the resources.

THE REAL WORLD: PLAN AND ENGAGE

It is somewhat astounding to listen to a significant number of senior leaders recognize the need for the Army to do better in marketing their programs and building coalitions of support, yet fall back on the reasoning, "It's just not part of the culture." Often it sounds like recognition of a problem and resignation that it will never change. Although the Army had an unusually successful year on Capitol Hill, several staff members mentioned a potentially detrimental approach that persists in the Army. One summarized it as, "We're honest and forthright. Here are our requirements. We'll take whatever you give us and accomplish the mission."¹⁰⁹ Even worse, some Army officers consider the political process beneath their dignity or status, revealing a lack of understanding of the professional environment and culture on Capitol Hill. This is a different kind of battle: one that requires new skills and approaches to accomplish the mission.

These missions can be addressed within a very familiar framework and the battle engaged. Recall the "enemy forces" and "friendly forces" of the OPORD. Army Field Manual

7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, provides step-by-step guidance to the small unit level. It is a methodology engrained in the Army culture. When leaders receive orders for a new tactical operation, they conduct an estimate of the situation. As prescribed in Field Manual 7-10,

The estimate of the situation is the Army's decision-making process. It helps the leader determine his mission, understand his situation, and select the best course of action ... The estimate is a continuous process; the CO constantly receives information about the situation. ... The estimate has five steps.

Step 1: Conduct a detailed mission analysis.

Step 2: Analyze the situation and develop courses of action.

Step 3: Analyze courses of action (wargame).

Step 4: Compare courses of action.

Step 5: Make a decision.¹¹⁰

What a simple way to initially think about the complexities and interdependence of influential actors that can affect the momentum for Army Transformation. The sand table is much bigger and the terrain is unfamiliar, but relationships must be built with new allies and obstacles must be overcome. Still, the basic analysis process to identify courses of action and accomplish the mission applies. In this particular instance the Army's mission on the transformation battlefield is to identify and engage influential actors to support the momentum of Army Transformation. The process is familiar within the Army down to the lowest levels. This research recommends the same process be applied at the highest levels to address the "real world" considerations and their potential impact on momentum.

It is easy to see that the Army will transform itself in a complex environment that includes influential actors that can affect transformational momentum. Marketing the leader's vision within and outside the Army will require a well-planned and coordinated effort. The guiding coalition helps sell the vision. Until it is understood and embraced within the Army and by the key stakeholders, momentum could be at stake. The frameworks in this study provide

indicators that should be useful to successive senior leadership as they pursue the vision of Army Transformation.

Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations

In this caldron of variables impacting organizational transformation, it is the leader (or two) at the top who shoulders the unwieldy task of piecing together the transformation puzzle. Additionally, this leader must be the catalyst, change agent, vision creator, and force behind transformational momentum. Corporate industry experiences with transformation offers the Army a ready resource to help guide the Army. Balancing, synchronizing, and managing the transformation processes, both internal and external, are part of a talent that future Army leaders must possess. Organizational transformation is about effective leadership and communications, which are more art than science; therefore, the Army must build a leadership team that deeply supports and sells vision.

Connecting intellectually with key members, both internal and external, who can influence the transformation process is one form of art that requires talented leaders who are skilled in the nuances of necessary interactions among key military, defense, and congressional actors. The consistent interactions and engagements by informed key senior Army leaders will provide the synergistic effect that is necessary to sustain momentum. Establishing and maintaining credibility gives the plan the momentum to catapult from one phase to another with a consistent theme and message.

CONCLUSIONS

As reflected in this study, there are numerous references books that discuss the challenges of organizational transformation. Moreover, there are several large corporations who have successfully transformed, such as, General Electric, Ford, Starbucks, Wal-Mart, and Chrysler are a few examples. This research offers conclusions in three general areas that the Army can use to sustain momentum of its transformation:

1) Vision

- Simple, Powerful, and Shared
- Permeates the Organization and Provides Focus
- Linked to Short-term Wins
- Survives Successive CSA/SA Changes

2) Communications

- Educate and Reeducate Throughout the Organization
- Develop a Thorough Corporate Communications Plan
- Market the Transformation
- Recognize Resisters and Naysayers

3) Continuity

- Build and Maintain a Strong Guiding Coalition
- Anticipate the Need for Mid-course Adjustments, be Flexible
- Select Senior Leaders who Embrace the Vision

RECOMMENDATIONS

In concert with the conclusions in these three general areas, this study also provides several recommendations to help the Army sustain transformational momentum.

1. Use and introduce Kotter's "Eight-Steps to Transforming Organizations" or a similar framework to enhance understanding and provide a means to synchronize actions throughout the organization. Remember, however, that models are not a panacea for transformation success and momentum.
2. Focus on developing and maintaining momentum throughout strategic planning. Actions or initiatives that don't appear to contribute to momentum may need to be evaluated as potential distractions. We are not suggesting that organizations pursue a course of action simply because it may be the best for momentum. Momentum should be one of the criteria used as part of the decision-making process.

3. Periodically educate and reeducate leaders at multiple levels to maintain momentum.

Methods could include off-sites, round-table discussions, traveling teams, school-house instruction, and guidebooks.

4. Identify persons that oppose the plan and systematically assess why they are at odds with the Army. Because resources and means to engage resisters are finite, the Army needs to make conscious decisions about who to engage and when to engage them. Similarly, the Army must also assess the potential consequences of whom it chooses to overlook.

5. Build relationships with Commanders in Chief, the other uniformed services, the Administration, Members of Congress and their staff, defense industry representatives, national security think tanks, and academia. Ensure they understand what the Army is doing, why the Army is doing it, and the process of how the Army will accomplish it.

End Notes

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- ¹ Shinseki, Eric K. Remarks. Army Chief of Staff Arrival Ceremony. Fort Myer, VA: 22 June 1999.
- ² Suzy Wetlaufer, "Driving Change: An Interview with Ford Motor Company's Jacques Nasser," Harvard Business Review: Interviews with CEOs, ed. Suzy Wetlaufer (Boston: Harvard Business School P, 2000) 4.
- ³ Need citation for here and to add to Works Consulted (published pamphlet The Army Vision)
- ⁴ National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), "Newton's First Law," online posting, 15 August 1999, NASA Glenn Research Center, 24 January 2001, <<http://www.lerc.nasa.gov/WWW/K-12/airplane/newton1.html>>.
- ⁵ Alice Howard and Joan Magretta, "An Interview with the Nature Conservancy's John Sawhill," Harvard Business Review: Interviews with CEOs, ed. Suzy Wetlaufer (Boston: Harvard Business School P, 2000) 176.
- ⁶ For example, Jon Katzenbach's book (see next endnote) is the only work known to the authors to treat "momentum" as a separate topic. He devotes an entire chapter to momentum.
- ⁷ Jon R. Katzenbach, Real Change Leaders (New York: Random House, 1996) 245-74, 391. The authors do not claim prowess in physics, but the idea that it takes a lot of effort to move something as big as the Army is a useful analogy.
- ⁸ John P. Kotter, "Why Transformation Efforts Fail," Harvard Business Review, March-April 1995: 61.
- ⁹ Katzenbach 391.
- ¹⁰ The twenty to thirty-year timeline is from: U.S. Army, online posting, 17 October 2000, "Transformation Timeline: Brigade Conversion to Objective Force," 11 March 2001, <http://www.army.mil/usa/AUSA Web/Short Transform-ation_files/frame.htm>.
- ¹¹ Information from several non-attribution interviews.
- ¹² Kotter, "Why Transformation Efforts Fail" 61.
- ¹³ Katzenbach 267.
- ¹⁴ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 76.
- ¹⁵ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 78.
- ¹⁶ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 78.
- ¹⁷ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 78.
- ¹⁸ Eric K. Shinseki, online posting, 17 October 2000, 2000-01 Association of the US Army Greenbook, 24 Jan 2001, <http://www.army.mil/usa/AUSA Web/Introduction Web_files/frame.htm>.
- ¹⁹ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 78.
- ²⁰ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 79.

²¹ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 80.

²² Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 80.

²³ Howard and Magretta 176.

²⁴ Wetlaufer 25.

²⁵ Wetlaufer 25.

²⁶ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 81.

²⁷ Noel Tichy, "The Teachable Point of View: A Primer," Harvard Business Review: Interviews with CEOs, ed. Suzy Wetlaufer (Boston: Harvard Business School P, 2000) 28.

²⁸ Tichy 29.

²⁹ Spencer Johnson, Who Moved my Cheese? (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1998).

³⁰ Peter Senge, Art Kleiner, Charlotte Roberts, Richard Ross, George Roth, and Bryan Smith, The Dance of Change: The Challenges of Sustaining Momentum in Learning Organizations (New York: Doubleday, 1999) 242.

³¹ John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996) 81.

³² Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 82.

³³ "Army Transformation Survey," unpublished briefing (Alexandria, VA: 7 December 2000). The study was conducted between 17 November and 1 December 2000. The breakdown of "uncomfortable" and "very uncomfortable" was 40% and 10%, respectively. Also, 62% of the respondents said they wanted more information.

³⁴ Katzenbach 268.

³⁵ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 82.

³⁶ Kotter, Leading Change 85.

³⁷ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 83.

³⁸ US Army, "The Army Vision," 19 October 1999, on line posting, 7 April 2001, <<http://www.army.mil/armyvision/armyvis.htm>>

³⁹ Senge et al. 321.

⁴⁰ For example, basic and advanced noncommissioned officer courses (BNCOC and ANCOC), basic and advanced officer courses (OBC and OAC), combined arms staff service school (CAS3), company-grade pre-command courses (PCC), first sergeants' courses, Command and General Staff College (CGSC), etc.

⁴¹ Wetzlaufer 25.

⁴² Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 86.

⁴³ Katzenbach 112-3.

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- ⁴⁴ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 87.
- ⁴⁵ Katzenbach 262.
- ⁴⁶ Kotter, What Leaders Really Do 87.
- ⁴⁷ Kotter, Leading Change 125.
- ⁴⁸ Kotter, Leading Change 121-2.
- ⁴⁹ Eric K. Shinseki, "CSA Sends—The Army Black Beret," 3 November 2000, official message to all Army commands, 9 March 2001, <<http://www.army.mil/beret>>
- ⁵⁰ Gary Sheftick and Michele Hammonds, "Army Selects GM to make Interim Armored Vehicles," (Washington DC: US Army News Service, 20 November 2000).
- ⁵¹ United Defense, "Protest of United Defense LP Contract No. DAAE07-00-D-M051," 4 December 2001, public version, 7 April 2001, <http://www.uniteddefense.com/issues/publicver_iav_protest.pdf>.
- ⁵² Harold Kennedy, "Army Encounters More Delays in Deploying Combat Vehicle," National Defense, January 2001 internet edition, 7 April 2001, <http://nationaldefense.ndia.org/article.cfm?ID=398>.
- ⁵³ Joe Burtas, "DoD backs Army Beret Decision," (Washington: Army News Service, 19 March 2001), <<http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Mar2001/a20010319dodandbb.html>>
- ⁵⁴ Kotter, Leading Change 132. Katzenbach instructs, "leaders do not measure their success by reaching some given end state. They believe that our best is ahead of us." Katzenbach 262.
- ⁵⁵ Kotter, Leading Change 133.
- ⁵⁶ Kotter, Leading Change 133.
- ⁵⁷ Michael L. Tushman and Charles A. O'Reilly, III, Winning through Innovation: A Practical Guide to Leading Organizational Change and Renewal (Boston: Harvard Business School P, 1997) 29.
- ⁵⁸ Senge et al. 26.
- ⁵⁹ Kotter, Leading Change 155-6; Senge et al. 74-82 and 334-344; and, Tushman and O'Reilly 35.
- ⁶⁰ Edgar Schein, "How to Set the Stage for a Change in Organizational Culture," in Senge et al. 334-5. Here Schein prescribes a seven-step process an organization can use to identify how its culture needs to be changed and how to initiate the process of changing it. This process could be easily adapted for use by the US Army.
- ⁶¹ Flamholtz, Eric G., and Yvonne Randle. Changing the Game: Organizational Transformations of the First, Second, and Third Kinds. (New York: Oxford University Press 1998) 12-13
- ⁶² Wheeler, Tom. Leadership Lessons from The Civil War. New York: Doubleday (1999). 74.
- ⁶³ Levy, Amir, and Uri Merry. Organizational Transformation: Approaches, Strategies, Theories. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986) 16-7.
- ⁶⁴ Collins, James C., and Jerry I. Porras. Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies. (New York: Harper Business Press 1997) 233.

⁶⁵ Covey, Stephen, A. Roger Merrill, Rebecca R. Merrill. First Things First. (New York: Simon and Schuster 1995) 103-4.

⁶⁶ Sullivan, Gordon R., and Michael V. Harper. Hope is not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army. (New York: Broadway Books 1997) 83-4.

⁶⁷ Covey, Stephen. The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People. (New York: Simon and Schuster 1989) The seven habits consist of 1) Be proactive 2) Begin with an end in mind 3) Put first things first 4) Think win/win 5) Seek first to understand, then be understood 6) Synergize 7) Sharpen the saw.

⁶⁸ Wheeler, Leadership Lessons from The Civil War 53.

⁶⁹ Covey, Stephen. Principle-Centered Leadership. (New York: Simon and Schuster 1992) 287.

⁷⁰ how cite "non-attribution" comment??

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⁷² Department of the Army. Field Manual 22-100: Army Leadership. (Washington DC: 31 August 1999) 3-17.

⁷³ Department of the Army. Field Manual 22-100: Army Leadership. 3-17.

⁷⁴ Goleman, Daniel. "Leadership That Gets Results," Harvard Business Review. March-April 2000: 78-90

⁷⁵ Goleman, "Leadership That Gets Results," 82-3.

⁷⁶ Levy and Merry, Organizational Transformation: Approaches, Strategies, Theories. 169.

⁷⁷ Flamholz and Randle, Changing the Game: Organizational Transformations of the First, Second, and Third Kinds. 285.

⁷⁸ Flamholz and Randle, Changing the Game: Organizational Transformations of the First, Second, and Third Kinds. 281.

⁷⁹ Army Research Institute, Chief of Staff, Army Transformation Survey, on-line survey conducted 17 Nov - 1 Dec 00

⁸⁰ Sullivan and Harper, Hope is not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army. 173.

⁸¹ Covey, The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People. 98.

⁸² Varley, Pamela, "Vision and Strategy: Paul H. O'Neill at OMB and ALCOA," Kennedy School of Government Case Study, 13.

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⁸⁴ Katzenbach, Real Change Leaders. 247.

⁸⁵ Katzenbach, Real Change Leaders 246.

⁸⁶ Levy and Merry, Organizational Transformation: Approaches, Strategies, Theories. 57.

⁸⁷ Farkas, Charles and Suzy Wetlaufer, Harvard Business Review on Leadership. (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1998) 120-121.

⁸⁸ Strebel, Paul, "Why Do Employees Resist Change?" Harvard Business Review. May-June 1996: 86-92.

⁸⁹ Reich, Robert, "Your Job Is Changing," Fast Company. October 2000 internet edition, 24 October 2000, <http://fastcompany.com/online/39/jobischange.html>.

⁹⁰ Wheeler, "Leadership Lessons from the Civil War," p. 157

⁹¹ Reich, Robert, "Your Job Is Changing," Fast Company. October 2000 internet edition, 24 October 2000, <http://fastcompany.com/online/39/jobischange.html>.

⁹² intend as a citation?

⁹³ Collins and Porras, Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies. 145.

⁹⁴ Peters, Thomas J. and Robert H. Waterman, Jr. In Search of Excellence. (New York: Harper and Row, 1982) 13.

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⁹⁶ Varley, "Vision and Strategy: Paul H. O'Neill at OMB and ALCOA," 23

⁹⁷ Collins and Porras, Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies. 148.

⁹⁸ United States. Department of the Army. Field Manual 7-10: The Infantry Rifle Company. Washington DC: 14 December 1990 <<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-10>>.

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¹⁰⁰ Louis Caldera. Secretary of the Army. Personal interview. 1 November 2000.

¹⁰¹ Pat Towell. "Bush's Hints About Spending Level Ease Defense Hawks' Concerns." CQ Weekly 59 (2001): 393.

¹⁰² Quoted from a non-attribution personal interview.

¹⁰³ "Some Good News in the Budget." Defense Report from AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare August 2000.

¹⁰⁴ Congressman Jerry Lewis (R-CA), Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, also spoke specifically about the transformation effort while introducing the appropriations bill on the House floor. He stated, "Mr. Chairman, let me say that this bill in many ways is a forward-leaning bill. Among other things, perhaps most important, we have taken seriously the efforts on the part of the new chief of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, to develop a vision and a transformation strategy that will take our Army into a posture that will cause it to be the Army we need well into 2020, 2025, 2050. Indeed, it is the Army, the men and women of our military, who make a critical difference in terms of America's strength. So I am proud to say that the bill is designed to accelerate the efforts on the part of General Shinseki in building that vision for the future." United States. Congressional Record, 7 June 2000: H3973.

¹⁰⁵ United States. Congressional Record, 27 July 2000: S7738.

¹⁰⁶ United States. Congressional Record, 12 October 2000: S10344.

¹⁰⁷ Information from several non-attribution interviews.

¹⁰⁸ Seena Simon. "Changes Will Mean More Air Missions." Air Force Times 22 January 2001: 17.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted from a non-attribution personal interview.

¹¹⁰ United States. Department of the Army. Field Manual 7-10: The Infantry Rifle Company. Washington DC: 14 December 1990 <<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-10>>.

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